PART VI. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT counsel de oficio for 2 other defendants.
counsel de oficio for 2 other defendants. Petitioner assailed the act of An appellant who is not confined in prison may, upon request, be assigned a counsel de
Questions:
 What is the nature of the attorney-client relationship?
 When and how is the attorney-client relationship created?
 Why is it important to know this?
 What are the lawyer’s responsibilities for the duration of the attorney-client
relationship? After the relationship is terminated?
Cases:
96.Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002.
Lawyer misappropriated for himself the 25k of client which was intended as filing fee,
claims that there was no attorney-client relationship, only drafted “letters” as favour to a
kumpadre…
SC: A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advice regarding the formers business.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such
cause
SUSPENDED for 1 year
• 2. Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007
Complainant approached respondent-lawyer-friend and disclosed her personal secrets
and sensitive documents for legal advice purposes. Respondent thereafter maliciously
denied taking the case after hearing the confidential information
IBP Commission: Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal
ethics when she [revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation
97.Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007
SC: The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal
advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
Respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client.
Purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach
of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
REPRIMANDED & STERNLY WARNED
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
98.Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974
• Petitioner was appointed Election Registrar, prior to this he was cousel de
parte to an accused pending in the sala of respondent Judge. Petitioner filed
motion to withdraw as counsel de parte (citing, inter alia, his appointment at
COMELEC), respondent Judge denied the same and instead appointed him as
respondent Judge through certiorari officio within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice to file brief and he establishes his
right thereto. 
• SC: Petition dismissed.
A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
• Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. 23815, June 28, 1974
SC: Law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is FACTS: On September 23, 2008 the Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of 2008. The resolution requested
the IBPs National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the
designated.
payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal aid offices in the various IBP
chapters
A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal.
RULING: Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy must not only be effective
ROC Rule 138, Sec. 31
and efficient, but also readily accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at
all.
Attorneys for destitute litigants. -  A court may assign an attorney to render professional
aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is
The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts
destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused
therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
hereby COMMENDED for helping increase the access to justice by the poor. The request
ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h)
of the Misamis Oriental Chapter for the exemption from the payment of filing, docket and
other fees of the clients of the legal aid offices of the various IBP chapters is GRANTED.
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. -  It is the duty of an attorney:
RA 6033 – An Act Requiring Courts to Give Preference to Criminal Cases where the party
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless
or parties involve are INDIGENTS.
or oppressed;
INDIGENT
ROC Rule 116, Sec. 6-8
shall refer to a person who has no visible means of income or whose income is
Sec. 6. Duty. of court to inform accused of his right to counsel – Before arraignment, the
insufficient for the subsistence of his family, to be determined by the fiscal or judge,
court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have
taking into account the members of his family dependent upon him for subsistence. (Sec
one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel
2, RA 6033)
of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him. 
The trial in these cases shall commence within 3 days from the date of arraignment and
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. – The court, considering the gravity of the
no postponement of the hearings shall be granted EXCEPT on the ground of illness of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
accused or other similar justifiable grounds.
officio such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and
ability, can competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of the
City and provincial fiscals and courts shall conduct the PI of a criminal case within 3 days
bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of the province and of
after its filing and shall terminate the same within 2 weeks.
good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused. 
Requirements: File a sworn statement of the fact of his being indigent and the said sworn
Sec. 8. Time for counsel de officio to prepare for arraignment.  – Whenever a counsel de
statement shall be sufficient basis.
office is appointed by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be
given a reasonable time to consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with
Sanctions: Any willful or malicious refusal by the fiscal or judge shall constitute sufficient
the arraignment.
ground for disciplinary action either suspension or removal.
ROC Rule 124, Sec. 2
RA 6034 An Act Providing Transportation and other allowances for indigent litigants
Sec. 2. Appointment of counsel de officio for the accused.  – If it appears from the record
of the case as transmitted that (a) the accused is confined in prison, (b) is without Adequate travel allowance to enable him and his indigent witnesses to attend the hearing.
counselde parte on appeal, or (c) has signed the notice of appeal himself, ask the clerk of
court of the Court of Appeals shall designate a counsel de officio. When the hearing requires the presence of the indigent for whole day or for 2 or more
consecutive days, in the discretion of the court, cover reasonable expenses for meal and
lodging.
RA6035 An Act Requiring Stenographers to give Free transcript of notes to indigent and
Low income litigants
Sanctions:
a. Suspension from office for a period not exceeding 30 days upon finding of guilt
for the first time;
b. Suspension from office for not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days
upon finding of guilt for the second time; and
c. Removal from office upon finding of guilt for the third time.
RA 6036 An Act Providing that bail shall not, with certain exceptions, be required in cases
of violations of municipal or city ordinances and in criminal offenses when the prescribed
penalty for such offenses is not higher than arresto mayor and/or 2k or both.
RA 9406 An Act Reorganizing and strengthening the public Attorney’s office
“SEC. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit. – The clients of the PAO shall be
exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court
and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal.
“The costs of the suit, attorneys fees and contingent fees imposed upon the adversary of
the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in the National Treasury as
trust fund and shall be disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers
of the PAO.” .
P.D. No. 543
• An Act AUTHORIZING THE DESIGNATION OF MUNICIPAL JUDGES AND
LAWYERS IN ANY BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO ACT AS
COUNSEL DE OFICIO FOR THE ACCUSED WHO ARE INDIGENT IN PLACES
WHERE THERE ARE NO AVAILABLE PRACTICING ATTORNEYS
• GR: Municipal Judges and other lawyers in the government service are
prohibited from practicing law
• WHY THE ACT? There are some places where there are no available legal
practitioners, as a result of which the trial of cases in court is delayed to the
prejudice particularly of detention prisoners
99. People v. Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130663, March 20, 2001
• Accused pleaded guilty to charge of rape (penalized with death), his counsel de
oficio said that considering the admission of guilt, he’s no longer in position to
oppose the formal offer of exhibits by the prosecution. Case went to SC on
automatic review.
• It’s asserted that the conduct of the counsel of the accused (scanty and
lackluster performance), considering the grave nature of the offense, is not a
violation of the right to due process.
SC: The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections
The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly
at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused,
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential
laws and existing jurisprudence
Defense counsels conduct falls short of the commitment and zeal required of him as
appellants attorney.  Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a
To buttress the lack of zeal shown in defending appellant, Atty. Adriano failed to appear
during the promulgation of the assailed RTC Decision. In fact, the trial judge appointed
another counsel de oficio.
100. People vs. Ingco, 42 SCRA 170 (1971)
• Respondent-lawyer was counsel de oficio of person accused of rape with
homicide, respondent was asked by the Court to explain why disciplinary
actions should not be taken against him for for having 15 days late a motion for
the extension of time for submitting the brief for the accused
• Respondent said he was busy preparing a brief of his other case pending
before the CA and he had to appear before several courts (in Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Bulacan)
• Also, respondent said he misled himself into thinking that he already filed the
brief for the accused (aka he got confused)
• People vs. Ingco, 42 SCRA 170 (1971)
SC: Lame excuse, he was woefully negligent.
Considering that the accused is fighting for his life, the least that could be expected of a
counsel de oficio is awareness of the period within which he was required to file
appellant's brief.
Such grave neglect of duty is deserving of severe condemnation.  It is clearly unworthy of
membership in the Bar which requires dedication and zeal in the defense of his client's
rights, a duty even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio.
SEVERELY REPRIMANDED.
CANON 15 - A LAWY ER SHALL OBSERVE C ANDOR, F AIRN ESS AN D LOYALTY
IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND T RANSAC TION S WITH HIS CLIEN TS.
101. Lopez v. Aquino G.R. No. L-28078, April 29, 1971
 The Petitioner filed an “Appearance with Motions for Substitution and be
served copy of Judgment”
 The “Judgment” mentioned pertains to the relief granted by the appellate
court in favor of the Respondent in his money claim against the estate.
 She mentioned in her petition that she asks the court to furnish a copy of the
said Decision to her counsels instead of Atty Unson who was the counsel
appointed by her former co-administrator.
 In this case the court reprimanded the counsel of the petitioner, Consuela
Domingo de Lopez, as to the representations they made in the petition at
bar.
 They are reminded of this Court's admonition in may cases that "the
cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless
clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
avoided.  There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed or delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful
violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.’”
  The petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble
costs. 
102.Gillego v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking to restrain the execution of a
judgment of ejectment rendered by the municipal court of Matnog,
Sorsogon, on the ground of the latter court's alleged loss of jurisdiction over
the ejectment case after the lapse of one year from the filing of the
complaint.
 Petitioner, in his brief on appeal, would belatedly assail the municipal court's
ejectment judgment against him on the alleged ground that the said suit
should have been considered as one between members of the same family
under Article 222 of the Civil Code (since he is a brother-in-law of respondent
Salvacion Diaz) and it had not been shown that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made but failed, as enjoined by said codal provision. 
 The Court , citing Casilan vs. Tomassi heldthat  Rule 31, section 4 of the old
Rules of Court (now Rule 22, section 3) for courts of first instance, that the
requirement in the cited Rule "for the judge of an inferior court to decide a
case within one week after trial is not jurisdictional and that a violation
thereof does not render the decision void but subjects the judge to
disciplinary action.“
 And in invoking Art. 22 of the Civil Code, it also held that it is much too late
now for petitioner to raise this question for the first time here on
appeal.  Not having raised it in the ejectment suit, which has long become
final and executory he is barred now by laches and waiver from invoking the
cited provision.
"(T)he circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous
and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude
deserves severe condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well
devote to meritorious cases.“
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble
costs in both instances. 
103.CASTANEDA VS. AGO 65 SCRA 505
 Stemmed from a Replevin suit filed by the complainants against Pastor Ago in
order to recover certain machineries.
 Pastor ago and his wife filed a with the Court of First Instance of Manila and
Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
  The CFI Manila ruled in favor of the Petitioners and issued a Writ of
Execution, while the CFI of Quezon ruled in favor of the Respondents and
issued an ex-parte writ of preliminary injunction of restraining the
petitioners, the ROD and the sheriff from registering the latter’s final deed of
sale, from cancelling R’s certificates of title and issuing new ones in favor of
the P.
 Pastor Ago and his wife, while the case is pending before the CFI Quezon, file
a Petition for Certiorari with the SC to enjoin the sheriff from the execution of
the Writ of Possession. SC denied. The Ago spouses then filed the same
petition with the CA praying for the same relief.
 Failing to obtain reconsideration, the petitioners Castañeda and Henson filed
the present petition for review of the aforesaid decision.
 Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of
the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit, must now
enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison,
have misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
 The respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14)
years to doggedly resist execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and
from one court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
The SC condemns the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
 far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to
use them to subvert the very ends of justice.6
 Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position
as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an
instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and
moral justice.
 A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's
cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and
cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his
client's position, as in the case at bar.
 The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside.
 Civil case Q-7986 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim in a new and
independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago
and Lourdes Yu Ago, which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.
 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, Rep. Act No. 9285, Chapters 1 & 2
 THE ADR Act of 2004
An act to institutionalize use of an alternative dispute resolution system in the Philippines
and to establish the office for alternative dispute resolution and for other purpose.
 The Lawyer’s Role
 Contribute to the promotion of ADR
 Assist courts in encouraging the parties to avail of alternative means of dispute
resolution
 Explain the benefits of the ADR system.
 “Alternative Dispute Resolution System”
Means any process or procedure used to resolve a dispute or controversy, other than by
adjudication of a presiding judge of a court or an officer of a government agency, as
defined in this Act, in which a neutral third party participates to assist in the resolution
of issues, which includes arbitration, mediation, conciliation, early neutral evaluation,
mini-trial, or any combination thereof;
 Exception to the Application of this Act
 Labor Disputes;
 Civil Status of persons
 Validity of Marriage
 Any ground of Legal Separation
 Jurisdiction of Courts
 Future Legitime
 Criminal Liability
Actions by which the law cannot be compromised
104.Mercado vs. Security Bank, 482 SCRA 501 (2006)
Jose and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado filed with the Court a Petition for Review on
Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dismissing their petition for annulment
of judgment;  
This prompted petitioner Jose Mercado to write Chief Justice Davide assailing
the latter allegedly pressured the Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the ponente, to
favor his adversary.  He alleged that this information was transmitted to him by his
counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, who he claims is a close friend of the ponente.
Atty. Villanueva, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s allegations. Justice
Dacudao submitted his recommended that he should be found Mercado "guilty of
improper conduct. However, he held that "there was no showing that he acted with
malice and/or in bad faith orthat he was properly motivated." Thus, he recommended
that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand pesos(P5,000.00).
O Whether or not Atty. Jose P. Villanueva is guilty of contempt of court.
In informing Mercado that he was a very very good, close and long time
friend of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a
favorable disposition of his case. Atty. Villanuevas statements led Mercado, not only to
suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court, together with Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente, could be pressured or influenced.
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts and the judicial officers. [21] Atty. Villanuevas conduct, no doubt, degraded the
integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this Court as well.
Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court.
O Rule 15.08: A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to
his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
O The fact of being a lawyer does not preclude him from engaging in business,
and such practice is not necessarily improper. Impropriety arises when the
business is of such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a
member of the Bar. (Comments of the IBP Committee that drafted the Code)
105.Nakpil vs. Valdez, 286 SCRA 758 (1998)
Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
Street, Baguio City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran
property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the
Nakpils until the latter could buy it back.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil
died, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow. Respondents
law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses
estate.
Complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages
against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute
ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this
administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated
professional ethics when:
1. He assigned to his corporation the Moran property,
2. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate property;
3. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him
as counsel and auditor.
Is Atty. Valdez guilty of misconduct?
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.
As to the first two charges, it is well-established that respondent offered to the
complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their close
relationship. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer,
accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil
agreed that the former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the
latter. Respondent misused his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property
is clearly unethical.
 As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney
cannot represent adverse interests. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing
both professions.
Even granting that respondents misconduct refers to his accountancy practice,
it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
◦ Art. 1491, Civil Code
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
1. The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
2. Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal has been given;
3. Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
4. Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government-owned or controlled corporation, or institution,
the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall
apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take
part in the sale;
5. Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts,
and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession;
6. Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)
106.Zalamea v. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7387,
November 3, 2016
FACTS: The petitioners, Zalamea brothers, acquired a property in Scout Limbaga, Quezon
City from their mother’s estate with the help of Atty. De Guzman. Said property, however,
is mortgaged to BDO. The property was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of the
Zalameas to pay their loan. The Zalamea then seek the advice of Atty. De Guzman to
reacquire the property. The BDO, through Atty. De Guzman, agreed to sell the property
for P20 Million, and with a 10% downpayment. Due to lack of funds of the Zalameas, Atty.
De Guzman’s wife, Angel, agreed to shoulder the P2 Million downpayment. Subsequently,
Angel was forced to pay the monthly installments and all in all, paid a total of P13 Million.
Not long after, the relationship, between the Zalamea brothers and the Spouses De
Guzman turned sour. The Spouses De Guzman wanted reimbursement of the amounts
which they had advanced, while the Zalamea brothers claimed sole ownership over the
property. Hence, the brothers filed a disbarment case against De Guzman for allegedly
buying a client's property which was subject of litigation under Article 1491 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: Whether the prohibition under Art. 1491 for lawyers apply in the case
RULING: No. The SC held that the prohibition does not apply in the case. The Court
dismissed the Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr. for utter lack
of merit.
According to the SC, the prohibition which the Zalameas invoke does not apply where the
property purchased was not involved in litigation. De Guzman clearly never acquired any
of his client's properties or interests involved in litigation in which he may take part by
virtue of his profession. There exists not even an iota of proof indicating that said property
has ever been involved in any litigation in which De Guzman took part by virtue of his
profession. True, they had previously sought legal advice from De Guzman but only on
how to handle their mother's estate, which likewise did not involve the contested
property. Neither was it shown that De Guzman's law firm had taken part in any litigation
involving the Speaker Perez property.
◦ CPR Rule 16.01: To account
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
107.Berbano vs. Barcelona, 410 SCRA 258 (2003)
FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice
and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust
Enrichment.
Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was
being claimed by FIlinvest Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a
certain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was arrested in Jan 1999 and
was detained so he needed the assistance of a law for his release. Someone
recommended Atty. Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona went to see
Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for his release. Atty.
Barcelona told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so
that he could secure Daen’s release the following day. Berbano didn’t have enough money
and time to immediately come up with such big amount but they were able to come up
with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the money. He said that he would go to the SC
to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that they should just meet
tomorrow.
The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth P24,000. The
day after, they gave another P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter).
There were other payments of money, the total amounting to P64,000. After much time
wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again
and he didn’t return their calls. Daen was still in jail. Atty. Barcelona failed to file an
answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and serious
breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board of
Governots adopted such findings but recommended only suspension.
 ISSUE: Whether Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.
RULING: Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the
court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the
profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before
the Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. The act
of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating
Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. 
Respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the detained
person in the total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee
through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court.  He deserves to be
disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for
misrepresenting to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they
seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given to such connections.  In
this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr.
Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. In so doing,
respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt. He is disbarred. 
108.Licuanan vs. Melo, 170 SCRA 100 (1989)
FACTS: Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional ethics.
Atty. Melo was Licuanan’s counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant. Atty.
Melo failed to remit to her the rentals collected nor did the said lawyer report to her the
receipt of said amounts. It was only after a year from actual receipt that Atty. Melo turned
over his collections to Licuanan because a demand made by the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals collected
RULING: Yes. The actuations of Atty. Melo in retaining for his personal benefit over a 1
year period, the mount of P5,220 received by him on behalf of his client, Licuanan is
deprived of its use, and withholding information on the same despite inquiries made by
her, I a breach of the Lawyer’s Oath to which he swore observance, and an evident
transgression of the CPR. Due to Atty. Melo’s professional misconduct, he has breached
the trust reposed in him by his client. Atty. Melo’s unprofessional actuations considered,
the SC find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office. He has
displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. Hence, Atty. Melo is disbarred.
◦ CPR Rule 16.02: To keep client’s fund separate
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
109.Hernandez vs. Go, 450 SCRA 1 (2005)
FACTS: Complainant‘s husband abandoned her and her son. Her husband has a lot of debt
and numerous creditors demanded payments of his loan from her. She hired Go to settle
the matter. Go persuaded complainant to execute deeds of sale of all the properties in
order for Go to sell the lots and from the proceeds pay her creditors. Complainant came
to know that Go paid her creditors with his own money and kept the properties. Hence,
this petition for disbarment.
ISSUE: Did Go abuse the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant?
RULING: Yes. The records show that complainant entrusted to Go her land titles and
allowed him to sell her lots, believing that the proceeds thereof would be used to pay her
creditors. Go, however, abused her trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself and spent his own money to pay her obligations.
Undoubtedly, Go‘s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has
definitely fallen below the moral bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful
and grossly immoral acts. We have been exacting in our demand for integrity and good
moral character of members of the Bar. Go is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
◦ CPR Rule 16.03: Delivery of funds, lawyer’s lien
Rule 16.03- A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
110.Businos vs. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 40 (1997)
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Ricafort was the counsel of records of herein complainant in a
civil case wherein he was appointed to be the true and lawful attorney-in-fact of
complainant to represent, testify and collect the sum of money from the court.
Respondent received the amount from the court and Oas Standard High School which was
entrusted to him by herein complainant to deposit the same to the bank account of
complainant’s husband. However, instead of depositing the money, herein respondent
used the same for his personal use and despite of several demands of complainant, he
failed to return the money which forced complainant to file a criminal case, administrative
case and disbarment case against him. Complainant further accused him for demanding
and receiving Php 2,000.00 which he said will be used for the bond in civil case which was
never really required in the said case.
The court issued several resolutions against respondent but he did not comply.
The court decided that he deemed to have waived his right to file his comment. On the
third hearing of the estafa case against respondent, he came to the court with the money
and paid complainant which made her not to pursue with the esafa case but did not
withdraw the instant complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort violated his lawyer’s oath.
RULING: Yes. A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or
malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients and is obligated
to report promptly the money of his clients that has come into his possession. He should
not commingle it with his private property or use it for his personal purposes without
his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity. Money
collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust
and must be immediately turned over to them. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty
to his client, his profession, the courts and the public. The Court then resolved to disbar
Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law
111.Quilban vs. Robinol, 171 SCRA 768 (1989)
FACTS: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative complaint before
this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000 and
praying that the court exercise its power to discipline over members of the bar unworthy
to practice law.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by complainants to
appeal their case to the CA after they had lost in the lower court. The agreement as to the
attorneys’ fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the decision of the
lower Courts decision, they will give him a portion of the property subject matter of the
litigation.
  There was confusion as to payment and they want the lawyers to be
disciplined for the said actions of the lawyers engaged in their complaint. It is equally true
that the Court cannot pass judgment on complainants pleas that the amount deposited by
respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action
that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession
for himself but he is holding it until the fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its
satisfaction because of the complainants refusal to pay him.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Robinol is unworthy to practice law.
RULING: YES. Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of his profession. After
the CA had rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter’s
funds, suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a portion of the land
equivalent to that of each plaintiffs to P50,000 which he alleges to be the monetary value
of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his client’s
money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because under the
circumstances it was highly unjust for him to do so. His clients were mere squatters who
could barely eke out an existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas
per family with which after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of
them.
112.Rayos vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 169079,
February 12, 2007
FACTS: Atty. Ponciano Hernandez was the lawyer of Francisco Rayos in a case wherein the
latter sued the government when NAPOCOR, recklessly opened three floodgates during
the Pading Typhoon, which resulted to the death of 10 of his family members. He won the
cases and damages were awarded to him. However, the check was turned over to Atty,
Hernandez as he was his counsel. When Rayos, asked it from him, Hernandez refused to
give the same. Thus, petitioner initiated this complaint for disbarment for the failure of
respondent to return the rest of the award in the amount of P557,961.21. According to
the respondent, he had been the petitioner’s lawyer for 15 years and that he was entitled
to such money because they had a verbal contract wherein Rayos agreed to give him 60
percent of the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s act of retaining the amount awarded to the petitioner in
the civil case to assure payment of his attorney’s fees is justified.
RULING: No. When Hernandez refused to give the check to Rayos, he already breached
the trust reposed on him. He only gave partial payment when the court already issued a
writ of execution. It is true that lawyers have a right of lien under Rule 16.03, but the fact
alone that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, as
above-stated, does not relieve him of his duty to promptly account for the moneys
received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. Furthermore, the fee
that he imposed was too unconscionable. He should have greatly considered Rule 20.1 in
determining the amount of his fees. 35% is enough. WHEREFORE the Court Resolves that:
1. Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorney’s oath
and of serious professional misconduct and shall be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely;
◦ CPR Rule 16.04: No borrowing, lending
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legwhenal matter he is handling for the client.
113.Barnachea vs. Quicho, 399 SCRA 1 (2003)
FACTS: Complainant engaged the legal services of respondent for the latter to cause the
transfer under her name of the title over a property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 334411 previously owned by her sister, Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. The latter
sold said property to complainant under an unnotarized deed of absolute sale.
Complainant drew and issued Bank Checks in the amount of P11,280.00 and
P30,000.00,respectively  for the expenses for said transfer and in payment for
respondent’s legal services.
Respondent encashed the checks. However, despite the lapse of almost two months,
respondent failed to secure title over the property in favor of complainant.  The latter
demanded that respondent refund to her the amount of P41,280.00 and return the
documents which she earlier entrusted to him.  However, respondent failed to comply
with said demands. complainant received a letter from respondent informing her that he
had failed to cause the transfer of the property under her name and that he was returning
the documents and title she had entrusted to him and refunding to her the amount
of P41,280.00 through his personal check No. DIL 0317787.  Said check was drawn against
his account with the Bank of Commerce in the amount of P41,280.00 and was postdated
December 1, 2001.  Respondent told complainant that he needed more time to fund the
check.  However, respondent failed to fund the check despite the demands of
complainant.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that his failure to transfer the title of the property
under the name of the complainant was caused by his difficulty in making good the
claimed amount, compounded by his affliction with diabetes and the consequent loss of
sight of his right eye.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is guilty of the said accusations?
RULING: The Court is led to believe that respondent’s failure to cause the transfer of the
title of the property under the name of complainant was due to a financial problem that
beset him shortly after he received the checks from complainant.   It can easily be inferred
from respondent’s letter that he used complainant’s money to alleviate if not solve his
financial woes.  What compounded respondent’s unethical conduct was his drawing of a
personal check and delivering the same to complainant without sufficient funds in his
bank account to cover the check.  Even as he promised to fund his account with the
drawee bank, respondent failed to do so when the check became due.
114.Navarro vs. Solidum, A.C. No. 9872,
January 28, 2014
FACTS: Respondent signed a retainer agreement with Presbitero to follow up the release
of the payment for the latter’s 2.7-hectare property. Respondent received ₱50,000 from
Presbitero, supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.
Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to
handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot.. Respondent undertook to register the
property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is registered.
Respondent obtained ₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration expenses. Navarro later
learned that the registration decree over the property was already issued in the name of
one Teodoro Yulo.
Respondent obtained a loan from Navarro to finance his sugar trading
business.  Respondent obtained an additional loan from Navarro, covered by a second
MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. The same time, respondent
obtained a loan from Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate
mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property. Respondent withdrew as counsel for
Yulo. On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as counsel.
Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed
by respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the 10% monthly interest on the
loan was usurious and illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
RULING: Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed ₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero.
At the time he secured the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of
Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and
real estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the
property he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account
but from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he
himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was
unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored
because the accounts were already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender
in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his
dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the
law as well as the tr
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr. GUILTY of violating Canon 16, Rule
16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he received from Hilda S. Presbitero,
amounting to ₱50,000, and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance
with this order within thirty days from finality of this Decision.
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him .
115.Angalan vs. Delante578 SCRA 113 (2009)
FACTS: In april 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their property to
the Eustaquio spouses in consideration of a loan in the amount of P15,000. The Eustaqios
prepared a document and sked the complainants to sign it; but because complainants
were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It turned out that the document was a
deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT No. 9926 was issued in
the name of Navarro Eustaquio.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in
November 1970 as shown in the receipt by respondent of P12,000 representing full
payment of his professional fees from the complainants.
Thereafter, an amicable settlement was entered into between complainants
and the Eustaquios which stipulated that the complainants would repurchase the lot at
P30,000. But since the complainants did not have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the
money to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its produce.
When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property,
Atty. Delante refused. Complainants learned that Delante transferred the title of the
property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-57932.
RULING: Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence
complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the
Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of
protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and
transferred the title of the property to his name.
Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the
property to complainants upon demand. Instead of holding in trust the property of
complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused
to return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as
malicious and untruthful.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating
Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court
DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys. Angalan vs. Delante, 578 SCRA 113, A.C. No. 7181 February 6, 2009
118.Quilban vs. Robinol 171 SCRA 768
FACTS: Samahan officers filed this Administrative complaint before this Court requesting
the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P75,000 and praying that the court
exercise its power to discipline over members of the bar unworthy to practice law.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by complainants to
appeal their case to the CA after they had lost in the lower court. The agreement as to the
attorneys’ fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the decision of the
lower Courts decision, they will give him a portion of the property subject matter of the
litigation.
There was confusion as to payment and they want the lawyers to be
disciplined for the said actions of the lawyers engaged in their complaint. It is equally true
that the Court cannot pass judgment on complainants pleas that the amount deposited by
respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action
that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession
for himself but he is holding it until the fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its
satisfaction because of the complainants refusal to pay him.
RULING: Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct
that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of his profession. After the CA had
rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latte r’s funds,
suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a portion of the land equivalent
to that of each plaintiffs to P50000 which he alleges to be the monetary value of that
area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money
not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because under the
circumstances it was highly unjust for him to do so. RULING:
Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of his profession. After
the CA had rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter’s
funds, suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a portion of the land
equivalent to that of each plaintiffs to P50000 which he alleges to be the monetary value
of that area.
Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his client’s
money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because under the
circumstances it was highly unjust for him to do so.
117.Cantiller vs. Potenciano 180 SCRA 246 (1989)
FACTS: An action for ejectment was filed against Peregrina Cantiller. The court issued a
decision against the latter. A notice to vacate was then issued against Cantiller.
Cantiller then asked the respondent to handle their case. The complainant was
made to sign by respondent what she described as a “[h]astily prepared, poorly
conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment”.
The petition was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Manila.
Respondent demanded from the complainant P l,000.00 as attorney’s fee. However the
judge of the said court asked the respondent to withdraw as counsel by reason of their
friendship.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter which
was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue the restraining order but
eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge.
But later on Cantiller found out that the amounts were not necessary to be
paid. A demand was made against Potenciano but the latter did not answer and the
amounts were not returned.
Contrary to Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he
withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get
another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and
executed.
RULING: When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all
effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or
the abandonment of a client’s cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the
client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most
elementary principles of professional ethics.
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in protecting
his client’s interests.
Respondent had knowledge beforehand that he would be asked by the
presiding judge to withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship.
Despite such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor did he
inform complainant of this fact.
Lawyers should be fair, honest, respectable, above suspicion and beyond
reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an ordinary
business proposition. It is a matter of public interest.
118. In Re: Maquera 435 SCRA 417 (2004)
FACTS: District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years. He was
suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his clients
property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an
unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case.
ISSUE: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be
meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction
committed in the foreign jurisdiction?  expert was necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the
RULING: The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one’s
good standing in the legal profession.
Atty. Leon G. Maquera is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be suspended or disbarred for his acts
which gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings against him in the Superior Court of Guam
and his subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate the current and correct address of Atty.
Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court
or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted
as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension 
119. MATTUS VS. VILLASECA
 The complainant and her husband sought the services of respondent lawyer
to represent them in a criminal proceedings for the crime of Estafa thru
falsification of public document.
 Complainant maintained that they were convicted due to Atty. Villaseca’s
gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.
Allegations of the complainant:
 Atty Villaseca was often absent during court hearings but still collected
appearance fees;
 he frequently sought the postponement of trial when he was present;
 he failed to ask the RTC to direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to
examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter in the special
power of attorney (SPA);
 He failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite having been granted
sufficient time by the RTC to submit one;
 He failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a
memorandum;
 He did not inform her and German of the dates of the presentation of
defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and
 He erroneously indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal.
Atty. Villaseca in his comment stated that:
 He made known to the complainant that the testimony of a handwriting
original copy of the SPA.
 Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as
his numerous motions for postponement, were justified and were never
intended for delay.
 He denied having collected appearance fees when he did not attend the
scheduled hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were intended
to compensate him for his services in the other cases filed by the
complainant.
 Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately corrected the case
number in the notice of appeal when he discovered this error.
The IBPs’ Report and Recommendation:
6 months to 1 year suspension
 Atty. Villaseca’s reckless and gross negligence deprived his clients of due
process;
 His actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard for his clients’ life
and liberty
Court’s Ruling:
Affirmed IBP’s ruling with modification.
Atty. Villaseca is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for FIVE (5) YEARS.
“We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal
strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense
within the authority of the law to support his client’s cause.
A memorandum, no matter how lengthy, should not be made a substitute for
testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal case where a
conviction could lead to dire consequences. In saying so, we are not insinuating that the
RTC decision would have tilted in favor of the defense had Atty. Villaseca presented
evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once
counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause.”
 B. DUTY TO GIVE CANDID, HONEST ADVICE ON MERITS AND PROSPECTS OF
CASE
 CPR Rule 15.05: Candid, honest advice on prospects of case
 Signature and address. 
 
 Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him ,
stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.
 The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
 An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the
same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this
Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly
report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate
disciplinary action.
120. Warriner vs Atty. Dublin
Facts: Complainant spouses alleged that they secured the services respondent Atty. Reni
M. Dublin forclaim of damages against E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. Respondent
requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence.
However, respondent did not send anything. This prompted the RTC to dismiss the Civil
Case to the prejudice of the complainants. On 26 June 2000, respondent was directed to
file his comment to the administrative complaint. He thereafter requested an extension of
30 days which the court eventually granted.
However respondent had not yet filed his comment as of August 5, 2002 or after a lapse
of almost two years. Respondent did not show any cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt.
On March 10, 2008, the court resolved to order respondent's arrest and detention. In his
side, respondent Atty. Dublin claimed that complainant Warriner's cause in filing the Civil
Case No. 23, 396-95 is vitiated by fraud, thus, led him to believe that his late comment in
the instant case was with the contention of protecting the legal profession and in
accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
Issue: Whether Atty.Dublin should be held guilty of violating Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in representing the cause of spouses Warriner?
Held: The Court suspended respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin from the practice of law for
six months. The court held that respondent is guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23, 396-
95. Responded, thus, violated Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that “A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence" and "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable ". Respondents admittedly
claim that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits.
121. TEJANO vs. ATTY. BATERINA, A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015
Facts: Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court against his counsel, Atty. Baterina “miserably failed
to advance [his] cause”, and Judge Dominador Arquelada of acting in conspiracy to take
possession of his property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the
judge’s court.
The Court required Atty. Baterinato file a Comment on the complaint to which he
explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a
copy of the complaint. The Court, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory”
and admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s directives” and referred the
case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation, which found sufficient
ground for disciplinary action against Atty. Baterina.
Issue: Whether Atty Baterina liable for gross negligence in his duty as counsel to his client?
Held: The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the
penalty. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to
exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are
engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his
client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him.” WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of
gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years.. He is also
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
122.Llunar vs Atty. Ricafort AC No. 6484 - June 16 2015
Facts: In September, 2000, Adelita engaged the services of Atty. Romulo Ricafort for the
recovery of a parcel of land owned by the Banez family but which was fraudulently
registered to a different name.  The lot was the subject of foreclosure proceedings, hence,
Adelita gave to Atty. Ricafort the amount of P95,000.00 (partial redemption fee, as filing
fees, and attorneys fees).  violator of the profession’s ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules.
Three years later, complainant learned that Atty. Ricafort did not file any case with the
RTC of Legazpi City, hence, she demanded the return of P95,000.00. The latter averred
that there was a complaint for annulment of title filed against Ard Cervantes, though not
him, but by another lawyer.  Thus, he was willing to refund the amount less the
P50,000.00 which he gave to Atty. Abitria.  Adelita refused to recognize the case filed by
Atty. Abitria, insisting she did not hire him as counsel; also, the complaint was filed three
years late and the property cannot be redeemed from the bank anymore.   She also
learned that Atty. Ricafort was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law since 2002
in A.C. No. 5054, thus she suspected it was the reason why another lawyer filed the case.
Issue: Whether Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable.
Held: The respondent is found guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client
and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose
upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.
The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave
misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the
complainant’s case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant’s property
within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-
dallied on the complainant’s case and wasted precious time and opportunity that were
then readily available to recover the complainant’s property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
states that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.”
Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the
complainant for handling the latter’s case. On three separate occasions, the respondent
received from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for
purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary
civil case/s against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several
times thereafter to follow up on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who,
in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.
Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant
that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should
have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his
services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.” The respondent lacked the
candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case
despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.
Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite
suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he
committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years
from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary
123.Legarda Vs CA 209 Scra 722
FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the
improvements located at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance
with preliminary injunction and damages in RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a
lease agreement with the private respondent through its representative, Roberto V.
Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner. Respondent drew up the written
contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign
the same despite demands of respondent.
Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his
appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10)
days from February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the
extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to
declare petitioner in default.
This was granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was
allowed to present evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court
rendered its decision.
Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the
same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final and executory.
The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of
private respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of
private respondent, and a certificate of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption
period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by the sheriff in favor of
Cabrera, who in turn appears to have transferred the same to private respondent.
During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to her
great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith
in her counsel. She still asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under
the circumstances.
As above related, said counsel filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its
amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After an adverse judgment
was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not
inform the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a
petition for review before this Court. Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon
repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her
counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
Issue: W/ Counsel is Negligent?
Held: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability,
to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with
the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of
his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties
to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the
judge or the general public. 12
Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to
exercise his utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. 13 It is not only a
case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross
negligence, so much so that his client was deprived of her property without due process
of law.
The Court finds that the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and
inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave said counsel
another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to file a petition for annulment
of the judgment in the appellate court, again counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in
that after he received a copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not
do anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He allowed the
judgment to lapse and become final. Such reckless and gross negligence should not be
allowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner was thereby effectively deprived of her day in
court.
Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforce an alleged lease agreement of the
property of petitioner, private respondent went to court, and that because of the gross
negligence of the counsel for the petitioner, she lost the case as well as the title and
ownership of the property, which is worth millions. The mere lessee then now became the
owner of the property. Its true owner then, the petitioner, now is consigned to penury all
because her lawyer appear to have abandoned her case not once but repeatedly.
Coronel is hereby found GUILTY of gross negligence in the defense of petitioner Victoria
Legarda in Civil Case No. Q-43811 and accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of six (6) months effective from the date
124.ENDAYA v OCA 410 SCRA 344
Facts: A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed against Artemio Endaya and his wife. An
answer was prepared by a Mr.Ramirez for the spouses. At the beginning of the
preliminary conference, spouses appeared without counsel.
Endaya sought the services of the Public Attorney’s Office. Atty. Oca was assigned to
handle the case. At the continuation of the prelim conference, Oca filed motion for
amendment of answer. Motion was denied.
The judge then ordered all parties to submit their affidavits and position papers. The
court also said that 30 days after the submission of the last paper or upon expiration of
the period for filing, judgment shall be rendered on the case. Oca failed to submit any
affidavit or position paper.
Nonetheless, the complaint for unlawful detainer was dismissed because those who filed
the case were not real parties-in-interest. The case was appealed to RTC. Oca failed to
submit
anything again. RTC reversed the MTC decision. Spouses were ordered to vacate the
property and pay a certain amount for rentals.
 
Endaya confronted Oca about the decision. Oca feigned that he did not receive
anything. Upon checking with the clerk of court, Oca did indeed receive a copy of the
decision. Hence this administrative complaint.
Issue: Whether Oca committed professional misconduct
Held: Yes. Suspended for 2 months from practice of law. In his comment, Oca put up the
defense that he did not file any paper in the MCTC because it would just be a repetition
of the answer. Endaya filed his reply which just reiterated what he put in his complaint.
SC ordered Oca to file a rejoinder. Oca once again failed to file anything. Oca explained
that he failed to file a rejoinder because he believed in good faith that it was no longer
necessary.
In the IBP investigation, Oca once again failed to submit anything. Oca only appeared once
in the MCTC and practically abandoned the spouses thereafter.
 The facts show that Oca failed to employ every legal and honorable means to advance
the cause of his client. For intentionally failing to submit the pleadings required by the
court, respondent practically closed the door to the possibility of putting up a fair fight for
his client.
 Oca cannot just appear only once for the spouses. A lawyer continues to be a counsel of
record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated. Oca’s story shows his appalling
indifference to his clients’ cause, deplorable lack of respect for the courts and abrazen
disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
125.CARLITO P. CARANDANG - versus -ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA A.C. No. 7813, April 21,
2009
FACTS:
ISSUE:WHETHER RESPONDENT ATTY. SHOULD BE SANCTIONED DESPITE HIS WITHDRAWAL
AND DESPITE NO LONGER PRACTICING LAW.
 Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines received
a Sworn Statement from Complainant CARLITO P. CARANDANG alleging the
following:
 that ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA was his counsel in a Civil case;
 that complainant trusted respondent’s capacity as a lawyer only to have their
house and land taken away by the Court and their right to appeal was already
forfeited;
 that when his daughter went to the Court she was told that their case had
already been decided six months ago;
 that when complainant went to respondent’s office to ask why was he not
informed of the decision, respondent merely said “AY WALA KANG IBABAYAD
SA ABOGADO DAHIL WALA KANG PERA PANG-APILA”;
 that complainant, on bended knees, sought help from the Malacañang, but
since he was too late he was instead given a letter that he was told to submit
to the IBP;
 that the IBP asked whether he has his Attorney’s Withdrawal, not having one
he went to the respondent’s office where the latter’s secretary said when
complainant looked for him, “nasa AMERICA NA!”;
 that respondent’s daughter instead made the withdrawal, but due to
complainants age, he was never able to attend the hearing at the IBP because
he could no longer walk.
 The CBD issued an Order directing respondent Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina to
submit his Answer.
 The Commission was in receipt of a Manifestation filed by a certain Atty. Ma.
Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa. Allegedly, the daughter of respondent Atty.
Gilbert S. Obmina. Stating that respondent is already a permanent resident of
the United States of America since March 2001 and had already retired from
the practice of law.
 Commissioner scheduled the Mandatory Conference/Hearing of the case, but
Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaa filed a Manifestation and Motion
reiterating her earlier Manifestation. Atty. Muaa likewise requested the
cancellation of the mandatory conference and sought to reset the same.
 On the scheduled Mandatory Conference complainant appeared.
Commissioner directed Atty. Carmelita Muaa to appear before this
Commission and to bring with her the alleged withdrawal of appearance filed
by her father and to bring proof that her father is now really a permanent
resident of the United States of America.
 Four rescheduling were had in total until Atty. Muaa was given a period of ten
(10) days within which to file a verified answer. There after the parties were
directed to submit their verified position papers within ten (10) days.
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
 IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline found that Atty. Obmina was still counsel
of record for complainant at the time the decision was rendered and up to the
time of the issuance of the writ of execution. Atty. Obmina received the
Decision dated 28 January 2000 on 1 March 2000.  There is nothing on record
that will show that Atty. Obmina notified complainant in any manner about the
decision.
  Commissioner observed that complainant is partly to blame for his loss for
failure to maintain contact with Atty. Obmina and to inform himself of the
progress of his case, Commissioner De La Rama nonetheless underscored the
duty of Atty. Obmina to notify his client as to what happened to his case.
 Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with head bowed in sadness, it is
respectfully recommended that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year.
Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of America and
accordingly retired from the practice of law, this Commission will not close its eyes on the
negligence that he has committed while in the active practice.
SO ORDERED.
 IBP GOVERNORS’ Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner De La Rama.
 The Ruling of the Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations. Atty.
Obmina violated Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR.
Atty. Obminas futile efforts of shifting the blame on Carandang only serve to
emphasize his failure to notify Carandang that the trial court already promulgated a
decision in Civil Case No. B-5109 that was adverse to Carandangs interests. Atty. Obmina
cannot overlook the fact that Carandang learned about the promulgation of the decision
not through Atty. Obmina himself, but through a chance visit to the trial court.  Instead of
letting Carandang know of the adverse decision himself, Atty. Obmina should have
immediately contacted Carandang, explained the decision to him, and advised them on
further steps that could be taken.
 The Ruling of the Court
It is obvious that Carandang lost his right to file an appeal because of Atty.
Obminas inaction. Notwithstanding Atty. Obminas subsequent withdrawal as Carandangs
lawyer, Atty. Obmina was still counsel of record at the time the trial court promulgated
the decision in Civil Case No. B-5109.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
approving and adopting the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina is found GUILTY of violation of Canon
18 and of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court SUSPENDS Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina from the practice of law for one year,
and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
126. CHAMELYN A. AGOT  - versus - ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERAA.C. No. 8000, August 5,
2014PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
 Complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best friend’s
wedding at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her
United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent who
represented himself as an immigration lawyer.
 Under a Contract of Legal Services respondent undertook to facilitate and
secure the release of a US immigrant visa in complainant’s favor.
 In consideration therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of
₱350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of
₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.
 Respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period.
 FACTS:
 Complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the instant
administrative complaint against respondent.
 Respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his obligation under the
Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda, who he had
believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the
amount given by the complainant.
 Respondent elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda on the
matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family,
including himself.
 Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no
longer be located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the
said amount to complainant.
 ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT ATTY. IS GUILTY OF ENGAGING IN
DECEITFUL CONDUCT / WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD
ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR VIOLATING THE CPR.
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
 Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly, recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a
period of four (4) months, with a warning that a repetition of the same would
invite a stiffer penalty.
 The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in
deceitful conduct for: (a) misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b)
failing to deliver the services he contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning
complainant’s downpayment of ₱350,000.00.
 IBP GOVERNORS’ Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid
report and recommendation with the modification increasing the period of suspension to
six (6) months and ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱350,000.00 to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, with legal interest from the
date of demand.
 The Ruling of the Court
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard
of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. alty to be
imposed upon respondent.
Respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract,
which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03
 The Ruling of the Court
Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s
cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He
owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively
liable, as in this case.
 The Ruling of the Court
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A.
Agot the legal fees he received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within
ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing
directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
127.OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION - versus - ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL
FACTS:
  Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion alleged that in April, 1955,
respondent volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in
connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for this
purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed
their signatures on blank papers.
 They noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the progress of
their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years
later, respondent refused to surrender them.
 Respondent admitted having received the documents from complainants but
explainer that it was for photostating purposes only.
 His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to complainants'
refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which
prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat service.
 Respondent had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on
December 13, 1961, the documents.
 Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants'
pension claims since there was no agreement for his compensation as their
counsel.
 RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged
complainants nothing for his services, Fiscal Raña recommended the former's
exoneration, or at most, that he be reprimanded only.
 The Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a
severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend to complainants' pension
claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite
repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to complainant
Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE WAS NO ATTY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP , THEREFORE
NO DUTY TO ATTEND TO COMPLAINANTS’ CLAIMS?
 The Ruling of the Court
Respondent, overlooks the fact that he volunteered his professional services
and thus was not legally entitled to recover fees. But having established the attorney-
client relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainants' claims with all due
diligence.
Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking
of disciplinary action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of
evidence substantiating the accusations against him.
Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the
documents has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they
admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did
not give him any money therefor.
 The Ruling of the Court
Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned by
respondent during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs
himself.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for
being legally insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of
the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely
complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute.
As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a
model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par excellence, especially so when, as in this
case, he volunteers his professional services.
 The Ruling of the Court
Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to
have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims.
And altho We voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a
reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of
him.
Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.
128. EDUARDO T. ABAY - versus -  Atty. RAUL T. MONTESINO A.C. No. 5718. December 4,
2003
FACTS:
 The Negros Institute of Technology (NIT), of which he is a stockholder, hired
respondent as counsel in an action for Cancellation of Title of Ownership,
Recovery of Ownership and Possession and Damages with Preliminary
Injunction against the estate of Vicente T. Galo.
 RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the civil case. Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of the judgment of dismissal was denied.
 Although respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA),
he thereafter failed to submit an appellants brief. Consequently, CA dismissed
the appeal with admonition since  a total of 120 days extension was already
given.
 Complainant attributes the failure of respondent to submit the brief to the
latters gross negligence and evident bad faith.Respondent allegedly abandoned
the appeal without the knowledge and consent of the NIT. Worse, he
supposedly never told the Institute that its appeal had already been dismissed.
 Respondent denied that he was negligent in his duty as counsel of
NIT.According to him, while Civil Case No. 1329 was pending appeal, he
discovered that the property that it was seeking to recover had been the
subject of another case, Civil Case No. 6017, which was for Annulment of Sale,
Deed of Donation, Cancellation of Titles and Damages. 
 Believing that the heirs of Vicente Galo had already validly transferred to
another party the ownership of the property that the NIT was seeking to
recover, respondent felt that to pursue the appeal would be dilatory,
expensive, frivolous and taxing to the precious time of the CA. Thus, he
deemed it wise to advise the stockholders of the NIT to abandon the appeal.
 Respondent avers that complainant was unjustly adamant in his demand to
continue with the appeal despite  said legal advice. However, because he
sincerely felt that the best way to protect the rights of NIT was to file
appropriate complaint(s) he allowed the period to submit NITs Appellants Brief
to[lapse.
 ISSUE:
WHETHER IT WAS PROPER FOR RESPONDENT ATTY TO LET THE PERIOD TO FILE
BRIEF LAPSE ON THE PRETEXT THAT A BETTER COURSE OF ACTION EXIST?
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
 Respondent was not able to justify his failure to file the brief. She explained
that if respondent actually believed that it was futile to pursue the appeal, why
did he request from the Court of Appeals numerous extensions of time to file
the same within the given extension periods? 
 Also, it should be noted that respondent admits that after he advised NIT and
herein complainant about the futility of pursuing the appeal, the latter
expressed the wish to continue with the appeal. At the very least, respondent
should have given due importance to the decision of his client to avail of a legal
remedy available to it under the legal system.
 She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six months, with a warning that a harsher penalty would be meted
out for a similar infraction in the future.[14]
 IBP GOVERNORS’ Recommendation
On June 21, 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XV-
2003-339 adopting the Report and Recommendation of the investigating commissioner.
 The Ruling of the Court
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The legal profession is invested with public trust. Its goal is to render public
service and secure justice for those who seek its aid. Thus, the practice of law is
considered a privilege, not a right, bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications required for the conferment of
such privilege.
Verily, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and of morality -- which includes honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession, as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.  for Atty. Barrientos, whose Notice of Appearance was submitted a month
 The Ruling of the Court
Any conduct found wanting in these considerations, whether in their
professional or private capacity, shall subject them to disciplinary action. In the present
case, the failure of respondent to file the appellants brief was a clear violation of his
professional duty to his client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to serve their clients
with competence and diligence.
The conduct of respondent shows that he failed to exercise due diligence, and
that he had a cavalier attitude towards the cause of his client. The abandonment by the
former of the latters cause made him unworthy of the trust that his client reposed in
him. Even if respondent was honestly and sincerely protecting the interests of
complainant, the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latters
knowledge and consent. 
If indeed respondent felt unable or unwilling to continue his retainership, he
should have properly withdrawn his appearance and allowed the client to appoint another
lawyer.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raul T. Montesino is found guilty of negligence and is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of this
Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
129. MELCHOR L. LAGUA - versus - THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig rendered a Decision in Criminal Case
Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H finding the accused petitioner guilty of homicide
and sentencing him to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum in each case.
 Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
27423. On 18 June 2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending
Appeal, which the CA granted without objection from the Office of the Solicitor
General.
 An Order of release upon bond was issued in his favor by the Division Clerk of
Court of the CA.
 Petitioner received the Order from the CA requiring, within 45 days from
receipt thereof, or until 28 November 2003, the filing of his Appellants Brief.
 He filed a Motion for Extension of another 45 days.
 He filed a Second Motion for Extension asking for an additional 45 days, which
the CA granted with a warning that no further extension shall be allowed.
 Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his appellants
brief. CA ordered him through counsel to show cause, within five days from
receipt, why the appeal should not be dismissed
 On 14 October 2004, petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Salvador Quimpo,
manifested to the Court that he had already withdrawn as defense counsel for
petitioner, but that he had failed to secure the latters conformity. The
following day, petitioner himself filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 1
September 2004 Resolution, requesting more time to secure the services of
another counsel.
 The Solicitor General, manifesting that accused-appellants abandonment of his
appeal rendered the judgment of conviction final and executory, moved for his
immediate arrest and confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.
 CA stated that it had never received a Notice of Withdrawal from Atty.
Quimpo, but nevertheless granted a 30-day period for petitioner and his new
counsel to file a Notice of Appearance. Again, petitioner failed to comply.
 Instead of filing a timely compliance, petitioners new counsel, Atty. Emerson
Barrientos filed a Notice of Appearance on 8 March 2005 or almost a
month after the Show Cause Order.
 The CA filed a Resolution stating that in the interest of justice, the Notice of
Appearance was considered sufficient compliance with the Order of 8 July
2005. It granted the Motion for Reconsideration, set aside the Order of
Dismissal issued on 1 September 2004, and gave petitioner and his new
counsel a non-extendible period of 30 days within which to file the appellants
brief.
 Notwithstanding the new non-extendible period, petitioner again failed to
seasonably file his brief, prompting the CA to issue the first assailed Resolution
dated 25 November 2005, which, for the second time, declared his appeal
abandoned and accordingly dismissed.
 Petitioner comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the lower court in declaring the appeal abandoned, pointing to the negligence
and errors of his counsel as the cause of the two-year delay in coming up with
the brief. Petitioner reasons that there would be no prejudice to the People if
his appeal is reinstated, and that he has a good defense that can lead to his
acquittal.
 ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING HIS APPEAL FOR THE SECOND TIME
FOR PETITIONER’S MULTIPLE FAILURE TO FILE HIS BRIEF?
 The Ruling of the Court
We dismiss the Petition.
 Petitioner was represented by private counsel (and not counsel de oficio) to
whom the CA had granted multiple extensions: two for Atty. Quimpo; and two
after the Show Cause Order of 8 July 2005. As for Atty. Quimpo, he filed his
Manifestation more than a month after the CA had first issued the dismissal. It
was only because of the plea for compassion in petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration that the CA granted him another 30 days in order to secure
the services of another lawyer. Again, petitioner failed to comply. Both he and
the new counsel, Atty. Barrientos, also failed to comply with the second Show
Cause Order.
 The Ruling of the Court
 Yet again, the CA allowed Atty. Barrientos Notice of Appearance and
considered it substantial compliance with the second Show Cause Order. Out
of the CAs liberality, petitioner was given another 30 days to come up with the
Appellants Brief. This he failed to submit, prompting the CA, for the second and
final time, to declare his appeal as abandoned. Even then, his Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellants Brief was filed 18 days after
his counsel received the CA Resolution.
 Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of
counsel are binding on the client. Otherwise, there would never be an end to a
suit, so long as counsel could allege its own fault or negligence to support the
clients case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of
law.
 The Ruling of the Court
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions issued by the
Court of Appeals on 25 November 2005 and 17 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27423 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
E. Duty to represent client with zeal within the bounds of the law
A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon
the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with
such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case.
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d)
It is the duty of an attorney
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means
only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any
 judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
130. Millare vs. Montero, 246 SCRA 1
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered respondent’s
client to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. respondent as counsel,
appealed the decision. CA dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to
comply with the proper procedures. Respondent thereafter resorted to devious and
underhanded means to delay the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC
adverse to his client.
Held: SUSPENDED for (1) year. Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions
arising from the same cause. Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede
the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and
warns him not to allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule
19.03). In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of
dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the execution of a judgment.
A judgment can be annulled only on two grounds: (a) that the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) that it has been obtained by fraud.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the
same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when,
by reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more
favorable resolution of his case.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
131. Roxas vs. de Zuzuarregui, 481 SCRA 250 (2006)
FACTS: The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, this was sealed by a Letter-Agreement. A Motion to Set Case for
Hearing,8 dated 14 February 1984, was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor in Civil Case No.
26804, praying that the case be revived and be set for hearing by the court at the earliest
date available in its calendar.
The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October 1984, a Partial Decision
was rendered by Branch 141 in Civil Case No. 26804 fixing the just compensation to be
paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter. Letter-Agreement was executed by
and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique De Zuzuarregui, on the
one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-
Agreement which reads that “This will confirm an amendment to our agreement
regarding your attorney’s fees as our lawyers and counsels for the Zuzuarregui’s
properties expropriated by National Housing Authority covering ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-
NINE (179) HECTARES, more or less, covered by TCT Nos. 138340, 85633 and 85634 and
filed as Civil Case No. 26804.
We hereby confirm and agree that we are willing to accept as final and complete
settlement for our 179 hectares expropriated by NHA a price of SEVENTEEN PESOS
(P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds.
We also agree and confirm that for and in consideration of your services as our lawyers
and counsels in the said expropriation case, we commit and bind ourselves to pay to you,
your heirs or assignees-in-interest, as your contingent attorney’s fees any and all amount
in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds as
mentioned above.”
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT, EXECUTED BY THE ZUZUARREGUIS,
AND ATTYS. ROXAS AND PASTOR, FIXING THE EXACT AMOUNT THAT MUST GO TO THE
FORMER, SHOULD STAND AS LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES
RULING:Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent
fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not
per se prohibited by law. However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law,
the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, and should always
be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness,47 such that under Canon
20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and
reasonable fees
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively, are
AFFIRMED but with the MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor
are hereby ordered to return to the Zuzuarreguis the amount of P17,073,224.84. No costs
132.Masmud vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 183385,
February 13, 2009
FACTS: Evangelina Masmud’s (Evangelina), filed a complaint3 against First Victory
Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his
counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s
fees on a contingent basis.The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the
monetary claims of Alexander. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce
the attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement.
Evangelina paid only the amount of ₱680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as
attorney’s fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel
as attorney’s fees.In  her comment, Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for
attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on Article 111
of the Labor Code.The LA issued an Order7 granting Atty. Go’s motion. Evangelina then
elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. 10 On October 31, 2007, the CA
rendered a Decision11 partially granting the petition. Evangelina filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution 13 denying the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW IN ITS DECISION AS IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT LAWYER’S CLAIM OF FORTY
PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.
RULING: There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services
rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees
may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to
the prevailing party,15 such that, in any of the cases provided by law where such award
can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall
pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. Considering that Atty.
Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate
compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of
attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of
justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means
to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and the
Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
133.Urban Bank vs. Pena, 364 SCRA 597 (2001)
• FACTS: Isabel Company, Inc. sold a particular land to Urban Bank (worth P240
million). Since the land was occupied by illegal tenants, the ISCI’s lawyer, Atty.
Peña had to make some effort in negotiating with the illegal tenants just to
vacate the land.
• The ISCI asked Urban Bank to make a document authorizing Atty. Peña to
negotiate with them. But Atty. peña through their with the President of Union
Bank, told him that it is not easy to negotiate with the illegal tenants
conversation in the phone since the local cops are in their side.
• Atty. peña, in order for him to negotiate under Urban Bank, is asking for a 10%
of the total price of the land sold and to be put in writing. It was then agreed
by the pres. Of ub through phone conversation. But the authorization made did
not include the 10% fee of Atty. Pena.
• Meanwhile, Atty. Pena settled the illegal tenants but he gave the illegal tenants
P1.5m and he also paid for the security guards which costed for about P3M.
• Urban Bank refuses to pay Atty. Peña filed a complaint against the recovery of
the costs he spent just to relocate the illegal tenants. But instead filed a
disbarment case against atty. Peña alleging that the act of the lawyer in
securing the letter of authority from complainant for the purpose of convincing
the occupants sought to be evicted that he was duly authorized to take
possession of the property and then using the same letter as basis for claiming
 compensation, expenses, and atty’s fees, constitutes deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct.
• IBP: Dismissed – Later on upheld by the SC
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Magdaleno Peña is guilty of D, M, & GM
RULING: Negative. What respondent was trying to enforce were the terms and conditions
of the contract. The letters, form his own admission, just served to officially confirm a
done deal. Respondent can hardly be faulted of d, m & Gm for invoking the aid of the
court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims he undertook for
complainant, which the latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did
was a lawful exercise of a right.
WHEREFORE, the disbarment complaint against respondent is hereby DISMISSED.
• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e)
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's
business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
• ROC Rule 138, Sec. 24, 32
Section 24.Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 32.Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may
be provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as
counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with
section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than
thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50)
in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred
pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500)
in capital offenses.
134.Corpus vs. aCA, 98 SCRA 424 (1980)
• FACTS: An administrative case against Corpus was filed being the director of
Central Bank. He employed the services of David and won the administrative
case. Corpus gave a check to David, but was returned by David with the
intention of getting paid after the termination of the case. Then, the case is
ruled with finality by the SC and Corpus gets his back salaries and wages.
• When Atty. David wanted to claim his attorney’s fees, petitioner Marino
Corpus contends that respondent David is not entitled to attorney's fees
because there was no contract to that effect. On the other hand, respondent
David contends that the absence of a formal contract for the payment of the
attorney's fees will not negate the payment thereof because the contract may
be express or implied, and there was an implied understanding between the
petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay the latter attorney's
fees when a final decision shall have been rendered in favor of the petitioner
reinstating him to his former position in the Central Bank and paying his back
salaries. Corpus refused to pay David contending that since David refused the
first check given by him, he gave his services gratuitously.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney's fees
RULING: YES. Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are
accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that the service was rendered gratuitously,
it is but just that he should pay a reasonable remuneration therefor because it is a well-
known principle of law, that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage
of another.
WHEREFORE, Mariano Corpus is hereby directed to pay Atty. David with the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
135. Malvar v. Kraft Foods, G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2013
• PETITIONER Czarina T. Malvar, who was represented by Atty. Dasal and Atty.
Llasos, filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against
respondents Kraft Food Philippines, Inc. (KFPI).
• While her appeal was pending, she and respondents entered into a
compromise agreement, whereby she was paid P40,000,000 in addition to the
P14M earlier paid to her. She later filed a motion to dismiss/withdraw case but
before it could be acted upon, a motion for intervention to protect attorney’s
rights was filed by the law firm of Dasal, Llasos and Associates, through its
counsel, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Bellosillo. The motion sought,
among others, that both Malvar and KFPI be held and ordered to pay jointly
and severally the intervenor’s contingent fees.
• In opposing the motion, Malvar claimed that the intervenor lacked the legal
capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist after Atty. Llasos resigned
from the intervenor and Atty. Richard B. Dasal became barred from private
practice upon his appointment to a position in a government subsidiary.
Besides, according to Malvar, her dismissal was based on a justifiable cause. 
• ISSUE: Should Malvar and Kraft Foods be liable to pay the contingent fees of
the Intervenor Law Firm?
• RULING: Yes. In the absence of the lawyer’s fault, consent or waiver, a client
cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a
justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the
intervenor’s legal service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to
defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with
her actions but, most importantly, fell short of being justifiable.
• In a word, she could not simply walk away from her contractual obligations
toward the Intervenor, for Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the parties
and should be complied with in good faith.
WHEREFORE, the Court APPROVES the compromise agreement; GRANTS the motion for
Interventions; and ORDERS Malvar and KFPI to pau Intevenor Law Firm its stipulated
contingent fees of 10% of P41.6M.
136.Balingit v. Cervantes & Delarmente, A.C. No. 11059, November 9, 2016
• FACTS: Complainant is a former Filipino citizen who subsequently became a
naturalized British citizen. Complainant’s 2 sons, Jose and Carlo Balingit, who
were on board their respective motorcycles, figured in a head-on collision with
the car driven by David A. Alizadeh (who recently based the board exams for
physicians). As a result, a case was filed against David.
• Complainant engaged the legal services of respondents in the filing of the
separate civil suit for damages and an administrative case against David.
• Atty. Cervantes prepared and signed an Agreement embodying the terms of
respondents' engagement. Addressed to Kristopher, Carlo, and the heirs of
Jose, but the same did not sign the said agreement. Complainant paid the sum
of P45,000.00 as partial acceptance fee receipt issued by Atty. Delarmente, and
Atty. Cervantes allegedly received P10,000.00 from Imelda Balingit (Imelda),
complainant's daughter-in-law, without issuing any receipt.
Complainant and the representatives of David agreed to settle and David agreed to pay
P1,000,000.00 for the dismissal of the case. Atty. Cervantes, upon discovering that
complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement, attended the hearing and demanded
10% of the amount of the compromise as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as appearance fee
from complainant. Complainant refused.
Atty. Cervantes filed a criminal complaint for estafa against complainant, his wife, and his
sons, as well as a complaint for deportation with the Bureau of Immigration, on the
ground that complainant and his family are undesirable British aliens.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated Canon 20, and Rule 20.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
• RULING: Yes. Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises that
xxx A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. xxx It is improper for
a lawyer to impose additional professional fees on his client that were never mentioned
nor agreed upon the time of the engagement of his services.
• The Court held that the respondent is guilty of being remiss in their duties as
counsel for complainant and that when a lawyer accepts a case he undertakes
to give his utmost attention, skill, and competence to it. His client has the right
to expect that he will discharge his duties diligently and exert his best efforts,
learning, and ability to prosecute or defend his client's cause with reasonable
dispatch.
 • WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDED Atty. Teodoro B. Delarmente and Atty.
Renato M. Cervantes for SIX MONTHS from the practice of law. Both
are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely. They are also DIRECTED to return to complainant the
amount of P45,000.00.
• WITHDRAWAL OF SERVICES
137.Quirante vs. IAC, 169 SCRA 769 (1989)
FACTS: Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building
contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine American General Insurance Co.
Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S
failure to perform his part of the contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio
Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN
before the Court of first Instance of Manila, now the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
for damages,. The RTC rendered a decision In said decision, the trial court ruled in favor of
the plaintiff by rescinding the contract. herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the
trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees,
which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de
Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C.
Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be
computed as follows:
 In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees
of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
 In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall
be divided equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante
Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation in an order, despite an opposition
thereto. It also denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its
second order dated May 25, 198
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CONFIRMATION OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THIS CASE IS PREMATURE
RULING: In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to
assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under our
jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of
attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on
certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R. No. 64834) "may or may not ultimately
result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages" awarded
by the trial court.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet
become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof
should be held in abeyance.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court
subject of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.
138.Tanhueco vs. de Dumo, 172 SCRA 760 (1989)
FACTS: Complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a Petition for Disbarment
(docketed as Administrative Case No. 1437) against respondent Justiniano G. de Dumo for
having violated the Canons of Professional Ethics by his (a) refusal to remit to her money
collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and (b) refusal to return documents
entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases.
Complainant Hilaria Tanhueco testified that she secured the legal services of respondent
to collect indebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a
document evidencing their lawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it was not
necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to collect
from the debtors Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her
P2,000.00, Pl,300.00, and P3,000.00 on three separate occasions, but she could not
remember when she gave those amounts. Respondent did not pay those loans (pp. 8-9,
tsn, Id.).
 ISSUE: WHETHER THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO HOLD ON TO THE ENTIRE AMOUNT
HE COLLECTED FOR THE REASON THAT HIS FEES IN OTHER CASES HAVE NOT YET BEEN
PAID
RULING: The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his
client, does not relieve him from his duty promptly to account for the moneys received;
his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 7
In the present case, what respondent could have properly done was to make an account
with his client, the complainant, deduct his attorney's fees due in respect of the amount
actually collected by him, and turn over the remaining balance to the complainant. The
Court notes that the services of respondent de Dumo were engaged by the complainant
on a number of cases and that these were on differing stages of completion. Respondent
was not entitled to hold on to the entire amount of P12,000.00 collected by him until all
his fees for the other cases had also been paid and received by him. There was not
enough evidence in the record to show how much money, if any, respondent had in fact
previously (i.e., other than the P12,000.00 from Mañosca) collected for and turned over to
complainant (thereby waiving his lien thereon) without deducting therefrom his claimed
contingent fees in respect of such collections
 WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that:
1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys' oath and of serious professional
misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice law for six (6) months and
WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with
139.Albano vs. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411 (1967)
FACTS: This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against
respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the Philippine Bar. Complainant alleged that
during the Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services
of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long
after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and
termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another
lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to
collect her attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE COMPLAINANT ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN TERMINATING
RESPONDENT’S SERVICES THUS MAKING HIM LIABLE TO PAY THE ATTORNEY’S FEES OF
THE LATTER
Ruling: The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of
bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who,
after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on
their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing
her as their counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of
their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ." 12
He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial
cases could not be considered binding "it is safe to conclude, from a review of the
evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence before us in this
case, that respondent may be exonerated herein." 13 With such a conclusion of the
Solicitor General, this Court, to repeat, is in full agreement.
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his
services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a
client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is
in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such
an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every
effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned
honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
 WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine
Bar, is hereby dismissed.
140. Metropolitan Bank vs. CA, 181 SCRA 367 (1990)
FACTS: A certain Celedonio Javier bought seven (7) parcels of land owned by Eustaquio
Alejandro. These properties were thereafter mortgaged by Javier with the petitioner to
secure a loan obligation. The obligors having defaulted, petitioner foreclosed the
mortgages. Subsequently, Alejandro, alleging deceit, fraud and misrepresentation
committed against him by Javier in the sale of the parcels of land, brought suits against
Javier et al., and included petitioner as defendant therein. It was during the pendency of
these suits that these parcels of land were sold by petitioner to its sister corporation,
Service Leasing Corporation. As a consequence of the transfer of said parcels of land to
Service Leasing Corporation, petitioner filed an urgent motion for substitution of party on
July 28, 1983..  Private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney's fees, based
on quantum meruit, which motion precipitated an exchange of arguments between the
parties.. The court a quo issued the order, granting payment of attorney's fees to private
respondent. On appeal, respondent court affirmed the order of the trial court in its
decision promulgated on February 11, 1988. A motion for reconsideration, dated March 3,
1988, was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in a resolution promulgated on
November 19, 1988, hence the present recourse.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF ITS CHARGING LIEN FOR PAYMENT OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT A SEPARATE CIVIL SUIT IS NECESSARY FOR THE
ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH LIEN AND
3. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO TWENTY-FIVE (25%)
OF THE ACTUAL AND CURRENT MARKET VALUES OF THE LITIGATED
PROPERTIES ON A QUANTUM MERUIt
RULING: On the first issue, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment
of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in
favor of his client. A lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as
an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered when something is due
his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
In the case at bar, the civil cases below were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs
"in view of the frill satisfaction of their claims." 8 The dismissal order neither provided for
any money judgment nor made any monetary award to any litigant, much less in favor of
petitioner who was a defendant therein.
In the Bacolod-Murcia Milling case, which we previously noted as cited by private
respondent, there was an express declaration that "in this jurisdiction, the lien does not
attach to the property in litigation."
Indeed, an attorney may acquire a lien for his compensation upon money due his client
from the adverse party in any action or proceeding in which the attorney is employed, but
such lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of the litigation. More
specifically, an attorney merely defeating recovery against his client as a defendant is not
entitled to a lien on the property involved in litigation for fees and the court has no power
to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client's title to property already in the client's
possession.
The resolution of the second issue is accordingly subsumed in the preceding discussion
which amply demonstrates that private respondent is not entitled to the enforcement of
its charging lien.
On the last issue, the Court refrains from resolving the same so as not to preempt or
interfere with the authority and adjudicative facility of the proper court to hear and
decide the controversy in a proper proceeding which may be brought by private
respondent.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in
the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other
money claim. The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney's fees have the
right to be heard upon the question of their propriety or amount. 23 Hence, the obvious
necessity of a hearing is beyond cavil.
Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the
basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance
of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as
may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the
amount thereof.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
141.Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 (2003)
Respondent allegedly asked the complainant if he could rent a small office space in
complainant’s building in Quezon City for his law practice. Complainant acceded and
introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant’s retained lawyer, who
accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainant’s
cases. Respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from
complainant which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a new car. In
return, respondent issued to complainant a post dated check. Subsequently, respondent
failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to
complainant. Complainant tried to encash respondent’s postdated check with the drawee
bank but it was dishonored as respondent’s account therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant’s repeated demands for payment. Complainant
then filed a criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22and a
civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
◈ Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 (2003)
 The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information
is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within
the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer; it does not extend to those
made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud.
Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a
copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension
to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED
◈ Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122 (1996)
The PCGG raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. During the course of the proceedings, PCGG filed a
"Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" which excluded private respondent Raul S.
Roco from the complaint on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder.
142.Regala vs. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 122 (1996)
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. This
general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
2)Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by
revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.
143.People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr.,
who was formerly the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and
Congressman. During his stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a
vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has already been
designated and reserved as a school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title
thereto through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came
forward and filed a case of perjury against him. However, the same was dismissed on the
ground of prescription. Then again, another case was filed against him for violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his
application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by respondent Atty.
Sansaet, a practicing attorney.
Another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then that respondent
Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his client Paredes.
◈ People vs. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)
 It is well settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be
privileged, must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
 existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact,
the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an
attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice.
144.Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 509 (2002)
RP filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against several persons, one of which is Gregorio Castillo. The
latter was accused of having acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent of the Marcoses, et
al. in establishing Hotel Properties, Inc., in order to acquire beneficial interest and control,
and conceal ownership, of Silahis International Hotel.Castillo later died, therefore, a
motion to dismiss was subsequently filed on the ground that the action did not survive the
death of petitioner. Sandiganbayan denied the motion, stating that the case is not only
one for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, but one for recovery of real and
personal property and that the cause of action being inclusive of claim for damages for
tortuous misconduct.
In another motion to dismiss, petitioner contended that the complaint filed against
Castillo is violative of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege (since Castillo is attorney-
in-fact). But Sandiganbayan ruled that Castillo is sued as principal defendant for being in
conspiracy with other defendants in the commission of the acts complained of. Hence this
petition.
◈ Castillo vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 509 (2002)
◈ The Court adopted its own ruling in the Regala case, viz: “an argument is
advanced that the invocation by petitioner of the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality at this state of the proceedings is premature and that they
should wait until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objection. But
petitioners are not mere witnesses.
◈ They are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. They
have made their position clear from the very beginning that they are not
willing to testify and they cannot be compelled to testify in view of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal
right to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality.”
145. Dalisay vs. Mauricio, 479 SCRA 307 (2006)
Valeriana U. Dalisay engaged respondent’s services as counsel in Civil Case No. 00-044.
Notwithstanding his receipt of documents and attorneys fees, respondent never rendered
legal services. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client relationship and demanded
the return of her money, but respondent refused.
The Supreme Court in its Decision, found respondent guilty of malpractice and gross
misconduct and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of six months.
Upon learning of the Court’s decision, respondent verified the status of Civil Case No. 00-
044. He learned of the trial court’sDecision holding that the tax declarations and title
submitted by complainant are not official records. Thereupon, respondent filed a Sworn
Affidavit Complaint against complainant alleging that complainant offered tampered
evidence. The respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration for the Supreme Court
Decision and argued that complainant did not engage his services as counsel, and that
complainant offered tampered evidence in Civil Case No. 00-004, prompting him to file
falsification cases against her.
◈ Dalisay vs. Mauricio, 479 SCRA 307 (2006)
◈ Rule 19.02 of the CPR specifically provides that a lawyer who has received
information that his clients has, in the course of the representation,
perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. As a lawyer, respondent
is expected to know this Rule. Instead of inaction, he should have confronted
complainant and asked her to rectify her fraudulent representation. If
complainant refuses, then he should terminate his relationship with her.
WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April
22, 2005 is immediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the
Office of the Bar Confidant his compliance with our Decision
◈ Lee vs. Simando, A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee. Atty. Simando. He went to
see Dr. Lee and asked if the latter could help a certain Mejorado for his needed funds.
Mejorado was Atty. Simando’s client in a case claiming rewards against the Bureau of
Customs. The latter gave in to her lawyer's demands. When the said obligation became
due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands, Mejorado failed and refused to comply with his
obligation. Since Atty. Simando was still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee instructed him to initiate
legal action against Mejorado. Atty. Simando said he would get in touch with Mejorado
and ask him to pay his obligation without having to resort to legal action. However, even
after several months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee. Thus, complainant was forced to
terminate her contract with Atty. Simando and demand payment from him as well.
146.Lee vs. Simando, A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013
◈ Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party
(complainant as creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who
is also his client, since a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests. He may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his present or former
client. Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because
complainant and respondent are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince.
His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated,
obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of
double-dealing.
CANON 22- Lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice
appropriate in the circumstances.
• Causes of termination of attorney-client relationship
• Withdrawal of the lawyer;
• Death (actual or presumptive) of the lawyer or the client;
• Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer from the practice of law;
• Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of the lawyer;
• Dismissal of the lawyer by the client;
• Client’s death;
• Full termination of the case
147. Domingo vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472 (1971)
NEGATIVE.The party in the subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased Luis C.
Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The
fact that his services were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr. in his (Luis') official capacity as
administrator, did not make him the personal counsel of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding Luis'
removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as counsel in the
appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until
the new administrator should terminate his services, which she never did.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner’s counsel shall pay treble costs.
148.Montano vs. IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)
FACTS: The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in
collaboration with Atty. Gerona in a case pending before the CA docketed wherein the
complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
• The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00, 50% of
which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance
upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent
the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney’s fee. 
• Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s brief
and contrary to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after
the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment
from complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
• Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, respondent counsel again demanded
payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was
unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainant’s
counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity.
• Thus this complaint charging respondent with misconduct and praying that he
be “sternly dealt with administratively.
Montano vs. IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)
YES.A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate
in the circumstances. Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately
fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the
attorney’s fees.
In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s
contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the
amount owing to him was only P3,500.00.
WHEREFORE, respondent was REPRIMANDED.
149.Obando vs. Figueras, 322 SCRA 148
FACTS: Alegria Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a
petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras.
While the settlement of the estate was pending, she dies and Eduardo assumed
administration of the joint estates of Don Jose and Doña Alegria.
• Later, Eduardo was served a petition of probate of what purported to be Doña
Alegria’s will.
• Obando was appointed as respondent Eduardo’s co-administrator of the joint
estate of Jose and Doña Alegria Figueras. Obando and several other members
of the Obando clan was allegedly bequeathed a will of the properties left by
the Figueras couple including two parcels of land.
• Upon insistence of the Eduardo (stepson of Doña Alegira) that the alleged will
was a forgery, the will was submitted to the NBI for examination and found
that the signatures were not made by the same person which led to the
indictment and conviction of Obando for estafa through falsification of a public
document.
• Eduardo Figueras sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on the strength of
an Order issued by the probate court. Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-
administrator and universal heir of Doña Alegria, filed a Complaint against
Eduardo and Amigo Realty for the nullification of the sale.
• The probate court removed Obando from his office as co-administrator of the
estate. Consequently, the respondents, through their counsel Atty. Yuseco,
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the civil case - granted.
• Obando then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. Then his Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus was dismissed and the dismissal order of the RTC
was affirmed.
• Petitioner then argues before the Supreme Court that the motion to dismiss
was invalid since at the time of the filing, Atty. Yuseco no longer represented
the respondents, as shown by Eduardo’s Manifestation and Motion dispensing
with said counsel’s services in the proceedings in view of a Compromise
Agreement with Petitioner Obando.
No.Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in
accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former manifested that
he had been tricked by Petitioner Obando into signing the aforesaid Manifestation and
Motion and Compromise Agreement. Besides, the filing of the Motion to Dismiss was not
prejudicial but beneficial to the said respondent; hence, he had no reason to complain.
Therefore, it cannot be said that Atty. Yuseco has been validly dismissed.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
150. Caoile vs. Macaraeg, A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015
FACTS: Francisco Caoile engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent them in a
civil case before the CFI. After the CFI rendered judgment against them, they decided to
appeal their case before the CA. Atty. Macaraeg thrice moved for extension of time to file
an appeal but still failed to file, causing the CA to dismiss the appeal and declared the
decision final and executory.
• Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until
they were served with the CFI’s writ of execution and a notice of sale at public
auction6 of their property. Alleging that his lawyer's neglect and dereliction of
duty caused the dismissal of his appeal, complainant Francisco Caoile filed on a
Complaint for disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg.
• On Atty. Macaraeg’s defense, he said that Francisco and his codefendants did
not pay in full for his services in filing the appeal. While he admitted that he
failed to submit an appellants’ brief, he averred that the same was actually the
fault of his clients who failed to provide the necessary funds to file said brief.
• Caoile vs. Macaraeg, A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015
AFFIRMATIVE.
153.Perez v. Dela Torre (A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006)
A motion for extension to file an appellant's brief carries with it the presumption that the
lawyer will file the pleading within the requested extended period. Failure to do so
without any reasonable excuse violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a penalty,
supervening circumstances (death of the respondent) call for the dismissal of the
administrative case.
WHEREFORE, complaint for disbarment against Atty. Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.
PART VII. Understanding “Conflict of Interest”
Questions:
 What is conflict of interest? Why are there proscriptions against it?
 What are the kinds of Conflict of interest?
 What are the tests for determining conflict of interest?
 How can conflict of interest be avoided? Mitigated?
 What are the defenses against a charge of conflict of interest?
Cases:
151.Hilado v. David (G.R. L-961, Sept. 21, 1949)
 As to conflict of interest: Where it appeared that an attorney, representing
one party in litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party with
respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not
inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent
the adverse party.
• CASE: Hilado v. David (G.R. L-961, Sept. 21, 1949)
 Disposition: The motion for disqualification was allowed.
152.Dee v. Mutuc (G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989)
 As to conflict of interest: Generally, an attorney is prohibited from
representing parties with contending positions. However, at a certain stage of
the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting
interests with the consent of the parties. A common representation may work
to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest
motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may
well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their
differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation
and confidence of said parties.
• CASE: Dee v. Mutuc (G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989)
 Disposition: WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated February 12,1987, reinstating its original decision of May 9, 1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
 On conflicts of interest: The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer
were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time
that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two accused, he was also
representing the interest of the victim’s family. This was declared by the
victim’s daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of
Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers.
• CASE: Perez v. Dela Torre (A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006)
 To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal
services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his
assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded
to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional
rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion
to give their confession.
• CASE: Perez v. Dela Torre (A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006)
  Disposition: WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation
of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of
law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
154.Samson v. Era (A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013
 On the conflict of interest: Contrary to Atty. Era’s ill-conceived attempt to
explain his disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination of the attorney-
client relationship does not justify a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to
or in conflict with that of the former client.
• CASE: Samson v. Era (A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013
 Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO
O. ERA guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his
commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
• CASE: Perez v. Dela Torre (A.C. No. 6160, March 30, 2006)
Perez also said that Atty. Dela Torre went to the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo
and Avila were being detained and made representations that he could secure their
freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions; that unknown to Ilo and Avila,
Atty. Dela Torre was representing the heirs of the murder victim; that on the strength of
the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them.
155. Hornilla and Ricafort v. Salunat (A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003)
 As to conflict of interest: Again, this constituted conflict of interests,
considering that the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the
individual members of the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the
interest of the corporation.
• CASE: Hornilla and Ricafort v. Salunat (A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003)
 Disposition: ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY
of representing conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
156. Solatan v. Inocentes and Camano (A.C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005)
 On conflict of interest: In fact, considering the circumstances, the questioned
statement is in consonance with complainants foremost duty to uphold the law
as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. Camano in such a context
should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the
interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the
incorrectly levied properties.
• CASE: Solatan v. Inocentes and Camano (A.C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005)
• Disposition: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16 April 2004 is AFFIRMED in respect of the
sanction meted out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is hereby ADMONISHED
to monitor more closely the activities of his associates to make sure that the
same are in consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the
WARNING that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with
more severely.
157.Daging v. Davis (A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014)
 On conflict of interest: Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of
Davis & Sabling Law office, her case is actually handled only by his partner Atty.
Sabling. He was not privy to any transaction between Atty. Sabling and
complainant and has no knowledge of any information or legal matter
complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He thus inveigles that he
could not have taken advantage of an information obtained by his law firm by
virtue of the Retainer Agreement.
• CASE: Daging v. Davis (A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014)
 Disposition: WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15,
2012 Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.
Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is warned that a commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a stiffer penalty.
158. Quiambao vs. Atty. Bamba (2005)
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a
lawyers conduct lies within this proscription:
(1) Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;
(2) Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
159.Alisbo vs. Atty. Jalandoon (1991)
Solicitor General’s Report:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the
circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the
controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose (Canon 6, CPE).
160.Heirs of Falame vs. Atty. Baguio (2008)
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.
The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to contest for that which
his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation
will develop.
In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the
lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
There is sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory
pleading, it was put forward in complainants position paper filed with the IBP and in the
petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered his defenses to the charge in
his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his very
first pleading before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as
his client. Such absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his
defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.
161.Aniñon vs. Atty. Sabitsana (2012)
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the
highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information to his/her
lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
A client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is
duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with
the client.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action. The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.
To be held accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one case,
one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the
lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty
of undivided fidelity to both clients.
162.Orola vs. Atty. Ramos (2013)
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties.
The test is:
1. Whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client;
2. Whether the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection;
3. Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
163.Mabini Colleges vs. Atty. Pajarillo (2015)
Based on the principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but
also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance
in the administration of justice.
Respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of complainant's financial capacity to
pay the loan.
164.PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan (2005)
Matter - any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving
a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.
Intervene - includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.
It is proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public
confidence in government.
PART VIII. The Special Role of the Notary Public
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Supreme Court A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,
RULE IV: POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Powers. - (a) A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial
acts:
(1) acknowledgments;
(2) oaths and affirmations;
(3) jurats;
(4) signature witnessings;
(5) copy certifications; and
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or
other mark on an instrument or document presented for notarization if:
(1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary
public and of two (2) disinterested and unaffected witnesses to
the instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or
other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: "Thumb
or Other Mark affixed by (name of signatory by mark) in the
presence of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned
notary public"; and
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark
through an acknowledgment, jurat, or signature witnessing.
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically
unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make
a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or
document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: “Signature affixed by
notary in presence of (names and addresses of person and two
[2] witnesses)”; and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or
jurat.
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his
regular place of work or business; provided, however, that on certain exceptional
occasions or situations, a notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties in
the following sites located within his territorial jurisdiction:
(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of
office may be administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of
instruments or documents requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an
instrument or document is confined for treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring
notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if
he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right,
title, interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these
Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described
in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate
fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) thenotary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;
(b) thesignatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction
requiring a notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will.
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not:
(a) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the notary to be
false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.
SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. - A notary public shall not notarize:
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document;
(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.
- Rule VII, Sections 1-2
RULE VII
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Official Signature. – In notarizing a paper instrument or document, a notary
public shall:
(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the name indicated and as appearing on
the notary's commission;
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at the time the notarial act is performed.
SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of
office, to be procured at his own expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by any
other person. It shall be of metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have
the name of the city or province and the word “Philippines” and his own name on the
margin and the roll of attorney's number on the face thereof, with the words "notary
public" across the center. A mark, image or impression of such seal shall be made directly
on the paper or parchment on which the writing appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the notarial act is performed and shall
be clearly impressed by the notary public on every page of the instrument or document
notarized.
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible
only to the notary public or the person duly authorized by him.
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is stolen, lost, damaged or
other otherwise rendered unserviceable in affixing a legible image, the notary public, after
informing the appropriate law enforcement agency, shall notify the Executive Judge in
writing, providing proper receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail, and in the
event of a crime committed, provide a copy or entry number of the appropriate police
record. Upon receipt of such notice, if found in order by the Executive Judge, the latter
shall order the notary public to cause notice of such loss or damage to be published, once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or
province where the notary public is commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall
issue to the notary public a new Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of the notary public, or the
revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, the official seal shall be surrendered to
the Executive Judge and shall be destroyed or defaced in public during office hours. In the
event that the missing, lost or damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it shall be
delivered by the notary public to the Executive Judge to be disposed of in accordance with
this section. Failure to effect such surrender shall constitute contempt of court. In the
event of death of the notary public, the person in possession of the official seal shall have
the duty to surrender it to the Executive Judge.
- Rule XI, Sec. 1
RULE XI: SPECIAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any
person who:
(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
(b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register, or official
records of a notary public; and
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official
misconduct.
165. Mondejar vs. Rubia, 496 SCRA 1 (2006)
Re: violation of the Anti Dummy law
Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
thus rendering the document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity.
Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are thus mandated to subscribe to the sacred
duties appertaining to their office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed
with public interest.19 A graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their
solemn oath to obey the laws, to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any,20 and to
guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement,21 and other duties and responsibilities.
166. Lee vs. Tambago, 544 SCRA 393 (2008)
Re: Notarization of a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged
signatures of the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses
The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose:
(1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and
(2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and
to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary public,
especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
Notarial duties — Note the various ways by which the Notarial Rules are violated.
167. Crisostomo v. Nazareno, A.C. No. 6677, 10 June 2014
Re: multiple filing of complaints for rescission of contracts. Respondent committed
malpractice as a notary public since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc.
No. 1968) in all the certifications against forum shopping that were separately attached to
the six (6) complaints for rescission and ejectment.
Doctrine: Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a
certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and
subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions
It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial
register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of
the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in
his register.35
168. De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, 08 July 2014
Re: the drafting and notarization of a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that
falsely named his client as its absolute and registered owner, despite lawyer’s knowledge
as a consultant of the Bataan LGU.
Doctrine: Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason
that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of
a notarized document would be undermined.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial
seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the
circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents
diminished.
169. Almazan v. Suerte-Felipe, A.C. No. 7184, 17 September 2014
Re: Notarized an EJS stating he is a notary public of Marikina when in fact he is a
commissioned notary public of Pasig.
The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11,
Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, particularly Sec. 11 on the notary public’s
jurisdiction and term.
SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The term “regular place of work or business”
refers to a stationary office in the city or province wherein the notary public renders legal
and notarial services
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall
be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila
shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial
act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the
requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a
formality definitely more than casual.
170. In re: Order of Judge Madamba, A.C. No. 10119, 11 November 2014
Re: The notarization of Applications for Foreclosure and Rem despite the cease and desist
order previously issued by the court against respondent.
"lawyers are bound ·to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing." Similarly, the duties of notaries public
are dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
171. Angeles v. Bagay, A.C. No. 8103, 03 Dec 2014 (assisting in unauthorized practice of
law)
Re: the notarization of 18 documents done by the secretary while the lawyer was in
Mexico
Respondent is responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice provides that a “Notary Public” refers to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules. A notary public’s secretary is obviously not
commissioned to perform the official acts of a notary public.
A person who is commissioned as a notary public takes full responsibility for all the entries
in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of this responsibility by passing the buck
to his secretary.
172. Pitogo v. Suello, A.C. No. 10695, 18 March 2015
Re: another case of a secretary doing the notarization on behalf of the lawyer. Jusq
The secretary cannot be held responsible for the erroneous entries in the notarial register.
The notarial commission is a license held personally by the notary public. It cannot be
further delegated. It is the notary public alone who is personally responsible for the
correctness of the entries in his or her notarial register. Atty. Suello’s apparent regret
may alleviate the injury done privately, but it does not change the nature of the violation.
PART 9. Judicial Ethics
173. OCA v. Judge Eliza Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Nov. 22, 2016
FACTS: Judge Eliza Yu’s noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011, refusal to honor the
appointments of court personnel, issuance of a show-cause order
against fellow Judges and court personnel, disrespectful attitude towards SC officers and
offices, order of presentation of ex parte evidence before the OCA who was not a member
of the Bar, refusal to sign the application for leave of absence, inappropriate messages to
her fellow Judge, authorization to allow criminal proceedings without the actual
participation of the public prosecutor, her manner of disposing cases, and other
allegations of oppressions resulted to the several complaints filed against her.
ISSUE: W/N disbarment should also be imposed on the respondent.
RULING: The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 relevantly states:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special
courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall
also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required
to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should
not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned aa member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the
ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court. Given her wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open disrespect
towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to her judicial
office, and her penchant for threatening the defenseless with legal actions to make them
submit to her will, we should also be imposing the penalty of disbarment. The object
of disbarment is not so much to punish the attorney herself as it is to safeguard the
administration of justice, the courts and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court. Also, disbarment seeks to remove from the Law Profession attorneys who have
disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby proved themselves unfit to continue
discharging the trust and respect given to them as members of the Bar.
The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were also
grounds for disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be treated as
justifiable disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This treatment is
explained by the fact that her membership in the Bar was an integral aspect of her
qualification for judgeship. Also, her moral and actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as
found in these cases, reflected her indelible unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar.
At the very least, a Judge like her who disobeyed the basic rules of judicial conduct should
not remain as a member of the Bar because she had thereby also violated her Lawyer's
Oath.
Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct
embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would
constitute a breach of the following canons: 1, 6, and 11.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and
misconduct as a judicial officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal
from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain a member of the Law
Profession.
However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any
way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her
disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment on
the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to
her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her professional
standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not to disbar her.
Note:
Judge Eliza B. Yu filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause
Order filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated on November 22, 2016.
On March 14, 2017, SC ruled:
Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of
any lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the
respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for
disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence.
We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed
does not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is
intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as
attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the
clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.
174.
Canon 1: Independence
175. Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991)
Topic: CANON 1 SECTION 4
FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his
client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the respondent judge against the accused
Tranquilino Calo Jr. and Belarmino Alloco for the crime of murder fixing their bail without
any prior hearing.
ISSUE: W/N Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
RULING: Yes. A judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable
law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. He
should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the
temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is
contrary to established principles of law. It has been an established legal principle or rule
that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a
hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary
release of the accused.
A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a
manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
The respondent judge is imposed of a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
and WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a
judge, and that the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally
176. Tan vs. Rosete, 437 SCRA 581 (2004)
Facts: Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former
Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, for
violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act or R.A. No. 3019.
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, then presided by respondent judge. Before
the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff to talk to
complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue
in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for P150,000.00 in
exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of respondent judges
Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the
complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the
disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff member
allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed that
she had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were
eventually dismissed by respondent judge.
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He
instead stated that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a
favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions
in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then
San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly
talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant. But he politely declined,
telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and moreover, he
had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent
judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the down payment of a car
he was planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a
member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No.
59440. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change the
resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give
complainant copies of said Decisions.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge violated the standard for judicial conduct.
Ruling: Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and
show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office
premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is punishable
under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as
the documentary evidence presented by both parties, the complainant’s version is more
trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented
during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in
Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary
evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainants staff met with her. It
would be impossible for complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft decision, it being
highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the people in his office.
Judges should adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be
the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. The exacting standards of
conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the
members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral
uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the
transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute,
encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself.
177.Ramirez vs. Corpus-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462 (1986)
FACTS: Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
stands charged in six separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the
performance of her official duties. Such as: the alleged failure of respondent judge to
decide Civil Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza Lazaro," despite the
case having been submitted for decision for more than 18 months; indiscriminately issued
restraining orders without conducting hearings on the applications for the issuance of
preliminary injunctions and had reiterated restraining orders after the lapse of the
mandatory twenty [20] days; with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering
an unjust decision; and other gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE:Whether Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog should be discipline
RULING:YES. Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official
duties. 9 They are likewise charged with the knowledge of internal rules and procedures,
especially those which relate to the scope of their authority. They are duty bound to
observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to
ensure the orderly administration of justice. Thus, confronted with a serious challenge to
one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if not the
wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to this Court.
The hasty and reckless attitude of respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding
Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection against her authority and the reasonable
request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office
warranting disciplinary sanction.
Canon 2: Integrity
178. In re Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla Marcos Against Judge F. Marcos, 360 SCRA
539 (2001)
FACTS: In 1996, complainant, the wife of respondent Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their
children filed a complaint against respondent for his failure to sufficiently support the
family and for having an illicit relationship with a law student. Complainants prayed that
all remuneration due respondent be directly released to them but the complaint was later
withdrawn and dismissed.
In 2000, Chief Justice Hilario Davide recommended for the suspension of respondent after
a scandalous incident during an exclusive Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges
Association where respondent brought along a woman. When Chief Justice pulled
respondent aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit relationship with the
woman, respondent candidly admitted that he had been living with the woman named
Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already.
During investigation, respondent denied all the allegations. However, the evidences
including a phone bill addressed to the respondent not to their conjugal dwelling but to
the address of the alleged mistress, a birthday card which read “MT cares a lot, you know”
and a vehicle and its insurance policy under the name of both the respondent and his
alleged mistress, among others, proved respondent’s infidelity. The matter of the illicit
relationship was even published in the newspapers.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct
RULING: YES. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that the conduct ofa
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance
of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. Being the subject of
constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to
possess the highest standard of morality and decency. If a judge fails to have
high ethical standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes as he
represents the judiciary.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He
has violated the code of Judicial Conduct, which requires every judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the appearance of
impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent was ordered dismissed from
service.
179. Dela Cruz vs. Bersamira, 336 SCRA 353 (2000)
180.
181.In re Undated Letter of Mr. Luis C. Biraogo, February 24, 2009
NATURE OF ACTION:
The resolution is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution
dated December 10, 2008, to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated
ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,
Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, to
determine who are responsible for the leakage of a confidential internal document of the
En Banc.
FACTS:
 July 15, 2008 - the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of
Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated (Limkaichong case) which was used
by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations. It having been already
printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were
concurring "in the result," Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia
during the same session.
 July 22, 2008 - the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpio’s Reflections which
had in the meantime been circulated to the members of the Court. As a result,
the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the date for holding
oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008. On the request of
Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in the agenda of
July 29, 2008 where it was listed as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral
arguments remained, however.
 December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press conference at the Barrio Fiesta
Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media
an undated letter signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox
copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated that the
Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the
other Justices, unlawfully and with improper motives withheld the
promulgation of the ponencia.
 Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated
ponencia infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court and
constituted contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 10,
2008, directed
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior
Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division and
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Working Chairperson, First
Division, as Members to investigate the unauthorized release of the
unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are
responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal document of
the En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the appropriate
actions thereon;
2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be punished for
contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the same
together with the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes.
As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices,
conducted initial hearings on December 15 and 16, 2008.
The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:
1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes
2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes
3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes
4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office
8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice
9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc
10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division,
Office of Administrative Services
11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court
12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court
13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court
15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice
Ruben T. Reyes
16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T.
Reyes
17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes
ISSUE: Whether Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) leaked the unpromulgated ponencia.
RULING: The court finds Justice Reyes, together with Armando A. Del Rosario and Atty.
Rosendo B. Evangelista administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, and Simple Neglect
of Duty for the Court Stenographer and Judicial Staff Head of the said Justice.
The Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and
employees are mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any impression of
impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be
avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all
those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the people’s faith in the judiciary.
Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple)
neglect of duty is punishable by suspension of one month and one day to six months for
the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty of fine (instead of
suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative.
182. Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held
on 26 September 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory Ong, September 23, 2014,
A.M. No. 09-2-89-SC
Facts: In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an exposé involving billions of
government funds channeled through bogus foundations.  Dubbed as the "pork barrel
scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted
to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned
massive protest actions all over the country. .  In the course of the investigation
conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and
other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the
alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer.
These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or
attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement[2] before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other
special occasions
33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are:
Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani
Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife,
Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae
Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene
Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that
case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear
pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang
kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan. In her testimony before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement
regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung
TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions
on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by
the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of
the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu
proprio under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the
judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were
alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs]
involved in the scam).[9]
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution
was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-
DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty
(60) days from notice hereof.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the
Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and
WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Issue: Whether respondent Ong is indeed guilty of violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
Ruling: This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record. It is a settled
rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the
Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses
as they testified.[17]  The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies
a fortiori to administrative cases.[18]  In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's
claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles. In
Cañeda v. Alaan,[22] we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is
an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins
judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free
from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act
liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one
has to pay for occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not
freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just
impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for
reproach."
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
Canon 3: Impartiality
Ø Disqualification of judges:
Ø Canon 3, Section 5, NCJC
Section 5
Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable
observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include,
but are not limited to, instances where
a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter
in controversy;
c. The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the
outcome of the matter in controversy;
d. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as
counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein;
e. The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the
sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
Definition of “judge’s family” - Definitions section of NCJC
"Judge's family" includes a judge's spouse, son, daughter, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, and
any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or person who
is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge's household.
183.People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 244 (1995)
FACTS: On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza
wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left
hand protruding from it was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares
St., Binondo, Manila. When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the
victim was seen clad only in a light colored duster without her panties, with gaping
wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and
with her head bashed in. On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets,
arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey
of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo,
Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower
St., Tondo, Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, Richard Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St.,
Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo,
Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, presided over by respondent Judge. Duly arraigned, all the accused, except
Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by police escorts after
attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994),
pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial
court rendered a decision 2on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y
Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." 3 Disagreeing with the sentence
imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be
imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty
(reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WHETHER "penalty of reclusion perpetua “ instead of DEATH was proper?
RULING: We find for petitioner. Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our
system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed
to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought
"to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, 5 or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution
and the defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was
bound by its provisions.
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is
not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary
rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion — depending
on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed — to impose the
penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape
with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly and unequivocably
provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the
part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than
a sentence of death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of
his religious convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its
bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on
the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence
of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by
those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter
upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy
or morality of laws
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death
upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the
private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision imposing the death
penalty.
184.Jorda vs. Judge Bitas, A.M. RTJ-14-2376, March 5, 2014, 718 SCRA 1 (2014)
Facts: The complaint stemmed from 3 criminal cases for Qualified Trafficking (RA 9208)
and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7610, which were filed against Miralles, et al.
before the RTC Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Respondent judge issued an Order which states that the Court finds that there is probable
cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208.
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and violated
mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest
against the accused Miralles, who was charged with non-bailable criminal offenses.
Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles in
the absence of a motion to fix bail, and the prosecution was not given the opportunity to
interpose its objections.
Respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court was
still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused
for trial. Respondent judge also claimed that there was no more need for a petition for
bail, because in the judicial determination of probable cause the court found that the
evidence against accused was weak.
Issue: Is bail hearing required if the accused-applicant is charged with Qualified
Trafficking?
Ruling: Yes. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence
is weak or strong. In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking,
which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a
matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is
submitted in a hearing.
With life imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense charged against
Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance
with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, respondent
judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known
rules.
Canon 4: Propriety
185.Marcos, Sr. vs. Arcangel, 258 SCRA 517 (1996)
Facts: The complaint stemmed from 3 criminal cases for Qualified Trafficking (RA 9208)
and Violation of Article VI, Section 10 of RA 7610, which were filed against Miralles, et al.
before the RTC Tacloban City where respondent Judge Bitas presides.
Respondent judge issued an Order which states that the Court finds that there is probable
cause to hold the accused for trial for Violation of 4 (a & e) of R.A. 9208.
Complainant lamented that respondent judge disregarded his duties and violated
mandatory provisions of the Rules of Court when he did not issue a warrant of arrest
against the accused Miralles, who was charged with non-bailable criminal offenses.
Moreover, respondent judge granted a reduced bail of P40,000.00 for accused Miralles in
the absence of a motion to fix bail, and the prosecution was not given the opportunity to
interpose its objections.
Respondent judge reasoned that it was wrong to arrest Miralles, because the court was
still in the process of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused
for trial. Respondent judge also claimed that there was no more need for a petition for
bail, because in the judicial determination of probable cause the court found that the
evidence against accused was weak.
Issue: Is bail hearing required if the accused-applicant is charged with Qualified
Trafficking?
Ruling: Yes. The hearing of the application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely
indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence
is weak or strong. In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking,
which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is punishable by life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a
matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is
submitted in a hearing.
With life imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the offense charged against
Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance
with Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, respondent
judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio is not mere
deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known
rules.
Canon 5: Equality
186. Guanzon vs. Rufon, 537 SCRA 38 (2009)
Facts: A letter-complaint was filed by complainants Atty. Rowena V. Guanzon and Atty.
Pearl R. Montesino of the Gender Watch Coalition, Asst. City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-
Toledano, Bacolod City, and Atty. Erfe del Castillo-Caldit against respondent Judge
Anastacio C. Rufon of the RTC, Branch 52, same city, for violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Rule on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or obscene and
discriminatory language, discrimination against women lawyers and litigants and unethical
conduct.
In her November 8, 2006 affidavit, Cynthia Bagtas-Serios significantly gave the
following account of respondents deportment which goes into the heart of the
complaint, viz.:
x x x x x x x x x
In one of the first hearings of my case, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon
was not assisting me but another counsel, I was shocked when Judge
Anastacio Rufon, inside the court with so many people present, said to
me next time you see your husband, open your arms and legs. I felt
humiliated and insulted, and was glad that the hearing did not proceed
because the respondent was not present.
The following day, I called Atty. Rowena Guanzon and reported Judge
Rufons foul language and intolerable conduct to her (p. 170, ibid.).
In his comment, respondent judge vehemently denied the charges. Justice Salvador
resolved the case on the basis of the pleadings and documents filed by the parties, and
submitted a recommendation reprimanding the respondent.
Issue: Whether or not sufficient cause exists to hold respondent administratively liable for
violation of the Code of Conduct for Judges and the Rule on Gender Fair Language, use of
foul or obscene and discriminatory language, discrimination against women lawyers and
litigants as well as unethical conduct
Ruling: Yes. A careful scrutiny of the record shows sufficient ground for a reprimand and
an admonition to respondent to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity and
circumspection in the discharge of his functions.
We sustain the finding of Justice Salvador that respondent judge uttered in open court
intemperate and obscene language injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of
complainants who are all women. Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times
temperate in his language, refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric or from
resorting to language of vilification.It is very essential that they live up to the high
standards demanded by Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary]which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses,
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. x x x
In Fidel v. Carao, we held that although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate
language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from
him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always
temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language
 
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon is found guilty of vulgar and
unbecoming conduct and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00, with a warning that a
repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely
Canon 6: Competence and diligence
187. Castro vs. Malazo, 99 SCRA 165 (1980)
Rule of Law:
- The Judiciary Act of 1948 explicitly commands in Section 5 thereof the
following duty as follows:
- Sec. 5. Judge's certificate as to work completed. — District judges,
judges of city courts, and municipal judges shall certify on their
applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them
for payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are
paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions,
and all civil and criminal cases which have been under submission
for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more
have been determined and decided on or before the date of making
the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be
paid without such certificate.
Facts:
- Admin case by Felicidad Castro against Arturo Malazo, presiding judge of Court
of Agrarian Relations in Tayug, Pangasinan, for undue delay in deciding a CAR
case (Bonifacio Castro and Felicidad Torio-Castro vs. Alfonso Cruz, Enriqueta
Salcedo Cruz and Romeo Tibay)
- July 11, 1972 - Romeo Tibay filed a complaint for reliquidation, leasehold, and
fixing of rental with damages with the CAR against Castro (complainant) and a
certain Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz, who was the owner of the land where Tibay
was allegedly a tenant
- Tibay prayed Castro be restrained from dispossessing him of his tenancy
- Aug 14, 1972 - Spouses Castro (Felicidad and her husband) then filed a new
CAR ase against Tibay, Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz, and Alfonso Cruz
- Spouses Castro said that THEY (the Castros) were the legit lessees of Francisca
Quinto (deceased mother of Enriqueta) and that Tibay forcibly entered the
premises
- Spouses Castro prayed for reinstatement as tenants of the land and for fixing
rental plus damages
- Jan 31, 1975 - All the parties in both cases were given fifteen days from receipt
of the transcript of stenographic notes to file their memoranda
- Aug 25, 1975 - Castros filed memoranda in the two cases. Tibay failed to
submit memorandum, and the cases were deemed submitted for a decision on
Sep 9, 1975
- Jan 29, 1976 - (This is FOUR MONTHS after the decision was supposed to be
submitted) Complainant Castro submitted this complaint
- Feb 12,1976 - The letter was referred to the respondent
- Feb 26,1976 - Resp submitted information saying that the Castro (second) case
had been decided Sep 15,1975 but was not immediately released because he
wanted it to be released the same day as the Tibay (first) case, which was
today lol
Issue:
- W/N the judge should be exonerated since, technically, Castro decided the
case September 15, even though he did not release the decision? - NO
Holding:
- While the records support the claim of respondent that he signed the decision
on September 15, 1975 and that consequently, the charge of ante-dating the
questioned decision in the Castro case is devoid of merit, respondent admitted
that he deliberately deferred the promulgation of the decision
-
- Respondent did not file the decision with the Clerk of Court, which filing is the
essential act that constitutes rendition of the decision and gives it validity
and binding effect, for otherwise, the Judge can readily change, alter, revise,
or modify his decision while the same is under his personal control and
custody.
- The rule is well established thatthe filing of the derision, judgment or order
with the Clerk of Court, not the date of the writing of the decision or
judgment, nor the signing thereof or even the promulgation thereof, that
constitutes rendition thereof.
- We must once more impress upon the members of the Judiciary their sworn
duty of administering justice without undue delay under the time-honored
 precept that justice delayed, is justice denied. The present clogged condition
of the courts' docket in all levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared
unless each and every judge earnestly and painstakingly takes it upon himself
to comply faithfully with the mandate of the law.
- Just because respondent had an overload of cases is is NO VALID REASON for
him to defer and delay the filing of the decision with the Clerk of Court after he
signed it on Sept 15
Ruling:
- IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent is hereby reprimanded for having
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 151, Republic Act No. 3844, the
Agricultural Land Reform Code. He is admonished and enjoined to comply
strictly with the law and a repetition of the offense may be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be spread in his record.
188. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Floro, 486 SCRA 66 (2006)
FACTS: It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the SC Clinic revealed "(e)vidence of ego
disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew
his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological
evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion,
social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual
distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a
judge. But because of his impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty. Floro to
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable
thus paving the way to atty. Floro's appointment as RTC judge.
An administrative complaint was filed against him by court administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo. Then he recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under
preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him. In a Resolution
dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA,
docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the acts or
omissions as reported by the audit team.
One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he
declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct or Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The audit team reported that
Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-
accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to
continually pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart
upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having
40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to
the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. At any rate, Judge Floro submits
that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant
that he sided with the accused. Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other
hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to
her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his PAO lawyer that he is pro-
accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those under detention
as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded
offenses
Issue: W/n Judge Floro violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Held: Yes. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice
"should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. Judge Floro, by broadcasting
to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion
regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should
reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias
and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public
confidence in the judiciary.
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an
independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge
Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt,
necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his ability to render justice.
Part 10. Disciplinary Action and Penalties
Rule 138, Section 27
189.Supreme Court Bar Matter No. 1755, September 25, 2007
RE. CLARIFICATION ON RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated  June
17, 2008 B.M. No. 1755 (Re. Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline)
x-------------------------------------------------------------x
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governs the investigation of administrative complaints
against lawyers by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Section 12 of said rule
prescribes the procedure before the IBP, thus:
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator
with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's report.
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines
that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction
imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition,
reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing
such sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of
the complainant or other interested party filed with the Supreme Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court
orders otherwise.
d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties
through their counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court.
To implement Rule 139-B, the Court, in Bar Matter No. 1755, approved the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP on September 25, 2007.
The rules pertinent to pleadings, notices, and appearances are provided in Secs. 1 and 2 of
Rule III which read:
RULE III
PLEADINGS, NOTICES AND APPEARANCES
SECTION 1.  Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer
and verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a resolution.
SEC. 2.  Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:
a. Motion to dismiss the complaint or petition
b. Motion for a bill of particulars
c. Motion for a new trial
d. Petition for relief from judgment
e. Motion for reconsideration
f. Supplemental pleadings
Upon query of IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the Court issued on February
12, 2008 a Resolution amending Sec. 1, Rule III of the same rules by deleting the phrase
"motion for reconsideration of a resolution," to resolve the conflicting provisions of Secs.
1 and 2 of said Rule III, thus:
 Sec. 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified
answer and verified position papers.  2 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD is consequently repealed. At present, a
Pursuant to the February 12, 2008 Resolution, a party cannot file a motion for
reconsideration of any order or resolution with the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD
hearing the case.
In the Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in A.C. No. 7055 entitled Ramientas v. Reyala, the
Court held that:
IN CONCURRENCE WITH THE ABOVE, NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it
is hereby resolved the accordance with our ruling in Halimao v.
Villanueva, pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP,
particularly §1 and §2, are hereby deemed amended. Accordingly, §1 of said
rules now reads as follows:
SECTION 1.  Pleadings. – The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint,
verified answer, verified position paper and motion for reconsideration of
resolution. x x x
And in §2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of
the class of prohibited pleadings.
Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of
disciplinary cases against lawyers:
1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion for
reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and
recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties
thereon;
2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an aggrieved party,
the IBP must first resolve the same prior to elevating to this Court the subject
resolution together with the whole record of the case;
3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period provided
for, the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court, for final action, the
subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;
4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IPB may file a petition
for review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of said
resolution sought to be reviewed; and
5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there exist
pending motions for reconsideration filed in due time before the IBP, the latter
is directed to withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together with
the whole records of the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to
act on said motions with reasonable dispatch.1
In view of the February 12, 2008 Resolution, the fallo of Ramientas amending Secs. 1 and
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in CBD proceedings before the
Investigating Commissioner. It has to be clarified further that said CBD rules of procedure
apply exclusively to proceedings before said CBD Commissioner and not proceedings
before the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) which are governed by Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court. As such, the other dispositions in Ramientas relative to the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before the IPB BOG are still valid and subsisting. In
fact, Ramientas has amplified the rules laid down in Rule 139-B by supplying the
procedure for the filing of motions for reconsiderations before the BOG.
Thus, in answer to the query of Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B.
Layusa dated March 17, 2008 on whether the February 12, 2008 Resolution in Bar Matter
No. 1755 has effectively superseded Ramientas, the Court resolved as follows:
1. On the amendment to Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule III of the CBD Rules of Procedure,
the fallo in Ramientas is repealed and superseded by the February 12, 2008 Resolution. A
party can no longer file a motion for reconsideration of any order or resolution of the
Investigating Commissioner, such motion being a prohibited pleading.
2. Regarding the issue of whether a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution
of the BOG can be entertained, an aggrieved party can file said motion with the BOG
within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt thereof by said party.
In case a decision is rendered by the BOG that exonerates the respondent or imposes a
sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for
reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party
can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for
reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said
decision shall be furnished this Court.
If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG
shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved
party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within fifteen
(15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate
the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-
day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG
shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case records for
appropriate action.
Let this Resolution be published once in a newspaper of general circulation
190.Yuhico vs. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, November 23, 2010
FACTS: Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico.
Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his
mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez
promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees
from a Japanese client.
Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the
medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to
Gutierrez a check amounting to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two
loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time."
Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and in a text message he
asked for an extension of time to pay.
Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from Yuhico again.
Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take
the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will
pay all his debts within a month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any
amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts.
Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico and requested him to give him
another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no avail.Thus,
Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the
complaint against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of
just debts and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to Yuhico, with interest
until full payment.
ISSUE:Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and likewise guilty of
gross misconduct
RULING: Atty. Gutierrez is guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT. He is ordered to pay the
amount of P90,000.00 to the Yuhico with interest.
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts
and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must
conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan
he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither
can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez
should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.1avvphi1
Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and
misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying
them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts,
yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising
to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his
promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral
character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals
and as officers of the court.
Supreme Court also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, the Court had already
disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of
just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it cannot,
however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering
that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, the
court does not have double or multiple disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither
do it have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by
the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot
disbar him anew.
191.Maniago vs. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 10, 2010
Facts:Theinstant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya
Maniago, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of
law despite having been suspended by the Court. Complainant alleged that she filed a
criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office
address at 22 Magsaysay Drive,Olongapo City. Complainant then learned from the RTC
staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court
since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further
alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-2005) and another case (Special
Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134,
where Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios
ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for her flagrant violation and deliberate
disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client,
Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his
counsel in the cases.Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed
against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the
penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt of
the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed
on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her
practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of
the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007,
orderingrespondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission
for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable,
respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the court order.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account
of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in
Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her
practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is revoked. Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of
Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise: suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable
recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and
thus allow him to resume the practice of law.
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) Respondents Urgent Motion
for Clarification dated 14 March 2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served
her six (6) months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on 17 November Issue: Whether the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law is
2001 onwards as proper is NOTED. immediately executory
Ruling: The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as
Dios to have SERVED her six (6) month suspension and her recommencement of law such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact
practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated 30 January compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.[3] Whenever it is made to appear that
2002. an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public,
it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him
Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw that
during which she allegedly practiced law, she was neither suspended nor in any way privilege.[4] However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer,
prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom
should be dismissed outright. and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC
directed the complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating therein the exact period IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be
of appearances of Atty. De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of
counsel in the following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0- law:
2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the suspended from the practice of law, the Court
OBCs reply to an inquiry made by the Office of the Court Administrator regarding the shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision
status of Atty. De Dios.[1] Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension
is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
order was not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and respondent has 15 days within which to file a
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of
complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. said motion shall render the decision final and
Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states: executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension,
respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any
shown his compliance with the Courts resolution is a caveat that his suspension could
court during the period of his or her suspension;
thereby extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is not 4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished
automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Courts decision, and an order from the to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] Executive Judge of the courts where respondent
to resume the practice of his profession has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof
of respondents compliance with the order of
suspension;
According to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements
submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
 for the imposition of a more severe punishment,
or disbarment, as may be warranted.
§ ROC Rule 71 - Direct and indirect contempt
Section 1. Direct contempt punished summarily.
A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or
interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so,
may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or
both, if it be a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or by a
fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) day,
or both, if it be a lower court.
Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.
The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but
may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the
judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such
person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned
that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or
in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a
court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such
real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing
process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending
such proceedings.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced.
Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge
requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers
involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out
of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt
shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided
separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
Sec. 5. Where charge to be filed.
Where the charge for indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial
Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed by it,
the charge may be filed with such court. Where such contempt has been committed
against a lower court, the charge may be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
place in which the lower court is sitting; but the proceedings may also be instituted
in such lower court subject to appeal to the Regional Trial Court of such place in the
same manner as provided in section 2 of this Rule.
Sec. 6. Hearing; release on bail.
If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, the respondent may be released
from custody upon filing a bond, in an amount fixed by the court, for his appearance
at the hearing of the charge. On the day set therefor, the court shall proceed to
investigate the charge and consider such comment, testimony or defense as the
respondent may make or offer.
Sec. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.
If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a
fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower
court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both. If the contempt consists in the
violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he
may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such
violation of the property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.
The writ of execution, as in ordinary civil actions, shall issue for the enforcement of a
judgment imposing a fine unless the court otherwise provides.
Sec. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed.
When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in
the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the
court concerned until he performs it.
Sec. 9. Proceeding when party released on bail fails to answer.
When a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing,
the court may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his
appearance to be forfeited and confiscated, or both; and, if the bond be proceeded
against, the measure of damages shall be the extent of the loss or injury sustained
by the aggrieved party by reason of the misconduct for which the contempt charge
was prosecuted, with the costs of the proceedings, and such recovery shall be for
the benefit of the party injured. If there is no aggrieved party, the bond shall be
liable and disposed of as in criminal cases.
Sec. 10. Court may release respondent.
The court which issued the order imprisoning a person for contempt may discharge
him from imprisonment when it appears that public interest will not be prejudiced
by his release.
Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.
The judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be
appealed to the proper court as in criminal cases. But execution of the judgment or
final order shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person adjudged in
contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the appeal is taken,
conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by and perform
the judgment or final order.
Sec.12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities.
Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed
against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or
shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to
authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of
the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over
such charges as may be filed therefor.
 2. Discipline of judges
Ø A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC - Re: Automatic Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of
Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who
are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them
Both as Such Officials and as Members of the
Philippine Bar
EN BANC
Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court
dated 17 SEPT 2002.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC(Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them
Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.)
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers
are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of
the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have
been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution.
This Resolution shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and shall take effect on
the first day of October 2002. It shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the
respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
This Resolution shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
192.Samson vs. Caballera, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 423 (2009)
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public
document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any
not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of corporations.
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for
judgeship with a pending administrative case. Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately Atto
concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed
that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed
criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code
against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties
and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he
conducted.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Virgilio G. Caballero is GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an
official document?
RULING: On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. It also denied the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for
review on October 28, 2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision dated November
25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges
against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way of
a petition for certiorari. As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent.
The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the administrative charges
against respondent.
However, in any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official
concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately.
However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular
court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against
members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against
such judge as a member of the Bar.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to
purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the
imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict
with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good
example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on
them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity
that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official
document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and