IV.

The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or
set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are
sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or
otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate
concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed
in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except
on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.

This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the 2005 Decision and the dissenting
view, which dwells in the main on the alleged flaws in the titles held by the Manotoks and
Araneta, without making a similar inquiry into the titles held by CLT and the Heirs of Dimson.
Since the decision in favor of CLT and the Heirs of Dimson was ultimately grounded on a
factual predicate now acknowledged as erroneous, it follows that the primary focus should
have been whether the titles held by CLT and the Dimsons are valid and with force and effect.
To that end, we need only examine the titles relied upon by CLT and the Dimsons.

In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a complaint for annulment of the titles in the
name of the Manotoks, alleging that it was the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate
covered by TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Reproduced below is
what appears on the face of TCT No. T-177013: 60

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April, in
the year, nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume 36455, page ____, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No. _____in the name of
___________.

This certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title No. R-17994/T-89, which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

Entered at City of Kalookan

Philippines, on the 15th day of March
In the year nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m.

CLT further alleged that it derived TCT No. T-177013 on 10 December 1988 from Estelita
Hipolito whose title, TCT No. R-17994, is depicted, thus: 61

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April, in
the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page NA, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record No. ________.

This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-15166/T-75, which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at the City of Caloocan
Philippines, on the 12th day of December
in the year nineteen hundred and seventy-eight at 3:30 p.m.

Dimson’s original complaint for recovery of possession against Araneta was founded on the
claim that he was the absolute owner of a parcel of land located at Malabon, comprising fifty
(50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City. Said TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced below: 62

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April, in
the year nineteen hundred and seventeen, in the Registration Book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page___ , Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record No. __

This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. [illegible] which is cancelled by
virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.

Entered at Caloocan City

Philippines, on the 8th day of June
in the year nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at 10:34 a.m.

It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—that the properties they
purport to cover were "originally registered on the 19th day April, in the year nineteen hundred
and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." Note,
as earlier established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19 April 1917.

The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three titles can be accorded
recognition simply because the original title commonly referred to therein never existed. To
conclude otherwise would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be
affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually
existed. CLT and the Dimsons were given the opportunity to submit such proof before this
Court, but they did not. In fact, CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994 they
concede as true is also the one which the Office of Solicitor General submitted as true, and
that is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917.

Given this essential clarification, there is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision which
sustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or recovery of possession filed by CLT and
the Dimson when their causes of action are both founded on an inexistent mother title. How
can such actions prosper at all even to the extent of dispossessing the present possessors
with title?

The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19 April 1917 OCT from which the
Dimson and CLT titles are sourced. As earlier mentioned, the focus is instead placed on the
purported flaws of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta notwithstanding that said parties
swere the defendants before the lower court and,
therefore, the burden of proof did not lie on them. The established legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a
preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that the land sought to be
reconveyed is his.63 In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 64

V.

The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present acknowledgment of
the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the titles involved in the Gonzaga and
MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact that the titles debunked in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases,
which find origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, seem to have been derived from
Cadastral Case No. 34 also covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in fact the theory of the dissent
that there are, in effect, two competing sources of title – the OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917
arising from the issuance of Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City in Cadastral Case
No. 34. It is further opined that the registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34,
even if the date of such registration is 3 May 1917, is void since such registration could not
supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court.

The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had it been
adopted by the Court, the effect would have been to precipitate the utter astonishment of legal
scholars, professionals and students alike.

The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in ordinary
land registration cases was acknowledged by this Court in Pamintuan v. San Agustin. 65 Such
jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the
lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner,
and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a registered owner of his title." 66 It was
further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz67 that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such
lands even extends to the determination of "which one of the several conflicting registered titles
shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for a complete settlement of the title
to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered
to be within the jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings." 68

The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar69 concerned the validity of an order of a cadastral court
directing the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of Sideco and his children, at
Sideco’s own prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo

Sideco. This Court ruled that such order was valid and did not amount to a readjudication of
the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief surveyor had
reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree in a land registration
proceeding and registered in the name of Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be
cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court may determine. In
ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated that "[t]he proceedings did not in any way
purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to readjudicate the title of the land. They were
precisely predicated on the finality of the title already issued, because it was the registered
owner who was asked to express his desire with respect thereto, and the court’s order
precisely followed the petition of the registered owner." 70
The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds,
explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the issuance of new titles in place of
the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:

"Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that a new
title be issued, giving the lot its cadastral number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This
does not mean that the court has the power to alter the decree entered in the previous
registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said decree. It does not
adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for the

convenience of the landowner because it is easier for him to identify his property inasmuch as
all the lands brought under the cadastral survey are designated by cadastral numbers." 71

What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in the
name of a person, in the name of another, divesting the registered owner of the title already
issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial
rights.72 Yet such prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not have jurisdiction
over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained in Pamintuan and Timbol,
or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all even if it would not impair the rights of
the previously registered owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the
simplistic conclusion that because there was a cadastral case covering the Maysilo Estate from
which the titles emanated, such titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be
such titles issued, and they would be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the
original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued.