Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker
What is politics? What is it that political scientists study? 7
What is a scientific approach to politics? 9
The discipline of political science: a celebration of diversity? 11
Introduction to Part 1 17
Vivien Lowndes, David Marsh and Gerry Stoker
2 Behavioural Analysis 20
David Sanders
The rise of the behavioural movement and its core
characteristics21
Criticisms of the behavioural approach 25
Objections to the positivist claim that statements which
are neither definitions (useful tautologies) nor empirical
are meaningless 25
The tendency towards mindless empiricism 26
The assumed independence of theory and observation 28
The strengths of the behavioural approach: an example 30
Conclusion: the behavioural legacy in the twenty-first century 37
Further reading 38
3 Rational Choice 39
Andrew Hindmoor and Brad Taylor
Introduction 39
The methods of economics (and rational choice) 40
The logic of collective action 43
Collective action and the environment 46
What’s wrong with rational choice theory? 48
From imperialism to peaceful co-existence 52
Conclusion 52
Further reading 53
v
vi Contents
4 Institutionalism 54
Vivien Lowndes
The ‘traditional’ institutional approach 55
The emergence of the ‘new institutionalism’ 57
The ‘three new institutionalisms’ 58
Core features of new institutionalism 59
Institutions as rules not organisations 60
Institutions as informal as well as formal 61
Institutions as dynamic as well as stabilising 62
Institutions as embodying values and power 62
Institutions as contextually embedded 63
New institutionalist dilemmas 64
What is an institution anyway? 64
Where do institutions come from, and how do
they change? 67
Are the normative and rational choice approaches
compatible?70
Conclusion 73
Further reading 74
Contents vii
8 Poststructuralism 125
Mark Wenman
French structuralism 127
From structuralism to poststructuralism 129
Poststructuralism in politics and international relations 130
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of
poststructuralism133
Criticism and evaluation 137
Conclusion 140
Further reading 141
viii Contents
Contents ix
x Contents
Contents xi
xii Contents
Bibliography 332
Index 380
Chapter 1
Introduction
This book introduces the theories and methods that political scientists
use, which we think tells us a great deal about the nature of political science.
To us, political science is best defined in terms of what political scientists
do. Of course, there are thousands of political scientists around the world
and we have tried to capture and clarify the variety of ways they seek
to understand, explore and analyse the complex processes of politics in
the modern era. We are interested in how they differ in their approach,
but also in what they share. Our book identifies nine approaches used by
political scientists and then explores some of the specific research meth-
ods, which are used in different combinations by scholars from these
different approaches.
All disciplines tend to be chaotic, to some extent, in their development
(Abbott, 2001) and political science is certainly no exception. However,
we would argue that the variety of approaches and debates explored in
this book are a reflection of its richness and growing maturity. When
trying to understand something as complex, contingent and chaotic as
politics, it is not surprising that academics have developed a great variety
of approaches. For those studying the discipline for the first time, it may
be disconcerting that there is no agreed approach or method of study.
Indeed, as we shall see, there is not even agreement about the nature
of politics itself. But, we argue that political scientists should celebrate
diversity, rather than see it as a problem. The Nobel Prize winner Herbert
Simon makes a powerful case for a plurality of approaches, which he
sees as underpinning the scientist’s commitment to constant questioning
and searching for understanding:
2 Introduction
The study of politics can trace its origins at least as far back as Plato
(Almond, 1996); as such, it has a rich heritage and a substantial base on
which to grow and develop. More specifically, it has been an academic
discipline for just over a century; the American Political Science Asso-
ciation was formed in 1903 and other national associations followed.
As Goodin and Klingemann (1996) argue, in the last few decades the
discipline has become a genuinely international enterprise. Excellent
and challenging political science is produced in many countries and this
book reflects the internationalisation of the discipline in two senses.
First, we have authors who are based in the UK, elsewhere in Europe,
the USA and Australia. Second, many of the illustrations and exam-
ples provided by authors offer up experiences from a range of coun-
tries, or provide a global perspective. Our authors draw on experiences
from around the world and relate domestic political science concerns
to those of international relations. This makes sense in an ever more
globalised world.
The increasing influence of global forces in our everyday lives makes
globalisation a central feature of the modern era. Debates about collec-
tive decisions which we observe at the international, national and local
levels take place through a dynamic of governance (Chhotray and Stoker,
2009). In the world of governance, outcomes are not determined by cohe-
sive, unified nation states or formal institutional arrangements. Rather,
they involve individual and collective actors both inside and beyond the
state, who operate via complex and varied networks. In addition, the gap
between domestic politics and international relations has narrowed, with
domestic politics increasingly influenced by transnational forces. Migra-
tion, human rights, issues of global warming, pandemics of ill-health and
the challenges of energy provision cannot, for example, be contained or
addressed within national boundaries alone.
A new world politics (different from ‘international relations’) is emerg-
ing, in which non-state actors play a vital role, alongside nation states
(Cerny, 2010). The study of world politics is not a separate enterprise,
focused on the study of the diplomatic, military and strategic activities of
nation states. Non-state and international institutions, at the very least,
provide a check to the battle between nation states. At the same time, the
role of cities and sub-national regions has expanded, as they make links
across national borders in pursuit of economic investment in a global
marketplace, while seeking also to collaborate in tackling complex gov-
ernance challenges (such as migration and global warming), which do
not themselves respect national boundaries. Indeed, some analysts go
as far as to suggest that cities may become the ‘new sovereign’ in inter-
national orders in which both nation states and multilateral bodies are
challenged (Barber, 2013; Katz and Bradley, 2013).
Moreover, the breadth of the issues to be addressed at the international
level has extended into a range of previously domestic concerns, with a
focus on financial, employment, health, human rights and poverty reduc-
tion issues. At the same time, the nature of politics at the international
Behaviouralism Concentrates on processes The generation of general In early phase keen to Claims to be value
of politics associated with laws and at a minimum the emphasise difference between free, neutral and
mainstream politics and development of theoretical the new science and old detached
government statements that can be armchair theorising. Now
4 Introduction
range of social institutions ‘reality’ is intrinsically medi- does sustain a normative cri- popular culture and
and environments and in a ated by language or discourse tique of power and domina- a strong capacity to
6 Introduction
When people say they ‘study politics’ they are making an ontological
statement because, within that statement, there is an implicit understand-
ing of what the polity is made up of, and its general nature. They are also
making a statement that requires some clarification. In any introduction
to a subject it is important to address the focus of its analytical attention.
So, simply put, we should be able to answer the question: what is the
nature of the political that political scientists claim to study? A disci-
pline, you might think, would have a clear sense of its terrain of enquiry.
Interestingly, that is not the case in respect of political science. Just as
there are differences of approach to the subject, so there are differences
about the terrain of study.
As Hay (2002: chapter 2) argues, ontological questions are about
what is and what exists. Ontology asks: what’s there to know about?
Although a great variety of ontological questions can be posed (discussed
in Chapters 11 and 12), a key concern for political scientists relates to
the nature of the political. There are two broad approaches to defin-
ing the political, seeing politics in terms of an arena or a process (Left-
wich, 1984; Hay, 2002). An arena definition regards politics as occurring
within certain limited ‘arenas’, initially involving a focus upon Parlia-
ment, the executive, the public service, political parties, interest groups
and elections, although this was later expanded to include the judici-
ary, army and police. Here, political scientists, especially behaviouralists
but also rational choice theorists and some institutionalists, focus upon
the formal operation of politics in the world of government and those
who seek to influence it. This approach to the political makes a lot of
sense and obviously relates to some everyday understandings. For exam-
ple, when people say they are fed up or bored with politics, they usually
mean that they have been turned off by the behaviour or performance of
those politicians most directly involved in the traditional political arena.
The other definition of ‘politics’, a process definition, is much looser
than the arena one (Leftwich, 2004: 3) and reflects the idea that power
is inscribed in all social processes (for example, in the family and the
schoolroom). This broader definition of the political is particularly asso-
ciated with feminism, constructivism, poststructuralism and Marxism.
For feminists in particular there has been much emphasis on the idea that
the ‘personal is political’ (Hanisch, 1969). This mantra partly originated
in debates about violence against women in the home, which had tradi-
tionally been seen as ‘non-political’, because they occurred in the private
8 Introduction
rather than the public realm. Indeed, in the UK at least, the police, his-
torically, referred to such violence as ‘a domestic’, and therefore not
their concern. The feminist argument, in contrast, was that such violence
reflected a power relationship and was inherently ‘political’.
Marxists have also generally preferred a definition of politics that sees
it as a reflection of a wider struggle between social classes in society. Poli-
tics in capitalist systems involves a struggle to assert the interest of the
proletariat (the disadvantaged) in a system in which the state forwards
the interests of the ruling class. Constructivists tend to see politics as a
process conducted in a range of arenas, with the main struggles around
political identity (hence the focus on identity politics). Poststructuralists
take this position further, arguing that politics is not ‘contained’ within
a single structure of domination; rather, power is diffused throughout
social institutions and processes, and even inscribed in people’s bodies.
Process definitions are usually criticised by those who adopt arena
definitions, because of what is termed ‘conceptual stretching’ or the
‘boundary problem’ (see Ekman and Amnå, 2012; Hooghe, 2014). If
politics occurs in all social interactions between individuals, then we
are in danger of seeing everything as political, so that there is no sepa-
ration between the ‘political’ and the ‘social’. The alarm bells might be
ringing here since it appears that political scientists cannot even agree
about the subject matter of their discipline. Yet our view is that both
‘arena’ and ‘process’ definitions have their value; indeed, the relation-
ship between process and arena definitions may be best seen as a dual-
ity, that is interactive and iterative, rather than a dualism, or an either/
or (Rowe et al., 2017). Moreover, all of the different approaches to
political science we identify would at least recognise that politics is
about power and that we need to widen significantly an arena defini-
tion of politics.
Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 7) suggest that a broad consen-
sus could be built around a definition of politics along the lines: ‘the
constrained use of social power.’ The political process is about collective
choice, without simple resort to force or violence, although it does not
exclude at least the threat of those options. It is about what shapes and
constrains those choices and the use of power and its consequences. It
would cover unintended as well as intended acts, and passive as well as
active practices. Politics enables individuals or groups to do some things
that they would not otherwise be able to do, while it also constrains indi-
viduals or groups from doing what they might otherwise do. Although
the different approaches to political science may have their own take
on a definition of politics, contesting how exactly power is exercised or
practised, they might accept Goodin and Klingemann’s broad definition.
It is clear that politics is much broader than what governments do,
but there is still something especially significant about political processes
that are, or could be, considered to be part of the public domain. In a
pragmatic sense, it is probably true to say that most political scientists
tend to concentrate their efforts in terms of analysis and research on the
As Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 9) comment, ‘much ink has been spilt
over the question of whether, or in what sense, the study of politics is or
is not truly a science. The answer largely depends upon how much one
tries to load into the term “science”.’ If you adopt what they call a mini-
malist approach the question can be answered fairly straightforwardly,
namely that political science is science in the sense that it offers ordered
knowledge based on systematic enquiry. There is no reason to doubt that
political science in all its forms has achieved, or could achieve, that level
of knowledge. But, beyond such a basic agreement, the approaches that
we consider in this book take diverse views on the issue of ‘science’.
What is at stake here is the various ontological and epistemological
positions taken by the different approaches. As Marsh, Ercan and Fur-
long argue in Chapter 11, ontology is concerned with what we can know
about the world, and epistemology with how we can know it. There is
a fundamental ontological difference between realists (or foundation-
alists) and constructivists (or anti-foundationalists). The former argue
that a real world exists independently of our knowledge of it and can
be discovered as such if we use the right methods in the right way. Con-
structivists, on the other hand, view the world as socially constructed
and capable of being interpreted in different ways. Crucial for a con-
structivist is the idea that there is a double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1987),
that is, two levels of ‘understanding’. From this perspective, the world is
interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level), and their interpretation
is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level). For research-
ers, the aim becomes to explore their own interpretation of the interpre-
tations made by actors about their behaviour.
If ontological realists are epistemological positivists rather than criti-
cal realists (see Chapter 11), they are concerned to identify causal rela-
tionships, developing explanatory, and, most often, predictive models
(following natural scientists). Critical realists, in contrast, do not privi-
lege direct observation; rather, they posit the existence of deep structures,
which cannot be directly observed but shape the actions of agents. Con-
structivists can draw upon a long tradition within social and political
studies, but it is fair to say that this is an approach of growing impor-
tance in the discipline which has seen a growth in research within the
interpretivist school (see Chapter 5), alongside broader intellectual cur-
rents associated with poststructuralism (see Chapter 8).
It is by no means straightforward to divide the various approaches
considered in this volume on the basis of their epistemological position.
10 Introduction
The behavioural and rational choice approaches are those that most
obviously claim the positivist position. The former aims to identify gen-
eral laws about political action/life, while the latter places more of an
emphasis on the predictive capabilities of its models. At the same time,
the epistemological positions underpinning the different approaches
reviewed in this book have been subject to change and development.
As Sanders points out in Chapter 2, behaviouralists have increasingly
acknowledged the first level of the hermeneutic, acknowledging that an
individual’s action may reflect the way in which s/he thinks about the
world, as much as any external ‘reality’. So, in explaining voting behav-
iour, they would recognise that a voter’s subjective perception of his/her
class position is as important as his/her objective class position. Never-
theless, a positivist, whether a behaviouralist or a rational choice theorist,
does seek to establish causal relationships between political phenomena,
which are reproducible and generalisable – a position which would be
questioned by any constructivist. At the same time, as Marsh, Ercan and
Furlong argue in Chapter 11, a positivist has great difficulty in accepting
the second level of the hermeneutic, which emphasises that the research-
er’s interpretation of what s/he discovers is partial, in both senses of the
word. Most positivists would defend the idea that a researcher can be
objective, with their conclusions unaffected by those partialities.
A similarly nuanced stance on epistemological positions is taken by
Parsons in relation to constructivist approaches. There are, as Parsons
points out in Chapter 5, several different positions within the broad
school of constructivism. One view argues that our concern should be
with understanding, not explanation, thus challenging the scientific pre-
tensions of positivists. In this view, there is no ‘real world’, independent
of the social construction of it, for political scientists to study. As such,
social science involves an interpretive search to understand the mean-
ings attached to actions, rather than a scientific search for explanation,
establishing causal relations between social phenomena. However, other
constructivists do not break so sharply with science and causality, allow-
ing for greater dialogue and exchange. Such constructivists would argue
that, although action depends on meaning, this does not necessarily
imply that there can be no explanation of why certain people do cer-
tain things. If we can show that people’s action is shaped by meaningful
social constructs, then a careful observer can show this to be the case,
thus offering an explanation of that action (while being circumspect
about the possibility of generalising from the case).
Of the other approaches that we cover in the first part of the book it is
clear that institutional, psychological and feminist approaches all include
scholars who take different ontological and epistemological positions.
The psychologists lean towards positivism, but many would be com-
fortable with the modern behaviouralist position outlined by Sanders
(Chapter 2). In contrast, institutionalism and feminism are marked by
ontological and epistemological debates, as Lowndes shows in relation
to institutionalism in Chapter 4. As for feminism, many contemporary
Read many of the reviews of political science and they agree that politi-
cal science has become more diverse and more cosmopolitan in character
(see, for example, Almond, 1990; Goodin and Klingemann, 1996; and
on the social sciences in general, see Della Porta and Keating, 2008).
Some of those who pioneered what they called the scientific treatment
of the subject expected that the scientific revolution would lead to a
unity in the understanding of political science (Weisberg, 1986: 4). There
can be little doubt that those ambitions have not been realised; indeed,
constructivists would say they can’t be realised. There is a basis for some
common agreement about what constitutes ‘minimal professional com-
petence’, but as Goodin and Klingemann (1996: 6) note, when it comes
to judging the value of work beyond some agreed baseline of coherence
and craftsmanship ‘the higher aspirations are many and varied’. Conse-
quently, there is a de facto plurality of views about the nature of political
science endeavour.
So, has peace broken out in the political sciences? There is a grudging
public acceptance of plurality, but in private there is a quiet war going
on. Some positivists are very dismissive of the ‘storytelling’ approaches
of others. Some constructivists imply that philosophical ignorance and
12 Introduction
Index
380
Index 381
382 Index
Index 383
384 Index
Index 385
386 Index
Index 387
388 Index
Index 389
390 Index
Index 391
transparency, 236, 242, 255, 267, 298 Van Evera, S., 287
Trotsky, L., 112, 118–19 Verba, S., 94, 189, 254, 273
Trump, Donald J., 199, 234, 321, 325 Verge, T., 95
truth, poststructuralist reflections on Vietnam War, 299
the status of, 135 voluntarism, and agency, 137
Tunisia, 234 volunteering
Tversky, A., 296 quantitative study, 259, 261
Twitter, 300, 303, 305, 310–12, 316, relationship between wealth and,
318, 324 261
voter attitudes, elections and, 153
ultimatum game, 49–50 voter turnout, research strategies,
United Kingdom (UK) 277–78, 282, 297
airport expansion, 132 voting behaviour
British Political Tradition (BPT), internet-based experimentation,
215–16 298
compulsory methods courses researching, 20, 200
introduced, 239 Vromen, A., 174
devolution, 216–17
feminist activism, 93 Wade, R., 331
New Labour, 216 Wagemann, C., 282
and the punctuated evolution model, Weaver, R., 298
212, 215–16 Weber, M., 76, 78–79
referendum on leaving the EU (see Wedeen, L., 79
also Brexit), 223, 284, 286, 299 welfare state, capitalist perspective,
treatment of violence against women 111
in the home, 7–8 Wenman, M., 19
UKIP, 216 Westminster model, 56, 63
‘Winter of Discontent,’ 214 WhatsApp, 303
United Nations, 79 Wildavsky, A., 322
United States of America (USA) Williams, E., 112
annexation of part of Mexico, 116 Williams, K., 112, 201, 203, 228,
and climate change, 47 291–93, 296–97, 305
election of Donald Trump, 199, 234, Wilson, Woodrow, 56
321, 325 Winch, P., 79
exercise of hegemony, 123 Wincott, D., 70
experimental tradition, 297, 302 ‘Winter of Discontent,’ 214
feminist activism, 93 women, exclusion from the state, 104
Health Insurance Experiment, 297 women’s suffrage, role in democratic
liberalism in, 71 transition, 97–98
lynchings, 145 working class, 110–11, 113–15, 119
presence of qualitative methods in World Bank, 120
political science, 240 Writing and Difference (Derrida), 129
relationship with China, 122
social movements, 197 Yanow, D., 79, 239, 242