Decide election contests 10, 2004 national and local elections, to serve for a term of 6 years, beginning on June
l and local elections, to serve for a term of 6 years, beginning on June 30,
G.R. No. 165691 June 22, 2005
ROBERT Z. BARBERS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NATIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR SENATORS AND
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES, and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction to nullify the Resolution dated 6 July 2004 of the Special Division
of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"),2 as well as the Resolution dated 25 October
2004 of the COMELEC en banc.3 The Resolutions affirmed the proclamation of the COMELEC
sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers ("NBC") declaring Rodolfo G. Biazon
("Biazon") as the duly elected 12th Senator in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections.
The Facts
Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of
the Philippines in the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections ("elections").
On 24 May 2004, the COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators
promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-002 proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in
the elections. The COMELEC as the NBC promulgated the Resolution based on the
Certificates of Canvass ("COCs") submitted by the following: (a) 78 Provincial Boards of
Canvassers; (b) 7 City Boards of Canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative
districts; (c) 13 City Board of Canvassers from the National Capital Region; (d) 2 District
Boards of Canvassers from Metro Manila; (e) 74 Special Boards of Canvassers for Overseas
Absentee Voting; and (f) 1 Board of Canvassers for Local Absentee Voting. The COMELEC
declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for Senator after
canvassing the remaining unsubmitted COCs.4
On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-005 proclaiming Biazon
as "the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
2004 in accordance with Article VI, Section IV of the Constitution of the Philippines." The
COMELEC stated that after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from
Maguindanao (Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon
obtained 10,635,270 votes nationwide. On the other hand, Barbers obtained 10,624,585
votes. Thus, Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this
"difference will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where there was
failure of elections."5
Claiming that Biazon’s proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the
proclamation of Biazon as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines with the COMELEC on 7
June 2004. The petition, docketed as SPC Case No. 04-258, was assigned to a Special Division
of the COMELEC.6
In his petition, Barbers asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal and premature
being based on an incomplete canvass." Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed
COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be conducted,
would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections.7
In his Comment/Answer, Biazon asserted that: (1) the First Division of the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to review, modify, or set aside what the COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for
Senators has officially performed, which is the promulgation of Resolution No. NBC 04-005;
(2) since the COMELEC has proclaimed Biazon on 2 June 2004 in Resolution No. NBC 04-005
as the duly elected 12th Senator and Biazon has taken his oath of office on 30 June 2004,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, not the COMELEC, has jurisdiction to entertain the present
petition; (3) with Biazon’s admitted and established margin of 10,685 votes, the votes from
the alleged uncanvassed COCs and the votes still to be cast in the special elections which
were still to be conducted would not substantially affect the results of the election for the
12th and last slot for Senator; and (4) the NBC committed a manifest error in crediting to
Barbers a total of 34,711 votes from the province of Lanao del Sur while crediting to Biazon
only 1,428 votes from the supplemental Provincial COCs for Lanao del Sur despite the
existence and availability of the Municipal COCs for Balabagan and Tagoloan, Lanao del
Sur.8
On 9 June 2004, Barbers filed an Omnibus Motion for Immediate Service of Summons, for
Suspension of the Effects of Proclamation, and to Set Case for Hearing. Barbers asserted that
an immediate resolution of the present case was necessary because the term of office of
Senators would commence on 30 June 2004. Barbers further claimed that there were
Municipal COCs still to be included in the senatorial canvass and special elections still to be
held in certain municipalities involving a total of 29,219 votes. Thus, Barbers insisted that
"suspension of the effects of the proclamation" of Biazon was necessary. Barbers stressed
that there could be no valid proclamation based on an incomplete canvass.9
On 6 July 2004, the COMELEC issued the first assailed Resolution, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Special Division) hereby DENIES the
petition to annul the proclamation of respondent RODOLFO G. BIAZON for LACK OF MERIT.
ACCORDINGLY, the Special Division RESTATES the proclamation of the Commission on
Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers declaring RODOLFO G. BIAZON
as the duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of Philippines in the May 10, 2004 National
and Local Elections.
Records reveal that on June 2, 2004, the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), on the basis of
the Certificates of Canvass submitted by seventy-eight (78) Provincial Board of Canvassers;
seven (7) City Boards of Canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts;
thirteen (13) from the National Capital Region (NCR); two (2) from the District Boards of
Canvassers of Metro Manila; seventy-four (74) from the Special Board of Canvassers for
Overseas Absentee Voting; and one (1) from the Board of Canvassers for Local Absentee
Voting, including the supplemental Provincial Certificates of Canvass from Maguindanao
(Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and Nueva Vizcaya (one barangay), declared that private
respondent obtained ten million six hundred thirty-five thousand two hundred seventy
(10,635,270) votes as against the ten million six hundred twenty-four thousand five hundred
eighty-five (10,624,585) votes garnered by petitioner.

SO ORDERED.10 On the basis of the number of votes garnered by private respondent, he was proclaimed on
June 2, 2004 as the duly elected Senator in the recently concluded May 10, 2004 National
Barbers filed a motion for reconsideration11 which the COMELEC en banc denied in the and Local Elections.
second assailed 25 October 2004 Resolution.
However, after his proclamation, the Commission received Certificates of Canvass from the
The COMELEC’s Ruling aforementioned provinces. The results of the votes for petitioner and private respondent,
showed the following figures, to wit:
In its 6 July 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC (Special Division) denied Barbers’ petition, thus:
PROVINCE NO. OF
The instant petition is not a pre-proclamation case as the issues raised herein clearly are not PRECINCTS VOTES OBTAINED
among those enumerated under Section 34 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669. Neither is it a BARBERS BIAZON
protest case because the ground cited in the petition is not proper for protest although a 1. Maguindanao
proclamation has already been made. It is a petition, as entitled, to annul proclamation a. South Upi 35 4,068 997
based on alleged incomplete canvass. b. Talitay 32 116 138
2. Sultan Kudarat
The power to annul proclamation is an exclusive power of the Commission vested upon it by a. Columbio 21 831 656
the Constitution, which states that the Commission shall exercise the power to "Decide 3. Northern Samar
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections xxx" (Article IX-C, a. Silvino Lobos 31 62 372
Section 2 (3). 4. Albay
a. Ligao City 12 1,259 100
As held in the Case of Aguam vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall Total
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. The Constitution enjoins 6,736
the COMELEC to decide, saving those involving the right to vote, all administrative 2,263
questions, affecting elections. Corollary thereto, the court has given its imprimatur on the Although special elections in Tinglayan, Kalinga were conducted on June 7, 2004, no voters
principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally voted, thus, there was no COC to canvass.
made.
On the other hand, special elections for the remaining places are yet to be conducted, that respondent’s lead over petitioner was insurmountable regardless of the results from
namely: the delayed certificates of canvass and from the uncanvassed votes for the special elections.
This ratiocination was very well explained in the assailed resolution and need not be
1. Lanao del Sur reiterated herein. Unfortunately for petitioner, he failed in this motion to adduce evidence
a. Bayang 259 votes (3 precincts) sufficient to overturn Our ruling and justify the prayer for reliefs.
b. Balabagan 375 votes (2 precincts)
c. Madalum 537 votes (4 precincts) It must be noted that, in a pleading, petitioner has raised the Report/Recommendation of
d. Kapai197 votes (1 precinct) the Supervisory Committee to buttress his claim that, indeed, there was incomplete canvass.
2. Maguindanao Petitioner is invited to examine the said report closer, for the same shows the extent of
a. Kabuntalan 263 votes (1 precinct) irregularities that transpired in the subject towns and provinces such as Columbio, Sultan
3. Northern Samar Kudarat, and Talitay, Maguindanao, rendering the supplemental provincial certificates of
a. Silvino Lobos 1,300 votes (8 precincts) canvass dubious at the very least.
Total
2,931 votes For the town of Columbio, the Committee reported that:
From the foregoing data, petitioner and private respondent should be credited with the
following number of votes, to wit: … Records with the ERSD show that the MCOC and corresponding SOV dated June 18 and
17, 2004, respectively, for the twenty-one (21) precincts used as basis for the supplemental
As canvassed by the NBC Not included in PCOC are unsigned by the chairman of the municipal board of canvassers, but signed by the
the PCOC two other members. Please note that the two other members of the MBC who signed the
where special SOV and MCOC used as basis of the supplemental PCOC are the members of the
elections were Pangamadun board all of whom were replaced by the Radam board as early as May 20,
conducted Total 2004. (emphasis supplied)
BIAZON 10,635,270 2,263 10,637,533
BARBERS 10,624,585 6,736 10,631,321 On the other hand, the Committee noted that for the town of Talitay, thus:
From the above summation, the lead of private respondent over petitioner undoubtedly
was reduced to six thousand two hundred twelve (6,212). Assuming that the remaining Atty. Wyne Asdala, Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of
uncanvassed votes of two thousand nine hundred thirty-one (2,931) in places where special Maguindanao then submitted a supplemental provincial certificate of canvass dated June
elections are yet to be held were all votes in favor of petitioner Barbers, nevertheless, this 16, 2004 containing the results from the municipalities of South Upi and Talitay. Per SOV
will not materially affect the results of the election. To say the least, even if private attached to the supplemental PCOC, Barbers obtained 4,472 votes and Biazon, 455 votes for
respondent’s lead was decreased to three thousand two hundred ninety-nine (3,299) votes, the municipality of Talitay. Records do not show which MCOC was used as basis by the
he remains to be the winner and therefore the lawful occupant of the 12th slot for the Asdala board for the preparation of the supplemental PCOC. (emphasis supplied)
senatorial position.121awphi1.zw+
And by exercising its prerogative and discretion, the Commission duly noted the said
In its 25 October 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC en banc denied Barbers’ motion for Committee’s recommendation to "use only the MCOCs prepared by the duly constituted
reconsideration, thus: municipal boards of canvassers as basis for the provincial canvass in Sultan Kudarat and
Maguindanao."
We maintain Our declaration and findings as established by the Special Division. After a
judicious and thorough scrutiny of the records, We are more than convinced that At any rate, We likewise confirm the opinion of Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., on
respondent’s proclamation was indeed, valid and operative. In the questioned resolution the nature and ramifications of herein SPC Case for Annulment of Proclamation.
issued by the Special Division, We based our ruling on the official Comelec records, revealing
Citing the case of Rasul vs. Comelec, the Honorable Supreme Court declared that – In
Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections, this Court has ruled that ‘where the candidate has
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is
to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.’ In
like manner, where as in this case, petitioner assails the Commission’s resolution
proclaiming the twelfth (12th) winning senatorial candidate, petitioner’s proper recourse
was to file a regular election protest which under the Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), following the clear enunciation of Section 242 and
the immediately succeeding sections, it is clear that annulment of proclamation, be it partial
or total, arises from the Commission’s jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies.
Republic Act (RA) No. 7166, qualifies such power of the Commission by so stating that a pre-
proclamation contest may only apply in cases where there are "manifest errors" in the
election returns or certificates of canvass, with respect to national elective positions such as
herein case.
To prove that the same is manifest, the errors must appear on the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made
before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their administrative
proceedings. (Chavez vs. Comelec, GR No. 150799, 03 February 2004)
Parties, therefore, ought to be careful in availing themselves of remedies lest they fall into a
trap of their own making – one that they cannot escape from.
Nevertheless, granting arguendo that the present case is not a pre-proclamation case, as so
painstakingly pointed out by petitioner, but one that is due to an incomplete canvass, and
the relief sought emanates from the plenary power of the Commission, herein petitioner,
sadly, failed to present convincing and legitimate evidence in support of his petition
(including this motion for reconsideration).13
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Barbers raises the following issues for resolution:
Whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it deliberately insisted in resorting to and in using and
considering, for purposes of tallying/tabulation of the still uncanvassed election results,
MERE improvised Municipal COCs, which are NON-CANVASSED election documents,
unauthentic, unreliable and dubious on their faces which documents were submitted, not to
the NBC, but to a mere Comelec Department [ERSD]; instead of availing and relying on
official CANVASS documents – PROVINCIAL COCs submitted to COMELEC, as the National
Board of Canvassers for Senators.
Whether or not the public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it first correctly recognized the undisputed fact that there
was an INCOMPLETE CANVASS at the time that respondent Biazon was initially "proclaimed"
PREMATURELY on June 2, 2004, but adamantly refused to rectify its VOID premature
proclamation when it opted to reinstate the said sham proclamation of respondent Biazon,
by anomalously resorting to and relying on, unauthentic, dubious and non-canvassed
documents [Municipal COCs], rather than on the legal and lawful canvassed documents
[PROVINCIAL COCs].14
The Court’s Ruling
The petition must fail.
To our mind, the basic issue for resolution is whether this Court can take cognizance of this
petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul or modify the proceeding. There
must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for certiorari to prosper.15
On the other hand, prohibition as a special civil action is available only if the following
essential requisites concur: (a) the proceedings of the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions are without or in excess of
its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law to compel the respondent to desist from further proceedings in
the action.16
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal provides:
RULE 12. Jurisdiction. – The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,17 we ruled that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals
which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its
jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress).
In Javier v. COMELEC,18 we interpreted the phrase "election, returns and qualifications" as
follows:
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing
of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the
election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised
Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal ("SET") underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority
conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.19 Since Barbers contests Biazon’s
proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.20
In Pangilinan,21 we ruled that "where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in
the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives."22 In like manner, where as in the
present case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th duly elected Senator,
Barbers’ proper recourse is to file a regular election protest with the SET.23
Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an available and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELEC’s assailed
proceedings. We take pains to emphasize that after the proclamation, Barbers should have
filed an electoral protest before the SET.
While the resolution of the issues presented in this petition falls within the sole jurisdiction
of the SET, still we opt to discuss them to show the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of COMELEC.
Barbers claims that Biazon’s 2 June 2004 proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial
candidate is a nullity because it was based on an incomplete canvass. Barbers asserts that
the COMELEC’s act of making such premature proclamation constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Barbers also claims that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when, after having used Provincial Certificates of Canvass
("PCOCs") in the canvass of election results for Senators up to 2 June 2004, the COMELEC
used the Municipal Certificates of Canvass ("MCOCs") in the "final tabulation of the
uncanvassed results and that of the special elections yet to be held in certain parts of the
country."24
Barbers’ arguments are specious.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board
of canvassers considers all returns and omits none. However, this is true only where the
election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the
election.251avvphi1.zw+
The COMELEC, in promulgating its 2 June 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-005 proclaiming
Biazon as the 12th duly elected Senator, observed the following provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code:
SEC. 233. When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. – In case its copy of the
election returns is missing, the board of canvassers shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain
such missing election returns from the board of election inspectors concerned, or if said
returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the
Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or certified copy of
said election returns issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its representative to
investigate the case and immediately report the matter to the Commission.
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have
been received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the
basis of the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the
results of the election. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On 5 May 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 6749, i.e., "General Instructions
for the Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Results for Senators and Party List in the
May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections." Section 9 of the Resolution provides:
SEC. 9. Proclamation of results. – Upon completion of the canvass, the Supervisory
Committee and the watchers if available shall certify the final printout of results as
canvassed. On the basis of the certified final printout, the NBC shall cause the preparation
of, sign and approve the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation, and proclaim the winning
candidates for senators, certify the results of the election of the party-list system and
proclaim the nominees of the parties which obtained the required percentage of votes.
Notwithstanding the fact that not all of the COCs have been received or canvassed, the NBC
may terminate the canvass if the missing COCs would no longer affect the results of the
elections. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, the report which the COMELEC Supervisory Committee submitted on 29
June 2004 shows that Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not
included in the national canvass. As for Biazon, he garnered 2,263 votes.26 Also, the
Supervisory Committee’s report shows that the total number of registered voters in areas
where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering only 19 precincts
in three municipalities.27
As correctly stated by the COMELEC:
From the above summation, the lead of private respondent over petitioner undoubtedly
was reduced to six thousand two hundred twelve (6,212). Assuming that the remaining
uncanvassed votes of two thousand nine hundred thirty-one (2,931) in places where special
elections are yet to be held were all votes in favor of petitioner Barbers, nevertheless, this
will not materially affect the results of the election. To say the least, even if private
respondent’s lead was decreased to three thousand two hundred ninety-nine (3,299) votes,
he remains to be the winner and therefore the lawful occupant of the 12th slot for the
senatorial position.28
It suffices to say that the COMELEC based its ruling in the assailed Resolutions on official
COMELEC records. The COMELEC enjoys the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty.29
Since the election returns not included in the national canvass as well as the results of the
special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections, it is
immaterial whether the COMELEC used PCOCs or MCOCs in the subsequent canvass.
The alleged invalidity of Biazon’s proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the
election returns of members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls
within the sole jurisdiction of the SET. For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral
protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions of the SET. In addition, the
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions
affirming Biazon’s proclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results of the special
elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Decide all questions affecting elections
G.R. No. 134169 February 2, 2000
SADIKUL SAHALI, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) and HADJA JUBAIDA H. MATBA, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Sadikul Sahali and respondent Hadja Jubaida H. Matba were two of the
contending gubernatorial candidates in Tawi-Tawi in the elections of May 11, 1998 . On May
13, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected
governor of Tawi-Tawi.
The counting of votes, canvassing of returns and consolidation of results of the elections
were conducted using the Automated Election System, authorized under Republic Act No.
8436.
Before petitioner could assume office on June 30, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Minute
Resolution No. 98-1959 dated June 29, 1998, the pertinent part of which reads:
RESOLVED, consistent with the resolutions of the Commission in Sulu and Maguindanao
cases, to direct the immediate manual recounting of ballots in the province of Tawi-Tawi;
and in the meantime, to suspend the effects of the proclamation as a logical consequence of
the manual counting and that all pleadings filed relative to SPA No. 98-349 be made to
survive even beyond the June 30, 1998 deadline.1
It appears that the COMELEC passed the above Minute Resolution in connection with a
petition filed by respondent Matba and Ismael B. Abubakar, Jr. on May 22, 1998 and
docketed as SPA No. 98-349, praying for the immediate manual counting of ballots in the
Province of Tawi-Tawi, on the allegation that the automated counting machines utilized in
said province suffered massive and total systems breakdown resulting in the following
problems:
1. Inability of the machines to read the ballots properly;
2. Inability of the ballots to reject spurious and excess ballots;
3. Material discrepancies of figures appearing in various election documents, such as the
election returns, municipal certificates of canvass, statement of votes per precinct and
municipality, and the provincial certificate of canvass. Needless to say, these material
discrepancies resulted in the proclamation of losing candidates. A case in point is the
election contest in the Municipality of South Ubian;
4. Cases of several candidates not obtaining any vote in the precinct where they are
registered and where they voted;
5. Absence of any entry in the statements of votes in some forty (40) precincts of Tawi-Tawi
involving the position of president down to municipal councilors.2
On July 3, 1998, petitioner brought this special civil action for certiorari seeking the
annulment of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 98-1959. Petitioner likewise prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
COMELEC from implementing or executing the assailed Resolution.
Petitioner contends that he was not notified of the filing of SPA No. 98-349. Consequently,
he was not afforded an opportunity to answer the petition, and was thereby denied his
constitutional right to due process. He alleges that he was also not officially notified of the
promulgation by the COMELEC of Minute Resolution No. 98-1959; that he only learned of it
from newspaper reports after which his counsel went to the COMELEC office in Manila to
verify. Petitioner maintains that his right to assume the office of governor of Tawi-Tawi
constitutes property right within the meaning of the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Minute Resolution, he argues, is also void ab initio inasmuch as no pre-proclamation
controversy was filed during the canvassing, and there can be no suspension of the effects
of a proclamation or a recounting of ballots where there is no pre-proclamation controversy.
Petitioner further states that the COMELEC erred when it granted respondent's prayer that
the petition in SPA No. 98-349 be extended beyond June 30, 1998 on the strength of Section
16 of the Synchronized Elections Law of 1991,3 saying that the said provision is inapplicable
in the case at bar since no pre-proclamation case was filed. Consequently, petitioner
submits that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner subsequently filed a "Very Urgent Motion Reiterating the Prayer for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order".4 Thus, on July 14, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution
directing the parties "to maintain the status quo ante prevailing at the time of the filing of
the petition."5
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General filed on October 9, 1998 a
"Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,"6 wherein it opined that the COMELEC should have
conducted a summary hearing before issuing Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 and should not
have taken the allegations concerning systems failure in the automated counting system as
gospel truth. Hence, the Solicitor General argues that the questioned resolution was issued
in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process, citing the case of Bince, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections,7 where this Court held that the right to public office is a right
protected by the due process clause, and the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and
hearing.8
On October 15, 1998, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed in this case a "Motion with
Leave to Allow the Undersigned to Seek Clarification,"9 asking the Court whom — between
Mr. Sulay H. Halipa, who had been designated by ARMM Governor Nur P. Misuari as Officer-
in-Charge of the Office of the Governor of Tawi-Tawi, and petitioner Sadikul Sahali — it
should recognize as authorized to transact business with the bank on behalf of the Province
of Tawi-Tawi.
Acting on the above motion, this Court issued a Resolution on October 20, 1998.10 It found
that the COMELEC issued on July 14, 1998 a resolution holding in abeyance the
implementation of the assailed Minute Resolution of June 29, 1998. On this basis, the Court
ruled that, under its status quo ante order in this case, official business with the governor of
Tawi-Tawi should be dealt through petitioner Sadikul Sahali, inasmuch as he was the one
proclaimed as such by the COMELEC prior to the filing of this petition. In its Resolution, this
Court also noted the Manifestation filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and required
the COMELEC to comment on the petition.
On December 7, 1998, public respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment.11 It countered
that its findings in the assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 was supported by the
following documents, to wit:
1. Narrative Report of Idlana Mangona, Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Tawi-Tawi,
recommending that the petition for manual recounting and revision of the official ballots be
considered, due to discrepancies found in the Election Reporting System (ERS) computer;12
2. Letter of Brigadier General Edgardo V. Espinosa, Commanding General, Headquarters
Marine Forces, Southern Philippines, to then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo,
recommending the manual counting and re-counting of votes to minimize post-election
related incidents and to satisfy complaints against the use of automated counting machines
which resulted in some technical and unexplained defects and errors;13
3. Joint letter of respondent Hadja Jubalda Matba and Ismael Abubakar, Jr. to the COMELEC
alleging massive systems breakdown of the automated counting machines in Tawi-Tawi.14
The COMELEC further stressed that the instant petition was premature because it was filed
before the assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 became final. The petition was
subsequently rendered moot and academic when the COMELEC isssued Minute Resolution
No. 98-2145 on July 14, 1998, which held in abeyance the implementation of Minute
Resolution No. 98-1959.15 These events were explained further by the COMELEC when it
promulgated Minute Resolution No. 98-2828 on October 15, 1998,16 which pertinently
reads:
. . . . This means that the Commission in issuing Min. Res. 98-2145 corrected itself, thus
Minute Resolution 98-1959 and Min. Res. 98-2106 were never implemented and therefore
at the time the status quo ante order was issued by the Supreme Court, the prevailing
situation was that Sadikul Sahali was the duly proclaimed winning candidate for Governor in
Tawi-Tawi as well as other proclaimed local candidates as of May 13, 1998.
RESOLVED, to clarify that Sadikul Sahali and other proclaimed local candidates are duly
elected officials of Taw-Tawi at the time referred to in status quo ante order by the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner thereafter filed his Reply,17 reiterating the substantial arguments in his Petition
and amplifying those contained in the Manifestation of the Solicitor General.
On April 29, 1999, respondent Matba filed a "Manifestation & Motion", wherein he invoked
the Resolution of this Court dated March 15, 1999 dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 134188
entitled "Nur G. Jaafar, Petitioner versus The Commission on Elections, Radja Jubaida H.
Matba, Ismael B. Abubakar, Jr., Habid Gulam Hadjirul, Sauragal Dayan, Hadja Monera
Managula, Hadji Ladjakawasa Tabarasa, Abdurahman Nawali and Laurel Tahil,
Respondents", which petition likewise sought the annulment of COMELEC Minute
Resolution No. 98-1959. Accordingly, respondent Matba prayed that the instant petition be
likewise dismissed for being moot and academic.
This Court agrees with respondents. Indeed, it can be gleaned from the records that shortly
after the promulgation of Minute Resolution No. 98-1959, Hon. Nur G. Jaafar, Congressman,
Lone District of Tawi-Tawi, wrote a letter to the COMELEC on July 3, 1998 contending that
the Commission was misinformed and misled into promulgating the assailed Minute
Resolution. Congressman Jaafar alleges the following to be the correct facts:
1. That, the May 11, 1998 elections in Tawi-Tawi were generally clean, honest and peaceful.
The votes were casted (sic), machine counted and canvassed. The winning candidates were
duly proclaimed and have taken their respective oath of office prior to the promulgation of
said questionable Resolution;
2. That, the counting of votes were done through the automated counting machine which
was pre-tested a few days before the election by Comelec technicians and conducted in the
presence of representatives of all political parties. The same machine were used (sic) in the
counting of votes by municipalities also in the presence of the Military, Police, Namfrel,
Comelec and representative of all parties concerned which eventually led to the
proclamation of the winning candidates for various positions;

3. That, the recommendation of Mr. Idlana Mangona to conduct a manual recount because
of system failure and/or total breakdown of the machine should not be used solely as a
basis in promulgating said Resolution because Mr. Mangona was not the Comelec-In-Charge
of the province during the elections, neither is he in the position to technically attest to the
defectiveness of the counting machine. Atty. Alloden Dalaig of the Comelec Central Offices
was the one assigned as Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) and
designated Comelec-In-Charge for the entire Province of Tawi-Tawi.1âwphi1.nêt
Also, neither can Bgen. Espinosa equate the situation in Sulu and Maguindanao to that of
Tawi-Tawi as it was an entirely different situation, besides the General was not physically
present on the ground. On the contrary, the post-election report of Col. Nelson Allaga C0
8MBLT who was the overall-in-charge of securing the last elections in the province show
otherwise; (Attached letter of Col. Allaga to Honorable Chairman Pardo);
4. That, the questioned Resolution triggered by the unsworn letter request of Hadja Jubaida
Matba and Ismael Abubakar, defeated gubernatorial and congressional candidates,
respectively, should not have been given due course considering that the same was not
even calendared much more part of the agenda of the Commission of June 29, 1998; and
5. Lastly and more important of all, the undersigned and other wining candidates were not
given due notice and allowed to present their side thereby depriving them of their right to
be heard by the Commission, a clear violation of their Constitutional right to due process.18
On July 10, 1998, COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra issued a Memorandum
inquiring and seeking clarification as to whether the COMELEC En Banc will order the
Executive Director to implement Minute Resolution No. 98-2106, which resolved to direct
the immediate implementation of the assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1959, considering
that there was still pending a petition for certiorari filed by Congressman Jaafar before the
Supreme Court to annul Minute Resolution No. 98-1959.
It was on the basis of the foregoing that the COMELEC passed Minute Resolution No. 98-
2145 which states:
RESOLVED, to hold in abeyance Min. Resolution No. 98-1959 dated 29 June 1998 and Min.
Resolution No. 98-2106 dated 07 July 1998, for further study/review by the Commission.
Let the Executive Director implement this resolution.
Later, after this Court issued the status quo ante order of July 14, 1998, the COMELEC
promulgated another resolution, namely, Minute Resolution No. 98-2828, which provides:
. . . This means that the Commission in issuing Min. Res. 98-2145 corrected itself, thus
Minute Resolution 98-1959 and Min. Res. 98-2106 were never implemented and therefore
at the time the status quo ante order was issued by the Supreme Court, the prevailing
situation was that Sadikul Sahali was the duly proclaimed winning candidate for Governor in
Tawi-Tawi as well as other proclaimed local candidates as of May 13, 1998.
RESOLVED, to clarify that Sadikul Sahali and other proclaimed local candidates are duly
elected officials of Tawi-Tawi at the time referred to in the status quo ante order by the
Supreme Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC, motu proprio, reconsidered its earlier Minute Resolution No. 98-
1959, as it was within its power to do, before it became final and executory. As argued by
the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to amend and control its process and order. Within
the thirty-day period from its promulgation,19 therefore, the questioned Minute Resolution
No. 98-1959 was still under the control of the COMELEC and may thus be recalled or set
aside. Necessarily, the subsequent passage by the COMELEC of Minute Resolution No. 98-
2145 on July 14, 1998, wherein it corrected its earlier Minute Resolution No. 98-1959,
rendered the instant petition and academic.
Verily, this very same issue has already been resolved by this Court en banc in Jaafar v.
Commission on Elections, et al.,20 which held:
We agree with respondent COMELEC that this petition should be dismissed. The pleadings
and their annexes show that shortly after this petition for certiorari to annul Minute
Resolution No. 98-1959 dated 29 June 1998, was filed the COMELEC motu proprio issued
M.R. No. 98-2145 on July 14, 1998 which held in abeyance the implementation of the
questioned resolution and that of Minute Resolution No. 98-2106 dated July 7, 1998 for
further study/review by the Commission. Hence, Resolution No. 98-1959 never became final
and executory and is still subject to either recall or modification by the Commission.
The Court notes that COMELEC Resolution No. 98-2828 issued on October 15, 1998 clarified
that all the winning candidates for local government positions have been proclaimed and
that no declaration of failure of elections in the island province of Tawi-Tawi was made by
the Commission. Sadikul Sahali (who was proclaimed governor of Tawi-Tawi) and all other
local candidates who were proclaimed winners as of May 13, 1998 are the duly elected
officials of Tawi-Tawi as of July 14, 1998, when the status quo ante order was issued by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, the subsequent promulgation of COMELEC Resolution Nos. 98-
2145 and 9828 (sic) show that the questioned Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 of the
respondent tribunal suspending the effects of the proclamation of the petitioner and other
local candidates has been effectively withdrawn, or at least held in abeyance for further
study and a review. The subsequent issuance of COMELEC M.R. Nos. 98-2145 and 98-2828
has mooted the instant petition.
The court should refrain from expressing its opinion in a case in which no practical relief may
be granted in view of a supervening event. It is a rule almost unanimously observed that
courts of justice will take cognizance only of justiciable controversies wherein actual and not
merely hypothetical issues are involved. Where the issue has become moot and academic
there is no justiciable controversy, an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or
value.21
The present petition for certiorari, therefore, must be dismissed. It is grounded on alleged
grave abuse of discretion and lack of jurisdiction. In the recent case of Perla Garcia, et al. v.
HRET, et al.,22 this Court had occasion to rule:
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the
essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess or jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to
prosper.23
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the agency exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions, the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. The petitioner in such cases must clearly show that the public respondent acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.
It has been held, however, that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may
not be used to correct a lower tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. In
other words, it is not a remedy for mere errors of judgment, which are correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or
mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to
nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by
special civil action for certiorari.24
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to show that the promulgation by respondent
COMELEC of the assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1959 amounted to a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or that its act was
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
towards petitioner. On the contrary, the COMELEC, perhaps realizing the precipitousness of
the issuance of Minute Resolution No. 98-1959, lost no time in recalling the same and
promulgating Minute Resolution No. 98-2145 in its stead. To be sure, this negates any
indication of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Finality of Decision
G.R. No. 89604 April 20, 1990
ROQUE FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , NOBELITO RAPISORA, respondents.
Felix B. Claustro for petitioner.
Romeo B. Astudillo for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Roque Flores was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having received the
highest number of votes for kagawad in the elections held on 28 March 1989, in Barangay
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus became punong barangay in accordance with Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 6679, providing in part as follows —

Sec. 5. There shall be a sangguniang barangay in every duly constituted barangay which shall
be the legislative body and shall be composed of seven (7) kagawads to be elected by the
registered voters of the barangay. The candidate who obtains the highest number of votes
shall be the punong barangay . . . .
However, his election was protested by Nobelito Rapisora, herein private respondent, who
placed second in the election with 463 votes, or one vote less than the petitioner. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, sustained Rapisora and installed him as punong
barangay in place of the petitioner after deducting two votes as stray from the latter's total.
1 and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
Flores appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Abra, which affirmed the challenged decision
in toto. Judge Francisco O. Villarta, Jr. agreed that the four votes cast for "Flores" only,
without any distinguishing first name or initial, should all have been considered invalid
instead of being divided equally between the petitioner and Anastacio Flores, another
candidate for kagawad. The judge held that the original total credited to the petitioner was
correctly reduced by 2, to 462, demoting him to second place. 2
The petitioner then went to the Commission on Elections, but his appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the public respondent had no power to review the decision of the regional
trial court. This ruling, embodied in its resolution dated 3 August 1989, 3 was presumably
based on Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, which was quoted therein in full as follows:
Sec. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the
proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the result of the election. The trial court shall decide the election protest
within (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial
court may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
party to the regional trial court which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact shall be final and non-
appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed.
In this petition for certiorari, the Commission on Elections is faulted for not taking
cognizance of the petitioner's appeal and for not ruling that all the four questioned votes
should have been credited to him under the equity of the incumbent rule in Section 211(2)
of the Omnibus Election Code.
The Commission on Elections was obviously of the opinion that it could not entertain the
petitioner's appeal because of the provision in Rep. Act No. 6679 that the decision of the
regional trial court in a protest appealed to it from the municipal trial court in barangay
elections "on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable."
While supporting the dismissal of the appeal, the Solicitor General justifies this action on an
entirely different and more significant ground, to wit, Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution, providing that the Commission on Elections shall:
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
His submission is that municipal or metropolitan courts being courts of limited jurisdiction,
their decisions in barangay election contests are subject to the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections under the afore-quoted section. Hence, the
decision rendered by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, should have been
appealed directly to the Commission on Elections and not to the Regional Trial Court of
Abra.
It is recalled that in the case of Luison v. Garcia, 4 respondent Garcia's certificate of
candidacy was declared invalid by the Commission on Elections for non-compliance with the
statutory requirements. What he did was appeal to the court of first instance, which held
that the certificate was merely defective but not altogether null and void. Garcia continued
his candidacy on the strength of this ruling and was subsequently proclaimed elected,
thereafter assuming office as municipal mayor.
In sustaining the quo warranto petition filed against him by Luison, this Court declared that
all the votes cast for Garcia should have been rejected as stray because he did not have a
valid certificate of candidacy. The action of the Commission on Elections should have been
appealed not to the court of first instance but to the Supreme Court as required by the 1935
Constitution. Since this was not done, the resolution of the Commission on Elections
rejecting Garcia's certificate remained valid on the date of the election and rendered all
votes cast for him as stray.
The doctrine in that case, although laid down under the 1935 Constitution, is still controlling
under the present charter as the interpretation by this Court of Article IX-C, Section 2(2).
Accordingly, Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679, insofar as it provides that the decision of the
municipal or metropolitan court in a barangay election case should be appealed to the
regional trial court, must be declared unconstitutional.
We make this declaration even if the law has not been squarely and properly challenged by
the petitioner.1âwphi1 Ordinarily, the Court requires compliance with the requisites of a
judicial inquiry into a constitutional question. 5 In the case at bar, however, we feel there is
no point in waiting to resolve the issue now already before us until it is raised anew,
probably only in the next barangay elections. The time to resolve it is now, before such
elections. We shall therefore disregard the technical obstacles in the case at bar so that the
flaw in Rep. Act No. 6679 may be brought to the attention of Congress and the
constitutional defect in Section 9 may be corrected.
In taking this step, the Court does not disregard the fact that the petitioner was only acting
in accordance with the said law when he appealed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tayum to the Regional Trial Court of Abra. That is what the statute specifically
directed in its Section 9 which, at the time the appeal was made, was considered
constitutional. The petitioner had a light to rely on its presumed validity as everyone
apparently did. Even the Congress and the Executive were satisfied that the measure was
constitutional when they separately approved it after careful study. Indeed, no challenge to
its validity had been lodged or even hinted — not even by the public respondent — as to
suggest to the petitioner that he was following the wrong procedure. In fairness to him
therefore, we shall consider his appeal to the Commission on Elections as having been made
directly from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, disregarding the detour to the
Regional Trial Court.
Accordingly, we hold that the petitioner's appeal was validly made to the Commission on
Elections under its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all contests. . . involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." Its decision was in turn also
properly elevated to us pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution, stating that
"unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution that "decisions, final
orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of
fact and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme Court of its
authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial power conferred upon it by
the Constitution. 6 We eschew a literal reading of that provision that would contradict such
authority.
The issue the petitioner was raising was one of law, viz., whether he was entitled to the
benefits of the equity-of-the-incumbent rule, and so subject to our review. This issue was
not resolved by the public respondent because it apparently believed itself to be without
appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Abra. Considering that
the public respondent has already manifested its position on this issue, as will appear
presently, the Court will now rule upon it directly instead of adopting the round-about way
of remanding the case to the Commission on Elections before its decision is elevated to this
Court.
Implementing Rep. Act No. 6679, the Commission on Elections promulgated Resolution No.
2022-A providing in Section 16(3) thereof that:
Incumbent Barangay Captains, whether elected, appointed or designated shall be deemed
resigned as such upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy for the office of "Kagawad,"
which is another office, for the March 28, 1989 barangay election.
This was the reason why the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayum, Abra, held that the four
questioned votes cast for Flores could not be credited to either Roque Flores or Anastacio
Flores and should have been regarded as stray under Section 211(1) 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Rejecting the petitioner's claim, the court held that Roque Flores was not
entitled to any of the four contested votes because he was not incumbent as punong
barangay (or barangay captain, as the office was formerly called) on the date of the election.
The petitioner insists on the application to him of Section 211(2) of the Code, stating
pertinently that:
2. . . . If there are two or more candidates with the same full name, first name or surname
and one of them is the incumbent, and on the ballot is written only such full name, first
name or surname, the vote shall be counted in favor of the incumbent.
because he should not have been considered resigned but continued to be entitled to the
office of punong barangay under Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6679, providing as follows:
Sec. 8. Incumbent elective officials running for the same office shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of then, certificates of candidacy. They shall continue to hold office
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified.

The petitioner contends that the afore-quoted administrative regulation is inofficious
because the forfeiture prescribed is not authorized by the statute itself and beyond the
intentions of the legislature. Moreover, the enforcement of the rule would lead to
discrimination against the punong barangay and in favor of the other kagawads, who, unlike
him, could remain in office while running for re-election and, additionally, benefit from the
equity-of-the-incumbent rule.
Alternatively, the petitioner argues that, assuming the regulation to be valid he was
nonetheless basically also a kagawad as he was a member of the sangguniang barangay like
the other six councilmen elected with him in 1982. In fact, Section 5 of the Rep. Act No.
6679 also speaks of seven kagawads, the foremost of whom shall again be the punong
barangay. He concludes that he should thus be regarded as running for the same office —
and therefore not considered resigned — when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
kagawad.
The Court does not agree.
It seems to us that the challenged resolution quite clearly expresses the mandate of the
above-quoted Section 8 that all incumbent elected officials should not be considered
resigned upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy as long as they were running for
the same position. The purpose of the resolution was merely to implement this intention,
which was clearly applicable not only to the ordinary members of the sangguniang barangay
but also to the punong barangay.
As for the questioned authority, this is found in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which empowers the public respondent to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and
administer. . . ."
The justification given by the resolution is that the position of punong barangay is different
from that of kagawad — as in fact it is. There should be no question that the punong
barangay is an essentially executive officer, as the enumeration of his functions in Section 88
of the Local Government Code will readily show, unlike the kagawad, who is vested with
mainly legislative functions (although he does assist the punong barangay in the
administration of the barangay). Under Rep. Act No. 6679, the person who wins the highest
number of votes as a kagawad becomes by operation of law the punong barangay, or the
executive of the political unit. In the particular case of the petitioner, it should be noted that
he was in fact not even elected in 1982 as one of the six councilmen but separately as the
barangay captain. He was thus correctly deemed resigned upon his filing of a certificate of
candidacy for kagawad in 1989, as this was not the position he was holding, or was
incumbent in, at the time he filed such certificate.
It is worth stressing that under the original procedure followed in the 1982 barangay
elections, the petitioner was elected barangay captain directly by the voters, separately
from the candidates running for mere membership in the sangguniang barangay. The offices
of the barangay captain and councilmen were both open to the candidates, but they could
run only for one or the other position and not simultaneously for both. By contrast, the
candidate under the present law may aspire for both offices, but can run only for one, to
wit, that of kagawad. While campaigning for this position, he may hope and actually strive to
win the highest number of votes as this would automatically make him the punong
barangay. In this sense, it may be said that he is a candidate for both offices. Strictly
speaking, however, the only office for which he may run — and for which a certificate of
candidacy may be admitted — is that of kagawad.
It follows that the petitioner cannot insist that he was running not for kagawad only but
ultimately also for punong barangay in the 28 March 1989 election. In fact, his certificate of
candidacy was for kagawad and not for punong barangay. As the basic position being
disputed in the barangay election was that of kagawad, that of punong barangay being
conferred only by operation of law on the candidate placing first, the petitioner had to
forfeit his position of punong barangay, which he was holding when he presented his
candidacy for kagawad. Consequently, he cannot be credited with the four contested votes
for Flores on the erroneous ground that he was still incumbent as punong barangay on the
day of the election.
The petitioner argues that he could not have run for reelection as punong barangay because
the office was no longer subject to separate or even direct election by the voters. That may
be so, but this argument goes to the wisdom of the law, not its validity, and is better
addressed to the legislature. From the strictly legal viewpoint, the statute does not offend
the equal protection clause, as there are, to repeat, substantial distinctions between the
offices of punong barangay and kagawad. Precisely , the reason for divesting the punong
barangay of his position was to place him on the same footing as the other candidates by
removing the advantages he would enjoy if he were to continue as punong barangay while
running for kagawad.
In sum, we hold that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is constitutionally defective and must be
struck down, but the challenged resolution must be sustained as a reasonable and valid
implementation of the said statute. The petitioner was no longer the incumbent punong
barangay on election day and so was not entitled to the benefits of the equity-of-the-
incumbent rule. The consequence is that the four votes claimed by him were correctly
considered stray, making the private respondent the punong barangay of Poblacion, Tayum,
Abra, for having received the highest number of votes for kagawad.
It remains to stress that although the elections involved herein pertain to the lowest level of
our political organization, this fact has not deterred the highest tribunal from taking
cognizance of this case and discussing it at length in this opinion. This only goes to show that
as long as a constitutional issue is at stake, even the barangay and its officers, for all their
humility in the political hierarchy, deserve and will get the full attention of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides that
barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be
appealable to the regional trial court;
2. Declaring valid Section 16(3) of Com. Res. No. 2022-A dated January 5, 1989; and
3. Declaring private respondent Nobelito Rapisora the duly elected punong barangay of
Poblacion, Tayum, Abra.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Finality of Decision
G.R. No. 146724 August 10, 2001
GIL TAROJA VILLOTA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTION and LUCIANO COLLANTES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari seeks the reversal of the June 13, 2000 Order1 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in EAC No. 5-2000, which dismissed petitioner's appeal from the
decision2 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, for failure of the petitioner
to perfect his appeal on time; and the Resolution dated February 1, 2001,3 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In the May 12, 1997 barangay elections, petitioner was proclaimed as the Punong Barangay
of Barangay 752, Zone 81, District V, over his opponent, herein private respondent.
Consequently, the latter filed an election protest against petitioner with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. On December 29, 1999, the court, after due hearing
rendered decision declaring private respondent as the duly elected Punong Barangay. The
decretal portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING PROTESTANT LUCIANO COLLANTES as the duly elected Punong Barangay of
Barangay 752, Zone 81, District V of the City of Manila in the May 12, 1997 barangay
elections;
2. DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID and SETTING ASIDE the proclamation of the protestee by
the barangay board of canvassers; and
3. ORDERING the protestee Villota to vacate in favor of protestant the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay 752, Zone 81, District V of the City of Manila.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.4
On March 2, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously paid with the
cashier of Metropolitan Trial Court the amount of P150.00 as appeal fee and another P20.00
as legal research fee, or a total of P170.00.
On March 9, 2000, or nine (9) days after petitioner's receipt of the decision of the trial court,
he again paid with the Cash Division of the COMELEC the sum of P520.00 as appeal fee and
legal research fee. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's appeal for
failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period.
On June 13, 2000, the COMELEC issued an Order dismissing the appeal, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission (FIRST DIVISION) RESOLVED, as It
hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant appeal for failure of the Commission to acquire
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
Accordingly, the December 29, 1999 decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 24 in Election Protest Case No. 97001263 is now FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
Let the records of this case be immediately remanded to the court a quo for the execution
of its December 29,2000 Decision.
SO ORDERED.5
A motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied by the COMELEC in its
questioned Resolution dated February 1, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue for resolution here is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing appeal and in denying his
motion for reconsideration.
Section 3, Rule 22, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure6 specifically mandates that the
notice of appeal must be filed within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision,
otherwise, the appeal is dismissible under Section 9,7 of the same ruIe.
Corollary thereto, pertinent portion of Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, provide:
Section 3, Appeal Fees. - The appellant in election cases shall pay an appeal fee as follows:
(a) x x x xxx xxx
(b) Election cases appealed from courts of limited jurisdiction...P500.00.
In every case, a legal research fee of P20.00 shall be paid by the appellant in accordance
with Section 4, Republic Act No. 3870, as amended.
Section 4. Where and When to pay. - The fees prescribed in Sections x x x 3 hereof shall be
paid to, and deposited with, the Cash Division of the Commission within the period to file
the notice of appeal.
In Soller v. COMELEC, et al.,8 reiterating the cases of Loyola v. COMELEC, et al.,9 and
Miranda v. Castillo, et al.,10 the Court stressed the caveat that errors in the payment of
filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. Thus, on the matter of non-payment or
incomplete payment of filing fees we opined that: "the Court would no longer tolerate any
mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees" for election cases filed after the
promulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997."11
In the case at bar, although petitioner filed his notice of appeal within the reglementary
period, however, he erroneously paid the required appeal fees with the cashier of the
Metropolitan Trial Court and not with the Cash Division as required in Sections 3 and 4, Rule
40, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. After he realized his mistake, petitioner paid again
with the Cash Division of the COMELEC the total amount of P520.00 only on March 9, 2000
or four (4) days beyond the five (5) day reglementary period to appeal.
Verily, the present controversy is no different from the case of Rodillas v. COMELEC, et al.,12
where the necessary appeal fees were likewise paid out of time. The Court held therein that:
The mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It should be accompanied by the
payment of the correct amount of appeal fee (See Galang v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 683
[1991]; Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 32 [1998]).
Petitioner had only five days from receipt of the decision.of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
or until June 5, 1994 to perfect his appeal. While he timely filed his Amended Notice of
Appeal on June 2, 1994, he paid the amount of P510 representing the appeal and legal
research fees only on June 14, 1994. It is, therefore, evident that petitioner belatedly paid
said amount. x x x
The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection
of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v, Femandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In
both original and appellate case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306
(1982). The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would
become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provision of the law.13
Invoking Enojas, .Jr. v. Gacott, Jr.,14 petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules
of procedure. A reading, however, of the Enojas case shows that petitioner had taken the
ruling therein out of context. In the said case, the Court found gross ignorance of the law on
the part of the respondent judge in not applying a liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure in election cases as enunciated in Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al.15 The court explained
in Enojas that the Pahilan case should have been applied by the judge because it was the
prevailing doctrine at the time he rendered the assailed decision.16 It bears stressing,
however, that nowhere in the said case did the Court imply that errors in the payment of
filing fees can still be permitted. To repeat, as early as March 25, 1997, we emphasized in
the Loyola case that our decision therein, as well as in Pahilan v. Tabalba, et al., and
Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals, et al.,17 would no longer provide any excuse for
shortcomings in payment of filing fees. Thus, we ruled: "these cases now bar any claim of
good faith, excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing
fees in election cases which may be filed after the promulgation of this decision."18

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
respondent COMELEC in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee
within the reglementary period and in denying his motion for reconsideration.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Hearing of Election cases
G.R. No. 150946 October 23, 2003
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GLAN, ENRIQUE B. YAP, JR., VENANCIO S. WATA,
JR., GILDO VILLORENTE, SR., JING MUSA, BENEDICTO L. RUIZ, ANANIAS S. EMNACE,
VANNEVAR B. ALEGADO, ALITO ARNOLD CARIÑO, SATURNINO BAG, JR., and FEDERICO J.
TANGAN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (En Banc) and FLORA L. BENZONAN, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
The present petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, originated from SPC
No. 01-032, a pre-proclamation controversy instituted by respondent Flora L. Benzonan with
the Commission on Election (COMELEC) en banc. Benzonan, who was a mayoralty candidate
in the Municipality of Glan, Sarangani during the May 14, 2001 elections, sought to declare
null and void the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Glan,
Sarangani and to recall the proclamation of petitioners Enrique B. Yap, Jr., Venancio S. Wata,
Jr., Gildo Villorente, Sr., Ting Musa, Benedicto L. Ruiz, Ananias S. Emnace, Vannevar B.
Alegado, Alito Arnold Carino, Saturnino Bag, Jr. and Federico J. Tangan, as duly elected
Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Glan, Sarangani, respectively.
Benzonan argued her pre-proclamation case on the grounds that: a) after the original and
second MBC had resigned, the third MBC was illegally constituted as its Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and Secretary are not qualified under the Omnibus Election Code;1 b) the
canvassing proceedings, which were initially held in the Session Hall of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Glan, were later transferred to the Provincial Capitol of Danao Province, contrary
to COMELEC Resolution No. 3848;2 c) the Secretary of the MBC failed to record the minutes
of the canvassing proceedings since the start of the canvass; d) neither Benzonan nor her
representatives were notified of the last three days of the canvassing proceedings and,
consequently, they were not able to participate therein; e) a substantial number of the
election returns had been tampered with or falsified; and f) the MBC had falsified the
certificate of canvass votes.3
On December 4, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution4 finding that, based on the
evidence presented, the canvass of votes had been conducted in a place other than the
previous venue at the inception of the proceedings to which all were notified. Thus, the
proclamations of the winning candidates were declared null and void and a re-canvass of
the election returns was ordered.
To reverse the COMELEC en banc’s resolution, petitioners filed the present petition with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary prohibitory injunction.5 On
December 21, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC
to cease and desist from implementing its December 4, 2001 resolution.
Although not raised as an issue, the Court is compelled to resolve whether the COMELEC has
jurisdiction over this case.
Section 3 (c) of Article IX-C of the Constitution reads:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite the disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc.1awphi1.nét
Beginning with Sarmiento v. COMELEC6 and reiterated in subsequent cases,7 the most
recent being Balindong v. COMELEC,8 the Court has upheld this constitutional mandate and
consistently ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the requisite authority to
hear and decide election cases in the first instance. This power pertains to the divisions of
the Commission and any decision by the Commission en banc as regards election cases
decided by it in the first instance is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
It is important to clarify, however, that not all cases relating to election laws filed before the
COMELEC are required to be first heard by a division. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC
exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC en banc can act
directly on matters falling within its administrative powers.1a\^/phi1.net It is only when the
exercise of quasi-judicial powers are involved that the COMELEC is mandated to decide
cases first in division, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en banc.9
It is clear that SPC No. 01-032 is one that involves a pre-proclamation controversy that
requires the exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers, as the illegality of the
composition and proceedings of the MBC, including the falsification of election returns and
certificate of canvass, were alleged to be in issue.10 Furthermore, in her comment to the
petition dated January 9, 2000,11 Benzonan categorically stated that it is not disputed that
what is involved here is a pre-proclamation controversy.

Also undisputed is the fact that Benzonan filed her pre-proclamation case directly with the
COMELEC en banc and that the case was subsequently decided by the COMELEC, sitting en
banc. As aforestated, the COMELEC en banc is without jurisdiction to decide cases involving
these types of controversies in the first instance. Thus, the procedure taken by Benzonan
resulted in a resolution in her favor that the Court must declare null and void and set aside.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution of the
COMELEC en banc dated December 4, 2001 in SPC No. 01-032 is hereby declared null and
void and set aside, and the COMELEC is directed to assign SPC No. 01-032 to a division.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hearing of Election cases
G.R. No. 165677 June 8, 2005
EDILWASIF T. BADDIRI, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALKADAR T. LOONG, NIJAR I. HASSAN AND THE PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SULU, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction to nullify the questioned Resolutions promulgated on July
8, 2004 and October 1, 2004 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, and
COMELEC en banc, respectively. The COMELEC affirmed the Ruling of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of the Province of Sulu which granted the Petition for Correction of Manifest
Error filed by respondent Loong, resulting in the exclusion of petitioner from the list of the
four winning candidates for Board Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District of the
Province of Sulu.
The factual antecedents1 are as follows:
Petitioner Baddiri, private respondents Alkhadar T. Loong and Nijar Hassan were candidates
for Board Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District of the Province of Sulu in the
May 10, 2004 elections.
On May 17, 2004, during the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu,
respondent Loong became aware of a manifest error of 2,000 excess votes in favor of
petitioner Baddiri in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes for Local Positions for the
Municipality of Patikul, Province of Sulu after tallying petitioner’s votes based on the
Statement of Votes. Baddiri was credited with 4,873 instead of 2,873 votes in said Certificate
of Canvass.
To support Loong’s stand, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu, executed an
Affidavit on May 17, 2004, which stated, among others:
3. That, in the preparation of Certificate of Canvass as supported by Statements of Votes per
Precincts for the said municipality, the Board committed an honest ERROR in the total votes
garnered by candidate Edil[wasif] Bad[d]iri for member of Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Sulu;
4. That, in the said Certificate of Canvass, the total votes indicated as garnered by said
candidate is 4,783, but [in] the supporting five (5)-sheet Statements of Votes by Precincts,
the total votes so garnered by said Edil[wasif] Bad[d]iri is only 2, 783.2
On May 17, 2004, Loong filed a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error with the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Sulu. On May 18, 2004, Baddiri filed an Opposition.
On May 19, 2004, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu granted the Petition for
Correction of Manifest Error in its Ruling, thus:
...
WE, the undersigned Chairman and Members of the Board of Canvassers of Sulu Province,
after deliberating on the objection to the inclusion/exclusion of Correction of Manifest Error
ELECTION RETURNS/COC NUMBER 000094
OF PRECINCT NUMBER/CITY/MUNICIPALITY Patikul
of the City/Municipality of _________ and admitting the supporting evidence consisting of:
EXHIBIT ___ Affidavit of the MBOC admitting that they erred in the addition of votes in the
SOV where Edil Baddiri was given an additional votes of 2,000—Candidate E. Baddiri
opposed the Petition alleging that the board [having] canvassed the COC for Patikul [the
same] should no longer be reappreciated by the board.
The board rules to grant the petition to correct manifest error considering that there is no
proclamation yet and that this is allowed by the rules.3
On the basis of the corrected Certificate of Canvass from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu,
respondent Loong placed third with 20,660 votes; Nijar Hassan placed fourth with 20,558
votes; while petitioner Baddiri placed sixth with 19,578 votes and would not make it to the
four-member Board of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District of the Province of Sulu.
Petitioner filed an Appeal dated May 20, 2004 with the COMELEC docketed as SPC No. 04-
159. To protect his interest as the candidate who placed fourth as Board Member, Nijan I.
Hassan filed a Motion to Intervene before the COMELEC, which motion was granted.
In its Resolution promulgated on July 8, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, dismissed
petitioner’s appeal for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission [First Division] RESOLVED as it hereby
RESOLVES to DISMISS the Appeal for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Ruling of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of the Province of Sulu, granting the petition for the correction of
manifest errors filed by Appellee Loong is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu is hereby directed:
1. To immediately RECONVENE with proper notice to the parties and;
2. to prepare a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation for candidate Nijar I. Hassan, as the
4th winning Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Province of Sulu, by including in the
computation of votes the corrected Municipal Certificate of Canvass for the Municipality of
Patikul, Sulu.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit by the
COMELEC en banc in its Resolution dated October 1, 2004. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
LACK OF MERIT.
ACCORDINGLY, the 8 July 2004 Resolution of the First Division is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu is hereby DIRECTED to (i) RECONVENE after giving
due notice to the concerned parties, (ii) CORRECT the error in the Certificate of Canvass of
Patikul, Sulu as well as the Statement of Votes by City/Municipality with Serial No. 00003
with respect to the votes of Provincial Board candidate [Edilwasif] T. Baddiri, and thereafter
proclaim the 4th winning candidate for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sulu, First District.
Let the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu implement this Resolution with dispatch.
FINALLY, this case is hereby referred to the Law Department for investigation of the alleged
inadvertence of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul that resulted in the manifest
error subject of this petition in order to determine if there is a possible violation of the
Omnibus Election Code and other pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner alleges, thus:
RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
HAVING ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION FOR PROMULGATING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS IN COMELEC CASE NO. SPC 04-159 BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
(A) RESPONDENT COMELEC BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE ESTABLISHED RULES ON
JURISDICTION TO THE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER AND THE ELECTORATE OF SULU;
(B) THERE WERE SIMPLY NO MANIFEST ERRORS TO SPEAK OF IN THIS CASE;
(C) RESPONDENT COMELEC PATENTLY IGNORED CLEAR EVIDENCE ADMITTED BY
RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SULU IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER;
(D) THE BELATED OBJECTION OF RESPONDENT LOONG IS A CLEAR CASE OF INEXCUSABLE
AND INCURABLE ESTOPPEL, NOT TO MENTION A PALPABLE DISOBEDIENCE OF ESTABLISHED
COMELEC PROCEDURES;
(E) RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF SULU ISSUED A RULING IN
VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.6

The main issues in this case are the following: (1) Whether or not there was manifest error
in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu; (2) whether or
not the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu had jurisdiction over the Petition for
Correction of Manifest Error filed by respondent Loong; and (3) whether or not the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the Ruling of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu.
First Issue: Whether or not there was manifest error in the Certificate
of Canvass of Votes from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu
Petitioner argues that there were no manifest errors in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes
from the Municipality of Patikul. He states that under Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6669,7 there is manifest error in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the
canvassing where:
1. A copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once;
2. Two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of
certificate of canvass were tabulated separately;
3. There was a mistake in the copying of the figures from the election returns to the
statement of votes by precinct or from the municipal/city Certificate of Canvass to the
Statement of Votes by Municipality; or from the Provincial/City Certificate of Canvass to the
SOV by province/city;
4. Returns from non-existent precinct were included in the canvass; or
5. There was a mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate.
Petitioner asserts that none of the above enumerated manifest errors appeared in the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes from the Municipality of Patikul.
On the other hand, the COMELEC, First Division, held that it is clear that the manifest error
committed in this case falls under subparagraph 5, Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No.
6669. It found that there was manifest error in the addition of votes for Baddiri resulting in
the addition of 2000 votes in his favor. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes from the
Municipality of Patikul, Sulu, reflected 4,873 votes in favor of petitioner, but the supporting
Statement of Votes by Precincts showed that the correct total votes garnered by him is only
2,873, as admitted by the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of the said
municipality. The COMELEC held thus:
...
[I]t is very clear under said Section 32, particularly subparagraph 5 [of Resolution No. 6669],
that "there is manifest error in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing
where: xxx (5) there was a mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate."
The records reveal that there was "a mistake in the addition of [2,000] votes in favor of
[petitioner] Baddiri in the CoC from the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu. The Statement of Votes
per Precinct reveals that [petitioner] obtained the following:
Annex "E" - 736 votes
Annex "F" - 496 votes
Annex "G" - 803 votes
Annex "H" - 377 votes
Annex "I" - 461 votes
2,873 votes
and not 4, 873 votes.8
The factual finding of the COMELEC, which is supported by substantial evidence, is binding
on the Court. Hence, petitioner’s contention that there were no manifest errors in the said
Certificate of Canvass is without merit.
Second Issue: Whether or not the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Sulu had jurisdiction over the petition for correction
Petitioner, citing Section 319 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6669, contends that if there was a
manifest error in the municipal certificate of canvass, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Patikul which prepared the document is the appropriate canvassing body that had
jurisdiction to correct the error and not the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu.
The provision of law cited by petitioner is not in point because it refers to "Pre-proclamation
cases not allowed in the election for President, Vice-President, Senator, Member of the
House of Representatives and Party-List."
The pertinent rule on the matter is Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
thus:
Sec. 7. Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers.—
(a) Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in
the tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing
as where . . . (3) there was a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the
certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by precinct, . . . the board may motu
proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or coalition
of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the aforecited provision of law, the Board of Canvassers may correct manifest errors
committed under the circumstances enumerated therein before proclamation of the
winning candidate. In this case, therefore, either the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Patikul, Sulu or the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sulu has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of respondent Loong’s Petition For Correction of Manifest Error. Since the canvassing
proceedings for the subject position were already before respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sulu and the petition for correction was filed before it, respondent Provincial
Board of Canvassers correctly took cognizance of the petition.
Consequently, petitioner’s argument that there was violation of due process when the
petition for correction was filed only after the municipal canvass and was brought before a
different body (the respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers) since he was prevented from
contesting the claim before the very body that is supposed to have committed it, is without
merit. It must also be pointed out that petitioner was able to contest the claim because he
filed an Opposition to the Petition for Correction of Manifest Error with the Provincial Board
of Canvassers.1awphi1
As regards petitioner’s allegation that the petition for correction is unverified, it has long
been enunciated that the COMELEC has discretion to liberally construe its Rules.10 It may
suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice.11
Petitioner further contends that the belated objection of respondent Loong is a clear case of
estoppel creating serious doubt on the validity of the belated claims made.
The Court disagrees.
Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure clearly states that the petition for
correction may be filed at any time before the proclamation of a winner.12 Respondent
Loong filed the petition for correction during the proceedings of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers; hence, it was filed before the proclamation of the winning candidates. The
petition was, therefore, filed on time.
With regard to the validity of the claims, the COMELEC en banc stated:
We have examined the original copy of the Statement of Votes by Precincts ("SOVP") (copy
for the Commission) of the municipality of Patikul and we found the same to be in order and
there were no signs of tampering or alteration….
Thus, the correct total votes garnered by Baddiri in the municipality of Patikul is only 2,873,
as admitted by the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of the said
municipality, and not 4,873 as reflected in the Certificate of Canvass by the MBOC.13
In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC en banc did not gravely
abuse their discretion in issuing their respective Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division,
promulgated on July 8, 2004 and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc, promulgated on
October 1, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hearing of Election cases
G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution,1 dated July 19, 2001, of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras,
Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001 elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the
COMELEC en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen.2 From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy.3 Otherwise, even after his retirement from
the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place
on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000.4 Subsequently, petitioner applied for
repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His
application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No.
000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No.
115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras,
Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January
12, 2001.6 On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he
had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for "two (2) years."7
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and
who was running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of
candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in
truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he
took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14,
2001. Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131)
against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001,
petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.8 He
subsequently took his oath of office.
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondent’s petition
and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis of the
following findings:
Respondent’s frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar
after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as
would qualify him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the
one-year residency requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in
relation to Sections 65 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency
requirement contemplates of the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency
where he seeks to be elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras,
Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A.
before November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation]
cannot be added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14,
2001 to cure his deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run
for an elective office in the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of
computation used, respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the
May 14, 2001 elections.9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en
banc on January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.
Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether
the 30-day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing
of a motion for reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained
jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in
this case should be dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to
Rule 19, §4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the
running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points out that petitioner received a
copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28,
2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the
petition in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as
having been filed late and should be dismissed.
Private respondent’s contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. – A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the
period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, §2 should be
counted from the receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC
Division.10 In this case, petitioner received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the
COMELEC’s Second Division on July 28, 2001. Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his
motion for reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received a copy of the order, dated
January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for reconsideration. Five days
later, on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no question,
therefore, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the
COMELEC en banc, was filed within the period provided for in Rule 19, §2 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), §7 of the Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
en banc did not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion
was pro forma and, consequently, this petition should have been filed on or before August
27, 2001. It was actually filed, however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites
the finding of the COMELEC en banc that —
An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the
same [are] a mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified Answer and
Memorandum. Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently warrant a
reversal of the assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes the said Motion pro
forma.11
We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro
forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case.
The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and
passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s
remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other
remedy.12 But, as we have held in another case:13
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the
evidence; and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon
by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence
would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only
motions for reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the
motion was so held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration,14 or (2) it did
not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged
to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence,15 or (3) it failed to substantiate the
alleged errors,15 or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law,17
or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof.18 The 16-page motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the
foregoing defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was pro forma because the allegations raised therein are a mere
"rehash" of his earlier pleadings or did not raise "new matters." Hence, the filing of the
motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as
earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondent’s petition for
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In
the meantime, the votes were canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a
margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act
on the petition filed by private respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election
shall not be voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against
whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and
proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their
proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their
certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of
candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been
begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of
the winners. In Abella v. COMELEC19 and Salcedo II v. COMELEC,20 the candidates whose
certificates of candidacy were the subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and,
having received the highest number of votes, were duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in
the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions of the COMELEC rendered
after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been divested of
jurisdiction upon the candidates’ proclamation but on the merits.
II.
On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in
his certificate of candidacy. We find that he had not.
First, §39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect. (Emphasis added)
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
"dwelling" or "habitation,"21 but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,22 that is, "the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)."23 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
new domicile (domicile of choice).24
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen
after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the
Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen.
Title 8, §1427(a) of the United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization. – Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless
such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization
has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the
United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the
date of filing his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half
of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the
United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has
resided continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the
time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the period referred to in this subsection
has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the
United States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by
virtue of a "greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country,
constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does
naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by
reason of his service in the U.S. armed forces.26 It is noteworthy that petitioner was
repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies to the repatriation of those who lost
their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United
States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for the repatriation
of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost
his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence
in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country
in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a
Community Tax Certificate in that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his
intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.27 The status
of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the
status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when
one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa
under §1328 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR)29 and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may
acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a
former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an
act of Congress,30 in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status
as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on
October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the
statement "Philippine Immigration [–] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his
entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription "good for one year stay."31
Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan
includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and comes
or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free entry to
the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (§3(c)). It would appear then that when
petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan
visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to
have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon
taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171.32 He lacked the requisite
residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections33 in support of his
contention that the residency requirement in §39(a) of the Local Government Code includes
the residency of one who is not a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an
issue in that case and this Court did not make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The
question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of repatriation on the same
day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with the
citizenship requirement under §39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be
possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as
already noted, §39(a) of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have
been a resident of the municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election."
Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal.34 What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former
natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen.
Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar in January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the
Omnibus Election Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray,35 however, registration as a
voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of
residency.
Petitioner’s invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As
held in Aquino v. Commission on Elections:36
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government
those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they
dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner
clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second
District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his
motion to be allowed to present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646
(Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In
any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard since he filed a Verified
Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before the
COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to
petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in the records.
III.

The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for "two years" at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false representation of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to
cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign
country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Indeed, it has been held that a candidate’s statement in her certificate of candidacy for the
position of governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not
so37 or that the candidate was a "natural-born" Filipino when in fact he had become an
Australian citizen38 constitutes a ground for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy.
On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC39 that a candidate who used her
husband’s family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of
misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false
statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the
cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the
Commission on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Rendition of decision and Judicial Review
G.R. No. 132603 September 18, 2000
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA, REGION P. DE LEON,
MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA,
DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS TOO
NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A CLASS SUIT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan,
Batangas; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGLALA WIGAN OF BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON.
SANGGUNIANG PANGBAYAN, CALACA, BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Order dated February 25, 1998,1 of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch
XI,2 in Civil Case No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from holding the
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca,
Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang
Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as
Civil Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by the
Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of 199S,
with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order. Ordinance No. 05 3
declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the
required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991.4 On the other hand, Resolution No. 345 5
affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto6 exercised by the
governor of Batangas.7 Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being
ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under Section 9,
in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the attestations or
certifications of the Department of Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the
Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution, on February 10,
1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28,
1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with
barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.8 Simultaneous with the filing of the action before the
trial court, petitioners also filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No.
345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction for lack of
jurisdiction. According to the trial court, the temporary restraining order/injunction sought
by petitioners is directed only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court ruled that
any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be
brought before the Supreme Court.9
On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated
February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the conduct of the
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998.10
In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition.11
On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners' cause and recommending that the
instant petition be given due course.12 Consequently, the Court further resolved on
September 29, 1998 to require the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas to submit their own Comment on the petition.
In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
and require the parties to submit their respective memoranda.13
In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the following issue
for the resolution of this Court:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN THE COMELEC
FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998, WHICH PROVIDED FOR
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON
FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS
MERGER WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA, BATANGAS, PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE NO. 05,
RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2987."14
First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages multiplicity of suit[s] and splitting a
single cause of action," contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court.15 Petitioners
maintain that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 was only issued pursuant to Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, the propriety
of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent upon the validity of the
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.16 And considering that the jurisdiction of the trial
court to hear and determine the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is not
disputed, the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek the
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before this Court, advances
multiplicity of suits and splitting a single cause of action.
Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi judicial functions
under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are
subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely
ministerial but, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court,17 citing Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes
ministerial in character."'18
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that "[t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant to
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory [or quasi judicial] in nature but
simply ministerial or administrative in nature [and only] in obedience to the aforesaid
Ordinance and Resolution," citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
". . . To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC [Regional Trial Court], a court which the law vests
with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over 'all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi judicial
functions'."19
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has already been
conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from being moot and academic,
claiming that the actual holding of the said plebiscite could not validate an otherwise invalid
ordinance and resolution;20 that there are still substantial matters to be resolved;21
assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and academic, ". . . courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading
review"';22 and finally, petitioners maintain that this Court has resolved to require the
parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that is, a
day before the plebiscite was scheduled to be conducted.23
Concurring with petitioners' arguments, the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum filed on
September 7, 1999, asserts that ". . . [I]t is already settled in this jurisdiction that what is
contemplated by the terms 'any decision, order or ruling' of the COMELEC reviewable by
certiorari to this Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987]
Constitution, are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial and city officials." (Citations
omitted.)24 The Solicitor General further argues that the issuance of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions,
hence, it is submitted that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.
Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand, submits that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court, citing
the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-541[1968]); Luison vs. Garcia (L-
10916, May 20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968]); and Aratuc vs. COMELEC
(88 SCRA 251, 272 [1979]);25 thus:
". . . For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this Court may review
the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand
why no interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on Elections of its
functions should be allowed unless emanating from this Court. The observation of Acting
Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in point, indicates the
proper approach. Thus: 'It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First
Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard,
suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body
would be speedily reduced to impotence."26
The COMELEC further argues that ". . . if a Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction to
issue writs against statutory agencies of government like the ones cited above [referring to
the former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public Service Commission,
Social Security Commission, National Electrification Administration and Presidential
Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such jurisdiction over the
Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent body expressly clothed by the 1987
Constitution with, among others, quasi-judicial functions and tasked with one of the most
paramount aspects of a democratic government. . . ."27 Finally, the COMELEC contends that
the temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot and
academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined.28
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
"SECTION 7. . . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within this days from receipt of a copy thereof."
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision
in this wise:
". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."29
In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that powers vested by the Constitution and the law
on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and
sometimes ministerial in character.30
As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the COMELEC
ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay
San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the
affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160. We
agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . . [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987
is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to
hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to
the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws."
(Citation omitted.)31 Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a
"final order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of
said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention — that the power
to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are simply
not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo32 speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In
the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia33 refers to this Court's power to
review "administrative decisions," particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a
certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935
Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC,34 we reiterated that when a board of canvassers
rejects an election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the
COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In
both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of "final
orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
Rendition of decision and Judicial Review
G.R. No. 135468 May 31, 2000
DIOSCORO O. ANGELIA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENTINO R. TAN, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside the
resolution, dated August 18, 1998, of the Commission on Elections en banc annulling the
proclamation of petitioner as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog, Leyte and
ordering the Municipal Board of Canvassers of said municipality to make the necessary
corrections in the election returns of Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 and Precinct No. 23-A and,
thereafter, proclaim the winning candidate or candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan.
The facts of the instant case are as follows:
Petitioner Dioscoro O. Angelia and private respondent Florentino R. Tan were candidates for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog, Leyte in the elections held on
May 11, 1998. After the canvass of votes on May 13, 1998, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed the following as the duly elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan:1
Winning Candidates Votes Obtained

In view of the foregoing, public respondent's other contentions deserve scant consideration. 1. Placido A. Deloy 9,681

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Order dated 2. Emmanuel L. Gacis 9,164
February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to 3. Edmundo P. Sano 8,720
proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the
plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the outcome of Civil 4. Clementino Rudas 8,277
Case No. 3442.
5. Francis Raymundo Realino 8,173
SO ORDERED.
6. Carmelita P. Piscos 7,898
7. Marcelo G. Ganoza 7,835
8. Dioscoro O. Angelia 7,765
Private respondent, who received a total of 7,761 votes — four votes less than those
obtained by petitioner — ranked ninth among the candidates.
On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional
Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte against petitioner, alleging that in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, he
was credited with only 82 votes, when he actually obtained 92, while in Precinct No. 23-A,
petitioner was credited with 18 votes, when he actually garnered only 13 votes. According
to private respondent, he actually received a total of 7,771 votes, while petitioner actually
garnered 7,760 votes.
On June 12, 1998 petitioner took his oath and assumed office as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan.
On June 23, 1998, private respondent filed a motion to withdraw his petition. Subsequently,
he filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of petitioner with the COMELEC. He
attached to the petition a copy of Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-
A-1, which he claims showed a tally of 92 votes for him but indicated a corresponding total
in words and figures of only 82 votes.2 He also submitted a copy of Election Return No.
3700023, which allegedly showed a tally of only 13 votes for petitioner but indicated a
corresponding total in words and figures of 18 votes.3 He presented the affidavit4 of Alma
Duavis, the poll clerk of Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, stating that she inadvertently entered in
Election Return No. 3700088 only 82 instead of 92 as the total number of votes received by
private respondent, and the affidavit5 of Chona Fernando, the poll clerk of Precinct No. 23-
A, stating that through oversight, in Election Return No. 3700023, she indicated 18 instead
of 13 as the total votes obtained by petitioner. In addition, private respondent submitted to
the COMELEC the affidavit6 of Susan Matugas, the chairperson of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1, corroborating the affidavit of Duavis.
In the resolution, dated August 18, 1998, the COMELEC annulled the proclamation of
petitioner as member of the Sangguniang Bayan and ordered the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to make the necessary corrections in the election returns from Precinct Nos. 84-
A/ 84-A-1 and Precinct No. 23-A and, thereafter, to proclaim the winning candidate or
candidates on the basis of the amended results. The resolution of the COMELEC reads:
On the basis of the documents thus presented and taking into consideration the admission
of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct Nos. 84-A and 84-A-1, Barangay Dingle, as
well as the Chairman of the BEI of Precinct No. 23, the Commission En Banc hereby RULES to
GRANT the Petition. Petitioner had correctly availed of the procedure provided for under
Section 5 Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules which prescribes:
Pre-proclamation controversies which may be filed directly with the Commission — (a) The
following pre-proclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of
the results during the canvassing as . . . . (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the
figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate of canvass . . . and such errors
could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence
and proclamation of the winning candidates had already been made.
Indeed, the error committed is manifest in that in Resolution No. 2962 (General Instructions
for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers in Connection with the May
11, 1998 Elections) it was clearly directed:
In case there exist discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in taras/tally as against the
votes obtained in words/figures in the same returns/certificate, the votes in taras/tally shall
prevail.
Clearly, rectification of the error is called for, if We are to give life to the will of the
electorate. Moreover, it is purely administrative and "It does not involve any opening of the
ballot box, examination and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns. As said error
was discovered after proclamation, all that is required is to convene the board of canvassers
to rectify the error it inadvertently committed in order that the true will of the voters will be
effected." (Tatlonghari vs. Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 849)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Banc hereby ANNULS the
proclamation of Dioscoro Angelia, the same being based on an erroneous tally and DIRECTS
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Abuyog, Leyte, to RECONVENE within five (5) days
from receipt hereof and effect the corrections in the total number of votes received by the
candidates in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 (clustered) and Precinct No. 23-A and thereafter
PROCLAIM the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on the corrected results.
Accordingly, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on September 1, 1998 and,
after making the necessary corrections in the election returns, proclaimed private
respondent a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that he was not given due notice and
hearing. Then, without waiting for the resolution of his motion, he filed the instant petition
for certiorari, alleging, as the sole assignment of error, the following:
WITH DUE RESPECT, PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC GRAVELY ERRED AND VIOLATED
PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT PASSED THE AUGUST 18,
1998 RESOLUTION ANNULLING HIS PROCLAMATION AND RECONVENING THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND HEARING.
The petition has no merit and should be dismissed, but before we do so, certain preliminary
questions raised by the parties must first be disposed of.
First. Respondents contend that the instant petition should be dismissed for being
premature, because petitioner has a pending motion for reconsideration of the resolution,
dated August 18, 1998, of the COMELEC.
We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition because the resolution
of the COMELEC in question is not subject to reconsideration and, therefore, any party who
disagreed with it had only one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.7 Rule 13, §1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:
What Pleadings are Not Allowed. — The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx xxx xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases;
xxx xxx xxx
As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense, reconsideration of the
COMELEC resolution was not possible and petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC
denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing a petition for
certiorari with this Court to run and expire.
The COMELEC contends that petitioner should not be allowed to speculate on the outcome
of his motion for reconsideration, which he has not formally withdrawn. Indeed, it would
have been more appropriate for petitioner to first withdraw his motion for reconsideration
in the COMELEC before filing the present petition. Nevertheless, the filing by petitioner of
the instant petition and his reply to the comments of respondents — where he admitted
that, except in cases involving election offenses, a motion for reconsideration of a decision
of the COMELEC en banc is a prohibited pleading8 — sufficiently indicated his intention to
abandon his motion for reconsideration.
Second. Petitioner alleges that private respondent failed to serve him a copy of the petition
for annulment of proclamation filed with the COMELEC. In reply, private respondent
submitted the registry receipt and the return card9 to prove that a copy of the said petition
was received on June 26, 1998 by a certain Tudila M. Angelia on behalf of petitioner.
Petitioner admits the receipt of said mail, but avers that it did not contain a copy of the
petition for annulment of proclamation in the COMELEC but of the petition for quo warranto
filed by private respondent in the Regional Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte. 10 As private
respondent points out, however, the petition for quo warranto was filed by his former
counsel, the Martinez & Martinez Law Office, and a copy of said petition was already sent to
petitioner. On the other hand, the petition for annulment of proclamation was filed by his
new counsel, the Astorga & Macamay Law Office. Since a copy of the petition for quo
warranto had previously been served on petitioner, there could be no reason for private
respondent's new counsel to serve it again on petitioner.
Petitioner likewise claims that private respondent engaged in forum-shopping because, after
filing a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte, private
respondent filed the present petition for annulment of proclamation with the COMELEC.
This contention is bereft of merit. First, private respondent withdrew the quo warranto case
before filing the petition for annulment of proclamation. Second, while the filing of a
petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation
controversy, this principle admits of several exceptions, such as when such petition is not
the proper remedy. 11 Under §253 of the Omnibus Election Code, the grounds for a petition
for quo warranto are ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines of the
respondent. Since in the present case, private respondent alleged the existence of manifest
errors in the preparation of election returns, clearly, the proper remedy is not a petition for
quo warranto but a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Third. Petitioner further contends that he was denied procedural due process because the
COMELEC issued its resolution without notice and hearing. Indeed, it appears that the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC did not comply with the procedure that
should have been followed in the instant case.
In Castromayor v. COMELEC, 12 the returns from a precinct were overlooked by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers in computing the total number of votes obtained by the
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan, for which reason the
COMELEC directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to make the necessary corrections.
We held that, as the case involved a manifest error, although the COMELEC erred in
annulling the proclamation of petitioner without notice and hearing, the expedient course
of action was for the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and
hearing in accordance with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the
necessary corrections on the certificate of canvass and proclaim the winning candidate or
candidates on the basis thereof.
Said Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states:
Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the Board of Canvassers. — (a)
Where it is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as
where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a
certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns
or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or
copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes by
precinct, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the
canvass, the board may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political
party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the
errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be made in writing and must be promulgated.
(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by
said order may appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the
promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning
candidates, unless their votes are not affected by the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents the Board of Canvassers concerned and all
parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons,
together with a copy of the appeal, to the respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
This case likewise involves manifest errors. Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos.
84-A/84-A-1 is claimed to show 92 votes in favor of private respondent but indicate a total
in words and figures of only 82 votes. On the other hand, Election Return No. 3700023
allegedly shows 13 votes for petitioner but indicates in words and figures 18 votes. These
discrepancies can be easily resolved without opening the ballot boxes and recounting the
ballots. COMELEC Resolution No. 2962 provides that "in case there exist discrepancies in the
votes of any candidate in taras/tally as against the votes obtained in words/figures in the
same returns/certificates, the votes in taras/tally shall prevail."
In the present case, although the COMELEC annulled the proclamation of petitioner, it
merely directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "RECONVENE within five (5) days from
receipt hereof and effect the corrections in the total number of votes received by the
candidates in Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 (clustered) and Precinct No. 23-A and thereafter
PROCLAIM the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on the corrected results."
It was the Municipal Board of Canvassers which the COMELEC ordered to actually effect the
necessary corrections, if any, in the said election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim
the winning candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan. In
accordance with our ruling in Castromayor, the expedient action to take is to direct the
Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and, after notice and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if
any, in the election returns and, on the basis thereof, proclaim the winning candidate or
candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
WHEREFORE, the en banc resolution, dated August 18, 1998 of the Commission on Elections
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Abuyog,
Leyte is ordered to reconvene and, after notice to the parties and hearing in accordance
with Rule 27, §7 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to effect the necessary corrections, if
any, in Election Return No. 3700088 from Precinct Nos. 84-A/84-A-1 and Election Return No.
3700023 from Precinct No. 23-A and, based on the amended results, proclaim the winning
candidate or candidates as member or members of the Sangguniang Bayan of said
municipality.
SO ORDERED.
Rendition of decision and Judicial Review
G.R. No. 142527 March 1, 2001
ARSENIO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LA RAINNE ABAD-SARMIENTO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc,
denying the Motion for Reconsideration of herein petitioner and affirming the Resolution of
the Second Division of the COMELEC that modified the decision dated December 4, 1997 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Br. 40, of Quezon City in Election Case No. 97-684. Said
decision declared herein private respondent La Rainne Abad-Sarmiento the duly elected
Punong Barangay of Barangay Doña Aurora, Quezon City during the May 12, 1997 elections;
directed the herein petitioner to vacate and turnover the office of Punong Barangay to
private respondent upon the finality of the resolution; and directed the Clerk of the
COMELEC to notify the appropriate authorities of the resolution upon final disposition of
this case, in consonance with the provisions of Section 260 of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code, as amended.1
The facts of the case are as follows:
On May 12, 1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doña Aurora,
Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-
Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming
irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election
Inspectors. After petitioner answered and the issues were joined, the Metropolitan Trial
Court ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts. It
subsequently rendered its decision that private respondent won the election. She garnered
596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount.2
On appeal, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled that private respondent won over
petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal
which petitioner opposed. Both petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and private
respondent's Motion for Execution pending appeal were submitted for resolution. The
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the
Second Division.3 It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal.
Petitioner brought before the Court this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC when:
(1) it did not preferentially dispose of the case;
(2) it prematurely acted on the Motion for Execution pending appeal; and
(3) it misinterpreted the Constitutional provision that "decisions, final orders, or rulings of
the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final,
executory and not appealable".
First, petitioner avers that the Commission violated its mandate on "preferential disposition
of election contests" as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as
Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases
brought before it within ninety days from the date of submission. He points out that the
case was ordered submitted for resolution on November 15, 19994 but the COMELEC En
Banc promulgated its resolution only on April 4, 2000,5 four months and four days after
November 14, 1999.
We are not unaware of the Constitutional provision cited by petitioner. We agree with him
that election cases must be resolved justly, expeditiously and inexpensively. We are also not
unaware of the requirement of Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code that election
cases brought before the Commission shall be decided within ninety days from the date of
submission for decision.6 The records show that petitioner contested the results of ten (10)
election precincts involving scrutiny of affirmation, reversal, validity, invalidity, legibility,
misspelling, authenticity, and other irregularities in these ballots. The COMELEC has
numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical. Considering further the
tribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural
requirements on deadlines realistically. Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce
the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In
our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict
construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would
amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.
Petitioner avers the COMELEC abused its discretion when it failed to treat the case
preferentially. Petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It will be noted that the "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the
courts7and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily
show.
Further, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time.
As private respondent pointed out, petitioner did not raise the issue before the COMELEC
when the case was pending before it. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she
who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The
active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the
court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of
that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said
party from later impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction.8 On the matter of the
assailed resolution, therefore, we find no grave abuse of discretion on this score by the
COMELEC.
Second, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Execution
pending appeal of private respondents on April 2, 2000 when the appeal was no longer
pending. He claims that the motion had become obsolete and unenforceable and the appeal
should have been allowed to take its normal course of "finality and execution" after the 30-
day period. Additionally, he avers it did not give one good reason to allow the execution
pending appeal.
We note that when the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a
motion for reconsideration before the Second Division. This pending motion for
reconsideration suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Division.
Appropriately then, the division must act on the motion for reconsideration. Thus, when the
Second Division resolved both petitioner's motion for reconsideration and private
respondent's motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the exercise of its exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are: (a) there
must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be
a good reason for the execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a
special order.9 In our view, these three requisites were present. In its motion for execution,
private respondent cites that their case had been pending for almost three years and the
remaining portion of the contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar
cases and for the same good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant execution
pending appeal in the best interest of the electorate.10 Correspondingly, we do not find
that the COMELEC abused its discretion when it allowed the execution pending appeal.
Third, petitioner contends that the COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2), second
paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that factual findings of the
COMELEC in election cases involving municipal and barangay officials may still be appealed.
He cites jurisprudence stating that such decisions, final orders or rulings do not preclude a
recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari,11 when grave abuse of
discretion has marred such factual determination,12 and when there is arbitrariness in the
factual findings.13
We agree with petitioner that election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be
appealed by way of a special civil action for certiorari. But this recourse is available only
when the COMELEC's factual determinations are marred by grave abuse of discretion. We
find no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and the records, we observed
that the lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed.
Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience, the
COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on
factual questions before it. Here, we find no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion
or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously held, factual
findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are
conclusive on this Court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned resolutions.14 Unless any of these
causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will not interfere with the COMELEC's findings of
fact.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the En Banc Resolution of the
Commission on Election is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Rules of Procedure
G.R. No. 166032 February 28, 2005
ELENITA I. BALAJONDA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION) and MARICEL S. FRANCISCO, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections has power to order the immediate execution
of its judgment or final order involving a disputed barangay chairmanship is at the heart of
the present Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman (Punong Barangay), having won the office in the barangay
elections held the previous day.2 Her margin of victory over private respondent Maricel
Francisco (Francisco) was four-hundred twenty (420) votes.3 Francisco duly filed a petition
for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of proclamation, lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 35.4
In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Francisco’s petition stated no cause of
action and that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were "baseless,
conjectural, flimsy, frivolous, preposterous and mere figments of the latter’s wild
imagination." She also laid stress on the fact that although the grounds relied upon by
Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted for
violation of the same.51ªvvphi1.nét
After the issues were joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-nine (69)
ballot boxes, and eventually, the ballots in thirty-nine (39) precincts were revised.6 After
trial, MeTC dismissed the protest with its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by four
hundred eighteen (418) votes.7 The dispositive part of its Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Protest filed by Maricel Susano Francisco is hereby DENIED. The
proclamation of Elenita I. Balajonda as the duly proclaimed Barangay Captain of Barangay
Sta. Monica, Quezon City during the 15 July 2002 Barangay Election is hereby upheld.8
Francisco appealed the MeTC Decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In a
Resolution9 promulgated on 2 February 2004, the COMELEC First Division reversed the
MeTC, finding that Francisco won over Balajonda by one hundred eleven (111) votes. The
COMELEC First Division thus annulled the proclamation of 0Balajonda, and declared in her
stead Francisco as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the
Appeal. The decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The proclamation of ELENITA BALAJONDA as Punong Barangay of said Barangay is
ANNULLED. Protestant MARICEL FRANCISCO is hereby declared the duly elected Punong
Barangay of Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches City.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) hereby ORDERS:
1. Protestee ELENITA "Baby" BALAJONDA to VACATE the post of Punong Barangay of Sta.
Monica, Novaliches City in favor of MARICEL SUSANO FRANCISCO and to CEASE and DESIST
from performing the functions attached to said office.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 of the COMELEC First Division’s
Resolution.12 In the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for Execution13 dated 5 February
2004, praying for a writ of execution in accordance with Section 2(a) of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court [Sec. 2(a), Rule 39], which allows discretionary execution of judgment
upon good reasons to be stated in the order.14
Balajonda duly opposed15 the Motion for Execution, arguing in the main that under Sec.
2(a), Rule 39, only the judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of
discretionary execution pending appeal. However, in its Order16 dated 26 November 2004,
the COMELEC First Division after due hearing granted the motion and directed the issuance
of a Writ of Execution,17 ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her
functions as Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco. The Order states in
part:
WHEREFORE, the Motion is hereby GRANTED. In order to implement the Resolution of the
Commission (First Division) in the above entitled case, the Clerk of Commission (Director IV,
ECAD) is hereby DIRECTED to issue a WRIT OF EXECUTION ordering ELENITA I. BALAJONDA
to CEASE and DESIST from discharging the powers and duties of Barangay Captain of Sta.
Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City and to relinquish the same to and in favor of MARICEL S.
FRANCISCO who was declared duly elected to the post in the Resolution pending final
disposition of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Protestee in the above-entitled case.
Protestant however is ordered to post a bond in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱50,000.00) which shall answer for whatever damage protestee will sustain by reason of
this execution if the final resolution of the protest would decide that the protestant is not
entitled thereto. This Order is immediately executory.1awphi1.nét
SO ORDERED. 18
This Order is the subject of the present petition.
In support of her thesis that the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion
in granting execution pending appeal, Balajonda in essence submits the following grounds,
thus: (1) that the COMELEC may order the immediate execution only of the decision of the
trial court but not its own decision; (2) that the order of execution which the COMELEC First
Division issued is not founded on good reasons as it is a mere pro forma reproduction of the
reasons enumerated in Ramas v. COMELEC;19 and (3) the COMELEC exhibited manifest
partiality and bias in favor of Francisco when it transgressed its own rule.20 Balajonda
invoked only the first ground in her opposition to the Motion For Execution, but definitely
not the second and third.l^vvphi1.net In any event, all the grounds are bereft of merit.
Early last year, the Court, through Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Batul v. Bayron,21
affirmed a similar order of the COMELEC First Division directing the immediate execution of
its own judgment. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the
procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to
dispute the COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the
Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character
and effect.
Batul also clearly shows that the judgments which may be executed pending appeal need
not be only those rendered by the trial court, but by the COMELEC as well. It stated, thus:
It is true that present election laws are silent on the remedy of execution pending appeal in
election contests. However, neither Ramas nor Santos declared that such remedy is
exclusive to election contests involving elective barangay and municipal officials as argued
by Batul. Section 2 allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court applies
in a suppletory manner to election cases, including those involving city and provincial
officials.22
Batul is different from this case in that in Batul the decision subject of the order of
immediate execution was rendered by the poll body in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction23 while the decision in this case was promulgated in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Still, there is no reason to dispose of this petition in a manner different from
Batul. The public policy underlying the suppletory application of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 is to
obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by either the courts or
the COMELEC.24 Towards that end, we have consistently employed liberal construction of
procedural rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections.25 Balajonda’s argument is
anchored on a simplistic, literalist reading of Sec. 2(a), Rule 39 that barely makes sense,
especially in the light of the COMELEC’s specialized and expansive role in relation to election
cases.
Anent the second ground, we find that the COMELEC First Division committed no grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that:
In the instant case, the protestant cited the good reasons enunciated in Ramas v. Comelec
(286 SCRA 189), to wit: (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the
shortness of the remaining period, and (3) the length of time that the election contest has
been pending.
After evaluating the case, we rule that the reasons cited are indeed obtaining. Public
interest is best served if the herein Protestant who actually received the highest number of
votes should be immediately be installed. It is likewise true that the remaining period or the
unexpired term is too short that to further prolong the tenure of the protestee is a virtual
denial of the right of the protestant, the duly elected barangay captain, to assume office.
Considering that there are good reasons for the issuance of an Order of Execution, to wit:
dictates of public policy and the shortness of the remaining period, we have to grant the
Motion.26
All that Balajonda musters in the main to debunk the poll body’s ruling is that it is just a pro
forma reproduction of the reasons enunciated in pertinent jurisprudence for the grant of
execution pending appeal.27 The argument suffers from a discernible fallacy. The reasons
relied upon by the COMELEC First Division are either self-evident or borne out by the law.
With respect to the first reason, it cannot be disputed with success that public interest
demands that the winner on the basis of a full and incisive recount and new appreciation of
votes should be installed in office without delay. Indeed, "[I]t is neither fair nor just to keep
in office for an uncertain period one whose right is under suspicion."28
Balajonda’s corollary argument that the public interest involved or the will of the electorate
is fully determined only after the election contest becomes final29 would, if sustained,
negate altogether the purpose of allowing executions pending appeal in the first place.
Indeed, the argument begs the question. In this regard, Balajonda’s filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of the decision likewise did not divest the COMELEC First Division of
jurisdiction to rule on the Motion For Execution. Once more, Batul30 instructs us that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s resolution with the
COMELEC en banc does not suspend the execution thereof.
As regards the second reason, it is provided in Republic Act No. 916431 that barangay
officials elected in the barangay elections of July 2002 shall serve up to November 2005.
Thus when the poll body’s First Division promulgated the challenged Order on 26 November
2004, directing immediate execution of its Decision pending final disposition of Balajonda’s
motion for reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc, the expiry of the term of the disputed
position was a scant twelve (12) months away.
At this point, the Court cannot take judicial notice of what Balajonda calls "the consensus to
extend the terms of barangay captains" purportedly soon to be enacted into law by
Congress.32 The Court lacks the powers of prognostication to ascertain whether there is
such a "consensus" and, more so, whether it would actually ripen to reality in the future.
In a bid to ascribe partiality and bias in favor of Francisco to the COMELEC itself, Balajonda
alleges that the poll body failed to observe its own Rules of Procedure33 directing the Clerk
of Court, within twenty-four (24) hours following the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
to notify the Presiding Commissioner and therefore to set the motion for hearing, and the
Presiding Commissioner in turn thereafter to certify the case to the Commission en banc.34
However, the record does not bear out Balajonda’s charge. The case was not forwarded to
the COMELEC en banc right away precisely because of the pendency of Francisco’s motion
for immediate execution and Balajonda’s motions. According to the COMELEC Records,
Balajonda filed with the First Division on 03 March 2004 a Manifestation with Motion for
Leave to Xerox Contested Ballots,35 and on 03 March 2004 a Manifestation with Motion for
Partial Reconsideration.36
It is noteworthy that the COMELEC First Division did not make use of the third reason
invoked by Francisco which refers to the length of time that the election contest has been
pending.37 Consequently, it is pointless to address Balajonda’s accusation that the delay in
the disposition of the election protest is attributable to Francisco.38
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED for failure of petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda
to show that respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the
challenged Order dated 24 November 2004. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Votes required before rendition of decision
G.R. No. 143398 October 25, 2000
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND DIVISION) and
JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to nullify the order dated June
15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 giving notice to the
parties of the promulgation of the resolution on the case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee,
versus Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr., Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in
the afternoon and to prohibit the respondent Commission on Election from promulgating
the so called "Guiani ponencia."2
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the
position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections.3 On May 16, 1998,
the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected
Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the
election returns.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second highest
number of votes, filed with the Comelec, an election protest4 challenging the results in a
total of 201 precincts.5 The case was assigned to the First Division (formerly Second),
Commission on Elections.6
On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a proposed
resolution in the case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio F. Desamito
dissented. Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco at first did not indicate her vote but said
that she would "wish to see both positions, if any, to make her (my) final decision."7
In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the service. On
March 3, 2000, the President of the Philippines appointed Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to
the seat vacated by Commissioner Guiani. Commissioner Javier assumed office on April 4,
2000.
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez received a
purported resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani
and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting. The result was in favor of
respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176 votes.8 On February 28,
2000, the Comelec, First Division, declared that the thirteen-page resolution "is a useless
scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no
promulgation of the Resolution in the instant case." 9
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the promulgation of
the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on April 6, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon.10
However, on April 6, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed a motion to cancel promulgation
challenging the validity of the purported Guiani resolution. The Comelec, First Division,
acting on the motion, on the same date, postponed the promulgation until this matter is
resolved.11
On June 14, 2000, two members of the First Division, namely, Commissioners Luzviminda G.
Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier, sent a joint memorandum to Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito, presiding Commissioner, stating:
"Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to the Commission
En Banc that this case be submitted for a reconsultation by the members of the First
Division, it is our position that we promulgate as soon as possible the Guiani Resolution of
the case. This is notwithstanding the Jamil vs. Comelec (283 SCRA 349), Solidbank vs. IAC (G.
R. No. 73777) and other doctrinal cases on the issue. After all, this Commission stood pat on
its policy that what is controlling is the date the ponente signed the questioned Resolution
as what we did in promulgating the case of Dumayas vs. Bernal (SPC 98-137).
"In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the
subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the
Supreme Court.12
On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F. Desamito,
issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case on June 20, 2000, at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.13
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19, 2000, petitioner
interposed the instant petition.14
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the promulgation of
the resolution of the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon,
and prohibiting the Comelec, First Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani
resolution and directing the Comelec, First Division, to deliberate anew on the case and to
promulgate the resolution reached in the case after such deliberation.15
On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Comelec
from implementing the June 15, 2000 order for the promulgation of the resolution set on
June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon. At the same time, the Court directed the
respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.16
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment.17 Respondent Ramirez admitted
that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his
retirement on February 15, 2000.18 He submitted that Comelec, First Division, its
membership still constituting a majority, must elevate the protest case to the Comelec en
banc until resolved with finality.19
In his comment filed on August 29, 2000, the Solicitor General interposed no objection to
the petition.20
At issue in this petition is whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of
the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find the petition without merit.
To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is
prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by
the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."21
[emphasis supplied]
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."22 This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc,23 not of a
division,24 certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.25 The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division
of the Commission on Elections.26
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to
the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.27
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no
appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion
for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law.28 Failure to abide by
this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.29
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed
by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory.30 Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987 Constitution provides as
follows:
"Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided
in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied]
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a decision of a division may be
raised to the en banc via a motion for reconsideration.31
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar.32 It
is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division.33 Admittedly,
petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the division’s resolution or final decision.34 In
fact, there was really no resolution or decision to speak of 35 because there was yet no
promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court from an order of "promulgation of the
Resolution of this case" by the First Division of the Comelec.36
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction
of the Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of
a decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because
the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration
having been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari
cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition.37 In
truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final
decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.38
We are aware of the ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections,39 that "in a situation such as
this where the Commission on Elections in division committed grave abuse of discretion or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action
pending before it and the controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is
not to refer the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its
present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court." This is the case relied upon by the dissenting justice to support the
proposition that resort to the Supreme Court from a resolution of a Comelec Division is
allowed.40 Unfortunately, the Kho case has no application to the case at bar. The issue
therein is, may the Commission on Elections in division admit an answer with counter-
protest after the period to file the same has expired?41 The Comelec First Division admitted
the answer with counter-protest of the respondent. The Supreme Court declared such order
void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.42 However, an important moiety in the Kho case was not mentioned in the
dissent. It is that the Comelec, First Division, denied the prayer of petitioner for the
elevation of the case to en banc because the orders of admission were mere interlocutory
orders.43 Hence, the aggrieved party had no choice but to seek recourse in the Supreme
Court. Such important fact is not present in the case at bar.
We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order dated June 15, 2000, which is
a mere notice of the promulgation of the resolution in EPC Case No. 98-29. We quote the
order in question in full, to wit:
"Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and the Joint
Memorandum of Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier to the
Presiding Commissioner of the First Division dated 14 June 2000 paragraph 5 of which
states:
‘In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation of the
subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a certiorari case before the
Supreme Court.’
the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday, June 20, 2000 at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon at the Comelec Session Hall, Intramuros, Manila.
No further motion for postponement of the promulgation shall be entertained.
The Clerk of the Commission is directed to give the parties, through their Attorneys, notice
of this Order through telegram and by registered mail or personal delivery.
"SO ORDERED.
"Given this 15th day of June, 2000 in the City of Manila, Philippines.
FOR THE DIVISION:
[Sgd.] JULIO F. DESAMITO
Presiding Commissioner"44
There is nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the resolution in the case,
except in the mind of suspicious parties. Perhaps what was wrong in the order was the
reference to the memorandum of the two commissioners that was not necessary and was a
superfluity, or excessus in linguae. All the members of the Division were incumbent
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and had authority to decide the
case in the Division. What appears to be patently null and void is the so-called Guiani
resolution if it is the one to be promulgated. We cannot assume that the Comelec will
promulgate a void resolution and violate the Constitution and the law. We must assume
that the members of the Commission in Division or en banc are sworn to uphold and will
obey the Constitution.
Consequently, the Guiani resolution is not at issue in the case at bar. No one knows the
contents of the sealed envelope containing the resolution to be promulgated on June 20,
2000, simply because it has not been promulgated!
It may be true that the parties received a copy of what purports to be the Guiani
resolution,45 declaring respondent Jose T. Ramirez the victor in the case. Such Guiani
resolution is admitted by the parties and considered by the Commission on Elections as void.
The Solicitor General submitted an advice that the same resolution is deemed vacated by
the retirement of Commissioner Guiani on February 15, 2000.46 It can not be promulgated
anymore for all legal intents and purposes.
We rule that the so-called Guiani resolution is void for the following reasons:
First: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not
before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final
decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or
decision.47 Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The
resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of its members and duly
promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from office,
but when he vacated his office without the final decision or resolution having been
promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated.48 Before that resolution or decision is
so signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision to speak of.49
Second: Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., Clerk of the First Division, Commission on Elections,
denied the release or promulgation of the Guiani resolution. He disowned the initials on the
face of the first page of the resolution showing its promulgation on February 14, 2000, and
said that it was a forgery. There is no record in the Electoral Contests and Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the Commission on Election that a "resolution on the main merits of
the case was promulgated."50
Third: By an order dated February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, disclaimed the
"alleged thirteen (13) page resolution" for being "a useless scrap of paper which should be
ignored by the parties" there being no promulgation of the resolution in the case.51
Fourth: It is unlikely that Commissioner Tancangco affixed her signature on the Guiani
resolution. On the date that it was purportedly promulgated, which was February 14, 2000,
the Division issued an order where Commissioner Tancangco expressed her reservations and
stated that she wished to see both positions, if any, before she made her final decision.52
A final decision or resolution of the Comelec, in Division or en banc is promulgated on a date
previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their
attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.53
It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before promulgation of a decision or
resolution, the ponente may change his mind.54 Moreover, in this case, before a final
decision or resolution could be promulgated, the ponente retired and a new commissioner
appointed. And the incoming commissioner has decided to take part in the resolution of the
case. It is presumed that he had taken the position of his predecessor because he co-signed
the request for the promulgation of the Guiani resolution.55
If petitioner were afraid that what would be promulgated by the Division was the Guiani
resolution, a copy of which he received by mail, which, as heretofore stated, was not
promulgated and the signature thereon of the clerk of court was a forgery, petitioner could
seek reconsideration of such patently void resolution and thereby the case would be
elevated to the Commission en banc.56
Considering the factual circumstances, we speculated ex mero motu that the Comelec
would promulgate a void resolution.
"The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or
compass."57 We must not speculate that the Comelec would still promulgate a void
resolution despite knowledge that it is invalid or void ab initio.
Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was premature. Petitioner
failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies available before the COMELEC.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that "before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then
such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action."58
"This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for reconsideration
then is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action for certiorari, unless the party
who avails of the latter can convincingly show that his case falls under any of the following
exceptions to the rule: (1) when the question is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention
is urgent, (3) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the
controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high government official from whom
relief is sought to act on the matter, and seeks when the issue for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot."59
"This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and
legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts
of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the
case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principal of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine
is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the
factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is
irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the president bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."60 The
administrative authorities must be given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum.61 Only after administrative remedies are exhausted
may judicial recourse be allowed.62
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions and indeed, as heretofore stated, the
exceptions do not apply to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in
Division.
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. "Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on that
ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of cause of action."63
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity.
The Court orders the Commission on Elections, First Division, to resolve with all deliberate
dispatch Election Protest Case No. 98-29 and to promulgate its resolution thereon adopted
by majority vote within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
The temporary restraining order issued on June 20, 2000, is hereby lifted and dissolved,
effective immediately.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Votes required before rendition of decision
G.R. No. 145802 April 4, 2001
DOMINADOR T. BELAC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROMMEL DIASEN, respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction, assailing the Resolutions dated February 22, 2000 and November
16, 2000 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in SPC No. 98-170.
The facts as shown by the records are:
Rommel Diasen of the LAMMP and Dominador Belac of the LAKAS-NUCD were candidates
for governor in the province of Kalinga during the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
On May 14, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers started to canvass the results of the
election.
On May 15, 1998, when the Certificate of Canvass and Statement of Votes for the
municipality of Pinukpuk were scheduled for canvassing, Diasen objected to the inclusion of
the election returns of 42 precincts in the said municipality.
On May 19, 1998, Diasen also questioned the inclusion of the election returns of 28
precincts of the town of Tinglayan.
Within twenty-four (24) hours therefrom, Diasen filed with the Kalinga Provincial Board of
Canvassers a petition for exclusion of the Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes
for Pinukpuk and Tinglayan, alleging in the main that:
1. The Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes were not prepared by the Board of
Election Inspectors as the same were not signed by the respective watchers for the
candidates' political parties.
2. There were discrepancies in the tally of votes. The official LAMMP copies of the official
returns have a lesser number of votes than those appearing in the Statements of Votes for
the said municipalities.
However, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proceeded to include in its canvass the results
as stated in the election returns for Pinukpuk. On Diasen's objection to the inclusion of the
election returns for Tinglayan, the Board ruled that it will only issue a certificate of
correction since the discrepancies were caused by mere error in indicating the entries.
On May 19, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Belac as the duly elected
governor for the province of Kalinga.
On May 21, 1998, Diasen appealed to the COMELEC (First Division) from the rulings of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers.
On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) issued a Resolution dismissing Diasen's appeal
for lack of merit, thus:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The
rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the petition for exclusion of Certificate of
Canvass and Statement of Votes are hereby affirmed. The Provincial Board of Canvassers for
Kalinga is hereby directed to reconvene and continue with the canvassing with reasonable
dispatch and proclaim the winning candidate if the votes from the four precincts of
Tinglayan, Kalinga where there was failure of elections would not materially affect the
results of the election.
"Considering that the records of the case show that additions in the COCs and SOVs of
Pinukpuk for the votes of gubernatorial candidate Dominador Belac were made, the Law
Department is directed to conduct a preliminary investigation for the commission of an
election offense against the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Pinukpuk,
Kalinga.
"The Law Department is similarly directed to conduct an immediate investigation on the
possible commission of electoral fraud as alluded to in the ultimate paragraph before the
herein dispositive portion. The Election Officer of Pinukpuk is directed immediately to cause
the transfer of the Book of Voters for the 69 precincts of Pinukpuk to the Comelec Main
Office [c/o Law Department] for this purpose."
On June 19, 1998, Diasen filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Resolution which
was elevated to the COMELEC en banc.

While the said motion was pending resolution in the COMELEC en banc, the Chairman of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers, Atty. Nicasio Aliping, convened the Board by calling the two
other members in order to proclaim Belac as the new governor. But the two members
declined, so only Atty. Aliping proceeded with Belac's proclamation.
On June 28, 1998, Diasen filed with the COMELEC a separate petition (SPC No. 98-291) to
dispute the proclamation of Belac.
Meanwhile, on February 22, 2000, or almost two years after the filing of Diasen's motion for
reconsideration on June 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc promulgated the first assailed
Resolution modifying the ruling of the First Division, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the resolution of the Commission (First Division)
subject of the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby modified as follows:
"1) The Provincial Board of Canvassers for Kalinga is hereby directed to proceed with the
canvassing of votes for the office of the provincial governor deducting from the Certificates
of Canvass of the Municipalities of Tinglayan and Pinukpuk the votes reflected on the
election returns from the above-excluded precincts and thereafter proclaim the winning
candidate for governor;
"2) The directive to the Law Department to conduct appropriate investigations is affirmed
with the modification, however, that the Board of Election Inspectors concerned for the
municipalities of Pinukpuk and Tinglayan, as well as John Does, be likewise investigated for
possible collusion in the commission of the election offense and election anomaly, subject of
petitioner's case."
The above Resolution was penned by Commissioner Manolo Gorospe, concurred in by
Commissioners Japal Guiani and Luzviminda Tancangco. Chairman Harriet Demetriou and
Commissioner Julio Desamito joined Commissioner Teresita Dyliacco Flores in her dissent. In
short, the voting was 3-3.
In view of the results of the voting, Belac filed a motion praying that the COMELEC en banc
desist from implementing the February 22, 2000 Resolution in favor of Diasen, citing Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.1 The COMELEC granted the motion in its
February 24, 2000 order and set the re-hearing on March 9, 2000.
On February 28, 2000, pursuant to the COMELEC en banc's February 22, 2000 Resolution,
the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Diasen as the duly elected governor. On the
same date, Diasen took his oath of office as governor of Kalinga Province.
On March 9, 2000, after receiving Atty. Aliping's Report on March 3, 2000 on Diasen's
proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an order:
"1. To direct Rommel Diasen to cease and desist from discharging the duties and functions
of the Office of the Governor of Kalinga Province until further orders of this Commission
during the pendency of this case;
"2. To require both parties to comment on the report of Atty. Nicasio M. Aliping, Jr.,
Regional Election Attorney and Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Kalinga, . . ., and to include in said comment why the proceedings of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on February 25, 2000 and the subsequent proclamation of Atty. Rommel Diasen
on 28 February 2000 be declared null and void."
Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc re-scheduled the re-hearing of Diasen's motion for
reconsideration (in view of the 3-3 voting) set on March 9 to March 23, 2000. The parties
agreed to file their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, on October 3, 2000, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued a Resolution in SPC
Case No. 98-291 declaring null and void the proclamation of Belac as governor, holding that:
"The proclamation of respondent Belac by the PBC Chairman alone-against the votes of the
other two members of the PBC is illegal because the Omnibus Election Code (Section 255)
provides that a majority vote of all the members of the Board of Canvassers shall be
necessary to render a decision."
On November 16, 2000, Belac filed his "Manifestation with Formal Motion" claiming that the
votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani in the assailed Resolution dated February 22,
2000 should not be considered since they retired on February 15, 2000, or before the
promulgation, citing the recently decided case of Ambil vs. Comelec.2 In this case, the
Supreme Court held that "one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time
the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or
decision."
Chairman Demetriou denied Belac's motion.
On November 16, 2000, the Commission en banc, now with new members in view of the
retirement of Commissioners Manolo Gorospe and Japal Guiani, promulgated the second
challenged Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, We hereby:
"1. AFFIRM the proclamation of Petitioner-Appellant ROMMEL W. DIASEN as the duly
elected Governor of Kalinga by Public Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers of Kalinga;
"2. RECALL and LIFT the Order promulgated on March 9, 2000 directing Petitioner-Appellant
to cease and desist from performing the duties and functions of the Office of Governor for
the province of Kalinga;
"3. AFFIRM the directive to the LAW DEPARTMENT to conduct appropriate investigations of
the Board of Election Inspectors for the municipalities of Pinukpuk and Tinglayan, as well as
John Does, for possible collusion in the commission of election offenses and irregularities,
subject in the above-entitled case; and
"4. FURNISH a copy of this Resolution to the Office of the President, the Secretary of Interior
and Local Government, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Kalinga Province, for their guidance and information."
The above Resolution was concurred in by Commissioners Julio Desamito, Luzviminda
Tancangco, Ralph Lantion and Rufino Javier. Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liaco-Flores again
wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Chairman Demetriou.
Hence, this petition by Dominador Belac on the following grounds:
"First Ground
"Respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction and in fact implicitly deprived petitioner of DUE PROCESS, when it
manifestly, deliberately and utterly FAILED AND REFUSED to act WITH DISPATCH on private
respondent's SUMMARY Petition on Pre-Proclamation Controversy; the Supposed Final
Resolution on Mere REHEARING promulgated only on November 16, 2000, AFTER MORE
THAN 30 MONTHS from the filing of the Petition, clearly violated petitioners' right to due
process, to a speedy disposition of cases and an (sic) clearly an act of grave abuse of
discretion.
"Second Ground
"The November 16 Questioned Resolution (Annex 'A') was absolutely useless and was
indeed superfluous (sic) and totally NULL AND VOID, considering that the same was
supposed to be a Final Resolution on a supposed REHEARING under Rule 18, Section 6 of the
COMELEC Rules, wrongfully premised on a supposed previous EQUALLY DIVIDED VOTE in
the February 22, 2000 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, However, legally, procedurally
and truthfully there was no such prior Equally Divided Resolution/Vote that would have
required a Rehearing, as the COMELEC En Banc patently erred in counting and accepting
even the null and void VOTES/signatures of two (2) Commissioners who retired on February
15, 2000 — prior to the February 22, 2000 promulgation.
"Third Ground
"RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT EXCLUDED FROM CANVASS FORTY TWO (42)
ELECTION RETURNS FOR PINUKPUK AND TWENTY EIGHT (28) ELECTION RETURNS FOR
TlNGLAYAN, DESPITE UTTER LACK OF LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES THEREFOR AND IN GROSS
AND WANTON DISREGARD OF LAW AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE."
Public respondent COMELEC en banc and private respondent Rommel Diasen filed their
respective comments on the petition.
Respondent COMELEC, in its comment, states that based on evidence on record, there were
serious irregularities, tampering and falsification of the questioned election returns in the
contested precincts at Pinukpuk and Tinglayan. On this ground, "although an exception," the
COMELEC can rule on the exclusion of the questioned election returns.
In his comment, respondent Diasen maintains that petitioner Belac can not be considered
the duly elected governor of Kalinga because the respondent COMELEC (Second Division)
unanimously declared null and void his proclamation in its resolution promulgated on
October 3, 2000. Likewise, petitioner was not deprived of due process considering that he
was given the opportunity to be heard and that he actively participated in the proceedings
before the COMELEC. And by such active participation, he is estopped from questioning the
validity of the votes cast by Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani who retired.
The basic issue for our resolution is whether or not respondent COMELEC in a pre-
proclamation case can go beyond the face of the election returns.
It may be recalled that when the Provincial Board of Canvassers commenced the canvassing
of the Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes for Pinukpuk and Tinglayan,
respondent Diasen objected to the inclusion of the election returns of several precincts in
both municipalities; and that within twenty-four hours therefrom, he filed a formal petition
with the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the exclusion of the Certificates of Canvass and
Statements of Votes for the said municipalities.
Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a pre-proclamation controversy
refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the Board or directly with the Commission, on any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns.
Section 243 of the Code enumerates the specific issues that may be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy as follows:
"(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or
they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates."
The above enumeration is restrictive and exclusive. Thus, in Sanchez vs. COMELEC,3 this
Court held:
"3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under
sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be
raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any
clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain
material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under
duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the
difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances
where a pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the
integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail.
In his petition with the Provincial Board of Canvassers, respondent Diasen raised the
following grounds:
"1. The Certificate of Canvass of Votes is falsified.
2. The Certificate of Votes were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation.
3. The certificate of Canvass of votes is obviously manufactured as the Statement of Votes
supporting it is likewise manufactured and falsified.
4. There was a deliberate and massive operation DAGDAG-BAWAS in the Certificate of
Canvass and Statement of Votes in Pinukpuk, Kalinga.
"1. The votes of Candidate for Governor, Dominador Belac, in Precincts 1A, 2A, 3A, . . . were
all padded (OPERATION DAGDAG) or increased in the Statement of Votes per precinct as
well as in the Election Returns.
"2. The Election Returns in the above-stated precincts cannot be the basis of a proper
correction of the votes garnered by Belac because said election returns were likewise
tampered with, falsified and manufactured as can be determined from the documents
(ELECTION RETURNS) themselves due to the following:
"A. The aforesaid election returns were already prepared even before the actual counting of
votes as shown by the fact that they were prepared by persons other than the BEIs; (Board
of Inspectors)
B. The PENCRAFT of the BEIs in the aforesaid precincts differ from the pencraft of those who
prepared the election returns;
C. In the aforesaid election returns, the votes of Belac were drastically and obviously
increased as can be gleaned from the fact that Belac garnered almost 100% of the registered
voters in said precincts;
D. That in order to determine the true will of the electorate[s], a RECOUNT of the votes
must be ordered."
Respondent Diasen's petition pertains to a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, it
alleges that the votes for petitioner Belac were all padded through "Operation Dagdag"; the
election returns for him (Diasen) was tampered, falsified and manufactured; and that the
election returns were already prepared even before the counting of votes. He thus prays
that the votes must be recounted.
Diasen did not say that the alleged irregularities appear on the face of the election returns.
Obviously, they came from external sources and, therefore, not manifest on the election
returns.
In fact, even the Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes for Pinukpuk and Tinglayan
were in order.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers explained that it refused to exclude the Certificate of
Canvass of Tinglayan because it was regular on its face and the grounds raised by
respondent Diasen are not among those in the list enumerated by law. Nothing therein
shows it was manufactured or prepared under duress, threat or intimidation or that it was
tampered or falsified.
As to the Statement of Votes for Tinglayan, the reason why some election returns were not
canvassed was because of ballot snatching in some areas. The incompleteness of the
Statement of Votes, therefore, did not vitiate the Certificate of Canvass.
With respect to the Certificate of Canvass and Statement of Votes for Pinukpuk, the Board
checked the entries therein of the election returns in the presence of the parties'
representatives. Having found there were some "Dagdag" for Belac, the Board required the
correction of the Statement of Votes and the Certificate of Canvass basing the correction on
the figures in the election returns, pursuant to the General Instructions for Boards of
Canvassers. It was only after the proper correction was made that the Board included the
Certificate of Canvass in the provincial canvass.
In Matalam vs. COMELEC,4 this Court held that "in a pre-proclamation controversy, the
COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without
jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. Indeed, in
the case of Loong vs. Comelec,5 the Court, through Mr. Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr.,
declared that "the prevailing doctrine in this jurisdiction ... is that as long as the returns
appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot
look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the
counting of the votes."
Loong cited the earlier ruling of the Court in Dipatuan vs. COMELEC6 and held: "The policy
consideration underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and procedure is the
policy to determine as quickly as possible the result of the election on the basis of the
canvass. Thus, in the case of Dipatuan vs. Commission on Elections, we categorically ruled
that in a pre-proclamation controversy, COMELEC is not to look beyond or behind election
returns which are on their face regular and authentic returns. A party seeking to raise issues
resolution of which would, compel or necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election
returns which appear prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular
election protest. By their very nature, and given the obvious public interest in the speedy
determination of the results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved
in summary proceedings without the need to present evidence aliunde and certainly
without having to go through voluminous documents and subjecting them to meticulous
technical examinations which take up considerable time."
The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of June Genevieve R. Sebastian, et
al. vs. COMELEC, et al.,7 this Court stressing that it sees "no reason to depart from this rule."
In granting respondent Diasen's motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of its First
Division, the COMELEC ruled:
"Based on evidence on record, there were serious irregularities, tampering, and falsification
of the questioned returns in the said contested precincts in the municipalities of Tingalayan
and Pinukpuk, Kalinga province. On these factual findings, We find for their exclusion from
canvass, albeit in a pre-proclamation proceedings."
xxx xxx xxx
"Upon a re-examination and comparison of the copies for this Commission and for the
LAMMP, We find that the same were prepared by a few select persons, assembled in a
particular place, and pressured by circumstances attendant during elections. There is a
striking likeness and uniformity of the handwriting found in the questioned election returns
from the different precincts in the two aforementioned municipalities. We are in awe on the
evident likeness of strokes in the handwriting in the entries in the election returns, despite
the geographic distance of the two municipalities. There is no inescapable conclusionary
finding that could be made other than to declare that the contested election returns as
manufactured, and therefore, could not be a basis for a valid Certificates of Canvass and
Statement of Votes." (Emphasis supplied).
In concluding that there were serious irregularities, tampering and falsification of the
questioned election returns; and that they were manufactured, respondent COMELEC
looked beyond the face of the documents, hence, exceeding its authority, contrary to the
mandate of Loong, reiterated in Matalam and Sebastian.
We thus hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
granted respondent Diasen's motion for reconsideration.
At this point, counsel for respondent Diasen must remember that he should have
determined carefully the proper legal remedy or recourse for his client, such as an election
protest. Needless to state, a procedural flaw, as in this case, causes prejudice to the litigants
and impairs the proper administration of justice.
We now come on the peripheral issue regarding the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani in the February 22, 2000 Resolution. They had retired when they participated in the
promulgation of the said Resolution.
In Jamil vs. Comelec,8 this Court ruled:
"x x x. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. Consequently, if at
the time of the promulgation of a decision or resolution, a judge or a member of the
collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office, his vote
is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.
"The reason for the rule, which is logically applicable to decisions of constitutional
commissions and administrative bodies or agencies, is cogently expressed in the case of
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court:
xxx xxx xxx
'A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated and not before. As we said
only recently in re Emiliano Jurado, 'a decision or resolution of the Court becomes such, for
all legal intents and purposes, only from the moment of its promulgation.' According to
Chief Justice Moran in the landmark case of Araneta v. Dinglasan:
'Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this court at the-time a decision is signed
and promulgated, cannot validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the true
decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before
that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The
vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject
to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is
of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is
apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve
their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to sign the decision, so that
they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of their most
mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is
signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the
deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not
even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the
opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the
decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding unless and until signed and
promulgated.
We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the
ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he
may still withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or dissent as long as the
decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it was
made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.
If at the time of the promulgation, a judge or a member of a collegiate court has already
vacated his office, his vote is automatically withdrawn. . . .' "
The rule has not been modified. In fact in the recently decided case of Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.
vs. Comelec,9 this Court passed upon a resolution written by Commissioner Guiani himself,
holding that the said resolution is null and void ab initio because:
"A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final
decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision.
Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or decision
[of the Division] must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated."
Upon their retirement, Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani had been stripped of all
authority to participate in the promulgation of the February 22, 2000 Resolution. Pursuant
to Section 6 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, earlier quoted, the Resolution dated June 4,
1998 of the First Division is therefore deemed affirmed as the votes of Commissioners
Gorospe and Guiani are considered cancelled.
Indeed, there was initially no evenly divided vote in the February 22, 2000 Resolution that
should have merited a rehearing or the issuance of the challenged Resolution dated
November 16, 2000 by the new members of respondent Comelec.
On petitioner's contention that there was a long and deliberate delay on the part of public
respondent Comelec — as previously stated, respondent Diasen's motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of the Comelec First Division was filed with respondent
Comelec en banc on June 19, 1998. However, it was only on February 22, 2000, or after
almost two (2) years, when the motion was resolved. In view of the equally divided voting, a
rehearing was ordered. The parties merely submitted memoranda. Yet, it was only on
November 16, 2000, or after almost nine (9) months from February 22, 2000, when
respondent Comelec finally promulgated the other challenged Resolution dated November
16, 2000.
Pre-proclamation controversies are mandated by law to be summarily disposed of. 10
Here, the Comelec failed to comply with this mandate. Let it be reminded that pre-
proclamation controversies, by their very nature, are to be resolved in summary
proceedings which obviously should be disposed of without any unnecessary delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby given due course and is GRANTED. The challenged
Resolutions dated February 22, 2000 and November 16,. 2000 of respondent COMELEC en
banc are SET ASIDE, while the Resolution of the COMELEC (First Division) dated June 4, 1998
is AFFIRMED. Respondent COMELEC is directed to forthwith conduct the proclamation of
petitioner Dominador Belac in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Requirements - Registration
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001
AKBAYAN Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II Youth, ALYANSA, KALIPI, PATRICIA O.
PICAR, MYLA GAIL Z. TAMONDONG, EMMANUEL E. OMBAO, JOHNNY ACOSTA, ARCHIE
JOHN TALAUE, RYAN DAPITAN, CHRISTOPHER OARDE, JOSE MARI MODESTO, RICHARD M.
VALENCIA, EDBEN TABUCOL, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 147179. March 26, 2001
MICHELLE D. BETITO, Petitioner, v. CHAIRMAN ALFREDO BENIPAYO, COMMISSIONERS
MEHOL SADAIN, RUFINO JAVIER, LUZVIMINDA TANCANGCO, RALPH LANTION,
FLORENTINO TUASON and RESURRECCION BORRA, all of the Commission on Election
(COMELEC), Respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
At the helm of controversy in the instant consolidated petitions 1 before us is the exercise of
a right so indubitably cherished and accorded primacy, if not utmost reverence, no less than
by the fundamental law - the right of suffrage.
Invoking this right, herein petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14,
2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. 2cräläwvirtualibräry
Acting on the clamor of the students and civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman of the
Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and Peoples Participation, through a Letter dated
January 25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a public hearing for the purpose of discussing the
extension of the registration of voters to accommodate those who were not able to register
before the COMELEC deadline. 3cräläwvirtualibräry
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Ralph C. Lantion, together with Consultant
Resurreccion Z. Borra (now Commissioner) attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee headed by Senator Roco, held at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters Bldg.,
Pasay City.
On January 29, 2001, Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No.
2001-027 on the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters
Only, excerpts of which are hereto quoted:
Please be advised that the undersigned attended the public hearing called by the Senate
Committee on electoral Reforms, Suffrage and Peoples Participation presided over by the
Hon. Sen. Raul Roco, its Committee Chairman to date at the Senate, New GSIS Headquarters
Building, Pasay City. The main agenda item is the request by youth organizations to hold
additional two days of registration. Thus, participating students and civic leaders along with
Comelec Representatives were in agreement that is legally feasible to have a two-day
additional registration of voters to be conducted preferably on February 17 and 18, 2001
nationwide. The deadline for the continuing voters registration under R.A. 8189 is December
27, 2000.
To address the concern that this may open the flood parts for hakot system, certain
restrictive parameters were discussed. The following guidelines to serve as safeguards
against fraudulent applicants:
1. The applicants for the registration shall be 25 years of age or less and will be registering
for the first time on May 14, 2001;
2. The applicants shall register in their places of residences; and
3. The applicants shall present valid identification documents, like school records.
Preparatory to the registration days, the following activities are likewise agreed:
1. Submission of the list of students and their addresses immediately prior to the actual
registration of the applicants;
2. The Comelec field officers will be given the opportunity to verify the voters enumerators
list or conduct ocular inspection;
3. Availability of funds for the purpose; and
4. Meetings with student groups to ensure orderly and honest conduct of the registration
and drum up interest to register among the new voters.
The rationale for the additional two-day registration is the renewed political awareness and
interest to participate in the political process generated by the recent political events in the
country among our youth. Considering that they failed to register on December 27, 2000
deadline, they approved for special registration days.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission en banc has to discuss all aspects regarding this
request with directives to the Finance Services Department (FSD) to submit certified
available funds for the purpose, and for the Deputy Executive Director for Operations
(DEDO) for the estimated costs of additional two days of registration.
The presence of REDs on January 30 can be used partly for consultation on the practical side
and logistical requirements of such additional registration days. The meeting will be set at
1:30 p.m. at the Office of ED.4cräläwvirtualibräry
Immediately, Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director Mamasapunod
Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director Jose Tolentino, Jr.
of the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of voters on the ground
that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during
the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
5cräläwvirtualibräry
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584, the decretal portion of
which reads:
Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters
on February 17 and 18, 2001.
Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier and Mehol K. Sadain voted to deny the request while
Commissioners Luzviminda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion voted to accommodate the
students request. With this impasse, the Commission construed its Resolution as having
taken effect.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II (YOUTH)
et al. filed before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as
G.R. No. 147066, which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELECs Resolution
and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision
effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated.
Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent
COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration
petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May
14, 2001 General Elections.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner Michelle Betito, a student of the University of the
Philippines, likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 147179, praying
that this Court direct the COMELEC to provide for another special registration day under the
continuing registration provision under the Election Code.
On March 13, 2001, this Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions and further
required respondents to file their Comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring
at 10:00 A.M. of March 16, 2001. Moreover, this Court resolved to set the consolidated
cases for oral arguments on March 16, 2001. 6cräläwvirtualibräry
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, recommended that an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted
at the soonest possible time in order to accommodate that disenfranchised voters for
purposes of the May 14, 2001 elections.
In effect, the Court in passing upon the merits of the present petitions, is tasked to resolve a
two-pronged issue focusing on respondent COMELECs issuance of the assailed Resolution
dated February 8, 2001, which Resolution, petitioners, by and large, argue to have
undermined their constitutional right to vote on the May 14, 2001 general elections and
caused the disenfranchisement of around four (4) million Filipinos of voting age who failed
to register before the registration deadline set by the COMELEC.
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a) Whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
COMELEC Resolution dated February 8, 2001;
b) Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the extraordinary
writ of mandamus, to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period
between the COMELECs imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001
general elections.
The petitions are bereft of merit.
In a representative democracy such as ours, the right of suffrage, although accorded a prime
niche in the hierarchy of rights embodied in the fundamental law, ought to be exercised
within the proper bounds and framework of the Constitution and must properly yield to
pertinent laws skillfully enacted by the Legislature, which statutes for all intents and
purposes, are crafted to effectively insulate such so cherished right from ravishment and
preserve the democratic institutions our people have, for so long, guarded against the spoils
of opportunism, debauchery and abuse.
To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute.
Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights,
is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. Thus, as to the substantive aspect,
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. SUFFRAGE MAY BE EXERCISED BY ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES NOT
OTHERWISE DISQUALIFIED BY LAW, WHO ARE AT LEAST EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE, AND
WHO SHALL HAVE RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR AND IN THE PLACE
WHEREIN THEY PROPOSE TO VOTE FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
THE ELECTIONS. NO LITERACY, PROPERTY, OR OTHER SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT SHALL
BE IMPOSED ON THE EXERCISE OF SUFFRAGE.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of
registration. Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in
addition to the minimum requirements set by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to
register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the
Voters Registration Act of 1996.
Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of
suffrage. For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element
in the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and
should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement. Proceeding
from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard
and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest,
orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-
election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of
the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Viewed broadly, existing legal proscription and pragmatic operational considerations bear
great weight in the adjudication of the issues raised in the instant petitions.
On the legal score, Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, which provides a system of continuing
registration, is explicit, to wit:
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during
regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting
one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a
special election. (Emphasis Ours)
Likewise, Section 35 of R.A. 8189, which among others, speaks of a prohibitive period within
which to file a sworn petition for the exclusion of voters from the permanent voters list,
provides:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List Any registered voter, representative of
a political party x x x may file x x x except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election
xxx.
As aptly observed and succinctly worded by respondent COMELEC in its Comment:
x x x The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety
mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified
registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of
securing the voters substantive right to be included in the list of voters.
In real-world terms, this means that if a special voters registration is conducted, then the
prohibitive period for filing petitions for exclusion must likewise be adjusted to a later date.
If we do not, then no one can challenge the Voters list since we would already be well into
the 100-day prohibitive period. Aside from being a flagrant breach of the principles of due
process, this would open the registration process to abuse and seriously compromise the
integrity of the voters list, and consequently, that of the entire election.
x x x It must be remembered that the period serve a vital role in protecting the integrity of
the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived
of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. We would be obliged to simply take
them at face value. If we compromise on these safety nets, we may very well end up with a
voters list full of flying voters, overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with
shadows and ghosts x x x.
x x x The short cuts that will have to be adopted in order to fit the entire process of
registration within the last 60 days will give rise to haphazard list of voters, some of whom
might not even be qualified to vote. x x x the very possibility that we shall be conducting
elections on the basis of an inaccurate list is enough to cast a cloud of doubt over the results
of the polls. If that happens, the unforgiving public will disown the results of the elections,
regardless of who wins, and regardless of how many courts validate our own results. x x x
Perhaps undaunted by such scenario, petitioners invoke the so called standby powers or
residual powers of the COMELEC, as provided under the relevant provisions of Section 29,
Republic Act No. 6646 7 and adopted verbatim in Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8436, 8
thus:
SEC. 28. Designation of other Dates for Certain Pre-election Acts - Ifit should no longer
bepossible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts,
the Commission shall fix other periods and dates in order to ensure accomplishments of the
activities so voters shall not be deprived of their right to suffrage.
Onthis matter, the act of registration is concededly, by its very nature, a pre-election act.
Under Section 3(a) of R.A. 8189, registration, as a process, has its own specific definition,
precise meaning and coverage, thus:
a)Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality
wherein he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval
by the Election Registration Board;
At this point, it bears emphasis that the provisions of Section 29 of R.A. 8436 invoked by
herein petitioners and Section 8 of R.A. 8189 volunteered by respondent COMELEC, far from
contradicting each other, actually share some common ground. True enough, both
provisions, although at first glance may seem to be at war in relation to the other, are in a
more circumspect perusal, necessarily capable of being harmonized and reconciled.
Rudimentary is the principle in legal hermeneutics that changes made by the legislature in
the form of amendments to a statute should be given effect, together with other parts of
the amended act. It is not to be presumed that the legislature, in making such changes, was
indulging in mere semantic exercise. There must be some purpose in making them, which
should be ascertained and given effect. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
Similarly, every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in
relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand
together, if they can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. 10 Interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of
interpretation is that which makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of
justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile
them instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should
harmonize them, if this is possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same
legislature. 11cräläwvirtualibräry
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.
Corollarily, it is specious for herein petitioners to argue that respondent COMELEC may
validly and legally conduct a two-day special registration, through the expedient of the letter
of Section 28 of R.A. 8436. To this end, the provisions of Section 28, R.A. 8436 would come
into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the
available period prior to election day. In more categorical language, Section 28 of R.A. 8436
is, to our mind, anchored on the sound premise that these certain pre-election acts are still
capable of being reasonably performed vis-a-vis the remaining period before the date of
election and the conduct of other related pre-election activities required under the law.
In its Comment, respondent COMELECwhich is the constitutional body tasked by no less
than the fundamental charter (Sec. 2, par. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution) to decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
registration of voterspainstakingly and thoroughly emphasized the operational impossibility
12 of conducting a special registration, which in its on language, can no longer be
accomplished within the time left to (us) the Commission. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
Hence:
xxx xxx xxx.
19) In any case, even without the legal obstacles, the last 60 days will not be a walk in the
park for the Comelec. Allow us to outline what the Commission has yet to do, and the time
to do it in:
20) First we have to complete the Project of Precincts by the 19th of March. The Projects of
Precincts Indicate the total number of established precincts and the number of registered
voters per precincts in a city or municipality. Without the final Project of Precincts, we
cannot even determine the proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other
election forms and paraphernalia. More succinctly said, without the Project of Precincts, we
wont know how many forms to print and so were liable to come up short.
21) More Importantly, without a completed Project of Precincts, it will be impossible to
complete the rest of the tasks that must be accomplished prior to the elections.
22) Second, the Board of Elections Inspectors must be constituted on or before the 4th of
March. In addition, the list of the members of the BEI including the precinct where they are
assigned and the barangay where that precinct is located - must be furnished by the Election
Officer to all the candidates and political candidates not later than the 26th of March.
23) Third, the Book of Voters, which contains the approved Voter Registration Records of
registered voters in particular precinct, must be inspected, verified, and sealed beginning
March 30, until April 15.
24) Fourth, the Computerized Voters List must be finalized and printed out of use on
election day; and finally
25) Fifth, the preparation, bidding, printing, and distribution of the Voters Information Sheet
must be completed on or before April 15.
26) With this rigorous schedule of pre-election activities, the Comelec will have roughly a
month that will act as a buffer against any number of unforeseen occurrences that might
delay the elections. This is the logic and the wisdom behind setting the 120-day prohibitive
period. After all, preparing for an election is no easy task.
27) To hold special registrations now would, aside from being Illegal, whittle that
approximately 30-day margin away to nothing.
28) When we say registration of voters, we do not - contrary to popular opinion - refer only
to the act of going to the Election Officer and writing our names down. Registration is, In
fact, a long process that takes about three weeks to complete not even counting how long it
would take to prepare for the registration in the first place.
29) In order to concretize, the senior Staff of the Comelec, the other Commissioners,
prepared a time-table in order to see exactly how the superimposition of special registration
would affect the on-going preparation for the May 14 elections.
30) We assumed for the sake of argument that we were to hold the special registration on
April 16 and 17. These are not arbitrary numbers, by the way it takes in account the fact that
we only have about 800,000 Voters Registration Forms available, as against an estimated 4.5
million potential registrants, and it would take about 14 days If we were to declare special
registrations today to print up the difference and to verify these accountable forms. After
printing and verification, the forms would have to be packed and shipped - roughly taking up
a further two and a half weeks. Only then can we get on with registration.
31) The first step in registration is, of course, filling the application for registration with the
Election Officer. The application, according to Section 17 of R.A. 8189, is then set for
hearing, with notice of that hearing being posted in the city or municipal bulletin board for
at least one week prior. Thus, if we held registrations on the 16th and the 17th the posting
requirement would be completed by the 24th. Considering that time must be allowed for
the filling of oppositions, the earliest that the Election Registration Board can be convened
for hearing would be the May 1st and 2nd.
32) Assuming and this is a big assumption that there are nit challenges to the applicants
right to register, the Election registration Board can immediately rule on the Applicants
registration, and post notices of its action by the 2nd until the 7th of May. By the 10th,
copies of the notice of the action taken by the Board will have already been furnished to the
applicants and the heads of registered political parties.
33) Only at this point can our Election Officers once again focus on the business of getting
ready for the elections. Once the results of the special registration are finalized, they can be
encoded and a new Computerized Voters List generated - at the earliest, by May 11, after
which the new CVL would be posted. Incidentally, it we were to follow the letter of the law
strictly, a May 11 posting date for the new CVL would be improper since the R.A. 8189
provides that the CVL be posted at least 90 days before the election.
34) Assuming optimistically that we can then finish the inspection, verification, and sealing
of the Book if Voters by May 15, we will already have overshot the May 14, election date,
and still not have finished our election preparations.
35) After this point, we could have to prepare the allocation of Official Ballots, Election
Returns, and other Non-Accountable Forms and Supplies to be used for the new registrants.
Once the allocation is ready, the contracts would be awarded, the various forms printed,
delivered, verified, and finally shipped out to the different municipalities. All told, this
process would take approximately 26 days, from the 15th of May until June 10.
36) Only then can we truly say that we are ready to hold the elections.
xxx xxx xxx.14cräläwvirtualibräry
It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative
agency as to the operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded
great weight considering that these specialized government bodies are, by their nature and
functions, in the best position to know what they can possibly do or not do, under prevailing
circumstances.
Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be
done. 15 The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo
tenetur ad impossible. 16 In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing.
Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute may not be so construed as to require
compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally 17, it must
be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a
law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of
statutes, the interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic,
common sense, reasonableness and practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that
the stand-by power of the respondent COMELEC under Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes
the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.
Further, petitioners bare allegation that they were disenfranchised when respondent
COMELEC pegged the registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of January 13,
2001 the day before the period before the May 14, 2001 regular elections commences is, to
our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the two consolidated
petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has
filed an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a
complaint before the respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office
of the Election Officer to register between the period starting from December 28, 2000 to
January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by respondent COMELEC
from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC
set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the Firm view that
petitioners were not totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration
under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not
without fault or blame. They admit in their petition 18 that they failed to register, for
whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its
protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo
accedat curiam. Let no one come to court with unclean hands.
In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re
subveniunt.
Applying the foregoing, this court is of the firm view that respondent COMELEC did not
commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same in some
patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which, in
respondents own terms, resolved to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional
registration of new voters on February 17 and 18, 2001.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in exercise its corrective power... It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
contemplation of laws. 19cräläwvirtualibräry 23cräläwvirtualibräry

Under these circumstances, we rule that the COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners
to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on
the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution, respondent COMELEC
simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, 20 inter alia, questions relating to the registration of
voters; evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains
to it and one which squarely falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated
powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of
discretion, specifically on matters involving voters registration, pertains to the wisdom
rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave
abuse of power of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly
conduct an incursion and meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent
COMELEC a body accorded by no less than the fundamental law with independence.
Finally, the Court likewise takes judicial notice of the fact that the President has issued
Proclamation No. 15 calling Congress to a Special Session on March 19, 2001, to allow the
conduct of Special Registration of new voters. House Bill No. 12930 has been filed before
the Lower House, which bill seeks to amend R.A. 8189 as to the 120-day prohibitive period
provided for under said law. Similarly, Senate Bill No. 2276 24 was filed before the Senate,
with the same intention to amend the aforesaid law and, in effect, allow the conduct of
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections. This Court views the
foregoing factual circumstances as a clear intimation on the part of both the executive and
legislative departments that a legal obstacle indeed stands in the way of the conduct by the
Commission on Elections of a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus are
hereby DENIED.

As to petitioners prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, we hold that this Court SO ORDERED.
cannot, in view of the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without
transgressing the time-honored principles in this jurisdiction.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise
of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. 21cräläwvirtualibräry

Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the
present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction
of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible,
possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves
the exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

In Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Zamora and related cases, 22 we enunciated that the
Courts function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, is merely (to) check whether or not
the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing...(of) grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to