MODULE 3

1. Burbe vs. Magulta

Facts:
In connection with petitioner’s business, he was introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in September,
1998, in his office at the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao
City, who agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach
of contract.
Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared for petitioner the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which services
he have accordingly paid; inasmuch, however due to failure to secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that he file the necessary complaint, which the filing fee whereof will require the amount of Twenty
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
Realizing the need to legally recover from the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited the amount of
P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that he
needed the case filed immediately;
A week later he was informed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed in court, and
that he should receive notice of its progress. Sensing he was being given the run-around by Atty. Magulta, he
decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court to personally verify the progress of his case, and there told that
there was no record at all of a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf.
For the inconvenience, treatment and deception he was made to suffer, he filed a complaint against Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive conduct.
Respondent averred that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter
never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only drafted the said documents as a personal favor
for the kumpadre of one of his partners.
The IBP recommended that for the failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees
deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer-client relationship resulted from the agreement?
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked respondent for
legal advice regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the
client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer be
paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case
for which his service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then
the professional employment is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal relationship between the lawyer
and the complainant or the nonpayment of the former's fees. Hence, despite the fact that complainant was
kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a
personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and
had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.

2. Hadjula v. Madianda, AC 6711, July 3, 2007

Facts:
complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical,
Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some
legal advice. Complainant further alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a
baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to
a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused handling her case only after
she had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of
2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainant’s account, precipitated the
filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board, demanded a cellular phone in exchange
for the complainant’s promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER COM-
PLAINT3 with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,4
falsification of public documents and immorality, the last two charges being based on the disclosures complainant
earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a
disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter’s act of disclosing personal
secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent’s legal advice.
Issue:
WON an attorney-client relationship was established the moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice.
Ruling:
Yes. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what
she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and assistance.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed
by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent
in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal consultations. The fact
that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the client’s case is hardly of consequence. Of little
moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it make any
difference that no contract whatsoever was executed by the parties to memorialize the relationship.
A lawyer breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client where the documents shown and the
information revealed in confidence to her in the course of the legal consultation were subsequently used as bases in
the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the client.

3. Ledesma v Climaco
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. He is also counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did
respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner,
which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, denied the said motion.
According to the respondent judge, "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement
of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case without the
express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses
who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is denied.
When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2,
1964 that the trial would be resumed. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel for
the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on
May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9,
1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.
RULING:NO, Ledesma may not withdraw as counsel de oficio for the sole reason of his appointment as Election
Registrar. The provision in the Constitution states that, “Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against them. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
This manifests the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the defense of an accused. What is incumbent
upon him as counsel de oficio must be fully fulfilled. The ends of justice would be served by allowing and requiring
Ledesma to continue as counsel the officio, since the prosecution has already rested its case—the case being
postponed at least eight (8) times. It was also noted that there was no incompatibility between his duty to the
accused and to the court and the performance of his task as Election Registrar.
Hence, because of these considerations, it is suffice for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio.

4. People vs. Sta. Teresa

While Lorna Teresa was sleeping, the appellant brought his daughter in a hut belonging to his cousin and there, did
raped her by inserting his private into hers which caused the latter’s to bleed.
During the arraignment in 1997, , appellant with the assistance of his counsel de oficio pleaded "not guilty." by ,
withdrawing his plea of "not guilty" and changed it to a plea of "guilty."
After such manifestation, the prosecution decided to dispense with the presentation of other testimonial evidence
and formally offered their exhibits to the trial court
The trial court then admitted all the documentary exhibits offered by the prosecution without any comment
and/or objection from the defense counsel. It granted the motion of appellant to change his plea to one of guilt.
Issue: W/N the plea of guilty made by the accused-appellant was qualified and conditional.
Ruling: No. The court ruled that the RTC gravely erred in not entering a plea of not guilty for the accused-appellant
and in not affording the latter the opportunity to adduce controverting evidence in blatant violation of his right to
due process.
The appellant initially entered a plea of "not guilty”, however, after the victim and the medico-legal officer testified
against him, his counsel de oficio manifested that his client wanted to change his plea of "not guilty" to one of
"guilty."
The trial judge fell short of the exacting standards set forth in Section 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. When the trial judge then conducted an inquiry into the voluntariness of the change of plea and
appellant's full comprehension of its consequences.
“SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. -- When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf.”
The trial court must, if the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense,
1.Conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the
consequences thereof;
2.Require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
3.Ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
A searching inquiry occurs when the plea of guilt is based on a free and informed judgment, focusing on the
voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences
The SC held that “the abbreviated and aborted presentation of the prosecution evidence and appellant's
improvident plea of guilty, with the scanty and lackluster performance of his counsel de oficio, are just too
exiguous to accept as being the standard constitutional due process at work enough to snuff out the life of a
human being”

5. People of the Philippines vs. Gaudencio Ingco

Facts: Respondent Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who was appointed counsel de oficio for the
accused in this case, Gaudencio Ingco, sentenced to death on September 28, 1970 for the crime of rape with
homicide, was required in a resolution of this Court on September 9, 1971 to show cause within ten days why
disciplinary action should not be taken against him for having filed fifteen days late a motion for the extension of
time for submitting the brief for appellant Ingco. The explanation came in a manifestation of September 16, 1971.
It was therein stated that respondent "was then busy with the preparation of the brief of one Benjamin Apelo
pending in the Court of Appeals; that while he had made studies in preparation for the brief in this case, during
such period he had to appear before courts in Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City, Bulacan and Pampanga; and that
likewise he did file, on July 27, 1971, motions for extension in the aforesaid case of Benjamin Apelo with the Court
of Appeals, which motions were duly granted. He would impress on this Court then that he was misled into
assuming that he had also likewise taken the necessary steps to file a motion for extension of time for the
submission of his brief in this case by the receipt of the resolution from the Court of Appeals granting him such
extension.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable for not properly performing his duty as counsel de oficio
Ruling: Yes. Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his own confession, he was woefully negligent.
Considering that the accused is fighting for his life, the least that could be expected of a counsel de oficio is
awareness of the period within which he was required to file appellant's brief. The mere fact that according to him
his practice was extensive, requiring his appearance in courts in Manila and environs as well as the provinces of
Bulacan and Pampanga, should not have lessened that degree of care necessary for the fulfillment of his
responsibility. What is worse is that by sheer inattention, he would confuse the proceedings in a matter pending
before the Court of Appeals with this present case. Such grave neglect of duty is deserving of severe
condemnation. It is clearly unworthy of membership in the Bar which requires dedication and zeal in the
defense of his client's rights, a duty even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio. On such an occasion, the
honor and respect to which the legal profession is entitled demand the strictest accountability of one called
upon to defend an impoverished litigant. He who falls in his obligation then has manifested a diminished
capacity to be enrolled in its ranks.

6. Angalan vs Delante
Facts: In april 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their property to the Eustaquio spouses in
consideration of a loan in the amount of P15,000. The Eustaqios prepared a document and sked the complainants
to sign it; but because complainants were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It turned out that the
document was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT No. 9926 was issued in the
name of Navarro Eustaquio.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in November 1970 as shown in the receipt
by respondent of P12,000 representing full payment of his professional fees from the complainants. Thereafter, an
amicable settlement was entered into between complainants and the Eustaquios which stipulated that the
complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But since the complainants did not have the money, Atty.
Delante advanced the money to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its produce. When the
complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property, Atty. Delante refused. Complainants learned that
Delante transferred the title of the property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-57932. On April 30, 204,
complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a complaint for (1) nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and (2)
nullification of TCT No. T-57932; and on December 28, 2005 charged respondent with gross violation of the Code
Professional Responsibilty. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the complaint for
disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.
Issues:
(1.) Whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance terminates
the disbarment proceeding;
(2.) Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
bought the property of his clients without their consent and against their will.
Ruling:
1. No. A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance is immaterial. Section 5,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, “No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute
the same.”
2. Yes. Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states that
lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent should
have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon demand. Instead of holding in
trust the property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to
return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as malicious and untruthful. Canon
17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should have been
mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and
that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope
that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent
took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of
Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct. A person
who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a
lawyer. The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys.

7. Quilban v Robinol (1989)

Facts:
Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala is a group of squatters residing at the “reserved site” of the
Quezon City General Hospital. This reserved site is owned by Colegio De San Jose. They settled in the area
sometime in 1965 or 1966. In 1970, Congressman Luis R. Taruc proposed to Fr. Federico Escaler (Administrator of
the Colegio) to donate or sell the land cheap to the squatters. The Samahan’s President, Bernabe Martin was to
negotiate with Fr. Escaler. However, Martin connived with a realtor, Maximo Rivera, and succeeded in purchasing
the land in Rivera’s name with the price intended for the squatters. Fr. Escaler was made to believe that Rivera
represented the squatters. In 1971, Rivera obtained a TCT. In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan
filed a Civil Case for conveyance. CFI dismissed it.
Atty. Santiago R. Robinol was hired to prosecute the appeal. His attorney’s fees cost P2,000 and was
promised to be given a part of the land equal to the portion that would be given to each of squatters. In 1978, the
CA granted the appeal. Now, the squatters needed to raise the amount to reimburse Rivera. The sums that were
diligently collected by the officers from the Samahan were eventually turned over to Atty. Robinol. It totalled
P75,000. However, Rivera was not paid. Atty. Robinol lied to his clients, saying there was an intervention in the civil
case that’s why no Writ of Execution could be issued yet.
In 1980, twenty-one out of the thirty-two plaintiffs arrived at a “consensus” and approached Atty.
Anacleto R. Montemayor, to be their counsel. Two demand letters were sent to Atty. Robinol for the return of the
P75,000. The Samahan then filed this Administrative Complaint against Atty. Robinol. The case was referred to the
Solicitor General who recommended Atty. Robinol’s suspension for three months.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Robinol deserves to be suspended for three months?
Ruling:
No, because he deserves to be disbarred.
Atty. Robinol is guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in
the practice of the profession. After the CA decided in favour of his clients, and had received the latter's funds, he
suddenly changed his mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees (from a portion of land equivalent to
that of each of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00) which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty.
Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written
agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients
were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas
of P 2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having
seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right
to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients
had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests,
which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to
retain his clients' funds. He cannot invoke the principle of quantum meruit, because the principle of applies only if
a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive
what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the
practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it
full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own.

8. Cantiller vs. Potenciano, 180 SCRA 246 (1989)

Facts: A notice to vacate was issued against Cantiller. Cantiller then asked the Atty. Potenciano to handle their
case. The complainant was made to sign by respondent what she described as a “[h]astily prepared, poorly
conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment”.
Cantiller paid Potenciano as demanded by the latter which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who
will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge.
Complainant paid Potenciano allegedly as purchase price of the apartment and to cover the expenses of the
suit.  Cantiller found out that the amounts were not necessary to be paid.
Contrary to Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he withdrew his appearance as counsel
for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was
eventually enforced and executed.
Issue: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.
Held: YES. Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their
clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition since it is a matter of public
interest.
Suspended indefinitely and ordered to return the money.

9. IN RE: Suspension From The Practice Of Law In The Territory Of Guam Of Atty. Leon G. Maquera
Facts:
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996, the District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam. He was suspended from the practice of law in
Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a
consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his
disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyer's
oath.
The case was referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation report
and recommendation. In its decision, the Superior Court of Guam stated that Maquera was the counsel of a certain
Castro. Benavente the creditor Castro, obtained a judgement against Castro, thus Castro;s property was to be sold
at a public auction in satisfaction of his obligation to Benavente. However, Castro retains the right of redemption.
In consideration of Maquera’s legal services, Castro entered into an oral agreement with Maquera and
assigned his right of redemption in favor of the latter. On January 8, 1988, Maquera exercised Castro's right of
redemption by paying Benavente US$525.00 in satisfaction of the judgment debt. Thereafter, Maquera had the
title to the property transferred in his name.And after, sold the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang for Three
Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$320,000.00).
The Guam Bar Ethics Committee filed a Petition in the Superior Court of Guam praying that Maquera be
sanctioned for violations of Rules 1.5 and 1.8(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) in force
in Guam. In its Petition, the Committee claimed that Maquera obtained an unreasonably high fee for his services.
The Committee further alleged that Maquera himself admitted his failure to comply with the requirement in Rule
1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless the transaction and the terms governing the lawyer's
acquisition of such interest are fair and reasonable to the client, and are fully disclosed to, and understood by the
client and reduced in writing.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said
court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed a breach of
ethics in the Philippines."However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual
dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Maquera, who was suspended from the practice of law in Guam, be suspended as member of the
Philippine Bar on the same ground of his suspension in Guam.
Held:
Yes.
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions committed in a foreign
jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992, which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence
of the ground for disbarment or suspension
In the case at bar such transaction made by Maquera falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article
1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Paragraph 5 of Article 1491 prohibits the lawyer's acquisition
by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the lawyer. Under Article
1492, the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. This is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his
office, an attorney may easily take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client 30 and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01
which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The requirement of
good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing
requirement to maintain one's good's standing in the legal profession.
The Court notes that Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf regarding the
charges of unethical behavior in Guam against him, as it is not certain that he did receive the Notice of
Hearing earlier sent by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there is a need to ascertain Maquera's
current and correct address in Guam in order that another notice, this time specifically informing him of the
charges against him and requiring him to explain why he should not be suspended or disbarred on those
grounds (through this Resolution), may be sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for
non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the
Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

10. MATTUS v. VILLASECA

Facts:
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal Case No. 10309-02 –
a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus,
Cavite. The complainant and her husband, German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the
proceedings. The complainant maintained that she and German were convicted due to Atty. Villaseca’s gross and
inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.
In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was often absent
during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the postponement of trial when he
was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures
of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter2 in the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to file a demurrer to
evidence despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to present evidence on
behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and German of the dates of the
presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case
number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in handling the case
resulted in her own and her husband’s conviction.
Issue:
WON Atty. Villaseca committed gross and inexcusable negligence.
Ruling:
YES.
The Supreme Court held that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence constitutes inexcusable
negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. Furthermore, Atty. Villaseca’s
failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in
performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the cause of his clients.
Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts to
rebut the presented prosecution evidence. The Court emphasized that while a lawyer has complete discretion on
what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law to support his client’s cause.

11. CONSUELO DOMINGO DE LOPEZ v. PEDRO A. AQUINO

Facts: The CFI of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent against the petitioner
estate by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo, "to pay from the available funds of the
estate the sum of P20,000.0 with 12% interest per annum to respondent. Both parties appealed from the said
judgment to the Court of Appeals, insofar as it was adverse to them, and the appellate court affirmed the lower
court's judgment with modifications in favor of respondent. According to the present petition, the estate's counsel
of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's
judgment sent to him by registered mail.
Pursuant to said information, petitioner filed with the appellate court an "Appearance with Motions for
Substitution", stating that the former special administratrix had long resigned and that the other co-special
administrator was removed from his trust by the intestate court for having squandered cash funds of the estate.
That that Atty. Unson ceased as counsel for the estate by virtue of his appointment to and assumption of the
public office of Assistant Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration. That Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez
was appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as
judicial administratrix and the latter wished to file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: W/N the CA acted in excess of or without jurisdiction.
RULING: No. The records at bar amply show that Atty. Jose A. Unson was the counsel on record of the petitioner
estate in the appellate court and never filed any withdrawal as such counsel. Notice and copy of the appellate
court's decision were duly served by registered mail at the latter’s address of record. The representations made by
the present administrator and her counsel in the petition at bar alleging and praying that the appellate court's
decision be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or without jurisdiction is
utterly untenable and without legal justification. Her very motion for substitution with the appellate court after its
decision recognized the fact that the appellate court had already duly handed down its adverse decision and
merely expressed her wish to belatedly file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the petitioner estate.
Petitioner's counsel is reminded that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless
clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided.  There must be more faithful adherence
to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed or delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation
of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.'"

12. Gillego vs. Diaz [May 29, 1971]

FACTS: On January 15, 1964, respondents Salvacion Diaz and Manuel Gata filed a complaint for ejectment and
illegal detainer of a certain residential property against petitioner before the municipal court of  Matnog, Sorsogon,
presided by respondent Judge Mayorico Gallanosa.
After numerous postponements attributed by respondents to the effort of respondent judge to effect an amicable
settlement of the case (petitioner's wife being the sister of respondent Salvacion Diaz) and to postponements
secured by the parties, judgment of ejectment was rendered on November 1, 1965 by respondent judge,
sentencing "the defendant Leodigario Gillego and other occupants therein to vacate the premises as soon as
possible, to pay the amount of P315.00 as rentals in arrears at the rate of P15.00 a month which is considered a
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises from the final filing of the complaint to date,
and finally to pay P100.00 as attorney's fee and the cost of this action."
The judgment having become final and executory, respondents filed on February 16, 1966 the corresponding
motion for execution  of judgment, but petitioner filed with the lower court on March 22, 1966 the present
petition for certiorari with injunction, praying for a declaration of nullity of the judgment of ejectment on the sole
ground that "the said decision of the respondent Municipal Judge of Matnog, rendered on November 1, 1965 is
null and void ab initio for the reason that the same was rendered by him after he has lost jurisdiction over the case
due to the lapse of one year from the date of filing of the complaint."
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal is frivolous
Ruling: Yes. The case at bar recalls to mind the Court's admonition, through Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in a similarly
unmeritorious case that "(T)he circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous
and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily.  Such attitude deserves severe
condemnation, wasting, as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases." In Lopez
vs. Aquino promulgated last month, the Court exhorted counsel that "the cooperation of litigants and their attor-
neys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided.   There
must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay'  and expressly
admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.'"
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs in both
instances.  Let this decision be noted in the personal record of petitioner's counsel.

13. Saburdino vs Madrono

Facts:
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Balingasag,
Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental. Sps Saburdino filed an administrative complaint
against respondent. They allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing numerous complaints against
them i.e for serious irregularity. for falsification, for evasion through negligence violation of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Complainants allege that respondent filed those cases against them in retaliation, since they had earlier
filed administrative cases against him that resulted in his dismissal from the judiciary. Respondent contends that
the grounds mentioned in the administrative cases in which he was dismissed and his benefits forfeited did not
constitute moral turpitude. Hence, he could not be disbarred therefor. He then argues that none of the complaints
he filed against complainants was manufactured. 
IBP: In its report submitted to this Court on October 16, 2000, the IBP noted that respondent and his counsel failed
to appear and present evidence in the hearing of the case set for January 26, 2000, despite notice. Thus,
respondent was considered to have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf during said hearing. Neither
did respondent submit his memorandum as directed by the IBP.
After evaluating the evidence before it, the IBP concluded that complainants submitted convincing proof that
respondent indeed committed acts constituting gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative
sanction. The IBP recommends that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Issue: W/N respondent is guilty of gross misconduct
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that complainants submitted convincing proof that respondent indeed committed acts constituting
gross misconduct that warrant the imposition of administrative sanction.
Respondent's action erodes rather than enhances public perception of the legal profession. It constitutes gross
misconduct for which he may be suspended from the practice of law, which is sufficient to discipline respondent.
Following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides: 
SECTION 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.x x x
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Florante E. Madroño is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one year with a WARNING that a repetition the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

14. CASTANEDA V AGO

FACTS: > 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago to recover certain machineries.
>1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson.
> 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on
Ago’s house and lots; sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC
affirmed dismissal-  Ago  thrice  attempted to  obtain writ  of preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution; his motions were denied
> 1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
>1964 – sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession to the properties
>1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his
personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy
made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda, the Registered of Deeds and the sheriff
from registering the final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining
order  continued
- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC
dismissed it; Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition; Agos appealed to SC which
dismissed the petition- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which gave due course
to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: WON Agos’  lawyer was right?
HELD: No.  Despite the pendency in the trial  court of  the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale, justice
demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for
the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies and prostituted the
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners . The
respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist execution of
the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court). Forgetting his
sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty.Luison has  allowed himself to become  an  instigator  of
controversy  and  a predator  of  conflict  instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence
despite the patent futility of his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or lack
of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then it is his duty to advice the latter to
acquiesce  and  submit  rather  than traverse the incontrovertible.  A lawyer must  resist  the  whims and caprices of
his client, and temper his client’s propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to
his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.

15. Warriner vs Dublin

Facts: The Warriner spouses engaged the legal services of Atty. Dublin in a civil case against E.B Villarosa and
Partner Co. Ltd. During the case, Atty. Dublin requested the RTC for 10 days within which he was supposed to
submit is Formal offer of Documentary Evidence. He failed to submit the same despite the lapse of the requested
period. He also failed to file any comment to EB Villarosa & Partner’s motion to declare complainant’s to have
waived their right to file formal offer of documentary evidence and eventually their motion to dismiss.
The spouses Warriner filed an administrative complaint against Dublin and he was made to file his
comment, but he failed to do so for a span of 2 years.
He eventually answered stating that his failure to handle the case of his clients was because he found
them to be doing faleshoods as Warriner was an Australian National who married his Filipino spouse as a
convenient scheme to stay in the country and was fabricating evidence.
Issue: W/N Warriner was guilty of mishandling the case of his clients
Ruling: Yes. He failed to file timely formal offer of evidence to the prejudice of his clients. If he truly
believes that the exhibits were fabricated then he should have exercised his option to withdraw from the case. His
failure to answer the comment required by the court in his administrative case also shows his propensity to
disobey and disrespect court orders and processes.

16. Joselito F. Tejano vs. Atty. Benjamin F. Bateria, A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015
FACTS:
joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the
Supreme Court and Tejano’s own counsel, Atty. Baterina and Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21. Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in
conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to take possession of his (Tejano) property, which was the subject
matter of litigation in the judge’s court. he case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession
and damages filed by Tejano, his mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. In his Affidavit-Complaint,
Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in the former’s bid to “take possession” of their
property and was “collecting rentals from squatters who had set up their businesses inside the whole of Lot [No.]
5663. As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his] cause.” Specifically,
Tejano alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs
had waived their right to present evidence after several postponements in the  trial because his mother was ill and
confined at the hospital;10 (2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order
declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do so; 11 (3) not only failed to file said
motion for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that they would not be presenting any witnesses
without consulting his clients; 12 and (4) failed to comply with the trial court’s order to submit their formal offer of
exhibits.
Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his counsel at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and that
the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already “being acted upon” by the OCA. Court required Atty. Baterina 
to file a Comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice. 15 Failing to comply with the Court’s order, Atty.
Baterina was ordered to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with. Atty. Baterina explained that he
had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court’s
indulgence and said that his failure to comply was “not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the
Honorable Tribunal.” Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano
case. He explained that the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial presentation
of the plaintiffs’ case, he was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two years. 18 He alleged that this
fact was made known to Tejano’s mother and sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the
services of another lawyer. On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a
lawyer until the termination of the case.19 Atty. Baterina instead points to the “displayed bias” and “undue and
conflict of interest”20 of Judge Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano’s predicament.  The IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline promulgated its Report and Recommendation that respondent’s acts constitute sufficient ground for
disciplinary action against him. His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is,
therefore, respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Baterina acted with gross negligence?
HELD:
Yes. The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty. The
Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE
HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
information.
When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with
competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him.”25 A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its
termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.”
Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such
suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their
case and advise them to retain another counsel. A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession –
owes it to his client to not “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.” 27 The client
“should never be left groping in the dark” and instead must be “adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case.” Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run
its course without any effort to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required
pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility29 and renders him subject to disciplinary action. 30 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the
required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment.

17. Adelita B. Llunar v. Atty. Romulo Ricafort [A.C. 6484, June 16, 2015]
FACTS: Petitioner, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bañez, hired the respondent to file a case against father and son
Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Bañez family but was
fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard. The property was mortgaged
by Ard with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, and was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the time
respondent was hired. Respondent was paid P95k. Petitioner discovered 3 years later that no case involving the
subject property was ever filed by the respondent with RTC Legaspi. Petitioner demanded the return of the
amount she paid respondent. Respondent argued that a complaint for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes
had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was
willing to return only what was left of the P95k after deducting therefrom the P50k that he paid to Atty. Abitria as
acceptance fee for handling the case. Petitioner refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by
Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the
complaint was filed 3 years late and the property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the
complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May
29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative Case No. 5054, which the complainant suspected was
the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of grave misconduct
HELD: Yes. The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave misconduct. First,
the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in
redeeming the complainant's property within the redemption period. The delay of 3 years before a complaint to
recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly wasted precious time and opportunity that
were then readily available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule
18.03 of the CPR, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Note: Respondent was disbarred.

18. Legarda vs. CA

Facts:
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements thereon located at 123 West
Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the
petitioner for specific performance with preliminary injunction and damages in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
Quezon City alleging, among others, that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the private respondent
through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner effective January 1,
1985 until December 31, 1989 or for a period of five (5) years. Private respondent deposited the amount of
P72,000.00 with petitioner as down payment of rentals and that respondent drew up the written contract and sent
it to petitioner and for petitioner ‘s failure and refusal to execute and sign the same despite demands of
respondent; the respondent suffered damages due to the delay in the renovation and opening of its restaurant
business.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel Dean Antonio Coronel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his
appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from February
26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel for
private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court
on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The RTC ruled in favor of
respondent approving the sale of petitioner’s property to Robert Cabrera which petitioner failed to redeem.
A petition for annulment of judgment was filed by petitioner engaging again the services of said counsel but the
court dismissed such petition with costs against the petitioner. A copy of the said judgment appears to have been
served on counsel for the petitioner. However, said counsel did not file a motion for reconsideration or appeal
therefrom, so it became final. The CA however ruled that the counsel is only guilty of pure and simple negligence
to which petitioner appealed averring that such constitutes gross negligence thus such mistake of the counsel
should not bind him.
Issue: Whether or not the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld
from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the
law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his
client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.
Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected that he would
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel appears to have
abandoned the cause of petitioner.
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost
learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the
appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property
without due process of law.
In its questioned decision dated November 19, 1989 the Court of Appeals found, in no uncertain terms, the
negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to dismiss or to draw a
compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed on a settlement of the case; or in simply filing an answer;
and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by the court he failed to appeal therefrom or to file a
petition for relief from the order declaring petitioner in default. In all these instances the appellate court found
said counsel negligent but his acts were held to bind his client, petitioner herein, nevertheless.
The Court disagrees and finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and inexcusable.
This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel another chance to make up for his
omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel
abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate
court, he did not do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the
judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be allowed to bind the
petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in court.

19. Endaya v. Oca

FACTS: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio Endaya and his wife. An answer was prepared
by a Mr. Ramirez for the spouses. At the beginning of the preliminary conference, spouses appeared without
counsel. Endaya sought the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Atty. Oca was assigned to handle the case. At
the continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion for amendment of answer. The motion was denied.
The judge then ordered all parties to submit their affidavits and position papers. The court also said that 30 days
after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of the period for filing, judgment shall be rendered on the
case. Oca failed to submit any affidavit or position paper. Nonetheless, the complaint for unlawful detainer was
dismissed because those who filed the case were not real parties-in-interest. The case was appealed to RTC. Oca
failed to submit anything again. RTC reversed the MTC decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the property and
pay a certain amount for rentals. Endaya confronted Oca about the decision. Oca feigned that he did not receive
anything. Upon checking with the clerk of court, Oca did indeed receive a copy of the decision. Hence this
administrative complaint
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Oca violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING: YES. The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal
fraternity. From it springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his
disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action. Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and
safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself “to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.” This duty is further stressed
in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that “A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.”
Once a lawyer takes the cudgels for a client’s case, he owes it to his client to see the case to the end. This, we
pointed out in Legarda v. Court of Appeals, thus: It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a
client’s cause, he covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who
fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s cause make him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
the latter.
Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas, “every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts if for a fee or for free.” In other words, whatever
the lawyer’s reason is for accepting a case, he is duty bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or defending it.
The facts and circumstances in this case indubitably show respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby
warranting his suspension from the practice of law.
*Atty. Oca was suspended for 2 months

20. Carandang v Obmina

Facts:
Carandang lost in an eviction case on January 28, 2000. Carandang only knew of it on year 2006 through
his daughter of the decision of the case when the latter was asked “san na kayo nakatira?”. Carandang went to the
office of atty Obima and asked, and Obima said “kaya di ko sinabi ksi wala kang ibabayad sa abogado mo”. He
claimed that if only his counsel inform him about his case, his reglementary period to appeal the decision should
not have been lapsed.
Consequently, Carandang filed a sworn-statement in the Commission on Bar discipline of the IBP stating
his complaint about what Atty. Obmina done to his case. A Manifestation dated December 11, 2006 filed by a
certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaña. Allegedly, she is the daughter of respondent Atty. Gilbert S.
Obmina. She further alleged that [her] father is already a permanent resident of the United States of America since
March 2001 and had already retired from the practice of law.
After the investigation, the IBP ruled that the respondent who has in his possession the complete files and
address of the complainant, should have exerted efforts to even notify Mr. Carandang as to what happened to his
case. Whether the decision is adverse [to] or in favor of his client, respondent is duty bound to notify the clients
pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence."  Further under Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."  Lastly, under Rule 18.04, "a
lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s
request for information."
That as a result of the respondent’s failure to notify the complainant, the latter lost the case leading to his
eviction. Thus, the IBP suspended Atty. Obmina from the practice of law for 1 year. Although the said respondent is
reportedly in the United States of America and accordingly retired from the practice of law, this Commission will
not close its eyes on the negligence that he has committed while in the active practice.
Issue: Wether or not Atty Obima should be suspended for not informing his client if the decision of the case
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Obmina should have immediately contacted Carandang, explained the decision to him, and
advised them on further steps that could be taken. It is obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal
because of Atty. Obmina’s inaction. Notwithstanding Atty. Obmina’s subsequent withdrawal as Carandang’s
lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record at the time the trial court promulgated the decision in Civil Case
No. B-5109. This is pursuant to Canon 18.03 and .04
In Tolentino v. Mangapit, we stated that:
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform her client of whatever information she may have
acquired which it is important that the client should have knowledge of. She should notify her client of any
adverse decision to enable her client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client
informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and [loss] of trust and confidence in
the attorney.6
The relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the lawyer to
inform timely and adequately the client of important developments affecting the client’s case. The lawyer
should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.

21. Agot vs. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12 (2014)

FACTS:
Agot claimed that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend’s wedding in United States of America. Agot
sought the services of Atty. Rivera to facilitate the issuance of her US visa as an immigration lawyer. Agot paid Atty.
Rivera P350,000.00 as downpayment and agreed to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US
visa. They also stipulated in the retainer agreement that if the visa was denied for any reason other than her
absence on the day of the interview or records of criminal violation, the downpayment shall be returned. Atty.
Rivera failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Agot was not even scheduled for interview in
the US Embassy. It was later found that Atty. Rivera did not specialize in immigration law but merely had a contact
with purportedly US consul who was supposed to process the US visa applications for him. For failure to refund the
downpayment, Agot filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant administrative complaint against Atty.
Rivera.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rivera violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for misrepresenting himself as
an immigration lawyer.
RULING:
Yes. Atty. Rivera was found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 6.03 of Canon 16, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As officers of the
court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and
dishonorable to the legal profession but also revealing a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. The relationship between a lawyer and
his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith, he highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client, a lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. In
this case, Atty. Rivera failed to refund the money that complainant paid him.
Canon 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is bound to observe his client with competence. He should be mindful of the trust
reposed in him and shall not neglect a legal matter to him. Atty. Rivera failed to perform his obligations under the Contract, which is to
facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of the complainant.

22. WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC vs.CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL and ANTONIO D. BERNARDO

Warning! This case has no relation under 18.04. Rather, it focuses on the duty of attorney to client; court can
recognize no other representation on behalf of client except the counsel of record.

FACTS:
Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of petitioner filed with the CFI a money claim for overtime services
rendered to said employer, for unenjoyed vacation leave, moral damages and attorney's fees. The case was
accordingly set for trial. At the hearing, however, neither the defendant employer (petitioner) nor its counsel,
Balcoff, Poblador and Angel Cruz appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were duly notified of the hearing.
The lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff employee. The law firm of Juan Chuidian, on behalf of the
defendant employer, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding, mistake and
excusable neglect, which petition was denied. And such was affirmed by the CA

There is no disagreement as to the facts allegedly constituting the mistake, accident, or excusable negligence upon
which the employer's petition for relief was based. To which they are:
The records of this case show that the employer was represented by the law office of Balcoff and
Poblador and Angel Cruz from the inception of this case up to May 14, 1955, when law Office Juan T.
Chuidian filed its appearance upon being referred by law office of Balcoff and Poblador on May 12, 1955
the copy of the decision dated May 10, 1955 of the trial Court.
"Sometime before May 5, 1955 the employer manifested its desire to replace their counsel Messrs.
Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador in this case with Law Office Juan Chuidian. On May 5, 1955 Atty. Jesus
Sayoc of the undersigned law firm conferred with Atty. Angel Cruz of Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and
Poblador for the purpose of securing the court file in this case and effect the substitution of attorney.
Unfortunately, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office at the moment and no one else had no authority to turn
over to Law office of Juan T. Chuidian the court papers and file in this case; besides, there were unpaid bill
due Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador. In view of this development, Atty. Chuidian called up Atty.
Balcoff by telephone and it was agreed between the two that inasmuch as Attys. Paredes, Balcoff and
Poblador were still the attorneys of record in the case, Atty. Balcoff would sent a representative of his law
office to appear at the hearing in order to ask for postponement of the case. Consequently, nobody in Law
Office Juan Chuidian. As a matter of fact, the records of the case were turned over to Law Office Juan T.
Chuidian only after it received on May 12, 1955

ISSUE: W/N court can recognize no other representation on behalf of client except the counsel of record.

RULING: YES
The law firm of Balcoff and Poblador and Angel Cruz were still the employer's counsel of record, the law office of
Juan Chuidian having entered its appearance in the case only on May 14, 1955. As such counsel of record, said law
firm must have known that, its impending relief as counsel for the defendant notwithstanding, it is under
obligation to protect the client's interest (which includes appearance at the hearing) until its final release from the
professional relationship with such client. For its part, the court could recognize no other representation on behalf
of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected. Thus, any agreement
or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the presentation of the client' case in the
court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in the court cannot be made to depend on them. The lack of
coordination or understanding between the two law firms in the instant case cannot be considered as a legal
excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the granting of relief from the order declaring
the client in default, or as in the case, from a decision entered after presentation of evidence in his absence.

23. Blanza v. Arcangel

FACTS: Atty. Agustin Arcangel, respondent, volunteered to help Olegaria Blanza and Maria Passion, complainants,
in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this
purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers. But
subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of their claims and refused
to surrender the papers when asked by the complainants six years later.
ISSUE: WON the respondent be reprimanded for professional non-feasance.
RULING: No. The Court found the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against
respondent. For the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant, the former denies
this. Fiscal Raña made no findings on the matter. However, the Court cannot but counsel against his actuations as a
member of the Bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with
the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of the law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked
up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he
volunteers his professional services.
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has not been
controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the
photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and their
photostats were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the
photostating costs himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves — they appear to have been in
existence for quite some time — supports respondent's allegation that they remained in possession of the
photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/or complainants), to withdraw the same upon
payment of the corresponding costs. Hence, complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing
their respective claims.

24. ABAY vs MONTESINO

417 SCRA 77; A.C. No. 5718. December 4, 2003
FACTS: Atty. Montesino was the counsel of Negros Institute of Technology in an action for Cancellation of Title of
Ownership, Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary Injunction against Vicente
Galo’s estate. RTC dismissed the case on Apr. 27, 1995. The RTC denied the respondent’s MR. Respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal in the CA but failed to submit the appellant’s brief even after a total of 120 days extension
(beyond the 45 reglementary period). Mar. 19, 1999 – CA dismissed the appeal. Complainant prays for the
disbarment of respondent alleging that the latter abandoned the appeal without knowledge of NIT and never told
that the appeal had already been dismissed. Respondent avers that his failure to file the brief was due to his
discovery that the property sought to be recovered was subject to another civil case as a result of overlapping
rights of transfers: a Contract of Sale in favor of Florserfina Grandea and a Contract of Mortgage in favor of
Ludovico Hidalgo. Thus, respondent advised NIT to abandon the appeal and file instead an appropriate Complaint
against Grandea and Hidalgo to recover the properties. However, complainant demanded to continue with the
appeal. Thinking that his advice was the best way to protect his client’s rights, he let the period to submit
appellant’s brief lapse. Atty. Montesino failed to file the appellant’s brief of his client NIT in a civil case, resulting to
the dismissal of the appeal. Respondent claims that this was due to him deeming it futile to pursue the appeal and
wanting to take another legal course of action to protect his client’s rights. The IBP found him guilty of violating
CPR and suspended him for 6 months with warning.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Montesino was guilty of violating the CPR for failing to file his client’s appellant’s brief.
RULING: Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and of morality --
which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing.20 They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether
in their professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action. In the present case, the failure of
respondent to file the appellant’s brief was a clear violation of his professional duty to his client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients with competence and
diligence.21 Rules 18.03 and 18.04 specifically provide: "Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
"Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information." It must be noted that respondent and complainant
disagreed on the legal course to be taken regarding the appealed case. The former strongly advised the latter to
abandon the appeal and to consider the other available remedies. Complainant, on the other hand, wanted to
pursue it. Feeling that he was "unjustly adamant" in wanting to do so, respondent -- contrary to the desire of the
former -- deemed it wise to abandon the appeal without informing his client.
Not filing an appellant’s brief is prejudicial because, as happened in this case, such failure could result in the
dismissal of the appeal.22 The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and that he
had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the former of the latter’s cause made
him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in him. Even if respondent was "honestly and sincerely"
protecting the interests of complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latter’s
knowledge and consent. If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he should have
properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another lawyer.
Moreover, the appellate court noted that respondent failed to file the appellant’s brief despite being granted
several extensions of time to file it. He therefore violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."
We emphasize that all lawyers owe fidelity to their client’s cause.23 Regardless of their personal views, they must
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of that cause.

25. Lagua vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: The Regional Trial Court of Pasig rendered a Decision finding the petitioner guilty of homicide. Petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA. On 18 June 2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending Appeal,
which the CA granted without objection from the OSG. 4 On 6 November 2003, an Order of release upon bond was
issued. On 14 October 2003, petitioner received the Order from the CA requiring, within 45 days from receipt
thereof for the filing of his Appellant’s Brief. Petitioner filed a motion for extension to file the brief, which was
granted, but on the deadline, instead of submitting the brief, another motion for extension was filed which was
again granted. Despite the two extensions, petitioner still failed to submit the same. CA ordered petitioner through
his counsel to show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed, but again failed to do so, thus, the appeal
was dismissed. On 14 October 2004, petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Salvador Quimpo, manifested to the Court
that he had already withdrawn as defense counsel for petitioner, but that he had failed to secure the latter’s
conformity. The following day, petitioner himself filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the dismissal of the appeal,
requesting more time to secure the services of another counsel. On 20 October 2004, the Solicitor General,
manifesting that accused-appellant’s abandonment of his appeal rendered the judgment of conviction final and
executory, moved for his immediate arrest and confinement. In its Resolution dated 9 February 2005, the CA
stated that it had never received a Notice of Withdrawal from Atty. Quimpo, but nevertheless granted a 30-day
period for petitioner and his new counsel to file a Notice of Appearance. Again, petitioner failed to comply. On 8
July 2005, the CA issued another Show Cause Order, directing him to explain why he had not caused the
appearance of his new counsel, and why the appeal should not be considered abandoned. Instead of filing a timely
compliance, petitioner’s new counsel, Atty. Emerson Barrientos filed a Notice of Appearance on 8 March 2005 a
month after the Show Cause Order. The CA filed a Resolution stating that in the interest of justice, the Notice of
Appearance was considered sufficient compliance. It granted the Motion for Reconsideration, set aside the Order
of Dismissal issued on 1 September 2004, and gave petitioner and his new counsel a non-extendible period of 30
days within which to file the appellant’s brief.
Notwithstanding the new non-extendible period, petitioner again failed to seasonably file his brief, prompting the
CA to issue the first assailed Resolution dated 25 November 2005,which, for the second time, declared his appeal
abandoned and accordingly dismissed. He came to SC stating that it was his 2 previous counsel’s fault and
negligence(mishandling) and the same should not be attributed to him and that the dismissal of the appeal should
be revoked.
Issue: Whether or not negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.
Ruling: Yes. Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the
client. Otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit, so long as counsel could allege its own fault or negligence
to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.

26. Millare vs. Montero

246 SCRA 1 (1995)
FACTS:
Millare, obtained a favorable judgment which ordered Co to vacate the premises. Co, through Atty. Montero, filed
a total of six appeals, complaints or petitions to frustrate the execution of the judgment
ISSUE:
WON respondent shall be held guilty of malpractice
HELD:
Yes. Under Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. It is unethical for a lawyer to
abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous
appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the same judgment,
respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Respondent is suspended for one year.

27. IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE PLUNDER LAW CASE
HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
FACTS: The court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering some allegedly contemptuous statements as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer newspaper in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) which was then pending resolution. To wit:
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by
Estrada's lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camp's effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices
---considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will
most likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or
vague." De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme
Court insiders.
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People Power II if the
rumor turned out to be true. "People wouldn't just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is
basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail."
In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in issue of the Inquirer  but argued that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech. While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited
statements, respondent denied having made the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and
to bring it into disrepute.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Leonardo De Vera be held in indirect contempt for uttering those statements.
RULING: Yes. Freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such right does
not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court's integrity and authority, and interfering with the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the
requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather,
it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech,
for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect
therefor and confidence therein. It is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be
immune from every extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them.

28. Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987)

Facts:
Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism and Nationalism Olalia, intensified the intermittent pickets they bad been conducting since June 17,1987
in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in
front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and
offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a
kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation.
They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with
the use of loudspeakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as
Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro
Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease
immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their
petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-
described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that
he had explained to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer
such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances.
Issue:
WON Atty. Espinas be held in contempt for his actions.
Ruling:
Yes. Supreme Court cannot be pressured to act one way or the other in any case pending before it. We accept the
apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the
contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier
case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No.
73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in
future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure
the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated
through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the
respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its
business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."

29. Lantoria vs. Bunyi

Facts:
Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that
herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance.
It appears that the complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the
aforementioned farm. These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting
municipal judge of which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the
municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course,
declared in default.
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative case
against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974 for
acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery .
The letters contain statements addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which said
judge told Atty. Bunyi to prepare and he is going to sign them. Complainant contends that respondent won the
said three (3) cases because the (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered
therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
Respondent contended that such letter was from the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant
who, from his several letters, had demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm
he was entrusted to manage and such preparation of said decision never came from him and such was not
lutong macao as Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at any rate they were judgments
by default, the defendants lost their standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their
answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof .
Issue: Whether or not respondent must be suspended from practice of law for influencing a judge in relation to the
three civil cases
Ruling:
Yes. We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary action,
deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although
nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's consent to the said preparation for a
favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an
officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time
respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal relations
of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A
lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A
self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy
and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations
between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in
Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where he
had pending civil case

30. Mercado v. Security Bank, 482 SCRA 501 (2006)

Facts:
Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose
Teofilo T. Mercado arising from his letter dated October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to
the “tremendous pressure” of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank
Corporation, respondent, financed the ponente’s travel to the United States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent
a “go signal” to sell his property.
He wrote to the Chief Justice saying that his counsel, Atty. Villanueva, said the ponente informed him that she has
to deny our petition on the same ground because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice to favor
Security Bank Corporation (SBC). In his letter, he said that his counsel and the ponente are very close and long time
friends to each other so when he heard the bad news, he was so shocked in disbelief… He also added saying to the
Supreme Court, “Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of the final judgment after life? Is this the
legacy you want to impart to your children and all the Filipino people? What you did to my family and I is
unforgivable not only to God and to humanity. You have deprived us of our precious possession without due
process. This is also the abode of my wife, my children, their respective spouses, and my 10 grandchildren, not to
mention the several household members and their families. xxx
I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I looked up at you before as the most honest and
upright Chief Justice. As we would like to know if you really had intervened and put pressure, as the Ponente said
to Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten us before
we seek another forum to seek redress the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment we
suffered. If we are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please accept our appeal for forgiveness and
apologies. GOD is my witness, that what I have told you is the truth. Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know
how religious you are. Please do what a religious man ought to do in serving justice. Please live up to our, as well as
HIS expectations.”
Issue:
Should Atty. Villanueva be guilty of indirect contempt of court?
Ruling:
Yes. Court has repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients; Responsibility enjoins
lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers; Court finds Atty. Villanueva also
guilty of indirect contempt of court.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who guarantees
the successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs.
But when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in
this case, Atty. Villanueva’s statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court,
together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced. Responsibility enjoins
lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers. Atty. Villanueva’s conduct, no
doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well. Thus, we
find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court.

31. Nakpil v. Valdez

FACTS: Jose Nakpil and Carlos Valdes were friends since the 1950s. Due to their friendship, respondent (CPA-
lawyer) became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils. In 1965, Jose Nakpil became
interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran St., Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested respondent
to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to the agreement, respondent obtained 2 loans from a bank, in
the amounts of P65, 000 and P75, 000, which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued
in respondent’s name. Nakpils occupied the summer house. When Jose Nakpil died in 1973, respondent acted the
legal counsel and accountant of Jose’s widow. Respondent’s law form, Carlos J. Valdes & Assoc. handled the
proceeding for the settlement of Jose’s estate. Ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings. Respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate. He transferred his title
to the Moran property to his company, Caval Realty Corporation. Complainant sought to recover Moran property
by filing with the them CFI Baguio an action for reconveyance with damages. During the pendencey of the action
for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the respondent.
Allegations of complainant: Respondent maliciously appropriated the property in trust knowing that it did not
belong to him, Respondent’s auditing firm excluded the Moran property from the inventory YET included the
Moran property in the claims against the estate the amounts P65k and P75k which respondent represented as
complainant’s husband’s loans applied “probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran”, Conflict of
interest- Respondent’s law firm filed the petition for the settlement of her husband’s estate in court, while
respondent’s auditing firm acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors.
CFI dismissed the action for reconveyance
CA reversed the trial court. Respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property.
OSG submitted report on disbarment complaint, Recommendation: dismissal of administrative case.
ISSUE: W/N respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CANON 17)
RULING: Yes. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondent initially acknowledged and
respected the trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent exercised bad faith in transferring the property to
his family corporation. Respondent’s act of excluding Moran property lack of fidelity to the cause of his client
(Canon 17)
If he truly believed that it was his, he should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead
of transferring it to his own company and concealing it from complainant. His misuse of his legal expertise to
deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical. To make things worse, respondent through his
accounting firm, charged two loans against the estate as liability for the purchase and renovation of the property
he claimed for himself.
There is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are adverse to each other.
Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate
which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
Respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the
estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which
claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the
estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from
said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than
full fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
DISPO: Suspended from the practice of law for ONE YEAR.
32. Hilado vs David
FACTS: Blandina Hilado brought an action against Selim Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed
by Hilado’s husband. Delgado et al. was counsel for Hilado, while Ohnick et al filed an answer for Assad. Later on,
Atty Vicente Francisco entered his appearance for Assad substituting Ohnick et al. The firm of Delgado urged
Atty Francisco to stop representing Assad since there exists an atty-client relationship between him
(Francisco) and the other party (Hilado) in the same case. It was alleged that Hilado consulted Francisco regarding
the case and that the former turned over papers to the latter. From such documents, Francisco sent a written
opinion to Hilado. Delgado et al. sought to disqualify Francisco from representing Assad in the case. Francisco’s
defense was that he only met Hilado once and this was when the latter informed him about the case. He added
that when Hilado left documents in their office, he told his assistant to tell Hilado that their firm would not handle
her case. And that the written opinion was made by his assistant, which he signed without reading, and only for
the purpose of explaining to Hiladowhy his firm rejected the case. David is the judge trying the case who dismissed
the complaint for disqualification against Francisco. Said judge reasoned that no attorney-client relationship
existed between Hilado and Francisco.
ISSUE: Was there an attorney-client relationship between Francisco and Hilado? Should Atty Francisco be
disqualified from representing Assad?
HELD:
The firm of Francisco mailed a written opinion to Hilado on the merits of the case (with Francisco’s signature); this
opinion was reached on the basis of papers submitted at his office; and that Hilado’spurpose in submitting those
papers was to secure Francisco’s professional services. From these ultimate facts, an attorney-client relationship
between Francisco and Hilado can be said to have ensued.To constitute professional employment it is not essential
that the client should have employed theattorney professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that
any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did
not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. When a person consults with his attorney
in his professional capacity with the view of obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be
regarded as established.
The existence of attorney-client relationship precludes the attorney from representing (and receiving a
retainer from) the opposite party in the same case. An information professionally obtained by an attorney from a
client is sacred to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it be used in the interest of another, or in the
interest of the adverse party is to strike at the element of confidence which forms the basis of an attorney-client
relationship. The rule inhibiting an attorney from acting in behalf of both parties is implied in the Rules of Court
(wala pang codified codes of professional responsibility noon).The defense that Francisco never read the written
opinion nor the documents submitted by Hilado will not preclude the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
The fact remains that his firm did giveH ilado a formal professional advice from which emerged the relation. The
letter binds and estops him in the same manner and degree as if he wrote it personally. And an information
obtained from a client by a member or assistant of the firm is information imparted to the firm. The failure to
object to counsel’s appearance does not operate as a waiver of the right to ask for counsel’s disqualification.
Motion for disqualification against Attorney Francisco should be allowed. *A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given
to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client.

33. Dee vs CA and Amelito Mutuc

Facts: Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter’s
cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother, Dewey
Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Private respondent
personally talked with the president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada. He advised the president that for
the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness.
The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be
exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with
Ramon Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private respondent
brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the
account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him. Having thus settled the account of
petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters.
Issues: 1. Whether Dee is obligated to pay Mutuc for rendering legal services. YES
2. Whether there was conflict of interest on the part of Mutuc who worked for Dee and for Caesar’s in the
collection of the amount. NO
Ruling: 1. Yes. Dee must pay. There was a lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and private respondent
Mutuc. The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship which merits attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary formalism is not an
essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting
on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. 50k initial payment and subsequent demand
letters prove three facts, viz: that petitioner hired the services of private respondent Mutuc; that there was a
prior agreement as to the amount of attorney's fees to be given to the latter; and there was still a balance due
and payable on said fees.
 2. No conflict of interest. It is not completely Dee’s assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were
adverse to those of Dewey’s. Mutuc's representations in behalf of Dee were not in resistance to the casino's
claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by establishing the liability of the true debtor. Even
assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained, private respondent's role therein was not ethically or
legally indefensible. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions.
However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting
interests with the consent of the parties. 16 A common representation may work to the advantage of said parties
since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions,
may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan
inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of said parties. 
34. Perez vs Dela Torre
Facts: Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in December
2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were
apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of Calabanga
where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign
the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs
of the murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including
herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities
for which they were being charged.
Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the Calabanga
Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in
the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents about his
decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he
might be utilized as a state-witness. Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his
extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced that
Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dela Torre should be held liable for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Dela Torre is suspended for 3 years. Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having
conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the
written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent should be
sanctioned.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty
to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he
argues for the other client." There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste. In
the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client’s case, including
the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of impropriety and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
At the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion
Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the
murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. What is unsettling is that respondent
assisted in the execution by the two accused of their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in
various serious criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the
victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment
before conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their
counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.

35. Samson v Era (2013)

Facts:
Ferdinand A. Samson and his relatives were among the investors who were scammed by ICS Corporation,
whose corporate officers were led by Emilia C. Sison. Samson engaged Atty. Edgardo O. Era to represent him and
his relatives in the criminal prosecution of Sison and her group.
In April 2003, Atty. Era met with Samson and his relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable
settlement with Sison. Atty. Era guaranteed the turnover to them of a ICS property in exchange for their
desistance. Samsons acceded, and received a deed of assignment covering a registered land. Later, Samsons
demanded from Atty. Era a deed of absolute sale. Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title of the property
had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer be his responsibility.
Samson learned that the property because was no longer registered under ICS Corporation but was
already under Bank Wise Inc. Due to the silence of Atty. Era for some time thereafter, Samsons wrote to him in
2004 to remind him about his guarantee. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at all. During the hearings in the RTC,
Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to
find out later on, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases involving the same pyramiding.
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found Atty. Era guilty of misconduct for representing
conflicting interests, for failing to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his
clients’ cause with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. It recommended 6-month suspension. IBP-BOG
recommended 2-year suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Era should be suspended for two years?
Ruling:
Yes. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
Atty. Era thus owed to Samson and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of their rights. He was expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve the
clients’ cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his clients likewise served the ends of justice. There is
conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as follows:
First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with undivided loyalty.
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the effectiveness of legal
representation.
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the client’s confidential information.
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to
make a gift to the lawyer.
Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in obtaining adequate
presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the
litigation, complicating the process of taking proof and compromise adversary argumentation.
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.
Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the
termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in
conflict with that of the former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the client’s confidence once given should
not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a
lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client’s confidences acquired in
the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that:
"A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him."
In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full disclosure to them of the
conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly decline
representing and entering his appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage another lawyer for
herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper sanction.

36. HORNILLA VS. ATTY. ERNESTO SALUNAT

Facts: Benedicto Hornilla is a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Along with
several other complainants, Hornilla filed intra-corporate cases before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) against PPSTA board members for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real property.
Atty. Ernesto Salunat on the other hand is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, and a retained legal counsel
of PPSTA. As retained counsel, he represented PPSTA in the cases against them by Hornilla and other members.
Hornilla alleged that Atty. Salunat is laboring under conflict of interests for engaging with PPSTA, where his fees are
derived from the corporate funds that its members, including himself, contributed on.
Atty. Salunat refused to withdraw his representation despite being told by PPSTA members about the conflict of
interest. For his part, he contends that his representation was in behalf of ASSA Law and Associates, being the
retained legal counsel of PPSTA, and not under his personal capacity.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Salunat is indeed representing conflicting interests for representing members of the
same corporation in a derivative suit?
Held: Yes. Atty. Salunat is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. Engaging as counsel for a corporation
and representing part of its members in a derivative suit would normally give rise to a conflict of interests.
Since this is still his first offense, Atty. Salunat is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in his
professional practice, and is further warned that a repetition of such act will be dealt with severely.
37. Leticia Gonzales vs Atty. Marcelino Cabucana
Facts:
Gonzales was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City, where she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE
GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an
associate/partner.
A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales the amount of  P17,310.00 with
interest and P6,000.00 as attorney’s fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution
issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said sheriff.
Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales, harassed her, and asked her to execute an affidavit of
desistance regarding her complaint. Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass,
grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation.
Contention of the complainant
Complainant alleges that respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law since respondent’s acceptance
of the cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent’s law
firm.
Notwithstanding the pendency of the case where respondent’s law firm was still representing Gonzales,
respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses. She added that
respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses. Respondent likewise acted as their
counsel in the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against them.
Defense of the respondent
Respondent alleges that he never appeared and represented complainant since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar
Cabucana who appeared and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff
Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his appearance is pro bono and that the
spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good
faith and opted to represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos asked for his
assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking
official who wanted to get even with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case.
The civil case filed by Gonzales where respondent’s brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the
criminal cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate any canon on legal
ethics.
Issue: Whether Attorney Cabucana is guilty of conflict of interest which is a violation against the Code of
Responsibility?
Held: Yes.
Respondent is fined the amount of Two Thousand Pesos with a stern warning that a commission of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely for violation of Canon 15.03 CPR.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
As expounded in the case of Quiambao vs Bamba,
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action.  It is of no moment that the lawyer
would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other
client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.  It is enough that the opposing parties
in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided
fidelity to both clients.
The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of interests or, at the
very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this Court cannot allow.
Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses case other than him, still he
should have observed the requirements laid down by the rules by conferring with the prospective client to
ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the
written consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the
matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the
prospective client.
Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
38. SOLATAN v. INOCENTES
Facts:
Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law
Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the Genito Apartments were placed
under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan
and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments.
Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to Solatan and other members of
her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was
rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was occupying said apartment
when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a new
lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to
Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the
entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check
in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees.
Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of
execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano
agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty.
Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the levied items.
However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito
Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP
Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to reprimand Atty.
Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
2) Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their clients.
1. YES. An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being
retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and
dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest conflicting
with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice given by Atty. Camano in the context
where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly levied properties was in consonance with his duty
as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as
they have no interest over the properties. The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned
upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing
and betrayal.
2. YES. Atty. Inocentes’ failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his
law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the
responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in conformity to the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s dealings with complainant.
This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof. Partners and
practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising
themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over which they are exercising supervisory
authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
persons under their charge.

39. DAGING VS. ATTORNEY DAVIS

FACTS: Daging was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She leased the building from Pinlac
where she operated the bar. Daging received a Retainer proposal from Davis & Sabling Law Office and eventually
resulted in the signing of a retained Agreement. The lease was terminated by Pinlac and inventoried all the
equipment therein, and informed her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Hence, she filed an
ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo before the MTC. However, Atty. Davis appeared as counsel for Balageo
during the subsistence of said Retainer Agreement. Daging filed a disbarment case against Atty. Davis.
The latter DENIED participation in the takeover or acting as business partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar.
He also argued that it was Atty. Sablong, his partner, who initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able
to convince Daging to accept the law office as her retainer. Investigating Commissioner rendered a report and
recommendation finding Atty. Davis GUILTY of betrayal of his client’s trust and for misuse of information obtained
from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and to the advantage of another person. Hence, recommended that
Atty. Davis be suspended from the practice of law for one year. IBP Board of Governors adopted such report and
recommendation but upon motion of Atty. Davis, the penalty was reduced to six months suspension considering
that there is no proof that Atty. Davis actually handled any previous legal matters involving Daging.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Davis is guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
HELD: Yes, based on the established facts, it is indubitable that Atty. Davis transgressed Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the
CPR. (Rule 15.03 –A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.)
A lawyer may not act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even if the lawyer has
acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
40. QUAIMBAO VS. BAMBA
FACTS: Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc (AIB).
Quiambao procured the legal services of Atty. Nestor Bamba for the corporate affairs of AIB. Atty. Bamba was also
the official legal counsel of an ejectment case filed by Quiambao against spouses Santiago and Florito Torroba.
When Quiambao resigned from AIB, Atty. Bamba, without withdrawing as counsel from the ejectment case,
represented AIB in a complaint case for replevin and damages against her. Quiambao filed charges against Atty.
Bamba for representing conflicting interests and violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
For his part, Atty. Bamba denies that he was a personal lawyer of Quiambao, and he believes that it is part of his
duty to pursue cases in behalf of employees at the time Quiambao was working in AIB. Even then, Atty. Bamba
contends that the ejectment case and replevin case are completely unrelated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Bamba is representing conflicting interests. The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the
opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of
the lawyer's respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity
to both clients.[15]

In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB he was still the
counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. We do not sustain respondent's theory that
since the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, and
subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though
unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the
respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the ejectment
case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any
written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Neither can we accept respondent's plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the cases referred to him by AIB,
including the personal cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate affairs. That the representation
of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the
prohibition inoperative. Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person
who may wish to become their client. They have the right to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon
14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Although there are instances where lawyers cannot decline
representation, they cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective
one.
41. Alisbo vs Jalandoon
Facts:
 Ramon Alisbo engaged respondent Atty. Jalandoon as his counsel in an action to recover his share of the
estate of the deceased sps Catalina Sales and Restituto Gozuma w/c had been adjudicated to him under the
judgment of CC No. 4963 because Alisbo failed to file a motion for execution of judgment in his favor w/in the
reglementary 5year period. The salient provisions of the Contract for Professional Services (Exhibit A) between
Alisbo and Attorney Jalandoon were the following: 1. That respondent will decide whether or not to file a suit for
the recovery of Ramon Alisbo's share 2. That respondent will shoulder all expenses of litigation; and 3. As
attorney's fees, respondent will be paid 50% of the value of the property recovered.
– 4/18/70: respondent prepared a complaint w/ Ramon, Teotimo, and Pacifico Alisbo as plaintiffs and
Carlito Sales as defendant signed by him alone (CC No. 9559); on the same day, he withdrew it and replaced it with
a complaint w/ Ramon as sole plaintiff and Teotimo and Pacifico impleaded as defendants w/c respondent and
Atty. Pablo signed as counsel - 12/8/71: an amended complaint was filed w/ Ramon, his judicial guardian Norberto,
and eight others as plaintiffs, signed by Atty. Pablo alone (10 years after final judgment) - 8/21/73: defendant Sales
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed - 10/3/73: the CFI of Negros Occidental
dismissed the case on the ground of prescription (though Ramon filed the complaint w/in the ten-year prescriptive
period, it was null and void since Ramon was insane and hence w/o capacity to sue)
- 1/2/74: complainants charged Jalandoon w/ having deliberately caused the dismissal of CC No. 9559
and concealing the fact that he had been the former legal counsel of Sales - Jalandoon claims he only discovered
his previous professional relationship with Sales during the pre-trial on Oct. 6, 1972
ISSUE: WON Jalandoon is guilty of non-disclosure to client of adverse or conflicting interest
Ruling:
YES because: 1. Before filing the complaint, he had several interviews w/ Ramon and Norberto re: CC No.
4963 2. He must have done research on the court records of CC No. 4963 3. For CC No. 9559, he had to inform
himself of the personal circumstances of defendant Sales -w/ this knowledge, he should have declined
employment by Alisbo due to conflict of interest - The actuations of respondent attorney violated Paragraphs 1 and
2, No. 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide: 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCE AND CONFLICTING INTEREST It
is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the
parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of
counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
 Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (pp. 14-15, Solicitor General's
Report.) -Jalandoon had delayed the filing of CC No. 9559, instead asking the court to resolve the pending incidents
in CC No. 4963. The first complaint w/ Ramon and his brothers was only partially defective due to Ramon‘s
insanity; by making Ramon the sole plaintiff in the second complaint, it was rendered wholly defective and
ineffectual in stopping the prescriptive period - Jalandoon alleges to have only found out about Ramon‘s incapacity
on July 17, 1971, he only amended the complaint impleading his guardian as plaintiff 5 months . later when it had
prescribed Disposition It was more than simple negligence; the Court found respondent guilty of serious
misconduct and infidelity and was suspended for a period of 2 years. 

42. Heirs of Falame v. Baguio

SUMMARY: Atty. Edgar Baguio was charged for violating Canon 15.03 by representing a party with which he has
conflicting interests, for knowingly making false statements and for filing a baseless and fabricated suit. He had
originally represented Lydio Falame as a defendant in a civil case involving land disputes. A few years later, a civil
suit was filed against the heirs of the deceased Lydio Falame on behalf of Raleigh Falame (Brother of Lydio Falame)
regarding the same land.
FACTS: A disbarment complaint was filed by the Heirs of Lydio Jerry Falame against Atty. Edgar Baguio. July 15,
1991 – Atty. Baguio was counsel for Lydio Falame as a defendant in a civil case regarding forcible entry. He
submitted in evidence the ff: Special Power of Attorney for his BROTHER, Raleigh Falame & Affidavit dated 23 July
1988 which stated that Lydio had owned the property. The court ruled in favor of defendants. Lydio Falame dies.
Oct. 23, 2000 – Representing Raleigh, Atty. Baguio filed a complaint against the heirs of Lydio Falame. The action
sought to declare null and void the sale of the property and the subsequent mortgage. Raleigh likewise prayed for
specific performance, reconveyance and damages.
Complainants allege the ff: Respondent had conflicting interests as the case he is pursuing now is adverse to his
former client’s interest; He had made false statements in violation of Sec. 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; The
civil case against the heirs is baseless and fabricated; Complainants alleged that respondent Baguio only wanted to
retain property from the heirs in violation of Sec. 20(g), Rule 138; Alleged a violation of Rule 15.03 of the CPR.
Respondent claims the ff: Raleigh had engaged his services and paid the legal fees; The power of attorney was
signed and adhered to in good faith (That he did not reveal or use any knowledge acquired from representing the
late Lydio Falame); He had not knowingly made any misleading or untruthful statements; He also argued that Lydio
had not retained him as counsel; That he was no longer bound to the acts committed by the heirs after Lydio’s
death; He also stated that since a second civil case is pending before the court, the IBP cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the administrative case; Raleigh Falame had died and could not testify in his favor.
The board of governors issued a resolution recommending dismissal of the administrative case.
o The charged lacks specification as to where the point of conflict of interest arose (What
information was disclosed).
o There is no specific charge for violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and prohibition of conflicting
interest. (Due process is violated if one is charged with more than was a complaint contains)
o Lack of bases to provie violations of Sec. 20(d), Rule 138 of ROC.
o IMPORTANT: Dismissal on grounds of prescription as it has been 4 years since the alleged
misconduct had taken place.
 Complainants file this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N dismissal of the administrative case is warranted and should he be disbarred?
RULING: NO
 Although some of the charges remain unsubstantiated, there is sufficient basis that Atty. Baguio had
violated Rule 15.03. Although, respondent denied being the Attorney of Lydio Falame in his motion to
dismiss. Absence of this attorney-client relationship is an essential element of defense to the charge of
conflict of interest. Moreover, respondent had been properly apprised on the issue, due process has been
adhered to.
 However, Rule 15.03 mainly means that a lawyer may not act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. Such rule does not only cover confidential information
but also that information which no confidence has been used. The general rule is that if there are adverse
effects by representing a particular party, the fiduciary obligation of loyalty to one’s client is violated.
Termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify representing a party with conflicting
interests or adverse interest.
 Canon 17 provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. A lawyer’s highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at
all hazards and costs even to himself. Such protection is perpetual and does not cease upon cessation of
employment of attorney or even death of client. Attorney Baguio should have diligently anticipated the
conflict of interest.
Disposition: Atty. Edgar Baguio is found guilty of representing conflicting interest. He is not disbarred. He was only
reprimanded and admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession.

43. Aninon vs Sabitsana

Facts:
Aninon engaged the services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution of a deed of sale over a parcel of
land in her favor.
Subsequently, Atty. Sabitsana filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the deed of sale he prepared in
favor of Zenaida Canete using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the case.
Issue: W/N Sabitsana violated the prohibition on representing conflicting interest
Ruling:
Yes. Jurisprudence has three tests in determining whether a violation of conflicting interest is present in a case
1.) Whether the lawyer is duty bound to fight for an issue in behalf of one client, and at the same time to
oppose that claim for the other client.

2.) When the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of the
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance of that duty
3.) Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any
confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.
Based on the test there was a violation on the rule against conflict of interest due to the following:
1.) Sabitsana’s legal services were initially engaged by Aninon to protect her interest and Sabitsana
executed a deed in Aninon’s favor
2.)
3.) Sabitsana met Canete to discuss her interest over the lot bought by Aninon despite having knowledge
that Aninon’s interest clashed with Canete’s interest
4.) Despite that knowledge, he accepted the engagement from Canete
5.) Sabitsana’s knowledge of conflicting interest could be seen when he filed a case against aninon in
behalf of canete, when he impleaded aninon as a defendant in the annulment of deed of sale case
and when he filed for the annulment of the deed which he himself prepared and executed for aninon.
The exception to the violation under Rule 15.03 cannot be applied because he did not provide full disclosure about
the cases to Aninon and Canete and acquiring their consent before accepting the engagement

44. JOSEPHINE L. OROLA v. ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS AC. No. 9860, Sep 11, 2013
FACTS:
The respondent acted as a collaborating counsel with Atty. Ely Azaragga Jr. in representing Maricar, Karen,
and the other heirs of the late Antonio Orola in the settlement of the estate of Trinidad Laserna-Orola. The heirs of
Antonio together with the heirs of Trinidad moved for the removal Emilio Orola as the administrator of Trinidad’s
estate. Subsequently, respondent appeared as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the same case. As such,
complaints for disbarment were filed against respondent for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03 of the CPR.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code?
HELD:
YES. Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is
prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether
or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste. In Hornilla v. Salunat the Court explained the concept of conflict of
interest, to wit: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.  In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be
opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be
called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double dealing in the performance thereof.
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions
that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not
for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but
for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the
Heirs of Antonio succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their
interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of seeking his reinstatement as
administrator in the same case, he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio particularly,
Karen in violation of the above-stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him
for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in  Hornilla, provides an absolute
prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot
change his representation from one party to the latter's opponent in the same case. That respondent's previous
appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given
any credence since the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

45. Mabini Colleges v. Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo [A.C. 10687, July 22, 2015]
FACTS: The board of trustees of Mabini Colleges was divided into two opposing factions: (1) The Adeva Group and
(2) the Lukban Group. Mabini appointed respondent as its corporate secretary. Adeva Group issued an
unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized its members to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale
(RBP). Lukban Group opposed the loan application because among those appointed to apply for the loan, two were
allegedly not registered as stockholders of Mabini, and that Mabini had financial difficulties. Respondent sent a
letter to RBP to assure the latter of Mabini’s financial capacity to pay the loan. RBP granted the loan of P200k,
which was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant. SEC issued an order
nullifying the appointment of the members made by Adeva group, as a result, Mabini sent RBP a letter, informing it
of the SEC Order. RBP sent Mabini a letter, informing it that the SEC Order was referred to its legal counsel. Mabini
alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel
of RBP. Property of Mabini was foreclosed. Mabini filed for an annulment of mortgage against RBP. The
Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed
by his former client, Mabini.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he entered his appearance as counsel
for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by Mabini against RBP.
HELD: Yes. Respondent represented conflicting interest in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to
situations where in a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present
or former clients. Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the Court finds that respondent represented
conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by the
complainant, respondent’s former client, against RBP.
Note: Respondent suspended from practice of law for 1 year.

46. PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank.1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved
various loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was
classified as doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible.As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans
to GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable
to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A
public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted
the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court
of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated
by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon
C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages" against respondents.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan,
et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively
intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by
respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the
procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with
its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.
Issue: Whether or not Estelito Mendoza must be disqualified for violation of Rule 6.03 for being a counsel for
respondent Tan despite being a former solicitor general
Ruling:
No. We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
"matter" and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within
the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza
which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil Case
No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with
the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the
procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc.
No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096.
Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of
GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining
claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent
to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

47. Genato v Silapan

FACTS: In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan,
complainant alleged that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainant’s
building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin
Dacanay, complainant’s retained lawyer, who accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle
some of complainant’s cases.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed P200,000.00 from complainant which he
intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to complainant a
postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the 6 months interest on the loan. He likewise
mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the
subject of reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to
complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent’s postdated check with the drawee bank but it was
dishonored as respondent’s account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant’s repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case
against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage.
Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously
designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their
confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed
this complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his
issuance of a bouncing check.
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained that it was complainant who offered him an office
space in his building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22
case filed against complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest
business practices to complainant and his revelation of complainant’s desire to bribe government officials in
relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial
proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainant’s credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to
commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client
relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.
Complainant denied respondent’s charges and claimed that respondent’s allegation is libelous and not privilege as
it was irrelevant to the foreclosure case.
Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a
perjury case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
ISSUE: W/N Respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices
and disclosing complainant’s alleged respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged
RULING: YES. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause
of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an
attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless
the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of
their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is
limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a
lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful
purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to
his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally.
It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a
gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the
strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings
fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the
foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it
was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent’s professional competence and legal advice were
not being attacked in said case.
48. Regala v Sandiganbayan
Facts: The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corporations entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus Eduardo Cojuangco, etal
Among the dependants named in the case are herein petitioners Teodoro Regala and et al and the law firm
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA
Law Firm performed legal services for its clients. It was alleged that the latter plotted, devised, schemed conspired
and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC,
and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corporation
shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious
means and machinations. ACCRA asked for their exclusion and said that they will not disclose the names of its
clients because of attorney-client privilege but respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners
executed in favor of its client covering their respective shareholdings.
Sandiganbayan denied such exclusion and ACCRA filed a petition for certiorari alleging that The Honorable
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-
client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.
Issue: Wether or not the non disclosure of the lawfirm of the name of its clients proper
Ruling: Yes. It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint.
Petitioners are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their
duties as lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners’ inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as
leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such
being the case, respondent PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere agent or
servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client. A lawyer is also
as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from and superior to those of an
ordinary agent. Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a “quasi-judicial office” since he is
in fact an officer of the Court and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to
his client. Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that
breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of
necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is
an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the
general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood. Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the
subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.” He cannot be
obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. For instance, the peculiar facts
and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corporation, prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a
lawyer’s claim to the effect that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to
civil litigation.
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the
general rule. For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if it is
relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. Moreover, where the
nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to
be confidential, the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise
result in disclosure of the entire transaction. From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce
that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice
in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings which
is the third condition asked by PCGG in the facts. under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name
would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.   The
utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer’s loyalty to
his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends
even after the termination of the relationship.
Dissenting (Davide Jr): The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially vested
in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the issue of “interest” (§2,
Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an indispensable party has not been joined, or whether there is a
misjoinder of parties (§7, 8, and 9, Id.), is raised. The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is
not a cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a witness (§24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
and may only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness, as
when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to such confidential communication or advice, or is
being otherwise judicially coerced to produce, through subpoenae duces tecum or otherwise, letters or other
documents containing the same privileged matter.
(Puno J)The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes.” In the
well chosen words of retired Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire. As a general rule, the attorney-client
privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity. As a general rule, the attorney-client
privilege does not include the right of non-disclosure of client identity.
Separete opninion (Vitug) I see in the case before us, given the attendant circumstances already detailed in the
ponencia, a situation of the Republic attempting to establish a case not on what it perceives to be the strength of
its own evidence but on what it could elicit from a counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for the
Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly disguised
threat of incrimination.

49. People vs Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)

FACTS:
Respondent Paredes, who was formerly the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and
Congressman applied for and was granted a free patent over a vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled
because it has been reserved as school site. The Court found that Paredes had obtained title through fraudulent
misrepresentations, and somebody filed a case of perjury against him. However, the case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription. Later, another case was filed against him for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands
officials to favorably act on his application for patent. Atty. Sansaet represented him in all his cases.
Paredes contends that he has already been charged under the same set of facts and evidence where such
complaint has already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already attached. Paredes presented court
records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment in the perjury case. However, the documents were found to be
falsified, in conspiracy with the counsel and clerk of court where the perjury case was filed. Teofilo Gelacio claims
that no notice of arraignment was received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, another case was filed for
falsification of judicial records. Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against Paredes, claiming to have
induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by having him falsify the
documents. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer
could not testify against his own client.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet is barred by attorney-client privilege.
RULING:
No. There is no privileged communication because the privilege applies only if the information was relayed by the
client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is when the communication was given, not when
the lawyer was made to testify. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply as the facts and the actuations of both
respondents constitute an exception to the rule. It may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with the criminal cases since the latter served as his
counsel. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but
extends as well to information communication by other means. However, the announced intention of a client to
commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. The testimony
sought from Sansaet as state witness are communications made to him by physical acts or accompanying words.
The confidential communications made by Paredes to Sinsuat were for purposes of and in reference to the crime
of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes. Having been made for purposes of future
offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

50. CASTILLO VS SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PH

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against several persons one of which is petitioner. It alleged that “Defendant GREGORIO
R. CASTILLO acted as a dummy, nominee and/or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Modesto Enriquez, Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, Rebecco Panlilio, Erlinda Enriquez Panlilio and Leandro Enriquez in
establishing Hotel properties Inc. in order to acquire beneficial interest and control, and conceal ownership, of
Silahis International Hotel” as well as “Gregorio R. Castillo in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of their close relationship with the latter Defendant
spouses, in order to enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff, devised several schemes and strategems"
Petitioner (died), represented by his heirs, filed to Dismiss on the ground that the Complaint against him is
violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and pursuant to the SC’s decision in Regala vs.
Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Republic contends that the ruling in Regala does not apply, because in said case, there was a clear
finding that the ACCRA lawyers were impleaded as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
clients as shown by the PCGG’s willingness to cut a deal with the ACCRA lawyers – the names of their clients in
exchange for exclusion from the complaint. In the present case, continues the respondent Republic, petitioner is
being sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy with the other defendants in the commission of the act
complained of, and he is not being required to name his clients.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege
RULING: YES. THE SC FOUND FOR PETITIONER
The fact of the lawyer-client relationship between petitioner and defendants Enriquezes and Panlilios was
immediately raised by petitioner. In the same vein, in Regala the professional relationship was raised merely as a
defense by defendant lawyers and was not yet proved during the trial. Notwithstanding, the SC struck out the
complaint against the lawyers.
What is clear from the complaint is that defendant is being sued as principal defendant for being in conspiracy
with the other defendants in the commission of the acts complained of.
In the case of Regala. In overruling the Republic’s position, this Court ruled:
"An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at
this stage of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait until they are called to testify and examine
as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But petitioners are not
mere witnesses. They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They have made their
position clear from the very beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in
view of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right to maintain
inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality."
Additional:
The doctrine of adherence to judicial precedents or stare decisis is provided in Art. 8 of the Civil Code. The doctrine
is enunciated thus:
"The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.”

51. DALISAY vs. ATTY. MAURICIO, JR.

FACTS: Valeriana U. Dalisay engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044. Notwithstanding his
receipt of documents and attorneys fees, respondent never rendered legal services. As a result, she terminated the
attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money, but respondent refused. The Supreme Court
in its Decision, found respondent guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct and suspended him from the practice
of law for a period of six months.
Upon learning of the Court’s decision, respondent verified the status of Civil Case No. 00-044. He learned
of the trial court’s Decision holding that the tax declarations and title submitted by complainant are not official
records. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn Affidavit Complaint against complainant alleging that complainant
offered tampered evidence. The respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration for the Supreme Court
Decision and argued that complainant did not engage his services as counsel, and that complainant offered
tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file falsification cases against her.
ISSUE: WON the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
HELD: No. The Court explained that once a lawyer accepts money from a client, an attorney-client relationship is
established. Assuming that complainant indeed offered falsified documentary evidence, it will not be sufficient to
exonerate the respondent. Consistent with the mandate of Canon 19 that a lawyer shall represent his client with
zeal and only within the bounds of the law, Rule 19.02 of the same Canon specifically provides that a lawyer who
has received information that his clients has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the
relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
As a lawyer, respondent is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted
complainant and asked her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If complainant refuses, then he should
terminate his relationship with her.

52. Lee vs. Simando

A.C. No. 9537 June 10, 2013
FACTS: Respondent was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee. Respondent went to see Dr. Lee and asked if
the latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his needed funds. Mejorado was Respondent’s
client in a case claiming rewards against the Bureau of Customs. Dr. Lee initially refused to lend money but
Respondent persisted and assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation. He even offered to be the co-maker of
Mejorado and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Due to Respondent's persistence, his
daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr. Lee, the latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to
give Mejorado sizeable amounts of money. When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated
demands, Mejorado failed and refused to comply with his obligation. Since Respondent was still her lawyer then,
Dr. Lee instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado. Respondent said he would get in touch with
Mejorado and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action. However, even after several
months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked Respondent why no payment has been made yet.
Dr. Lee then reminded Respondent that he was supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to
which he replied: "Di kasuhan din ninyo ako!" Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her
and failed to bring legal actions against Mejorado. Thus, complainant was forced to terminate her contract with
Respondent and demand payment from him as well.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interest.
RULING: YES. Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of representing
conflicting interest: One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to
be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to
use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party (complainant as creditor)
against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is prohibited from
representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflict with that of his present or former client. Respondent’s assertion that there is no
conflict of interest because complainant and respondent are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince. His
representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at
the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered into by the
complainant and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso when
he signed as co-maker.

53. Zalamea vs. De Guzman, Jr.

Facts: In 2000, petitioners Zalamea brothers sought respondent Atty. De Guzman, Jr.’s advice on the properties of
their ailing mother, Merlinda L. Zalamea. When Merlinda died, De Guzman then prepared a letter for a possible
tax-free transfer of the property to the Merlinda Holding Corporation which was sought to be incorporated to
handle Merlinda’s estate, and notarized the incorporation papers of said corporation. In September 2001, the
Zalameas put up EMZEE FOODS INC., (EMZEE) a corporation engaged in lechon business, with De Guzman
providing the capital and operational funds. Sometime in 2002, Manuel Enrique, one of the brothers informed De
Guzman about the property located at Speaker Perez St. which was then under the name of Elarfoods, Inc. a
corporation owned and run by the Zalamea brothers’ aunts and uncles. Since said property had been mortgaged to
BDO, the bank foreclosed it when Elarfoods failed to pay the loan and likewise failed to redeem the property,
resulting in the consolidation of the ownership over the property in BDO’s name.
Later, petitioner approached De Guzman and convinced him to help in the reacquisition of the Speaker Perez
property from BDO. Respondent negotiated with BDO and was able to secure a deal over the property for P20
Million. The bank required 10% down payment of the total price or P2 Million, to be paid in 36 monthly
installments, without interest. Due to lack of funds on Manuel Enrique’s part, De Guzman’s wife, Angel, agreed to
shoulder the down payment in order not to lose the good opportunity, but under the condition that the Speaker
Perez property would later be transferred in the name of a new corporation they had agreed to form, the
EMZALDEK Venture Corporation, a combination of the names EMZEE Foods, Zalamea, and Dek De Guzman. By this
time, EMZEE had also relocated to Speaker Perez.Subsequently, Angel was forced to pay the monthly installments
and the additional 20% required for EMZEE to be able to transfer its office to the Speaker Perez property, since
Manuel Enrique still could not produce sufficient funds and EMZEE continued to incur losses. All in all, Angel paid
P13,082,500.00.
The relationship between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses De Guzman turned sour and the Sps. De
Guzman wanted reimbursement of the amounts which they had advanced for the corporation, while the Zalamea
brothers claimed sole ownership over the Speaker Perez property. Hence, the brothers filed a disbarment case
against De Guzman for allegedly buying a client’s property which was subject of litigation.
Issue: whether or not De Guzman should be disbarred.
Ruling: No. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney
and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.Under
Article 1491 of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited to acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction,
either in person or through the mediation of another, their client’s property and rights in litigation. The purchase
by a lawyer of his client’s property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice. The persons mentioned in Article 1491 are prohibited from purchasing said property because of an
existing trust relationship. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. The prohibition which
the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the property purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman
clearly never acquired any of his client’s properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take part by
virtue of his profession. There exists not even an iota of proof indicating that said property has ever been involved
in any litigation in which De Guzman took part by virtue of his profession. Clearly, the relationship between the
Spouses De Guzman and the Zalamea brothers is actually one of business partners rather than that of a lawyer and
client. Atty. De Guzman’s acquisition of the Speaker Perez property was a valid consequence of a business deal, not
by reason of a lawyer-client relationship, for which he could not be penalized by the Court.

54. FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA

FACTS:
o 11 Mar 1999 – Felicitas Berbano filed a sworn affidavit before the IBP and alleged the following:
o Berbano was one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo and had appointed Porfirio Daen as their attorney-in-fact
in the settlement of a land dispute against Filinvest Dev. Corp. with theCommission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) involving 244 hectare land in Alabang, Muntinlupa
o 26 Jan 1999 – Daen was arrested by a Muntinlupa police who presented an expired warrant dated Feb 1990 and
was detained at Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan Naty Sibuya, a friend, recommended Wenceslao Barcelona, her
cousin-in-law, to assist in the release of Daen
o 26 Jan 1999 - Barcelona purported that he could have Daen released the following day if he would be given
PhP50,000. Berbano gave him only PhP15,700 as it was already around 10:30PM and could only gather the money
from their relatives
o 27 Jan 1999 – At a Max's Restaurant, 12NN, Berbano handed Barcelona a pay-to-cash cheque amounting to
PhP24,000 dated 29 Jan 1999. Barcelona claimed that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept cheques but
took the cheque presented nonetheless.
o 28 Jan 1999 – Berbano gave an additional PhP10,000 in cash to Barcelona through the latter's wife. As the
cheque was allegedly not encashed according to Barcelona, PhP15,000 was given to him by Gil Daen, Porfrio's
nephew. Berbano also gave PhP1,000 for Barcelona's gasoline expenses.
o 3 Feb 1999 – Barcelona told Berbano that Daen will be released the following day.
o 4 Feb 1999 – Daen was not released and Barcelona, according to his wife, was in Mindanao attending a peace
talk with the Muslims
o After more than a week – Barcelona promised that he would return the PhP64,000 but was never heard from or
seen again by Berbano
o 15 Apr 1999 – Investigating Commissioner J. Virgilio A. Bautista of CBD IBP required Barcelona to submit
an answer to the complaint. Barcelona never submitted despite due notice received by him. return the
PhP24,0000.
ISSUE:
WON Barcelona should be disbarred.
RULING:
YES.
Court ordered the disbarment of Barcelona as he was found guilty of gross misconduct and in violating Canons 1, 7,
11, 16 and Rule 16.01 andordered that PhP64,000 be returned to the complainant within 30 days from receipt of
the notice.

55. LICUANAN VS. MELO

FACTS: Leonila Licuanan, through her counsel Atty. Melo, filed an ejectment case against Aida Pineda who
was one of her tenants. The City Court of Manila ruled for Licuanan and ordered Pineda to pay her rentals.
In the months following the favorable judgement, Pineda proceeded to pay rentals to Atty. Melo. However,
Atty. Melo did not remit the money to Licuanan. In fact, he did not even tell Licuanan about receiving them
even when Licuanan called him regularly to ask for updates regarding the ejectment case. Because
Licuanan was not receiving any of the rental payments, she filed an administrative complaint against
Pineda before the Chief of the Tuberculosis Society accusing her of moral turpitude for not paying the
rentals which the court had ordered her to pay. Of course, the complaint was found to be groundless
because Pineda was actually paying the rentals to Atty. Melo who was not remitting to Licuanan. In turn,
Pineda filed a case for damages against Licuanan because the accusation that she was not paying her
rentals had caused her humiliation. Licuanan later found out, through another counsel, about the money
paid by Pineda to Atty. Melo. Licuanan’s new counsel demandad the same from Atty. Melo who only then
remitted the rentals. (This was about a year after he actually received them.) However, he explains by
saying that he did not tell Licuanan about the money and only kept it to himself for a while because he
wanted to surprise her by his success. Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of
professional ethics.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Melo was guilty of breach of professional ethics
RULING: YES. Atty. Melo was guilty of breach of professional ethics. Respondent's actuation casts doubt on
his honesty and integrity. He must know that the "highly fiduciary" and "confidential relation" of attorney
and client requires that the attorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held
by him for the client's benefit, and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. Respondent is
guilty of breach of trust reposed in him by his client. Not only has he degraded himself but as an unfaithful
lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession. By his deceitful conduct, he placed his
client in jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a damage suit; thus, instead of being a help to his client, he
became the cause of her misery. The Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the
practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

56. Hernandez vs. Go, 450 SCRA 1 (2005)

Facts:
Sometime in 1961, complainant’s husband abandoned her and her son, Luciano S. Hernandez, Jr. Shortly
thereafter, her husband’s numerous creditors demanded payments of his loans. Fearful that the various mortgage
contracts involving her properties will be foreclosed and aware of impending suits for sums of money against her,
complainant engaged the legal services of Atty. Jose C. Go, herein respondent.
Respondent instilled in complainant a feeling of helplessness, fear, embarrassment, and social humiliation. He
advised her to give him her land titles covering Lots 848-A, 849-Q, and 849-P at Zamboanga City so he could sell
them to enable her to pay her creditors. He then persuaded her to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any
monetary or valuable consideration. Complainant agreed on condition that he would sell the lots and from the
proceeds pay her creditors.
Complainant also owned Lots 2118, 2139, and 1141-A, likewise located in Zamboanga City, which were mortgaged
to her creditors. When the mortgages fell due, respondent redeemed the lots. Again, he convinced her to execute
deeds of sale involving those lots in his favor. As a result, respondent became the registered owner of all the lots
belonging to complainant.
Sometime in 1974, complainant came to know that respondent did not sell her lots as agreed upon. Instead, he
paid her creditors with his own funds and had her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of her real
properties worth millions.
Respondent denied the allegations in the instant complaint. He averred that he sold, in good faith, complainant’s
lots to various buyers, including himself, for valuable consideration. On several occasions, he extended financial
assistance to complainant and even invited her to live with his family. His children used to call her “Lola” due to
her frequent visits to his residence. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action.
Issue:
WON Atty. Go has breached Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
Yes. A lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s financial plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his own
benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession;
Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, he deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.—Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too light. It bears reiterating that a lawyer who takes advantage of his client’s financial
plight to acquire the latter’s properties for his own benefit is destructive of the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Thus, for violation of Canon 16 and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which constitutes gross misconduct, and consistent with the need to maintain the high
standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the
ultimate penalty, that of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

57. Businos vs. Ricafort

Facts:
In a sworn complaint for disbarment dated 31 October 1994 but received by us on 21 November 1994,
complainant Lourdes R. Busiños charged respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort, a practicing lawyer in Oas, Albay with
having committed the crime of estafa under Article 315(1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code by misappropriating the
sum of P32,000.00. Of this amount, P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for deposit in the bank account of
complainant's husband, while P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent demanded from complainant
supposedly for a bond in Civil Case No. 5814, when no such bond was required. Instead, however, of depositing the
money, respondent converted the money to his own personal use, and despite several demands, he failed to
return the same to complainant.
Issue: Whether or not counsel is guilty of unlawful retention of the funds of his client
Ruling:
Yes. Plainly, respondent breached Section 25 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules
16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of
his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others
kept by him.
Rule 16.03. — A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees
and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on
all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Respondent's transgressions manifested dishonesty and amounted to grave misconduct and grossly unethical
behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to respondent, but to the noble profession to which he belongs, for it
cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.

58. Quilban v. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 (1989)

Facts:
The Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the investigation of Atty.
Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over
members of the Bar unworthy to practice law.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of
Appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attorney’s fees was on a contingent basis
—if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they will give him a portion of the property subject matter of
the litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; and that
while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court
cannot pass judgment on Complainants’ plea that the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as
this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate
the money in his possession (P62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it until his attorney’s fees are satisfied there
being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of Complainants’ adamant refusal to pay him; that there was no
previous notice to him of his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his (Robinol’s)
formal withdrawal and conformity.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Robinol is guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct for having retained in his
possession his clients’ funds intended for a specific purpose.
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to
continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his
clients and he had received the latter’s funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the
payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he
alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his
clients’ money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it
was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence.
They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to
be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain
the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost
confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was
duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his
clients’ funds intended for a specific purpose—the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.

59. Rayos v Hernandez

Facts: Atty. Ponciano Hernandez was the lawyer of Francisco Rayos in a case wherein the latter sued the
government when NAPOCOR, recklessly opened three floodgates during the Pading Typhoon, which resulted to
the death of 10 of his family members. He won the cases and damages were awarded to him. However, the check
was turned over to Atty, Hernandez as he was his counsel. When Rayos, asked it from him, Hernandez refused to
give the same. On 24 January 1994 , petitioner filed with the RTC a motion 8 to direct respondent to deliver to him
the check issued by NAPOCOR, corresponding to the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner sought
to recover the check in the amount of P1,060,800.00 from respondent, claiming that respondent had no authority
to receive the same as he was already dismissed by petitioner as his counsel on 21 November 1993. Respondent,
on the other hand, justifies his retention as a means to ensure payment of his attorney’s fees. A writ of execution
was issued later on, however, despite this, Hernandez still refused. However, on 4 July 1994, respondent deposited
the amount of P502,838.79 with Farmers Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., Norzagaray, Bulacan, in the name of
petitioner which was eventually received by the latter.
Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of respondent to return the rest of the
award in the amount of P557,961.21. According to the respondent, he had been the petitioner’s lawyer for 15
years and that he was entitled to such money because they had a verbal contract wherein Rayos agreed to give
him 60 percent of the award of damages.
Issue: Is the respondent justified in retaining the amount awarded to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951 to assure
payment of his attorney’s fees?
Ruling: NO. Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client constitute trust funds
and must be immediately paid over to the client. When Atty. Hernandez withheld and refused to deliver the check,
he breached the trust reposed on him. The claim that Rayos failed to pay his attorney’s fees is not an excuse for
Atty. Hernandez’ failure to deliver the amount. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s
money for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees. The failure of an attorney to
return the client’s money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own
use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
It is true that under Canon 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, an attorney has the following rights:
Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he
shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
But the fact alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve
him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. Thus, what respondent should have properly done was to provide the petitioner with an accounting
before deducting his attorney’s fees and then to turn over the remaining balance of the award collected.
The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust and confidence. An
attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship vis-à-vis his client. Respondent fell
far short of this standard. Respondent had, in fact, placed his private and personal interest above that of his client.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely; Respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to thirty-five
percent (35%) of the total amount awarded 51 to petitioner in Civil Case No. SM-951;

60. Barnachea vs Quincho

FACTS: Barnachea filed a complaint for breach of lawyerclient relations against respondent Atty . Edwin T .
Quiocho. Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for the latter to cause the transfer under
her name of the title over a property previously owned by her sister , Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea.
However , despite the lapse of almost two months, respondent failed to secure title over the property in
favor of complainant. The latter demanded that respondent refund to her the amount of P41,280.00 and return
the documents which she earlier entrusted to him. Complainant received a letter from respondent informing
her that he had failed to cause the transfer of the property under her name and that he was returning
the documents and title she had entrusted to him and refunding to her the amount of P41,280.00.
Respondent told complainant that he needed more time to fund the check. However, respondent failed to
fund the check despite the demands of complainant.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: YES.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may come to his possession. He
is a trustee to said funds and property. He is to keep the funds of his client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the
registration of a deed with the Register of Deeds and for expenses and fees for the transfer of title over
real property under the name of his client if not utilized, must be returned immediately to his client upon
demand therefor . The lawyers failure to return the money of his client upon demand gave rise to a
presumption that he has misappropriated said money in violation of the trust reposed on him. The
conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and
a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very delicate, exacting and
confidential character . A lawyer is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an attorney an absolute abdication of
every personal advantage conflicting in any way , directly or indirectly , with the interest of his client. In
this case, respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard expected of him.
In view of the foregoing, He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 1 year with a stern warning that a
repetition ofthe same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely .

61. Natividad Navarro and Hilda Presbitero vs. Ivan Solidum A.C. No. 9872
Facts: Hilda S. Presbitero and Natividad P. Navarro filed a disbarment case against Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
Presbitero and her other daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, engaged in the services of Solidum for each of their own
cases concerning land. Yulo, pursuant to her land registration case, convinced Navarro to finance the expenses.
Navarro paid Php200, 000 for the registration expenses, but later learned that the property was already registered
in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Meanwhile, Solidum obtained two loans of Php1,000,000.00 from Navarro and
one loan of Php1,000,000.00 to finance his sugar trading business, securing them with postdated checks and
drafting a MOA in each.
Solidum was able to pay complainants a total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the
principal amount or the interest thereon. The checks issued by Solidum to the complainants could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were already closed. When complainants called
Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a
reduction of the interest for the succeeding months. Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to grant him
loans by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn
against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity and
value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a different property from that which he owned.
Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for Php1,000,000.00
but he later sold it for only Php150,000.00.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts were already
closed.
Issue: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the
CPR. Solidum was disbarred from the practice of law.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the complainants. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when
he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that the interest rate
was unconscionable. It was also established that respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to
Presbitero for P1,000,000.00, but he later sold the property for only P150,000.00, showing that he deceived his
client as to the real value of the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually
rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son,
Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants knew that he could
no longer open a current bank account, and that they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him.
However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account
belonged to him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to
Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero
through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his client, Presbitero.
Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it
turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued
were not drawn from his account but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the
MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable.
Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed.
The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability
to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent
took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

62. Quirante vs IAC

Facts: Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named Norman Guerrero. Philippine
American General Insurance Co. Inc. (Philamgen) acted as bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerrero's failure to
perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante,
sued both Guerrero and Philamgen. Philamgen filed a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification. RTC ruled
in favor of Dr. Indalecio Casasola by rescinding the contract ordering Guerrero and Philamgen to pay actual
damages of P129,430, moral damages of P50,000, exemplary damages of P40,000 and attorney's fees of P30,000
ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300/day from December 15, 1978 to July 16,
1979 and ordering Philamgen to pay  Dr. Casasola the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000. Petition
to quash the writ of execution and to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal was dismissed.
In the mean time, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as survivors. Quirante filed a
motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an
oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola that in case of recovery of the surety bond  - P30K and in
case of damages excess of the surety bond, divided equally between the heirs, Atty. Quirante and Atty. Cruz. . RTC
granted the motion for confirmation.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Ruling: No. Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the
Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in
which the services of counsel have been rendered ."  It also rests on the assumption that the court trying the case
is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. The rule against
multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved. 
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item
of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant,
not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for
attorney's fees by execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional
services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors. In filing the motion for
confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper
remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of
attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in
this Court (G.R. No. 64834) "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total
amount of damages" awarded by the trial court.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the
determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure
gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Thus, it was ruled that:... an attorney's fee
cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the
disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been recovered from which
the fee is to be paid. 

63. Tanhueco v De Dumo (1989)

Facts:
In 1975, Hilaria Tanhueco filed a Petition for Disbarment against Justiniano G. de Dumo for having violated
the Canons of Professional Ethics. The case was referred to the Solicitor General. He made the following findings:
Tanhueco secured the legal services of respondent to collect indebtedness from her different debtors.
Although she offered to execute a document evidencing their lawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it
was not necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to collect from the debtors.
Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her P2,000.00, Pl,300.00, and P3,000.00 on three
separate occasions. Respondent did not pay those loans
 Atty. Justiniano G. de Dumo testified that complainant indeed secured his legal services to collect from
her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect. He thus filed collection cases
against Tipace Mañosca Morena, Jr., and others, and was able to obtain favorable judgment. The initial payments
made were all given to complainant. With respect to Mañosca respondent obtained a judgment for P19,000.00
although the debt was only P12,000.00. Because complainant filed a complaint against him with Malacañang which
referred the matter to Camp Crame, he terminated his relationship with complainant and demanded his attorney's
fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected. Complainant refused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over
to her the P12,000.00 initial payment of Mañosca which he considered, or applied, as part payment of his
attorney's fee. Respondent estimated his attorney's fee due from complainant in the amount of P17,000.00
The Sol Gen recommended: “For failure to turn over the amount of P12,000.00 to the complainant, and
applying it as his attorney's fees, respondent Atty. Justiniano G. de Dumo be severely reprimanded and admonished
that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.”
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Dumo deserves to be reprimanded and admonished?
Ruling:
No, he deserves to be suspended for six months. Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment
rendered in favor of his client, constitute trust funds and must, be immediately paid over to the client. Canon 11
of the Canons of Professional Ethics 5 then in force, provides as follows:
11. Dealing with trust property.
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be
comingled with his own or be used by him.
The claim of the respondent that complainant had failed to pay his attorney's fees, is not an excuse for
respondent's failure to deliver any amount to the complainants. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on
moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his duty promptly to account for the moneys
received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
In the present case, what respondent could have properly done was to make an account with his client,
the complainant, deduct his attorney's fees due in respect of the amount actually collected by him, and turn over
the remaining balance to the complainant. The Court notes that the services of respondent de Dumo were
engaged by the complainant on a number of cases and that these were on differing stages of completion.
Respondent was not entitled to hold on to the entire amount of P12,000.00 collected by him until all his fees for
the other cases had also been paid and received by him. There was not enough evidence in the record to show
how much money, if any, respondent had in fact previously collected for and turned over to complainant without
deducting therefrom his claimed contingent fees in respect of such collections.
Respondent had in fact placed his private and personal interest above that of his client. Respondent's act
constitutes a breach of his lawyer's oath and a mere reprimand is not an adequate sanction.

15% vs. 50% Contingent fees

There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot gloss over. In this jurisdiction, contingent fees
are not per se prohibited by law. But when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee are obtained by undue
influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is
clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party.
We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly
excessive and unconscionable. Such a fee structure, when considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this
case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon
her.
The complainant was an old and sickly woman and, in respondent's own words, "penniless." She was at
the time she filed her complaint in 1976, already seventy-six (76) years old. In her circumstances, and given her
understandable desire to realize upon debts owed to her before death overtook her, she would easily succumb to
the demands of respondent attorney regarding his attorney's fees. It must be stressed that the mere fact that an
agreement had been reached between attorney and client fixing the amount of the attorney's fees, does not
insulate such agreement from review and modification by the Court where the fees clearly appear to be excessive
or unreasonable.
This Court has power to guard a client, especially an aged and necessitous client, against such a contract.
We hold that on a quantum meruit basis, no circumstances of special difficulty attending the collection cases
having been shown by respondent, respondent attorney's fees should be reduced 15% of the total amount
(including attorney's fees stipulated as chargeable to the debtors) collected by him on behalf of his client.
Note: When this resolution came out, Complainant Tanhueco already passed away. Return of the amounts and the
documents was ordered to be made to her estate.

64. ALBANO v COLOMA

FACTS: A proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma,
a member of the Philippine Bar. In his letter complaint, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation,
he and his mother retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in a civil case. After which
came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to
expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another
lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney’s fees.
It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised that respondent presented to exhibit a document
showing that they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her contingent fee of whatever could be
recovered in damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma should be dismissed.

RULING: YES. If there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in the Civil
Case who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their
agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she
had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn
the authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees.

A counsel who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time
and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to
escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the
party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It
views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-
earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.

65. Metroploitan Bank vs CA

Facts:
Celedonio Javier bought 7 parcels of land owned by Eustaquio Alejandro, et al., with a total area of about
10 hectares. 
Properties were mortgaged by Javier with Metrobank to secure a loan obligation of one Felix Angelo
Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. Javier defaulted. Metrobank foreclosed the properties.
Alejandro, on the other hand, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation committed against him by
Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought suits against Javier et al., and included Metrobank as defendant
therein. AAA’s services were already acquired here.
While the case was pending, Metrobank sold the properties to its sister company, Service Leasing
Corporation on March 23, 1983 for the purported price of P600,000.00. SLC, on the other hand, sold the property
to another company and the cycle went on.
Metrobank, no longer the possessor of the properties, moved for substitution of party on July 28, 1983.
AAA had no knowledge about this. AAA only knew when Metrobank filed its motion. Thus, they filed on
August 16, 1983 a verified motion to enter in the records of the aforesaid civil cases its charging lien, pursuant to
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties as its attorney's fees. This was granted by the TC because of Metrobank’s
failure to appear.
The Alejandro case was subsequently dismissed as well.
On May 28,1984, AAA filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated
an exchange of arguments between the parties. (dismissal of the Alejandro case, etc.)
Metrobank: paid in full.
AAA: P50,000.00 given by Metrobank could not be considered as full payment but merely a cash advance
Negotiations up to P600,000.00 were even made to evade court litigation but to no avail.
Issue: Whether or not the legal fees charged by AAA are reasonable.
HELD: No.
On the matter of attorney's liens Section 37, Rule 138 provides:
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions
issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered
to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.
Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's
fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment
secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the
necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due his
client in the action from which the fee is to be paid. .
In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs "in view of the
frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for any money judgment nor made any
monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of petitioner who was a defendant therein. This being so,
private respondent's supposed charging lien is, under our rule, without any legal basis. It is flawed by the fact that
there is nothing to generate it and to which it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary lien arises and
attaches to real or personal property.
NOTE: Quantum meruit means as much as the lawyer deserves or such amount which his services merit.
It is essential for the proper operation of the principle that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one
sought to be charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
performing the task is expecting to be paid compensation therefor. The doctrine of quantum meruit is a device to
prevent undue enrichment based on equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without
paying for it. (Agpalo, R. (2010). LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS. QC: Rex Printing Company, Inc.)

66. ROXAS V DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.

FACTS:
1977, the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis for parcels of
land belonging to them situated in Antipolo, Rizal with a total land area of 1, 790, 570.36 The Zuzuarreguis
engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor. They executed a Letter-Agreement
dated April 22, 1983 which indicated that the contingent fees that the lawyers will receive at P11 or more per
square meter is thirty percent of the just compensation. The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued and
on October 29, 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered fixing the just compensation to be paid to the
Zuzuarreguis at P30 per square meter. The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the lowering of the amount
of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws. Pending the resolution of the MFR filed by the NHA, a
joint special power of attorney was executed by the Zuzuarreguis in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor. On December
10, 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between the Zuzuarreguis and Attys. Roxas and Pastor which
fixed the just compensation due the Zuzuarreguis at P17, and anything in excess of that shall be the contingent
fees of Attys. Roxas and Pastor for their legal services. Resolution No. 1174 dated December 16, 1985, issued by
the NHA, stated that the property would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 per square meter and that it will be paid
in NHA Bonds which the yield would be based on the Central Bank rate atthe time of the payment. As a result of
the NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed and it was approved by the Court in a Decision dated
December 20, 1985. Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a
total price of P34, 916, 122. The total amount released by the NHA was P54, 500, 00. The difference of P19, 583,
878 is, undoubtedly, the yield of the bonds. The amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted
to P30, 520, 000 in NHA bonds. On August 25, 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel to Attys.
Roxas and Pastor demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by
the NHA within a period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action. The RTC
dismissed the complaint. The Zuzuarreguis filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals ordered Attys. Roxas and
Pastor to return to the plaintiffs the amount of P12, 596, 425, already deducting the reasonable attorney’s fees in
the amount of P4,4 76,426.275.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the contingent fees were reasonable?
RULING:
No. Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their
professional services.
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:
a contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to
the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only
reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and
unconscionable (Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront
one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. Therefore, the power to determine the reasonableness of
attorney’s fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts. In the
instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which is equal to 44% of the just
compensation paid by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the
expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is undeniably excessive.

67. MASMUD VS. NLRC

FACTS: Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on behalf of her late husband against First Victory Shipping Services
for non-payment of permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowances, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees of his late husband. In consideration of Atty Go’s legal services, her husband agreed
to pay attorney’s fees on a contingent basis, as follows: 20% of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an
additional 10% in case of appeal. The Labor Arbiter granted the monetary claims. However her husband’s
employer appealed it with the NLRC. The appeal was denied and affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The surety
bond of the employer was garnished and Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina. The
Labor Arbiter directed the NLRC Cashier to release the said amount of P3,454,079 to Evangelina and P680,000 to
Atty. Go. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record an enforce attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina reneged
on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the P680,000, equivalent to 20% of the award as
attorney’s fees, thus , leaving a balance of 10% pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s fees. Evangelina manifested
that Atty. Go’s claim for 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labour
Code.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Go’s compensation is under the concept of attorney’s fees governed by Sec. 24, Rule 138 of
ROC or under the extraordinary concept governed by Article 111 of the Labour code.
RULING: YES. Atty. Go’s compensation should be governed by Sec.24, Rule 138 of the ROC. The retainer contract
between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the determination of
the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. Attorney’s fees are
unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. In the case at bar, considering
that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate compensation
for his efforts. The fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to
secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal
profession. However, we agree with the CA decision on reducing the award of attorney’s fees pointing out Canon
20, Rule 20.01 of the CPR as basis in assessing the proper amount that a lawyer should receive.
Canon 20 A Lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Rule 20.01 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a. The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b. The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
c. The importance of the subject matter;
d. The skill demanded;
e. The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f. The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chpter to which he belongs;
g. The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h. The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i. The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j. The professional standing of the lawyer.
k.
68. URBAN BANK vs. ATTY. PEÑA
FACTS: An administrative case for disbarment was filed by complainant Urban Bank, Inc., a commercial bank,
against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña. Complainant charges that respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice
and gross misconduct in violation of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court. The allegations of the
Complaint in support of the accusation are as follows:
"3. Last 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land located along Roxas Boulevard from the Isabela
Sugar Company ("ISC" for brevity). One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the
occupants found in said property. This condition was incorporated in the Contract to Sell and adopted in the
subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between ISC and Complainant dated 15 November 1994 and
29 Novemebr 1994, respectively.
4. To fully implement the abovementioned condition, ISC engaged the services of herein Respondent Atty.
Magdaleno M. Peña. This was communicated by ISC to Respondent in a Memorandum dated 20 November 1994
and relayed to Complainant in a Letter dated 19 December 1994.
5. Respondent accepted the engagement of his services by ISC and he proceeded to take the necessary steps to
evict the occupants of the property subject of the sale.
6. During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Respondent about the necessity of a letter of
authority in favor of the latter, granting him the authority to represent Complainant in maintaining possession of
the aforesaid property and to represent Complainant in any court action that may be instituted in connection with
the exercise of said duty.
7. Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-authority dated 15 December 1994, but only after
making it very clear to the Respondent that it was ISC which contracted his services and not Complainant. This
clarification was communicated to Respondent by Atty. Corazon M. Bejasa and Mr. Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Senior
Vice-President and Vice-President, respectively of Complainant bank in a letter addressed to respondent dated 15
December 1994. A copy of said letter is attached hereto and made an integral part of this Complaint as Annex "E".
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice of his
profession as member of the bar.
RULING: NO. The evidence on record showed that respondent successfully performed his task of evicting the
tenants and intruders in the property in question. More so, no less than Senior Vice-President Corazon Bejasa was
very thankful for his job well done. Complainant benefited from respondent’s task and for a period of fifty (50)
days no behest or complaint was received by the respondent from the complainant. It was only when payment for
his legal services was demanded that complainant re-acted when it is incumbent upon the benefactor of services
that just compensation should be awarded.
It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to
institute an action before the proper court and such actuation of the respondent herein did not constitute deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct.
To be sure, no evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct was adduced by the
complainant. It is axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus of validating it. In disbarment proceedings,
the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former
establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. 7 In this regard, we find that complainant failed
to meet the required standard.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

69. Corpus vs CA and David

FACTS:
The defendant was charged administratively by several employees of the Central Bank Export Department of which
the defendant is the director. Pending the investigation, he was suspended from office. After the investigating
committee found the administrative charges to be without merit, and subsequently recommended the immediate
reinstatement of the defendant, the then Governor of Central Bank, recommended that the defendant is
considered resigned as on the ground that he had lost confidence in him.
The defendant filed the CFI of Manila a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto with preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages against Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., the Central Bank and Mario Marcos who was
appointed to the position of the defendant. Judge Lantin dismissed a case for failure to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to the herein defendant.  After they talked about the defendants having lost his case before
Judge Lantin, and knowing that the plaintiff and the defendant were both members of the Civil Liberties Union,
Rafael Corpus requested the plaintiff to go over the case and further said that he would send his son, the herein
defendant, to the plaintiff to find out what could be done about the case. The defendant called up the plaintiff for
an appointment, and the plaintiff agreed to meet him in the latter’s office. At said conference, the defendant
requested the plaintiff to handle the case because of Atty. Alvarez had already been disenchanted and wanted to
give up the case. Although at first reluctant to handle the case, the plaintiff finally agreed on the condition that he
and Atty. Alverez would collaborate in the case.
 
ISSUE: W/N private respondent Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney’s fees.
RULING:
YES. While there was an express agreement between petitioner Corpus and respondent David as regards
attorney’s fees, the facts of the case support the position of respondent David that there was at least an implied
agreement for the payment of attorney’s fees. Petitioner’s act of giving the check to respondent David indicates
petitioner’s commitment to pay the former attorney’s fees. It is patent then that respondent David agreed to
render professional services to petitioner Corpus secondarily for a professional fee. Thereafter, respondent David
continued to render legal services to petitioner Corpus, in collaboration with Atty. Alverez until he and Atty.
Alvarez secured the decision directing petitioner’s reinstatement with back salaries.
Moreover, the payment of attorney’s fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue of the innominate
contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that “no one shall unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another.” innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by
providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general
provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate
contracts, and by the customs of the people.
It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the parties for the employment of the
plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other innominate contract was entered into but whether the plaintiffs services
were solicited or whether they were offered to the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were
accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the
rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services to make
compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render service as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the
other to pay for the service rendered, is thereby incurred.

70. Malvar v Kraft Foods

Facts: Czarina T. Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against respondents Kraft Food
Philippines, Inc. (KFPI) and/or Bienvenido Bautista.

While her appeal was pending in the SC, she and respondents entered into a compromise agreement, whereby she
was paid P40,000,000 in addition to the P14,252,192.12 earlier paid to her. She later filed a motion to
dismiss/withdraw case but before it could be acted upon, a motion for intervention to protect attorney’s rights
was filed by the law firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its counsel, retired SC Associate Justice Josue N.
Bellosillo. The motion sought, among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly and
severally the intervenor’s contingent fees.

In opposing the motion, Malvar claimed that the intervenor lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it had
ceased to exist after Atty. Marwil N. Llasos resigned from the intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became barred
from private practice upon his appointment to a position in a government subsidiary. They both personally
handled her case. Besides, their dismissal was based on a justifiable cause.
Issue: Does this contention find merit?
Ruling: No. In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just
fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the
intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by offering
excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell short of being justifiable.

The letter Malvar addressed to Retired Justice Bellosillo, who represented the intervenor, debunked her
allegations of unsatisfactory legal service because she thereby lavishly lauded the intervenor for its dedication and
devotion to the prosecution of her case and to the protection of her interests. Also significant was that the
attorney-client relationship between her and the intervenor was not severed upon Atty. Dasal’s appointment to
public office and Atty. Llasos’ resignation from the law firm.

In other words, the intervenor remained as her counsel of record, for, as we held in Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo
and Africa v. Eastern Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 104600, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 566, 574, a
client who employs a law firm engages the entire law firm; hence, the resignation, retirement or separation
from the law firm of the handling lawyer does not terminate the relationship, because the law firm is bound to
provide a replacement.
The stipulations of the written agreement between Malvar and the intervenors, not being contrary to law, morals,
public policy, public order or good customs, were valid and binding on her. They expressly gave rise to the right of
the intervenor to demand compensation.

In a word, she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations toward the Intervenor, for Article 1159
of the Civil Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties and
should be complied with in good faith
71. Balingit vs Cervantes an Delarmente
Facts:
Balangit’s two sons, Jose and Carlo figured in a collision with a car driven by Alizadeh. Carlo suffered serious
injuries and Jose was pronounced dead on arrival. An information for criminal negligence was filed against
Alizadeh.

Balingit engaged the services of Atty. Cervantes and Delarmente for the separate civil case and administrative case
against Alizadeh. Atty. Cervantes sent a demand letter to Alizadeh for the payment of 2 million pesos + 25%
thereof as attorney’s fees.
Meanwhile, Atty. Cervantes prepared an agreement embodying the terms of agreement with Balangit for his legal
services. Among others, the agreement provided a payment of 30k acceptance fee, 4k appearance fee, 20%
success fee, and office fees for the account of Balangit.
Balangit did not sign the agreement, but paid 45k as partial acceptance fee for the filing of the civil suit. Cervantes
also received 10k from Balangit’s daughter in law without issuing any receipt.
Despite the payments, the respondents still failed to file the separate civil suit agreed upon. During the criminal
case, the parties agreed to compromise on the amount of 1 million pesos. Learning of this, Atty. Cervantes sent a
demand letter to Balangit seeking 100k as attorney’s fees and appearance fees of 5k.
Balangit refused to pay prompting Cervantes to file a case against him for estafa.
Issue: W/N respondents violated the CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. They violated Canons 15, 16, 17, and 18.
Firstly, they failed to file the separate civil action for damages against Alizadeh despite receipt of payments from
Balangit.
Secondly, Atty. Cervantes demanded payment of 5k as appearance fee and 10% of the settlement of 1milion as
success fee even though such award was from the criminal case, and not the civil case agreed upon. It is highly
improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his clients which were never mentioned nor
agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services.
Assuming he was entitled to the fees, his manner of enforcement was improper. Rule 20 provides that lawyers
should avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensiation and should only resort to judicial action to
prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
The manner of enforcement is by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the main action in which his service
was rendered. For example, the filiing of a motion for intervention or an independent civil action against his client
is permissible.
In this case however, Atty Cervantes chose to file a criminal case for estafa which the court cannot countenance.

72. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS C. DOMINGO, SR., CONSUELO DOMINGO DE LOPEZ vs. PEDRO A.
AQUINO G.R. No. L-28078 April 29, 1971
FACTS:
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro
A. Aquino against the petitioner estate by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria,
"to pay from the available funds of the estate to Pedro A. Aquino." On appeal, the court found the claim to be
valid. According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A.
Unson, did not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but
the estate's attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and
Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate
court. Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March 9, 1967, with the appellate court an
"Appearance with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating  inter alia, that
the former special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as such with the permission of
the intestate court, that the other co-special administrator, Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the
prosecution of the appeal) was removed from his trust by the intestate court's order dated May 21, 1963, for
having squandered cash funds of the estate, and that as a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was
appointed judicial administratrix and has since been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial
administratrix wished to file a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the clerk of
court be directed to serve copy of said judgment on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special
administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of time to move for re-hearing or reconsideration;" and praying
that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her
counsel be served with copy of the appellate court's decision.
ISSUE: Was it proper for petitioners to substitute counsels without informing the court?
HELD:
NO. One vital factor that the present administratrix, Mrs. Lopez, has obviously failed to appreciate,
wittingly or otherwise, is that the party in the Subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C.
Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The fact that his services
were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as administrator, did not make him the personal
counsel of Luis. Thus, nothwithstanding Luis' removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the
estate as counsel in the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until
the new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.

The representations made by the present administrator and her counsel in the petition at bar — filed
almost five months after the appellate court's denial of her belated motion for substitution and to be served with
copy of its decision — to the effect that the appellate court had granted respondent "new and further relief" in its
decision by the award of compound interest on the sum due respondent are deplorable. They failed to set out
before the Court the full facts, viz, that respondent had duly prayed for the award of compound interest by the
intestate court in accordance with the very stipulation of the promissory note sued upon; that respondent had
duly moved the intestate court to reconsider its decision failing to provide for such compound interest; that the
intestate court, in denying respondent's motion, merely stated "that the issue may just as well be decided in the
appellate court, since both parties had indicated their intention to appeal; and that respondent in fact filed his
appeal from this adverse portion of the intestate court's decision, as well as the non-award of the stipulated
attorney's fees of P500.00. The appellate court therefore properly modified the intestate court's decision by
awarding such compound interest and attorney's fees as prayed for in the errors assigned in respondent's brief as
appellant. It results clearly that the petition, alleging and praying that the appellate court's decision of January 20,
1967, be declared null and void for having been rendered and entered in excess of or without jurisdiction or that
this Court send for the records from the appellate court "for purposes of review and thereafter render its own
decision reversing the judgment [of the appellate court]" notwithstanding its long having become final and
executory, is utterly untenable and without legal justification.
Petitioner's counsel are reminded of this Court's admonition in Pajares vs. Abad Santos,6 and other cases
cited therein, to wit, that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of
the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7,
section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this
rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.' "
73. Felicisimo M. Montano v. IBP and Atty. Juan S. Dealca [A.C. 4215, May 21, 2001]
FACTS: Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a
case pending before the CA. The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15k, 50% of which was
payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly,
Montano paid respondent the amount of P7.5k representing 50% of the attorney's fee. Even before respondent
counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable
after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant obliged by
paying the amount of P4k. Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment
of the remaining balance of P3.5k. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdraw his
appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Dealca’s conduct was just and proper.
HELD: No. The Court finds Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon
22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails
to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was
unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted
honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the
bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3.5k rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall
avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent
imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed
to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
Note: Atty. Dealca was reprimanded with a warning.

74. Obando vs. Figueras

Facts:
Strebel Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate
estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras.While settlement of the estate was pending, she died and Eduardo
assumed administration of the joint estates of Don Jose and Doña Alegria. Hardly had the proceedings in both
intestacies begun when Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Doña Alegria's Last Will
and Testament, filed by Felizardo S. Obando (herein petitioner), a nephew of Doña Alegria.
The alleged Will bequeathed to Petitioner Obando and several other members of the Obando clan properties left
by the Figueras couple, including two parcels of land in Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City.
When the probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, Petitioner Obando was appointed as
Eduardo's co-administrator of the joint estates.
As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document was submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination and comparison of Doña Alegria's alleged signature therein with samples which
both parties accepted as authentic. The NBI found that the questioned and the standard signatures were not
made by the same person. This led to the indictment and the conviction of Petitioner Obando in Criminal Case
90-858198 for estafa through falsification of a public document.
On February 20, 1990, the probate court denied Eduardo's Motion for authority to sell the aforementioned two
parcels of land in New Manila. Despite such denial, Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on the
strength of an Order issued by the probate court on May 15, 1991.
On June 4, 1992, Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator and universal heir of Doña Alegria, filed a
Complaint against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (collectively referred to as the respondents) for the nullification of
the sale. The proceedings were docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12384 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 79.
However, in Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948, the probate court, in its Order dated December 17,
1997, removed Petitioner Obando from his office as co-administrator of the joint estate of the Figueras spouses
due to his conviction for falsification. Consequently, in the civil case, respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss
dated January 27, 1998, after Obando had rested his case.
Petitioners claim that when Atty. Joaquin Yuseco filed the Motion to Dismiss, he no longer represented the
respondents, as shown by Eduardo's Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said
counsel's services in the proceedings in view of a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner Obando.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Yuseco continued to be the counsel of Eduardo when it filed a motion to dismiss
against Orbando’s petition for nullification of sale
Ruling:
Yes. We disagree. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance
with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.18 Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following
requisites are complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2) the client's written
consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the
written consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the
motion has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules.19
In this case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former manifested that he
had been tricked by Petitioner Obando into signing the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and Compromise
Agreement. Besides, the filing of the Motion to Dismiss was not prejudicial but beneficial to the said respondent;
hence, he had no reason to complain. At the discretion of the court, an attorney who has already been dismissed
by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the client's rights. In the present case, had there
been any irregularity, it should have been raised by the respondents, not the petitioners.

75. Caoile v Macaraeg

FACTS: Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent them in Civil Case for an
action for recovery of ownership filed before the CFI of Lingayen, Pangasinan. After the CFI rendered judgment
against them, Francisco and his codefendants decided to appeal their case before the CA.
Accordingly, Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for extension of time to file appellants’ brief.
In his last motion for extension, he alleged that he was already in the process of doing the finishing touches on the
brief and just needed to have it printed. Yet, the extended period expired without Atty. Macaraeg filing any brief.
Hence, upon motion of the opposing party, the CA dismissed the appeal. The dismissal became final and executory
on December 13, 1963.
Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until they were served with the CFI’s writ
of execution and a notice of sale at public auction6 of their property in 1965. After confirming with the CA that
they indeed lost the case, Francisco confronted Atty. Macaraeg who informed him that they lost the case because
they failed to pay him in full.
Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for neglect and dereliction of duty.
In his Answer, Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his codefendants did not pay in full for his services in
filing the appeal.
Atty. Macaraeg denied Francisco’s accusation that he neglected their case. He pointed out that to push through
with the appeal he even advanced some of the appeal expenses. While he admitted that he failed to submit an
appellants’ brief, he averred that the same was actually the fault of his clients who failed to provide the necessary
funds to file said brief. According to him, he constantly reminded Francisco to give him the amount necessary to
cover the costs of the transcript and printing of the appeal brief. He even filed three motions for extension of time
to file brief to give Francisco more time to come up with the said payment. Still, Francisco was unable to pay.
Moreover, Atty. Macaraeg was not reimbursed for the amount he advanced for appeal expenses.
--Atty. Macaraeg died during the pendency of this case--
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Macaraeg violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING: YES. A considerable length of time had elapsed from the time Atty. Macaraeg filed the notice of appeal on
August 30, 1962 up to the time he filed the third motion for extension of time to file brief on October 5, 1963.
Despite the passage of such time, however, Atty. Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which resulted in the
dismissal of his clients’ appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for extension to file an appellant’s brief carries with
it the presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within the requested extended period. Failure to
do so without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.
While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his clients’ failure to give the amount necessary for
filing the same, he should have, as aptly stated by Commissioner Cachapero (of the IBP), shown a more mindful
and caring attitude towards the cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this case show
that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with their obligation to him and were not
deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as claimed by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they
enter into a pacto de retro sale in order for them to fully pay him for the services he rendered in connection with
their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly believed that the necessary funds from his clients were not
forthcoming, he could have excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows a
counsel to withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client’s failure to comply with the retainer
agreement. Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated Rule 12.03.
Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty, supervening
circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case.