Republic of the Philippines 3.
That the said Alberto Barretto exceeded his
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 8692           September 10, 1913
GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of
Caloocan, petitioner, 
vs.
ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of first instance of Rizal,
and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for petitioner.
R. Diokno, and Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for
respondents.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an application for a writ of certiorari  to the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Rizal.
It appears that on or about the 1st of March, 1913,
Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to
open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan,
and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began
an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal
president of said municipality, the officer whose duty he
claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain
a mandamus compelling said official to issue such license.
On the presentation of the verified complaint and upon the
facts stated therein and the exhibits annexed thereto, the
plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction
directed to the defendant requiring him to issue a provisional
license under which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit
during the pendency of the action. The court, in pursuance
of such request and upon the facts stated in the complaint
and exhibits annexed thereto, issued such order ex
parte without notice of the defendant.
Thereupon the defendant in that action began a proceeding
in this court against the judge of the Court of First Instance
who had issued the mandatory injunction relative to the
provisional license referred to, Honorable Alberto Barretto,
and Constancio Joaquin, plaintiff therein, for a writ
of certiorari, alleging that the court below and had acted
without jurisdiction in the following particulars:
1. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto
exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory
injunction, because, according to paragraph ( j),
section 40, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of
municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan (Exhibit
1 a), the issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and
Maypajo does not pertain to the municipal
president of Caloocan but to the municipal council
thereof.
2. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto
exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the mandatory
injunction ex parte without giving the municipal
president opportunity to show cause why such
injunction should not be issued as required by
section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
1
jurisdiction in issuing such mandatory injunction
for the reason that the cockpit license which the
president of Caloocan had erroneously issued in
favor of Constancio Joaquin, on the day of
__________, 1913, has been annulled and
cancelled by virtue of ordinance No. _____ of the
municipal council of Caloocan, which ordinance
has been duly approved by the provincial board of
Rizal.
4. That there being another action pending
between the same parties, founded upon the same
facts and reasons, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory
injunction of the 1st of March, 1913 (Exhibit 4),
for the reason that such injunction tends to render
inefficacious and null the final decision which this
honorable court will render in civil case No. 8673.
The action referred to in this paragraph is one begun by
Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., windows of Angeles,
against Godofredo B. Herrera and others relating to the
validity of a certain ordinance.
5. That there being pending civil case No. 986
mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Court
of First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to
issue the mandatory injunction which he issued on
the 1st of March, 1913, for the reason that it
tends to render inefficacious and null the decision
which the Honorable Richard Campbell will render
in civil cause No. 986.
This objection is based upon an action previously begun by
Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., windows of Angeles,
against the municipality or the officials thereof for the
purpose of having declared null and void municipal
ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan, which is the same ordinance
upon which was based the complaint of Constancio Joaquin
and in which the mandatory injunction was issued.
6. That the said Constancio Joaquin at the present
time does not possess a license to maintain and
run the said cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor
does he have the right to exploit the same.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ
of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that
the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction. It will be not be issued to cure errors
in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law
or of fact. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to
the cause are decision within its jurisdiction and, however
irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected
by certiorari. The Code of Civil Procedure giving Court of
First Instance general jurisdiction in actions for mandamus,
it goes without saying that the Court of First Instance had
jurisdiction in the present case to resolve every question
arising in such an action and to decide every question
presented to it which pertained to the cause. It had already
been held by this court that, while it is a power to be
exercised only in extreme cases, a Court of First Instance
has power to issue a mandatory injunction to stand until the
final determination of the action in which it is issued. While
the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this particular
case may have been irregular and erroneous, a question
concerning which we express no opinion, nevertheless its
issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its
action is not reviewable on certiorari. It is not sufficient to
say that it was issued wrongfully and without sufficient
grounds and in the absence of the other party. The question
is, did the court act with jurisdiction?
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in
requiring the municipal president to issue the license, for the
reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and
that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to
exercise a discretion as to whom the license should be
issued. We do not believe that either of these question goes
to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the
fundamental questions in a mandamus against a public
officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise
discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff
asks him to perform. It is one of the essential determination
of the cause. To claim that the resolution of that question
may deprive the court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel
proposition. It is equivalent to the contention that a court
has jurisdiction if he decides right but no jurisdiction if he
decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never
necessary to decide the fundamental questions of a cause to
determine whether the court has jurisdiction. The question
of jurisdiction is preliminary and never touches the merits of
the case. The determination of the fundamental questions of
a cause are merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already
conceded. In the case at bar no one denies the power,
authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to
take cognizance of an action for mandamus and to decide
every question which arises in that cause and pertains
thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those
questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident
contradiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —
the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and
determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of
the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the
decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority
to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered
therein, is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is
jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have
said before, the decision of all other questions arising in the
case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.
In the case of Chase vs. Christianson (41 Cal., 253), the
court said: "Here, then, was jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the person and these conditions conceded, the
decision of all other question arising in the case is but the
exercise of that jurisdiction and an erroneous decision of any
of these other questions could not impair the validity and
binding force of the judgment when brought in question
collaterally.
It is not the particular decision given which makes
up jurisdiction, but it is the authority to decide the
question at all. Otherwise all distinction between
erroneous exercise of jurisdiction upon the hand,
and a total want of it upon the other, must be
obliterated.
In the case of Freeman vs. Thompson (53 Mo., 183), the
following is quoted with approval from Paine vs.
Mooreland(15 Ohio, 435): "The court once having, by its
process, acquired the power to adjudicate upon a person of
thing, it has what is called jurisdiction. . . . The distinction is
between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court,
and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the
first instance, all acts of a court, not having jurisdiction or
power, are void; in the latter, voidable only. A court, then
may act, first without power or jurisdiction; second, having
power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongfully; or third,
irregularly. In the first instance the act or judgment of the
court is wholly void, and is as though it as though it had not
2
been done; the second is wrong and must be reversed upon
error; the third is irregular and must be corrected by
motion."
In Hardin vs. Lee (51 Mo., 241), the court said: "The
judgment though grossly erroneous was not void, the court
having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . . In a
word, error and nullity are not legal equivalent or
synonymous."
In Hagerman vs. Sutton (91 Mo., 519), the court said: "The
power to decide correctly and to enforce a decision when
correctly made necessarily implies the same power to decide
incorrectly and to enforce a decision when incorrectly made.
(Devis vs. Packard, 10 Wend., 71.)"
In Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435), the court said: "The
distinction is between a lack of power or want of jurisdiction
in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the
power. In the first instance all acts of the court, now having
jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter voidable only."
In the case of Colton vs. Beardsly (38 Barb., 51), the court
said: "The test of jurisdiction is, whether the court has
power to enter on the inquiry, and not whether its decision is
right or wrong."
In Wertheimer vs. Boonville (29 Mo., 25 4), the court said:
"It is hard to conceive how the question of jurisdiction can
be made to depend on the fact whether the judgment was
right or wrong. The mayor unquestionably has authority to
decide whether the ordinance had been violated, and after
he has determined it, how can it be said he had no
jurisdiction?"
In O'Rielly vs. Nicholson (45 Mo., 160), the court said: "A
judgment, though informal, even to the extent of granting a
relief not contemplated in the petition, when the parties are
before the court and the relief is within its jurisdiction, is not
a void proceeding. The doctrine laid down in Fithian vs.
Monks (43 Mo., 502), 'in that it fails to make the readily
observable distinction between jurisdiction to act in a given
cause, and erroneous exercise of such jurisdiction, . . .
should no longer be followed . . . Jurisdiction being acquired
error could not oust it, although that error consisted in
granting relief not warranted by law.'"
In the case of Gray vs. Bowles (74 Mo., 419), the court said:
"When a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action and the parties to it, a judgment rendered by it,
although it may be an erroneous, irregular, or wrong
judgment, cannot be said to be void, but remains valid and
binding until reversed or set aside on the ground of such
error or irregularity."
In States vs. Second Judicial District (24 Mont., 238), the
court said: "A judgment was rendered against Baker, who
appealed but could not furnish the necessary bonds or
security on appeal. The purpose of this application is to set
aside the judgment, the relator asserting that the district
court was without jurisdiction. The right to hear and
determine necessarily carries with it the power to decide
wrong as well as right. It did not exceed its jurisdiction
although the court may have erred, yet it regularly pursued
its authority. Certiorari may not be used to correct errors
committed within the jurisdiction of the court."
In Central Pac. vs. Board (43 Cal., 365) the court said:
"Mere irregularly intervening in the exercise of an admitted
jurisdiction — mere mistakes of law committed in conducting
the proceedings in an inquiry which the Board had authority
to entertain, . . . are not to be considered here
upon certiorari, otherwise that writ would be turned into a
writ of error . . . Jurisdiction over a question presented being
conceded, carries with it necessarily the authority — the
mere power — to decide the question either way."
In Lewis vs. Larson (45 Wis., 353), the court said: "The
judgment of a justice of the peace will not be reversed on a
common-law certiorari, if the justice had jurisdiction to
render it, no matter how irregular or erroneous it may be."
In the case of Utah Association vs. Budge (16 Idaho, 751),
the court said: "If the court had jurisdiction of the person
and the subject matter, then it is clear that whatever
mistakes has been made has been only an error committed
on the part of the trial court in exercising his judgment and
applying the law to the case, rather than an excess of
jurisdiction in acting in a matter wherein he had not acquired
jurisdiction to act or wherein his court has no jurisdiction of
the subject in litigation. . . . The court had the jurisdiction,
power, and authority to hear and determine that question. It
accordingly did so. If the court committed an error in
deciding the question thus presented, we answer that the
court had jurisdiction to commit the error."
Although certiorari  may be considered a direct attack upon a
judgment as distinguished from a collateral attack,
nevertheless, under the laws of these Islands the only
ground for the issuance of certiorari being the failure of
jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the basis of the direct
attack upon the judgment becomes in this jurisdiction the
same as for collateral attack, inasmuch as, generally
speaking, a collateral attack against a judgment is
sustainable only when the judgment is void for lack of
jurisdiction in the court to pronounce it. Therefore the
authorities relative to the ground necessary for a successful
collateral attack upon a judgment are authorities in a large
sense, pertinent to a discussion as to when a court may be
held to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
In the case of Cooper vs. Reynolds (10 Wall., 308), the court
said: "It is of no avail, therefore, to show that there are
errors in the record, unless they be such as prove that the
court had no jurisdiction of the case, or that the judgment
rendered was beyond its power. This principle has been
often held by this court and by all courts, and it takes rank
as an axiom of the law."
In the case of Cornett vs. Williams (30 Wall., 226), it was
declared that "the settled rule of law is, that jurisdiction
having attached in the original case, everything done within
the power of that jurisdiction, when collaterally questioned,
is to be held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless
impeached for fraud."
These two cases were cited and approved in the case
of Manson vs. Duncanson (166 U. S., 533), wherein the
court said: "When a court has jurisdiction it has right to
decide every question that may arise in the cause; and
whether its decisions be correct or not, its judgment, until
reversed, is regarded as binding in every other court. These
principles apply in all respects and with special force in this
case. It was for the court whose decree is attempted to be
impeached, not only to decide on the facts before it, but
upon the construction and legal effect of all deeds and
muniments of title upon which the proceeding was based.
The court having general jurisdiction over the subject matter
of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased debtor and
for the payment of debts, it had the right and was required
to determine the question as to the liability of the property
for the debts, and whether the case was within its
3
jurisdiction; and though its decision may have been
erroneous, it could only be reversed upon a direct appeal."
See Shepard vs. Adams, 168 U. S., 618; Gunn vs. Plant, 94
U. S., 664; Parker vs. Kane, 22 Howard, 1; Huff vs.
Hutchinson, 14 Howard, 586; Thompson vs. Tolmie, 2 Pet.,
157; Hatcher vs. Hendrie, 68 C. C. A., 19.
See also, the long list of authorities cited as sustaining this
doctrine in 23 Cyc., 1090, where the rule is stated as
follows: "Where a court has jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter, its judgment, although irregular in form,
or erroneous or mistaken in law, is conclusive, as long as it
remains unreversed and in force, and cannot be impeached
collaterally."
In the case of Miller vs. Rowan (251 Ill., 344), the court
said: "A judgment or decree is not binding upon anyone
unless the court rendering the same had jurisdiction of the
parties and the subject matter of the cause. The court did
have jurisdiction of the parties, and the appellant, who is
disputing the binding effect of the decree, was one of the
complainants. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power
to adjudge concerning the general question involved, and if
a bill states a case belonging to a general class over which
the authority of the court extends, the jurisdiction attaches
and no error committed by the court can render the
judgment void. It the court has jurisdiction, it is altogether
immaterial, when the judgment is collaterally called in
question, how grossly irregular or manifestly erroneous its
proceedings may have been. The judgment cannot be
regarded as a nullity, and cannot, therefore, be collaterally
impeached. Such a judgment is binding on the parties and
on every other court unless reversed or annulled in a direct
proceeding and is not open to collateral attack. If there is a
total want of jurisdiction in a court its proceedings are an
absolute nullity and confer no right and afford no protection
but will be pronounced void when collaterally drawn in
question. (Buckmaster vs. Carling, 3 Scam., 104;
Swiggart vs. Harber, 1 id., 364; People vs.Seelye, 146 Ill.,
189; Clark vs. People, 146 id., 348; O'Brien vs. People,
216 id., 354; People vs. Talmadge, 194 id., 67.)"
Trombly vs. Klersy (146 Mich., 648); Chapman vs.
Taliaferro (1 Ga. App., 235); Smith vs. Schlink (44 Colo.,
200), where the court said: "That the court had jurisdiction
of the parties and the subject matter cannot be questioned.
This being true, and it not appearing that the judgment was
not within the issues presented by the pleadings, however,
erroneous it may be, the judgment cannot be held to be
void, so as to bring this case within the rule that
disobedience of a void decree does not constitute contempt
of court."
Baldwin vs. Foster (157 Cal., 643), where the court said:
Throughout this consideration the fact is to be
borne in mind that we are not reviewing this
judgment under attack made on direct appeal
where errors prejudicial to those appealing would
call for a reversal, but we are considering it upon
collateral attack, where every intendment is in
favor of the judgment and where mere errors and
irregularities will not be considered. Upon
collateral attack the judgment will be set aside,
generally speaking, for but one of three reasons:
Lack of jurisdiction of the person, lack of
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, or
an absolute lack of jurisdiction to render such a
judgment as the one given. (Moore vs.Martin, 38
Cal., 428; Mayo vs. Foley, 40 Cal., 281; In
re James, 99 Cal., 374; 37 Am. St. Rep., 60; 33
 Pac., 1122; Wood vs. Jordan, 125 Cal., 261; 57
Pac., 997.)
Goodman vs. City (164 Fed., 970); Sawyer vs. Kelly (148
Iowa., 644); Lucy vs. Deas (59 Fla., 552).
That certiorari  will lie only in case of failure of jurisdiction
has been consistently held by this court. The following are
substantially all of the cases decided by this court referring
to certiorari  or prohibition. We include those referring to
prohibition for the reason that the ground of its issuance is
the same as that in certiorari, viz, lack or excess of
jurisdiction:
In the case of In re Prautch (1 Phil. Rep., 1 32), the court
said: "Under the provisions of the code
in certiorari proceedings, it is necessary that it would appear
both that the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction and
that there is no appeal from such court."
In his concurring opinion Judge Willard says: "Considering
the existence of facts which may confer jurisdiction, the
question of whether those facts are presented in such a
manner in the affidavit as to invoke the exercise of this
jurisdiction is one which the court has the same right to
determine as it would have in the decision of any other
questions which might arise in a matter within its
recognizance. In the exercise of this power it may issue an
erroneous order, but such an order is not absolutely void;
unless it is remedied during the same action by means of an
appeal or otherwise, it will have the effect of a valid order.
The Court of First Instance should not give a judgment upon
a complaint on a promissory note which does not state a
cause of action, but if it does so its judgment is valid unless
it is reversed by means of appeal. We cannot defer to any
decision of the supreme court of California which sustains a
contrary doctrine. Article 528, already cited, establishes the
law of these Islands, and we must submit to that. To accept
the other rule would be to convert the writ of habeas
corpus into a writ of error, a thing which is in no wise
permissible. It would make it possible for any defendant by
means of such writ to interpose an appeal to this court in all
those cases in which an order of arrest should be issued and
would oblige us to review the errors of law which are alleged
to have been committed by the court in investigating the
sufficiency of the affidavit, and this is, in our opinion the
very practice which article 528 seeks to avoid."
In the of Reyes vs. Roxas (1 Phil. Rep., 625), the court held
that the refusal to hear witnesses offered by the defense in a
criminal action might constitute error, but was not an excess
of jurisdiction to be remedied by certiorari, the court saying:
"The complaint in this case does not allege that the court
which convicted the petitioner had no jurisdiction to try the
case. Neither does it allege that in the prosecution of the
case there has been any affirmative action by the judge
outside of his jurisdiction. It simply alleges that he has failed
to take action; that he has refused to hear the witnesses for
the defendant. This, if true, would constitute error, but it
would be error committed by the judge in the exercise of a
jurisdiction which he possessed. The remedy
by certiorari  does not apply to this case."
In the case of Dy Chuan Leng vs. Amber (1 Phil. Rep., 535),
the court said: "We cannot grant an injunction under this
section unless there is a compliance with article 164 and
166. It must appear from the complaint that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover in the action. If the complaint states no
cause of action no preliminary injunction can be issued. The
complaint filed in this court is defective in this respect. It
shows upon its face that the petitioner are not entitled to an
order of prohibition against the court below. That court had
4
jurisdiction of the action to dissolve the partnership. In that
action it had the power to grant a preliminary injunction
(art. 164), and to appoint a receiver (art. 174). Having
those powers, if in the exercise of them any errors were
committed, they could be corrected only on appeal from the
final judgment. The facts as alleged, that the complaint was
ambiguous; that the judge believed that the plaintiff below
was a partner when the defendants denied it; that he fixed
the bonds at $1,000 instead of $30,000, as requested by the
defendants; that no mention of the bond was made in the
writ of injunction; that he refused to hear the defendants'
witnesses; that he refused to dissolve the injunction upon a
bond which the defendants offered to give, all of these do
not show that the court was acting outside of its jurisdiction.
They simply show, if they are true, that the court has
committed certain errors in exercising its jurisdiction, errors
which must be corrected by appeal."
In the case of Ivancich vs. Odlin (1 Phil. Rep., 284), the
court said at page 287: "The ground upon which the second
prohibition is sought is that the attachment ordered by the
court is not such an attachment as is authorized by articles
424 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine
Islands, but on the contrary is an attachment under a
procedure not in force here, although it is in force in the
United States of America in maritime cases, and that the
attachment, moreover, was levied without affidavit, bond, or
any of the securities established by law whereby the owners
of the steamer can obtain reparation for any damages which
may be occasioned them by the unlawful detention of the
said steamer; and that the procedure of the court below is
devoid of all the formal requisites established by law for the
levying of such attachments.
xxx           xxx           xxx
The judge, did not, therefore,
act without jurisdiction when directing the
attachment of the vessel in question, and has not
exceeded his jurisdiction. If the excess of
jurisdiction upon which the argument was based
consists in his having levied the attachment
without the fulfillment of the necessary conditions
and without following the form prescribed by some
law of procedure applicable to the case, it is our
opinion that this error is not such an excess of
jurisdiction as can be secured by prohibition, and
the petitioner has other means whereby this error
or procedure may be corrected or remedied. Upon
these grounds we decide that the petition for a
writ of prohibition must be denied, with the costs
to petitioner, and it is so ordered.
In the case of Araneta vs. The Heirs of Tranquilino Gustilo  (2
Phil. Rep., 60), this court said: "This is a petition for a writ
of certiorari  to review the action of the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros in requiring a supersedeas
bond under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
does not appear from the petition what the amount involved
in the litigation is, nor on what sum that bond was fixed by
the court, but it is alleged that the bond is excessive. The
court below had jurisdiction to require the bond as a
condition of a stay of execution, and to fix its amount.
Assuming that the bond was excessive, yet nothing is
alleged in the petition which shows that the court exceeded
its jurisdiction in the premises or committed any irregularity
in its proceedings in exercise thereof. The writ must
therefore be denied."
In the case of Springer vs. Odlin (3 Phil. Rep., 344), the
court said: "The court, on the 30th of May, after hearing
both parties, made an order by which it was adjudged that
the claim of Co-Banco had a preference over the claim of
Springer and ordered the money in the custody of the clerk
to be believed to Co-Blanco, but requiring him to execute a
bond for the sum of P400 with sureties for the protection of
Springer in case he appealed to the Supreme Court to annul
the order.
The plaintiff, Springer, alleges in his application
for certiorari  that the Court of First Instance acted
without jurisdiction in making this order of the
30th day of May, 1903; that not being a party in
the cause of the United States vs. Catalino Mortes,
he has no right to appeal nor has he any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy from the order; and
further alleging that Co-Banco had no lien upon
the P259.50 in dispute, either by attachment or by
execution; nor did the said Co-Blanco on the date
of the making of the order in his favor have any
right of any other character upon said money.
If the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to
render the judgment of the 13th day of May,
1903, in favor of Co-Banco in the case of the
United States vs. Catalino Mortes, and in the
proceeding in which Springer intervened resulting
in the order of May 30, or if the plaintiff, Springer,
had any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by a
bill of exceptions, appeal, or otherwise from the
order of the 30th day of May, 1903, by which the
money in question was directed to be paid to Co-
Banco, then the proceeding in certiorari  will not
lie.
In the case of Felizardo vs. Justice of the Peace of Imus  (3
Phil. Rep., 635), the court said: "Attorneys Pineda and
Escueta, on behalf of Flaviano Felizardo and Francisca
Felizardo, upon the facts stated by their complaint, dated
April 4, 1904, and upon the ground that there was no other
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
pray for an order dissolving the attachment levied upon the
property of the petitioners, and that a writ issue to the
justice of the peace of Imus, requiring him to absolutely
refrain from all further proceedings until a final decision is
rendered upon the complaint.
By intervening in the suit result in which the
attachment was levied, the parties may avail
themselves of all the legal remedies provided for
the defense of their lawful rights, but cannot avail
themselves of the writ of prohibition for the
purpose of obtaining a discharge of attachment
complained of. The case is one which pertains
exclusively to the jurisdiction of the judge who is
trying it, and there is no authority of law for
interference with the proceedings.
In the case of Rubert & Guanis vs. Sweeney  (4 Phil. Rep.,
473), the court said: "The court below had jurisdiction of the
subject matter of that suit and of the parties thereto. It had
power by law to grant an injunction in the case and power to
dissolve it or modify it. There can be no doubt of the
correctness of these propositions, but it is claimed by the
plaintiff in this suit that the stipulation made between the
parties to the suit below to the effect that the sheriff should
hold the money until the final judgment in that case,
deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order
modifying the injunction and requiring to sheriff to pay the
money to the defendant Lo Shui upon his furnishing a proper
bond.
When section 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure
speaks of a tribunal exercising functions which are
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, it covers
5
those cases only in which such tribunal acts
without or in excess of the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by law. It has no reference to cases where
it is claimed that such tribunal acts in excess of
jurisdiction which the parties may have attempted
by stipulation to confer upon it, or in excess of a
jurisdiction to which the parties may by stipulation
have attempted to limit the court. The fact that
the judge may have committed an error in
disregarding the stipulation of the parties has
nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction
which by law the judge was authorized to excess.
If there was such error in the action of the court
below, it was an error that must be corrected by
appeal. An action of prohibition cannot be
maintained in such cases. (Citing cases.) There is
nothing in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil.
Rep., 404), relied upon by the plaintiff, in conflict
with this rule. As was stated in the case of Dy
Chuan Leng vs. Amber above cited, the writ of
prohibition was there granted upon the ground
that in no case where the fact of marriage was
denied did the Court of First Instance have any
jurisdiction to grant temporary alimony.
In the case of Castaño vs. Lobinger (7 Phil. Rep., 91), the
court said: "The concrete questions raised by the parties to
these proceedings are (1) whether or not the judge of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte had power to issue an
injunction against the justice of the peace of Manila in an
action pending in his court, and (2) whether the judge of the
said Court of First Instance of Leyte could entertain a
petition for a writ of certiorari  against the said justice of the
peace of the city of Manila.
xxx           xxx           xxx
The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
had no jurisdiction over the judge of the peace of
the city of Manila, and were a judge of the Court
of First Instance permitted to grant such
extraordinary remedies against a justice of the
peace in a district or province other than his own,
it would be a serious interference with the proper
administration of justice, and a procedure relating
to appeals from and other remedies against the
judgments of inferior courts would be subverted.
It should be borne in mind that the enforcement of
the laws jurisdiction of the various courts,
concerns the interests of the community at large.
The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
had no power to take cognizance, on appeal, of a
case originally tried in the justice court of the city
of Manila, nor has he the power to take
cognizance of cases that should ordinarily be tried
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, unless by
virtue of a special commission. Nor has he the
power to issue writs of injunction in connection wit
other special and extraordinary remedies sought
from the decisions of said justice of the peace.
In the case of Herman vs. Crossfield (7 Phil. Rep., 259), the
court said: "After the term at which judgment was rendered,
a Court of First Instance made an order opening the case for
the introduction of additional evidence, the motion therefore
having been made and argued during said term. Held, That
such order was not void because made after the close of said
term and that it could not be reviewed on certiorari."
The court at page 261 said: "Whether the order made on the
14th of April was right or wrong is not before us for decision.
The court had jurisdiction to decide the motion, even if it
were a motion for a new trial, a point which we do not
determine. If it decided it incorrectly, the plaintiff who was
the defendant in that case, had the right to except to the
order and, although he could not bring the case here at once
for decision because that order was not a final judgment, yet
he could do so after final judgment had been entered and
could then have the order in question reviewed."
In the case of Somes vs. Crossfield  (8 Phil. Rep., 284), the
action was one of certiorari. The court said: "The plaintiff, in
an action brought by himself in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, made a motion for a preliminary injunction
restraining the defendants from selling certain property upon
execution. After a hearing upon the motion, the court after
saying that the plaintiff was not entitled to the preliminary
injunction, made the following order:
"According, the petition for a preliminary
writ of prohibition is denied, and it is
hereby further ordered that the
proceeds of the sales under the
executions already issued, and pending,
either in this court or in the hands of the
sheriff of the Province of Albay, be
deposited in this court, subject to the
further orders thereof, upon a bond of
P10,000 being filed by the plaintiff to
answer for any loss resulting from the
failure to apply said proceeds as ordered
in the execution issued."
The plaintiff thereupon commenced this original
action of certiorari  in this court, claiming that the
court below, in making the order in question,
exceeded its jurisdiction. The defendants have
demurred to the complaint, and the case is now
before us for decision upon such demurrer.
xxx           xxx           xxx
That the court below did not exceed its jurisdiction
in making that order is free from doubt. (Rubert &
Guamis vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473.)
In the case of Artacho vs. Jenkins (11 Phil. Rep., 47), the
court said at page 48: "It is alleged in the complaint that, in
ordering the issue of a second execution, the defendant
judge exceeded his jurisdiction and that such order was
absolutely void. This contention cannot be sustained. The
court of Pangasinan had jurisdiction of the case of Tan Chu
Chay against the plaintiff Artacho, jurisdiction both of the
parties and of the subject matter, and the mere fact that
some creditor of Tan Chu Chay had attached the debt due
from Artacho to the former did not oust that court from its
jurisdiction to proceed with the case. (See among other
cases decided by this court: Rubert & Guamis vs.Sweeney, 4
Phil. Rep., 473; Somes vs. Crossfield, 8 Phil. Rep., 284; and
Yambert vs. McMicking, 10 Phil. Rep., 95.)"
In the case of Lagahit vs. Nengasca and Wislizenus  (12 Phil.
Rep., 423), the action was one of certiorari. The action in
the court below was one over a contested election. The
court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Arellano, said:
"Whether or not the below acted rightly in considering the
other candidate as the 'adverse party' and the party
defeated in the proceedings is not a matter on which action
may be taken by this court in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. It is evident that it was a matter within the
jurisdiction of the court below to tax the 'adverse party' with
the costs. The remedy of certiorari is, therefore, not
6
available, as the purpose thereof is to prevent and remedy
extra limitations of jurisdiction and authority, not to correct
errors in decisions or mistakes of law, which are proper
subjects for appeal and cassation.
The first finding is perfectly in accordance with the provision
of the law. The court below in deciding upon the protest
against the contested election for president of Aloguisan
said: 'The court believes that the majority of the electors at
the present election voted in favor of the petitioner, Simeon
Nengasca.' Whether or not this opinion of the court below is
proper cannot be the subject or review by this court. It is a
decision which is within the jurisdiction of the lower court as
conferred by law.
As a result of this opinion of the court below, and
in compliance with the provision of the law, the
judgment should have been: "Let a writ
of mandamus be issued against the board of
canvassers requiring the board to correct its
canvass in accordance with the facts as found."
For the reason above set forth we decide that the
order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
recognizing Nengasca as president-elect at the
elections in the municipality of Aloguisan, in said
province, should be, and is hereby annulled for the
reason that it is not within the jurisdiction of the
said court to recognize or proclaim a president in a
contested election.
The action of Ocampo vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681), was
one of prohibition. It was held there: "The fact that an
appeal is pending in the Supreme Court in a criminal case
for libel, under Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission,
does not prevent the prosecution of a civil action for
damages under the same Act, which clearly recognizes two
distinct actions upon the theory that there are two separate
and distinct injuries received from the crime, one by the
State and the other by the individual damaged by the libel.
In such a case, therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition
enjoining the prosecution of the civil suit while the criminal
appeal is pending will be denied."
There are certain cases like Lagahit vs. Nengasca and
Wislizenus  above cited wherein the court has held
that certiorari would lie. In the case of Encarnacion vs.
Ambler  (3 Phil. Rep., 623), the court said at page 624: "In
the case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs. Byron S. Ambler et al. (2
Phil. Rep., 392), which involved the validity of the
appointment of Antonio Torres as receiver of the estate of
Tan-Tonco in the said cause of Sergia Reyes vs. Fulgencio
Tan-Tonco, it was held by this court that section 174 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, under which the appointment of the
receiver was made, did not authorize the appointment; that
no property belonging to Fulgencio Tan-Tanco was the
subject of litigation in the case of Sergia Reyes vs. Tan-
Tonco; nor did the case fall within either of the other
subdivisions of section 174; that the placing of the property
of the defendant in said cause in the hands of the receiver
for the purpose, after praying fees and expense of
distributing the property among the creditors, was
practically a bankruptcy proceeding; that there are no
bankruptcy laws in force in these Islands; that bankruptcy
proceedings have been expressly forbidden by section 524 of
the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions until a law shall be
enacted; and that consequently the Court of First Instance
acted in excess of its jurisdiction in appointing Antonio
Torres receiver in said action.
We adhere to the views expressed in the decision of this
court in the said case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs. Byron S.
Amber et al."
In the case of United States vs. Siatong (5 Phil. Rep., 463),
the court said: "Without its being our purpose to decide if
the remedy or certiorari invoked by the provincial fiscal is
proper in this case or not, we cannot admits his petition on
account of its not being made in due form. The remedy
of certiorari  should be petitioned for by formal complaint
having all of the requirements prescribed by the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions, and the petition formulated by the
fiscal in the form of a brief in a criminal cause does not come
up to these requirements, for which reason it is set aside in
accordance with law."
In the case of Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield (6 Phil. Rep., 355),
the court, on page 358, after quoting the section of the Code
of Civil Procedure relating to cases in which a receiver may
be appointed, said: "The case at bar does not fall within any
of the provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the
complaint, as has been before stated, that the plaintiff is the
owner of any of the property of Rocha & Co., nor is there
any allegation that he has any lien thereon, nor are there
any facts alleged in the complaint from which it could be
inferred that he was the owner of such property of had any
lien thereon. On the contrary, from the facts that are alleged
in the complaint it would seem that his separation from the
partnership of Carman & Co. left that partnership as a going
concern and did not dissolve it. The effect of the provisions
of the articles of partnership which are referred to in the
complaint is that after the withdrawal of any partner the
remaining partners became the owner of all the assets of the
partnership and he became a general creditor of the
partnership.
xxx           xxx           xxx
The case not being one in which a receiver could
be appointed, the order making such appointment
was void and was beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, although that court had jurisdiction of the
main action has been settled adversely to the
defendants in this suit by the case of Bonaplata
vs. Amber  (2 Phil. Rep., 392; see also
Encarnacion vs. Amber, 3 Phil. Rep., 623; Findlay
& Co. vs. Amber, 3 Phil. Rep., 690).
That certiorari  is the proper remedy in such cases
was decided in the case of Blanco vs. Amber  (3
Phil. Rep., 358, 735).
In the argument in this court it was claimed that
this extraordinary remedy would not, lie because
the plaintiff, Rocha & Co., had a right to appeal
from the order appointment a receiver, although
that appeal could not be taken until a final
judgment had been entered in the case. That
argument is answered by what is said in the case
of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404)."
In the case of Bañes vs. Cordero (13 Phil. Rep., 466), the
court said: "And, if the jurisdiction has not been exceeded,
there is not nor could there be any legal ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari, because these proceedings
can only exclusively be granted to remedy abuses
committed in the exercise of a power or jurisdiction.
Sections 217 and 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing for such relief unequivocally and specifically refer
to the act of exceeding or going beyond the jurisdiction; and
this court has repeatedly held that, in order
7
that certiorari may issue, it is absolutely necessary to show
that the respondent has exceeded his power or jurisdiction.
(In re  Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; De los Reyes vs. Roxas, 1
Phil. Rep., 625; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344.)"
In the case of Arzadon vs. Chanco (14 Phil. Rep., 710); the
court decided as follows: "Certiorari is the proper remedy
whenever an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions has exceeded its or his jurisdiction, and no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists
to correct such excess or extra limitation. (Secs. 217 and
514, Code of Civil Procedure). The jurisdiction of Courts of
First Instance to hear and decide election contests is
exclusive and final (sec. 27 of the Election Law);
consequently, decisions rendered by them in the exercise of
said jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by means of an appeal.
As they are not appealable and as against them no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, it is evident that
they constitute a proper subject for the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. Therefore, if the court below has
exceeded his jurisdiction in rendering the above-cited
decision it is proper to annul and the same by virtue of said
proceedings."
In that case the Court of First Instance made the following
order: "By the foregoing, Silvestre Arzadon appears to have
violated the provisions of the Election Law which prohibit
every action, influence, and promise of any kind, for the
purpose of obtaining votes. These should indicate the free
will of the voters, and for such infractions his election for the
office of municipal president of the town of Badoc must be
considered illegal.
Therefore, it is declared by the court that the
election of Silvestre Arzadon for the office of
president, held on the 15th day of November last
in the municipality of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, was not
legal, and another special election for the said
office must be held at the expense of the said
Arzadon who shall not then be eligible, and any
vote entered in his favor shall not count; the costs
and expenses of these proceedings shall also be
charged to him.
In respect to that order the Supreme Court said: "It is our
opinion that he has so exceeded his jurisdiction. The
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance hear election protests
is conferred upon them by the aforesaid section 27 of the
Election Law, and neither the said section, nor any other
legal provision, authorizes the court, in deciding such
protests, to declare ineligible in future elections the person
against whom the protests was presented, nor to sentence
him to pay the expenses of the new election to be held.
Hence, the court below had no power to enter such rulings in
the case as gave rise to these proceedings, and in
consequence there of said rulings must be entirely
annulled."
See also Topacio vs. Paredes  (23 Phil. Rep., 238).
The case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404) was one
relating to the allowance of alimony pending the trial of an
action for a divorce. The court below allowed alimony
although the answer denied the marriage. Prohibition was
brought in this court, and after hearing, the lower court was
enjoyed from levying and collecting alimony. The court said
at page 414: "The court below had jurisdiction to try the
divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony
when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This code
only grants the right to alimony to a wife. This status not
appearing by a final judgment, the court is without
jurisdiction to make any order in the matter."
See also U. S. vs. Crossfield (24 Phil. Rep., 321); Young
Wampo vs. Collector of Customs (id., 431).
The reasons given in these cases last cited for the allowance
of the writ of prohibition are applicable only to the class of
cases with which the decisions deal and do not in any way
militate against the general proposition herein asserted.
Those which relate to election contests are based upon the
principle that those proceedings are special in their nature
and must be strictly followed, a material departure from the
statute resulting in a loss, or in an excess, of jurisdiction.
The cases relating to receivers are based, in a measure,
upon the same principle, the appointment of a receiver being
governed by the statute; and in part upon the theory that
the appointment of a receiver in an improper case is in
substance a bankruptcy proceeding, the taking of which is
expressly prohibited by law. The case relative to the
allowance of alimony  pendente lite when the answer denies
the marriage is more difficult to distinguish. The reasons in
support of the doctrine laid down in that case are given in
the opinion in full and they seem to place the particular case
to which they refer in a class by itself.
It is not light thing that the lawmakers have abolished writs
of error and with them certiorari  and prohibition, in so far as
they were methods by which the mere errors of an inferior
court could be corrected. As instrument to that end they no
longer exist. Their place is now taken by the appeal. So long
as the inferior court retains jurisdiction its errors can be
corrected only by that method. The office of the writ
of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects
of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other
purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this
jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases
—cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly
void; where any further steps in the case would result in a
waste of time and money and would produce no result
whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be
utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be
nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing,
protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded
falsehood, a standing menace. It is only to avoid such
results as these that a writ of certiorari  is issuable; and even
here an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to
prosecute it.
The fact that another action may have been pending
involving the same subject matter and even between the
same parties, which was not the fact in this case, does not
touch the jurisdiction of the court to act.
We cannot leave the case without suggesting that the
applicant herein, before coming to this court, should, as the
better practice, have made the proper application to the
Court of First Instance for a dissolution or modification of the
mandatory injunction, and thereby given that court an
opportunity, after full argument of counsel and citation of
authorities, to pass upon the question of his power and
jurisdiction and, even, the correctness and propriety of his
action, should power and jurisdiction be found by the court
to exist. Questions which Courts of First Instance are
required by law to decide should not be summarily taken
from them and presented to this court without first giving
them an opportunity of deliberately passing on such
questions themselves. The most natural and proper thing to
do, when such court, in the judgment of one of the parties,
has issued an injunction erroneously, is immediately to call
the attention of that court to its supposed error and ask for
its correction. The strongest reasons of policy and courtesy if
not actual legal rights itself, require such procedure; and we
discourage all attempts to come to this court upon questions
which a court below is entitled to decide without first
invoking its judgment thereon. There are special reasons for
following this course in cases where the court has acted ex
parte.
The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Trent, J., concurs in the result.

A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in

this court touching the question of certiorari  and prohibition
fully support the proposition already stated that, where a
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of the subject matter
and of the person, its decision of any question pertaining to
the cause, however erroneous, cannot be reviewed
by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal.

It must be remembered that the people of the Philippine

Islands may go to the Court of First Instance to require a
public officer to perform his duties; and they have the right
to have that court pass upon the whole case and upon every
phase thereof and upon every question arising therein. This
right is conferred by statute. It would be respected by the
courts as well as by others. It would be manifestly illegal, as
it would be flagrantly unjust, so long as the court acts within
its jurisdiction, to withdraw from the Court of First Instance
the consideration of that caseunder color of any proceeding
whatever. As long as the court is considering that case, its
right and the rights of the litigants to continue to final
determination are inviolate.