ZADDALINO

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

PETITIONERS/PLAINTIFFS: minor, represented by her parents and the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources)

RESPONDENTS: Hon. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of DENR

FACTS: Petitioners instituted a civil case as a class suit. It alleges that the plaintiffs “are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country’s virgin tropical rainforests.” The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are “so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court.” The
minors further asseverate that they “represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn.”

 They prayed that:

1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

SECRETARY FACTORAN, JR.,: filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.

RTC: GRANTED THE MOTION TO DISMISS. the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for
would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

THUS THIS SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT

PETITIONERS:

 CAUSE OF ACTION:the complaint states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their
right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man’s
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.

 Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent’s correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard
the people’s right to a healthful environment.

 It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary’s alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.

 NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE CONTENTION: the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.

RESPONDENTS:

 Petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning
 an “environmental right” which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the “protection by the state in its capacity
as parens patriae.” Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. 

 CANCELLATION OF THE TLAs: the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time—usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the
same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.

ISSUE: W/N the said petitioners have a cause of action to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment” of Philippine
rainforests and “arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country’s vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth.

RULING: YES! The Court found the statements of the Petitioners to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights. The Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter:  “[it] concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions”.  The right is linked to the constitutional right to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalized”, “self-
executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the
first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.

 Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the
country’s natural resources,then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources “shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation
of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.”

 Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR’s duty—under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the
Administrative Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said right.

 A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

CAUSE OF ACTION DEFINITION:“x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right.”

MAY PETITIONERS FILE A CLASS SUIT, REPRESENTING THEIR GENERATION AS WELL AS GENERATIONS YET UNBORN?
 YES.
 Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means the created
world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
 wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.
 The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time the performance of
their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generation to come. Every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment.

POLITICAL QUESTION?
 NO.
 The foregoing considered,cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by
the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved
is the enforcement of a right vis-à-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”

REVOCATION OF TLA’s AMOUNT TO IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE?

 NO! All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

“x xx A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
‘A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation’ (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs.
Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x xx”

ALCALA
1b. Oposa v. Factoran
July 30, 1993
Separate Opinion – Concurring Opinion of Feliciano, J.

For granting the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of
extreme importance for the country.

1. W/N the petitioner-minors have locus standi of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment
of Philippine rainforests.”
YES. Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness
of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi.

The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure
to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate
case.

2. W/N the right to balanced and healthful ecology is “fundamental” and “specific”.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology".There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, it cannot be characterized as
"specific," without doing excessive violence to language.
The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control
of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3,
Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151,
dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in
Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners
are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and
sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on
the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements
above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
Petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order
of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to
the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed
for.The Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and
that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
The legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a
constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and
effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined
with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the
result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical
 competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown
to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.

3. W/N timber companies must be impleaded in the proceedings.

YES. The timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be
impleaded in the proceedings.They may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well
as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to
act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

BRYLE
3. Concerned Citizens v. MMDA
Facts: On January 29, 1999, concerned residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the RTC Imus, Cavite
against several government agencies for the clean-up, rehabilitation and protection of the Manila Bay/ The
complaint alleged that the water quality of Manila Bay is no longer within the allowable standards set by law
(esp. PD 1152, Philippine environment Code).
DENR testified for the petitioners and reported that the samples collected from the beaches around Manila
Bay is beyond the safe level for bathing standard of the DENR. MWSS testified also about MWSS efforts to
reduce pollution along the bay. Philippine Ports Authority presented as evidence its Memorandum Circulars on
the study on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal as its LinisDagat project.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating
the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) The Environment Code (PD
1152); (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); (4) The Water Code (PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); (8) Executive Order
No. 192; (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code provisions on
nuisance and human relations; (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and (12)
International Law.
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
RTC ordered petitioners to Clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The petitioners appealed arguing that the Environment Code relate only to the cleaning of the specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Raising the concerns of lack of funds appropriated for
cleaning, and asserting that the cleaning of the bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by
mandamus.
CA sustained the RTC stressing that RTC did not require the agencies to do tasks outside of their usual basic
functions.
Issues:
1. W/N PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents.
2. W/N the cleaning or rehabilitation of the Manila Bay is not ministerial act of petitioners that can be
compelled by mandamus.
Ruling:
1. No. Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment (PD 1152) Code include cleaning in general.
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such
measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water
quality standards.
 Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and
clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses
incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such
pollution.
Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.
17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.” This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, “to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.” In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
2. Yes. The cleaning of the Manila bay can be compelled by mandamus. Petitioners’ obligation to perform their
duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two
different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be
noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This
duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated; discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.

ANGELO

Concerned Citizens v. MMDA

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO,J.:

FACTS: The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee to the concerned agenciesand local
government units (LGUs) for the implementation of the 18 December 2008 Decision of the Court in this case.

Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to submit to the Court their plans of action and status reports,
thus:

1. The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to ensure
compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments, and private homes;

2. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSSshall submit their plans and projects for the
construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said
facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;

3. Local Water Utilities Administration is further ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan to
provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the
completion period for said works which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020;

4. The Department of Agriculture, within the same period, shall submit its five-year plan to restore and
improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose,
and the completion period for said undertakings;

5. The Philippine Ports Authority shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends
to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision
and the completion dates of such measures;

6. The Philippine National Police– Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan
of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of RA 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998;
 7. The Philippine Coast Guardshall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on
the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree (PD)
979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009;

8. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who own and occupy houses, structures,
constructions and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable;

9. The DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers
and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012;

10. The DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper disposal facilities
and the completion dates of compliance;

11. On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of all the
schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school
curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has the competence or even the jurisdiction to evaluate the plans which involve technical matters
best left to the expertise of the concerned agencies.

RULING: NO. Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of the Executive . In
the guise of implementing the 18 December 2008 Decision through the Resolution, the Court is in effect supervising and directing the
different government agencies and LGUs concerned.

The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively vested in the President. First, the Constitution
provides that "executive power shall be vested in the President."This means that neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can
exercise executive power for executive power is the exclusive domain of the President. Second, the Constitution provides that the
President shall "have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." Neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature
can exercise control or even supervision over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.

Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined in our Constitution is essential to prevent tyranny by
prohibiting the concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one body. Considering that executive power is exclusively vested in
the President of the Philippines, the Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive power by the President nor arrogate
executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine itself to the exercise of judicial functions and not encroach upon the functions
of the other branches of the government.

SERENO, J.:

FACTS: On 18 December 2008, the Court promulgated its decision in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, denying the
petition of the government agencies. It held that the Court of Appeals, subject to some modifications, was correct in affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court. It ordered "the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR
Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation."

The Court further issued each of the aforementioned agencies specific orders to comply with their statutory mandate. Pursuant to the
judgment above, the Court established its own Manila Bay Advisory Committee. Upon the recommendations of the said
Committee, the present Resolution was issued. It encompasses several of the specific instructions laid out by the court in the
original case, but also goes further by requiring reports and updates from the said government agencies and setting deadlines
for the submission thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has encroached upon the exclusive authority of the Executive Department and violated the doctrine
of Separation of Powers.

RULING: YES. Clearly, the Court has no authority to issue these directives. They fall squarely under the domain of the executive
branch of the state. The issuance of specific instructions to subordinate agencies in the implementation of policy mandates in all
laws, not just those that protect the environment, is an exercise of the power of supervision and control – the sole province of
the Office of the President.
ASALI
ISAAA v Greenpeace
GR. No. 209271, December 08, 2015
Petitioners: INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH
APPLICATIONS, INC., (ISAAA), EMB, BPI and FPA
Respondents: GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES), MAGSASAKA AT SIYENTIPIKO SA
PAGPAPAUNLAD NG AGRIKULTURA (MASIPAG) et al
Petitioner International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA) is an
international non-profit organization founded in 1990 "to facilitate the acquisition and transfer of
agricultural biotechnology applications from the industrial countries, for the benefit of resource-poor
farmers in the developing world" and ultimately "to alleviate hunger and poverty in the developing
countries." Partly funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), ISAAA
promotes the use of agricultural biotechnology, such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs)
Respondent Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines) is the Philippine branch of Greenpeace Southeast
Asia, a regional office of Greenpeace International registered in Thailand which, operates in over 40
countries and with an international coordinating body in Amsterdam, Netherlands. It is well known for
independent direct actions in the global campaign to preserve the environment and promote peace.

FACTS: On September 24, 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking (MOU) was executed between UPLBFI,
ISAAA and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research and development
project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies involved in the project
were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India,
Cornell University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of US AID.
As indicated in the Field Trial Proposal submitted by the implementing institution (UPLB), the pest-resistant
crop subject of the field trial was described as a "bioengineered eggplant." The crystal toxin genes from the soil
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant (talong) genome to produce the
protein CrylAc which is toxic to the target insect pests. CrylAc protein is said to be highly specific to
lepidopteran larvae such as the fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of eggplant.
Under the regulatory supervision of NCBP, a contained experiment was started in 2007 and officially completed
on March 3, 2009. The National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) thus issued a Certificate of
Completion of Contained Experiment stating that "During the conduct of the experiment, all the biosafety
measures have been complied with and no untoward incident has occurred." Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) also
issued Biosafety Permits to UPLB on March 16, 2010 and June 28, 2010. Thereafter, field testing of Bttalong
commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North Cotabato; Sta. Maria,
Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.

RESPONDENT’S ACTION
On April 26, 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et al.) filed a petition for
writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO). They alleged that the Bttalong field trials violate their constitutional right to health
and a balanced ecology considering that:
(1) the required environmental compliance certificate under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation;
(2) as a regulated article under DAO 08-2002, Bttalong is presumed harmful to human health and the
environment, and there is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bttalong for human
consumption and the environment;
(3) a study conducted by Professor Gilles-Eric Seralini showed adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt
corn, while local scientists also attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal health;
 (4) Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species as highlighted by a research conducted in the US
which demonstrated that pollen from Bt maize was toxic to the Monarch butterfly;
(5) data from the use of BtCrylAb maize indicate that beneficial insects have increased mortality when fed
on larvae of a maize pest, the corn borer, which had been fed on Bt, and hence non-target beneficial species
that may feed on eggplant could be similarly affected;
(6) data from China show that the use of Bt crops (Bt cotton) can exacerbate populations of other secondary
pests;
(7) the built-in pesticides of Bt crops will lead to Bt resistant pests, thus increasing the use of pesticides
contrary to the claims by GMO manufacturers; and
(8) the 200 meters perimeter pollen trap area in the field testing area set by BPI is not sufficient to stop
contamination of nearby non-Bt eggplants because pollinators such as honeybees can fly as far as four
kilometers and an eggplant is 48% insect-pollinated.
Greenpeace, et al. further claimed that the Bttalong field test project did not comply with the required public
consultation under Sections 26 & 27 of the Local Government Code which also resulted to backlashes from
several local government units in Leyte, Davao and Ilo-ilo expressing their uncertainties of the Bttalong field
testing in their barangays.
Greenpeace, et al. argued that this case calls for the application of the PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, the
Bttalong field testing being a classic environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health,
environmental and socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation
indicates reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous effects on human health and the
environment.
Greenpeace then prayed for:
− TEPO: (i) enjoining public respondents BPI and FPA of the DA from processing for field testing, and
registering as herbicidal product, Bttalong in the Philippines; (ii) stopping all pending field testing of
Bttalong anywhere in the Philippines; and (in) ordering the uprooting of planted Bttalong for field trials
as their very presence pose significant and irreparable risks to human health and the environment.
− writ of continuing mandamus commanding respondents to submit to and undergo the process of
environmental impact statement system under the Environmental Management Bureau and conduct
consultation with the public.
− writ of kalikasancommanding Respondents to file their respective returns and explain why they
should not be judicially sanctioned for violating or threatening to violate or allowing the violation of
the above-enumerated laws, principles, and international principle and standards, or committing acts,
which would result into an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or
property of petitioners in particular and of the Filipino people in general. (THIS WAS APPROVED
BY THE CA WHEN THE CASE WAS REMANDED TO THEM, hence this appeal now)
− cancel all Bttalong field experiments; and recommend to Congress curative legislations to effectuate
such order.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS
Petitioners argued that the issuance of writ of kalikasan is not proper because in the implementation of the
Bttalong project, all environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected
communities, to ensure that the people's right to a balanced and healthful ecology was protected and respected.
They also asserted that the Bttalong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
(PEIS) Law and that Bttalong field trials will not significantly affect the quality of the environment nor pose a
hazard to human health. ISAAA contended that the NBF amply safeguards the environment policies and goals
promoted by the PEIS Law. ISAAA also argued that the allegations regarding the safety of Bttalong as food are
irrelevant in the field trial stage as none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals, and all
materials that will not be used for analyses will be chopped, boiled and buried following the Biosafety Permit
requirements.
Finally, it is argued that the precautionary principle is not applicable considering that the field testing is only a
part of a continuing study being done to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative impact on
the environment. There is thus no resulting environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health, property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Moreover, the issues raised by Greenpeace, et
al. largely involve technical matters which pertain to the special competence of BPI whose determination
thereon is entitled to great respect and even finality.

ON THE PROCEDURAL ASPECT, ISAAA sought the dismissal of the petition for writ of kalikasan for
non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts and the allegations therein being mere assertions and baseless
conclusions of law.
EMB, BPI and FPA questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. in filing the petition for writ of kalikasan
as they do not stand to suffer any direct injury as a result of the Bttalong field tests. They likewise prayed for
the denial of the petition for continuing mandamus for failure to state a cause of action and for utter lack of
merit.
UPMFI also questioned the legal standing of Greenpeace, et al. for failing to allege that they have been
prejudiced or damaged, or their constitutional rights to health and a balanced ecology were violated or
threatened to be violated by the conduct of Bttalong field trials.
Petitioner UPLBFI argues that respondents failed to adduce the quantum of evidence necessary to prove actual
or imminent injury to them or the environment as to render the controversy ripe for judicial determination;
UPLBFI contends that testimonial and documentary evidence of respondents, taken together, do not amount to
"scientifically plausible" evidence of threats of serious and irreversible damage to the environment; Lastly,
UPLBFI avers that the Bttalong field trial was an exercise of the constitutional liberty of scientists and other
academicians of UP, of which they have been deprived without due process of law.

ISSUES & RULING:

1. WON respondents have legal standing of respondents.

YES. The rule on standing is a matter of procedure which can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. This Court
recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” Court held that such
right need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

2. WON this case is already moot.

NO. Time and again, courts have refrained from even expressing an opinion in a case where the issues have
become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a determination
thereof would be of no practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. Court finds that the presence of the second and fourth exceptions justified the CA in not
dismissing the case despite the termination of Bttalong field trials. While it may be that the project
proponents of Bttalong have terminated the subject field trials, it is not certain if they have actually completed
the field trial stage for the purpose of data gathering. At any rate, it is on record that the proponents expect to
proceed to the next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial propagation of the Bt eggplants.
Biosafety permits will still be issued by the BPI for Bttalong or other GM crops. Hence, not only does this case
fall under the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the mootness principle, the human
and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically modified plant, a very
popular staple vegetable among Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.

3. WON there is violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
NO. The provisions of DAO 08-2002 (the dept order providing rules and regulations for the importation
and release into the environment of plants and plant products derived from the use of modem biotechnology) do
not provide a speedy, or adequate remedy for the respondents "to determine the questions of unique national
and local importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus they were
justified in coming to this Court." It is taken into judicial notice of the fact that genetically modified food is an
intensely debated global issue, and despite the entry of GMO crops (Bt corn) into the Philippines in the last
decade, it is only now that such controversy involving alleged damage or threat to human health and the
environment from GMOs has reached the courts.

4. WON law on environmental applies on impact statement/assessment on projects involving the

introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country.
YES. The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and indirect
impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed
by appropriate environmental protection and enhancement measures. It "aids proponents in incorporating
environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in determining the environment's impact on
their project." All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to
undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of the environment are required to prepare a
detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity. An
environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as "likely to have significant adverse impact
that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse" and which "include activities that have significant environmental
consequences." In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential
hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field testing
would definitely fall under the category of ECP. Therefore, said laws apply.

5. WON the Precautionary Principle is applicable in this case.

YES. The precautionary principle applies when the following conditions are met : uncertainties; possible
harm that are scientifically reasonable (that is based on some scientifically plausible reasoning); short term
without at the same time increasing ignorance of other relevant factors by higher levels of abstraction and
idealization; the potential harm is sufficiently serious or even irreversible for present or future generations or
otherwise morally unacceptable; counteraction later will be made significantly more difficult or costly at any
later time.
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
xx SEC. 1. Applicability . - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in
resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit
of the doubt.
SEC. 2. Standards for application . - In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors,
among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future
 generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights
of those affected.
Under this Rule , the precautionary principle finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases
before the courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases where scientific certainty in factual
findings cannot be achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court may construe a set of facts as
warranting either judicial action or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. An
application of the precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will enable courts to tackle future
environmental problems before ironclad scientific consensus emerges.
For a biodiversity-rich country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination
and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible. Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-
implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the
determination of the applicability of the EIS requirements to GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the
application of the precautionary principle. There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs
into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the
health of our people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.

WHEREFORE , the petitions are DENIED . The Decision dated May 17, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00013 is hereby
MODIFIED, as follows:
1. The conduct of the assailed field testing for Bttalong is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED ;
2. Department of Agriculture Administrative Order No. 08, series of 2002 is declared NULL AND VOID ; and
3. Consequently, any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and importation of genetically modified
organisms is TEMPORARILY ENJOINED until a new administrative order is promulgated in accordance with law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CONCURRING OPINIONS
VELASCO,JR., J. - Vote to DENY the petition on the grounds that the project proponents failed to comply with the requirements
under the PEISS and that the DENR-EMB failed to require from/he project proponents the securing of an ECC or a CNC prior to the
field testing of the Bttalong.
i. Anent the technical aspect of the case, the subject matter of the instant petition—that is, field testing of a GMO—is truly of a
highly complex nature and this complexity is strongly demonstrated by the fact that the matter remains to be hotly debated in the
scientific community. However, it is respectfully submitted that the instant petition can be resolved, and the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology sufficiently protected, on a purely legal ground.

ii. Anent the invocation of the Precautionary Principle under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Court's Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, it is submitted that such is not necessary in the instant petition since, as mentioned, it could be sufficiently
settled on purely legal grounds and without a heavy, if not complete, reliance on the scientific aspect of the case. As correctly
mentioned by the ponencia , it is an evidentiary rule that must be applied only as a last resort. Thus, if an environmental case can
be settled and the people's environmental rights sufficiently protected without applying this principle, then the courts should
refrain from doing so.

iii. As to the alleged neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents in connection with the processing and
evaluation of the applications for Bttalong field testing and the applicability of the Philippine Environmental Impact Statement
System (PEISS) to GMO field trials. It is in these matters that, in my opinion, the petitioner-agencies failed. it was also stated
that an environmental assessment may be required when a confined field test involves new species, organisms or novel
modifications that raise new issues. Considering that data on the Bttalong, as admitted by the proponents, is still being collected
through research and field trials, and that its effects not only on the environment but also on human health are yet to be
determined with scientific certainty, caution calls that the DENR-EMB should have applied the required standard of precaution
under EO 514, which requires that the precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions in accordance with Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration of 1992 [38] and the relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Articles 1, 10
(par.6)and 11 (par. 8) thereof.

iv. With these, it is respectfully submitted that the omission by the project proponents of securing an ECC or CNC, whichever is
proper for its project, prior to the conduct of the field testing, and the DENR-EMB's failure to evaluate GMO field trials within
the purview of the PEISS and simply allowing the trials to be conducted without a prior determination of whether the conduct of
an EIA or the prior securing of an ECC is a condition sine qua non for its conduct, warrant the issuance of a permanent
environmental protection order directing:
 a. herein project proponents to cease and desist from continuing any pending Bttalong field trials without first
complying with other applicable environmental laws, including the PEISS; and
b. the DENR-EMB to apply the PEISS to GMO field trials
CONCURRING OPINION - LEONEN, J.
SUMMARY
The Petition for Writ of Kalikasan of Greenpeace insofar as it assails the field testing permit granted to private petitioners
should have been dismissed and considered moot and academic by the CA. The Petition for Writ of Kalikasan was filed
only a few months before the two-year permit expired and when the field testing activities were already over. This does
not necessarily mean that respondents can proceed to commercially propagate Bttalong. Under DA AO No. 8, Series of
2002, the proponent should submit a new set of requirements that will undergo a stringent process of evaluation by the
Bureau of Plant Industry and other agencies. Completion of field testing by itself does not guarantee commercial
propagation.

The cessation of the validity of all the biosafety permits issued to the University of the Philippines Los Banos and the
termination of all field trials render the Petition for Writ of Kalikasan moot and academic.  Administrative Order No. 8
recognizes three (3) stages before genetically modified organisms—as products, ingredients, or processes— may become
commercially available.

The first stage is the Contained Use where research on regulated articles is limited inside a physical containment facility
for purposes of laboratory experimentation.
The second stage is Field Testing where regulated articles are intentionally introduced into the environment in a highly
regulated manner also for experimental purposes. It is specifically recognized that in field testing, no specific physical
containment measures shall be undertaken "to limit that contact of the regulated article with ... the general population and
the environment."4 Prior to field testing, the results of the contained experiments are taken into consideration.
Finally, the Propagation stage is where regulated articles are introduced into commerce.

Mere completion of a preceding stage is no guarantee that the subsequent stage shall ensue. While each subsequent stage
proceeds from the prior ones, each stage is subject to its unique set of requisites. It is, thus, improper to rely on the
expectation that commercial propagation of Bttalong shall ensue after field testing. For the process to proceed to
commercial propagation, the concerned applicants are still required to formally seek the permission of the Bureau of Plant
Industry by filing an application form.

Sections 15 and 16 of Article II are not simply hortatory rights. They are as much a part of the fundamental law as any
other provision in the Constitution. They add to the protection of the right to life in Article III, Section 1. Sections 15 and
16, however, impose on the state a positive duty to "promote and protect" the right to health and to "promote and
advance" the right of "the people to a balanced and healthful ecology." With respect to health and ecology, therefore, the
state is constitutionally mandated to provide affirmative protection.
At its bare minimum, Sections 15 and 16 imply that the standard to be used by the state in the discharge of its regulatory
oversight should be clear. This is where Administrative Order No. 8 fails. While providing for processes, it does not refer
to any standard of evaluating the applications to be presented before the Department of Agriculture or, in field testing, the
Scientific Review Technical Panel. There are many of such standards available based on best practices. For instance, the
regulators may be required to evaluate applications so that there is a scientific demonstration of a "reasonable certainty of
no harm" to both health and environment in all aspects in the creation, testing, and propagation of genetically modified
ingredients, processes, or products. Without these standards, Sections 15 and 16 become meaningless. Hence, in this
regard, Administrative Order No. 8 is null and void.

In addition, the Philippines also sources its environmental obligations from conventions and subsequent protocols. On
May 24, 2000, the Philippines became one of the signatories to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biodiversity. The Cartagena Protocol's objective is to ensure "an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology. . . ." Article 23 of the
Cartagena Protocol stresses that the public must be consulted in the decision-making process regarding living modified
organisms, and that the decisions made with this regard must be communicated to the public.

Both the Cartagena Protocol and National Biosafety Framework require participation from community members.
However, in Administrative Order No. 8, the applicant has the initial choice as to the community representatives who will
participate as members of the Institutional Biosafety Committee. The approval by the National Committee on Biosafety of
the Philippines is not a sufficient mechanism to check this discretion.
The Court of Appeals, instead of relying on these standards of science, employed a "hot tub" examination of experts. It
took into account literature on Btmaize or Bt cotton, and various arguments and studies conducted for Bt maize. It then
made conclusions, without a rigorous explanation of its methodology and standards for credibility, from these studies.
Without these rigorous explanations, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it
considered Bt maize research. Ideally, the Court of Appeals should have scrutinized the results of the contained
experimentation with respect to Bttalong because the results were the basis for the Bureau of Plant Industry's allowance of
field testing. It should have examined whether the experimentation conducted may be replicated and whether it will yield
the same result.

If any, the resolution of this case implies rigor in environmental advocacy. Vigilance and passion are the hallmarks of the
public interest movement. There is no reason that the members of this movement should not evolve the proper skills and
attitudes to properly work the legal system and understand the role of the judicial process. Environmental advocacy also
requires an understanding of science and the locating of the proper place of various norms such as the precautionary
principle. After all, representation of marginalized community voices deserves excellent representation and responsible
leadership. Filing a judicial remedy almost two years too late and without the required scientific rigor patently required by
the allegations and the arguments misses these standards.

But, we cannot "just leave things as they are especially when patent unconstitutional provisions surface and where
deference will amount to a denial of the positive constitutional duties we are required to discharge. There are grave errors
in Administrative Order No. 8 that stack decisions made by the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Plant
Industry in favor of the commercial applicant. We have so far only evaluated the provisions in accordance with law and
found them wanting. By declaring Administrative Order No. 8 null and void, there is now incentive for either Congress or
our administrative bodies to review the present regulatory framework and bring it not only to legal fiat but also to address
all concerns including those voiced by respondents in this case.

Food safety and food security are vital for the assurance of human dignity. We can only hope that the complex issues
relating to genetic modification of the food we eat be debated deliberately, vigorously, and with all the scientific rigor and
rationality required in the proper public forums. Food safety and food security are complex issues requiring the benefit of
all the wisdom of all our people.

RASHIDO
Case 3b
ISAAA V. GREENPEACE
JULY 26, 2016

*This is the Resolution of the MR of the December 2015 Decision (Shasha’s digest)
SUMMARY: The Court granted the MR (setting aside its previous decision) on the ground of mootness. These
cases stemmed from respondent’s petition for writ of kalikasan. The writ being sought was mooted by the
expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by the Bureau of Plant and Industry and the completion of the
BtTalong field trials. There is no more field test to enjoin. Also, there is no perceptible benefit to the public
that may be gained by resolving respondent’s petition for writ of kalikasan.

2015 CASE
The CA Ruling
CA ruled in favor of respondents and directed petitioners to pemanently cease and desist from conducting
the Bttalong  field trials. At the outset, it did not find merit in petitioners' contention that the case should be dismissed
on the ground of mootness, noting that the issues raised by the latter were "capable of repetition yet evading review"
since the Bttalong  field trial was just one of the phases or stages of an overall and bigger study that is being conducted
in relation to the said genetically-modified organism. It then held that the precautionary principle set forth under
Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is relevant, considering the Philippines' rich
biodiversity and uncertainty surrounding the safety of Bttalong.  It noted the possible irreversible effects of the field
trials and the introduction of Bttalong  to the market, and found the existing regulations issued by the DA and the DOST
insufficient to guarantee the safety of the environment and the health of the people. Anent UPLB 's argument that the
Writ of Kalikasan  violated its right to academic freedom, the CA emphasized that the writ did not stop the research
on Bttalong  but only the procedure employed in conducting the field trials.

Petition for review on certiorari  before SC.

SC denied the petitions and held that the precautionary principle applies in this case since the risk of harm from the field
trials of Bttalong  remains uncertain and there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible harm. The Court likewise
agreed with the CA in not dismissing the case for being moot and academic despite the completion and termination of
the Bttalong  field trials, on account of the following exceptions to the mootness principle:
(a) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; and
(b) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Further, the Court declared DAO 08-2002 null and void for failure to consider the provisions of the National Biosafety
Framework.

2016 CASE (MR)

ISSUES:
(1) W/N the case should have been dismissed for mootness in view of the completion and termination of
the Bttalong  field trials and the expiration of the Biosafety Permits. 
(2) W/N the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as it was not raised as an issue. 

RULING:
(1) YES.
On the paramount public interest 
Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining whether a case involves
paramount public interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a survey of cases would show that,
as a common guidepost for application, there should be some perceivable benefit to the public which
demands the Court to proceed with the resolution of otherwise moot questions. In the instant case, no
perceivable benefit to the public - whether rational or practical - may be gained by resolving respondents'
petition for Writ of Kalikasan on the merits.

To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for Writ of Kalikasan, were
mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits issued by the BPI and the completion and
termination of the Bttalong field trials subject of the same. These incidents effectively negated the necessity
for the reliefs sought by respondents in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field
test to enjoin. Hence, at the time the CA rendered its Decision dated May 17, 2013, the reliefs petitioner
sought and granted by the CA were no longer capable of execution.

There are three (3) stages before genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) may become commercially
available under DAO 08-2002. Specifically, before a genetically modified organism is allowed to be
propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for propagation must be secured from the BPI; (b) it can be
shown that based on the field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will not pose any
significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed safety studies show that the regulated article will not
pose any significant risks to human and animal health; and (d) if the regulated article is a pest-protected
plant, its transformation event has been duly registered with the FPA.As the matter never went beyond the
field testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were pursued or the requirements
therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after-effects to the already concluded Bttalong field
trials that demand an adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any future threat to the
right ,of herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is therefore more
imagined than real.

More significantly, it is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in assessing the merits of field
trials whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bttalong tested, but are now, in fact,
rendered obsolete by the supervening change in the regulatory framework applied to GMO field testing. To
be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by Joint Department Circular No. 1, series of
 2016  (JDC 01-2016), issued by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the DA, the DENR,
89

the Department of Health (DOH), and the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which
provides a substantially different regulatory framework from that under DAO 08-2002 

On capable of repetition yet evading review

The supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC 01-2016 clearly prevents this case from being one capable of
repetition so as to warrant review despite its mootness. The regulatory framework now applicable in
conducting risk assessment in matters involving the research, development, handling, movement, and
release into the environment of genetically modified plant and plant products derived from the use of modem
biotechnology is substantially different from that which was applied to the subject field trials. 

The Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before a case is deemed one capable of
repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior
to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action.

Here, respondents cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too short to be fully litigated. It
must be emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were issued on March 16, 2010
and June 28, 2010, and were valid for two (2) years. 

(2) YES. The Court should not have even delved into the constitutionality of DAO 08-2002 as it was
merely collaterally challenged by respondents, based on the constitutional precepts of the people's rights
to information on matters of public concern, to public participation, to a balanced and healthful ecology, and
to health.

RECHINE
4. Resident Mammals v. Reyes, 756 SCRA 513, April 21, 2015
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the Respondents in the petitions are
 “Resident Marine Mammals”- are the toothed whales, (a) Angelo T. Reyes, as then Sec. of the Dept. of Energy
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, which (SDOE);
inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. (b) Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR;
 “Stewards” - They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos and (c) Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENR-Regional Director
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal for Region VII and
guardians and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and (d) Chairman of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape
seek the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Management Board;
 former President GMA- also impleaded as an unwilling (e)Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX), a
co-petitioner for her express declaration and undertaking in company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with
the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among a Philippine branch office; and
others. (f)Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged
Philippine agent of JAPEX.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the

 Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center (FIDEC), a non-stock, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization, established for
the welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and
 Cerilo D. Engarcial, Ramon Yanong and Francisco Labid, in their personal capacities and as representatives of the subsistence
fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, Cebu.
X XX --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X XX

FACTS: On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through SDOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with respondent JAPEX. This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Tañon Strait. The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted
by SDOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.

SDOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850 sq. km offshore the Tañon Strait. From May 9 to 18, 2005,
JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751
km was also done to determine the area’s underwater composition.
 JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the well was to be drilled in the
marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to P.D. 1586, entitled “Establishing An Environmental
Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes.”

The Protected Area Management Boardof the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it
adopted the Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of
JAPEX’s application for an ECC. The Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE
and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well,
with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.

Petitioners applied to this Court for redress wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46
for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX’s oil exploration activities in the Tañon Strait, petitioners aver the following:
 A study made after the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent. They claim
that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to 20 kilos; but after the activity, the
fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a day. They attribute this “reduced fish catch” to the destruction of
the “payao,” also known as the “fish aggregating device” or “artificial reef.”
 Also impute the incidences of “fish kill”observed by some of the local fisherfolk to the seismic survey.
 the ECC obtained by JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected stakeholders, a
prerequisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC’s issuance.
 during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the
point where the oilrig was located, an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius “exclusion zone” stated in the IEE. 
 DENR and EMB abused their discretion when they issued an ECC to DOE and JAPEX without ensuring the strict
compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the Environmental Impact Assessment system, the
Fisheries Code, and their implementing rules and regulations. It further claims that despite several requests for copies of
all the documents pertaining to the project in Tañon Strait, only copies of the PAMB-Tañon Strait Resolution and the
ECC were given to the fisherfolk.
 As to Legal Standing:
 The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, “claim” that they have the legal standing to file this
action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit.
 Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as
they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of
Tañon Strait and as stewards of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its
duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.

Furthermore, Petitioner FIDEC asserts that

 SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical and financial assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the
same provision. 
 the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining contracts under Republic Act No. 7942, does not apply in this case.
 The PD No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it is deemed to have
been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which enunciate new policies concerning the environment. 
 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the
Filipinos of our natural resources, and paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial Technical
Assistance Agreements.

Public Respondents’, on the other hand, alleged the following:

 petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition;
 that SC-46 does not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions;
 the ECC was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations;
 public respondents may not be compelled by mandamusto furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC-46;
 that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief.
 They further contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and academic by the fact that SC-46
had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto effective June 21, 2008.
 As to Legal Standing:
 Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an
action to be either natural or juridical persons.
 As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal standing on the ground that
they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an action.
  Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim that absent any proof that former
President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her
own.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Petitioners possess the legal standing to file this petition
(2) Whether or not the SC-46 is null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
(1) YES. The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit
any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws .—It had been suggested by animal
rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the
difficulty for persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation of these
animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that
he/she would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction,  locus standi in environmental
cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not
progressed as far as Justice Douglas’s paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards simplification
of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. Recently, the Court passed the landmark  Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts for
violations of our environmental laws.

Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Supreme Court (SC) had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases.—Even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases.
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations yet unborn “based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, we
said that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed
to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the
foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio,
having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals,
are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her
office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
from requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided attention.”—Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.

(2) YES.In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), the Supreme Court (SC) held that the deletion
of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution didnot amount to a ban on them per se.—This Court has previously settled
the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), we held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a
ban on them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the Constitutional
Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service
contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime.
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are
governed by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 .—The disposition, exploration,
development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or
the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery
and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the
maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument,
Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed.

Service Contract No. 46 vis-à-vis Other Laws

Tañon Strait — is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich
biodiversity of marine life, including endangered species of dolphins and whales.
 NOTE: Congress enacted the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to secure the
perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of
integrated protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically
important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones
and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine.It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to
ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent
possible.

Protected area— refers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to
enhance biological diversity and protected against human exploitation. The following categories of protected areas were established
under the NIPAS Act:
 a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government is a signatory.

NOTE: The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a protected area under the
category of Protected Seascape.

Protected Seascape — to be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while
providing opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this
areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent preservation of its natural
conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to
undertaking any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is obtained, no activity
inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be implemented.

Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) — was established in 1978 under PD 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or
corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an ECC issued
by the President or his duly authorized representative. It called for the proper management of environmentally critical areas.

Proclamation No. 2146 — identified the areas and types of projects to be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope
of the EISS. DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).

Environmentally critical area — “an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts are
expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which
is “any activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,”is undertaken in it, such
project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the environment.

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves evaluating and predicting the likely impacts of a project
(including cumulative impacts) on the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes
designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these consequences to protect the environment
and the community’s welfare. The process is undertaken by, among others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a
Review Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.

NOTE: Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having been declared as a protected
area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC
secured after undergoing an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system. It is true that the restrictions
found under the NIPAS Act are not without exceptions. However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for
energy resources is allowed under Section 14 of the NIPAS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the requirement
to undergo an EIA under Section 12. Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying
with the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites before any exploration for energy
resources may be done in protected areas.

The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46,
which required the drilling of an oil exploration well. This means that when the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon Strait,
no such environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the management plan of the Tañon
 Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586. The
respondents’ subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46 cannot and will not cure this violation.
The following penalties are provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.

Moreover, SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources in the
Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil
in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon
which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of
this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is
a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no
energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and procedural rights for animals through their
allegation that they can speak for them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen by the Resident
Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait; (b) they were chosen by a representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals;
(c) they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent from their animal principals that they would wish to
use human legal institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge through judicial notice that the
interests that they, the human petitioners, assert are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had they been
humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies that they agree with.

In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a relationship of guardianship between them and all
the resident mammals in the affected ecology.

A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case is a real party-in-interest. 7When a case is brought
to the courts, the real party-in-interest must show that another party’s act or omission has caused a direct injury, making his or her
interest both material and based on an enforceable legal right. Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in
representation of the real party-in-interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

In the United States, animal rights advocates have managed to establish a system which Hogan explains as
the “guardianship model for nonhuman animals”: Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by
which nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights and protections:
guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals
in the same way court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans who possess an
enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.

When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as individuals who
have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. They are also
similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore,
may be properly represented as real parties-in-interest. The same cannot be said about animals.

Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to
nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the
courts. As humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know what remedy they
need in the face of an injury.

Even in Hogan’s discussion, she points out that in a case before the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass’n v. Weinberger, the court held that an emotional response to what humans perceive to be an
injury inflicted on an animal is not within the “zone-of-interest” protected by law.Such sympathy cannot stand independent of or as a
substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant. The ability to represent animals was further limited in that case by the need to
prove “genuine dedication” to asserting and protecting animal rights:

In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA
might have obtained standing in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the humane treatment of
animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might
have had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization’s standing is more than a derivative of its history, but
history is a relevant consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to commencing legal action . ALVA was not the
proper plaintiff because it could not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and commitment to the
dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The court’s analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a
demonstrated commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in the form of a court-sanctioned
guardianship. (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to implead and feign representation on behalf of
animals. To have done so betrays a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that we, humans, can
claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that humans
seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for themselves, which of course includes compassion for all
living things.

I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiño regarding this rule alongside the appreciation of legal standing
in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., for environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality, especially in cases brought by
representatives, should be used with great caution:
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental concerns in light of emerging
international legal principles. While “intergenerational responsibility” is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments
that would preclude future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present generation
must restrain itself from assuming that it can speakbest for those who will exist at a different time, under a different set of
circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from
protecting their own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our children’s
children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear
legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no
possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is
an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is
necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.(Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, in PAJE:
A person cannot invoke the court’s jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the court’s
jurisdiction must be the “owner of the right sought to be enforced.” The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a
citizen’s suit. A citizen’s suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on
behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not real parties-in-interest
to institute actions on behalf of the real party-in-interest.
To allow citizen’s suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question its
representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on political issues, the resolutions
of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class or citizen’s suit on behalf of minors and generations yet
unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining
future generation’s true interests on the matter.
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential to diminish the
value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of “real party-in-interest” to the Resident Marine Mammals, or
animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the
extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of
guesswork, and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring “reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-founded
arguments”on behalf of those they represent.
 
In G.R. No. 180771, apart from adjudicating unto themselves the status of “legal guardians” of whales, dolphins, porpoises, and
other cetacean species, human petitioners also impleaded Former President GMA as “unwilling co-petitioner” for “her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect Tañon Strait.” However, Former President GMA cannot be a party to
this suit. As a coequal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his
or her alter egos. The Former President’s name should be stricken out of the title of this case.
   
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46’s validity is P.D. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972. It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it allows service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter into
withforeign-owned corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer allowed by the
Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution,this inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective.

SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which is
that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of the parties should it be
discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under PD 1234  requires
that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically
for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of RA 7586 or the NIPAS.

Former President GMA was not the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2
for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered into by then DOE on behalf of the government. I
agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty
cannot be delegated to another public official.La Bugal highlights the importance of the President’s involvement, being one of the
constitutional safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality. At this point, we sum up the matters established, based
on a careful reading of the ConCom deliberations, as follows:
 In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term  service contracts in referring toagreements
x x x involving either technical or financial assistance.
 They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
 It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service contracts.
 Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
during the marital law regime.
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative
of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the
NIPAS.

In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of
1992 (NIPAS) additionally requires that a program be approved by the DENR, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall
also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law
specifically allowing the exploitation of energy resources found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an ECC for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an environmental
impact evaluation only in the second sub-phase of its project, with the Environmental Management Bureau of Region VII granting the
project an ECC on March 6, 2007. Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted without any
environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the NIPAS ACT OF 1992.
 
Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment. As sentient species, we do not lack in the wisdom
or sensitivity to realize that we only borrow the resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not incapable of mitigating the
greed that is slowly causing the demise of our planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign representation of any other species or some
imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to claim any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In
this way and with candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace and power endowed on our species.

MACY
Carino v Insular Government
FACTS:The applicant and plaintiff Mateo Carinois an Igorot of the province of Benguet, where the land lies. For
more than fifty years before the treaty of Paris, and as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his
ancestors had held the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient
for the holding of cattle. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or
received the land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had
issued from the Spanish Crown, and although, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897, he made application for
one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it. In 1901 the plaintiff filed a
petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, establishing only
a possessory title. Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine
Commission's act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the province of Benguet from its operation. But that act deals with
the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the perfecting of titles begun under the
Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration under the
Philippine Commission's act No. 496, of 1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction
'throughout the Philippine archipelago,'

ISSUE: WON The plaintiff owns the land

RULING: Yes. The plaintiff is entitled to the registration of the land. The land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the
doubt. Under the Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."  For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For
uncultivated, 30. Thus, Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father
ever was made. Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.There must be a presumption against the government
when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent
contrary proof. 

COELI
CASE NO. 5
CRUZ v. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT
FACTS:
 Cruz and Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of R.A. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
 SC required the respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions to comment. Thus, they filed their Comment to the
Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA.
 Secretaries of DENR and DBM filed thru SolGen a consolidated comment. The SolGen is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
 Intervenors: the ff filed Motions to Intervene – Sen. Flavier (author of IPRA), Mr. Bennage (member of 1986 ConCom), leaders
and members of indigenous groups, CHR, Haribon et. al. = all prayed that the petition be dismissed
 Petitioners assailed, among others, the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on
the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution:
o (1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
o (2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies
of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
o (3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
o (4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
o (5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
o (6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right
to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for
a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
o (7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
 Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which
might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.

RULING: As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon.
However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
1. PUNO: DISMISS PETITION
The IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities'
right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people. The IPRA recognizes
the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It
grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands
and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and empowerment, social
justice and human rights, the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and
the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.

NCIP
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still unresolved, the matter may be brought
to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for
review.

The provisions of the IPRA do not contravene the Constitution

Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the
public domain. The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands
are not the same as ancestral domains.
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters,
coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally
had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or
shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited
to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or
traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots.

Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral
lands only.

Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim
of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated. Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title.

2. VITUG: GRANT PETITION

IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally millions of hectares. The notion
of community property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-governance over the
curved-out territory. These provisions of IPRA, are beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue
delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the law. Indeed, the State is
exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail a balancing of
interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national interest.

3. KAPUNAN: DISMISS PETITION

The provisions of the IPRA affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of
native title do not diminish the State’s ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are
considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain.
The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to
the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of natural resources under existing
laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous
peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them
under the aforesaid laws

The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions of the IPRA which, among others, establish the
composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact
the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of
customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution.

4. MENDOZA: DISMISS PETITION

In his Opinion, he voted to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds, not on the issue of the constitutionality of the IPRA. “I do not
conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution to determine in the abstract whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in
enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in
enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all cases. . . ."

5. PANGANIBAN: GRANT PETITION

All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing
provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the 1987
Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all
those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
400 years of Philippine political history cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA. The perceived lack of understanding of the cultural
minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged
simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles,
ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It would be
plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the
country’s resources.

Cariño v. Insular Government has been modified or superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be
understood as referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim
of Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above.

No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371

Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land,
whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only. IPRA,
however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts
of the nation's territory. The properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through
their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources
Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in
the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof.38 And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-
ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the
rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.

MARTIN
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. RAMOS
G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004

FACTS:

This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition that assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942,
otherwise known as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto.

July 25, 1987 - then President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of
agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale (single mining unit with a capital of
at least $50M) exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.
March 3, 1995 - then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. The law prescribes the qualifications of
contractors and grants them certain rights, including timber, water and easement rights, and the right to
possess explosives.
March 30, 1995 – prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942 the President entered into an Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with Western Mining Corporation Philippines, Inc. (WMCP) covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. Note that this FTAA
WMPC was entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279.
April 9, 1995 – Effectivity of R.A. No. 7942
August 15, 1995 - then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 95- 23, s.
1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942.
B- counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the DENR
stop the implementation of R.A. No, 7942 and DAO No. 96-40.

Petitioners averred that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA applications had already been filed,
covering an area of 8.4 million hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations
covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over
offshore areas. Furthermore, they claim that the assailed law is unconstitutional as it runs afoul to the
provisions of Sec.2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, under the Act, an FTAA contractor
warrants that it “has or has access to all the financing, managerial, and technical expertise . . . .” This suggests
that an FTAA contractor is bound to provide some management assistance - a form of assistance that has been
eliminated and, therefore, proscribed by the present Charter. Specifically, they claim that the WMC FTAA,
which was entered into pursuant to E.O. No. 279, violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution because,
among other reasons:
(1) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the State
in the exploitation, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, and even
permits foreign owned companies to operate and manage mining activities.
(2) It allows foreign-owned companies to extend both technical and financial assistance, instead of either
technical or financial assistance.

Nonetheless, the respondents alleged that January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws. WMCP claims that at least 60% of the
equity of Sagittarius is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations while about 40% is owned by an
Australian Company hence such transfer already cured any claims for unconstitutionality. The Court addressed
it in this manner: These circumstances, while informative, are hardly significant in the resolution of this case, it
involving the validity of the FTAA, not the possible consequences of its invalidation.

Section 33, Chapter VI of R.A. 7942 states: A legally organized foreign-owned corporation may be granted an
exploration permit, right to conduct exploration for all minerals in specified areas, i.e., to enter, occupy and
explore the same. Eventually, the foreign-owned corporation, as such permittee, may apply for a financial and
technical assistance agreement

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not foreign-owned mining companies are allowed to extend both financial and
technical assistance to the state for large-scale mining operations.
(2) Whether or not technical or financial assistance agreements are synonymous to service contracts.
(3) Whether or not foreign-owned mining companies are allowed to provide managerial assistance in the
exploitation, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.

RULINGS:
The first sentence of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution embodies the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia.
Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal concept is based on the State’s power of dominium, which
is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property.The Regalian doctrine extends not only to land but also
to all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth, thus, declaring all natural resources of the
Philippines,including mineral lands and minerals, to be propertybelonging to the State.

Under the Regalian theory, mineral rights are not included in a grant of land by the state; under the American
doctrine, mineral rights are included in a grant of land by the government. In particular, earlier jurisprudence
held that: The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location, perfect his claim
and his location, not only against third persons but also against the Government. x xx. [Italics in the original.]

The 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian doctrine. Consonant with the State’s “full supervision and
control” over natural resources, Section 2 of Article XII offers the State twooptions: One, the State may
directly undertake these activities itself; or two, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or entities at least 60% of whose capital is owned by such citizens.A
third option is found in the third paragraph of the same section. While the second and third options are
limited only to Filipino citizens or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by Filipinos, a fourth allows the participation of foreign-ownedcorporations. Although Section 2 sanctions the
participation of foreign- owned corporations in the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources, it imposes certain limitations or conditions to agreements with such corporations.
First, the parties to FTAAs. Only the President, in behalf of the State, may enter into these agreements, and
only with corporations. By contrast, under the 1973 Constitution, a Filipino citizen, corporation or association
may enter into a service contract with a “foreign person or entity.” Second, the size of the activities: only
large-scaleexploration, development, and utilization is allowed. Theterm large-scale usually refers to very
capital-intensiveactivities.Third, the natural resources subject of the activities isrestricted to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils,the intent being to limit service contracts to those areaswhere Filipino
capital may not be sufficient.Fourth, consistency with the provisions of statute. Theagreements must be in
accordance with the terms and conditions provided by law.Fifth, Section 2 prescribes certain standards for
entering into such agreements. The agreements must be based on real contributions to economic growth and
general welfare of the country.Sixth, the agreements must contain rudimentary stipulations for the promotion
of the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.Seventh, the notification requirement.
The President shall notify Congress of every financial or technical assistance agreement entered into within
thirty days from its execution.Finally, the scope of the agreements. While the 1973 Constitution referred to
„service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance, the 1987 Constitution
provides for “agreements . . . involving either financial or technical assistance.” It bears noting that the
phrases “service contracts” and “management or other forms of assistance” in the earlier constitution have
been omitted.

The nationalization of the natural resources was intended

(1) to insure their conservation for Filipino posterity;
(2) toserve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension to the country of foreign control
through peaceful economic penetration; and
(3) to avoidmaking the Philippines a source of international conflicts
with the consequent danger to its internal security and
independence.

(1) No. It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrumentmust be so construed as to
give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. Accordingly, following the literal text of the
Constitution, assistance accorded by foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils should be limited to technical orfinancial assistance
only.
(2) No. the phrase “service contracts”has been deleted in the 1987 Constitution’s Article on NationalEconomy
and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of service contracts under the 1973
Constitution, it could have simply adopted the old terminology (service contract) instead of employing new
and unfamiliar terms (“agreements . . . involving either technical or financial assistance”). Such a difference
between the language of a provision in a revised constitution and that of a similar provision in the preceding
constitution is viewed as indicative of a difference in purpose. It is said service contracts lodge exclusive
management and control of the enterprise to the service contractor, which is reminiscent of the old
concession regime (the concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country’s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of
extraction). The service contract as we know it here is antithetical to theprinciple of sovereignty over our
natural resources restated in the same article of the [1973] Constitution containing the provision for service
contracts. If the service contractor happens to be a foreign corporation, the contract would also run counter
to the constitutional provision on nationalization or Filipinization.
(3) No.By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, the
above-cited provisions of R.A. No. 7942 have in effect conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation’s mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.Management and other
forms of assistance are also not permitted as it has been clearly not adopted by the 1987 Constitution from
the 1973 Constitution.

In any case, the constitutional provision allowing thePresident to enter into FTAAs with foreign-owned
corporations is an exception to the rule that participationin the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively toFilipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construedstrictly against their enjoyment by non-
Filipinos. AsCommissioner Villegas emphasized, the provision is “veryrestrictive.” Commissioner Nolledo also
remarked that “entering into service contracts is an exception to the rule on protection of natural resources
for the interest of the nation and, therefore, being an exception, it should besubject, whenever possible, to
stringent rules.” Indeed,exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed;they extend only so far as
their language fairly warrantsand all doubts should be resolved in favor of the generalprovision rather than
the exception.With the foregoing discussion in mind, this Court finds
that R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.

The Court declared unconstitutional and void:

(1) The following provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:
(a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), (b) Section 23,
(c) Section 33 to 41,
(d) Section 56,
(e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision, and
(3) The, Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.

In sum, the Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution: (1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines ”qualified person” to wit: Provided, That a legally
organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for purposes of granting an
exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral processing permit. (2) Section 23,
which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said section applies to a
financial or technical assistance agreement; (3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a
financial or technical assistance agreement; (4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for
every financial or technical assistance agreement; (5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and
technical assistance agreement to convert the same into a mineral production- sharing agreement; Section 37,
which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance agreement
proposals; Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 40, which
allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements; Section 41, which allows the
withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA; The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the
Government’s share in a financial and technical assistance agreement; and Section 90, which provides for
incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors