Acceptance, Commissioning and Field Testing Techniques For Protection and Automation Systems

637
Acceptance, Commissioning and Field

Testing Techniques for Protection
and Automation Systems
Working Group
B5.45
November 2015
ACCEPTANCE,
COMMISSIONING AND FIELD
TESTING TECHNIQUES FOR
PROTECTION AND
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
Working Group B5.45
Members
E. Cahuet, Convenor (FR), A. Apostolov (US), T. Hamet (FR), N. Kearns (IR),

S. Lidstrom (SE), C. Mempel (AT), Q. Verzosa Jr, (US), L. Yang (BE), J. Wright (UK)
Corresponding Members
N. Alexandrov (RU), J. Jaceswska (FR), D. Jenkins (NZ), S. Schwabe (AT)
W. Chandrasena (CD), P. Cleaves (AU), P. H. Flores (BR),
Copyright © 2014
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ISBN: 978-2-85873-340-8
ACCEPTANCE, COMMISSIONING AND FIELD TESTING TECHNIQUES FOR PROTECTION AND AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
ACCEPTANCE,
COMMISSIONING AND FIELD
TESTING TECHNIQUES FOR
PROTECTION AND
AUTOMATION SYSTEMS
Page 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 3
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 5
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 6
2. DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................................................... 7
3. ENGINEERING PROCESS ............................................................................................................................... 9

3.1 Standardization ........................................................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Testing requirements for IEDs, Schemes and Systems ............................................................................. 16
3.2.1 Standard scheme template: testing requirements definition ................................................................. 16
3.2.2 Requirements for testing of the complete PAC scheme ....................................................................... 17
3.2.3 Testing Requirements for Defined standard scheme ............................................................................ 18
3.2.4 Testing Requirements for Applied standard scheme ............................................................................ 20
3.2.5 Testing Requirements for Instantiated standard scheme ...................................................................... 22
4. TEST PHASES ................................................................................................................................................ 23

4.1 Certification ................................................................................................................................................. 23
4.1.1 Certification for an IED .......................................................................................................................... 23
4.1.2 Certification testing for a protection scheme or system ........................................................................ 23
4.2 Routine testing of the protection scheme ................................................................................................... 24
4.3 Factory Acceptance .................................................................................................................................... 25
4.4 Commissioning Testing .............................................................................................................................. 26
4.4.1 Installation tests ..................................................................................................................................... 26
4.4.2 Commissioning/Site acceptance ........................................................................................................... 26
4.5 Maintenance testing .................................................................................................................................... 30
4.5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 30
Maintenance Types ............................................................................................................................................ 30
Preventative Maintenance .................................................................................................................................. 30
Corrective Maintenance ...................................................................................................................................... 31
4.5.2 Recommended Strategy for maintenance testing ................................................................................. 32
Utility Case Studies ............................................................................................................................................ 32
4.5.3 Power System Mal Operation Investigation .......................................................................................... 34
4.5.4 Changes in the Protection system ......................................................................................................... 38
5. TESTING METHODS ...................................................................................................................................... 41

5.1 Steady state and dynamic test simulation methods ................................................................................... 42
5.2 Transient Simulation ................................................................................................................................... 48
5.2.1 Standard file format for exchange of transient simulation data ............................................................. 49
5.2.2 Playback of files recorded by digital fault recorders or numerical relays .............................................. 49
5.2.3 Transient simulation tools ...................................................................................................................... 50
5.3 End to End Testing ..................................................................................................................................... 52
5.4 Closed loop Testing .................................................................................................................................... 54
5.5 Primary injection ......................................................................................................................................... 57
5.5.1 NCIT with direct IEC 61850 9-2 LE interface ........................................................................................ 57
5.5.2 Testing of NCIT based protection applications ..................................................................................... 57
5.5.3 Testing of NCIT with low-power interface .............................................................................................. 58
5.5.4 Testing of NCIT with IEC 61850 9-2 LE interface ................................................................................. 59
5.6 On load testing ............................................................................................................................................ 61
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5.7 Automated testing ....................................................................................................................................... 62
6. TEST USE CASES .......................................................................................................................................... 64

6.1 Testing Multifunction relays ........................................................................................................................ 64
6.1.1 Challenges when testing numerical multi-function relays ..................................................................... 64
6.1.2 Features of numerical multi-function relays that help in testing ............................................................ 65
6.1.3 Strategy for testing numerical protection and control systems.............................................................. 65
6.1.4 Testing protection functional elements in multi-function IEDs............................................................... 66
6.1.5 Testing protection functions in a multi-function IED .............................................................................. 66
6.2 Accuracy and performance Testing - Use case of distance protection ...................................................... 67
6.2.1 How to Perform Accuracy Tests According to IEC 60255-121 ............................................................. 68
6.2.2 Feasibility of dynamic performance tests .............................................................................................. 69
6.3 Testing a distance relay .............................................................................................................................. 72
6.3.1 Testing a multifonctional protection device ........................................................................................... 73
6.3.2 Testing Of Distance Protection Schemes.............................................................................................. 78
6.4 Testing a transformer differential relay ....................................................................................................... 79
6.4.1 Zero-sequence current removal ............................................................................................................ 79
6.4.2 Sensitivity setting test ............................................................................................................................ 80
6.4.3 Bias characteristic test........................................................................................................................... 81
6.4.4 Differential Timing Test.......................................................................................................................... 83
6.4.5 Testing High-set Unrestrained Differential Function ............................................................................. 83
6.4.6 Testing Inrush Blocking ......................................................................................................................... 83
6.4.7 Testing the 2nd and 5th Harmonic Blocking.......................................................................................... 83
6.4.8 Testing the Waveform Recognition (gap type) Blocking ....................................................................... 83
6.4.9 Testing the Overexcitation Blocking ...................................................................................................... 84
6.5 Testing a line differential relay .................................................................................................................... 84
6.5.1 Loopback Testing .................................................................................................................................. 84
6.5.2 Local relay back-to-back bench test ...................................................................................................... 85
6.5.3 Time-synchronized end-to-end testing .................................................................................................. 85
6.5.4 Functions to be tested ........................................................................................................................... 85
6.6 Testing a teleprotection .............................................................................................................................. 86
6.7 Testing a breaker failure scheme ............................................................................................................... 90
6.8 Testing Automation Functions .................................................................................................................... 92
6.8.1 General case ......................................................................................................................................... 92
6.8.2 Optimization ........................................................................................................................................... 94
6.9 Testing in an IEC 61850 hybrid environment ............................................................................................. 98
6.10 Testing of IEC 61850 Sampled Values based applications ..................................................................... 99
6.11 Testing Schemes and systems on a lab environment (for certification or factory acceptance) ............. 101
7. TESTING TOOLS REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................ 102
8. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 109
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 110
10. ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................... 111

Survey ................................................................................................................................................................. 111
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Advances in technologies has led to the wide introduction of numerical relays and systems with a large number of
integrated functions, utilising embedded automation and control functionality. This increased level of integration is
facilitated by high speed standardised communications. As a result of such enhancements, utilities are facing the
need to readdress current and in some cases adopt a new testing approach and strategy for protection and control
equipment and systems. At the same time, test equipments have also become much more sophisticated with a
higher degree of software functionality, enabling much faster and comprehensive testing.
In order to develop a suitable testing methodology and process, it is important that utilities and other users have a
clear understanding of the different testing techniques, tools and strategies that are currently applied in the industry
today.
The brochure presents an optimized engineering process by emphasizing standardization and clearly defined
testing requirements as the key components to improve the process and facilitate all the testing operations. It goes
on to describe the various phases of the testing during the life cycle of protection devices and systems :
certification, routine testing, factory acceptance, commissioning and maintenance testing.
Testing Methods are explored and categorised based on different criteria such as single ended or end to end
testing, steady state, dynamic and transient simulation, functional and application oriented, primary and secondary
injection, manual and automated testing. The brochure provides guidance on the appropriate use of these methods
for specific applications and test cases. This is illustrated by typical examples ranging from testing mulitfunctional
relays, accuracy, performance and applications – from discrete protection devices to complete systems utilising
standardised communications such as IEC61850.
Following the selection of the testing methods, in order to achieve effective and efficient testing, it is important to
use tools with the appropriate functionality. Several use cases are considered to identify such tools for testing of
specific devices or systems. Features that should be available in hardware and software testing tools are described
using various examples.
This brochure investigates the forementioned topics with a view to providing recommendations, best practice and
guidance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern numerical relays and systems can have a large number of integrated functions and impose different test
requirements over older, more traditional static and electromechanical relays. New communication capabilities
added to the numerical relays and the data that must be sent to Substation control systems under fault conditions
offers new possibilities for relay testing and post relay operation investigation. At the same time, test equipments
have also become much more sophisticated and driven by software featuring higher levels of functionality. This,
enables much faster and comprehensive testing. It is important to understand this shift in relay development and
the different testing strategies. This in turn will ensure that we make use of all the available technology and strive
to utilise this to reduce outage times and improve system availability.
Protection testing is essential for the safe and efficient operation of a power system. When carrying out testing of
modern protection and control systems the following questions should be asked by every organization:
• Do we have a process in place that is both efficient and effective?

• Do we define detailed requirements before launching the tests?
• Are we using the right methods for the right tests ?
• Are all tests controlled, repeatable and traceable?
• Are we fully utilizing appropriate modern testing technology?
• Do we have the right test equipment?
This Technical Brochure adresses these questions by exploring methods, providing guidance for application and
giving examples of best practices.
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2. DEFINITIONS
Black box testing: Testing based upon the requirements with the function or system treated as a "black box" when
the internal workings of the system are unknown. In black-box testing the system is given a stimulus (input) and if
the result (output) is what was expected, then the test passes. No consideration is given to how the process was
completed.
Bottom-up testing: This testing starts with the function elements and works upwards. It involves testing the
function elements at the lower levels in the hierarchy, and then working up the hierarchy of sub-functions until the
final function is tested.
Certification tests:
The certification tests serve to verify if an IED or a scheme meets the customer requirements. This could include a
specific FAT if it is required by the customer.
Closed loop testing:

Closed loop testing is characterized by the fact that the output from the device under test is looped back and
affects the next stage of the simulation.
Commissioning tests:
The commissioning phase is carried out on site (in the substation) when the installation phase is complete. These
tests are performed to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the system with associated substation interfaces.
The commissioning phase is a global operation which follows the installation and runs until the energization.
Conformance tests:
These are the first of the functional tests of the components of an integrated substation automation system (SAS).
Every IED or Device Under Test (DUT) which belongs to the SAS, is tested. The conformance tests are performed
to show that the IED are compliant to requirements relative to environment, data model, communication and
functional standards. These tests can be performed by a Vendor or by an independent authority who certify test
results.
Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) of schemes and systems:

Customer agreed functional tests of the specifically manufactured system or its parts, using the parameter set for
the planned application (definition from IEC61850).
This test is typically performed in the factory of the system integrator by the use of process simulating test
equipment.
Installation tests:
The installation tests are carried out by the contractor after installation in order to verify if the system is ready to be
commissioned.
Interoperability tests:
The interoperability tests are applied to an assembly of IEDs of the same or different vendors. They shall
demonstrate that these IEDs, when interconnected by a proper communication system, may operate together,
sharing information and performing their functions in a secure way and with specified level of performance. They
should be performed with the customer acceptance during conformance, homologation and factory acceptance
tests.
Page 7
Maintenance Tests:
All testing activities which occur after the protection IED or scheme has been put into service.
Manual testing:
Manual testing is the process where all simulation tasks, the assessment of the tested device performance and the
documentation of the results from the test are performed manually by the tester.
Site Acceptance Tests (SAT):

The site acceptance tests consist in the verification of each data and control point and the correct functionality
inside the automation system and between the automation system and its operating environment at the whole
installed plant by use of the final parameter set (from IEC61850).
The SAT is a precondition for the automation system being put into operation.
Top-down testing: This tests the high levels of a system before testing its detailed functional components. Testing
starts with the overall function test and goes down the hierarchy testing sub-functions until the function elements at
the bottom of the hierarchy are tested.
White box testing: Testing based upon the requirements with the internal workings of the function or system
known. In white-box testing the system is given a stimulus (input) and if the result (output) is what was expected,
then the test passes, however consideration is also given to how the internal elements of the function worked.
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3. ENGINEERING PROCESS
Utilities manage the certification, acceptance and commissioning testing process for IEDs, schemes and systems
throughout their operating life. This chapter will address how such utilities are embracing the new developments in
both intelligent electronic devices (IED`s) and test equipment to reduce testing time, outage time, costs, risk. This
allows to meet ever more stringent Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS) requirements to ultimately limit the
amount of time on site commissioning in a challenging environment and improve system availability. During the life
of the protection and control system, the main task for the utility is to develop a quality assurance testing procedure
which simplifies the engineering process, minimizes the possibility of human error and provides an auditable record
of all the testing reports.
In order to succeed in these issues the system must be tested before its delivery on site. The following diagram
shows the phases of the engineering process and the related tests as recommended in the IEC 61850 standard. [1]
Materi al approval Del i very and putti ng on l i ne
Devel opment Customer 1 Project 1

P (EN ISO
r
o 9001) Project x
S
i
d
u t
c Routi ne Tes t e
t FAT Del i very
Sys tem test Certi fi cati on of Products O
r p
e
Test e
a Instal lati on tests r
l a
i t
z
Prototype Customer n Project n Commi ssi oni ng i
a s eri es tests
o
t n
i s
o
n
Type Test SAT
Energi zati on
Figure 1: Testing phases of the engineering process
The engineering process needs to clarify the stakeholder’s responsibilities:
• Manufacturer responsibilities
o The manufacturer is responsible for the correct handling of type tests and system tests of his
individual products and the System product family
o Type tests and system tests are preconditions for starting the regular delivery
o All IEDs have to pass device specific routine tests defined by the manufacturer to ensure quality
before the products are handed over for delivery
• Customer responsibilities
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o Customer specific verifications and approvals may be required according to the customer
philosophy and shall be negotiated between the system integrator and the customer
o Customer is responsible for giving the parameter set
• Integrator responsibilities
o The system integrator is obliged to prepare and carry out these special investigations with
individual products and the overall System
o The system integrator is obliged to prove the fulfillment of the technical requirements, including
performance criteria
o When introducing a System, the system integrator is responsible for ensuring that all functions are
jointly tested by the representatives of the system integrator and the customer
Factory
Acceptance
Conformance Qualification Test FAT Commissioning
tests (including or (including or Site
interoperability Homologation interoperability Acceptance Maintenance
tests) tests tests) Tests tests
According to
Accordi ng parti cul ar
How are the tests Internati onal Customer Custormer Custormer
defined? standards requirement requi rement requi rement
Who defines the tests? M M or I or C I or C I or C C

Who validates the test
procedures? M M or I or C I or C I or C C
Who executes the
tests? M M or I or C I I or C C
How are the tests
documented? M M or I or C I I or C C
Who validate the
results of the tests? M C C C C
M = Manufacturer, I = System Integrator, C = Customer
Table 1: Roles and responsibilities for testing
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3.1 Standardization
The CIGRE Working group B5.27 have published a brochure [11] which define a four steps standardization
process:
• Step 1 : Standard scheme template

• Step 2 : Defined scheme template
• Step 3 : Applied scheme template
• Step 4 : Instantiated standard scheme
As standardization is key to improve the engineering process and facilitate all the testing operations, it was decided
to integrate this method in the current report. A short description is given in the following paragraph, and their
application to testing is proposed afterwards.
Testing plays a very important role in the lifecycle of any protection, automation and control system. The
development and implementation of standard schemes has significant advantages from the point of view of testing
compared with the testing of non-standardized schemes.
The testing of any system is dependent on:
• The functionality of the system

• The hierarchy of the system
• Its components
• The purpose of the test
In order to improve the quality and efficiency of testing, it is important to start considering the requirements,
methods, procedures and tools at the very beginning of the engineering process and maintain this link at every step
of that process.
While the testing requirements should be developed together with the scheme at the early stages of the
standardisation process, detailed test plans for the different types of test of the standard scheme can be defined
only at the later stages of the process.
Depending on the complexity of the system, its components can be simple functional elements, subsystems or
combination of the two. A subsystem is then defined as a set of elements, which is a system itself, and also a part
of the whole system.
In the substation protection and automation domain we can consider different functions performed by the system
as subsystems. The system can contain one-to-many functions that can have several layers of one-to-many sub-
functions and at the bottom – a sub-function can contain one-to-many functional elements (e.g. logical nodes in
IEC 61850).
The testing of a protection, automation and control system is conducted on a complete, integrated substation
automation system, subsystem or distributed function. Its goal is to evaluate the system's compliance with its
specified functional and performance requirements.
Different methods for testing are used depending on the type of test being performed. Some of these methods are:
• Bottom-up testing
• Top-down testing
• Black box testing
• White box testing
When we carry out commissioning or maintenance testing we assume that the individual functional elements are
operating properly, especially if there are no alarms in any of the IEDs that are included in the system test. In this
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case, a “top-down” approach is suitable, since we are interested in the overall performance of the tested system
function and not in the behaviour of the components of the system. This fits the “black box” approach, which means
that we take an external perspective of the test object to derive the test cases and analyze the results.
Functional testing of any function or sub-function requires the test designer to select a set of valid or invalid inputs
and determine the correct expected output for each test condition defined in the test plan.
The purpose of functional element testing is to determine if the tested element has the expected behaviour under
different realistic test conditions. The functional elements in system testing are considered units, i.e. the smallest
testable parts of any system.
In the case of standard scheme testing, since we are not only testing individual functions, but also the complete
scheme, we should use the principles and methods for testing of systems with different levels of complexity.
System testing looks at the overall performance of the system from an external observer point of view. Bottom-up
or top-down testing methods can be used depending on the type of test performed.
In all cases it is important to clearly identify the system or function boundary that will define the requirements for
simulation by the test system and monitoring the behaviour of the tested function.
Figure 2: Function boundary definition

In Figure 2 SF indicates a sub-function that contains K functional elements. The functional elements are the
smallest component in the system that can be defined with a function boundary, interface and behaviour, i.e. can
be tested.
All the above described principles can be used in the testing of substation protection, automation and control
systems and should be considered during the standardization process.
A standard secondary scheme within the scope of a project is defined as a single set of multifunctional intelligent
electronic devices integrated using process and inter-device interfaces in order to provide all required by the
application functions:
• Protection
• Control
• Status monitoring
• Measurements (including synchrophasors when required)
• Communication
• Condition monitoring
• Recording
• Event reporting
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• Fault locator
• Power quality
For each standard scheme a four step standardization process is followed:
Step 1: Standard scheme template

The Step 1 of the standardization process and covers the definition of the functional requirement specification for a
standard secondary scheme based on utility’s philosophy and practice.
It is a conceptual description of the scheme. This is typically the formalized description of the application of
protection and control philosophy to a specific type of bay as described above. The templates should include all of
the necessary components of the documentation of each subsequent stage.
At this stage the functional requirements and integration constraints need to be defined. These are detailed
requirements associated with the bay topology, voltage level and criticality, communications requirements, etc.,
resulting in some interfaces and functions being defined.
This stage should also include:
• Primary single-line diagram

• Secondary functional diagrams
• Trip matrix
• Setting philosophies
• Testing philosophies including maintainability requirements
Items that are left “generic” at this stage are types of primary equipment or IEDs. They may be considered, but are
not specified at this stage.
In addition, the description of the functional specification in the form of an IEC 61850 Substation Specification
Description (SSD) file is recommended, thus allowing the automation of the procurement process based on
exchange of such files between a utility and its suppliers.
Step 1 of the standardization process is performed by a utility’s secondary core group of experts responsible for the
engineering of standard schemes at the company level.
Step 2: Defined standard scheme

The Step 2 of the standardization process and represents a development stage of a standard scheme that defines
the primary plant and the hardware interfaces with the specific type of bay covered by the scheme. The following is
specified at this stage:
• CB, disconnectors, earth switches, CT/VT and auxiliary interface specifications

• Signals list/diagram (hardwired or communications based)
• The facilities needed to satisfy the maintainability requirements
The defined standard scheme can be used for the same or similar types of new or existing installations without
ANY changes in external wiring, signaling and equipment.
Allocation of functions to generic (abstract) IEDs is also defined at this stage. The required functionality of
individual IEDs can be described also using the newly defined IED Specification Description (ISD) file format
(proposed for inclusion in next revision IEC61850-6), thus allowing the automation of the procurement process
based on exchange of such files between the utility and its suppliers. This will support automatic selection of the
IEDs that meet the requirement specification for a specific standard scheme by comparing the ISD file with the
existing IED Capability Description (ICD) files.
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The definition of the required interfaces (including quality) with the process at this stage also allows the definition of
the scheme terminal blocks that are signal specific, but not product specific.
Step 2 of the standardization process is performed by the utility’s experts responsible for the engineering of
standard schemes at the company level.
Step 3 : Applied standard scheme

The Step 3 of the standardization process is what is typically considered by the utility as a “standard secondary
scheme”.
This includes the use of approved specific IEDs or other secondary equipment based on the certification testing of
the product. The IED selection should ensure that all functions and functional elements defined for the scheme
template in Step 2 are available in the selected IEDs.
The following is specified at this stage:
• IED HW-version, SW-version, parameter-set-version

• IED configuration tools
• Scheme logic
• Signals list (hardwired or communications based)
• Schematic diagrams, Wiring diagrams, cable lists
• Standard settings
The global settings, including programmable scheme logic, of the IEDs are introduced at this level of
standardization. However, at this stage there are still no local settings or other site specific configuration
parameters.
A standard scheme is a scheme which can be used for same or similar types of new or existing installation without
ANY changes in internal wiring, signaling, equipment, or enabled functional elements.
In case that the utility wants to use a different supplier for the same scheme, it will result in a different scheme
template implementation that meets the requirements of the above definitions.
Since at this stage all IEDs and their interfaces are defined, the functionality of the standard scheme is configured
using IEC 61850 engineering tools based on the ICD files of the individual IEDs and documented as a Substation
Configuration Description (SCD) file. From this file the individual IED Configuration tools extract the Configured IED
Description (CID) files used to configure them for operation in the substation.
Step 3 of the standardization process is performed by the scheme supplier based on the documentation produced
in Step 2. The development of the standard scheme should also involve the members of the utility’s group of
experts responsible for the engineering of standard schemes at the company level.
The standard scheme should be subject to type testing before it is approved for use by authorized utility
representatives.
Step 4: Instantiated standard scheme

This is a site specific implementation of the standard scheme (i.e. an instantiated standard scheme from Step 3).
Site and application specific settings are implemented at this stage, and all hardware is defined.
While instantiation excludes any modifications besides site specific setting-parameters and site specific naming,
specialization on Step 4 offers the opportunity to adapt the standard scheme typically to variations in primary HW-
components when used in existing sites.
At this stage the following is applied:
• IED specific calculations and setting files
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• Specific commissioning, maintenance and testing procedures
In special cases also other modifications can be considered. This may appear as a deviation from the
standardization process, however it takes advantage of the developed standard scheme for a special application
that may not justify going back to Step 3 of the process.
Step 4 is performed by the secondary scheme supplier based on setting files and procedures supplied by the utility.
Test reports and other documentation produced during the production, configuration and instantiation of the
scheme should be reviewed and approved by authorized utility representatives before the scheme is delivered to
the site.
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3.2 Testing requirements for IEDs, Schemes and Systems
The development and implementation of standard protection schemes offers some significant benefits from the
point of view of testing. It allows the development of:
• Standard test plans that cover all functional elements, sub-functions and functions
• Standard test equipment configuration, including the self-configuration of testing parameters based on the
settings of the tested devices
• Standard wiring of test facilities
• Standard documentation of the test results
• Implementation of an automated testing process
All of the above results in time and cost reductions, while at the same time improve the quality of design and
testing. Performing a variety of tests that reflect different possible abnormal conditions reduce the probability for
undesired or misoperations.
The time savings in performing testing of standard schemes allows more time for the analysis of misoperations and
the testing of protection functions and schemes that improve their performance.
Testing needs to be considered at each step of a standardization process in order to ensure that the standard
protection, automation and control scheme will work properly under all power system conditions.
3.2.1 Standard scheme template: testing requirements definition

Since at this stage the standardization process defines the overall functionality of the standard scheme and its
components, this is the stage when it is also necessary to define the requirements and principles to be used for its
testing during the different stages of the process.
The testing requirements and principles should be defined according to the hierarchy of the standard scheme being
developed. Methods for testing can also be specified from a testing philosophy point of view at this stage.
3.2.1.1 TESTING OF FUNCTION ELEMENTS:

The definition of the testing requirements starts with the specification of the types of tests to be performed to verify
the performance of the individual function elements at the bottom of the functional hierarchy, such as:
• Measuring elements
• Protection elements (phase and ground distance zone elements; phase and ground overcurrent elements,
differential elements, etc.)
• Protection related elements (directional elements, reclosing elements, breaker failure protection elements,
etc.)
• Control and interlocking elements (select-before-operate, etc.)
• Fault location elements
• Disturbance recording elements
• Others
For each of the above elements the testing requirements for type/acceptance testing, commissioning testing and
maintenance testing needs to be defined.
For type\acceptance testing of distance protection requirements are defined in the IEC standard [5].
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For each of the test cases the simulation method should be specified at this stage. Typical simulation methods to
choose from are:
• Fixed values of input system parameters (currents and/or voltages, frequency, etc.)
• Ramping system parameters
• Shots
• State sequence
• Transient simulation
• Record replay
• Others
Positive and negative tests for each use case need to be defined for each type of test.
3.2.1.2 TESTING OF SUB-FUNCTIONS AND FUNCTIONS

The requirements for the testing of a specific sub-function or function in the hierarchy of the standard scheme being
developed need to be also defined at this stage of the standardization process based on the definition of a function
that includes:
• Description of the function boundary with its inputs, outputs, controls, etc. (as shown in Figure 2)
• Required behavior description – what combination of values of the individual inputs will result in what
combination of values of the outputs after what specified time duration
• Definition of the acceptable tolerances in the performance of the scheme
The requirements for testing of a sub-function or function in this case need to cover the testing definitions for
type/acceptance testing, commissioning testing and maintenance testing.
Positive and negative tests for each use case need to be defined for each type of test.
Simulation methods need to be defined for each test case.
The use of top-down or bottom-up testing approach in the definition of a test plan for the subfunctions and functions
needs to be defined as well.
3.2.2 Requirements for testing of the complete PAC scheme

The requirements and test cases for the complete standard PAC scheme are also defined at this stage.
The implementation of the scheme plays an important role in the definition of the testing. If a scheme is
implemented as a distributed scheme (for example bus differential protection) that may require the use of multiple
devices in different physical locations, the required time synchronization accuracy is required..
Typical standards are IEEE C37.238 and IEEE 1588
3.2.2.1 TESTING TOOLS REQUIREMENTS

This stage needs to define the generic requirements for the testing tools – hardware and software – that should be
available in order to support all types of test and testing methods defined in the later stages of the standardization
process. Some examples of such requirements are:
• Support of the different testing methods required for the standard scheme
• Support of the different testing simulation methods required for the standard scheme
• Support of the different synchronization methods required for the standard scheme
• Support of standard data formats
• Support of hardwired, communications based or hybrid testing environment
• Support of specific communication protocols
• Capacity of monitoring and alteration of communication network traffic
• Capacity of monitoring and publishing IEC 61850 messages
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Additional requirements may relate to:
• Support of automation of the testing procedures

• Availability of standard test plans for multiple ranges of manufacturers products
• Ability to develop test plan templates
• Support of automated documentation of the test results
• Other specific requirements based on the user's PAC and testing philosophy
3.2.3 Testing Requirements for Defined standard scheme

Since Step 2 of the standardization process is defining the interfaces that will be used for the standard PAC
scheme, it is the moment in the standardization process when we can define the specific requirements for the test
equipment that needs to be used to test it at the different later stages of the process (Step 3 and 4 ).
3.2.3.1 ANALYSIS OF SCHEME INTERFACES

The definition of the requirements for the test equipment needed for the testing of the standard scheme should be
based on detailed analysis of all interfaces of the scheme defined at this stage of the standardization process.
Figure 3 shows a simplified example of a distance protection IED that is used in a communications based scheme.
Figure 3: Interfaces of protection IED defined in the standardization process

The distance protection IED is defined in Step 2 of the standardization process as a device with the following
hardwired interfaces shown in the figure:
• It is connected to a current transformer on the bus side of the breaker and to a voltage transformer on the
line side of the breaker
• An auxiliary contact of the breaker is wired to an opto-input of the IED for monitoring of the status of the
breaker for use in a "echo-logic” scheme
• An output of the communication device is wired to a second opto-input of the IED for monitoring of the
status of the "Permissive Signal" received from the IED at the remote end of the protected line.
• A relay output of the IED is wired to the trip coil of the breaker
• A second relay output is wired to the communication devices to send the "Permissive Signal" to the IED at
the remote end of the protected line
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3.2.3.2 DEFINITION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TEST EQUIPMENT

The above information is then used to determine the requirements for the test equipment that needs to be used at
different stages of the standardization and engineering process.
For the example above, the following are the requirements for the test equipment shown in Figure 4 :
• Analog three phase current outputs and analog three phase voltage outputs
• Two relay outputs to simulate the status of the circuit breaker and the "Permissive Signal" from the
communication device
• Two binary inputs to monitor the Trip signal and the "Permissive Signal" from the tested protection IED
Figure 4: Interfaces of test equipment defined in Step 2 of the standardization process
3.2.3.3 IMPACT OF IEC 61850 ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TEST EQUIPMENT

IEC 61850 has a significant impact on the requirements for the test equipment that are defined at this stage of the
standardization process. Since this is the time when the use of IEC 61850 Station Bus, Process Bus or both is
defined from the point of view of specific scheme interfaces, now is also the time to define what capabilities the test
equipment needs to have.
Figure 5 shows the different interfaces for an IEC 61850 based protection system implementation using both
Station and Process Bus.
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Figure 5: Standard scheme interfaces in case of full IEC 61850 implementation

In the case of a full implementation of IEC 61850, the requirements for the test equipment to be used at different
stages of the standardization process discussed in this document will be a superset of the requirements for testing
of function elements, sub-functions, functions and the complete scheme, and will also depend on the type of test
required.
If the merging unit (MU) is tested, the test equipment should be able to apply three phase currents and voltages to
it and subscribe and analyze the stream of sampled values published by the merging unit.
If the breaker control device (IOU) is tested, the test equipment should be able to simulate a GOOSE message
from the tested device PTRC1 and monitor the relay output of the IOU.
If the Distance Protection IED is tested, the test equipment should be able to:
• Publish a stream of sampled values to simulate the merging unit

• Publish a GOOSE message to simulate the communication's device "Permissive Signal"
• Subscribe to the GOOSE message from the tested device PTRC1
• Subscribe to the GOOSE message from the tested device PDIS2
Requirements for accurate time synchronization sources and capabilities of the test equipment will be defined in
the case of use of sampled values and synchrophasors
3.2.4 Testing Requirements for Applied standard scheme

Since this is the stage when the specific IEDs and other devices are selected, this is the time when the
requirements for the specific tests in the context of type testing of the scheme are defined.
They are based on the definitions of the testing requirements defined in Step 1 of the standardization process and
the interface requirements defined in Step2.
3.2.4.1 IED SELECTION RELATED TESTING

The IED selection needs to ensure that the device used in the standard scheme should be capable of meeting the
requirements of all possible applications of the scheme within the user's electric power system. That is why the
IEDs need to go through the acceptance process defined in Step 1 based on test configured to cover the range of
possible applications.
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The characteristics of all function elements to be used in the specific standard scheme need to be tested as a
minimum as a part of the certification testing.
If the user is applying the concept of multi-functionnal IED compatible with several applications in order to reduce
the number of used IEDs, the superset of all functional elements to be used in all standard protection schemes that
may use the tested IED needs to be included in the test plan.
The certification testing should be performed based on an IED with the interfaces defined in Step 2 of the
standardization process.
3.2.4.2 TYPE TESTING OF THE STANDARD SCHEME

While the Type Testing of the function elements in the IED is performed by the manufacturer, the standard scheme
testing should be performed by the developer according to the requirements defined in Step 1 and interfaces in
Step 2.
The testing should be performed using the bottom up method, (see Figure 6),but assuming that all functional
elements at the bottom of the functional hierarchy of the scheme are performing as required based on the results
from the acceptance testing of the IEDs used in the standard scheme.
Figure 6: Bottom-up testing of standard protection scheme – stage 3

The bottom-up method applied in this case ensures that all components of the standard scheme operate as
required by the design specification from Step 1.
In the example above the order of testing for Function F1 will be as follows (see Figure 6):
• Testing of sub-function SFM

• Testing of sub-functions SFi - all in the range from SF1 to SFN
• Testing of function F1 - all in the range from FE1 to FEK
• Testing of complete standard scheme
The tests can be performed using the Black-box testing method. However, if the standard scheme is implemented
using IEC 61850, White-box testing is recommended, because it allows the monitoring of the behavior of all sub-
functions or function elements during each test.
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3.2.4.3 TEST PLANS DEVELOPMENT

Since the complete functionality and IEDs are defined at this stage, it is now possible to define standard test plans
for the protection, automation and control scheme that can be later instantiated based on the specific characteristic
of the protected object.
A superset test plan that covers all requirements for the different phases of the engineering process can be
designed and then subsets be used by disabling specific tests as a function of the type of test being performed.
3.2.5 Testing Requirements for Instantiated standard scheme

Since this is the stage when a specific instance of the standard scheme is defined, the requirements for its testing
will depend on:
• the instance specific setting and configuration parameters

• the variations in the use of the standard scheme for a non-identical application
• the type of test being performed
The following tests based on the test templates developed at stage 3 and the site specific settings can be included
as required by the testing philosophy defined in Step1 can be performed:
• Factory acceptance testing

• Commissioning testing
• Site acceptance testing
• End-to-end testing
• Maintenance testing
3.2.5.1 IED RELATED TESTING

The IED related testing at this stage is limited to ensuring that the settings and other configuration parameters are
correctly implemented in each IED and the IED interface modules are operating as expected. These tests should
be performed according to the testing definitions in Step 1.
3.2.5.2 STANDARD SCHEME RELATED TESTING

The testing of a standard scheme should be limited to ensuring that:
• all inter-panel interfaces are correct

• all interfaces to instrument transformers are correct
• all interfaces to primary equipment (breakers, transformers, etc.) are correct
• the performance of the scheme in some time critical cases meets the requirement specification
The tests can be performed using the Black-box testing method. However, if the standard scheme is implemented
using IEC 61850, White-box testing is recommended, because it allows the monitoring of the behavior of all sub-
functions or function elements during each test.
3.2.5.3 TEST PLANS DEVELOPMENT

Since the goal of these tests is to determine the actual site specific configuration of the IEDs and the site specific
performance of the standard schemes, the test plan should be a subset of the global test plan that meets these
requirements.
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4. TEST PHASES
The various phases of the testing life cycle are described, namely certification, routine testing, factory acceptance,
commissioning and maintenance testing.
4.1 Certification
The certification testing is related to step 3 of the standardisation process and is part of the process described in
§4.3.
Certification testing is used to verify that a piece of equipment is suitable for the application it is intended for and
meets customer requirements. The extent of the certification can be the IED alone or the protection and control
schemes consisting of one or more IEDs, auxiliaries, switches etc. If a certified component is used for different
application the process should be repeated.
Certification sets out a standard/bench mark for future comparisons and checks and will make the following phases
more efficient: routine tests, factory acceptance tests and commissioning tests. In order to complete the certification
process a suite of documentation is required (Generic Single Line Diagrams, configuration files, Setting files, and
Functional specifications such as application guidance documents).
The certification phase leads to a freeze in hardware, firmware and scheme version. A change in one of these
elements may require a re-run of the certification tests.
4.1.1 Certification for an IED

Certification testing of IEDs will vary between Utilities . It will typically consist of the following:
• Verification of the type tests carried out by the vendor and certified by homologated laboratories to
recognized international standards. Comprising of:
o Hardware tests (EMC, Electric, Climatic, Mechanic)
o Functional tests according to the standards (performance and accuracy)
o Communication tests (based on IEC61850 or other communication protocols)
• Examination of performance and reliability reports
• Additional tests to prove generic critical and dynamic functionalities which are not necessarily site specific,
such as:
o Functional tests with customer’s default settings
o application oriented tests to cover the full range of standard schemes including transient, closed
loop or end to end tests
o tests of the IED within customer defined protection schemes
o performance tests
4.1.2 Certification testing for a protection scheme or system
Certification testing of schemes or systems will vary between Utilities. Such tests may be required at the scheme or
system level and will typically comprise, but not be limited to the following functional tests:
• Control functions (operating of breaker and isolators, interlocking, disturbance record trigger, etc.)
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• Measuring functions (voltage, current, frequency, power, etc.)

• Protection functions (Impedance characteristic, overcurrent pick up and timing tests, differential slope
characteristic verification, etc.)
• Automation functions (Auto reclosing,Synchro-check, etc)
• Communication functions IED to IED and IED to SCADA, GPS, (time and avalanches performances, etc)
• Supervision functions (Alarms of the protection and control system, trips and circuit supervision, CT/VT
supervision, etc)
Some Utilities may verify the maintainability and testability to ensure the following in a safe and practical manner:
• Short circuiting of CT circuit

• Opening of voltage and trip circuits
• Replacement of the IEDs
• Isolation of functions (wired or based on communication protocol capabilities)
4.2 Routine testing of the protection scheme

Routine testing is generally performed by the supplier (integrator or contractor) to ensure the quality of a standard
certified scheme before the delivery.
The General manufacturing control is carried out during this phase: Verification that all equipment is installed
correctly in their control cabinet, Cabinet / panel wiring installed as per detailed design, Polarity orientation,
earthing, all cabling & termination complete as per design, Quality compliance – cable types, terminals, shorting /
isolation facilities, verification of equipment nomenclature, Relay model check including firmware / serial number,
Supply voltage check.
This general manufacturing control should be followed by a series of test routines developed specifically for the
IEDs and their site application, in order to test interfaces and functions:
• Interface tests: Analog inputs (Verify device analog magnitude and phase shift values for all inputs), Binary
Inputs (it should be verified that the functions associated with the binary inputs operate), Binary Outputs (it
should be verified that the internal functions are correctly associated to the binary outputs, Human machine
interface – HMI ( It should be checked, when available, all objects, links and descriptions), Communication
interfaces (All communication Ports should be checked)
• Scheme functional tests: A diverse range of test routines are used to test the functions. Test results shall
be subject to specified tolerances and performance criteria. Operating characteristics, timing tests, specific
functions such as reclosure, Teleprotection, or Disturbance recording
• Control and annunciation function tests: checking the conformance of the signal list, integration into the
substation control system.
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4.3 Factory Acceptance
Factory acceptance testing (FAT) is related to step 3 or step 4 of the standardization process.
The FAT phase is carried out when the Routine phase is complete.
The FAT serves to validate and verify a system and its functions from the customer’s point of view. The focus of a
FAT is to test typical solutions and their behavior in normal and abnormal situations. A process simulation allows
making also tests for abnormal process conditions and process failure situations.
In the case of the use of standard schemes it is to verify the behavior of schemes integrated within the substation
automation system.
The system under test can be defined as all the interrelated component parts, namely; protection devices, scheme
wiring, software, firmware, Digital Substation Automation System etc. With numerical IEDs this system maybe
software based and integrated into a single IED.
The FAT phase consists mainly of functional and communication tests. This test routine is often customized to
accommodate the specific settings, signal list, configuration associated with the HV assets and in accordance with
the protection scheme. It is preferable to carry out such tests with the final settings when available, if not the tests
are carried out with standard settings provided by the engineering teams of the final client. The depth and coverage
of the tests depend of the organization’s engineering process and whether or not a certification process has been
carried out. Some utilities will certify individual devices for operation on their system and others will approve
protections schemes/standard solutions. This approach is recommended since it allows standardization of designs
and hence tests, leading to a more efficient test process.The factory acceptance test is optional in the case of
standardized Substation Automation Systems which have been certified at the system level according to the
acceptance process.
The scope and object of the FAT have to be discussed and agreed between system integrator and customer and
should be documented in checklists. The checklists are part of the contract.
The result of the FAT should be documented and signed by both the system integrator and the customer.
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4.4 Commissioning Testing

4.4.1 Installation tests
These installation tests are carried out to ensure that all systems are installed correctly as per design, are
functionally operational and ready for the commissioning tests.
This phase should be carried out in compliance with utility guidelines which detail all procedures, test reports and
required handover certification. As these tests are typically not carried out by the commissioning staff there should
be a formal handover with acceptance criteria.
The amount of tests can be significantly reduced if routine tests and factory acceptance tests have been carried
out.
The following tasks are carried out during this phase: The tests should be documented by the utility in a site pre
commissioning test document. Such a document would be created for each relay/scheme type.
• Verification that all correct equipment is installed as per system design

o AC & DC systems (Batteries, distribution boards, polarity tests)
o Instrument transformers (Primary\secondary ratings, burdens, class etc.)
o Power transformers (Power ratings, vector group etc.)
o Circuit Breakers (Current breaking capacity etc.)
o Protection Relays (Type, secondary nominal currents\voltages, application suitability)
• Verification that all equipment is installed correctly as per installation design
o No infringement on safety clearances
o Polarity orientation, earthing etc.
• Verification that the earth grid is installed correctly and that all connections are compliant
• Verification of equipment nomenclature
• Verification that all wiring is installed and terminated as per installation design
o All cabling & termination complete as per design,
o Quality compliance – cable types, terminals, shorting\isolation facilities
• Verification that all local communication is installed and terminated as per installation design
o LAN complete as per design,
o Optical and wiring communication cables
• Pre-commissioning of all protection/control cabinets at factory/site
o Cabinet/panel wiring installed as per detailed design
• Powering up of all relays/control unit
• Functional testing of plant, e.g., circuit breakers operational
• Formal certified handover to the utility
Many tests are visual tests to ensure that the correct equipment is installed in compliance with the design. All
cable and wiring connections should be verified using insulation and continuity test equipment such as multimeters,
current generator, insulation testers and phase angle meter.
4.4.2 Commissioning/Site acceptance

Following a successful handover meeting in which all installation documentation is reviewed, the commissioning
phase can start.
The depth and coverage of the site commissioning tests depend of the organization’s engineering process and
whether or not a FAT has been carried out.
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These tests are performed to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the scheme with associated substation
interfaces. These tests are carried out to provide a sufficient level of confidence in the scheme before final
energization.
The commissioning phase should be carried out in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations and utility
guidelines based on international best practices.
Commissioning tests should be carried out with operational settings using a three phase power system simulator
test kit to simulate system faults in order to verify the protection relay settings, configuration and functionality.
A structured and sequenced approach is adopted in the commissioning phase to ensure that testing is efficient,
thorough and an acceptable level of confidence in the system can be achieved.
As previously mentioned the depth and coverage of the commissioning tests depend on the organization’s
engineering process and whether or not a FAT has been carried out.
If a comprehensive FAT has been carried out then only the commissioning tests should be carried out;
All relay configurations and settings should be compared with the values used in the FAT. After a successful
comparison the relay is subjected to, for example an impedance relay, sample zone 1 and zone 2 tests. A complete
relay test is not required as this has been carried out during the FAT.
All alarms and commands are verified both locally and to the remote control centre. If possible, it should also be
verified that protection relay fault records can be uploaded to the remote control\maintenance centre.
If the Utility does not carry out a FAT in the same manner, then, more comprehensive commissioning tests must be
carried out.
In this case, the following tasks are carried out during the commissioning phase:
Substation Systems
In order to commence any protection testing or primary plant testing all substation AC & DC systems must be
commissioned.
This includes batteries & chargers, distribution boards, DC supervision systems etc. as well as alarm systems
which will facilitate subsequent protection relay testing.
Protection relays
In order to describe the commissioning practices associated with protection relays, it is necessary to also consider
the associated primary plant and scheme interfaces.
Prior to commencing the protection testing on site, all site specific protection relay settings and configurations must
be available for testing. All protection relay tests are carried out using in-service settings provided by the setting
authority.
The commissioning of the protection relays and associated circuits should be carried out in the following sequence.
• Visual check
o Relay model check including firmware\serial number etc.
o Supply voltage check
o Wiring/Earthing check
• Communication and relay configuration
o Setting/configuration download
o Relay Setting file comparison
• Analog inputs
o Verify relay analog magnitude, phase and directional values for all analog inputs
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• Binary Inputs
o All binary inputs should be proven functionally from source (VT MCB, AR switch, CB, teleprotection
etc.) It should be verified that the function associated with the binary input operates.
• Binary outputs
o At this phase of commissioning the external wiring circuits will have been proven i.e. CB
tripping\auto reclosing, alarms. The operation of the binary outputs will be proven during the relay
protection function tests. When the individual protection functions are being tested, it will be proven
that each protection function results in the operation of the associated binary output.
The protection relay shall be subjected to a comprehensive series of tests to prove the correct performance of that
relay in terms of the integrity of the device and the operational performance intended by the setting authority.
These tests are carried out using three phase power system simulator test kit to simulate system faults via
secondary injection in order to challenge the protection relay settings, configuration and functionality.
A pre engineered commissioning test template for the relay under test is selected from a library. This template
consists of a series of test routines developed specifically for the relay and its site application.
These would have been developed previously following a successful type test and site test. These parameters
associated with the routines (zone reaches, overcurrent thresholds etc.) are customised using the relay specific
settings on the particular feeder under test.
• Relay functional tests

o Impedance characteristic tests
Single, two & three phase faults
Forward and reverse zone tests
Zone timing tests
o Overcurrent function tests
Operating threshold
Timing
IDMT\DT characteristic tests
o Differential
Slope characteristic
Backup Overcurrent
o Auto reclosing
o Synchronising
o Teleprotection
o Circuit Breaker Failure
o Trip tests
o Substation & remote control centre alarm annunciation
o Disturbance recorder tests
A diverse range of test routines are used to test the functions including steady state, dynamic & transient tests.
GPS technology is also used where differential line protection schemes are being commissioned in order to verify
the slope characteristic.
Test results shall be subject to specified tolerances and performance criteria.
Compliance with these conditions will deem the relay to have performed satisfactorily. In the event of marginal non-
compliance the commissioner must use a judgment on whether or not the relay can be put into service.
These tests are carried out using three phase power system simulator test kit to simulate system faults via injection
plugs in order to challenge the protection relay settings, configuration and functionality
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Standard automated relay application tests should be used to prove the protection relays performance at the in –
service operational setting.
Pass/Fail criteria should be clearly defined to ensure that any non compliances or setting incompatibilities are
identified.
A relay application test library should be developed to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted to each
application. This ensures that all protections relays are being tested in a consistent and repeatable manner.
The tests should be carried out to prove all relay functions, for example Impedance relay zone characteristics with
a minimum of x points per zone and Timing tests with points on curve.
In so far as possible relay settings should not be changed during the course of the relay testing, however this may
not be possible due the nature of the overlapping functions of modern numerical protection relays.
In any event a comparison check should be carried out after the testing is complete to verify that any temporary
changes have been restored correctly.
At this stage end to end testing should be performed as the system should be considered as a whole.
End to end testing is considered as the ultimate test of a protection relay scheme in that it provides an assurance
that, in addition to the discrete device and scheme component tests carried out previously, the protection scheme
as a whole will operate as intended.
In order to simulate a fault that is detected by more than one protection relay it is necessary to synchronise the
application of simulated fault data to all protections relays in the scheme. This synchronisation is most commonly
achieved by the use of GPS technology which allows two or more test sets, at different locations, to simultaneously
to apply secondary fault simulations to protection relays.
This testing methodology can provide the most realistic fault conditions to prove relay protection & their associated
communication schemes before placing them in service.
This methodology is described in more detail in Section 5.3.
The ‘Acceptance Testing’ or witnessing testing phase of the commissioning process may also be used to describe
the final phase of the project where the client formally witnesses the final commissioning tests associated with the
project. Subject to the successful completion of these acceptance tests, the client will ‘accept’ the project as having
complied with the technical requirements as specified in the contract and the plant can then be energized.
Therefore this ‘Acceptance’ phase of the testing may be described as a contractual and commercial milestone
rather than a technical component of the test process.
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4.5 Maintenance testing

4.5.1 Introduction
In the context of this report, Maintenance Testing can be defined as ‘all testing activities which occur after the
protection IED or scheme has been put into service’.
This report will briefly outline the practices that are commonly applied to maintenance testing by Utilities, as well as
the philosophies behind each one.
There are a number of factors which influence the protection relay & control system maintenance testing practice
implemented by a utility. This chapter will outline these factors as well as taking two examples of such practices to
demonstrate different approaches behind the practice employed by utilities.
The question of Maintenance testing has been recently addressed by the WGB5.06 in a report named “The impact
of Digital SAS on maintenance strategies”. The group has analyzed and consolidated the strategies for conserving
the capability of hardware and software repair, correction and update during the lifetime of the DSAS, taking into
account the Conservation of knowledge and abilities on the systems, the Management of spare-part stocks, the
Maintenance strategies and frequencies for DSAS, the Appropriate use of local and remote maintenance, and the
Cases of systems using IEC 61850 and proprietary protocols. The Report recommended dedicated requirements in
the specifications to guarantee the delivery of systems easy to be maintained.
Different types of protection and control systems exist, based on electromechanical, electronic (solid state) or
digital technologies.
Maintenance Types
Maintenance can be generally categorized using the following two types;
1. Preventative Maintenance
2. Corrective Maintenance
These maintenance methodologies can be further broken down in into sub divisions which we look into in more
detail in the context of the terms of reference of our report.
Preventative Maintenance
Preventative maintenance, or Planned Maintenance, is carried out within defined time-periods or following the
advice of a manufacturer. The goal is to verify that the equipment is working correctly and within the given
tolerances. It can also include replacing equipment identified at risk of future malfunction. Preventive maintenance
can be based on different strategies:
• Periodic Maintenance
• Planned Maintenance
• Condition Based Maintenance
• Reliability Centered Maintenance
This is a common approach among utilities, particularly where the utility has a mixture of protection technologies
and schemes in place.
As with all practices there are risks and benefits associated with a utilities preferred strategy;
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Benefits
• Unsupervised protection relays functionality being verified on a routine cyclical basis

• Unsupervised scheme components being tested – wiring, tripping of circuit breakers from protection etc.
• Increased level of assurance for Utility
• Frequent opportunities (depending on maintenance frequency cycle) to apply retrospective setting
parameter changes to protection\control devices
• Opportunity to carry out scheme tests and test scheme components that would otherwise not be checked,
e.g., Power Line Carrier\fibre communication links, alarm system, substation scheme interfaces
• Provision of maintenance services internally reduces reliance of Utility on manufacturers
Drawbacks
• Additional cost incurred by Utility due to cyclical maintenance being carried

• Possible unavailability of feeder\substation undergoing maintenance for duration of maintenance
• Risk of damage being caused to plant being maintained as a result of invasive maintenance tests
• Risk to security of in service equipment being compromised while maintenance is being carried out
• Risk of imcomplete recovery of temporary changes in wiring and settings after maintenance
Traditionally this maintenance strategy was being adopted where a utilities protection system includes legacy, or
older technology, such as electromechanical or electronic protection devices or schemes. This is because it
represented, and still does in the case of many utilities, the only means by which a utility can ensure the systems
availability when a fault occurs.
Here, the availability of a self-supervisory function in the schemes or protection devices must be considered. These
supervisory functions are not always available on these legacy technology devices\schemes which means that the
utility must decide on an appropriate maintenance strategy based on their specific risks as outlined above. This
decision can be helped by answering the following questions;
• What is the volume of unsupervised protection components on the system?

• What is the likelihood of failure of an unsupervised component?
• What are the implications of the failure of such a component?
• Does the risk\cost\benefit analysis support this strategy?
Corrective Maintenance
Corrective maintenance, also described as ‘Event Based Maintenance’, must be carried out after a malfunction or
the detection of a failure of a system or device. Corrective maintenance is event driven. Examples of such ‘events’
are;
1. Hardware failure
2. Firmware upgrade
3. Unexpected operation
4. Change in substation topology
5. Addition to additional protection device on feeder
6. Modification of design\wiring
7. System parameter modification
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Benefits
• No cyclical maintenance carried out results in reduced cost to Utility (assuming no events)
• Limited risk of loss of an element in service due to maintenance human error
• Opportunity to apply retrospective setting parameter changes to protection\control devices
• Opportunity to carry out scheme tests and test scheme components that would otherwise not be checked,
e.g., Power Line Carrier\fibre communication links, alarm system, substation scheme interfaces
Drawbacks
• Requirement for local & remote monitoring of protection relays & schemes
• Risk of undetected relay schemes component failure going unnoticed resulting in higher risk of incorrect
operation
• Potential loss of Utilities personnel’s knowledge of hardware\technology
• Reliance on 3rd party service providers\manufacturers to provide maintenance services
A utilities decision on a course of action will depend on the type of event that occurs. Some of the events described
above will require an immediate response where, for example a tripping occurs or a failure of hardware that may
result in an imminent risk of tripping. This can be described as ‘immediate corrective maintenance’ where work is
carried out immediately after a failure.
In the case of other events such as a change in station topology, setting change or manufacturers recommended
firmware upgrade; in this case the maintenance action may be deferred as there is no imminent risk to the security
of the system. This can be described as ‘deferred corrective maintenance’ where the work is delayed until certain
conditions are satisfied.
4.5.2 Recommended Strategy for maintenance testing

One of the key requirements of correct maintenance testing is to identify the reason for the test. As previously
mentioned, maintenance testing is any testing which is carried out after the protection device, or scheme, has been
put into service. It is used to diagnose and identify equipment problems or confirm that different actions taken as
part of the system maintenance process (to change settings, upgrade or repair the protection device or another
component of the fault clearing system) have been effective.
The tests that should be included in the maintenance tests will depend upon which of the listed items above
measures have been implemented. Depending on the reason for the test, in some cases it may be necessary to go
back to other types of test methodologies, such as certification (acceptance) testing or commissioning tests.
Regardless of the maintenance strategy of a combination of strategies adopted by a utility, it must be taken into
consideration that the protection & control system not only consists of protection devices but also includes a
number of other components such as battery systems, communication mediums and circuit breakers. Maintenance
testing provides an opportunity to test all these components, as well as the protection devices, in order to provide
the required level of assurance that the entire system will operate correctly during fault conditions.
In the case of digital systems, where secondary injection tests are carried out, it is not necessary to prove the full
functionality of the system. It is only necessary to carry out a reduced level of tests to verify the functional operation
of the system and verify that the appropriate settings are applied.
Utility Case Studies

The following matrices outline the different approaches adopted by 2 utilities in relation to their maintenance
practices at Transmission voltage levels.
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Both utilities adopt a hybrid approach incorporating both preventative and corrective strategies. However, there are
significant differences also in relation to their approaches to both strategies.
For example the criteria used to determine the frequency of carrying out of preventative maintenance are different.
For example Utility 1 uses the protection technology to determine the maintenance intervals while Utility 2 uses the
voltage levels. The preventative maintenance intervals are also different in duration.
There are also obvious differences in relation to the maintenance tests carried out as part of the preventative
maintenance. Utility 1 in all cases applies steady state & dynamic test methodology as part of their maintenance
tests as well as availing of the opportunity to optimise the protection settings based on system requirements.
Utility 2 carried out a setting file comparison without the secondary testing that Utility 1 conducts.
Table 2: Utility 1 Protection Maintenance Matrix
Tabl
e 3:
Utili
ty 2
Prot
ecti
on
Maintenance Matrix
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4.5.3 Power System Mal Operation Investigation

Regardless of the nature of the incident, the best time to prepare for an investigation is long before the incident
occurs. An organised response plan should be established describing the relevant steps to be carried out by the
appropriate personnel in the event of an incident.
The following document outlines the generic stages associated with a fault investigation into a system mal
operation. It will attempt to describe roles of the various stakeholders involved, their interactions, as well as the end
deliverables of the investigation.
It is important to state that the investigation should be focussed on the mal operation itself as against the personnel
involved in the events surrounding the mal operation. Investigators should take due cognisance of the fact there the
people involved are well intentioned and that, as such, do not deliberately set out to contribute to the incident.
Interviews carried out with staff involved in the investigation should be carried out with due care and consideration
bearing in mind that reputations can be potentially damaged and that cooperation with future investigations can be
affected.
A power system mal operation can be defined as an incident that occurs as a result of the unexpected behaviour of
protection/control scheme in response to a power system event.
4.5.3.1 IMMEDIATE INCIDENT RESPONSE

The role played by the initial operations staff on site is crucial as the immediate priority of the Utility will be to
restore the system to a safe and secure situation. This may involve site staff resetting flags, indications and
generally interfering with equipment whose state may be of material benefit to the investigation. The data collection
stage effectively commences when the first responder gets to site in the aftermath of the incident. This stage will be
outlined in section 4.5.3.3 .
It is highly recommended that any premature conclusions or hypothesis are not released before all data has been
gathered, collated and scrutinised by the panel. It is very easy, and potentially grossly misleading, to draw
inaccurate conclusions from partial data at this early stage of the investigation.
4.5.3.2 INVESTIGATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Following a major power system protection mal operation, the first step is for the relevant authority, e.g., Utility,
System Controller etc., to initiate a number of actions such as the following:
• Establish the Terms of Reference of the investigation including timeframe

• Establish a Investigation Panel
• Define the output or deliverables of the investigation
The Terms of Reference of the investigation shall define the areas to be covered by the investigation, the extent of
the investigation, the deliverables and timeframe associated with production of those deliverables.
Investigation Panel
The Terms of Reference shall also direct that an investigation panel or working group be established. This shall
comprise of representatives from a range of disciplines such as Health & Safety, System Operations, Technical
Specialists and relevant Commercial bodies.
These representatives should have a track record of competency in their field as well as an expertise in the nature
of the particular incident under investigation.
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If it is deemed required by the panel members, 3rd parties may be invited to form part of the panel, e.g.
manufacturers, external consultants, etc.
4.5.3.3 INVESTIGATION
Data Collection
This is a vital part of the investigation and should be undertaken with thoroughness, patience and diligence to
ensure all data pertinent to the incident is captured accurately.
This collection of data allows the facts to be established for analysis at a later stage.
• Interview of site personal

o What work, if any, was going on at time of fault in the station
Local switching
Persons working in protection/control cabinets
There are a number of sources of this data;
• System Operator
The System Operator can provide information as regards the state of the system prior to the mal operation,
the impact of the mal operation on the system as well as the immediate actions carried out to mitigate any
adverse impact of the mal operation.This information can be in the format of load profile records, SCADA
indications, system frequency records, system wide fault records and system wide time stamped events.
This data will enable the investigators with the following questions:
o What was the System reconfiguration prior to and at the time of mal operation?
o Were there System configuration changes ongoing at time of mal operation?
o Were there Load profile changes at the time of the mal operation?
o Was there any evidence of faults on other part of the system/voltage levels at the time of the mal
operation under investigation?
o Which alarms/indications were annunciated from remote stations affected by the mal operation?
o Obtain Operational time stamping (opening/closing of CB’s etc.)
o Obtain overall timelines
o Review settings/configuration of affected feeders, IED’s , DSAS
• Site/Substation
It is vital that a site visit is carried out as part of the investigation. This is important not only to retrieve data
which may not be accessible remotely, but also to view the environment in which the incident occurred and
interview the relevant Site based personnel. The following data should be collected:
o Feeder protection relay fault records/annunciations
o Substation/Feeder Disturbance Recorder records
o Local station event recorder data
o Relevant protection/control scheme design schematic wiring details
o Station protection/control schemes
o Photographs
• Utility/Setting Authority
The party responsible for the protection/control settings can provide valuable information in relation to the
protection performance in relation to the mal operation. This will involve the study of the individual relay
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configurations/settings as well as the fault records/annunciations to determine if the protection/control

performed correctly given the conditions which were presented to it during the event.
o Configuration/Settings Issues
Review IED settings in use at time of mal operation
Were there any calculation errors that may have been missed by the setting authority QA
process?
• Commissioning/Testing Function
The commissioning reports associated with feeders in question should also be studied to determine if all
tests were carried out in the appropriate manner. But also to verify if any of the test results/reports can
provide any additional insight into the cause of the mal operation.
o Review Commissioning documentation & test reports
• Relay/DSAS Manufacturer
As mentioned earlier, it may be necessary to invite a representative of the relevant IED/DSAS
manufacturer to participate in the investigation as part of the panel. Alternatively, the manufacturer may be
consulted as a routine part of the investigation as the primary investigator in the investigation.
4.5.3.4 DATA ANALYSIS

This stage of the investigation determines how all the facts gathered during the data collection stage fit together. All
data should be collated in order to develop overall definitive timelines indicating all relevant events. This includes
the collation of all fault records, event recorder and disturbance recorder information.
The key point on the all of the above is time alignment. It is important that it is all synchronised. If not it is very
difficult to compare. This data should be presented in a common format illustrating the events in a chronological
order. It is now possible to have a holistic view of all the events surrounding the system mal operation, not only at
the ‘fault’ location but also at remote location and system wide.
It may now be possible to evaluate if the events that occurred were consistent with the prevailing system
conditions, i.e.,
• Did the IED’s perform as expected given the conditions presented to it?
• Did the IED’s correctly remain stable given the system conditions presented to it?
• Were the conditions presented to the IED’s consistent with the system conditions?
• Did the scheme equipment perform as expected, i.e., circuit breakers, teleprotection equipment etc.
There are powerful software tools available to facilitate the analysis of power system data.
4.5.3.5 RECREATION OF FAULT/SYSTEM CONDITIONS

When all the data has been collated and the resulting timelines of all relevant events have been identified, it may
be possible to narrow the field of investigation.
The next stage of the process is to attempt to recreate the conditions associated with the mal operation in a
controlled environment. This will enable the investigation to focus on a possible root cause of the event.
For IED`s using numerical algorithms the vendor will also use off line computer simulation packages to try and
replicate the conditions. This is extremely advantageous since it is all done off line and does not need complicated
test equipment – it also rules out tester error etc.. This is a major advantage over the older IED technology.
This exercise can provide vital information in relation to the behaviour of the IED. The IED used in the lab test must
be an identical model, firmware & hardware version to that which was in the field.
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Furthermore, the settings and configuration must also be identical to those that were in service at the time of the
mal operation.
• Recreate protection relay fault in lab under controlled conditions using the identical setting/configuration
files loaded on relay.
• Using original fault records (if possible to retrieve them in Comtrade format from IED or external
disturbance recorder) replayed to an identical relay in terms of type, firmware & hardware.
• This can verify relay settings and, to a certain extent, the relay algorithms/firmware.
The above procedure is excellent if all the information is available. For E/M or static relays without such facilities as
events and disturbance records it was far more difficult if not impossible to fully determine the reasons for complex
problems because no limited fault data is recorded. A better understanding of the power system is often required,
in order to answer the fundamental question: ‘’Was it the device failure or a system\application issue?’’
System Performance
These tests are carried out in a site environment rather than a lab in order to use actual plant to assist in the
identification of additional potential contributory factors not highlighted by lab tests. These tests may involve the
cooperation of the system controller to facilitate ‘on load’ tests to replicate the system condition at the time of the
mal operation. Examples for such tests are:
• Recreate fault in station (if feeder is available).

• Single end tests including CB functional tests achieved via secondary injection by test engineers.
• GPS initiated ‘end to end’ functional tests?
• Again, where possible, using the actual fault records replayed to the IED’s, as the source of test routine.
Involvement of IED manufacturer for the following;

• History of Failure for the device under investigation
• Analysis of fault records
• Parallel investigation
Sources of Complementary Data

Forums such as CIGRE represent very valuable sources of information where it may be possible to benefit from
other parties experience. These parties may have experienced similar incidents or may have similar IED’s/DSAS
on their systems. If it is not the case that they have come across similar incidents, they may in the future benefit
from the knowledge gained from the mal operation.
Investigation Deliverables
Investigation reports can take the form of informal presentations, technical demonstrations or formal written
documents or combinations all three. Regardless of the form of the report, it is important that the report is factually
correct and that all conclusions arrived can be supported by reliable and verifiable information.
Formal Report
Where the investigation Terms of Reference requires a formal output, a formal report shall be produced. This report
will document the details of the investigation, the conclusions as well as recommendations as to what measures
may be put in place to prevent a reoccurrence of the incident. The report headings noted below represent an
example of how a formal report of a mal operation investigation may be structured;
1. Executive Summary
2. Terms of Reference
3. Background
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4. Investigation
5. Conclusion
6. Recommendation
7. Appendices (including manufacturers reports, IED test certificates etc., correspondence)
8. References
Technical Demonstration
It may also be a requirement to carry out a practical demonstration of the findings of the investigation to the utility.
This can be a repeat of the lab tests or site based system tests which were originally carried out to recreate the
fault. This can be a very valuable exercise in that it can effectively restore the confidence in the utility that a mal
operation of this nature should not reoccur in the future.
Informal Presentation
The findings of the investigation can also be presented in the form of an informal briefing using a power point
presentation which can provide a high level representation of the mal operation in terms of cause & effect, as well
as conclusions and recommendations as detailed in the formal report.
4.5.4 Changes in the Protection system

In the past it was perfectly reasonable for asset owners to assume that the protection and automation systems
installed in a new substation would be left undisturbed for many decades throughout the equipment’s useful
lifetime, with the possible exception of occasional settings changes. As such it was common practice to
commission complete systems as a whole and stipulate that if changes were made to device software or firmware,
that complete re-testing and re-commissioning was required.
With the introduction of digital substations there are many instances where these assumptions may no longer be
feasible and a new approach is required. Due to the distribution of automated functions in one way and the
integration of Protection and Control functions in IEDs in the other way, a modern substation device installed today
may now need to be upgraded or modified many times throughout its lifetime. Scenarios where this might be
required include:
• when a new relay software version is released to provide additional features and take advantage of
technology developments, to improve product reliability by fixing bugs, or to apply patches to cybersecurity
vulnerabilities.
• When the program logic or the configuration file are modified in case of scheme evolution
• When the hardware has been modified following in case of obsolescence for instance
There will be cases where it is necessary to apply new updates to existing equipment, and other cases where it is
more appropriate to leave the equipment in question ‘as-is’
Such ‘patch’ or ‘version’ management requires a new model for implementing changes to systems that are already
in operation. The diagram below shows a recommended approach and further discussion of each component:
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Figure 7: Process for applying changes
Risk assessment and impact analysis

Before implementing a change or update, an impact analysis should be performed which establishes what is the
greater risk: to modify the substation device and consequently have unforeseen issues arise from making changes,
or to not apply the change and leave bugs, security vulnerabilities and missing features as-is.
Figure 8: Risk assessment
Prioritisation and scheduling

As an output of risk assessment and impact analysis it should also be possible to determine the priority of a change
with respect to others that have previously been evaluated but not yet applied.
Pre-deployment testing
Depending on the impact of changes and the risks to the integrity of the system it may be necessary to re-certify
the components affected by the change. As a general rule, the more comprehensive the testing performed prior to
deployment, the less the requirements for re-commissioning and re-testing of live systems to reach the same level
of risk reduction.
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It is recommended to keep and maintain a generic version of the systems deployed on site. This allows to perform
the majority of testing in a controlled environment. This reduces time on site, outage time and therefore minimises
impact of the implementation of changes to the power system.
Deployment and Re-commissioning

Though the priority of the update will determine how urgent it is, the speed at which the update can be deployed is
dependant on: the number of devices affected, the number and geographical spread of substations where these
devices are located and the extent of on-site testing and commissioning that is required.
Rollback
Even with comprehensive testing, issues will sometime be found that were not anticipated. Therefore it is crucial to
have the ability to ‘rollback’ to the last working configuration of software version and settings if significant problems
are found to allow the real-time system to remain operational.
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5. TESTING METHODS
Typically testing methods can be categorized by different criteria:
Single ended testing – end to end testing

A single ended test typically uses one test set to inject fault currents and voltages to one or several protection
relays located at one place. Typically most testing is done as single ended testing.
End to end testing uses 2 or more test sets at different locations to simulate a fault simultaneously at multiple
protection relays that form together one protection scheme (e.g. at the relays of both ends of a transmission line).
End to end testing is further explained in chapter 5.3
Steady state simulation – dynamic simulation – transient simulation

Steady state fault simulation uses phasors for the simulation of currents and voltages with constant amplitude and
phase at each step. Transient fault simulation calculates realistic values of currents and voltages based on a
network model.
In steady state fault simulation with phasors the transition between pre-fault and fault (or during switching) is
discontinuous (e.g. there are jumps in amplitude and phase of simulated voltages and currents that do not exist in a
real fault and some transient phenomena are simply neglected). On the other hand usage of phasors makes testing
much more simple for the tester and reduces the requirements for the test sets.
Many modern protection test sets can simulate some selected transient effects even when working with phasors
(e.g. displacement voltage during fault inception, current extinction during zero crossing etc.). This “dynamic
simulation” is considered as something between steady state and real time simulation.
Typical testing methods for steady state and dynamic simulation are explained in chapter 5.1, and real time
simulation is explained in chapter 5.2.
Functional testing – application oriented testing

Functional testing starts from the functions of interest in an automation system and verifies that these are
functioning according to their specification. E.g. if the relay has an overcurrent function that should operate at 2
amps, the test verifies relay operation at a threshold of 2 amps within the specified accuracy. In that case the test is
driven by the function settings.
Application oriented testing typically starts from the application and the network and verifies that the system is
functioning as required for the intended application. For example, for a line protection realistic fault are simulated
on the protected line and on other lines and the reaction is analyzed. Typically detailed relay settings knowledge is
not required in this case (black box testing) but of cause the protection coordination study has to be considered. In
that case the test is driven by the parameters of the application object.
Secondary injection – primary injection – on load testing

For secondary injection tests instrument transformers do not belong to the equipment under test. The currents and
voltages are injected on the secondary side of the instrument transformers and typically directly fed to the
protection device. Although the instrument transformer is physically not part of the test, typical phenomena of
instrument transformers (e.g. saturation) can be considered in the tests (effects on the secondary side are
simulated by the test software). In most cases “protection testing” is understood as secondary injection testing.
Primary injection testing means that the injection from the test equipment is done on the primary side of the
instrument transformer or sensor. Here the instrument transformer belongs to the equipment under test. Typically
primary injection requires significantly more efforts because the required amplitudes of currents and voltages for
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simulation are significantly higher. In most cases this method is applied only in cases where the required
verification cannot be done by secondary injection. Examples are given in chapter 5.5.
For on load testing there is typically no injection of voltages and currents, the supply side of the power system (or a
part of it) is in service. Measured currents and voltages are given to the protection relay and are used for testing.
Chapter 5.6 explains this method more in detail.
Manual testing – automated testing

In process of manual testing, all simulation tasks, the assessment of the tested device performance and the
documentation of the results from the test are performed manually by the tester.
On the contrary, in an automated testing, testing tools can define generic or device specific test plans, and then
thes plans can be automatically executed based on the hardware and software configuration defined from the
functionality and settings of the test object.
Assigning a testing method to the above criteria

In principle all combinations of these criteria are possible. In the case of protection schemes, most testing is done
as single ended, steady state function testing by secondary injection. For end to end testing transient simulation
offers some advantages because a network model can easily calculate current and voltages for all desired relay
locations. Application oriented testing typically uses transient simulation and is often done as end to end test.
When testing a complete automation system, whether digital or conventional, the afore mentioned testing methods
equally apply, however with additional focus on system integration and interoperability.
5.1 Steady state and dynamic test simulation methods
Modern protection test systems controlled from computers with powerful software allow injection of voltages,
currents and various fault values. Simulation of binary signals can also be used when required by the tested
function.
Typically such testing tools monitor, record and evaluate binary output signals from the protection relays (e.g. a trip
signal) and can use such signals as a trigger condition.
Here some widely applied testing methods are further explained:
• fixed values
• linear ramp
• pulse ramp
• binary search of a single parameter
• test shots consisting of pre-fault and fault conditions
• ramp or binary search of test shots
• sequence of phasor-based states
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Linear Ramp
A linear ramp test is defined in Figure 9 where the test variable (a physical quantity, Q, such as current or voltage
amplitude, phase angle, frequency) is directly ramped in one direction in stepped equal increments of time ∆t and
test quantity ∆Q from an initial value Qo up to a limit value QL or until the device under test operates before
reaching the limit test value. The initial value may is applied for a time duration of to.
Figure 9: Linear Ramp

The step increments ∆Q of test quantity and the time increments ∆t are defined by the user or may be automatically
determined by the application software.
During a ramp other test quantities that remain constant throughout the entire test duration may be applied.
Pulse Ramp
A pulse ramp test is defined in Figure 10 where the test variable (a physical quantity, Q, such as current or voltage
amplitude, phase angle, frequency) is directly applied as a series of successive pulses and ramping in one
direction. It starts from an initial or pre-pulse value, Qo, lasting for an initial duration, to , before applying the first
pulse with a pulse duration of tP. It goes back to the pre-pulse value, Qo, with a wait duration, tw, before applying
the next pulse. Each successive pulse is increased (or decreased) in value by equal increments of ∆Q until the limit
test value QL is reached or until the device under test operates before reaching the limit. The step increments of
the test quantity, ∆Q, the pulse duration, tp, and the wait duration, tw, are defined by the user.
During a pulse ramp other test quantities that remain constant throughout the entire test duration may be applied.
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Figure 10: Pulse Ramp
Binary Search
A binary search test is defined in Figure 11 to search for the operating point of the device under test. The test
variable (a physical quantity, Q, such as current or voltage amplitude, phase angle, frequency) is applied in a series
of high-low test pulses between two limits, with wait states between pulses. One limit is Qo where the Device Under
Test (DUT) is expected to be in the non-operated or reset state and the other limit is QL where the DUT is expected
to operate when the pulse is applied. The test starts with a pre-pulse value equal to Qo for an initial duration, to,
during which the DUT should remain in the reset state. The first test pulse, Q1 in the figure, is midway between Qo
and QL for a pulse duration, tp. It is then followed by the wait state where Qo is again applied for duration, tw. If the
DUT does not operate (NoOp) during the first pulse the limit value QL is applied. If still the DUT does not operate
then the test result is a “NoOp”. If the DUT operates (Op) during the first pulse the next pulse is calculated to be
halfway between the last pulse value and the other limit, Qo. Successive pulses are calculated based on the
results of the last pulse values with opposite operation, i.e., the next pulse value is halfway between the last Op
value and the last NoOp value, i.e.,
QNext = (QLastNoOp + QLastOp)/2
The test stops when the difference between two consecutive pulse values is less than the specified search
accuracy, Q.
|QLastNoOp+QLastOp| < Q
The last pulse value at which the DUT operated is the result of the binary search test.
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Search Q2=QL
Quantity QL
Q Op
QNext = (QLastNoOp + QLastOp) / 2
(QL-Qo)/2
Q3=(Q1+Q2)/2
Q5=(Q4+Q3)/2
Op
Q4=(Q1+Q3)/2 Op |Q5-Q4|< Q
NoOp
Q1=(QL+Qo)/2 |QLastNoOp+QLastOp|< Q
NoOp
to tp tw
Qo
Time, t
Figure 11: Binary Search
The user defines the limits Qo and QL, the initial time duration to, the pulse duration, tp, the wait duration, tw, and
the search accuracy, Q.
During a binary search other test quantities that remain constant throughout the entire test duration may be
applied.
Test Shot
A test shot is defined as a test sequence consisting of usually a pre-fault state and a fault state. In many cases it
may include a post-fault state after the breaker opens or when an external fault is cleared. A test shot can also
consist of only a single fault state wherein the pre-fault has zero values. Figure 12 shows the voltage and current
values and their phasors for a test shot for simulating an internal A-phase to B-phase fault on a three-phase circuit.
Figure 12: Test Shot

A test shot may apply direct physical quantities like current and voltage amplitudes and angles or may apply
indirect quantities like impedance, power, and symmetrical components. When applying indirect quantities the
application software usually calculates and applies the direct quantities from the user-specified indirect quantities.
The user also specifies other quantities such as the pre-fault voltage, fault type and test method (either a constant
value of test current or test voltage or the source impedance). Such tests can be used to evaluate the dynamic
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expansion of impedance characteristics of some protection relay designs that rely on memory and polarizing
voltages.
Ramp of Test Shots

A series of multiple test shots may be applied in a linear ramp or pulsed ramp fashion in one direction, wherein the
pre-fault state corresponds to the wait state of the pulse ramp, and the fault state corresponds to the ramp or pulse
state. Figure 13 shows an example of a ramp of test shots for testing a distance relay. The first test shot is
composed of pre-fault impedance ZPF (which is equivalent to the pre-fault load) and the fault impedance point Z0.
It is followed by the next shot of pre-fault ZPF and fault impedance point Z01. The fault impedance points are
incremented by ∆Z which is a vector quantity. In addition to fault points Z01 and Z0L, and increment ∆Z, the user
also specifies other quantities such as the pre-fault voltage, the fault loop and the test method. The test application
software automatically calculates the fault voltages and/or currents that correspond to each of the individual fault
impedance points based on the user-specified test conditions.
Figure 13: Ramp of Test Shots
Binary Search of Test Shots

A binary search may apply test shots of direct or indirect quantities in a similar way like ramp and pulse ramp,
wherein the pre-fault state corresponds to the wait state of the binary search, and the shot fault state corresponds
to the pulse state of the binary search. The above example for ramp of test shots can equally be applied to binary
search. The test may start midway between Z0 and ZL, and depending on whether the device under test operated
or not, the next point would be midway between the first point and either Z0 or ZL in a similar manner as in Figure
11 under Binary Search above. Succeeding test shot points will be midway between the last point where the relay
did not operate and the last point where it operated
Dynamic testing with tests shots

When the fundamental voltage and current phasors for pre-fault and fault conditions are derived from power
system simulation models such as in a fault study or even simpler network simulation models the test is considered
as a dynamic simulation test [8]. However, for some high-speed numerical algorithms that use the instantaneous
values of voltages and currents, neglecting the decaying dc component can adversely affect the directionality and
speed of operation [7]. Some test systems include the decaying dc component avoiding the unrealistic step change
in current. The initial magnitude of the dc component and the time constant are automatically determined by the
test system based on the fault incident angle, the impedance values of the source and the location of the fault and
the fault resistance. Figure 14 shows a dynamic test shot with a decaying dc component.
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Figure 14: Two-state dynamic test shot for A-B fault simulation
Sequence of Phasor-based States

Sequence of phasor based state testing a flexible method that can be used for various purposes. The user defines
the phasors of currents and voltages for all states as well as binary outputs simulated by the test set individually
and also defines the conditons for a change from one state to the next one. These conditions are typically trigger
conditions for binary inputs or time elapsed for a state.
Typical examples for application of this methods are multi shot autoreclose and evolving faults. Using a higher
number of states users can even simulate basic frequency changes.
However, some modern protection protection relays use instantaneous voltage and currents for internal plausibility
checks and may react differently if instantaneous changes of values are detected that are not physically realistic.
For such cases transient simulation methods should be used (refer to chapter 5.2). However some test sets can
provide a more realistic current simulation by introducing decaying dc components for state changes.
Figure 15 shows how such a tool can be used to verify timers for switch onto fault (SOTF) detection. In this
example the first fault occurs after the time for SOTF detection has elapsed, therefore no immediate trip is
expected; afterwards the same fault is simulated within the SOTF interval and the SOTF funtion causes an
immediate trip.
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Figure 15: Using sequence of test states to check SOTF timing
5.2 Transient Simulation

Transient simulation is defined as testing by injecting an array of samples of the instantaneous values of currents
and voltages as opposed to their phasor values. Transient sampled values data can include the effects of power
system dynamics, distributed circuit component parameters, series and shunt capacitors and reactors, effects of
instrument transformer transients, fast-acting controls.
It is universally accepted that this is an effective method of accurately simulating power system conditions. This
testing methodology involves the applications of a real or simulated transient fault records to a protection device or
scheme, and observing its performance. This represents a challenge to the IED or scheme that steady state testing
cannot necessarily provide as it accurately replicates the behaviour of the power system during faulted conditions.
For example steady state testing cannot replicate the presence of DC offset and harmonics in the fault current
which is a characteristic of the majority of system faults and represents particular challenges to protection relay
performance.
In the past this testing methodology was not easily available to utilities and there was a reliance on manufacturers
to performing simulation testing using proprietary software and transient network analyser for particular
applications. Also time and cost were constraining factors in its implementation. This is no longer the case with the
availability of modern computer driven power system simulation test equipment as well as the availability of records
in COMTRADE format from a number of sources.
There are different sources for transient simulation data for testing:
• Transient files recorded by digital fault recorders (DFRs) and numerical relays.
• Transient files created by a transient power system simulation programs (stability and electromagnetic
transients), or real-time simulators (refer to chapter 5.4).
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• Simple transient simulation tools provided by test set manufacturers

• Real time transient simulation from analogue or digital network models
From a protection testing perspective, this methodology is frequently used in the following circumstances:
• Evaluation of a schemes performance, or as an application test, to check the performance of the protection
scheme under actual expected conditions.
• Evaluate various protection scheme options to select the appropriate scheme for the intended application.
• Analyse the questionable operation, or non-operation, of the protection scheme during a power system
disturbance as part of a fault investigation.
As previously mentioned there, this testing method can apply to different protection testing applications and this
application can require different levels of quality of data. Much depends on what is the purpose of the test and what
is expected to be achieved by the test. Other factors include cost and the technical capability of the tester.
5.2.1 Standard file format for exchange of transient simulation data

All of these options can generate fault data in COMTRADE data format. The COMTRADE format is a collection of
data around an event point, recorded at regular time intervals, to define the characteristics of voltage, current and
the status of digital channels before, during, and after an event. This can be played back through modern test
equipment, via a PC, to faithfully reproduce the stored data, point-by-point.
COMTRADE data files help the user to perform transient testing. Modern DFRs and numerical protection can
record power system events in a COMTRADE data format. It is also possible to create COMTRADE data files from
simulation programs such as EMTP and ATP. All modern computer driven test equipment are suitable to replay
power system events.
5.2.2 Playback of files recorded by digital fault recorders or numerical relays

Fault investigation in relation to the suspected mal-operation of an IED.
In this case the primary consideration is to attempt to recreate the fault in an effort to determine the cause of the
mal operation. In order to achieve this, it is vital to reproduce the same fault the protection device experienced to
analyse in order to its performance. Therefore a modelled fault may not be suitable to replicate the actual system
conditions even though the quality of the data from a sampling perspective may be very good. A substation DFR
will provide this specific fault data with a high enough sampling rate to replicate system transients etc.. However, as
is quite often the case, the circuit under investigation may not have been monitored by a DFR.
So we are left with the internal fault recorder of the IED which although offering a lower quality of generated data
(in the order of 1 to 1.2 kHz sampling rate) may be adequate to determine the reasons behind the mal operation of
the IED. In a lot of cases this mal-operation may be as a result of an incorrect function setting and replaying the
IED fault record will be adequate to identify the setting in question.
Figure 16 below shows a fault record which was recorded from a transformer differential relay internal fault recorder
which incorrectly operated for an external system earth fault. The fault record correctly indicated that the fault was
external to the protected zone but when replayed to the relay resulted in the relay repeatedly operating incorrectly.
This facilitated the investigation in identifying an incorrect setting on the zero sequence current elimination function.
This steady state type test was adequate in this case to discover the source of the problem.
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Figure 16: Typical Fault record to replay to protection device
5.2.3 Transient simulation tools

Various types of system faults, switching conditions and system disturbances can be simulated including such
phenomena like power swings, transformer inrush, CT saturation, CVT subsidence, etc. The resulting transient
simulation output files are typically in COMTRADE format. These files are imported into test programs for injection
into the devices under test. Such tools are frequently used by manufacturers to validate changes in the algorithim
or, completely new functions in the IED.
These sophisticated programs can perform complex simulation by requiring highly-skilled power system engineers
to use them. Some modern protection test systems include easy-to-use simplified network models that simulate
transient conditions and can directly apply the simulated transient currents and voltages into the device under test.
An example is shown in Figure 17 where a graphical user interface with the characteristics of the relay under test
and allows the tester to apply load, faults and control the power swing (stable and unstable) trajectory and rate of
change of impedance from point to point [2]. A simple model with source impedance (not shown) computes the
instantaneous values of currents and voltages along the impedance locus. Real time simulation is discussed further
in section 5.4
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(b) Voltage and current waveforms and operation of relay elements
Figure 17: Transient testing of line protection power swing blocking and tripping functions
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5.3 End to End Testing

End to end testing is the synchronized distributed testing of multiple protection devices or IEDs as shown in Figure
18. Typically synchronization between the test sets is done using a high precision absolute time source such as
GPS.
3 ph Test
system A 3 ph Test
system B
V I Binary V I Binary
I/O signals I/O signals
Analog and/or digital signal exchange between stations
Protection Direct wired or through communications Protection
under test under test
Station A Station B
Figure 18: Typical end-to-end testing configuration

For power system protection, modern IEDs are using communication technology to provide the most efficient and
selective solution. Typical examples are:
• Line protection relays using a teleprotection scheme, such as POTT (permissive overreach transfer trip) to
allow fast tripping for all faults up to 100% of the protected line.
• Line differential relays communicating their current values instantaneously to the remote end(s), e.g. using
fiber optic connections or a radio network.
• Busbar protection relays, e.g. when all bay units communicate to a central unit where the protection
algorithm is performed.
• Interlocking schemes, e.g. to perform a kind of simple busbar protection when fault detection of a relay of
an outgoing feeder can block the trip for the relay at the incoming feeder.
In some configurations (e.g. modern line differential relays) end to end testing can be the only method to perform a
functional test. In other cases a single end (normal) test with simulation of signals from other relays can be an
alternative.
In some cases IEDs are located relatively closed together, but there is a need for synchronized usage of multiple
test sets to generate the required amount of independent current and voltage sources for the different IEDs (e.g. for
testing busbar protection or during certification tests in a lab). In such cases often the same test configuration as for
an end to end test is used.
The more complex the communication between the relays is the more there is a need for end-to-end testing:
Commissioning and testing of a distributed system should involve the whole system, since the cause of a
malfunction can also be on the communication channel between the line ends.
End to end testing can even simplify the test set-up:

For a single ended functional test of distance protection with a teleprotection scheme the scheme logic (including
timing) has to be simulated in detail. For an end to end test the set-up can be independent of the scheme logic (e.g.
permissive overreach, permissive underreach, blocking or unblocking), it just needs simulation of various faults at
end of the protected line (outside the zone 1 reach) to verify the functioning of the protection scheme in a holistic
view, Figure 19. Measurement of the signals exchanged between the relays allows risk analysis regarding the
timing of the scheme logic (e.g. is there currently enough buffer time).
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Figure 19: Typical fault locations for End to end testing of a teleprotection scheme of a distance
protection relay
Protection testing always requires the simulation of a fault scenario, which is applied to stress the protection relay
and to verify the correct reaction. For an end-to-end test this fault simulation has to simultaneously provide the
quantities to inject for all ends:
• Manual calculation of such values is often used and can be suitable for simple test cases (e.g. through fault
of a 2 terminal line) but can be quite cumbersome for many realistic scenarios.
• Usage of pre-calculated transient fault values (e.g. in COMTRADE format) are an option that allows even
usage of test sets of different suppliers for end to end testing. Such files could be generated by a network
simulation program. The disadvantage is that typically it is not easy to modify such fault scenarios during
testing (e.g. vary the fault location or current a bit to analyze impact and cause of unexpected relay
behavior)
• An integrated transient simulation of a fault scenario within the test set software is therefore in many cases
the most reliable and best suitable option. Figure 19. shows a practical example for configuration of such
an end to end test.
End-to end testing requires simultaneous test set-up at all relays participating in a test. Typically the start of the
output of test values is triggered by a GPS impulse that is given e.g. every minute. The testers at the different
locations typically communicate by phone and prepare the test (start the software module) between
synchronization impulses so that the output then starts synchronized.
This end to end testing requires a high level of planning and coordination on site prior to the test, tasks such as the
following must be carried out in advance of test;
1. The development of specific test protocols to suit each application, as well as test equipment with the
synchronisation facilities. Development of fault values in COMTRADE format to facilitate realisitic fault test
data.
2. Availability of a synchronisation source at each location provided by either ;
a. Clock
b. GPS antenna
3. Specific measures may need to be taken to ensure the correct synchronisation of test sets from different
manufacturers
4. The isolation of the equipment under test
5. Adequate communication facilities between the test engineers at each location
6. The normalisation of all protection test facilities (switches, plugs, etc.) set to normal
7. The connection of the test set to the protection relays at the appropriate points at each end of the line\cable
8. Consultation, and agreement with, the System Operator\Network owner to ensure they have notice that a
‘real’ functional test is to be carried out at a specific time and location. Also that they are aware that the
running of the test will result in, if appropriate, circuit breaker operations as well as the associated
protection alarms to local & remote locations
9. Comprehensive evaluation of all test results, CB operation and alarm annunciations after the test has been
completed.
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5.4 Closed loop Testing

Closed loop testing means that the outputs (reactions) of the equipment under test are not only measured but used
to calculate the further inputs that are given to the equipment under test.
A simple example of such closed loop testing is the use of the binary outputs of a relay being used as a trigger.
IIn many cases test sets are using the outputs of the equipment under test (e.g. the trip signal of a protection relay)
as a trigger to switch to the next predefined simulation state. Generally, this is not considered as closed loop
testing.
Examples:
• for a shot test the test equipment measures the trip signal and switches to the post fault state considering
the timing of a circuit breaker
• For testing an autorecloser function the trip and close signals are used to switch between fault state and
dead time state, there might be an additional condition to terminate the test.
Real time transient network simulation

Typically closed loop testing is used in conjunction with transient network simulation (chapter 5.2). Typical test
cases are protection schemes consisting of more than one relay.
Figure 20 shows a typically example for such a test [3]. Depending on the test case, different teleprotection signals
(POTT\PUTT etc) would also be interfaced with the Real-Time Simulator and could be used to generate
COMTRADE recordings including this binary information.
Reactions of the two relays stimulate changes in the network configuration (Circuit breakers open and close), the
simulation software calculates the new state for each change in the configuration which typically takes place every
10 – 100us. As the closed loop simulation recalculates the next state based on the updated network configuration it
is not necessary to know in advance which relay will react first, if autoreclosure is initiated or not, in case of
aotoreclosure how many closing attempts are done. This allows easily realistic simulation of various fault
conditions.
Tools for transient network simulation typically provide a database containing power system components that can
be implemented in the model such as generator, power electronics, capacitor banks, conventional transformers,
auto-transformer, line models with or without mutual coupling. For a generator the model can include modelling of
the turbine and its control system. The power of the simulatiom software may limit the size and complexity of the
network model used. For that reason, it may be necessary to simulate only the section of the network that will be
subject to the tests, rather than a broader section of the network.
Typical applications for real time transient network simulations are;
• Protection testing(e.g. faults on parallel lines, protection coordination, busbar and breaker failure protection
schemes)
• Control System Testing
• PMU Studies
• IEC 61850 Tests
• Simulation of power plants and non conventinal energy resources
• Smart grid and distributed generation
• Power quality (e.g. impact of used equipment, effectiveness of measures
• HVDC systems
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Dorsey Riel Forbes

500kV
500kV
Line 603 Line 602
(50 km) (485 km)
HVdc
SVC
Faults within the protected zone
EMTP type
Reverse faults for the relay @ Riel
network model
Analog/digital
hardware interface
Digital to Analog converter Digital I/O
Power Power
amplifier V I amplifier V I
Status Trip
Status Trip
Reclose
Reclose
Relay #1 Relay #2
(Riel) (Forbes)
POTT 1-2
POTT 2-1
Figure 20: Real time network simulation for testing 2 relays with a teleprotection scheme
While real time transient network simulation allows realistic simulation of complex protection schemes and can
make testing more easy (as no prediction of the relay behavior is required for the fault simulation) there are also
some disadvantages of such a solution:
• The test set-up is costly and in many cases not easy portable. Therefore transient simulation is mainly
done in test labaratories only. There is however some trend towards smaller portable and less costly
solutions.
• One of the main application is testing with more than one relay, which are in reality typically located in
different locations (as in the example above). The example above has been carried out in a ’lab
environmen’, both relays were fed by the same digital to analog convertor. For real end to end test (refer to
chapter 5.3) this would have to be carried out simultaneously at 2 different locations. But due to uncertain
communication times via mobile phone or internet connections (where communication time may exceed
the time frame between relay output and expected circuit breaker reaction) this method is not suited for
distributed end to end testing (although it would be required mainly for such applications).
Iterative real time network simulation

An iterative approach can overcome the disadvantages of closed loop transient simulation stated above. It can run
in standard test sets and is suitable for end to end testing.
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The idea of an iterative real time network simulation is simple:
1. Changes to the precalaculated simulation are only initiated by reactions of the protection devices under test
(e.g. trip and close signals). These changes are effective with the reaction of the circuit breaker (i.e.
approximately 40 – 200 ms after the signal itself occurs)
2. Especially for numerical relays there is a high probability that for a repetition of a fault simulation the relay
behaviour will be the same.
Therefore the network simulation will run until the first relay reaction (that has an impact on the fault simulation) is
detected. Then the simulation is stopped, and the software calculates the approproiate next state. Afterwards the
sumulation is started again from the beginning. The software monitors that the first reaction is detected again (a
certain tolerance in time is acceptable as long as it is not greater than the typical variance in circuit breaker reaction
times) and then continued with the precalculated second state, which is continued until the next relevant output
signal from one relay is received. This is then continued until a steady state is reached or the simulation is
terminated.
This does require multiple repetition of the fault simulation, but for numerial relays a big number of shots is allowed.
Of course this procedure is only suitable for when the iterations are supported by the test software. But then it is a
suitable and easy to handle test method also for distributed testing. [4]
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5.5 Primary injection

Primary injection testing means that the injection from the test equipment is done on the primary side of the
instrument transformer or sensor. It is used to:
• check the CT polarity and wiring,

• the primary sensitivity, eg for high impedance differential protection
The above verification may also be done by using on load tests
The use of primary injection for non-conventional instrument transformers (NCIT) is detailed in the following
paragraphs.
5.5.1 NCIT with direct IEC 61850 9-2 LE interface

Depending on their operating principle (for example optical CTs), some NCITs may have direct IEC 61850 sampled
values interface as shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Direct IEC 61850 9-2 interface

Such an interface simplifies significantly the design of the system, because the number of components of the
protection and control system is reduced and the number of interfaces is practically reduced to fiber optic cables
only. The single exception is the hardwired connections that power the individual devices.
5.5.2 Testing of NCIT based protection applications

Considering the variety of interfaces and devices that are available when we are using NCITs for protection and
control applications, it is important to define what we are testing in order to determine when we need to perform
primary injection.
If we look at Figure 22, we can see that the answers can be:
• We are testing an NCIT with a low-power interface

• We are testing an NCIT with an IEC 61850 9-2 interface
• We are testing an NCIT with a low-power interface and a merging unit
• We are testing a merging unit with a low-power input
• We are testing a protection IED with an IEC 61850 9-2 interface
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• We are testing a protection scheme of a specific type – a bus protection in the case of this example
Figure 22: Different test objects in protection systems based on NCITs
5.5.3 Testing of NCIT with low-power interface

If we are testing an NCIT with low-power output, we need to be able to apply the primary current required by the
test and monitor the low-power output in order to determine that the NCIT meets the technical specification and the
requirements of the application.
To carry out this test, we need to inject current up to more than 100 A with a secondary test device or 800 A from a
primary test set output. If higher current is required for the test (up to 2000 A) we may use a current booster
connected to the "External booster" output to the current transformer’s primary side (refer to Figure 23).
The current transformer’s secondary side voltage has to be measured in order to determine the performance of the
NCIT under test.
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Figure 23: Testing of NCIT with low power interface
5.5.4 Testing of NCIT with IEC 61850 9-2 LE interface

If we are testing an NCIT with IEC 61850 9-2 LE output, we need to be able to apply the primary current required
by the test and monitor the streaming sampled values in order to determine that the NCIT meets the technical
specification and the requirements of the application.
The test device and the merging unit need to be time synchronized from the same source.
The primary test system performs closed-loop testing whereby a test signal is injected on the primary side of the
current/voltage sensors. The Merging Unit (MU) converts the sensor output into an SV stream which is published to
the substation network. The primary test system then reads the data back from the network in order to perform a
variety of different tests.
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Figure 24: Test setup for NCIT with direct IEC 61850 9-2 interface
The current transformer’s Ethernet output is connected to an Ethernet switch, with the test device and test
computer connected to the same switch as well.
If the test device and the test object are time synchronized, a test computer can capture the streaming sampled
values and store them for comparison and analysis of the performance of the NCIT.
The same methods described above can be used in case of integration testing of an NCIT with a low-power output
and a merging unit with a low-power input.
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5.6 On load testing

On load testing of protection IED’s or schemes can be defined as a set of tests which are carried out when the
equipment is connected to the system. The term ‘on load testing’ can have different meaning to different
utilities\manufacturers and, as such, can be implemented using different methods. However, regardless of the
methodology employed, it remains a vital final phase of the commissioning process.
It was previously noted that pre-energisation tests are carried out in order to provide an acceptable level of
confidence in order to certify an item of plant to be connected to the system.
These tests are carried out in such a way as to simulate real system conditions as far is reasonably practicable.
However it is neither possible, nor practical at this stage, to apply system level currents and voltages in a test
environment. Hence the application of power system conditions represents an important test in itself that must be
carried out as part of the acceptance testing process.
The objective of on load testing is to prove the acceptability of the installed equipment when connected to the in-
service power system, by observing its performance and ‘in-service readings’ when subject to power system
voltage, current and frequency. These are the final and definitive tests in confirming that the equipment has been
correctly installed, and is satisfactory for commercial operation.
In some cases this method of ‘on load testing’ is carried out with the trip circuits isolated from the protection under
test, for the duration of the test. This is due to the risk mal-operation of the newly commissioned protection scheme
when put into service due to issues not identified at the final commissioning stage. This is a common approach
adopted by utilities with a system that is not highly meshed.
In highly meshed systems, where the system can withstand the impact of a loss of the circuits under test, this can
take the form of a series of live trip tests where the plant\protection schemes are ‘in service’ and a live trip is
initiated from the protection scheme with the resulting circuit breaker operation being observed. This would typically
be carried out under a strictly controlled procedure and be subject to a risk assessment.
Unlike the previous example of on load testing being carried out by initiating protection trips, the following examples
of ‘on load’ testing are carried out while the feeder\substation remains in service.
In these cases, all protection device measurands\in service readings are monitored to verify that they are
consistent with what the actual system conditions are in terms of power component magnitudes, phase angles,
frequency, load flows and measurands in general.
The following are examples of on load tests which are carried out;
1. HV cable and transformer ‘energised’ or ‘soak’ test

2. Instrument transformer magnitude and polarity tests
3. Instrument transformer secondary circuit integrity tests
4. Primary and secondary circuit phasing tests
5. Protection directionality and stability tests
6. Metering accuracy and polarity tests
7. Synchronising and supply paralleling tests
8. CT & VT phasing for power & impedance relays
It is critical that these tests are carried out on any protection relays that are directional dependant. For example:
1) Line, busbar and transformer differential protection.
2) Line distance protection.
3) Directional overcurrent protection
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Relay manufacturers generally specify which on load tests are appropriate to the specific protection relay, including
the required level of power flow before these tests are carried out.
These levels are defined current\power flow thresholds which must be exceeded in reality in order to carry out an
on load test, e.g., 0.X In must be exceeded in order to carry out a directional load test for an impedance relay.
This may require the system operator to temporarily modify the system configuration to facilitate these load flow
levels on the feeders which will be subject to these on load tests.
5.7 Automated testing

One of the key requirements is the improvement of the efficiency of the testing process. This can be accomplished
based on the concept of repeatability and object-oriented testing.
The object-oriented testing is based on the use of different types of objects that represent the different actors in the
testing process and the various tools used in its execution. These include, but are not limited to the test device, test
object and test modules.
The definition of the test device and the tested IED (or any other type of relay, meter, recorder, etc. secondary
substation device) as objects allows a single test plan to use their single definition that can be later reused by all
test modules executed as part of the required tests. The test modules can be of different types, selected depending
on the purpose of the test and the functionality of the device being tested.
Object-oriented testing allows the definition and management of the execution of multiple test modules in a
complete test plan that does not require the continuous attention of a testing specialist.
Instead of manually configuring, executing and documenting the results from each individual test, it is preferred to
determine an automated test process based on:
• Use the settings of the test object to calculate the simulated currents and voltages for the individual test
modules
• Use for all test modules in a test plan the global hardware configuration for the test system hardware based
on the requirements of the test object
• Use for all test modules in a test plan the global IEC 61850 configuration (GOOSE and Sampled values
configuration) for the test system hardware based on the requirements of the test object
• Select from a generic test plan the individual test modules to be executed
Figure 25: Test plan block diagram
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Figure 25: Test plan block diagram shows a simplified block diagram of a test plan that starts with the definition of
the Test Object (the device or system being tested), the global hardware configuration of the test equipment being
used and four test modules that will reuse the test object and test device definitions established at the beginning of
the test plan.
The test plan automatically executes the test modules one by one, with the results being stored in the included
dynamic report. Further reusability is achieved by the use of the same generic test plan for the testing of multiple
multifunctional IEDs of the same type. The improvement of the efficiency is also resulting from the ability to
configure the executable test modules as a function of the imported settings of the test object, thus reducing the
time and probability for human errors in the testing process.
Figure 26: Test plan example

Figure 26: Test plan example shows a test plan example with individual test modules on the left side and the
hardware configuration on the right.
It is important to note an additional benefit of pre-defined test plans for a specific type of a protection IED. If the test
plan is created as a superset of all test cases that may need to be executed, when a specific instant of this test
plan is to be executed, the user only needs to select or de-select individual test modules that need to be included in
the test process to ensure its effectiveness.
If the user is interested in determining the effect of specific parameters of the fault condition on the performance of
the protection function being tested, this process can also be automated by defining a sequence of tests with
different values of a test parameter based on a range and step size. Some examples of such fault parameters are
fault location, faulted phase, fault resistance, fault inception angle.
The results of the sequence of tests are automatically documented and available for performance analysis.
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6. TEST USE CASES

Utilities may select differing strategic approaches, regarding the implementation and utilization, of both the defined
testing phases and the test methods described previously.
This may be as a result of a number of factors such as :
• Traditional utility practices

• Resource restraints
• Economic limitations
• Technology limitations
• Technical expertise
• Philosophies
• Risk management
• Regulatory requirements
6.1 Testing Multifunction relays

The design and implementation of numerical devices offer advantages in cost and functionality but they also have
an impact – both positive and negative – on testing. This section discusses the challenges that make testing
complicated and difficult as well as features that help in testing.
6.1.1 Challenges when testing numerical multi-function relays

The complex design of numerical relays create some issues and challenges for setting and testing the relays.
• Large number of functions and elements with thousands of extensive configuration and setting possibilities.
There are also multiple setting groups.
• Due to the complexity of many functions and their mathematical implementation and the fact that different
methods are used to perform similar functions, there is a higher possibility that the protection engineer
doing the configuration and setting of the relay can misunderstand how a function works and can make
incorrect settings; the test personnel are also in the same situation. For example, the resistive reach of a
quadrilateral distance element is set in ohm per phase in some relays, but in another relay it is set as a
separate loop resistance; the residual compensation setting in many relay models, even from the same
manufacturer, can mean different things. The zero-sequence current settings sometimes means 3I0 and in
some cases just I0; and this is similar for negative sequence. The transformer differential phase and ratio
compensation settings in many relays are performed internally by the relay, but each relay model, even
those from the same manufacturer, uses a different method that has a different external effect.
Understanding the relay manuals requires a good knowledge of mathematics and electrical theory.
• Many of the functions and elements may interact with other functions during testing and can influence
(allow or block operations or change an operating threshold) their behavior and performance.
• Performing an injection test for a specific functional element may also operate other functions that share
the same output contact. For example, testing a phase overcurrent element may result in operation of the
ground overcurrent element. Testing the backup overcurrent element will result in the differential elements
operating first. Testing a distance element may operate the switch-onto-fault function if there is no pre-fault
voltage or the breaker status input is missing.
• Many systems have the outputs of functions and elements mapped to common output terminals.
• Some high-speed protection algorithms do not operate as fast as specified or produce incorrect or
unrealistic results if the current has an unrealistic step change in the instantaneous current waveform when
going from the pre-fault state to the fault state without considering the complementary decaying dc
transient.
• Some protection functions have adoptive or dynamic characteristics.
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• Complex schemes are implemented in software.
6.1.2 Features of numerical multi-function relays that help in testing

• Microprocessor-based numerical multi-function relays have many features and characteristics that can
help in testing when compared to electromechanical and static relays.
• Multiple functions and elements share many common voltage and current inputs, making it faster to set
up for testing. There are also less number of physical relays to test. Hence, testing can be faster.
• The relay has many common software routines and algorithms shared by similar functions and
elements. Once it has been proven that common routines are working extensive testing for other
functions can be reduced dramatically and speeds up testing.
• The metering features display voltage and current amplitude and phase angles. Also the calculated
operating quantities, such as restraint and operating currents for differential functions, symmetrical
component quantities, polarizing quantities, etc., indicate that the input transformers and A/D
converters are working, and it proves the correctness of test lead connections for testing, and can
reveal incorrect settings, and possible defects in the relay.
• The self-monitoring features of microprocessor-based relays provides assurance that power supply
and other electronic and software components are working and reduces the need for periodic testing.
The digital inputs and output, however, are not monitored.
• Some relays can perform a triggered report of measurements and calculated quantities. Some relays
provide phasor diagrams of the measured and calculated quantities
• The fault and event recording features assist in finding incorrect or missing operation of internal
elements. This can uncover problems in some setting thresholds and the scheme logic. Analysis of the
records can also unmask unwanted operation of some elements that were supposed to have been
disabled.
• Event and DFR reports provide additional detailed documentation of the test.
• Many IED software include graphical real-time visualization tools such as phasor diagrams and plots of
points corresponding to injected voltages and currents together with the operating characteristics.
These help the tester see what is going on during testing, especially for trouble-shooting complex
functions and schemes involving multiple elements. This allows both black box and white box testing,
as necessary
6.1.3 Strategy for testing numerical protection and control systems

The features and characteristics of numerical multi-function suggest a bottom-up approach for testing of a
numerical multi-function IED during comprehensive certification type testing.
Functional elements can be tested using white box testing. For functions and scheme logic a combination of white
box and black box testing may be used.
It is at this time that the more complex functions that are difficult to understand and to test should be well
understood and documented. In some cases these compliated functions can be better understood and proven
through testing. The features of numerical relays should be used to advantage when testing these IEDs. The
performance of protection functions are also tested.
IEDs and schemes that have been tested comprehensively and standardized, when used or instantiated in a
project, need only be tested to ensure that IEDs are configured and set correctly. If settings are not available then
typical settings can be used. A black box approach to testing the functions and schemes is used, particularly for
schemes that consist of multiple IEDs. The focus of these tests are the external interfaces.
Following such strategy can dramatically reduce the amount of testing and the time for routine testing during FAT
and especially during commissioning of multi-function IEDs and complete protection and control systems.
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6.1.4 Testing protection functional elements in multi-function IEDs

For the purpose of performing tests of individual functional elements during certification type testing, all protection
functions should first be disabled or turned off. Then each individual functional element is turned on, set and tested.
Tests performed include accuracy of pickup/dropout, timing and operating characteristics of the functional element.
It should be tested at settings that cover the specified setting range for that functional element. The tested
functional element is then turned off before testing the next functional element, to simplify testing and to ensure or
minimized the possibility that one functional element does not influence the result of testing of another. The
process goes on until all the required functional elements are tested.
Pickup and dropout for voltage, current, or frequency functional elements are tested using a linear ramp method.
The results are compared to expected values and tolerances. High-set instantaneous overcurrent elements are
tested with a pulse ramp method to prevent overheating of current circuits. Time operating characteristics are
tested using a series of several fault shots and the results plotted.
In some cases it is not possible to enable a single functional element without also turning on other associated
functional elements, or the same numerical algorithm is used for other similar functional elements such phase A,
phase B, and phase C of a phase overcurrent function. However, the input signals come from different signal
sources, therefore, all individual phases must be tested in order to cover the three measuring elements. It is only
needed to repeat a few tests for the other phases to prove that they operate in the same way. For example, the
time-current characteristic is tested for 10 points for phase A and two or three points for the other phases.
In another case such as a phase distance zone elements, injecting a fault into a fault loop to test phase AB element
can potentially affect the other phase elements BC and CA. Some relays allow mapping of the individual element
signals to different digital outputs while other relays have only a common output for these elements. Testing in the
latter situation requires that the injected fault carefully targets the functional element under test. Testing should also
prove that the other functional elements do not operate or would operate with a much longer time so that the
operation of the element under test will stop fault injection preventing the operation of the other elements not under
test.
6.1.5 Testing protection functions in a multi-function IED

Testing of protection functions in a multi-function IED involves multiple elements or sub-functions, such as testing
all overcurrent functions together, or all distance functions together. The purpose of functional testing is to prove
that all the elements and sub-functions work together as a complete protection function. Only the function under
test should be enabled during this functional testing.
Some fault types can result in operation of more than one element from another sub-function. For example,
injecting a phase A-to-ground fault can result in the operation of the more sensitive residual overcurrent sub-
function instead of the phase A overcurrent element, and if a negative-sequence function is also enabled it may
operate first. Testing can be done by mapping the operating output signals of each function to different output
terminals or fault injection can be done in such a way that only the function under test is targeted. For example,
three phase currents with phase A current slightly higher than phase B and C will result in very small negative- and
zero-sequence currents allowing the phase A overcurrent element to operate and not the negative- and zero-
sequence overcurrent sub-functions. Ramping the three phase currents with the same proportion can be used to
test pickup and dropout of the overcurrent sub-functions. Injecting pure zero-sequence currents will result in
operation of only the zero-sequence overcurrent sub-function while injecting pure negative-sequence currents will
operate only the negative-sequence overcurrent sub-function since it is set much more sensitive than the phase
overcurrent elements.
Another example is testing the distance function with all zones enabled. Testing includes the basic reach points for
each zone and fault type as well as zone timing. This is done by injecting appropriate fault shots (with pre-fault
voltage) that target the individual functional elements or sub-functions. Testing the reach can be done by searching
using fault shots and zone timing tests can use state simulation or other advanced testing methods found in
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modern test systems. Figure 27 shows an example of testing all enabled distance zones and fault loops
simultaneously with actual settings; with no change in settings during the test. Test points along a test angle, such
as the line angle, are automatically selected based on the zone reaches and tolerances and plotted on the R-X
plane together with the reference characteristics and tolerance boundaries as shown in (a). Additonal test points
may be added. The same test points and their resulting operate times are plotted on the Z-t plane along with the
tolerance times curves as shown in (b).
‘ (a) Zone test points on R-X plane (b) Test points on Z-t plane
Figure 27: Boundary and timing test of multiple zones in a numerical distance IED
Ground distance functions with different residual compensation settings for each zone can be modeled and tested
simulataneously. The distance protection function can also be tested together with the related load encroachment
function to prove that the latter will prevent the former from undesirably operating during heavy load conditions.
All functions included in the specification are tested including disturbance recording, measurement functions,
alarms, and automation functions such as voltage and synchro-check, voltage control, etc.
The results of functional tests are compared with performance criteria and tolerances.
6.2 Accuracy and performance Testing - Use case of distance

protection
In 2006 the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee 95 Measuring Relays and
Protection Equipment set up a maintenance team (MT4) to revise the existing functional standards and develop
new standards.
The new standard IEC60255-121 describes the “functional requirements for distance protection” (IEEE/ANSI C37.2
Function numbers 21 and 21G). It defines type tests to be performed on a distance relay by the manufacturer. [5]
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The tests can be separated into two groups:
• Accuracy tests
• Dynamic performance tests
Accuracy tests should be performed under quasi steady state conditions to measure the inherent accuracy of the
characteristic shape of all operative zones. Such tests are well known and applied by manufacturers and utilities
since long time.
Whereas the main purpose of dynamic performance tests is to give a standard procedure to evaluate and compare
protection function performance claims from different manufacturers; in other words:
• The accuracy tests ensure the correct functionality according to the specification of the manufacturer
• The dynamic tests evaluate the relay from a customer’s point of view
These dynamic tests are much more challenging for the relays because they are performed under realistic fault
conditions. The decaying dc component, the distortion of signals caused by capacitive voltage transformers and
current transformers showing saturation effects have to be taken into account. As the test conditions and the
reporting format of the results are clearly specified in the standard these test results provide a direct comparison of
relays of different types and from different manufacturers.
This is caused by the underlying algorithms and the large variety of requirements in different markets. Therefore
only the “black-box” testing approach - looking at the behavior of the relay in real-life scenarios - makes the relays
comparable.
6.2.1 How to Perform Accuracy Tests According to IEC 60255-121

The accuracy tests are performed on the characteristics defined by the manufacturer. They shall check the basic
performance of the relay, resulting in an "accuracy rating".
The result of the tests is not a "passed" or "failed".
Ten test points are for example selected for the basic accuracy test:
Figure 28: Selection of test points

These test points describe the "nominal operating points" of the zone characteristic. Within the quadrilateral the
relay has a fast trip, outside a delayed trip from additional time delayed zones.
The goal of the test is to find the "measured characteristics operating points" and to compare these with the
nominals.
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Figure 29: Accuracy test

The way that the search has to be performed is described in detail and the tests can easily be performed with
automated three-phase protection testing systems.
The accuracy tests for MHO characteristics are similar and also the additional tests are feasible as they only deal
with performing the tests with frequency deviation or measuring the disengaging time.
It might not be easy to use the test software that is on the market "out-of-the-box", but with a bit of effort it is
possible to perform the described tests with most of the available tools. This is due to the fact that accuracy tests
are very common and all test set manufacturers offer the necessary test routines.
6.2.2 Feasibility of dynamic performance tests

IEC60255-121 defines a variety of dynamic network tests. The network models defined for these tests are relatively
simple. The challenge in testing is rather that the defined tests require thousands of test points (shots) and a
statistical analysis with a graphical representation of the results.
Offline simulation
The network is modeled in a tool with a graphical editor to draw single line diagrams. Test cases are defined and
for each test case the transient signals are calculated and stored, typically as a Comtrade file. For testing these
pre-calculated transients are injected using a test set.
Figure 30: Offline calculation for simulation tests using EMTP
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The advantage of this approach is the fact that the simulation expert is able to use the simulation program that he
is used to and that he knows well.
On the downside, the fact that this solution needs several tools from different vendors is a big disadvantage. There
is a lot of export/import in the workflow a lot of data handling between the applications. The evaluation of the test
results is also difficult, as the results have to be extracted from several test cases.
The test signals are not influenced by the relay's behaviour. So the signals will not change when the relay trips a
breaker. Therefore only the "trip" can be tested properly, but not the function of a reclosing function or more
complex evolving fault scenarios.
Closed-loop Simulation
To be able to let the relay change the condition of the simulated network there has to be some kind of feed-back
loop from the relay to the simulator.
"Closed-loop simulation" is a term that describes how simulation is performed and how feedback from the device
under test is fed back into the simulation system.
With closed-loop systems the feedback of the relay is fed directly back into the simulation, this way a circuit breaker
can be operated as in "real life". The network calculation has to be performed in "real-time", so the signals are
calculated during the injection.
When talking about closed-loop simulation systems for electrical networks, they have the huge advantage of a
dedicated hardware that is able to perform high-quality simulation in real-time. All of the well-known systems are
capable of tasks like simulating cables, power electronic components and controllers. For performing test
campaigns it is also possible to automate tests using a batch mode.
The disadvantages of the system are not to be found on the technical side. But for relay testing only such a
powerful system might be a bit too complex. For testing relays the IEC60255-121 defines relatively simple networks
with easy models, so a system much more focussed on relay testing might be sufficient. In addition the need for
specific automation features for variation of network and fault parameters and the documentation requirements also
have to be addressed.
Fully Automated Simulation-based Test

A dedicated testing tool to fulfill the requirements of tests according to IEC60255-121 is already available on the
market. [4]
It includes a network editor, allows the definition of automated tests and delivers the statistical analyses in the
format defined by IEC 60255-121. Several test cases each one with up to several thousand "shots" with variations
of the network or fault conditions can be easily combined in a test document. Complex statistical analysis functions
allow the creation of SIR diagrams, calculation of average trip times, etc., all according to IEC 60255-121.
Of course this tool can also be used to perform and analyse a variety of additional tests (e.g. for a differential
protective relay).
Models used for testing

The networks that are the basis of the transient performance tests according to the standard are relatively simple.
The most simple configuration is an infeed feeding a line simulated using an R-L model without the influence of
capacitances. It is mostly used for transient overreach tests with a variation of fault parameters and infeed
characteristics.
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Figure 31: Grid used testing transient overreach

In successive tests the line is fed with a second infeed, a parallel line is added, line capacitances are to be
simulated. In addition the performance of a relay connected to a CVT has to be tested and the manufacturer also
has to specify the performance under the influence of CT saturation, although these tests are not specified in detail.
Test System Requirements

In IEC60255-121 there are several implicit requirements towards a test system.
First of all it has to be able to perform basic transient network simulation and inject the calculated signals.
A "pure offline" simulation system is certainly capable of simulating the above network. But as described in the
previous chapters a lot of effort has to be made to inject the signals and to measure the reactions of the relay.
To generate a test suite for the SIR measurements and to perform many thousands of shots will take a lot of time.
But even if that can be managed: for some tests a closed-loop simulation is required, as the standard says: "As
soon as relay trip is received, local CB will open all three phases after 40 ms".
It's almost impossible to achieve that with a test system that is based on injection of pre-calculated transients.
To perform all the tests a closed loop simulation system of some kind is recommended. But even with these
systems still the automation of the tests and the evaluation takes a lot of effort; a lot of specific adaptation has to be
made.
Results of actual dynamic performance tests

The following results are actual results for the "Operate time and transient overreach (SIR diagrams)" tests
described in chapter 6.3 of the IEC 60255-121.
The diagrams shown are 2 of 12 specified diagrams for the SIR tests showing the trip time for a variety of fault
locations. For each SIR (source impedance ratio) a separate curve is displayed.
Figure 32: Trip time (max) vs. fault location

The tested relay performs well. There is no transient overreach visible and also no transient underreach. The trip
times for fault locations below 100% of the zone are below 40ms, faults at >100% are cleared within zone 2.
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But there is one interesting finding: the minimum trip time for faults at a fault location is usually 15ms. But as visible
in Figure 32, for a very low SIR of 0.2, indicating a very strong infeed, the relay trips in 40ms.
This performance is something that has to be analysed by the manufacturer as it could indicate that the relay has a
potential problem with very high fault currents.
The results also show that there is no "good" or "bad" relay. Some relays, like the tested one, might have problems
with high fault currents, others might show transient overreach when CVTs are used.
The selection of the "most suitable relay" always depends on the network situation, many of these are reflected in
the defined tests, so the test documentation acc. IEC60255-121 is helpful in picking the most suitable relay for a
certain situation.
Benefits of dynamic performance tests according to IEC 60255-121

The advantages of using transient simulation for testing relays are numerous. Only using appropriate methods the
quality of today's complex relays can be assured.
The test cases in the new IEC60255-121 are selected with great expertise and target many potential weaknesses
of the distance relays. Basic accuracy tests are combined with transient simulation tests using both white box and
black box test approaches.
To perform the tests an adequate test system needs the capability to perform basic testing with sinusoidal signals.
In addition it has to be capable of simulating a variety of network configurations, injecting currents and voltages
using a test set, measuring the relays reaction and analyzing the results.
The results of the tests and the standardized documentation will be very helpful for the utilities to select the most
suitable relay for specific protection problem. In challenging network architectures it is recommended to perform
some additional application specific tests to reconfirm the correct functionality of the relay.
6.3 Testing a distance relay

Distance protection relays have changed dramatically in the last two decades from simple single function distance
protection relays into multifunctional IEDs with primary transmission line protection functions based on classical or
advanced operating principles. The acceptance of IEC 61850 as the standard for communications between
protection IEDs in the substation and between sensors and relays is also leading to significant changes in the way
protection is implemented in the substation. Testing of such advanced devices requires the availability of a set of
tools that will simplify the testing process, while at the same time will ensure the required high quality of the testing
process.
Testing of distance protection relays and IEDs is one of the key requirements to ensure their correct operation
under short circuit faults and other abnormal system conditions. Since protection technology is becoming more and
more complex, with protective relays evolving to multifunctional devices with integrated pre-programmed control
logic and additional functions like metering, fault and disturbance recording, programmable scheme logic, etc.,
ensuring that they are properly configured and implemented requires adequate testing of their functionality. At the
same time the operation of the transmission systems close to their stability limit requires significant reduction in the
fault clearing times that can be only achieved by using the advanced logic schemes available in modern
transmission protection relays. In this case verification of the relay operating times through testing is critical.
The relays are also used as a front end to the substation automation system and provide different logging functions
for analysis of their operation or different power system events. That is why testing of such devices requires
excellent understanding of the available protection and non-protection functions, as well as the operational logic of
the different schemes that require testing.
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Considering the fact that there is a possibility for simultaneous occurrence of different types of abnormal system
conditions, it is clear that it is necessary to be able to test the distance protection relays operation under such
conditions. The requirements for the testing of different non-protection and protection functions, as well as the
impact of IEC 61850 on the testing process are presented also in the paper.
6.3.1 Testing a multifonctional protection device

When we analyze the complexity of modern multifunctional distance protection devices it is clear that their testing
requires the use of advanced tools and software that can simulate the different system conditions and status of
primary substation equipment and other multifunctional IEDs. The test system should be able to replay
COMTRADE files from disturbance recorders or produced from electromagnetic transient analysis programs. It
should be able to apply user defined current and voltage signals with settable phase angles, as well as execute a
sequence of pre-defined pre-fault, fault and post-fault steps.
Figure 33: Test system block diagram

The testing of the different IED elements has to start from the bottom of the functional hierarchy and end with the
most complex logic schemes implemented in the device. Protective relays with such schemes operate based on
the state of multiple monitored signals such as permissive or blocking signals, breaker status signals and relay
status signals. Time coordination of these signals and synchronization with the pre-fault and fault analog signals is
required in order to perform adequate testing of these types of schemes.
6.3.1.1 TESTING OF THE ANALOG SIGNAL PROCESSING AND MEASURING FUNCTIONS

5
The analog signal processing is the first critical step in the testing of a distance protection relay because if any
problems exist at this level, they will be reflected at any other step up the functional hierarchy.
The only problem is that the data bus of the IED is usually not directly accessible or visible through the relay
communications or user interface. That is why an indirect method is recommended. Since any problem in the
analog signal processing will be reflected in the measurements, both can be combined in a single test.
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Figure 34: Test configuration for analog signal processing and measurement functions tests
If we configure the testing software to generate pure sinusoidal waveforms of balanced currents and voltages with
their nominal values and no phase shift (zero degrees) between the currents and voltages in the same phases (as
shown in Figure 34), the measured phase currents and voltages in this case need to be as close as possible to the
nominal balanced values applied to the relay by the test device (within the accuracy range specified by the relay
manufacturer).
The positive sequence measurements should be within tolerance of the phase values. Since the applied phase
currents and voltages are balanced, the measured negative and zero sequence values should be close to zero
(again within the expected tolerance range). At the same time the power factor should be close to 1 and the
frequency close to the nominal frequency of the applied signals to the relay.
If we are interested to check the accuracy of the relay measurements at sub-nominal levels, we can configure the
test software to apply 10% or 1% of the nominal values and follow a similar procedure to the one described above.
6.3.1.2 TESTING OF THE MAIN PROTECTION FUNCTIONS

As discussed earlier, the main protection functions of a distance protection relay are the phase and ground
distance elements. The testing of the instantaneous and time delayed elements is different and also should follow a
specific order.
During the conventional testing of individual protection elements it is very important that they are the only enabled
protection function (if all protection elements share the same relay output). If the IED has multiple relay outputs and
different protection elements are mapped to different outputs, we need to make sure that the test device monitors
the correct relay output during the test. For a modern test system, such mappings shouldn’t be necessary. A good
fault model will correctly generate a system condition that the relay should distinguish, indicate, and trip correctly
for based on the enabled protection element characteristic.
If we (based on the measurement functions tests) assume that the relay measures accurately the applied current
and voltage signals, the testing of the distance elements should not provide any surprises from the accuracy point
of view, but will rather give us an indication of what is the expected relay operating time when the apparent
impedance seen by the distance element based on the applied currents and voltages is within the operating
characteristic.
The test system should be configured to apply currents and voltages with magnitudes and phase angles calculated
based on the apparent impedance, type of fault and testing method selected. It should measure the time between
the start of the test and the sensing of the operation of the relay output when connected to a binary input of the test
system. This time should be less than the maximum operating time in the technical specification of the tested relay.
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The testing of distance elements with complex characteristics also requires accurate modeling of the distance
characteristic as part of the test configuration process. Evaluation of the distance element operation for multiple
points on the selected characteristic is typically required. Figure 35 shows the configuration for the testing of a
distance relay with a complex characteristic.
Figure 35: Distance characteristic test configuration
Depending on the tested element the user should be able to configure the type of fault as single-phase-to-ground,
phase-to-phase or three-phase and also select the testing method.
If the results from the testing of the distance characteristics are within the expected range, the next step is the
testing of the different communications based schemes.
6.3.1.3 DYNAMIC TESTING

One of the key requirements for ensuring the correct operation of distance relays under dynamic system conditions
is the proper testing of their advanced functions. Conventional methods for testing of the main functions in
transmission line protection relays – the distance and the directional – have been used for many years based on
the requirements for testing of electromechanical or solid state relays. They are also influenced by the technology
available at the time. As a result the Constant Current and Constant Voltage methods are the ones usually applied.
The main characteristic of these methods is that one of the parameters is fixed at a pre-selected value, and then
the second parameter is changed until an operation of the tested elements is detected.
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Superimposed components based functions in transmission line protection relays can not be tested using the
conventional methods due to the simple fact that the relays are designed to detect faults in real life conditions, i.e.
when there is simultaneous change in the magnitude and angle of both the faulted phases currents and voltages.
The requirements for testing of such advanced functions clearly point towards dynamic testing. We still need to be
careful with regard to the understanding of this term. In some cases a state change from pre-fault to fault condition
may be sufficient. However, if this is represented as a step change in the fault injection to the distance relay under
test, it still may result in an operating time slower than expected due to the fact that the current waveform is not
realistic. That is why electromagnetic transient simulation is the best way to generate the signals for the testing of
the distance element.
When we analyze the complexity of modern multifunctional distance protection devices, it is clear that their testing
requires the use of advanced tools and software that can simulate the different system conditions and status of
primary substation equipment and other multifunctional devices. The test system should be able to replay
COMTRADE files from disturbance recorders or produced from electromagnetic transient analysis programs. The
assumption is that the transient simulation tests are performed after the testing of the basic functions of the relay –
measurements, wiring, characteristics, i.e. the focus at this time is determining the performance of the device under
realistic system conditions as required by the application.
Figure 36: Evolving fault transient simulation.
The simulation should include:

• Pre-fault load flow defined by the magnitude or phase angle difference of the voltages of the sources used
in the system model
• Fault definition based on location, inception angle, fault type and resistance
• Switching of breakers at the ends of the protected or adjacent transmission lines
• Evolving fault
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The testing of distance relays applied to double circuit lines requires the addition of several components of the
model:
• Parallel line, mutually coupled with the protected transmission line

• Cross-country faults definition
• Switching of the breakers on the healthy line
If the application requires, the test cases should also include synchronous or asynchronous out of step conditions
simulation to test the power swing blocking or tripping functions. Performance of the tested relay when a fault
occurs during a power swing should be included in the test plan (Figure 37).
The testing tools should allow easy configuration and execution of such transient simulations as part of the testing
process, as well as proper evaluation and reporting of the operation of the tested device. Testing of more complex
fault conditions is also a very important requirement.
Adequate simulation of power swing conditions is another key element in the distance relay testing process. Most
existing tools do not support such functionality, which forces the users to go through multiple steps in order to
perform dynamic stability study and then convert phasor data into sampled values that can be replayed by a test
system.
A better approach is to use electromagnetic transient simulation programs such as EMTP or ATP. The problem
with this approach is that using these tools requires very good understanding of the modeling of all system
elements, something that is not easily achieved.
The availability of transient simulation tools that are easy to configure and use makes a big difference and results in
acceptance of these methods and improvement in the use of advanced functions in distance protection relays.
Proper simulation of the load flow on the protected transmission line based on the voltage magnitude or phase
angle difference between the busses at the ends of the line can be also used to check the performance of the load
encroachment function at different stages of the simulation.
Figure 37: Power swing and fault transient simulation

The simulation of synchronous or asynchronous power swings is not sufficient, since it is possible for a fault to
occur during the power swing (Figure 37 ). That is why it is necessary to be also able to simulate such condition to
test the distance protection with power swing blocking enabled.
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6.3.2 Testing Of Distance Protection Schemes

The testing of distance protection schemes is the final step in the testing of a distance relay and it is based on the
assumption that all individual protection elements – distance, overcurrent, directional, faulted phase selection, etc.
have already been tested and proven to be operating correctly.
The conventional test process requires the programming of the test system to perform pre-fault, fault and post-fault
steps simulating the changing power system conditions to evaluate the performance of the selected transmission
line protection scheme logic.
Different control signals are required by the distance protection logic schemes and must be considered in the test
definition in order to verify the functionality and the correct settings of such schemes. The simulation of the relay
environment is also affected by the location of the fault.
The testing of communication aided distance protection schemes is intended to evaluate the performance of the
relay under different fault, system and communication channel conditions.
Different tests are designed to monitor the relay operation for fault conditions such as:
• Zone 1 fault
• Zone 2 fault on the protected line
• Zone 2 fault outside of the protected line
• Reverse faults
• Faults on a parallel circuit of a double-circuit line
• No fault
Because we are testing communication based schemes, the relay reaction to the receiving of correct and noise
control signals under the above listed fault conditions is tested as well.
Some more advanced communication aided schemes monitor not only the receiving of a control signal, but also the
availability of the carrier signal, which may be lost if the fault is on the phase used by the communication channel.
The combined effect of carrier signal and control signal received has to be also tested.
When communication aided schemes are used in complex system configurations, including double circuit
transmission line or transmission line loops with or without mutual coupling, sequential tripping of faults on adjacent
lines may result in incorrect operation of the accelerated schemes. It is required to develop test sequences
simulating such conditions to verify that the protective relay is going to operate correctly.
If a more complex scheme is tested, the number of steps will increase accordingly. For example if a Permissive
Overreaching Scheme is tested, and a fault on an adjacent line with sequential breaker opening is simulated, the
test will have to include the following steps:
• pre-fault with breaker in a closed position, nominal voltage and normal load current conditions
• initial fault condition with current flowing in reverse direction
• receive of Permissive Trip signal
• current reversal fault condition (simulating the opening of the breaker by the Zone 1 trip of the relay on
the adjacent line)
• post-fault condition with breaker closed, nominal voltage and normal load current conditions
The test device is used to simulate both the analog and the digital signals received by the relay in the field. At the
same time its inputs are used to monitor the operation of different relay elements as required by the scheme under
test.
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Figure 38: Single-phase fault with current reversal simulation

The test system is used to simulate both the analog and the digital control signals received by the relay in the field.
At the same time its inputs
6.4 Testing a transformer differential relay

Numerical transformer differential protection IEDs implement the vector compensation, ratio matching, as well as
zero-sequence current removal in software algorithms. The selection of the vector compensation method is usually
done automatically based on the transformer and CT data in many of the newer IEDs, but some IEDs require the
user select the compensation as part of the setting, while other IEDs allow the user to select one of the two
methods. There are several correct ways to compensate and various relay models, even from the same vendor,
implement the selection algorithm differently. In many cases the user may not know what the internal compensation
settings are without reading and understanding the instruction manual thoroughly or performing tests specific for
this purpose.
There are also more possibilities for selecting and setting the bias or restraint characteristics and for calculating the
bias quantity and the characteristics can have a dynamic behavior. Numerical IEDs also employ various methods to
block the differential protection during inrush conditions.
Before putting it into service it is very important to test and verify that the protection is applied correctly, based on
the transformer and CT data, to make sure that it will fulfill its intended purpose. The following tests need to be
performed:
• Zero-sequence current removal for each winding (where required)

• Through load stability across pairs of windings to verify vector compensation and ratio matching
• Sensitivity
• Bias characteristics
• Operating time
• Testing high-set unrestrained differential element
• Inrush blocking
• Overexcitation blocking
Before proceeding with these tests it is expedient to calculate first the full-load current for each winding equivalent
to the maximum transformer power rating as these values will be used in subsequent tests.
6.4.1 Zero-sequence current removal

This test is based on the transformer connection for each individual winding and the presence of zero-sequence
current source in the protected zone. For each transformer winding that is connected wye and it is grounded, either
solidly or through resistance or reactance, the IEDs must remove the zero-sequence current. Zero-sequence
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current must also be removed for a delta-connected winding if a source of zero-sequence current, such as a zig-
zag grounding transformer, exists between the transformer winding terminal and the CT associated with that
winding.
Testing is done by injecting zero-sequence currents (three currents with full-load amplitude and with same phase
angle) into one set of IED winding and this should result in zero or negligible differential current measurement
reading. If the differential protection operates or the measurement shows significant differential current then the
protection is not properly set for its intended application (for example the current removal function is not switched
On) .
Figure 39: Testing for zero-sequence current elimination
Though load stability across pairs of windings

The purpose of this test is to verify that the internal vector compensation and ratio matching for all windings are
suitable for the application. For transformers with more than two windings, testing needs to be performed across
pairs of windings, with the HV winding as the reference and testing each individual winding against this reference.
This requires current injection with six currents, balanced three-phase currents for each pair of windings.
Tests are performed by injecting full-load balance currents for the windings under test. The phase angles of
currents of the non-reference winding are made to lag the HV-winding currents according to the transformer vector
group. Since the reference current direction for testing is into the device under test the non-reference winding
current angles have to be reversed. This should result in measurement readings showing full-load currents for each
winding and the differential current should be zero or negligible. If there is significant differential current then the
protection is not properly set.
Figure 40: Testing for through load stability
6.4.2 Sensitivity setting test

This is performed by injecting balanced three phase currents into one side, usually the HV side, and ramping up
the currents until the differential protection operates. The expected pickup current depends on the bias
characteristic and the bias formula [6]. The actual pickup current should equal the expected pickup current +/- the
tolerance.
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Figure 41: Test points for pickup and differential bias characteristics
6.4.3 Bias characteristic test

The settings for the bias characteristics, including slopes and breakpoints need to be verified. The test can be
performed on pairs of windings, if there are multiple windings, but normally the HV side and the LV side should be
sufficient to prove these settings. One needs to test the slope of straight lines at two points near the breakpoints,
and for curved lines in at least three or four points, as shown in Figure 42. Since the internal software vector
compensation for each winding is not known in some cases testing with unbalanced currents is too complex. To
simplify testing, injection with six currents, balanced three-phase positive-sequence currents for each pair of
windings, avoids complications. Since the abscissa Ibias can use different formulas for different relays, and the
entire characteristic can be quite complicated for some numerical relays, it may not be easy to calculate the test
points.
Modern test systems allow easy modeling of the transformer differential characteristics based on the setting values.
Some systems can even model the internal compensation of specific relay models.
Figure 42: Example of modeling differential characteristic based on settings

With the characteristics and bias formulas known, targeting a specific point on the characteristic can easily be
tested by specifying the Ibias current and the Idiff value is automatically calculated together with the equivalent six
currents. Keeping the value of Ibias the test system performs a binary search of Idiff around its expected value,
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recalculating the six currents from every test shot of the search. The test results are tabulated and plotted as
shown in , as well as the test currents and phasors for a selected point [6].
Figure 43: Differential bias characteristic testing in a modern test system
Some transformer differential protection with dual slope can change the slope dynamically from slope1 to slope 2 to
adapt to an external fault with a possible CT saturation, as shown in Figure 44. Should one CT saturate, the higher
slope will be able to prevent maloperation. External fault detection is based on the premise that CT saturation
occurs only after about 2 ms or later. Within this short period of no CT saturation, if there is a significant increase in
bias current but with little or no change in the differential current, the external fault detector asserts and
immediately increases the slope.
Figure 44: Adaptive characteristic switches dynamically from slope1 to slope2 when an
apparent external fault is detected
To test slope2, the software can apply for a brief duration, pre-fault load current, higher than the “delta bias”
external fault detector threshold to make it appear that an external through fault occurred, causing it to switch to the
higher slope, and then the fault currents are applied in the next state [6]. A binary search using test shots
consisting of pre-fault and fault currents allows easy testing and plotting of the slope2 differential operating
characteristics. If the pre-fault is zero or small the relay will remain at slope1 when the fault is applied. For
characteristics with straight lines, a minimum of two points (a and b for slope1; d and c for slope2), will suffice to
prove the settings. If desired for record purposes, during commissioning more test points can be found and the
actual characteristics can be plotted for better visualization since automated software makes it easy.
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6.4.4 Differential Timing Test

The operating time of the differential function can be tested at points slightly above (say 120%) the expected
differential operating current, Idiff, and at a higher current (say 200%) of Idiff, for diffent values of Ibias covering the
slope characteristics as shown in Figure 47. The test points can be simulated for multi-phase faults.
Figure 45: Test points for timing tests
6.4.5 Testing High-set Unrestrained Differential Function

The pickup of the unrestrained differential function, with setting Id2, in per unit, requires high amplitudes of current
and a separate output to monitor. Inject three-phase current into the winding with the lowest tap setting and pulse
ramp starting the current from about 80% of the expected value (Id2 . Tapwx) until it operates. Return the current to
zero between pulses. If the required current is beyond the capability of the test set, single-phase injection can be
used and two or more current sources connected in parallel. If the compensation for that winding removes zero-
sequence current the expected value needs to be increased by a factor called the single-phase injection factor
described in reference [6] to calculate the new expected pickup.
6.4.6 Testing Inrush Blocking

The majority of relays use the ratio of 2nd harmonic current to the fundamental to detect magnetizing inrush and
block tripping of the differential function. Some relays supplement this by adding the 4th harmonic. Other relays use
waveform recognition, where the differential current or rate-of-change of current remains below a certain threshold
for more than about ¼ of a power cycle (gap), to declare an inrush condition.
6.4.7 Testing the 2nd and 5th Harmonic Blocking

This can be done with single-phase injection of fundamental current greater than or equal to the tap setting of one
winding, wherein the relay should trip. Then, with the fundamental current still being injected, the 2nd harmonic
current is injected into the same phase and winding and ramped up until the relay resets. The ratio of the 2nd
harmonic to the fundamental is then calculated and compared with the set value. Perform a similar procedure if 4th
harmonic blocking is used to supplement 2nd .
6.4.8 Testing the Waveform Recognition (gap type) Blocking

Using modern test sets, COMTRADE files with transient waveforms such as those shown in Figure 46 can be
played into one phase and one relay winding. The amplitude is about twice the nominal current. To test blocking,
use the waveform with gap greater than ¼ cycle. To test for no blocking use the waveform with gap less than ¼
cycle.
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(a) Gap > 1/4 cycle => Block (b) Gap < 1/4 cycle => Trip
Figure 46: Waveforms for testing gap-type inrush blocking
6.4.9 Testing the Overexcitation Blocking

This requires single phase injection of fundamental current equal to the tap setting, wherein the relay should trip.
Then the 5th harmonic current is injected into the same phase and winding and increased until the relay resets. The
ratio of the 5th harmonic to the fundamental is then calculated and compared with the set value.
6.5 Testing a line differential relay

Line differential protection consists of peer relays at each end of a line that are continuously sending and receiving
synchronized sampled data or current phasors over communication channels. Unlike other types of protection the
communication channels is an integral part of the protection scheme and communication characteristics have an
impact on the overall reliability, sensitivity and speed of the scheme. Hence, it is recommended that the actual
channels for the protection will be used when testing the line differential protection system during commissioning.
Field testing requires a test person and three-phase test set systems with accurate time synchronization be used at
each terminal of the transmission line.
The communication channels are usually tested separately by the communication group before being handed over
to the protection group. Completion and satisfactory testing of the channels for the differential protection, by the
responsible organization, can be a pre-condition before the channels and results are handed over to the
commissioning engineer.
Subsequently, each relay is configured and connected to the communications network. The relays remain isolated
from instrument transformer secondary circuits and circuit breaker control circuits. At this point, the relay can be
interrogated to determine if it is communicating with its remote relay(s).
Part of the relay commissioning procedure often requires the channel to be subjected to a substantial run time with
the actual relay hardware communicating with one another in order to check the compatibility of the interfaces,
identify issues (such as frame slips resulting in data loss), observe BERs as measured by the relay lost packet
counters, and measure the unavailability time reported by the actual differential protections devices.
The following methods of testing have been used for commissioning a line differential protection system.
1. Loopback Testing
2. Local relay back to back bench test
3. End-to-end time-synchronized relay system test
6.5.1 Loopback Testing

This test requires connecting the relay transmit, and receive ports together. Depending upon the type of
communications, this may require a simple fiber optic patch cord, or an electrical loopback connector, and in the
case of digital communications possibly, an external clock to emulate the communications network timing. The
relay transmit and receive addressing will need to be disabled, or made compatible. If the communications channel
is available, it can provide a loopback at the remote terminal, and confirm the relay channel integrity.
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With the communications looped back, the relay normally will be receiving remote currents that are always in phase
with the local current and thus calculate an internal fault condition. This simple test can be used for testing and
verifying the minimum pickup settings.
Depending on the design of the relay, testing points on the bias characteristics may or may not be possible to be
tested. Some numerical relays have a mode for testing the entire bias characteristics that takes advantage of the
phase-segregated nature of line differential element. In this test mode one of the currents injected is used by the
relay to simulate the phase current that is normally coming from the remote end. For example, when testing the
phase A differential element, the phase A local current is injected in the phase A current input, while the remote
phase A current is simulated by injecting current into phase B current input. A test set with two current sources may
be used for this test. This mode of testing cannot be used if the relays at both ends have different CT ratios and
settings or when an in-line transformer in part of the zone of protection. Also, a negative-sequence line differential
element cannot be testing by the loopback method.
6.5.2 Local relay back-to-back bench test

This test involves testing a relay at one location and using a second spare relay in place of the remote relay. The
communication channels are connected back-to-back and the actual relay settings and addresses are used.
With a test system with six current sources extensive automated testing of minimum pickup, though-load stability,
and search of bias characteristics can be performed. If the protected line includes an in-line power transformer, all
other tests that are applicable to power transformers can be performed. Additional tests including line capacitance
charging current compensation and negative-sequence or ground differential elements can also be performed.
The success of these tests would give sufficient confidence that the line could be energized with the newly set
relays, once the communication channel has been validated.
Back-to-back testing can also be used for evaluating the performance of a line differential system with transient
tests including simulation of CT saturation.
6.5.3 Time-synchronized end-to-end testing

End-to-end commissioning testing involves testing the line differential protection system including the
communication channels, except for the current transformers when only secondary injection is performed. It verifies
the overall wiring from the injection points. Time-synchronized three-phase test sets, laptops, and test personnel
are required at each terminal.
Testing verifies that the protection configuration and settings, including any compensation for current ratio, phase
shift, and zero-sequence elimination, if required, are correct at all ends. The current differential operating/restraint
characteristics are also tested as a complete scheme to verify that all ends are set correctly by performing “Op/No-
Op” simulation test shots near the characteristic boundaries for low and high current values and at the limit angles
of the characteristic. Modern test systems with prepared test plans allow automatic calculation of injection test
values based on the settings provided by the protection engineer.
Additional end-to-end tests may also performed based on fault simulation studies for internal and external faults of
various types and fault resistances to test for operating times and stability for external faults.
The measurement facilities of numerical relays and on-line measurement and visualization features of the relay
software while injecting currents help in the verification testing.
6.5.4 Functions to be tested

The functions to be tested are mainly the same as for transformer protection although it can or not have power
transformer in the zone. Depending on the type of differential function, we can identify the following functions to be
tested:
-Zero-sequence current removal for each terminal (where required)
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- Though load stability across pairs of terminals to verify vector compensation and ratio matching
- Sensitivity
- Bias or restraint characteristics. The two common characteristics used for line differential protection are the
biased or percentage restrained characteristics which is the same as those used for transformer differential
function and the alpha plane characteristic [Ref.]. These characteristic are shown in Figure 47 with the
recommended test points using “Op/No-Op” test shots for end-to-end testing.
(a) Bias differential characteristic (b) Alpha Plane characteristic
Figure 47: Test points for test shots on differential characteristics
- Operating time for bias characteristic differential function
- Testing high-set unrestrained differential element
- Inrush blocking
- Overexcitation blocking
- Negative sequence differential and fault classification function
6.6 Testing a teleprotection

Teleprotection systems consist of directional relays at each end of a line that exchange status signals about the
direction of a fault over communication channels to provide high-speed simultaneous tripping of all terminals for
internal faults on the protected transmission or distribution line. The protection functional elements used can be
distance elements which are inherently directional or directional elements including negative- and zero-sequence
polarized elements and directional elements based on change of instantaneous values of voltage and current.
Teleprotection systems are generally classified, in terms of channel signal use, as blocking systems and transfer
trip systems. In blocking systems, the signal is used to prevent one or more terminals from tripping on external
faults. For internal faults the absence of a blocking signal allows high-speed tripping.
In transfer trip systems, the signal is transmitted from one terminal and must be received at the other terminal to
permit high-speed tripping at the receiving terminal for internal faults. For external faults the signals are not used.
Teleprotection systems are also categorized in terms of direction and reach setting of the relay elements. Together
with the signal usage, the most common teleprotection systems include the following:
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• Direct transfer trip

• Permissive underreaching transfer trip
• Permissive overreaching transfer trip
• Directional comparison blocking
• Directional comparison unblocking
Direct transfer trip (DTT) system. The operation of a protection relay or a control event at a local terminal
transmits as trip signal to the remote terminal. Tripping will occur at the remote terminal upon receipt of the signal
without any supervision.
Permissive underreaching transfer trip (PUTT) system. The PUTT teleprotection system is shown in Figure 48.
The underreaching protection function (PU) at both ends use instantaneous Zone 1 distance elements, with
direction towards the line, and set to reach only about 80% of the protected line. For a fault close to the middle of
the line high-speed tripping will occur at both ends. For faults close to the local terminal but beyond the Zone 1
reach of the opposite terminal, the relay at the local terminal will trip instantaneously and will send a transfer trip
signal to the remote end. At the receiving end, reception of the transfer trip signals requires trip permission from a
high-speed fault detector (PO) that responds to faults anywhere on the line to provide instantaneously tripping. The
fault detector is generally a Zone 2 or Zone 3 or a starting zone which can be directional or non-directional as long
as it covers the protected line with adequate margin and set more than 120% of the protected line.
Figure 48: Permissive underreach transfer trip
Permissive overreaching transfer trip (POTT) system. The POTT teleprotection system is shown in Figure 49.
In this scheme protection functions (PO), which may be directional overcurrent or distance protection elements at
each line end are set in the direction of the protected line and cover the entire line with adequate margin to ensure
high speed. Distance Zone 2 elements are normally used and are set to overreach the end of the line and generally
set to cover more than 120% of the line impedance. For any fault on the line both ends send permissive transfer
trip signals. The reception of the permissive signal and the operation of the overreaching protection element will
result in high-speed instantaneous tripping at both line terminals. For external faults, the protection element at one
end may possibly see the fault and transmit a permissive trip signal, but the condition that the directional element at
the other end see the fault and simultaneously receive a trip signal will not be fulfilled, and no tripping will occur.
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Figure 49: Permissive overreaching transfer trip
Directional comparison blocking (DCB) system. The DCB teleprotection system is shown in Figure 50. In this
scheme each terminal has two protection directional elements, one looking forward in the direction of the line and
overreaching the remote end and a reverse-looking element. For faults external to the line the reverse-looking
element sees the fault and sends a blocking signal to the other end. At the receiving end, even if the forward
looking element sees the fault in the forward directions, it is blocked by the reception of the blocking signal. The
reverse-looking element at the local end needs to be set more sensitively than the far-end forward-looking element
with adequate margin to ensure that blocking will occur for all external faults. For an internal fault the reverse-
looking element at both ends do not see any fault and no blocking signal is sent at all. The forward looking
elements see the fault and trip high-speed simultaneously at both ends since there is no signal to block them from
tripping. A short delay (tC) to trip is required in order to wait for the blocking signal, should the fault be an external
one.
PO PB
Margin
PO Margin
PB
PO tC tC PU
& TRIP TRIP &
RCVR RCVR
PB XMTR XMTR PO
Figure 50: Directional comparison blocking
Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB) system. This uses a teleprotection channel, usually power line
carrier with frequency shift keying, that continuously sends a blocking or guard frequency signal at both ends under
normal conditions. At each end a directional protection element looking into the direction of the protected line and
overreaching the other end by at least 20% of the line length is used to shift the signal sent from a guard frequency
fG to a tripping frequency fT when a directional element sees a fault in the forward direction. Except for the receiver
logic, shown in Figure 51 with the continuous guard frequency signal, the principle is essentially the same as the
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POTT system. Only the operation of the protection elements and the reception of a tripping frequency signal will
result in a trip command to the circuit breaker. In case the signal is lost or if the trip signal is attenuated by the fault
on the phase coupled to the PLC channel, the key feature of this scheme, when both the guard frequency and trip
frquency are simulatneously missing, is to permit tripping for a very short window in the order of 100 ms to 300 ms,
after which it will be blocked, and alarmed as a teleprotection channel failure after an additional 100 ms to 300 ms
delay.
Figure 51: Directional comparison unblocking system receiver logic

There are other teleprotection schemes such as zone acceleration and hybrid systems that combine these
schemes. Scheme enhancements may include current reversal blocking logic, and weak-feed echo logic, etc. IEEE
PC 37.113 Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Transmission Lines provides a detailed explanation of all
these teleprotection systems.
Functional Testing
During commissioning of the protection elements are first tested as individual protection functions to verify that they
are set and installed correctly. This includes testing for sensitivity, directionality, reach, and operating time. The
communication channels are tested separately by the communication group before being handed over to the
protection group. Depending on the design of the system and philosophy of the electric utility the teleprotection
signaling equipment can be part of the communication system or can be part of the protection panel.
A functional test of the complete teleprotection system that includes the protection relays and the communication
channels and that considers the application parameters of the system gives assurance that the protection system
will perform correctly when it is put in service. This complete testing requires synchronized end-to-end testing as
described in section 5.3. Dynamic and transient simulation methods and explained in section 5 should be used for
performing these test. As an example of testing a teleprotection system we shall focus only the permissive
overreaching transfer trip and the directional comparison blocking schemes, using multifunction protection with a
phase and ground distance elements. Zone 1 is independent of the teleprotection scheme and is set to 80% of the
line length and trips instantaneously. Zone 2 is set to cover 125% of the line length and provides the forward
looking overreaching directional element. For the blocking scheme a reverse looking zone 3 with a reach of 50%
based on the protected line length is used to ensure that all external faults that may be seen by the forward-looking
overreaching zone 2 elements are always covered by the reverse-looking blocking elements.
Figure 52 shows the typical locations of faults (with reference to bus A) that need to be simulated. Both ends
should trip high-speed by zone 1 for fault locations 2, 3 and 4, with or without the communication channels. For
fault 1 zone 1 of end A should trip instantaneously and end B will be tripped by the teleprotection scheme. A
channel failure should result is delayed zone 2 tripping of the remote end. A similar situation should occur for fault 5
with roles reversed for ends A and B. It is important to test for external bus faults 6 and 7 to ensure that no
teleprotection tripping occurs. A communication channel failure should result in zone 2 delayed tripping of the
remote backup protection. Since the zone 2 elements are set to 125% of the line faults at locations 8 and 9 should
not result in any zone 2 delayed tripping. Testing at this fault location is also very important for a blocking scheme
and to check that the remote relay receives a blocking signal.
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Figure 52 : Location of faults for end-to-end testing
Figure 53: Additional external fault location for parallel lines
In case of parallel lines, especially with large zero-sequence mutual coupling, it is important to perform functional
testing for external faults on the parallel line, with current reversal on the protected line (one breaker on the faulted
line opens first before the other). The time coordination margins of the current reversal blocking logic needs to be
verified.
When auto-reclosing is employed and with voltage-check and/or synchro-check supervision, it becomes even more
important to perform end-to-end tests for various cases. The use of single-pole tripping and auto-reclosing add
additional complexity. It may be necessary to trip the circuit breakers to verify that the correct poles are opened.
6.7 Testing a breaker failure scheme

A circuit breaker can fail to trip or fail to clear a fault, or rare occasions, for various reasons, when commanded to
trip by protection and control devices. Breaker failure (BF) protection is designed to detect this condition and
provide backup by tripping adjacent breakers around the failed breaker in order to isolate the fault. The
arrangement of the station bus, the circuit breakers, disconnect switches, connected circuits and current
transformers greatly influences how breaker failure protection is implemented. The bus scheme arrangement can
be a simple straight single bus, main-and-transfer bus, double-bus single-breaker, double-bus double-breaker, ring
bus, breaker-and-a-half, and other special bus and breaker arrangements.
The main principle used in BF protection is based on checking the presence of current through the circuit breaker
after a short period of time when a protection or control trip command is received as shown in Figure 54. If the
breaker fails to clear the fault and current continues to flow, the signal from the initiating protection relay is
maintated and the current detector remains picked up, the 50BF timer times out to trip the breakers around the
failed breaker and possibly sends a transfer trip signal to a remote end. If the breaker clears the fault normally, the
intiating protective relay and the fault detector 50BF reset and the 50BF timer does not time out. The 50BF timer
delay is set to provide some margin so that it will not time out before the current detector resets.
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‘ (a) (b)
Figure 54: Breaker failure protection scheme and timing chart

BF protection can be implemented as a separate protection scheme dedicated to a specific breaker, as a built-in
ancillary function of a multi-function protection (such as a numerical feeder protection or transformer protection) or
in conjunction with a centralized bus protection system for the entire substation bus and circuit breaker
arrangement. Depending on how the breaker failure scheme is implemented the level of complexity varies as
regards the following: use of single or dual timers for single/multi-phase faults, whether fault detection is based on
the current detector resetting before the timer expires, or the current detector picking up after the timer expires,
initiation by other non-current protection (such as a sudden pressure, Buchholz relay, or overvoltage relay)
supervised by breaker auxiliary contacts when current is insufficiently low or none existent, use of a control timer to
limit how long the BF initiate signal is effective, use of BF initiate seal-in feature, use of re-trip feature with or
without additional delay, use of a timer by-pass scheme for breaker low gas pressure conditions, use with single-
pole tripping and auto reclosing schemes, pole discordance detection feature, use of multiple BF schemes within a
single multi-function protection relay, and use in a line differential scheme where the remote current can affect the
operation of a local breaker failure scheme. Also, the status of disconnect switches in some bus schemes affects
which backup breakers to trip, which ends to transfer trip, and which devices to block. Refer to IEEE Standard
PC37.119 for details of various BF protection schemes. When used in microprocessor-based systems some of
these BF protection features are implemented in internal software logic, and it may also include custom logic.
A very important design aspect in the application of BF protection schemes that is essential for testing is the need
for isolation switches (hardware or software) for both initiation of BF protection and output signals for tripping
backup breakers and for transfer trip. When testing protection relays that initiate BF protection, isolation switches
that are located at the protection being tested prevent inadvertent initiation of BF protection that is in normal
service. Likewise, when the BF protection is to be tested, the initiation inputs from protection devices should be
isolated by switches located at the BF protection under test, to allow safe injection of initiation signals from a test
system.
Testing BF protection requires

Testing BF protection requires a thorough understanding of the overall application of BF protection in the
substation and details of the implemented scheme design. As there are many different bus and breakers
arrangements where BF schemes are used and too many variations in the design of BF schemes, only general
guidelines for testing BF protection schemes will be discussed.
Commissioning test consists of proving that the BF protection scheme works properly according to the design from
input current circuits, the initiating input signals and any supervision signals, correct operation of the BF elements
and logic, the output signals, the isolating switches and all other signals per the design. It includes verifying that the
settings issued by the setting authority are properly applied to the devices.
Before performing functional testing of the BF scheme, initial tests include checking the pickup and dropout levels
of the current detectors, and tests of all timers. Even before applying a device for use as a current detector in a BF
protection scheme (as part of the certification tests), the dropout characteristics in the presence of subsidence
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current (or decaying dc current that can occur following breaker interruption of primary current with CT saturation),
needs to be tested as it affects the margins required for the timer settings. Even BF schemes that check the current
only after the BF timer expires may be affected by subsidence current. Digital filters used in microprocessor-based
current detectors usually retain a buffer of sampled data that can include the effects of subsidence current, which
may be sufficient for a current detector to pick up, even though the primary current has already been interrupted.
The whole BF protection scheme should be functionally tested as a system, starting from injecting simulated faults
into the initiating protection with currents in series with the BF protection, all the way to the output signals of the BF
protection. It should include positive testing (simulation of failure of the breaker to trip) which results in assertion of
the backup output signals, as well as negative testing (simulation of normal breaker fault clearing) which should not
cause backup tripping. It should also include other conditions in between, such as slow breaker tripping, re-trip of
the second trip coil, subsidence current, and verifying that timing margins are adequate. Various fault types and
fault current levels should be simulated as well using modern three-phase test sets, especially for BF protection
applied to independent pole tripping and reclosing systems.
Delayed breaker opening can be easily simulated by modern test systems by simply extending the fault duration.
Some modern test systems can also simulate CT subsidence currents by producing a decaying dc current with
some time constant after interruption of the fault current. During commissioning the test should include, to the
extent possible, without affecting parts of the substations that are in normal service, a case with actual re-tripping of
the associated breaker as well as a case with tripping of adjacent backup breakers. For cases where the initiating
protection and the BF protection are in different locations, more than one test sets that are time synchronized can
be used for testing. The time source may be GPS or other time sources supported by the test sets.
Figure 55: Overall functional testing of a BF scheme where the initiating IED and the BF IED are
in different locations
6.8 Testing Automation Functions

6.8.1 General case
It is also necessary to comprehensively test all non protection related functions in a systematic manner. These
functions such as, substation interlocking, plant control and position indication as well as all SF6 relating
functionality may be achieved by a combination of hardwired and communication based interfaces. For example, in
the case of interlocking all local ‘bay’ interlocking may be achieved by the configuration logic residing in the Bay
Control Unit, while the inter bay’ interlocking is achieved by hardwiring between feeder Bay Control Units.
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Regardless of how the functionality is delivered, it is necessary to ensure all specified interlocking conditions are
comprehensively tested to ensure compliance with the specification. This may involve the drafting of a Boolean
logic type matrix and operating all the plant to verify by both positive, and negative testing. The example below
shows the interlocking arrangement associated with a single busbar coupler arrangement.
Figure 56: Sample Interlocking Conditions Matrix
This level of testing should also be carried out on other automation functions such as the selection process
associated with the operation of an item of plant e.g., circuit breaker.
Tests should be carried out to ensure the following;
• It is not possible for an operator in the substatuion to operate a CB unless the main control has been
assigned from ‘Remote’ (SCADA) to ‘Local’ substation
• CB should not be available to operate unless initially selected by the user on the automation system
• Only the CB selected should be available for operation
• Once successfully operated, it is not possible to opeate a second time without the selection process being
repeated
In the case of Auto Reclosing, all functional tests should be carried out to verify the following;
• Successful functional operation independent of Local\Remote control switch & Substation SCADA control
switch
• AutoReclosing ‘Dead time’ testing
• Active time, lockout functionality
• Three pole\single pole functionality as required by protection device settings
• Functional testing of AR in all positions of AR Control switch
• Etc.
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6.8.2 Optimization
Testing all comprehensive conditions in a systematic manner following the Boolean Logic Type Matrix is
necessarily time consuming and might be optimized.
6.8.2.1 ELIMINATION OF IMPOSSIBLE CASES

In the following example a Boolean Logic Type Matrix has been drafted to test a typical interlocking function:
Line 1 Line 2 BusBar
(Breaker open or IED failed (Breaker open IED failed Off or

invalid position) or invalid invalid Trip/Busbar 1
Or (Switch Open position) Or
or invalid (Switch Open or
position) invalid position)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
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0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
In grey : impossible cases
• Breaker and Switch can’t be simultaneously closed at the same time on Line 1 and 2
(specification)
• If BCU failed, Breaker and Switch position can’t be valid
In blue : cases where trip should be operated automatically
In white : cases where breakers must not be tripped
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A new Matrix is drafted following optimization, 14/32 case tests have been eliminated:
Line 1 Line 2 Busbar
(Breaker open or IED failed (Breaker open IED failed Off or

invalid position) or invalid invalid Trip/Busbar 1
Or (Switch Open position) Or
or invalid (Switch Open or
position) invalid position)
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
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6.8.2.2 MODIFICATION IN THE SEQUENCE OF TESTS
1st method: In general preparation of a test and creation of the initial conditions are more time consuming than the
execution of the test itself. Also the template should be built as far as possible by using the final conditions of a test
as initial conditions in the following test.
For example if the breaker is closed at the end of a test of a reclosing function, it’s better to follow up with a test
which needs to start with breaker closed.
Another example is keeping as far as possible the same parameters in the IEDs for a certain amount of tests.
2nd method: based on a Gray Logic Matrix which is preferable in some cases as only one condition changes as
each step in this type of code.
6.8.2.3 CASE OF ROUTINE TESTS

If a certification of the generic function has been achieved, a routine test should be designed to be applied on
factory or on site.
Thereby, if the aim is limited at testing the wiring, each input must be tested once. In the previous example in
section 6.8.2.2 , only 4 test cases are required.
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6.9 Testing in an IEC 61850 hybrid environment

Hybrid systems are defined as substation PAC systems which use a combination of hardwired and IEC 61850
communications based interfaces. Specifically, the analog interfaces are hard wired and no sampled values
communications are used.
The testing of conventional functions in substation protection and control systems has some similarities and some
differences with the IEC 61850 communications based solutions. In the case of the conventional testing, the test
device has to simulate the substation process using a hard-wired interface between the analog and binary outputs
of the test device and the analog and binary inputs of the test object. A typical test process requires the test device
to output a simulation or event that will trigger a measurable response from the test object. Timing of the test
objects I/O change of state events for defined test cases determines proper operation.
By comparison, communications based distributed functions utilize the IEC 61850 GSSE or GOOSE messages
replacing the hard-wired connections. In the case of Figure 57, all devices with communications interface have to
be connected to the substation network switch to exchange data. In Edition 2 of the standard GSSE is not
supported anymore.
The expected communications based performance should be similar to the conventional hard-wired interface; it is a
good idea to include a test case that compares the operation of a wired relay output and a GOOSE message driven
by the same functional element in the IED logic.
Ethernet Laptop
Switch Computer
GOOSE
or GSSE
Ethernet
IEC 61850
GOOSE
Based IED
or GSSE
Trip
V I
IEC 61850
Ethernet Based Test
Device
Figure 57: IEC 61850 GSSE or GOOSE based IED functional testing
Another difference between the conventional testing and the IEC 61850 GOOSE based functional testing is the
requirement for the change-of-state process simulation using GOOSE messages from the test device to the test
object. An example is to indicate the opening of the auxiliary contact 52a of the circuit breaker monitored by the
IED under test.
The test system should be capable of simulating multiple GOOSE messages from multiple IED, while at the same
time subscribing to multiple GOOSE messages from multiple IEDs depending on the system under test and the
purpose of the test.
The test plans used for testing of conventional and GOOSE based systems or applications can be the same. The
only difference in the configuration of the test system will be the hardware configuration and the GOOSE
simulation/subscription.
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6.10 Testing of IEC 61850 Sampled Values based applications
Laptop
Computer
Ethernet
Switch
GOOSE
or GSSE
IEC IEC IEC

GOOSE
61850 61850 61850
or GSSE
Based Based Based
MU IOU IED
V I Trip
IEC 61850 Based

Ethernet Test Device
Figure 58: IEC 61850 based IED functional testing results
Distributed applications based on IEC 61850 Merging Units that send sampled values over the substation LAN will
need a test setup similar to the configuration shown in Figure 58.
In this case the analog signals from the test device will be wired to the Merging Unit. The distributed function will be
performed by the IEC 61850 based IED that will send a GOOSE message to an IEC 61850 Input/Output Unit (IOU)
that will operate a physical relay output to trip the circuit breaker. The test device will subscribe and capture this
message and also detect the operation of the binary output of the IOU. It monitors different elements of the
distributed function and can analyze their performance, as well as the system’s overall operating time.
If the tested IEC 61850 based IED also has a binary output, the test device can monitor it as well. This can provide
valuable information in the overall evaluation of process performance.
The binary output of the interface unit (IOU) will give the total distributed function operating time for the case of a
complete IEC 61850 communications based solution.
Testing of an IEC 61850 Sampled values based device
If we are performing type, acceptance, commissioning or maintenance testing of an IEC 61850 Sampled values
based device, the test system will be like the one shown in Figure 59. The test device will generate a stream of
currents and voltages sampled values based on the selected simulation method depending on the type of test
being performed, as well as the GOOSE messages required by the test. At the same time it will subscribe to the
GOOSE messages from the test object in order to evaluate its performance. If necessary, the test set can also
monitor the operation of a binary output as part the assessment of the tested device performance.
Page 99
Figure 59: 61850 sampled values based device test configuration

If we are performing type or acceptance testing of a merging unit, the test system will be like the one shown in
Figure 60. The test device will apply currents and voltages to the merging unit under test and at the same time will
publish the corresponding stream of sampled values messages.
The test device and the merging unit have to be time synchronized by the same source with accuracy better than 1
microsecond.
The test evaluation software compares the streams of sampled values messages coming from the test set and the
merging unit in order to assess its performance.
Figure 60: IEC 61850 merging unit (MU) test configuration

Detailed definitions of the functional testing of IEC 61850 based fully digital substations is the subject of ongoing
work of CIGRE WG B5.53 ”Test Strategy for Protection, Automation and Control (PAC) functions in a full digital
substation based on IEC 61850 applications”.
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6.11 Testing Schemes and systems on a lab environment (for

certification or factory acceptance)
The recent use of numerical IEDs which communicate not only vertically to transmit information to the SCADA, but
between themselves in order to process complete digital automatism, need to perform a complete functional test of
each system before delivery on site. It is important to note that testing the system closer to the site conditions will
bring to spent less time on site commissioning; that leads to reducing the outage time and mitigating the risks. This
is particularly important for environmental challenging areas such as off shore platform, or isolated areas.
Performing Factory Acceptance Tests at the system scale needs to install and inter-connect on the platform at least
a type bay of each (Transformer, Capacitor bank, Coupling, Overhead line, Cable, Bus bar …) with their IEDs, the
local SCADA, the remote access controller and all the communication devices (switches, fiber optic). They should
be connected to a simulator which emulates the HV plant (breakers, switches, transformers).
Ideally the complete test of the full DSAS including all the bays is better in particularly to fulfill the performance
tests.
If the utility launches a revamping program or a build of new substations, a qualification platform should be built
including all the generic components of the system as requested by the client. This virtual Power Plant could be
used to carry out any test (functional, performance, reliability). The system should be configured in order to test a
large scope of possible combination. Moreover this platform could be used later on for training and maintenance.
Tests of protection and automatism functions might be carried out using three phase power system simulator test
kit to simulate system faults via secondary injection in order to challenge the protection relay and system
automatism settings, configuration and functionality. Secondary injection may be performed directly to physical
analog inputs of the IEDs or using sampled analog values according to IEC61850.
To perform the tests and to ensure repeatability, best practice is to adopt a preconfigured FAT test template for the
IED or scheme under test, selected from a library. This template consists of a series of test routines developed
specifically for the IED/scheme and its site application. The functions and the hardwired/software interfaces will be
tested. All information (alarms, commands, and measurements) should be tested using simulator tools, checking
the remote data routing, according to the signal list.
If possible, the protection relay test kit application is automated and the application software will record all tests
carried out as well as applying pass\fail criteria. These test records should be stored on a central database. Data
management should include adequate document control and traceability.
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7. TESTING TOOLS REQUIREMENTS

The requirement for the testing tools are to support effective and efficient testing. This means that the tools should
allow the user to successfully test the device or system that is the object of the test (effective), while at the same
time uses minimum resources (efficient).
Considering the significant changes in protection, automation and control technology during the last thirty years, as
well as the specifications and design of protection devices that have been in service for almost a century, it is
obvious that there are very different requirements that need to be met by the test system in order to perform an
effective test.
When we talk about today's advanced test systems, we need to understand that they are multifunctional solutions
that have two main components – hardware and software.
While in the last century for many decades testing of electromechanical protection relays was performed by
electromechanical test devices, the methods for testing were developed based on the existing technology. The
testing was performed using manual control of the test device and manual reporting of the results witnessed by the
person performing the test. In this case the test system had a single component – the testing hardware.
With the development of computers based technology, and especially with the wide spread use of personal
computers, this technology started to penetrate the world of electric power systems protection, automation and
control. Software running in the test device and the computer controlling it became part of the testing system that
plays a very important role in ensuring the effectiveness of the testing.
The software tools to be used in order to achieve effective testing need to be developed by the test equipment
providers and applied by its users based on a good understanding of the different tools available and the object
that is being tested. This means that there is a need for understanding of the:
• Functionality of the device being tested

• Operating principles of the device
• Algorithms being used to implement different functions in the test object
• Accuracy of the device being tested
• Other technical characteristics of the test object
• Functionality of the test equipment
• Characteristics of the test equipment
• Software tools functionality
• Testing methods supported by the system
In order to achieve effective testing we need to make sure that the functionality and characteristics of the test
system meet the functionality of the test object. The following examples described such requirements. It is out of
the scope of this brochure to cover all possible requirements for tools, because they depend on specific use cases.
Testing of high burden devices
Electromechanical relays designed as protection device with rated current of 5 A represent a typical example of
effective testing challenges. In order for them to be tested, the test equipment needs to be able to produce high
currents and high apparent power, while maintaining high compliance voltage.
If the test device does not meet these requirements, the test is not going to be successful since the equipment
used cannot adequately simulate the conditions that will result in the operation of the device under test.
The requirements for testing electro-mechanical devices with high burden also depend on the type of device. On
one hand 3 phase relays may reaquire a high current in all 3 phases, on the other hand there are ground
overcurrent relays rated at 1 A with an extraordinary high burden that requires high VA output at lower currents.
Page 102
Figure 61 shows the apparent power of two sample test sets with the same maximum current. The requirements of
some electromechanical relays are shown as well (these are dependant on application and configuration). In the
example the “red” test set can meet the requirements for the effective testing all 3 phase relays shown. Some earth
fault relays may even be above the red curve and require a higher apparent power at lower currents (without the
need for a high maximum current); the “black” test set could be used for such relays.
Figure 61: Requirements for testing of electromechanical relays

The requirements for high current simulation capability are also important during the replay of recorded waveforms
during actual short circuit faults. Considering that the design of many relays is based on the requirement to
withstand 20 In during short circuit faults, it is clear that when replaying faults recorded in a part of the system with
high levels of fault current, the test equipment should be capable of producing more than 100 A for the effective
testing of relays with 5A current rating.
Tools for testing of devices with high measuring and time synchronization accuracy
Another example for effective testing requirements is the case when the test object is a device with high measuring
accuracy. Metering devices need to be tested and calibrated to ensure that they are going to correctly measure the
energy used by utility customers. It is obvious that the test equipment in this case will need to have a higher
accuracy in order to be able to perform the test end evaluate the measuring accuracy of the device.
A more interesting case that we will consider in more detail is the Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU). On one hand it
is a measuring device with high accuracy, and on the other – it requires very accurate time synchronization. So in
order to be able to perform successful testing of a PMU, the test system needs to be able to provide high accuracy
current and voltage signals, as well as be accurately synchronized with the test object.999
The IEEE C37.118 standard makes one brief, but essential statement on the requirements for test equipment
("calibration devices"). It demands to "have a ‘test accuracy ratio’ of at least four (4) compared with these test
requirements (for example, provide a Total Vector Error less than 0.25% where TVE is 1%).". This TVE of 0.25%
for the signal source is quite challenging. The combined worst case error of a test source with a magnitude error of
0.1% and a phase error of 0.1° already equals to a TVE of 0.2%. The requirements in this case should be that the
testing tools should be able to inject currents and voltages with accuracy better the required by the standard.
A test set also needs to provide versatile time synchronization features. Depending on the test case, the test set
must itself synchronize to an external time source or provide a time reference for the devices under test (PMUs) to
synchronize with.
PMUs operate globally time synchronized, so it might appear mandatory that test sets always have to operate
globally synchronized as well. There are indeed some test cases where this is required.
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Figure 62: Globally synchronized test setup

But there are many other test cases, where the test set and a PMU can be operated in an isolated configuration
without a reference to a global time source. Time synchronization is just established locally between the test set
and the PMU.
Highly accurate protection test sets with GPS, IRIG-B, and PPS interfaces serve the requirements for PMU testing.
For the PMU development at the vendors, custom test programs utilizing a programming interface support the
automation of special tests. For testing in the field, test plans with standard test modules provide as well a high
degree of test automation.
Tools for Testing of Distributed Protection Applications
A good example for the requirements for testing of distributed protection applications is the testing of the protection
of double circuit lines. It is quite challenging due to the complexity of the protection system being used, as well as
the different fault conditions that may occur. In order to effectively test such a protection system, the test system
needs to be able to take into consideration in the testing process issues such as:
• The mutual coupling between the two three phase circuits

• The development of a short circuit fault on one of the circuits into a cross-country fault affecting both
circuits
• The sequence of conditions that may occur when using communications based protection schemes (for
example a Permissive Overreaching Transfer Tripping scheme)
From the above requirements it is clear that if we try to test such a protection system using an electromechanical
test device with manual control of the currents and voltages, it will be impossible to simulate the conditions that
even roughly resemble what will happen in real life.
Figure 63: Current reversal on double circuit line
If we take the POTT scheme test for the current reversal logic, as a minimum, the test system will need to be able
to simulate a sequence of steps corresponding to the sequence of actions that take place. When a fault is cleared
sequentially on one circuit of a double circuit line with generation sources at both ends of the circuit, the current in
the healthy line can reverse for a period of time. Unwanted tripping of circuit breakers on the healthy line can then
Page 104
occur if Permissive Overreaching type communications aided distance schemes are used. Figure 63 shows how
the situation can arise.
The protection at circuit breaker B clears the fault faster than the relay at circuit breaker A. Before circuit breaker B
opens, the Zone 2 elements at C may see the fault and operate, sending a trip signal to the relay for circuit breaker
D. The reverse looking element of the relay at circuit breaker D also sees the fault and inhibits tripping of circuit
breakers C and D.
In order to effectively test the POTT scheme, the test system needs to simulate the following steps:
• Initial pre-fault condition with load current through each of the circuits
• Fault condition F1 in-front of breaker B
• Tripping of breaker B and the reversed current in the healthy line, as well as increased current through
relay A on the faulted line
• Post-fault condition after the clearing of the fault by tripping of breaker A
The above simulation can be achieved by manually defining a sequence of steps and entering the values of the
magnitude and angle of each phase current and voltage for each step, calculated in advance using available fault
analysis tools.
A three phase current and three phase voltage output from the test device will be sufficient for the effective testing
of simple distance relays. However, some more advanced relays used on double circuit lines have mutual current
compensation, which improves the accuracy by measuring the three phase or zero sequence current from the
adjacent circuit. It is clear that if the test device is not able to provide a second set of three phase currents as part
of the simulation, the testing of the protection system will not be successful, i.e. the requirements for effectiveness
of the testing will not be met.
We can use the Permissive Overreaching scheme testing example from above to demonstrate how the use of
advanced testing tools can improve the efficiency of testing by reducing significantly the amount of time it takes to
perform the test.
Earlier we described a process when the user needs to perform fault analysis studies to determine the values of
the system parameters for each step in the simulation and then manually enter them in the testing software in order
to perform the test.
The above is a very time consuming process, with the additional problem that at each step a human error can
make the test ineffective, which will require additional time until the test is successfully performed.
Page 105
Figure 64: Transient simulation of fault on a double circuit line with current reversal
Reducing the time to perform such a test can be achieved by using more advanced simulation tools based on
transient simulation. In this case the user needs to only:
• Configure the parameters of the double circuit line and sources at both its ends
• Configure the angle between the two sources' voltages to establish the power flow
• Configure the fault location, type of fault and other fault parameters
• The time of opening of circuit breaker B
• The time of opening of circuit breaker A
This whole process takes a couple of minutes, resulting in several improvements:
• Reducing the time to perform the test

• Reducing the possible errors in the configuration of the test
• Improving the accuracy of the test simulation
Testing of Protection IEDs using IEC 61850 Messages
The new concept for the execution of protection and control functions introduced by IEC 61850 results in
requirements for a different approach and technology for testing as well.
Figure 65 shows the testing configuration for a partial implementation of IEC 61850 communications in the tested
IED. In this case the multifunctional IED interfaces with the process is similar to the conventional method - hard
wired analog signals between test objects and devices.
The communications based distributed functions in this case use IEC 61850 GOOSE messages. All devices with
communications interface have to be connected to the substation network switch as shown in the Figure 65.
Since the expected communications based performance should be similar to the conventional hard-wired interface,
it is a good idea to compare the operation of a relay output and a GOOSE message driven by the same functional
element in the IED logic.
Page 106
Ethernet Laptop
Switch Computer
GO O SE
or GSSE
Ethernet
IEC 61850
GOO SE
Based IED
or GSSE
Trip
V I
IEC 61850
Ethernet Based Test
Device
Figure 65: IEC 61850 GOOSE based IED functional testing

Another difference between the conventional testing and the IEC 61850 GOOSE based functional testing is that the
state-of-change part of the process simulation is achieved by a GOOSE messages sent from the test device to the
test object. An example is to indicate the opening of the auxiliary contact 52a of the circuit breaker monitored by the
tested IED.
The test device has to be able to simulate more than one IEC 61850 IED since the test case may require interface
of the test object with several devices. For example if a Permissive Overreaching scheme implementation and
configuration in a distance relay is being tested, including single pole autoreclosing, the test object will need to
receive:
• GOOSE message from a communications IED indicating that it received a permissive signal from the
remote end of the line
• GOOSE message from the breaker IED indicating the change of state of each phase of the breaker
The above requires the ability to configure the test device through the testing software to publish two different
GOOSE messages - one representing the communications IED, the second representing the breaker IED. The test
device also needs to be configured to subscribe to the GOOSE messages from the test object.
It is clear that any test equipment or system that does not simulate and subscribe to GOOSE messages cannot be
used for effective testing of protection devices and systems that are based on IEC 61850.
In case of testing of IEC 61850 Sampled Values base systems, the testing tools should be able to:
• Be time synchronized with an accuracy better than 1 microsecond.
• Simulate analog signals and sampled values
• Subscribe to sampled values
A major requirement for the testing tools is to be able to configure the test system based on the import of specific
IEC 61850 Substation Configuration Language files.
Testing Automation
One of the biggest improvements in the efficiency of testing (regardless of the purpose of the test) is testing
automation. This is possible based on the ability of the testing tools to define generic or device specific test plans
that can be automatically executed based on the hardware and software configuration defined from the functionality
and settings of the test object.
Test Assessment and Documentation
The testing tools should have the capability to automatically assess the performance of the test object under the
specific test case conditions. This should be done based on the definitions of the tolerances and expected behavior
of the test object.
The results from the tests should be documented automatically based on user defined documentation specification.
Page 107
Other Examples of Testing Tools Requirements
It is impossible to list all different cases that impose specific requirements on the test system in order to be able to
achieve effective and efficient testing. The following is a list of some of these cases:
• Testing of superimposed components based functions.
• Testing of power swing blocking
• Testing of underfrequency load-shedding
• Testing of IEDs using IEC 61850 Sampled Values
• Testing of Merging Units
• Many others
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8. CONCLUSION
To meet the new demands of the power industry, organisations will have to decide if their current procedures are
adequate and if not look to adapt or change. Moreover, the evolving substation automation and protection
technology, test equipment and systems impose greater challenges from the data management perspective,
compared to the traditional testing environment which could be unmanageable if not addressed and controlled.
While this report is not exhaustive, it does highlight a number of very pertinent points:
It highlights that testing must be taken into consideration at the early stages of the project and built into the design
phase of the protection and control system, using the appropriate tests methodologies pertaining to the situation.
This will contribute to a reduction in the risk and costs during the later phases which are often the most critical.
It is recommended to reduce the time spent at the commissioning/SAT stage of the testing process as this will have
a significant impact on the risk of project delays at the energistion stage and overall cost.
In order to achieve efficiencies, it is recommended that utilities develop standard libraries for automated test
protocols to facilitate repeatability and the efficient testing of their systems. Also it is critical that the appropriate
test equipment is selected making full use of all the testing features available.
The use of modern testing tools in relation to data management will ensure that the utilities requirements for data
storage and reporting can be addressed in a more efficient manner, ideally making use of the ability to generate
documentation automatically which will help with traceability, saving time and money.
The improvements in testing equipment, procedures and practices will continue to evolve in order to keep pace
with the latest protection and control equipment. This will no doubt accelerate as we move towards a full digital
substation. With this in mind the new working group WG B5.53 will detail how to test a full digital substation.
Page 109
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES
• IEC documents
o IEC61850-3
• CIGRÉ Guides
o B5-06 Maintenance Strategies for Digital Substation Automation Systems
o B5-27 Implications and Benefits of Standardised Protection Schemes
o B5-32 Functional testing of IEC61850 based systems
o CIGRÉ 34-10 Analysis and Guidelines for Testing Numerical Protection Schemes
• PAC World papers
o Testing philosophy – The Numerical relays perspective by Ian Stevens
• Other papers
o Commissioning Numerical Relays by Mike Young and John Horak
[1] IEC 61850-4 Standard Ed. 2, published 2011-04-11

[2] Q. Verzosa, Jr: Realistic Testing of Power Swing Blocking and Out-of-Step Tripping Functions,
Microprocessor-based Numerical Transformer Differential Protection, Western Protective Relay Conference,
Spokane, Washington, USA, October 2011.
[3] W. Chandrasena: “Real time closed loop testing – Recent Projects at Manitoba Hydro”
Contribution to WG B5-45, 2014; available from the author.
[4] T. Hensler; B. Bastigkeit: New Possibilities in Field Testing of Distributed Protection Systems
OMICRON International Protection Symposium Boston, USA 2013
[5] IEC 60255-121 Ed.1 Measuring relays and protection equipment Pt.121: Functional requirements for distance
protection 2014
[6] Q. Verzosa, Jr: Testing Microprocessor-based Numerical Transformer Differential Protection, Gerogia Tech
Annual Protective Relaying Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, May 2014.
[7] J. Schilleci, G. Breaux, M. Kezunovic, Z. Galijasevic, T. Popovic, “Use of Advanced Digital Simulators for
Distance Relay Design and Application Testing”, Texas A&M 54th Annual Relay Conference for Protective
Relay Engineers, April 2001
[8] A.T. Giuliante, Dynamic-State Relay Testing, 29th Hands-on Relay School, Pulman, WA, USA, March 12-16,
2012
[9] A. Apostolov; B. Vandiver; D. Tholomier: Testing of Distance Protection Relays
B5-214, Cigre Session 2008
[10] A. Apostolov: Improving the Efficiency of Testing of Protection Devices and Systems
Cigre Study Committee B5 Colloquium Belo Horizonte, Brazil, 2013
[11] A. Apostolov : Testing as part of the standardization process, PAC WORLD
Page 110
10. ANNEXES
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Acceptance, Commissioning and Field Testing Techniques For Protection and Automation Systems

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Acceptance, Commissioning and Field

E. Cahuet, Convenor (FR), A. Apostolov (US), T. Hamet (FR), N. Kearns (IR),

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 5

3. ENGINEERING PROCESS ............................................................................................................................... 9

4. TEST PHASES ................................................................................................................................................ 23

5. TESTING METHODS ...................................................................................................................................... 41

5.7 Automated testing ....................................................................................................................................... 62

6. TEST USE CASES .......................................................................................................................................... 64

7. TESTING TOOLS REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................ 102

8. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................... 109

9. BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 110

10. ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................... 111

• Do we have a process in place that is both efficient and effective?

Closed loop testing:

Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) of schemes and systems:

Site Acceptance Tests (SAT):

Materi al approval Del i very and putti ng on l i ne

Devel opment Customer 1 Project 1

Figure 1: Testing phases of the engineering process

The engineering process needs to clarify the stakeholder’s responsibilities:

Who defines the tests? M M or I or C I or C I or C C

M = Manufacturer, I = System Integrator, C = Customer

Table 1: Roles and responsibilities for testing

• Step 1 : Standard scheme template

The testing of any system is dependent on:

• The functionality of the system

Figure 2: Function boundary definition

For each standard scheme a four step standardization process is followed:

Step 1: Standard scheme template

This stage should also include:

• Primary single-line diagram

Step 2: Defined standard scheme

• CB, disconnectors, earth switches, CT/VT and auxiliary interface specifications

Step 3 : Applied standard scheme

The following is specified at this stage:

• IED HW-version, SW-version, parameter-set-version

Step 4: Instantiated standard scheme

At this stage the following is applied:

• IED specific calculations and setting files

• Specific commissioning, maintenance and testing procedures

3.2 Testing requirements for IEDs, Schemes and Systems

3.2.1 Standard scheme template: testing requirements definition

3.2.1.1 TESTING OF FUNCTION ELEMENTS:

3.2.1.2 TESTING OF SUB-FUNCTIONS AND FUNCTIONS

Simulation methods need to be defined for each test case.

3.2.2 Requirements for testing of the complete PAC scheme

Typical standards are IEEE C37.238 and IEEE 1588

3.2.2.1 TESTING TOOLS REQUIREMENTS

Additional requirements may relate to:

• Support of automation of the testing procedures

3.2.3 Testing Requirements for Defined standard scheme

3.2.3.1 ANALYSIS OF SCHEME INTERFACES

Figure 3: Interfaces of protection IED defined in the standardization process

3.2.3.2 DEFINITION OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TEST EQUIPMENT

Figure 4: Interfaces of test equipment defined in Step 2 of the standardization process

3.2.3.3 IMPACT OF IEC 61850 ON THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TEST EQUIPMENT

Figure 5: Standard scheme interfaces in case of full IEC 61850 implementation

• Publish a stream of sampled values to simulate the merging unit

3.2.4 Testing Requirements for Applied standard scheme

3.2.4.1 IED SELECTION RELATED TESTING

3.2.4.2 TYPE TESTING OF THE STANDARD SCHEME

Figure 6: Bottom-up testing of standard protection scheme – stage 3