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AC 72099
Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB)

Contents
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Contents
Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | i
Foreword
Head of Warfare Development
Doctrine is what is taught and believed, assimilated and applied. It is the professional body of
knowledge of your trade. Thoroughly understood and properly implemented, it is the most
effective force multiplier as it creates mutual understanding and enables decentralisation, pursuit
of the initiative and generates tempo. Any force that is out-thought will almost always be out-
fought, no matter how bravely or skilfully its soldiers perform on the battlefield. If we accept
that in the main, plans do not survive contact with the enemy, and all equipment is designed
with the last war in mind, then every conflict will open with both sides improvising to make the
best of what they have in a race to dictate the course of events. It is people, thinking people,
who will improvise and who will seize and hold the initiative, and they must do so with a firm
doctrinal foundation.
The Army has a proud reputation based on an enviable ability to deliver success on operations
and training, at home and abroad. The implementation of the battlecraft syllabus has grown
deep professional expertise in special to arm core skills and is improving our individual and
collective standards supporting the restoration of our divisional-level warfighting foundation.
This Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) is built on the core document of AFM Command
and is complemented by the new Staff Officers’ Handbook (SOHB); it provides a standardised
and current ‘how to’ level of detail to support the conduct of tactical planning and execution
processes; moreover, it must be the foundation for formation and unit-level standard operating
instructions (SOIs).
It must be read, understood and practised by all. I commend it to you.
Head of Warfare Development
June 2018
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ii | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018
Preface
The new Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) replaces Part 3: Plan, Refine, Execute,
and Evaluate of the previous Staff Officers’ Handbook (SOHB), dated September 2014. The
PEHB establishes a single publication in which land tactical planning and execution doctrine is
documented.
The PEHB should be read in conjunction with the higher-level principles within AFM Command,
dated May 2017, and its paired supporting publication the revised SOHB in which planning data
is contained. It is essential reading for all commanders and command post staff under training,
in barracks or on operations from the division to the battlegroup levels of command in the land
domain.
This handbook provides the ‘how to’ level of detail for planning and execution that complements
the NATO operations process (plan, prepare, execute with assess as a constant) structure within
AFM Command. Critically, it provides authoritative guidance on the two principal land tactical
estimates, the tactical estimate (TE) and the combat estimate (CE). In addition, detail is provided
on both risk and deception, and execution doctrine has been significantly enhanced to fully
exploit current best practice.
The PEHB is divided into three distinct parts, comprising 26 chapters, supported by a doctrine
aide memoire.
Part 1: Planning.
Part 2: Prepare.
Part 3: Execute.
Doctrine aide memoire.
The content of the PEHB has been carefully selected to ensure it provides useful, relevant
and coherent information. It is inevitable that processes, procedures and supporting planning
reference data will evolve over time; the PEHB will be revised as necessary to ensure currency
and best practice are maintained. To facilitate future revision, it must be fed by the user with
recommendations for amendments submitted to the Warfare Branch, HQ Land Warfare Centre
(HQ LWC).
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Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | iii
Contents
Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB)
Foreword i
Preface ii
Contents Iii
Part 1 - Planning P1-1
Chapter 1 - Command post functions 1-1
Staff functional responsibilities 1-3

CP functions 1-6
The tactical movement of CPs 1-8
Tactical planning horizons 1-10
Multinational interoperability 1-10
Choice of estimate at the tactical level 1-13
Lessons 1-13
CHAPTER 2 - Tactical estimate (TE) 2-1
Process 2-1
Operating context 2-4
Planning concepts 2-6
Step 1 - Understand the situation 2-7
Step 2 - Identify and analyse the problem 2-10
Step 3 - Formulate and consider COAs 2-20
Step 4 - Develop and validate COAs 2-21
Step 5 - COA evaluation 2-25
Step 6 - Commander’s decision and development of the plan 2-27
CHAPTER 3 - Combat estimate (CE) 3-1
Q0. Baseline preparation and understanding 3-18

Q1. What is the situation and how does it affect me? 3-22
Q2. What have I been told to do and why? 3-43
Q3. What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must
I give to develop the plan? 3-50
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iv | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018
Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action or effect? 3-58

Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect? 3-61
Q6. When and where do the actions and effects take place in relation to each other? 3-65
Q7. What control measures do I need to impose? 3-68
COA decision brief 3-73
Wargame 3-75
Plan refinement Q4-7 3-76
OSW production 3-77
CHAPTER 4 - Supporting planning activity 4-1
Combat service support (CSS) - support to planning activity 4-1

Communications information system (CIS) – support to planning activity 4-5
Air assault operations planning considerations 4-6
Allied planning processes 4-13
CHAPTER 5 - Risk 5-1
Definitions 5-1
Risk tolerance 5-2
Risk management and the estimate process 5-3
Completing the RIG 5-5
Summary 5-5
Risk 5-5
CHAPTER 6 - Deception 6-1
Purpose 6-1
Deception techniques 6-3
Deception types 6-3
Planning considerations 6-4
Monitoring success 6-6
Failure to deceive 6-7
CHAPTER 7 - Tactical-level fires and targeting 7-1
Tactical fireplan 7-1

Fires and division-level operations process 7-2
Fires and the brigade/battlegroup-level operations process 7-3
Targeting 7-7
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Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | v
Execution 7-10
Target engagement process 7-10
Assessment 7-10
Annex - Target lists and effects guidance 7A-1

CHAPTER 8 - Assessment during planning 8-1
Process 8-1
MOEs, MOPs and indicators 8-2
Information requirements (IRs) 8-3
Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) 8-4
CHAPTER 9 - Deployable scientific support (DSS) 9-1
When to use OA and SCIAD support 9-1

Effective use of DSS 9-2
DSS support to the planning process 9-3
Other considerations 9-4
CHAPTER 10 - Wargaming 10-1
Purpose 10-1
Who participates 10-1
When to wargame 10-2
How to wargame 10-3
Wargame top tips: 10-7
CHAPTER 11 - Red teaming 11-1
What is red teaming? 11-1

Techniques 11-1
Thinking skills 11-3
CHAPTER 12 - Operational staff work (OSW) 12-1
Terminology 12-1
Dissemination 12-2
Staff duties 12-3
OSW formats 12-6
• Ops summary 12-8
• Ops schematic with elements of DSO: 12-9
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• Synch matrix: 12-10

• Reversionary warning order 12-11
• Reversionary operation order 12-13
• Reversionary fragmentary order 12-17
• Reversionary combat service support order 12-20
• TASKORG 12-23
CHAPTER 13 - Orders groups 13-1
Principles 13-1
Preparation 13-1
Timings 13-2
Seating plan 13-2
Aids 13-2
Orders group format 13-3
Post orders group 13-3
Part 2 - Prepare P2-1

CHAPTER 14 - ISR activity and G2 update 14-1
ISR activity execution 14-6

Tracking 14-7
CHAPTER 15 - Refinement of the plan 15-1
Process 15-1
Formation-level process and outputs 15-2
CHAPTER 16 - Subordinate’s backbrief 16-1
Subordinate’s backbrief 16-1
CHAPTER 17 - Coordination and liaison 17-1
Coordination and liaison 17-1

Coordinating points 17-2
Liaison officers 17-3
CHAPTER 18 - TASKORG and integration 18-1
Regrouping 18-1
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Command and control (C2) relationships 18-3

Control and coordination terms 18-5
CHAPTER 19 - Rehearsals 19-1
Rehearsals 19-1
Sequence of a ROC drill 19-2
CHAPTER 20 - CP pre-execution checks 20-1
Conditions checks 20-1

CP pre-execution checks 20-1
PART 3 - Execute P3-1

CHAPTER 21 - Command 21-1
The role of the commander 21-1

Commander’s checklist 21-1
Decision making 21-2
CHAPTER 22 - Control 22-1
Control 22-1
Coordination 22-2
Operations centre 22-2
Log sheet 22-8
Staff duties 22-11
Battle rhythm 22-20
Reports and returns 22-21
Notice to move 22-27
Briefings 22-28
Battlespace management 22-41
Land battlespace management 22-45
Fire support coordination measures 22-46
Combat identification (CID) 22-47
Airspace management 22-49
Risk management and ASC planning 22-56
Battlespace spectrum management (BSM) 22-61
EMCON 22-62
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CHAPTER 23 - Assess 23-1
Assessment during execution 23-1

Monitor 23-2
Recognising variances 23-2
Evaluate 23-4
Measurement 23-5
Determining progress 23-6
Gathering evidence 23-8
CHAPTER 24 - Decide 24-1
Command situational awareness 24-1

Identifying COAs 24-1
Decision briefs 24-3
Commander’s analysis 24-3
Command decision making 24-3
CHAPTER 25 - Direct 25-1
Commander’s direction 25-1
CHAPTER 26 - Staff process 26-1
Rules of engagement 26-1

Consequence management (CM) 26-7
Information management/information exploitation (IM/IX) 26-14
Data command 26-24
The lessons process 26-29
Glossary of lessons process abbreviations 26-36
LDOLP: lessons capture 26-36
Doctrine aide memoire 27-1

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Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | P1-1
Part 1
Planning
If no plan survives contact with the enemy, and all equipment is designed with the last war in
mind, then every conflict will open with both sides improvising to make the best of what they
have in a race to dictate the course of events. It is people, thinking people, who will improvise
and who will seize and hold the initiative. The Army prides itself on its ability to plan. The act of
planning as a process is as important a plan itself. This part sets out in some detail the activity
required by the generalist to conduct planning in the round. Critically, both the tactical and
combat estimates have been revised to reflect current best practice and are supported by the
additional content including: risk and deception.
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1-1 | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018
Chapter 1
Command post functions
1. Command post role. The role of a command post

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(CP) at division, brigade, battlegroup level is to:
• CP functions
a. Plan operations in support of the commander’s
• Tactical movement of CPs
intent.
• Tactical planning horizons
b. Execute operations. • Multinational interoperability
• Choice of estimate
c. Provide situational awareness and SME advice
• Lessons
to the commander to enable them to command
operations.
2. Functional groupings. The staff are usually organised into a command group supported
by staff branches. Further groups, such as the principal planning group (PPG) and the
staff planning group (SPG) also exist for the planning cycle – details for these planning
groups are explained in chapters 2 and 3. Additional functional groupings may be created
for specific tasks.
3. Staff responsibilities. While the CP size and composition may fluctuate, a number of
key appointments will endure and provide vital continuity to the commander, the CP
and to the subordinate units. Figure 1.1 details the generic staff functional groupings
in a CP. Figure 1.2 illustrates the generic core staff responsibilities in a division, brigade
and battlegroup CP. Details for the subtle differences from doctrine that are dependent
on the unit, role and mission will be captured within CP standard operating instructions
(SOI). Ultimately, it is the role of the CP, the requirements of the commander and the
subordinate units within the organisation that drive the size and shape of the CP.
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Command
COS DCOS
G1 G2 G3/5 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9
Personnel and Current ops and future ops Future plans CIS Finance and HR Policy, legal and
administration presentation
• Coordination and Integration of • Operational planning • CIS/ICS/EMS • Civil secretariat
current and future ops management
• Pers management • Tactical planning incl all • Finance • ROE
• Targeting incl fires, manoeuvre, CONPLANs and OSW • COMSEC/INFOSEC
• Manpower admin PPP, IA&O, CIMIC • Civilian personnel • CPERS, incl
• Measurements of management
• Welfare incl CPERS management detention,
• BM effectiveness (MOE) • Support IM/IX tracking and
administration • Budget planning
• Deployment and recovery • EW, SIGINT oversight
• Chaplaincy • Contract authority
• Reports and returns (R2) • Media
• Casualty procedures • Locally employed
• Counter-threat: AD, EOD etc. Combat service support • HN legal
• NOTICAS civilians (LECs)
• IM/IX, CPERS operations • IA&O
• Discipline and MP • Log, ES and Med C2
• CIMIC • Health service support (Med)
• MS, H&A, pay
• Air manoeuvre • Mov and tpt coordination
• Log HN coord incl contractors Training and development
• Infrastructure engineering • Force development
Intelligence and security
• Fire and environmental safety • Doctrine and lesson
management
Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | 1-2

• Intelligence cycle, ICP, • Casualty tracking incl LNs
CCIRs/PIRs, • Exercise planning
• Understand, incl MOE • Operational analysis
• Targeting and ISR Sp • Training and education
• Tracking/exploitation incl Engr Gp • Research, science and
CPERS technology
• Security assessment (incl • Engr recce, EOD and search
counter-Intelligence)
• Physical terrain analysis
• Geo, WIS, EW, SIGINT,
• CS and GS advice/sp
MASINT
• Resource allocation
ISR Gp Joint fires cell (JFC) 77 Bde
• DSO, DSOM, DSM • DSO, DSOM, DSM and STAP • IA&O, projects, LN and HN
and STAP interaction
• Air/OS allocation ASM
• Targeting, IX mgt • MACE, MAST
• UAS, AD, C-RAM, WL,
• Collect/taskings STA, fires • NGOs, OGDs
Figure 1.1. Staff functional grouping

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Staff functional responsibilities

Branch Title Level Core responsibilities
Coord all staff functions across all lines of activities within the
HQ and CPs
Division/
COS
brigade Direct, train and control the HQ and CPs
All but Implement all organisation and deployment (O&D) decisions
primarily Lead on development of SOIs, TTPs and drills
G2/3/5/6/7
Direct the planning cycle and oversee the production of OSW
2IC BG Senior information officer (SIO) responsible for IM/IX
Tactical change of control (CHOC) and emergency moves
Member of the commander’s personal staff

Command Division/
Provision of personal, professional and technical advice to the
sergeant major brigade
commander on enlisted soldier matters and the WO/NCO corps
All as a whole
Coordination of security operations, to include fighting positions
Regimental and local security
BG
sergeant major
Monitoring unit morale and discipline
Planning and control of CSS within the formation

Advice on CSS implications regarding formation actions
Control of the DSG and BSG through the respective CPs
Deputy chief of Division/
G1/G4 Direct the CSS input into the planning cycle and oversee the
staff (DCOS) brigade
production of Div/Bde combat service support orders (CSSO)
Represent the commander at Corps/Div Rear CP/CP DSG Fwd
Coordinate all G1 aspects of the formation, including MS
The XO’s function is primarily one of command support

The XO owns the battle rhythm and disseminates accordingly
Maintains the HQ’s diary
Executive officer
Various Division The XO is the secretary for the evaluation board and provides the
(XO)
staff support to the meeting
The XO provides the staff support for the daily GOC’s updates
Coordinates the visitors’ cell in the absence of SO2 visits
Is the deputy to the DCOS in barracks

Commander of the Div/Bde rear personnel
Advises the commander on all staff and personnel support (SPS)
matters. Usually head of SPS in the formation
G1 Liaison officer to CJIIM elements
Responsible for providing FAO facility in support of Div/Bde/units
SO1 G1 Division
G1 aspects of the planning cycle. At unit level the Adjt may have
G1 a responsibility for road moves
SO2 G1 Brigade
Theatre location index including JPA facilities
Casualty notification (NOTICAS) procedures, battle casualty
Adjt BG replacements (BCR)
Field administrative facilities (RAO, welfare)
Staffing of all G1 operational casework, discipline and MS
matters
Liaises with G4 staff for HN support (interpreters etc.)
Honours and awards
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Intelligence and security
The intelligence estimate, IPE and role in red teaming,
wargaming, ROC drills
Responsible for intelligence support to the targeting process and
the assess element of the operations process
SO1 G2 Division
Integrated with all ISR and collect feeds
Key role in the intelligence function
G2 SO2 G2 Brigade
Analysis of information from materiel and personnel exploitation
operations
IO BG CULAD involvement in the planning process throughout
operations process
IM/IX responsibilities
Socket for RE G2 staff
Analysis of all source reporting
Within Div, the main responsibility is to act as the battle manager

and to coord activities between COps and FOps as well as
SO1 COps Division between the deep, close and rear ops to ensure unity of effort
and coordination of current planning effort. Runs the Div battle
rhythm on behalf of the COS. Deputises for COS when required.
Control and coord execution of formation missions/tasks as
directed by commander/CO or COS
Control and coord dynamic retasking of assets organic to the
SO2 G3 Brigade formation/unit and leads on requests for external assets
Supervise the running of the operations room and the daily
battle rhythm, including BM, R2 and ORK (IM/IX responsibilities,
G3 storyboards etc.)
Provide regular SITREPs to the commander/CO and visitors
and brief the chain of command on the progress of ongoing
missions/tasks
Oversee the O&D and FGEN process for operations and exercises,
Ops officer/battle BG including Regular Army Assistance Table (RAAT)
capt
Counter-threat – AD, C-IDF, CBRN. EOD and search will augment
Div CP in Div Engr Gp
Captured persons (CPERS) administration
Consequence management
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Production of operation orders (OPORDs) and associated exercise
staff work, taking over the plan from FPlans/G5 to refine it
SO1 FOps Division Focus for land environmental tactical doctrine development,
including input to joint doctrine development and maintaining
links with the CJIIM community
SO2 G3/G5 Brigade Planning and organisation of Div/Bde seminars and study days
Focus for developing Div/Bde operational planning effectiveness
Ops officer BG Focus for Div/Bde SOI development and lead staff officer for
G3/5 functions within the CP
IM/IX responsibilities
Lead air planner, responsible for all aviation assets and planning
(aviation assaults, air drops, airborne insertions)
Liaise with higher, lower and parallel joint formations on all
SO1 Air Division matters
Lead on integration of all joint officers/staff into the CP
G3/5 SO2 Air Brigade Receive, coordinate and disseminate air tasking orders (ATO)
With JFC, ensure fire plans are deconflicted from air and aviation
Air ops officer BG activity
Lead on airspace management in conjunction with JFC
Oversee the employment and training of all air staff within the
formation or unit, including subunit 2ICs
Direct and coordinate all activity in the ISR cell

Integrate ISR with the planning cycle
SO1 ISR Division Produce the decision support overlay (DSO). Decision support
matrix (DSM) and decision support overlay matrix (DSOM)
Provide advice to the Comd/SO1/COS on the use of ISR collect
SO2 ISR Brigade assets
Coordinate the support given to collection assets
OC Fire Sp BG Provide ISR input to the joint effects and influence cell
Deputise for SO1 ISR where applicable
BM responsibilities
Cover all generalist CSS issues within the formation/unit (Log, ES

and Med). Role supported by specialists, such as commander ES/
SO1 G4 Division BEME/OC LAD, who are responsible for:
ES planning and delivery within the formation/unit, including
SO2 G4/BEME Brigade prioritisation of ES tasks such as vehicle recovery
Monitoring of ongoing ES activity involving ISTs and FRTs
BGLO BG Contribute to planning cycle, particularly during latter stages
of both estimates. BGLO assumes DCOS responsibilities during
G4 unit-level planning cycle.
Responsible for monitoring the status of all medical activity

SO1 Medical Division within the formation/unit – COps, FOps and FPlans
Inputs into the planning cycle under the G4 elements
SO2 Medical Brigade Monitors all casualties and provides regular updates to the
Comd/CO on the status of WIA and non-battle-injured personnel
RMO BG The CO of the affiliated Med Regt is the commander’s principal
medical adviser at the Bde level. SO2 Med provides the socket
SO1 FPlans Division Lead planner within the CP on all operations, exercises and
training events. Integral member of the staff planning group
(SPG) at Div/Bde level for the planning cycle.
G5 SO2 G5 Brigade
Leads on the production of all OSW
Div/Bde – leads on strategy, plans and assessment, including
Ops officer BG measurement of effectiveness (MOE)
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Lead air planner, responsible for all aviation assets and planning
(aviation assaults, air drops, airborne insertions)
Liaise with higher, lower and parallel joint formations on all
SO1 Air Division matters
Lead on integration of all joint officers/staff into the HQ and CPs
Air/Avn SO2 Air Brigade Receive, coordinate and disseminate air tasking orders (ATO)
With JFC, ensure fire plans are deconflicted from air and aviation
Air ops officer BG activity
Lead on airspace management in conjunction with JFC
Oversee the employment and training of all air staff within the
formation or unit, including subunit 2ICs
Detailed planning, delivery and management of CIS to the HQ,

SO1 G6 Division
CPs and AO
Div/Bde EMS management
G6 SO2 G6 Brigade
Wider ICS/CIS advice including electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)
COMSEC/INFOSEC and crypto matters
RSO BG
Advice on IM/IX and applications
SO1 G7 Doctrine management

Division
Lessons procedures
SO2 G7 Training (including augmentees)
G7 Brigade
Ops officer/Trg
BG
officer
Resources and finance

Division/ Finance and civil secretariat
G8 SO2 SPS
brigade Host-nation support
Quick impact projects
Civil affairs operations including policy, legal and media

SO1 G9 Division
Socket for SAG capabilities as SMEs for special influence
G9
methods (SIM)
SO2 G9 Brigade
Consequence management
Figure 1.2. Generic CP core staff responsibilities in a division, brigade and battlegroup
CP functions
4. CP functions. To deliver its functions with the flexibility to adjust to the operational
need, CPs are modular and will have a number of configurations. The following
represents the divisional-level CP with the three core CPs of main, tactical and forward
being replicated at brigade level. The same terminology applies at battlegroup level.
a. Main CP. The main CP (referred to as main) is the principal controlling CP where all
the staff functions are coordinated and from where C2 of all subordinate formations
is exercised. The primary functions of the main CP align with the operations processes:
plan, prepare, and execute with assessment being conducted as a continuous process.
The main CP accommodates additional cells or ‘plug-ins’ dependent on the operation
or role. It should be noted that many of these plug-ins have no step-up or alternate
capability and do not have the protection and mobility required to manoeuvre.
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b. Forward CP. The forward CP (referred to as Fwd) is configurable to meet the need
of the commander and staff as dictated by the tactical situation. It provides sufficient
situational awareness (SA) and a better geographic location from which to exercise
command and acquire first-hand knowledge. The forward CP is limited by its size and
therefore does not routinely conduct planning, nor is it able to control for anything
other than short periods. It enables the commander to influence tactical activity, direct
the main CP, with the ability to move tactically. The forward CP also provides real-life
support (RLS) for the tactical CP. It may be deployed in several roles:
(1) Step-up CP that enables main CP to move. A step-up CP role that takes control
of an operation for a limited time period to enables the main CP to move and re-
establish. The main CP is unlikely to move frequently in contemporary operations
but may do so to conform to AO adjustments etc.
(2) C2 node for a discrete operation. The forward CP may be required as a C2 node
to control a particularly complex discrete, often enabling operation. Examples are
a divisional obstacle crossing or a deliberate clearance operation within a wider
stabilisation mission.
(3) C2 node in close proximity to deployed brigades. In a manoeuvre battle there may
be need for a static main CP and a manoeuvrable forward CP that can keep up
with the battle.
c. Tactical CP. A tactical CP (referred to as Tac) is a small CP consisting of the commander

and the principal officers responsible for fires, ISR, engineers and current operations. It
must have sufficient mobility, protection and communications to command and control
the battle for limited periods away from the main CP or forward CP.
d. Advanced CP:
(1) Division advanced CP. The divisional advanced CP represents a rapidly deployable
2* land CP capable of shaping activity in the land environment. It will deploy prior
to the divisional main CP and link into the theatre CP and joint force enabling
infrastructure. It will deliver primarily information activities and outreach (IA&O)
and exploit the expanded capability of the main CP via reachback to the UK.
(2) Brigade advanced CP. The brigade will maintain a small advanced CP capable
of deploying early and conducting collaborative planning with the divisional
advanced CP.
(3) Brigade support group CP (BSG CP).1 If deployed, the BSG CP is responsible
for the coordination and control of brigade elements grouped within the BSG.
It consists of echelon CP, recovery assets, technical support assets, and motor
transport.
e. Command post support. The multirole signal regiment (MRSR) will deliver the C2,
including information communication systems (ICS) and power for the CP working
environment. Real-life support (RLS) including sleeps, ablutions, feeding etc. and force
protection (FP), 2 will be delivered by a nominated unit.
5. Physical requirements and defence of a CP. These would typically consist of:
a. The staff complex (command variant AFVs or soft-skinned vehicles, an RE geographic

detachment and an iHub, CP tentage and antenna field).
1 BSG is generated from either the CS Log or ES regiment affiliated to the brigade (ref AFM Sustainment).
2 See paragraph 6.
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b. Advisers and liaison vehicles for ISR, offensive support (OS), AD, Engrs, Air, Avn, CIS
and flanking units.
c. A Falcon node and a satellite communications terminal (for division and brigade-level
CPs).
d. Vehicle parking area, for support vehicles not integral to the CP, and visitors.
e. A secure helicopter landing site (HLS).
f. Administration areas for eating, sleeping and ablutions.
g. A secure briefing area to conduct orders and rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills as
required.
h. Expeditionary accommodation using modular tentage or an existing building of

opportunity if mobility is not a high priority.
6. All units that co-locate with the CP and all staff that occupy the CP should expect to
contribute to the defence of the location. Consideration should be given to the FP of the
different CP convoys as they move. FP of the staff officers as they move between CPs in
small numbers during a change of control is also required.
The tactical movement of CPs

7. Movement of the CP. The COS is responsible for the tactical movement of the CP,
although there are key roles for the signals officer and OC RLS. Efficient and well-
rehearsed change of control (CHOC) procedures are essential to ensure the commander
and staff retain full situational awareness (SA). There are two types of CHOC: a planned
CHOC and an emergency move:
a. Planned CHOC. The concept for the planned CHOC is to activate a second CP
location (the future CP - called step-up CP) such that it has the same technical
functionality as a controlling CP, but initially with a more limited staff capability than
the main CP. Once conditions are met, the two CPs will operate in parallel while the
key staff ‘swing’ from the controlling (main CP) to the future CP (step-up CP). During
the ‘swing’, the controlling CP (main CP) will operate on a reduced ‘balance’ staff and
control will only change when the key staff have ‘swung’ into the future CP (step-up
CP) location and that full SA of the battlespace has been restored. On CHOC, the
future CP (step-up CP) becomes the controlling CP (main CP) and the balance of staff
then moves from the former CP to the new controlling CP. The former CP is then
dismantled. There are a number of ways of moving the main CP and step-up CP, but
the principle is that one should always be set up and working before the other moves.
During either move, the commander will move with tactical CP to the CP that they
judge to be the optimum location from which to exercise command. Two variations of
movement are:
(1) Caterpillar. A method of manoeuvre whereby a future CP is established with

step-up CP, a CHOC is conducted, and the main CP moves to co-locate with the
step-up CP. This method benefits from co-locating staff for longer periods of
time and its effectiveness is aligned to that of the step-up CP. But movement is
slower. See Figure 1.3.
Contents
II II
II
X
Future CP
X
X
X
Step-up
Step-up
hide
Main
Figure 1.3. Caterpillar method of CHOC
(2) Leap-frog. A method whereby a future CP is established as a step-up CP, a CHOC

is conducted, and the main CP moves to a new location before assuming control.
CHOC then occurs again, having allowed the main CP to move. This method suits
greater distances, for example in the advance, but it involves more moving parts
and the staff are required to man two CPs for a greater period of time. See Figure
1.4.
II II
II
X
Future CP
X
X
Step-up
Main
Figure 1.4. Leap-frog method of CHOC
b. Emergency move. The sequence of events outlined above should be followed as far
as is possible for an emergency CHOC, accepting that some compromise is likely to be
required.
Contents
8. CHOC planning considerations. Figure 1.5 lists CHOC planning considerations.
State Consideration Responsible
Bde CP move every 12hrs

Div CP move every 24hrs
BG CP move more frequently Signals officer
Planning
Move depends on tactical situation but requires detailed map, aerial and RLS officer
ground recce (using recce forces) if possible
SOIs must include staff officers responsibilities during each type of CHOC
Recce - nothing requirements of CIS, protection (to incl concealment/

deception), threat/survival, to incl provision of rest areas, visitors, vehs etc.
Signals officer
Activation - requires the development of the activation party from the
controlling CP to the future CP. Confirms that the future CP is functioning G3
Scheme of as C4I node Ops
manoeuvre
Key staff swing - the deployment of key staff from the controlling CP to the COS
future CP
DCOS
Recovery - the move of the balance of staff from the former CP to the
controlling CP and the dismantling of the former CP location
Figure 1.5. CHOC planning considerations
Tactical planning horizons

9. As tactical activity is conducted, commanders continue to observe the situation and redirect
activities to seize opportunities or mitigate threats. Figure 1.6 details the tactical planning
horizons for commanders at different levels (division to subunit). Within the planning
horizon, the commander is in effect already committed with subordinate commanders
exercising mission command to react within their own lower planning horizon.
Ser Level of Command Planning horizon (hrs)
1 Div 48-12
2 Bde 30-6
3 Unit 15-3
4 Subunit 6-0
Figure 1.6. Tactical planning horizons
Multinational interoperability
10. Introduction. Both UK and allied doctrine recognises that success on future military
operations will rely on our ability to work with other military partners, either in a
coalition, combined or multinational context. However, the level of effectiveness depends
on our ability to be interoperable with those partner forces. 3
11. Levels of ambition. The UK’s ability to integrate with each allied or partner force will
vary significantly. A multitude of factors, including the technological and communications
systems employed, the coordination of joint fires assets, different legal and political
constraints, as well as language and cultural differences, will affect the ability to C2
multinational operations. Therefore, the more that is understood about the respective
challenges, dynamics and complexity of multinational interoperability, the greater the
ability will be for successful operations and efficient interaction via the operations process
(plan, prepare, execute and assess). The three levels of multinational interoperability
ambition are shown in Figure 1.7:
3 Further detail on multinational interoperability is covered in AFM Command, Chapter 9.

Contents
Forces that are integrated are able to merge seamlessly and are interchangeable. This high level of
Integrated interoperability is typically only achieved within coalition CPs and niche areas. It is highly unlikely
to be achieved between individual units at the tactical level.
Forces that are compatible are able to interact with each other in the same geographical
Compatible battlespace in pursuit of a common goal. This is the area where the majority of bilateral
interoperability development lies.
Forces that are deconflicted are able to coexist but not interact towards a common goal,
Deconflicted with the battlespace divided into nationally-led areas of responsibility. This is the base level of
interoperability provided by NATO procedures.
Figure 1.7. Levels of multinational interoperability ambition
12. Breadth of interoperability. The breadth of interoperability will span the human, the
procedural and the technical domains, with the human domain being by far the most
critical, Figure 1.8 refers:
Human interoperability Procedural interoperability Technical interoperability
Time and effort developing and Common doctrine, policies, It is inevitable that the technological
strengthening multinational practices and procedures can vastly capabilities of each nation
relationships on operations, and during increase the efficiency. As such, will differ due to respective
training, will create and improve trust the UK and other Allied nations are national equipment procurement
and mutual understanding. Therefore minded to use jointly developed programmes. However, every effort
human interoperability is the vital Allied publications to inform and should be made to ensure that,
ground, because the mutual trust direct operations. However, there despite interoperability issues,
generated through shared experience will often be a requirement where solutions are explored to enable
drives solutions on the ground and a nation must adhere to its own the effective exchange, display and
strengthens the moral component of doctrine, known as national ‘red exploitation of shared information.
fighting power. cards’ where policy differences exist
in the interest of the specific nation.
Figure 1.8. Breadth of multinational interoperability
13. Interoperability planning considerations for multinational operations. Figure

1.9 details the interoperability planning considerations for conducting multinational
operations:
Consideration Description
The majority of issues concerning multinational interoperability can be reduced, if not solved, by
the employment of LOs and embeds within CPs at every level of command. The correct selection,
Liaison officer
preparation and exchange of liaison officers (LOs) is of key importance to ensure understanding
and embed
and relationships are enhanced and not damaged. LOs should also be suitably empowered to
network
represent and make appropriate recommendations on behalf of their Comd, and must be able to
amplify their Comd’s intent and supporting context when required.
Any preconceptions about a partner nation’s abilities must be dismissed. While there may
be many similarities between our forces, no two armies will be the same and ill-informed
Preconceptions
assumptions and complacency may lead to operational misunderstandings, mistakes and
ultimately friction; which in turn has the potential to damage reputations, relationships and trust.
Arguably the single most important factor to effective interoperability is the development of
mutual trust and common understanding. Without it, there will be no real desire to become
highly interoperable, resulting in degradation of operational effectiveness. Partners who
Mutual trust
understand each other’s capabilities will be able to employ them to best effect. This is best
and common
achieved by developing strong links with likely partners prior to any operational deployment
understanding
through the conduct of visits, unit and individual exchanges, combined/joint exercises and
training course attendance, as well as a credible commitment to the LOs and embed network
during an operation.
Although it’s common practice for allied operations to adopt English as the primary working
Language and language, a non-native speaker’s ability to understanding what is actually being meant should not
culture be assumed. Deliberate efforts should be made to ensure that mutual comprehension of orders,
direction and guidance is confirmed prior to any decisions being made.
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Consideration Description
It is vital for Comds and staffs to identify and understand the different leadership methods and
attitudes employed by other nations with whom we operate. The difference between ‘staff
Leadership
driven’ processes and ‘Comd-led’ processes may mean a stark difference in the expectations of
subordinate Comds and their employment of mission command.
As a multinational force Comd, great care must be taken to consider the degree of political acumen,
Multinational
patience and tact when dealing with Comds and troops from a foreign nation. Getting it wrong is a
command
quick way of destroying any mutual trust and common understanding that has been achieved.
Most, if not all, contributing nations will deploy a national contingent Comd who may be
National
separate from the established multinational operational chain of command, and potentially
contingent
employed within the national support element (NSE). They will typically deal with issues from a
commanders
purely national perspective, reporting back to national capitals and higher CPs.
The importance of operational record keeping (ORK) cannot be underestimated. Different

Operational
partner nations will have different approaches to the process. However, this must not affect the
record keeping
UK’s responsibility to conduct such activity, and clear direction will be given to any subordinate
(ORK)
multinational units of their responsibilities to fulfil this requirement.
Command and C2 relationships should be mutually understood and agreed prior to any deployment or retasking
control (C2) of multinational contingents. To reach a common understanding, agreed C2 relationships should
relationships be articulated and confirmed, personally, at every level of Comd.
Many of the human and technical communication challenges experienced during multinational
operations, especially where participating forces are not operationally ‘integrated’, can be
Communications
mitigated to some degree with the passage of mutually understandable, accurate and timely
communications over a robust and well-practised network.
It is important to understand all national caveats during the planning of any operation, and
National caveats understand where red card issues might fall and who holds the authority to exercise them. It
(red cards) should also be recognised that national caveats may evolve and change during the course of an
operation. As such, Comds may need to exercise patience to preserve strategic relationships.
It’s important to understand the motivations for a partner’s participation in particular operations.
Not all partners will be forthcoming with their specific national agendas which will differ from
National
that of the UK. Ideally, these would have been openly discussed, clarified and agreed prior to
agendas
deployment. However, if these have not been articulated in advance, guidance should be sought
through the UK chain of command.
NATO doctrine and procedures should form the framework for all operational standardisation.
However, the tempo of technological change may sometimes outpace the ability for NATO
Operational make the necessary changes to meet developing operational timeframes. This should not hinder
standardisation any requirement for the continued development of new practices and procedures. However,
care should be taken on the part on the lead nation to ensure mutual agreement, training and
understanding among other partner nations.
Partner nations are likely to have differing approaches to OPSEC. As such, critical areas of
Operational
concern should be identified at the earliest opportunity and clear guidance should be issued to
security (OPSEC)
avoid any confusion.
Medically fit to deploy (MFD) standards will differ between nations. UK Comds, assuming
command of multinational FEs, should understand the medical condition of all subordinated
Medical
forces, to gage any constraints on their operation employment or any unplanned use of UK
medical supplies.
As a multinational force Comd, it should be expected to receive media and/or senior

representative visits from a number of contributing nations. Such visits need to be carefully
Media and visits considered in respect of the partner nation’s agenda and the likely message that will be
conveyed. Getting it wrong can have serious negative consequences for both the political and
popular willingness to support the operation.
There will be instances during multinational operations where partner nations may be dependent
Finance and on another nation for sustainment support. This needs to be factored in early to any operational
sustaining planning and clear direction issued detailing the extent and interoperability of such support/
material, and the financial processes which need to be adopted by partner nations.
It is inherent to multinational operations that a greater level of risk is accepted than when
operating on a purely national basis. Comds at every level should conduct the necessary risk
Risk
identification and mitigation measures that need to be employed, with particular focus applied
to open and honest dialogue concerning the management of risk.
Figure 1.9. Interoperability planning considerations for multinational operations

Contents
Choice of estimate at the tactical level

14. Key differences. At the tactical level, commanders need to decide whether to use the
tactical estimate (TE) or the combat estimate (CE). At division level, the TE will be the
default setting due to increased planning horizons and well defined future plans and
future operations planning responsibilities. At battlegroup level and below, the CE will
routinely be the default selection. This therefore leaves the brigade as the formation most
regularly having to make a decision as to which estimate to use. Figure 1.10 highlights the
principal differences that should govern the choice between using either the TE or the
CE; the respective processes are the detailed in the following chapters: TE Chapter 2 and
CE Chapter 3. 4
Planning criteria TE CE
Complex problem requiring detailed analysis Broadly understood tactical challenge,

The challenge
and sequenced mission delivery over time. normally focused on enemy and ground.
Detailed contextual analysis required. Step 1 Context broadly understood.

Level of
likely to be iterative as understanding develops
understanding
and its implications to the plan are considered.
Significant planning time required and Time-constrained tactical problem.

Time available
available, not less than 24hrs and usually more.
Figure 1.10. Criteria for estimate selection
Lessons
15. Lessons during the planning phase. During the planning phase whether using the
TE or the CE, staff should proactively hunt out lessons from previous experience in a
particular area, the detail and depth of which will be dependent on the time available.
Lessons could be from history, training or current operations (including from others such
as our coalition allies) to inform the estimate or preparation activity (detailed in Part 2).
Post-operational reports (PORs), initial deployment reports (IDRs) and historical lessons
can be found on the Army Knowledge eXchange (AKX); historical operational staff work
is held by Army Historical Branch. The Defence Lessons Identified Management System
(DLIMS) is a database of lessons identified from activity occurring at home or abroad.
Anyone can access DLIMS as a guest user here or contact the DLIMS manager in the
Lessons Exploitation Centre (LXC), in HQ LWC for assistance. All operations/training
or activities have their own nuances and it is essential to actively seek out previously
identified lessons to ensure that previous experience is learned from and to better inform
the planning of a new activity. Lessons are covered in detail in Part 3, Chapter 26.
4 Further detail on UK estimates and selection is in AFM Command, Chapter 6.

Contents
CHAPTER 2
Tactical estimate (TE)
16. Introduction. The TE5 is a decision-making tool,

Contents
typically used at the divisional/higher tactical level
• Process
of command, to enable the commander to make
• Operational context
timely and appropriate decisions and to generate
• Planning concepts
plans and orders. The end-state is a dynamic process,
• Step 1
not a linear and inflexible planning tool. The TE is a
• Step 2
means to an end. The actual decision a commander
• Step 3
makes is more important than the decision-making
• Step 4
process. To enable mission command, a commander
• Step 5
must provide clear and timely direction, particularly
• Step 6
regarding their intent. The TE should be command
led, but intelligence and information driven. Mental
agility underpinned by sound preparation is essential to the estimate process. The staff
should be a well-practised team. There must be an enabling mindset – to enable mission
command. Effective planning requires an acute awareness of time. The manoeuvrist
approach and the appreciation of integrated action are key, understanding the audiences,
actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E) and the relationships between them in complex
environments is now vital.
17. The TE, previously known as the 6-step process, is used when the tactical problem is
complex and plans may be longer term and involve significant sequencing6. There must
therefore be sufficient time, over 96 hours, to complete a thorough assessment of the
situation and the resultant plan may well link a number of tactical actions, through time
and across the battlespace.
Process
18. The TE consists of a structured analysis in six linked steps that complements
both the higher OLPP and the lower CE. It requires both concurrent and sequential
analysis and is designed to enable the commander, supported by the staff, to understand
the problem, identify the art of the possible, select a winning concept and translate it
into a workable plan within the available timeframe. It consists of the steps outlined in
Figure 2.1, each of which is described in detail in the within this chapter. Where process is
shared with the CE, the detail is covered in Chapter 3 to minimise duplication.
5 Supporting detail is at AFM Command, Chapter 6, Section 1, Overview of the Operational and Tactical Planning Processes.
6 It should be noted that NATO is in the final stages of writing APP-28 Tactical Planning for Land Forces, the NATO
equivalent to the UK TE. During 2018 this process will be assessed for suitability to replace the UK TE.
Contents

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Process
Understand the Identify and analyse the problem Formulate and consider Develop and validate COAs COA evaluation Commander’s decision and
situation COAs development of the plan
Higher OSW Higher OSW (extracted to Step 2C. Comd brief to Step 3. Comd’s COAs Step 2C. COA Step 5 COA decision
Inputs 3CF) PPG and SPG Step 2. Outputs judgement criteria brief
Step 1. OEB
Step 1A. [Step 2A and B conducted COA formulation: Step 4A. Effects into Step 5. COA Step 6. Commander’s
Informing concurrently] Revise decisive act and activities: Evaluation: decision and
the staff of Step 2A. Mission analysis (and each key objective Place commander’s Evaluate and development of the plan:
the receipt of commander’s visualisation): effects geographically/ score (record Commander decides
Formulate methods to
orders: conceptually in results) each
Q1. Higher Comd’s intent? achieving each objective Commander’s decision
ROOB Compile each COA in
battlespace, draw each COA against COA brief
Q2. Specified and implied tasks? effect as TAI judgement criteria,
operational framework Staff development of
Step 1B. Staff Q3. Freedoms and constraints? (shaping, decisive, Decide actions required by wargaming, plan
preparation sustaining) to achieve each effect by by red teaming,
Q4. Situation change? Risks: by operational OSW production
mitigate; protect against; Present potential
component of integrated
analysis Orders rehearsals
Step 1C. exploit? COAs to SPG via action and create task list
Analyse the Work out from each TAI Refine COA
CONOPS slide to incl:
operational assumptions, draft iot id NAIs/DPs and record Record results
environment OOEA SoM, info activities, in draft DSO/M
Step 2B. Evaluate objects and capacity building, fires, Review factors and
Outbrief to
Step 1D. factors: manoeuvre, key risks, consider ‘what ifs’ to id commander
Activity Analyse strengths/weaknesses, CONPLANs
Execution: feasibility and
mission and Step 4B. Resource
planning Full IPE: refine TAA, En COG, recommendation activities:
timelines En ML/MD COA schematics, Outbrief to commander:
PIRs, CCIRs Assess resources required
CONOPS slide to incl: for each activity
Step 1E. FF: Force ratios
assumptions, draft Review and select
Conduct HN F: COG SoM, info activities, capabilities required (incl
operational Other relevant factors capacity building, fires, CS and CSS)
environment manoeuvre, key risks,
Exploitation. Conduct TASKORG audit
brief (OEB) strengths/weaknesses,
Draft ICP (request for forces from
feasibility and higher?)
Step 1F. Draft DSO recommendation
Commander’s Step 4C. Synchronise and
direction and sequence activities:
WngO 1 FF, adversary, HN F and
local population timings,
other timings (incl
constraints)
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Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6

Process
Understand the Identify and analyse the problem Formulate and consider Develop and validate COAs COA evaluation Commander’s decision and
situation COAs development of the plan
Step 2C. Commander’s analysis Anchor synch matrix with

and guidance: key FF time constraints
Intent and schematic (Comd’s (decisive act complete?),
mission, intent, effects sequence activity, build
purposes and ME) synch matrix
Update BM/real estate
Commander’s visualisation
requirements
Activity Decisive act
Step 4D. Control measures:
Risk appetite
(contd) Control required for
Shaping activities
prelim move
Key tactical planning
BM deconfliction
concepts.
C2 requirement
Key planning guidance (step 1,
2A and 2B) Id coord measures
Validate COAs (FACES)
outbrief to commander
Step 1. Step 2A. Mission analysis: Outputs from Step 3. Step 4A. Effects into Step 5. COA decision Step 6. Comd’s decision
Operating CCIRs, FQs, PG, Key Outbrief to Comd: activities: brief: brief to staff, to incl:
environment

deductions, specific factors, CONOPS slide to incl: Updated DSO/DSOM COAs briefed to Mission
brief (OEB) Comd’s desired effects Comd to enable
Assumptions Step 4B. Resource Main deductions from
Comd initial Step 2A. MA backbrief to SPG activities: decision at Step 6 MA and estimate
direction Draft SoM
Step 2B. Evaluate objects and TASKORG CONOPS
WngO 1 factors: Info activities
Updated tasks Info activities
Step 2B. Backbrief to the Capacity building Capacity building
Updated DSO/DSOM
Comd and PPG to incl: refined Fires Fires,
TAA, enemy COG and ML/ Step 4C. Synchronise Manoeuvre
MDCOA schematics, HN F Manoeuvre
activities: Subordinate missions
Outputs COG, suggested PIRs and Key risks
CCIRs Draft synch matrix and tasks
Strengths/weaknesses CONPLANS to be
Step 2C. Commander’s analysis Draft control measures
and guidance: Feasibility and Updated TASKORG developed
recommendation Deception
Step 2C. Comd brief to PPG Step 4D. Control measures:
and SPG to incl: intent, WngO 3
Control measures (bdrys,
decisive act, planning report lines etc.). Refinement of plan
guidance, CCIRs, COA [HOTO between FPlans
judgement criteria to FOps]
[CoGs inform planning logic Write full OPORD,
for all subsequent planning] OPLAN, directive
WngO 2
Contents
Step 1 Understand the situation
Step 2 Identify and analyse the problem
2A Mission analysis
2B Evaluate objects and factors (includes intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE))
2C Commander’s analysis and guidance
Step 3 Formulate and consider courses of action (COAs)
Step 4 Develop and validate COAs
Step 5 COA evaluation
Step 6 Commander’s decision and development of the plan
Figure 2.1. The tactical estimate (TE)
Operating context
19. Operating within the context of an operational plan. At the higher tactical level,
the TE will typically be used to produce a tactical plan in support of an overarching
operational plan. This will usually be depicted by an operational schematic; an example
is at Figure 2.2. This illustrates the linkages between the operational level and tactical
level plans, using common planning concepts to break down, order and enable the
visualisation of a complex military plan. Planning concepts are listed and defined in Figure
2.3 and are explained further below.
Contents
OPERATIONAL SCHEMATIC USING CPCS
Phase 1 coerce Phase 2 attack Phase 3 defeat MILITARY STRATEGIC

END-STATE
Line of operation 1
C2 capability DC1 DC2
Line of operation 2 DC3 DC4 DC5

Attrition
Opponent
operational
centre Operational
of gravity end-state
Line of operation 3
Contain DC6
Surrender of
‘A’ Navy Country ‘A’
Garrison on
Line of operation 3 Island ‘B’
DC7 DC8
Isolate
DC1 ‘A’ C2 exploited DC5 ‘A’ Navy dispersed Own Own CVs
DC2 ‘A’ C2 neutralised DC6 Flow of material into/out of country denied operational 1.
DC3 Own capability demonstrated DC7 ‘A’ land forces isolated centre of 2.
DC8 ‘A’ garrison yielded gravity 3.
DC4 ‘A’ Navy ports neutralised
TACTICAL SCHEMATIC USING TPCS

Tactical LoO should be
Phases can be integrated A force might be given tasks
aligned to the relevant
into the accompanying within the branch/sequel of a
LoC on the op schematic
phases of a campaign campaign plan or build their own
although they may be sub-sets
plan or independent LoO/branches/sequels
of them eg: SFA within
LoO 1 (C2 capability)
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Conduct security
force assistance DC1 DC2 A force will be given the
(within op LoO 1) op end-state. They can
issue their own tactical
end-state for discrete
operations
2
SE
End-state
Secure OBJ X SE1 DC4 DC5 COG
(within op LoO 2)
A force might be tasked with A force may be tasked A force will usually be told of the
delivering SE1 (BLOCK) as with securing an objective strat COG (moral) or op COG
part of DC1 within JTFHQ as part of DC2 (physical), and their role in
campaign plan or DC7 on another LoO attacking/defeat/protecting it etc.
Isolate DC7 DC8

(within op LoO 4)
3
SE
Campaign end-state Sequel Branch

Line of operation KEY
Campaign end-state Line
brief narrative Centre of gravity
Centre Operational
Tipping point
Supporting effect (SE) Decisive condition (DC) pause
of
SE (number) DC (number) gravity
Contents
Figure 2.2. An example of an overarching operational schematic and its linkage to a

tactical schematic, both using planning concepts
Planning concepts
20. Planning concepts at the tactical level. Operational plans are designed and managed
using planning concepts from joint doctrine. Planning concepts focus effort, assist a
commander to visualise how the operation may unfold, provide a common lexicon for
disseminating ideas and instructions, and assist in mission execution. Planning concepts
are summarised at Figure 2.3. Tactical-level command posts (CPs) will deliver military
activities, and supporting effects, that will contribute to the achievement of success at
the operational level. Therefore the use of planning concepts has significant utility below
the operational level. Planning concepts, such as centre of gravity and phases, are a useful
method to bring order to higher-level tactical plans where they are complex, sequenced
or managed over significant periods of time. For example, a brigade conducting a
complex stabilisation operation that spans years may find a planning concept such as a
line of operation (LoO) of use. The use of planning concepts at the higher tactical level
are about exploiting a useful methodology; not about operational planning at the tactical
level, nor is it a mandatory part of tactical planning. Planning concepts may be self-
generated in the tactical planning process or may derive from analysis of the higher-level
plan. Staff should restrict themselves to examining 1 and 2-up plans only.
Planning
Definition
concepts
An end-state is the condition which needs to be achieved at the end of an operation, so it also
Operational explains the extent of the contribution required from a commander or force. End-states are
end-state or the most commonly used at the operational level, but may be used in tactical planning if doing so
outcome adds clarity and aids understanding. Although the outcome is singular and synonymous with
the end-state, a series of outcomes can exist at each level of warfare.
A centre of gravity is defined in NATO as: the characteristics, capabilities or localities from
which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action,
Centre of gravity physical strength or will to fight. The purpose of a centre of gravity analysis is to identify actor
(COG) vulnerabilities that can either be attacked or threatened, or be protected or strengthened.
Designed for strategic and operational level analysis, it is also a useful tool for land forces at
the tactical level.
These are vital considerations in the design of an operation. Will include the resolution of a
Transition and
conflict as well as mutual acceptance of terms and conditions. Commanders and staff must
termination
clearly understand exit criteria.
A goal which contributes to the desired outcome. Objectives can sit at the strategic through to
Objectives
the tactical level noting that, at the tactical level, they should be clearly defined and attainable.
Decisive A decisive combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign or

conditions (DC) operational objective.
(Supporting) The intended consequences of actions. When these effects are realised, decisive conditions are
effects realised.
Lines of operation In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive conditions or points in time and space on
(LoO) the path to the centre of gravity. Lines may be functional, thematic or environmental.
Sequencing is the logical arrangement of effects and activities based on their

Sequencing and
interdependencies. Synchronisation applies time and space considerations to sequences and
synchronising
thus establishes their feasibility.
These represent distinct stages in the progress of a campaign leading to decisive conditions to
Phases
reach the outcome.
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A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been
Contingency plans
identified or can be assumed. Branches provide alternative ways to achieve DCs within a phase.
(branches and
Sequels provide an alternative option for the next phase, based on the outcome of the current
sequels)
phase.
A culminating point is reached when the current situation can be maintained, but not
Culminating point developed to any greater advantage. To attempt to do so, without a pause or reinforcement,
would risk over-extension and the vulnerability this may cause.
An operational pause can be imposed on an operation or campaign out of necessity or through

choice. Although a pause tends to reduce tempo in the short term, it may increase it later on.
Operational pause
Pauses are used to avoid culmination. They should be exploited to regain or strengthen a hold
on the initiative and increase momentum.
The point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between
Tipping point/ opposing forces is disrupted significantly. One side starts winning and the other losing,
fulcrum* potentially irreversibly. The very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria,
however, can help to identify opportunities and create the requisite conditions for success.
*Note: neither tipping point nor fulcrum are accepted NATO terminology.
Figure 2.3. Planning concepts
Step 1 - Understand the situation

Purpose: To develop a thorough understanding of the character and nature of the
operating environment to allow the commander to frame the problem within its operational
context.
Product. A receipt of orders brief (ROOB) and an operational environment brief (OEB)
followed by warning order 1.
Outcome. An understanding of the operational context in which the tactical problem sits.
21. Introduction. The purpose of step 1 is to develop a thorough understanding of the

character and nature of the operating environment and its corresponding challenges to
allow the commander to frame the problem within its operational context. Step 1, which
initiates intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) and the intelligence estimate
(IE), is critical because it establishes the baseline for the remainder of the estimate. As
with the other steps, it is likely to be iterative and may be refined at any stage of the
estimate. Warning order 1 will be sent during step 1.
22. Process. Understanding the operating environment consists of five sub-steps:
a. Step 1A. Informing the staff of the receipt of orders. The TE, as with the CE, is
initiated by the receipt of orders from the higher CP. The receipt of orders brief
(ROOB) is conducted as for the CE Q0, see Chapter 3 for format, with the addition of
the following considerations at Serial 3: Understanding the operational and tactical
environment:
(1) Nature and character of the conflict.
(2) Identify AII/AIR.
(3) Initial planning concepts analysis.
(4) Initial target audience analysis (TAA).

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The ROOB is designed to inform all CP staff of the arrival of OSW, to define the mission/
task, to allocate individuals to tasks and to set the time and areas of focus for the follow-on
operational environment brief (OEB).
a. Step 1B. Staff preparation. Staff preparation at this stage of the TE is the process by
which they prepare themselves for the subsequent elements of step 1. Effective CPs
will prepare quickly and efficiently as directed by SOIs.
b. Step 1C. Analyse the operational environment. Analysing the operational environment
is a continual process throughout planning and execution. During the planning phase
of military operations, improving a force’s understanding of the character of the
conflict and the human dimension within it ensures unity of effort which, in turn,
helps deliver operational and tactical success. At this stage of the TE, analysis of the
operational environment is focused on understanding the framework and context in
which the tactical problem sits as well as the most appropriate capabilities to deliver
an outcome.
c. Step 1D. Analyse mission and staff planning timelines. The mission timeline allows
staff to understand the sequencing of military activity. Against this backdrop, the
staff planning timeline enables staff to understand the time available for the various
stages of the planning, OSW production and delivery of orders. Figure 2.4 illustrates
recommended percentage time allocation against the six steps using a planning
window of 96 hours. Both timelines must be briefed at the OEB.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6 and orders
40% (38hrs) 40% (38hrs) 20% (20hrs)
Figure 2.4. Recommended TE percentage time allocations for a 96-hour planning window
d. Step 1E. Conduct operational environment brief (OEB). The ROOB will have informed
the staff that new OSW has arrived and given a brief overview of it to provide context
and mark the start of a new estimate. The follow-on OEB at the end of step 1 is
conducted to cross brief initial deductions, frame the problem, define the operational
environment and inform subsequent planning direction. The OEB format should
answer the following questions:
(5) Where are we? (Geo).
(6) Why are we here? (Political context).
(7) What are we up against? (A3E).
(8) What have we got to do? (FF CONOPS).
(9) What have we got to do it with? (ORBAT).

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An example OEB format is at Figure 2.5.
Operating environment brief
Subject Speaker Product
Provide context and direction

Intro, scope, context, and planning focus for the TE COS
for the TE.
Purpose and scope for the briefand administration
timelines (planning and mission) Provide context for remainder
G5
of the brief.
RFI update/assumptions
Brief initial ground orientation to establish where we are G2 or Geo
Political context: PMESII for nations involved. UN, NATO, POLAD/G2/

Initial IPE key deductions to
coalition, UK national and legal context, NSE/NCE. LEGAD/LOs
understand character and
Initial audience, actor and information environment nature of the operating
IA and Media environment.
analysis
Why are we here?
Ground in more detail to include freedoms, constraints,
Geo What are we up against?
opportunities, risks.
A3E G2
BM BM AOR and flanking formations.

FF 2-up (intent)
FF 1-up CONOPS, outline synch and DPs Command and friendly force
analysis.
Own mission and tasks G5
What have we got to do?
CCIRs from higher What have we got to do it
TASKORG with?
C2 and CIS key deductions G6
Higher DSO/DSOM/DSM and ISTAR assets and
ISR and CEMA
capabilities (including EW) and limitations
Joint fires
An integrated analysis on
Air
Joint fires capabilities, key timings, implications joint fires resulting in key
Avn
deductions.
Arty
Engr capabilities and direction Engrs FR manoeuvre options.
CSS capabilities, linked to ground, planning yardsticks
Most likely area for logistic risk FR sustainment key deductions.

CSS
Med plan
Protect to include candidate risks and opportunities.
SO1/SO2 Protect
Specialist briefs as required such as air defence and FR protection deductions.
and SMEs
CBRN.
Review immediate RFIs from brief G5 3CF.

Shortfalls, opportunities, key deductions. Request for
G5
additional FEs
Initial direction to staff Comd
Figure 2.5. Example operating environment brief (OEB) template

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23. Step 1F. Commander’s direction and warning order 1. Commander’s direction is given
as the final element of the OEB to provide focus for the staff for the remainder of
the estimate. Particular focus should be given to specific factors for subsequent staff
analysis. Warning order 1 initiates subordinate battle procedure and should therefore be
distributed as soon as possible after the OEB.
Step 2 - Identify and analyse the problem

Purpose: Allows the commander to narrow their focus on the complexities of the problem –
what are the key factors and why, what is their theory of change from the current conditions to
the future desired conditions, and what risks and opportunities exist? The commander should
also envisage how the problem might change over time as a result of events both in and out of
their control.
Product:
2A – Mission analysis. Planning guidance, deductions in relation to planning concepts (i.e.

FF COG, decisive act and decisive conditions), IRs, tasks, assumptions, constraints and areas
of risk to the plan. Effects schematic and intent. Commander’s visualisation.
2B – Object and factor analysis. ML and MD En COA, ICP, draft DSO/DSOM/DSM and
analysis of specific factors – typically related to CCIRs.
2C – Commander’s analysis and guidance. Output of MA, intent and further planning
guidance for remainder of TE.
Warning order 2.
Outcome: A full understanding of the operational environment, the outcome to be achieved in
the context of the overall design for operations (higher intent and SoM), the objectives and tasks
necessary to fulfil the mission, what constraints apply and what further decisions are required as
the operation progresses.
24. Introduction. ‘Understanding the problem’ is the process by which the commander
narrows their focus on the complexities of the problem – what are the key factors and
why, what is their theory of change7 from the current conditions to the future desired
conditions, and what risks and opportunities exist? The commander should also envisage
how the problem might change over time as a result of events both in and out of their
control.
25. Process.
a. Step 2A. Mission analysis (MA). MA is the planning tool to ensure the commander
and the principal planning group 8 (PPG) analyse the higher commander’s orders
to establish precisely what their mission involves, where it fits into the higher
commander’s intent and what freedoms and constraints are imposed. MA also allows
the commander and staff to identify risks to the plan. In the TE, MA should also seek
to identify the emergence of potential themes and messages and gauge whether
7 Further detail on theory of change is at LINK; the Cynefin conceptual framework for decision makers is at LINK.
8 Further detail on PPG and staff planning group (SPG) are in Chapter 3.
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planning concepts are an appropriate methodology for subsequent planning. The

output of MA must be recorded in the 3CF and is complete when the commander
has drafted the effects schematic and intent statement. An MA 3CF template is at
Figure 2.6. The output of step 2A MA must be backbriefed to the SPG at the earliest
opportunity. The specific factors to be analysed in step 2B should be identified during
MA, building on those from the step 1 OEB. The process of MA is the same for both
the TE and the CE, a detailed explanation is in Chapter 3 CE Q2; it comprises the four
sub-questions:
(1) Question 1. What is the higher commander’s intent?
(2) Question 2. What are the specified and implied tasks?
(3) Question 3. What are the freedoms and constraints?

(4) Question 4. How might the situation change and how might it affect me? Where is
there risk? How can I mitigate/protect against it/exploit it?
Output (use staff

Question/factor Consideration
planning lexicon*)
Q1 - What is the higher commander’s intent?
2-up
Mission:
Intent:
Tactical planning concept analysis:
Outcome/end-state:
COG (link to COG analysis):
Objectives:
Decisive conditions:
Supporting effects:
Narrative:
Main effort:
1-up
Mission:
Intent:
Scheme of manoeuvre:
Tactical planning concept analysis:
Outcome/end-state:
COG (link to COG analysis):
Objectives:
Decisive conditions:
Supporting effects:
Our role in the plan:

Contribution to 2-up/1-up success:
Contribution to 2-up/1-up main effort:
2-up/1-up risks:
Broad sequence of events/priorities and
role in support of others:
Own COG (link to COG analysis):
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Q2 - What are the specified and implied tasks?
Mission: What is my objective?
Specified tasks: Main effort?

Actions and effects?
Who/what are the primary target actors/
audiences for each action/effect?
Implied tasks:
Constraints/risks:
Additional resources required?
Q3 - What are the freedoms and constraints?
Time and space:

Resources and control measures:
ROE:
Media:
Operational environment:
Other:
Q4 - How might the situation change and how might it affect me? Where is there risk? How can I mitigate/
protect against it/exploit it?
Identify the risks: Enemy (MD/ External

MLCOA) Internal
Human terrain
Physical terrain
Analyse the risks: Tolerate Terminate

Treat Take
Transfer
CONPLANS:
Collated outputs
Planning guidance (PG – take forward to step 2C)
Staff tasks (ST – input into staff task tracker)
Request for information (RFI – input into RFI tracker)
Clarification (CL – input into staff task tracker)
Constraint (Con – capture for step 3/4/5)
Assumption (Ass – capture for step 3/4/5)
Focused question (FQ – capture and allocate responsibility during 2B)
Implied tasks (capture for COA development)
*Further detail on staff planning lexicon is in Chapter 3.
Figure 2.6. Step 2A. Mission analysis 3CF template
During vertical integration a force’s role in the operation is identified and subsequently analysed
9
from the intent of the commander 2-up and the CONOPS of the commander 1-up (MA Q1).
This sub-question seeks to allow the commander to understand their commander’s outcome,
objectives and main effort, the context in which they will be operating and the nature of the
problem to be solved. The ‘intent’ of other key combined, joint, inter-agency, intra-governmental
and multinational (CJIIM) actors should also be analysed. This is similar to the CE, although
9 ADP Land Operations, page 6-5. Vertical Integration: commanders’ nesting their plans in the context and intent
of superiors, at least two levels up and ensuring that their own direction is resourced two levels down.
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the scale and subsequent assessment differ with the TE involving the formal consideration of
planning concepts and the higher commander’s narrative.
b. Commander’s visualisation.10 A commander, and staff, who are able to visualise the
battlefield, identify the key activities to be undertaken, and the frictions and risks to
be overcome will generally produce better plans. A clear picture should be developed
following the early steps of the CE (Q1- Q3) so that appropriate planning guidance
(PG) can be provided to the COA development teams. Visualisation requires experience
and practice, but there are numerous opportunities to aid its development including
through TEWTs, MAPEXs, wargaming and the utilisation of simulation. Wargaming
must be rigorous and adversarial, including Cbt, CS and CSS elements. Red team
actions must be consistent with realistic ‘most dangerous’ and ‘most likely’ enemy
COAs. Failure to wargame effectively often results in the plan unravelling during ROC
drill and subsequent execution.11 The commander’s visualisation is a methodology,
complementary to MA, which provides a synopsis of the situation, the commander’s
initial impression of the task, a description of how they fit into the plan and what is
important to them. It is used to consolidate the commander’s thoughts and express
them concisely to the staff, and as a reference point for the remainder of the estimate
process. The commander’s visualisation should consider:
(1) Context (why are we here?).
(2) Vertical integration (what is my higher commander trying to achieve?).
(3) Horizontal integration (what’s happening on our flanks and how can we help
them?).
(4) Outcome and objectives (what does success look like?).

(5) Initial planning considerations (what is important to me and how can I ‘steal a
march’ on the enemy?).
(6) Transition (what happens next and how do I prepare for it?).
c. Outcome, objectives, effects, actions (OOEAs). Within the TE, as with the CE, an
understanding of the relationship between outcomes, objectives, effects and actions
is crucial to successful planning, especially during a commander’s mission analysis12. It
not only helps a commander to understand where they sit in the higher commander’s
CONOPS, but also aids the analysis of specified and implied tasks. When considering
OOEAs within planning, it is essential that staff understand that actions might not
necessarily result in desired effects and they must therefore build the necessary
simplicity and flexibility into plans. In addition, while establishing cause and effect
can sometimes be difficult, especially with regard to human behaviour, it is criticalto
effective assessment. Appropriate MOEs and MOPs must therefore be established
during planning. The ‘layered’ relationship between outcomes – objectives – effects
– actions, with definitions, is depicted in Figure 2.7. The OOEAs interrelationship
expressed succinctly is actions create effects; effects achieve objectives, and numerous
objectives deliver the desired outcome. In the context of UK planning, tasks are
defined as something a formation or unit is required to do – they can include actions
and effects, as well as a range of other direction.
10 Similar to the ‘my role in the plan’ summary in Q2.1 of CE.

11 Extract from Observations from Training 17, HQ Fd Army Training Branch 4 Jan 18.
12 AFM Command, page 6-7.
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Outcome
Favourable or enduring situation
Objective Objective
A clearly defined and achievable goal
Effect Effect
Effect Effect
A change which is the Action Action
consequence of an action
Physical Will and
capability cohesion Action Action
Action
A task to create an effect
taken by the force. Action Action
Integrated with those not Understanding
under direct control.
Changed or maintained understanding and behaviour
Figure 2.7. Outcome, objectives, effects, actions (OOEAs)
The key differences at the divisional level, where the deep battle is fought, the close
battle is resourced and the rear areas are protected, are the CJIIM operating environment,
and the three effects dimensions: physical, virtual and cognitive which are detailed
below and summarised within the UK joint operations taxonomy model.13 The formation
therefore must synchronise and deconflict all activity within this context.
It provides an easily understood taxonomy for describing the joint operating

environment. It is prescriptive in how the operational domains and effects dimensions
and representative in how we should consider the environment around them should be
considered. The operational domains represent the discrete spheres of military activity
under the C2 of the joint commander, the purpose and consequence of which need to
be understood within the framework of the effects dimensions, and within the context of
the environment that will be unique to each operation and command post within it. It is
important that a common language is used among ourselves and to engage our allies and
defence partners.
Figure 2.8. Joint operational taxonomy model
13 Consistent with existing and developing NATO terminology at Figure 2.8

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d. Physical, virtual and cognitive dimensions. Commanders will achieve their intent
through the conduct of lethal and non-lethal actions in the physical, virtual and
cognitive dimensions, defined as follows:
(1) The physical dimension. The sphere in which physical activity occurs and where
the principal effects are on capability. Physical dimension considerations include
geography, terrain, infrastructure, populations, distance, weapons ranges and
effects, and known enemy locations. They also include other related factors that
influence the use of friendly or enemy capabilities, such as climate and weather.
When considering the physical dimension, a commander and staff should not
restrict thinking to the land environment in isolation.
(2) The virtual dimension. The sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such as
the generation, maintenance and transfer of information. The principal effects
are on understanding. The Internet is part of the virtual dimension. Virtual
dimension considerations are concerned with activities and capabilities in
cyberspace with commanders (supported by national assets) assigning priorities
for what should be targeted as well as protected. In warfighting, the virtual
dimension may be used by the enemy to transfer messages and ideas which can
energise the causes for which they may fight.
(3) The cognitive dimension. The sphere in which human decision making occurs
as a product of assimilated knowledge acquired through thought, experience and
sense. The principal effects are on will and understanding. Cognitive dimension
considerations are focused upon the decision making, perceptions and behavior
of the enemy, the local population and friendly forces. Military information
activities (predominantly media and information operations) are the primary
tools for operating in the cognitive dimension, but can also incorporate a wide
range of non-military methods and actors, including commerce, finance, counter-
corruption and proxy forces.
Enemies accustomed to conducting unconventional or asymmetric operations are likely

to seek to exploit the boundaries between the dimensions. The difference between the
use of OOEA in TE, compared with CE, is that the effects and actions can be achieved
in multiple dimensions through the orchestration of integrated action. The formation
may hold the capabilities to operate in only some of the dimensions, but must use its
CJIIM inter-dependencies to maintain situational awareness in the others and synchronise
operational activity.
a. Step 2B. Evaluate object and factors. Evaluation of the object and factors is the
process by which the staff develop a detailed understanding of the problem, it is
conducted by the SPG. It involves analytical deep dives in contrast to the broader
contextual analysis from step 1. It is designed to focus on the object, or principal
focus, of the mission and the array of factors likely to impact on a command post’s
ability to achieve the objective. In most military operations, the object will be the
enemy. With an understanding of what the enemy can or might do, the staff can
then seek to establish the art of the possible. This concerns the relative capabilities
of friendly and enemy forces, interacting with each other and the operational
environment, through time and space. A schematic showing the interrelationship
of factors is at Figure 2.11. The majority of the analysis of these interrelated factors
will be supported by a specified output of the IPE process. Additional factors for
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evaluation, often identified by the commander in step 1 and during MA in step 2A are
assigned to the staff for further analysis to ensure planning remains intent and mission
focused. The three sub-steps of step 2B are described in further detail below.
(1) Step 2B.1. Full IPE. Full IPE is a planning tool designed to analyse the both the
physical and human terrain as well as the enemy to establish what the enemy
is most likely to do and when. It consists of operational area evaluation (OAE),
threat evaluation and situation integration. In the TE, OAE typically includes
centre of gravity (COG) analysis, which is one of the key analytical processes
that link the higher commander’s intent to the examination of potential CCIRs.
The methodology for conducting a COG analysis is detailed below. Threat
evaluation and situation integration follow with the latter producing the analysis
of the enemy most likely and most dangerous COAs. The IPE also leads to the
production of the intelligence collection plan (ICP) and draft DSO and draft
DSOM. IPE is explained in detail at Chapter 3 in CE Q1.
(2) COG analysis methodology:
(i) The commander identifies candidate COGs during MA step 2A. A candidate
COG should exhibit the following criteria:
• Identifiable: Is it tangible? How is it made manifest?

• Critical to the ability of a party to a conflict to achieve its aims: Does it
directly relate to achieving core operational aims?
• Susceptible to change: Can it conceivably be altered by our potential

effects?
• Able to effect change in others: Does it have the ability to reach out and
touch us or our allies?
• Related to the conditions of that conflict: Is it specific to our conflict, e.g.

Russian ‘little green men’ rather than ‘globalisation’?
(ii) The staff analyse the components of the candidate COGs:
• List the entities involved in the conflict; think A3E.

• For each entity list their aims, objectives, means available to achieve the
aims, and the sources of strength to achieve the aims and objectives;
these become potential COGs.
• To determine the criticality of the candidate COG, ask a yes/no question

to determine if the entity can achieve its aims without this object or
influencing force intact?
• If the answer is yes, it is not a suitable COG.

• If the answer is no to only one of the possible options, then by
default that is the COG.
• If there is more than one ‘no’, it is necessary to establish how directly

each of the remaining options is related to the achievement of the
end-state.
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• By way of an example taken from a German High Command

perspective in the Western Theatre (August 1944) to illustrate the
method at Figure 2.9:
Criticality
Sources of strength
Entity Aim(s) Objective(s) Means of candidate
(‘candidate COG’)
COG
Penetrate and British 2nd Armoured divisions N

dislocate Ger Army Fires and Avn
Defeat of Y
defences Air force
State actor I, German
Infantry divisions
Isolate Pz Divs support Y
e.g. UK. Western
Army Close Air Supp Sqns Y
Secure LoCs Airborne and
Cdos Assigned SF Y
Pass intelligence Espionage Network of spy cells N
Irregular to allies
actor, e.g. End German Sabotage Trained saboteurs Y
French occupation Harass and
Resistance. interdict Ger
forces
Figure 2.9. Centre of gravity – criticality of candidate COGs method
(iii) The commander selects COG. Having identifed suitable COGs (both friendly
and enemy), detailed analysis of the COGs is conducted using the COG
matrix tool, Figure 2.10 refers. The GOG matrix tool breaks the COG down
to identify:
• Critical capabilities
• Critical requirements
• Critical vulnerabilites
The detailed analysis, particlarly the critical vulnerabilites which must either be protected or
targeted, must then be subjected to 3CF analysis to determine exploitable outputs that then
provide the underpinning to the remaining planning process to support the use of planning
concepts, planning guidance and the intent for example.
Entity assessed aim and desired outcome

What is the entity main goal and what conditions do they seek to achieve by their actions?
1 - Centre of gravity: 2 - Critical (cap)abilities:

......Is the principal source of strength or power for ......What can the centre of gravity do or cause to be
achieving one’s aim done?
(A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing) (The key word is the verb; the ability to...)
3 - Critical vulnerabilities: 4 - Critical requirements:

......What are the weaknesses, gap or deficiencies ......What does the centre of gravity need to be effective?
through which the centre of gravity may be influenced
or neutralised? (A noun with modifiers)
(A noun with modifiers)
Conclusion: 3 column analysis of key weaknesses, gaps and deficiencies
Figure 2.10. Centre of gravity (COG) matrix tool

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(iv) Step 2B.2. Factor evaluation. Factor evaluation is designed to ensure that
factors which are not analysed formerly in the IPE process are prioritised
for staff analysis, Figure 2.11 refers. The factors should be drawn from the
commander’s direction at the end of the step 1 and from the output of
the step 2A MA. Headline factors for further analysis will often relate to
CCIRs as well as to any key risks. In sum, the variety of IRs generated in the
planning process must be captured and prioritised for further analysis by the
commander or the COS.
Identify: PRODUCTS leading to OUTPUT:

• Most likely COA • BAE
• Most dangerous COA • Threat evaluation
• Strengths and weaknesses (COG) Enemy • Threat integration
• Situation overlay
• Event overlay
Identify: Relative capability

• Planning timeline Identify:
• Mission timeline Strengths, weaknesses • Vital ground
• Movement timeline Time Opportunities and threats Space • Key terrain
• Enemy timeline Surprise and security • Avenues of approach
• Latest H-hour Risks, CCIRs, PIRs, RFIs • Kill areas
• Earliest H-hour
Friendly
forces
Identify:
• Art of the possible
• CSS (constraints and freedoms - 4Ds
• Comms
• Combat power (available and when)
‘Context and purpose’ • Capability shortfall
Figure 2.11. Step 2B: The interrelationship of factors
(v) Step 2B.3. Factor analysis commander’s backbrief. The commander’s backbrief is
a formal brief which allows the commander to understand the results of the IPE
and additional factor analysis so that they can focus their planning guidance. It
should be concise and focus on the headline deductions. At this stage of the TE
the commander is likely to be focused on a refined understanding of the target
audience (object), enemy COG and most likely and most dangerous COAs,
feedback on or refinement of CCIRs and any host-nation or CJIIM analysis. A
template for the step 2B factor analysis commander’s backbrief is at Figure 2.12.
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Step 2B factor analysis commander’s backbrief

Intro and remarks COS

Purpose, scope, administration timelines
(planning and mission)
G5
Physical terrain analysis to include

manoeuvre corridors, avenues of In-depth intelligence preparation
approach, initial key terrain and vital Geo of the environment (IPE) to include
ground deductions and initial time and operational-level evaluation to include
space deductions COG analysis, threat evaluation, and
A3E analysis. HN forces — COG analysis G2/IA/Media/HN LO situation integration. Culminates
in decision making and intelligence
A3E analysis to include COG, doctrinal collection products such as the COGs,
G2 MLCOA, MDCOA, HVTL/HPTL, DSO
analysis, enemy MLCOA, MDCOA
and DSOM
Draft DSO, DSOM, and ICP ISR
Focus on OA to analyse whether we

have the forces we need. What is in the
realm of the possible, and how much
Friendly force analysis to include
G5/OA can be done simultaneously versus
representative OA
sequentially. This will influence the
timeline for the mission or requirement
to request additional FEs
Command Manoeuvre, CIS
Manoeuvre Manoeuvre, Engineer

Integrated briefings by tactical function
that focus on key takeaways. Briefing
Fires Arty, Avn, Air
key deductions or using a SWOT
Information manoeuvre IM Gp diagram can be useful at this stage.
Aim is to provide analysis and options
Protect to include risk and capability that can be considering during step 2C
Protect, AD, CBRN, CEMA
deductions
Sustainment CSS
CCIRs G5/G2
Review of assumptions G5

Summary and key deductions G5

Direction Comd
Figure 2.12. Step 2B factor analysis commander’s backbrief template
b. Step 2C. Commander’s confirmation and outbrief. The commander’s confirmation

allows the commander, supported by the PPG, to confirm the output of their MA,
their effects schematic and intent, any relevant planning concepts and their planning
guidance for the staff. The latter should include what enemy COA to plan against,
the broad FF COAs to be formulated in step 3, the criteria for how the COAs will be
evaluated, and the results of the commander’s risk analysis. The commander’s outbrief
is the formal process by which they deliver confirmed output and guidance to the
staff. This step is critical – if the staff does not understand what the commander
wants, the remainder of the estimate will flounder. Warning order 2 containing the
effects schematic and intent must follow step 2C. There is no standard format for the
commander’s outbrief, but the following items should be included:
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(1) Effects schematic to include description.
(2) Intent to include shaping activities and decisive act.
(3) Main effort if already determined.
(4) End-state.
(5) Planning guidance and priorities by tactical function.
(6) Thoughts on deception.
(7) Risk appetite.
(8) COA judgement criteria.
(9) Commander’s visualisation.
(10) Direction on COAs (step 3) to direction on requirement to rule out COAs.
(11) Thoughts on TASKORG.
Step 3 - Formulate and consider COAs

Purpose: Creation of credible and feasible outline COAs that can be further developed
in step 4.
Products:
• COA summary sheet for each COA.

• COA backbrief to commander.
Outcome: Commander has selected COAs for further development in the remainder of the
estimate.
26. Introduction. Step 3 is where the staff take the commander’s direction from step 2
and generate outline COAs. The commander should have already generated a number
of workable COAs in their own mind at this point and they must now focus staff effort
on providing sufficient detail for each of these. Where time is compressed, step 3 can be
bypassed if sufficient COA direction is provided at step 2C. Step 3 does not follow a set
procedure - its purpose is to create credible and feasible COAs using balanced planning
teams that can then be further developed in step 4. Where the situation is complicated,
the commander may examine a wider range of COAs or task bespoke planning teams
to scope the feasibility of certain contingency plans. When time is short, the situation
simple, or options limited, command judgement needs to be exercised to limit what is
considered. In sum, it is a relatively quick transitory step which allows the commander to
rule out options and select the most credible COAs to take forward.
27. Process. As there is not a set procedure, staff must develop COAs to the level of detail
and in the format specified by the COS. At a minimum, teams must consider the most
appropriate lethal and non-lethal capabilities at their disposal and develop a CONOPS for
procedure - its purpose is to create credible and feasible COAs using balanced planning
teams that can then be further developed in step 4. Where the situation is complicated,
Contents
the commander may examine a wider range of COAs or task bespoke planning teams
to scope the feasibility of certain contingency plans. When time is short, the situation
simple, or options limited, command judgement needs to be exercised to limit what is
considered. In sum, it is a relatively quick transitory step which allows the commander to
rule out options and select the most credible COAs to take forward.
28. Process. As there is not a set procedure, staff must develop COAs to the level of detail
and in the format specified by the COS. At a minimum, teams must consider the most
appropriate lethal and non-lethal capabilities at their disposal and develop a CONOPS for
each COA to demonstrate its feasibility. Different COAs must be captured in the same
format to aid subsequent comparison by the commander. As broad guidance:
a. During stabilisation operations different COAs might have different weights of effort applied
to, for example, providing security to the population, neutralising enemies or building
partner forces and will focus on different geographical areas. All must be consistent with the
principles of stabilisation.
b. In manoeuvre operations, COAs may vary between, for example, defensive or offensive
approaches, geographical emphasis, balance of the force and main effort. All COAs must be
consistent with the manoeuvrist approach and the principles of war.
29. Step 3 outbrief. The step 3 outbrief is a formal brief in which the commander is
presented with the various COAs developed in line with their direction. The commander
will then select COAs for further development. There is no set format for the outbrief,
it should be short and focus on the general description of the COAs to determine which
could best achieve the commander’s intent and end-state.
Step 4 - Develop and validate COAs

Purpose: Development and validation of detailed COAs to create mature options that
can be tested against each other in step 5.
Products:
• DSO/DSOM/DSM, SoM, TASKORG and synch matrix for each COA.

• Commander’s step 4 outbrief.
Outcome: Commander gives further direction on the development of the plan.
30. Introduction. Step 4 is where the staff work up the detail of the selected COAs to
ensure that credible and feasible COAs can then be tested against one another in step
5, note that operational planning teams (OPTs) can be formed to enable the efficient
staffing of individual COAs. Of note, by this stage in the process the complex nature of
operations at the higher tactical level may dislocate the commander from the CP so staff
must work diligently within their intent to ensure that the process does not lose tempo.
31. Process.
a. Step 4A. Effects into activities. Before any COA development can occur there must be
direction on which enemy COA to plan against, MLCOA or MDCOA. It is usually the
MLCOA with CONPLANs identified for the MDCOA. First, the COA teams must ensure
Contents
they resource all effects determined by the commander. A scribe should be nominated
to record all activities against effects. Integrated action can be used as a checklist to
ensure that those levers are being considered and integrated as required to achieve
the necessary effects. These actions become tasks which then must be resourced. As
this process develops the NAIs and TAIs of the DSO will be further refined. As actions
are being listed to deliver effects, the factors which could influence those actions
and impact the command posts’ (CPs’) ability to achieve the desired effects or factors
that could result in opportunities to exploit success will also be considered. These are
referred to as “what ifs?” and will be identified as CONPLANs, branch plans or sequels.
This is why choosing the enemy COA to plan against is critical. All other eventualities
become CONPLANS contained within the DSM and linked to decision points (DPs). At
this stage the DSO, and DSOM should be updated with a draft DSM commenced and
list of draft tasks completed. Step 4A is comparable to the CE Q4.
b. Step 4B. Resource activities. Review the effects to be delivered in priority order,
resource the associated activities, then select the most appropriate capability to deliver
the activity. Don’t forget to consider not only the levers of integrated action but also
other CS and CSS resources that need to be considered and allocated. The outputs
are a draft TASKORG, updated task list, and updated DSO and DSOM. Step 4B is
comparable to the CE Q5.
c. Step 4C. Synchronise and sequence activities.
(1) Start with known friendly (higher formation, flanking) forces, and A3E timings,
then input any previously identified time constraints and any other relevant known
timings. The synch matrix must be configured to the key FF time constraint (likely
the time by which the decisive act must have occurred) and how long it will take,
the timings and sequencing of all other activity are dictated accordingly.
(2) Identify how activities will be sequenced for each phase including the movement
method and route flow capacity.
(3) Sequence the activities to achieve the decisive act at the right time, right place,
and with the sufficient concentration and synchronisation of force. Consider what
needs to be done first to enable subsequent activities and how long these activities
will need to be effective. Time to complete each action must be considered as
well as the enabling activity such as movement, regrouping, maintenance, force
regeneration, and resupply should all be considered. Operational analysis (OA)
will be critical in determining the force and logistic requirements necessary to
ensure actions are properly resourced to achieve the desired effects. Force ratios
versus available resources will determine how many tasks may be completed
simultaneously to provide the enemy with multiple dilemmas and overwhelm them
and how many need to be sequenced to ensure the proper resources are available
for the decisive act. The commander’s risk appetite in terms of FF losses will also be
a factor. Throughout, these activities should be considered in terms of deep, close,
rear and shaping, decisive and sustaining activities. Step 4C is comparable to the
CE Q6.
(4) The deep battle. Synchronising tactical activity across the deep and close battles
is of fundamental importance at formation level. The deep battle requires a
focused approach across a formation CP which aims to neutralise specific and
Contents
targeted enemy capabilities rather than to achieve a blanket of attrition; the aim
should be to ‘hunt’ rather than ‘fish’ in the deep. Freedom of manoeuvre in the
close battle is often a direct outcome of how successful the deep battle has been
prosecuted.14
(5) Outputs at the end of this stage should include:
(i) Draft synch matrix with decision points.
(ii) Draft DSM.
(iii) Updated TASKORG.
(iv) Draft mission and tasks list.
(v) Initial risk register with mitigations.
(vi) CONPLANs identified.
(vii) Draft deception plan.
d. Step 4D. Control measures. Consider movement controls, route deconfliction,

deconfliction of forces to deliver the operation (BM - think 3D and over time), C2
requirements, and coordination measures to protect the operation, deception,
and surprise. Outputs include all necessary control measures such as boundaries,
objectives, coordination points, fire lines, etc. Step 4D is comparable to CE Q7.
e. Validating each COA. Validation by the staff prior to presentation to the commander
ensures that the COA continues to be feasible enough to warrant a detailed evaluation
in step 5. It is important to note that validating a COA is not the same as evaluating it.
The NATO FACES (Feasibility, Acceptability, Completeness, Exclusivity, and Suitability)
criteria are used to validate each COA using the detail at Figure 2.13 as required.
Sustainable, and in the right time and place?

Feasibility Sufficient and suitable combat power, and in right time and place
(TASKORG for effect)?
Benefits outweigh predicted cost?

Acceptable risk?
Acceptability Is it legitimate?
Politically acceptable?
Meets timelines?
Who, what and why, when and where, how?

Completeness
Clear C2?
Is it different to other COAs?

Exclusivity
Does it apply means in different ways to achieve same ends?
Does it answer the correct question?

Is there a coherent logic flow from steps 1-4?
Suitability
Does it meet conditions for success?
Does it enable subsequent action?
Figure 2.13. FACES criteria
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32. Step 4 COA outbrief. This is the formal brief in which the developed and validated
COAs are presented to the commander to seek their direction for the remainder of the
TE. COA teams must use a standardised outbrief template supported by the key products,
an example template is at Figure 2.14. Ensure that consideration is given to MOE to
enable assessment of progress subsequently and that there is sufficient CSS detail to
include deployment concept, readiness, logistics and resources.
Step 4 COA outbrief template
Purpose, scope, administration timelines (planning and

operational) G5

Understand update G2/IA/Media

CCIRs G5/G2
Same format for each COA being
COA theme and general description of COA OPT lead
presented.
COA TASKORG OPT lead
Description of COA in detail by phase. For each phase,

describe COA in terms of deep, close, rear activities.
Use additional phases as required in the same format. OPT lead
Shaping, decisive, sustaining activity could also be used
as a framework.
Key actions that will enable the

close battle and decisive act during
OPT lead, ISR,
close manoeuvre. DSO and DSOMto
Div Recce, Arty,
Phase 1 - Deep include all ISR levers such as Div
Air, Avn, IA
recce, HUMINT, UAS, STA ptls, etc.,
and O.
joint fires plan, strike manoeuvre plan
if applicable, IA & O plan.
Close manoeuvre plan. Remember

Phase 1 - Close OPT lead
reserve and echelon forces.
OPT lead, CSS Key actions that will enable the deep
Phase 1- Rear
and Protect. and close battles to be fought.
Deception plan ISR
Focus on decision points, conditions

within and between phases, key risk,
Draft DSM OPT lead/ISR and CONPLANs or branch plans. This
content should be described as the
COA is presented.
Draft sync matrix OPT lead
Initial evaluation - operational analysis and risk

OA and Protect
assessment
Repeat for each COA developed
Summary G5
PPG comments, commander’s direction and guidance,

COS direction
Figure 2.14. Step 4 COA outbrief template

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Step 5 - COA evaluation

Purpose: Step 5 is primarily designed to assist the commander in making a COA decision;
alternative COAs are evaluated against the likelihood of achieving the operational or
tactical outcome and the associated objectives.
Products:
• Captured results of the COA evaluation.

• Refined COAs.
• Commander’s step 5 outbrief.
Outcome: COAs refined and evaluated sufficiently to allow the commander to select a
COA for development into a detailed plan.
33. Overview. COA evaluation is the step where alternative COAs are evaluated against the
likelihood of achieving the operational or tactical outcome and the associated objectives.
At a minimum each COA should therefore have a fully developed CONOPS and ops trace
with any additional products specified in SOIs. Although there is an opportunity for
further refinement of the CONOPS, step 5 is primarily designed to assist the commander
in making a COA decision noting that they should have previously set the criteria for
evaluation. Step 5 consists of four stages and the results are briefed to the commander.
34. Process.
a. Evaluation. In general, there are four evaluation processes available at to the staff.
One, or a combination of all, can be used depending on time available:
(1) Evaluate against selected criteria. This evaluation technique tests COAs
against criteria that must have already been specified by the commander. If this
is not the case the staff can select from a variety of evaluation criteria, such as
the principles of war/stabilisation, the principles of the specific military activity, or
a bespoke set of criteria relevant to the tactical action or actions. It is important
that each COA is evaluated against specified enemy COAs, and that appropriate
MOE can be collected. Risk analysis is also a key component of the evaluation
process. Although it is impossible to envisage the consequences of every action,
CONPLANs can help mitigate identified areas of high risk.
(2) Evaluate by wargaming. Wargaming is explained at Chapter 10.
(3) Evaluate by red teaming. Red teaming is explained at Chapter 11.
(4) Evaluate by operational analysis (OA). OA, as part of deployed scientific

support (DSS), applies scientific methods to aid military decision making. OA is
explained at Chapter 9.
b. Refine COA. Refinement of the COA is the sub-step in which amendments are
made to the CONOPS as a result of weaknesses identified during evaluation. For
example, weaknesses may have been exposed in the commander’s narrative, in the
lack of consideration for a particular agency, neighbouring force or capability, or in
the underestimation of the enemy’s capabilities and adaptability. The MOE might be
too objective and take less consideration of people’s perceptions than is required.
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The balance of effects might be too heavily weighted on fires and not enough on
information activities.
c. Recording the results. Results of the evaluation must be recorded and backbriefed
to the commander. A scoring system is a popular method of doing so. The example at
Figure 2.15 shows three friendly COAs judged against the commander’s own criteria
and the enemy’s most dangerous and most likely COA .
Enemy COA Friendly COA A Friendly COA B Friendly COA C
Enemy COA 1 (most likely)
TEXT SCORE TEXT SCORE TEXT SCORE
Block AA1 and Mobilise reserve

How will the enemy respond to Mobilise reserves
DEFEND Objs 4 forces or incite 3 3
this COA? or incite militia
1-3 militia
Manoeuvre, Air manoeuvre,

What are the strengths of our Air and ground
night fighting, 7 night fighting, 7 8
COA against this enemy COA? manoeuvre, ISTAR
ISTAR ISTAR
Relative combat Complex

What are the weaknesses of our Single point of
power on 5 4 operation with 4
COA against this enemy COA? failure
narrow front multiple phases
Supports his Full support to DC4

How well will our COA fulfil the Full support to
DC1 and DC 4. and CONPLAN.
superior commander’s intent 6 7 CPCs, able to 7
Partial support COG attacked/
against this enemy COA? defeat COG
to CONPLAN defeated
Significant. Too Significant but Own will/cohesion

What is the risk against this
wide a frontage 3 opportunity to 5 at risk if militia 3
enemy COA?
to out-flank fix C2 used
Enemy COA 1 (most dangerous)
TEXT SCORE TEXT SCORE TEXT SCORE
Destroy bridges,
Destroy bridges,
How will the enemy respond to Counter-attack destroy oil
3 and threaten oil 6 7
this COA? using Z Bde distillery, threaten
distillery
IDP camps
Speed, agility,
What are the strengths of our
As above 7 SEAD capabilities 8 SEAD, AM 7
COA against this enemy COA?
capabilities, C2
What are the weaknesses of our Depends on 1 Div fixed on W

As above 4 4 3
COA against this enemy COA? deception plan bank, complex op
Destroying bridges
How well will our COA fulfil the As above. DC4 Fully, esp with
will delay superior
superior commander’s intent will be heavily 5 3 COG destroyed/ 7
comd from
against this enemy COA? contested neutralised
deploying 1 Div
Less, if Z Bde can Significant. 1 Div’s

What is the risk against this Significant if Z
3 be fixed/destroyed 5 subsq manoeuvre
enemy COA? Bde employed
during phase 2 vital
Figure 2.15. An example of a scored COA sheet

Contents
35. Step 5 outbrief. Although the commander may have been present for the wargame and
may have been closely involved in COA evaluation, they must be briefed formerly on the
results of evaluation and on the refined COAs. The information given to the commander
by the staff in the outbrief will allow the commander to make their decision at step 6. A
template format for the step 5 outbrief is at Figure 2.16.
Step 5 COA evaluation outbrief template

Purpose, scope, administration timelines (planning
and operational)
G5

Understand update G2/IA/Media

CCIRs G2
COAs described in same format as step 4. Add

missions and tasks. For products such as synch matrix,
OPT lead
DSO, DSOM, and DSM, focus on changes made as a
result of step 5 work.
COA specific analysis to include adversary actions and

risk. Highlight the ability of the COA to deal with both G2, Protect
the expected and unexpected.
Repeat for each COA developed
Evaluation of COAs intro G5
Operational analysis OA
OPT leads/
Wargaming and red teaming key deductions
G2/red team
Comparison against criteria G5
May include justification for request for

Summary G5
additional forces.
Figure 2.16. COA evaluation outbrief template
Step 6 - Commander’s decision and development of the plan

Purpose: Commander selects their chosen COA for development into the plan.
Products:
• Commander’s decision brief to the staff.

• Warning order 3.
• The plan – full OSW and supporting products to include ops schematic, TASKORG,
synch matrix and DSO/DSOM/DSM).
Outcome: A finalised plan.

Contents
36. Introduction. In this step the commander decides which of the COAs the staff will
develop into the plan. They must explain precisely what the COA will involve in the
form of a commander’s decision brief to the staff or, if time is constrained, to the PPG
for cascading to the staff subsequently. Warning order 3 is produced following the
commander’s decision brief.
37. Commander’s decision brief. The commander’s decision brief allows the commander
to sum up the headline deductions from their MA and follow that logic through to
their selected COA. The commander should therefore reiterate the higher commander’s
missions and tasks, actions and effects to maintain the integrity of the subsequent detail.
The commander should then confirm their CONOPs for the selected COA - considering
the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities, direction must include the detail for
the CONPLAN(s) development. This leads to the publication of warning order 3.
38. Staff development of the plan. Staff development of the plan takes the form of OSW
production, Chapter 12 refers, specific detail will be directed by the COS. The output at
the end of the TE, specifically the type and format of orders must be established at the
beginning of the TE. Agreement on the structure of OSW between the G5, G35, and G3
is critical to realising efficiencies and properly harnessing staff effort during the estimate
process. This will ensure that the products produced as part of the TE can subsequently
be used within the OSW and built upon, not redone, during the refinement process.15 For
example the description and graphic depiction of the SoM should not be any different
during the estimate process than what is contained within orders. Products such as the
DSO, DSOM, DSM, TASKORG, and synch matrix should be inserted as part of the OSW.
As each estimate will have a different context and purpose, it is essential that this occurs
as part of step 1 planning.
39. Orders/rehearsals. Once the OSW has been written and checked orders, backbriefs and
rehearsals can take place, further details are in Part 2, Prepare.
15 Further detail in Chapter 15

Contents
CHAPTER 3
Combat estimate (CE)
40. Introduction. The CE is a decision-making tool, used

from division to subunit, to enable the commander to Contents
make timely and appropriate decisions and to generate • Q0
plans and orders. The end-state is a dynamic process, • Q1
not a linear and inflexible planning tool. The CE is a • Q2
means to an end. The actual decision a commander • Q3
makes is more important than the decision-making • Q4
process. To enable mission command, a commander • Q5
must provide clear and timely direction, particularly • Q6
regarding their intent. The CE should be command led, • Q7
but intelligence and information driven. Mental agility • COA decision brief
underpinned by sound preparation is essential to the • Wargame
estimate process. The staff should be a well-practised • Plan refinement
team. There must be an enabling mindset – to enable • OSW production
mission command. Effective planning requires an
acute awareness of time. The manoeuvrist approach
and the appreciation of integrated action are key, understanding the audiences,
actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E) and the relationships between them in complex
environments is now vital.
41. The CE, previously known as the ‘7 questions’, is intended to enable rapid understanding
of a problem and to allow swift decision making as part of accelerated battle procedure.
The CE is designed to generate plans for single, urgent tactical problems, yet be adapted
for more complex, deliberate actions. It assumes the operating environment and the
general tactical situation are already well understood. A commander and staff must not be
seduced into admiring the problem and being overwhelmed by it. It is used at division and
brigade levels for problems that require quick execution (within 72 hours) and it is always
the tool that is used at battlegroup level and below. This chapter supports the detail
provided in AFM Command, and supersedes both the CE Doctrine Note 15/06 and Section
3.4 of SOHB 2014. The CE process is supported by the revised reference/data/planning
yard sticks contained within SOHB 2018. A CE summary schematic is at Figure 3.1, it is
configured to show clearly how the products/outputs are derived from the CE process.
42. Consequently, the CE can be used by an individual commander or with a supporting CP

staff:
a. Individual CE. The individual (or hasty) CE is conducted by an individual commander

where no staff are available, or planning time is insufficient to use them. It is generally
used at subunit level and below routinely. The CE process and products are identical
with the principal difference being the significantly less planning time available and
therefore the judicious level of depth in analysis that is achievable to formulate a plan.
Further detail in the AATAM.
Q0. Baseline
preparation and Q1. What is the
Process: understanding situation and how does
it affect me? (IPE)
Contents

Q3. What effects do I
Q0. Baseline Q1. What is the Q2. What have I been told to need to achieve and
Q6. Where and when do the actions/effects

preparation and situation and how does do and why? what direction must I
take place in relation to each other?

understanding it affect me? (IPE) (Mission analysis) give to develop the plan?
Process:
to accomplish each action/effect?

(Develop intent)
Q4. Where can I best accomplish
I need to impose? (control)

Q0.1 Inform CP Q1.1 OAE Q2.1 What is the higher Q3.1 Key deductions
Q7. What control measures do

Q5. What resources do I need
Q0.2 Staff preparation Q1.2 Threat evaluation Comd’s intent? Q3.2 Draft intent and
Q0.3 Analyse the Q1.3 Situation Q2.2 What are the specified effects schematic
each action/effect?
environment integration and implied tasks? Q3.3 Comd’s guidance
Plan refinement Q4-7

Q2.3 What are the freedoms
COA decision brief

Q0.4 Analyse the Q1 Backbrief
and constraints?
OSW production
timelines
Products/outputs Lead Q0.5 ROOB Q2.4 How might the situation
change and how might it
Wargame
Q0.6 WngO1
affect me?
Q2 Backbrief
CE 3CF template SPG Continuously updated Final

Q 0.2
RFI tracker SPG Continuously updated/feedback to routine CE backbriefs
Migrate to
Mission timeline COS Mission timeline Continuously updated synch matrix
Q 0.4
Planning timeline (see
Planning timeline COS below)
Continuously updated/feedback to routine CE backbriefs
Q0
Q 0.5 ROOB COS ROOB
Q 0.6 WngO1 SPG WngO1
}
Service
CSS estimate G4 Final
support
Concurrent process/feedback to routine CE backbriefs Comd &
CIS estimate G6 Final signal
Met overlay Q0 draft Met overlay
Met effects matrix Met effects matrix
Physical terrain overlay Q0 draft Physical terrain overlay
Infrastructure overlay Q0 draft Infrastructure overlay
MC overlay MC overlay
AA overlay AA overlay
KT and VG overlay KT and VG overlay
ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix Continuously updated/feedback to routine CE backbriefs, for COA development, Warg OSW production
Q1 Q 1.1 ISR (G2/ Situation
HT overlay Engr/IA) HT overlay Situation
Prohibited target list (PTL) Prohibited target list (PTL)
Link analysis charts Link analysis charts
Shade shift analysis Shade shift analysis
Information activities Information activities
Information systems analysis Information systems analysis
Electromagnetic spectrum Electromagnetic spectrum

analysis analysis
Contents



Process:

(Develop intent)


each action/effect?

COA decision brief

and constraints?
OSW production
timelines
Wargame
Q0.6 WngO1
affect me?
Q2 Backbrief
Relative strengths table Relative strengths table
Enemy capability table Enemy capability table
Enemy weapons range rings/ Enemy wpns range rings/

markers markers
Q 1.2 Enemy intent schematic Enemy intent schematic
Enemy doctrine overlay Enemy doctrine overlay
Execution
SWOT SWOT
ISR (G2/ Continuously updated/feedback to routine CE backbriefs, for COA development, Warg OSW production
Q1 Target lists (HVT and HPT) Target lists (HVT and HPT)
Engr/IA)

Situation overlays Situation overlays
MLCOA and MDCOA MLCOA and MDCOA
Indicators and warnings

Indicators and warnings (I&W)
Q 1.3 (I&W)
Event overlay and enemy Event overlay and enemy
timeline timeline
ICP and CCIRs ICP and CCIRs
Q1 backbrief Q0 draft Q1 backbrief
Q 2.1 Outcome Outcome

Specified and implied tasks Specified and implied tasks
Q 2.2 Objectives, effects and actions Continuously updated Objectives, effects and actions
Execution
Q 2.3 Freedoms and constraints Continuously updated Freedoms and constraints Refined/feedback to routine CE backbriefs
Q2 PPG
Risk (RIG) Risk (RIG)
Continuously updated/feedback to routine CE
Q 2.4 CONPLANS (for subsequent backbriefs CONPLANS (for subsequent
development) development)
Q2 backbrief Continuously updated Q2 backbrief

Contents



Process:

(Develop intent)


each action/effect?

COA decision brief

and constraints?
OSW production
timelines
Wargame
Q0.6 WngO1
affect me?
Q2 Backbrief
Q 3.1 Q1 and Q2 key deductions Continuously updated Q1 and Q2 key deductions

Intent statement Intent statement
Q 3.2 Effects schematic Effects schematic
Comd
Comd’s backbrief to 1-up Comd’s backbrief to 1-up
Q3 Comd’s Comd’s
Comd’s guidance Comd’s guidance Continuously updated Comd’s guidance
guidance guidance
Q 3.3 WngO2 (updated WngO1) SPG Continuously updated WngO2 (updated WngO1)
Comd’s recce Comd/RGp Comd’s recce
DSO &
Q4 DSO and DSOM COA teams Q0 draft Q1 draft Continuously updated
DSOM
Final
DSM Q0 draft Q1 draft Continuously updated DSM Final

Missions Refined
COA teams
Execution
Missions and tasks and Final
tasks
Q5 STAP ISR Final
IA plan IA Concurrent process/feedback to Final
CAOI plan Engrs routine CE backbriefs Final
Fire plan Fires Final
Synch matrix Q0 draft Continuously updated Synch matrix Final
SoM Q5 draft SoM Final
Execution
Q6 COA teams Refined
TASKORG Q0 draft Continuously updated Q5 draft TASKORG Final
Contents



Process:

(Develop intent)


each action/effect?

COA decision brief

and constraints?
OSW production
timelines
Wargame
Q0.6 WngO1
affect me?
Q2 Backbrief
Q5
Ops trace Q0 draft Continuously updated Q6 draft Ops trace Final
draft
Execution
Q7 SPG Refined
Coord
Coordinating instructions Continuously updated Final
instrs
COA decision COA DB COA teams Continuously updated COA DB

brief WngO3 (updated WngO2) SPG Continuously updated WngO3
Stress test the plan > War-

Wargame Refinements
COS Preparation
game
Execution
Plan refinement
Revisit Q4-7 SPG Final
Q4-7

OSW production OSW production COS Continuously updated Final OSW
% (of 1/3)
Time
Planning allocation
timeline From: From: From: From: From: From: From: From: From: From: From: From:
Timings To: To: To: To: To: To: To: To: To: To: To: To:
ROOB: Q1 backbrief: Q2 backbrief: Q3 Comd’s guidance: COA DB: WG: OGp:
Figure 3.1. The combat estimate summary schematic

Contents
b. Staff CE. The staff CE is command led, with the commander giving direction to the
staff regarding the key areas in which to focus staff effort. The staff contribution
is a concurrent, efficient and collaborative team effort, for which training and
practice are required to generate operational staff work (OSW) coherently, without
becoming overly fixed by process. When conducting the CE as a staff, individuals,
cells or branches are responsible for discrete elements of the CE. The commander
is responsible for ensuring that logic flow and direction is maintained but it is the
responsibility of the whole staff to know how their element of the analysis links into
the work being conducted by others. Suggested generic staff leads for the conduct
of each of the questions are summarised at Figure 3.2, where necessary guidance on
recommended staff leads by level (Div, Bde, BG) are detailed.
Question Lead(s)
Q0 Baseline preparation and understanding. COS
Q1 What is the situation and how does it affect me? ISR (G2, Engr, IA)
Q2 What have I been told to do and why? COS
Q3 What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I

Comd
give to develop the plan?
Q4 Where can I accomplish each action/effect?
Q5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?
Q6 Where and when do the actions/effects take place in relation

COA teams
to each other?
Q7 What control measures must I impose?
COA decision brief
Wargame COS
Plan refinement (Q4-7) SPG
OSW COS
Figure 3.2. CE leads
43. The generation of tempo. The CE is designed to enable mission command and to
contribute to the generation of tempo, in accordance with the manoeuvrist approach.
The CE construct starts with Q0 baseline preparation and understanding of the
environment. Any commander and staff conducting a CE will be subordinate to a
higher CP, whose responsibility it is to inform subordinates about the situation and
environment. The key aspect for users of the CE to remember is that it is a tool for
getting quick, sound answers. While familiarity with the process is important, the key to
success is understanding the purpose behind each question and what it seeks to deliver
in output and product terms. This should prevent a slavish adherence to process. Using
the CE assumes a base level understanding of the situation; planning time available will
determine the extent of deeper analysis of factors, such as human terrain. A key resource
vital to the generation of tempo are liaison officers (LOs), who sit within the higher
CP and have the necessary situational awareness and connectivity to provide essential
context in addition to that provided by warning orders (WNGOs).
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44. Audiences, actors, adversaries and enemies (A3E). A3E are well defined in both
ADP Land Operations and AFM Command and are mentioned only briefly in this section.
The CE is typically used to develop plans in a combat environment within the context of
integrated action involving the application of a mix of both lethal and non-lethal actions.
The threat and application of force is perceived by the entire array of A3E, but is aimed at
the enemy: the only element of A3E against which armed action can lawfully be taken.
Within this section for clarity, but without wishing to over simplify, the term enemy will
be used with the implication that A3E should be fully considered as applicable to the
situation being planned against. The interrelationships between A3E are summarised in
Figure 3.3.
Audiences Audience. All the groups and individual

people whose perception and interpretation
of events and subsequent behaviour contribute
to the success or otherwise of military action
Actors Actors. A group or person that

takes action or directly
exerts influence
Adversary. A group or person that

Adversaries
seeks to prevent us from achieving
our objectives
Enemy. A group or person that seeks

Enemies to defeat us through armed lethal means
Figure 3.3. Interrelationships between A3E
45. Sequencing. Figure 3.4 shows the recommended sequence for the CE. It should be
noted that although the questions were initially designed to be sequential, the CE
process has evolved with elements being conducted continuously and concurrently. The
exact sequencing is a matter of preference and a function of planning time available and
should be determined during Q0. Throughout the CE it should be remembered that the
CE process itself is less important than the delivery of the outputs and the products. The
greater the concurrency within the process, the greater the need for X-briefs to ensure
that analysis is shared and exploited among the whole staff and to maintain the logical
flow through the CE to deliver a coherent and robust plan.
Q1
COA decision Plan refinement

Q0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Wargame
brief Q4-7
OSW production
Figure 3.4. CE sequence

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46. The use of time available. The time available must be used efficiently with rigorous
adherence to the 1/3 2/3 rule16 and with maximum use of concurrent activity to enable
sound battle procedure and to therefore generate tempo. It is not always possible or
desirable to conduct a full staff CE addressing every question in complete detail. Often
the situation dictates that a commander and staff have only a couple of hours for a CE.
Time appreciation is essential and the COS must specify how much time is to be allocated
to each question and coordinate progression via a planning timeline; in some instances
organisations work from predetermined ‘fixed’ planning cycles: 2hrs, 6hrs, 12hrs, 24hrs
for example which enables the staff to intuitively understand the extent to which analysis
can be conducted. It is up to the commander, supported by the COS, to decide how to
conduct the CE. When under time pressure, maximum use is made of prior analysis and
work already conducted, as long as it remains relevant.
47. CIS tools. ComBAT is the recommended tool for digitising the CE to enable efficient
OSW production and dissemination; early digitisation is advised in all circumstances.
Other CIS tools such as MS Office applications are commonly used, in conjunction with
the less technical tools: talc overlays, white boards and paper flip charts etc. All tools
have multiple advantages and disadvantages and should be used to suit the environment
in which the CE is being conducted. Familiarity with the tools with consideration to
redundancy and reversionary modes are essential if challenging planning timelines are to
be achieved in field conditions.
48. Top tips for use of ComBAT BCiP 5.6 in the CE. The detail below is best practice
provided to illustrate a recommended process for conducting the CE with ComBAT:
Question 0/ROOB
a. If the CP has a spare projector, run a ‘golden thread’ .ppt document for the CE, it can be a
blank, white ppt to minimise file size and make data Tx faster; a pre-prepared slide deck saves
time.
b. On receipt of OSW from higher, immediately cut and paste the following in order into the
ppt:
(1) Own mission.
(2) Definitions of effects and actions (cut and paste from e-copy of SOHB).
(3) Met slide (if sent by HHQ on FTU).
(4) Any essential ground/enemy/situation detail for that illuminates the ROOB (if sent by
HHQ on FTU).
(5) 2-up intent.
(6) 1-up mission and intent.
(7) 1-up SoM. Ideally, in schematic format (if sent by higher on FTU). Time allowing, create
a schematic for use as a template for all further SoM development, CoA backbriefs and
concepts of Arty/Engrs /ISR/CSS in orders.
(8) 1-up main effort and end-state.
(9) ORBAT screenshot from ComBAT or slide (if sent by higher on FTU).
16 Further detail in Q0.

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(10) Mission timeline (add main dates/times to a skeleton template).
(11) RIG for identified or extant risks.
(12) Planning timeline (add times to a skeleton template).
c. Use the slides to give structure to the ROOB.
d. Any additional time pre-ROOB should be used to draft warning order 1. Use an operation order
template for creation on ComBAT, identifying doc as a warning order via the naming convention:
(e.g. 20180131Op_DRAGON_GAUNTLET_FragO_001_WngO_1_20X-U). Note the ComBAT
templates for WngO and FragO are not good, therefore creating all OSW as an operation
order makes posting to user terminals simpler. Complete draft of warning order 1 ASAP post-
ROOB and send as ComBAT OSW via iHub to all internal and external (up, down and sideways)
addresses. Warning order 1 is invariably ‘thin’, comprising cut and paste from higher OSW.
e. OSW printing. Time allowing, iHub should print 1 x copy of the OSW for the commander/
ORK, due to Bowman printers it will be a very slow process, therefore additional printing is
not permitted; staff must read from screens.
Question 1
a. Q1 team to create new .ppt slides for Q1 backbrief, to include: BLUF deductions, Met slide,
ground/terrain imagery not held on mapping (e.g. satellite imagery of bridges, Google Street
View images etc.), key human terrain actors (e.g. key leader details), A3E org charts, key
equipments, force comparison tables, SWOT analysis, doctrinal overlays (those not on talc),
SoM schematics for MLCOA and MDCOA, draft HVT (for approval by joint fires), proposed
CCIRs/PIRs (for approval by the commander), deception opportunities and summary.
b. G35 to ensure updated ‘golden thread’ .ppt is available to enable updates to RIG slide.
c. Once warning order 1 sent, G35 to ensure PGM .xcl document is set up and mission, higher
mission/CONOPs are cut and paste into relevant sections. G35 to capture planning guidance
as issued in Q1 backbrief live into PGM.
d. On completion of Q1 backbrief, G2 are to FTU the Q1 backbrief .ppt to all subordinate

BGISDs/IOs to support their IPE, adapt as necessary to reduce file size (remove photos etc.),
dependent on high capacity data radio (HCDR) connectivity and bandwidth.
e. On completion of Q1 backbrief, focus questions or bespoke parts of OSW can go into

production on ComBAT. These will generally be made on individual staff terminals for
distribution at warning order 2. Examples would include: Movement order for preliminary
moves, a detailed situation update, description of ground paragraph, a draft DSO (using
ComBAT stand-alone tools, but for refinement at Q4) or preliminary orders (e.g. early
movement of recce or orders for the defence).
Question 2
a. G35 to capture 3CF live on screen onto PGM .xcl document.
b. On completion of Q2, G35 should cut and paste all planning guidance, constraints, focus
questions etc. into a Q3 backbrief .ppt template at the back of the ‘golden thread .ppt while
the commander conducts Q3 on paper. Once the commander is complete, G35 copy the
effects schematic, list of effects, scoring criteria etc. into the slides for display as part of Q3
backbrief.
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Question 3
a. G35 display the .ppt slides created for Q3 for the commander’s brief. If time permits and
there are two or more COAs, a Bowman print of this direction (normally two sides maximum)
may be sanctioned to ensure the direction is front and centre for the COA development.
b. The PGM .xcl or the RIG slide from earlier in the ‘golden thread’ .ppt may be updated live if
additional PG or risks are identified. This is common to all questions.
At this point, only warning order 1, a draft DSO (for Q4) and elements of annexes (e.g.
preliminary movement orders) have been created on ComBAT. 2 x .ppts have been created (1 x
golden thread deck, 1 x Q1 deck sent by FTU to G2 reps) and 1 x .xcl (the PGM).
Questions 4 - 6
a. On completion of Q3, G35 should compile warning order 2, from the warning order 1. Where
direction has not changed, ‘No Change from WngO 1’ should be inserted. Warning order 2
is invariably ‘fat’ to enable maximum concurrent activity/battle procedure to aid unit timings
(e.g. orders for recce).
b. CoA development should use a standardised .ppt for all CoA teams to ensure that there is
standardisation in backbrief formats, to include:
(1) Title slide.
(2) TASKORG amended as per Q5 (based on the ORBAT created in ‘golden thread’ .ppt for
the ROOB).
(3) SoM schematic (based on the version created in the ‘golden thread’ .ppt for the ROOB).
(4) Pros and cons list/table.
c. All other details for the COA decision brief should be briefed off the map. With multiple
COAs, it is usually false economy to digitise the DSO/DSOM at Q4 and the synch matrix at Q6
as all will require refinement post-CoA decision brief. More efficient to brief off map products
and notebooks, and then digitise in plan refinement once the plan is commander approved.
Wargame and Question 7

a. PGM and RIG remain available for update.
b. G35 scribes coordinating instructions direct into the draft operation order to save later OSW
production time. This slows Q7 (in particular) but ensures no detail is lost. It is a good idea to
have the Q7 headings template in the OSW ready to go (e.g. BSM, FSCM, EMCON etc.).
c. Warning order 3 is only produced where necessary, if there is significant detail that must go
to units immediately or if there is likely to be significant delay in OSW distribution. Normally,
staff time is better spent on the main OSW.
OSW production
a. Clarity, brevity, simplicity.
b. Throughout the CE, staff leads should draft annexes and products as allocated to enable rapid
collation. Use ComBAT to publish and subscribe to distribute the draft OSW to relevant cells,
with the strict guidance for editing the only the content for which responsibility has been
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allocated (e.g. G2 only edit Annex B – Situation). This avoids ComBAT fratricide. Only G35 edit
the main body. G35 or COS draft the CONOPs/missions and tasks for commander approval.
c. Where annexes are not essential then they are avoided. Detail for the main body that others
need to input (e.g. Comd and Sigs from G6) should be sent by ComBAT Freetext to G35 for cut
and paste. Uniformity of formatting is essential in SOIs (e.g. carriage spaces between numbered
paragraphs but not between lettered sub-paragraphs). Formatting standards are dictated to
achieve a readable document given the limitations of the Bowman printer capability.
d. No separate Microsoft or .pdf products are created for subordinates. Gunners must make AB
545s on ComBAT.
e. The synch matrix can be created in ComBAT to a reasonably useful standard if supported by
coherent and detailed coordinating instructions timings paragraph. In the event of a complex
synchronisation mission (e.g. contested obstacle crossing), consider augmenting with a
mission-essential check list (MECL), on ComBAT using the ‘Tables’ tool – this can be published
to subordinate G3 by for live updates/amendments during execution.
f. TASKORG is best completed on ComBAT if there is an accurate CoRE file present to reflect the
ORBAT. If not, this is represented in words in the relevant boxes on the operation order rather
than in an additional .xcl product (e.g. 1. QRH detach 1 x ½ CR2 Sqn OPCON to 1PWRR).
g. DSO is relatively easy to create on ComBAT, it is recommended to use rectangles for all
NAIs/TAIs to make subsequent transfer to hardcopy maps more straightforward/accurate.
Supporting detail must be captured in the DSOM/DSM table (in ComBAT one product contains
both DSOM and DSM) to ensure that the commanders’ IRs and DPs are well understood. If
the CP has the capacity, the Bowman DSOM/DSM does print well and is often of more utility
to G3 execute than the synch matrix for running the battle.
h. Creating an accurate and detailed ComBAT battlespace management overlay is the hardest
and most time-consuming element of OSW production; technical skill is required combined
with simple control measures. A recommended method is to project the overlay to enable
staff to direct the BSM producer from the from the hardcopy map/talc created during CoA
development, wargame and Q7.
i. The operation order is completed by G35, staff checked, recorded for ORK and backup, and
finally sent as ComBAT OSW to iHub for distribution.
Orders groups
a. At brigade level, consideration should be given to only conducting an orders group when the
tactical situation allows: electronic OSW with radio backbriefs will often suffice.
b. If an orders group (or ROC drill, TTX or G5 – G3 handover) is conducted, then the golden
thread .ppt combined with extracts from the Q1 .ppt should be available for reference: it
contains most of the headings and some minor amendments required to the CS/CSS elements
of the base template SoM schematic.
c. Units should be directed to bring Bowman ‘pink sticks’ to receive OSW and additional data
as necessary. OSW should arrive at subordinate CPs during the orders group to facilitate
subordinate concurrent Q0 preparation. Geo products are issued as required. A two-sider
as an additional product can be considered, if time allows and with tight version control
processes in place, it does not replace the main OSW. If time allows, the OSW main body only
may be Bowman printed for subordinates.
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Conclusion
The process outlined above produces: 2 x .ppt (Q1 and ‘golden thread’), 1 x .xcl (PGM) and 3 x
consolidated ComBAT products (2 x warning order and 1 x operation order). The end goal of it
all is a clear, brief and simple 1 x operation order issued in a timely and tactically sound manner.
49. Roles and responsibilities. The exact roles and responsibilities of each staff member
during the CE will vary by organisation and will reflect a number of other organisational
factors including the task organisation (TASKORG) of the unit, experience levels and the
degree of staff collective training. Generic staff leads are recommended throughout this
document using the G1-9 classification.
50. Staff groupings. There are two principal staff groupings, established for the conduct
of the CE: the principal planning group (PPG) and the staff planning group (SPG). The
exact membership of the groupings will be determined by SOIs. The COS is a member of
both groups to act as the ‘bridge’ to ensure that relevant information is shared equally
between the two groups.
a. PPG. The PPG contains the key officers within the CP and is designed to support
the commander in their analysis, particularly with Q2 and Q3. Typical membership
will include: Comd, COS, POLAD, LEGAD, Fires Comd, ISR Comd, Engr Comd, CSS,
LOs (key to generate tempo), Scribe. The scribe is critical and must be capable of
backbriefing the SPG on the detailed PPG logic flow, analysis and outputs.
b. SPG. Those staff not in the PPG.
51. Change of situation. If a substantial change in situation has been identified, the CP
must act quickly to enable the commander to make timely decisions to influence future
events. Using their experience, education, judgement and intuition the commander will
then compare the situation with progress made in accordance with the original plan, and
the higher commander’s intent. The commander can then decide to:
a. Take no action.
b. Give the staff more specific direction.
c. Direct the staff to conduct a CE considering the new situation, options include:
(1) Select an existing CONPLAN for execution.
(2) Make a minor change to the existing plan (e.g. a boundary change).
(3) Make a major change (e.g. a change in the mission of a subordinate).
(4) Declare the plan invalid and begin planning again (this is most commonly the case
when new orders have been received).
d. Direct the staff to clarify the orders, (or give them personally).
52. Tools.
a. 3 column format (3CF). The 3CF is a simple and highly effective analytical tool for
use throughout the CE, Figure 3.5 refers. The tool assists a commander and staff to
interrogate relevant factors within a problem, to record the analysis as implications
and to then define a series of outputs for subsequent action via classification within
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the staff planning lexicon. The process records a logical analysis audit trail that
underpins the plan; it also enables a commander and staff to revisit the analysis where
necessary to test and adjust the implications if the situation changes.
(1) Logic flow throughout the CE. The logic trail that flows through the selection
of appropriate factors, their comprehensive analysis for implications resulting in
outputs categorised via the staff planning lexicon is central to the effectiveness
of the estimate process. It is critical that the logic is pulled through to maximise
the benefit of the analysis to shape a robust plan. Efficient staff processes must
ensure that all analysis at any stage of the CE is followed through to its natural
conclusion and acted upon.
Factor Analysis/implications Output
WHAT WHY SO WHAT

is the factor? is it a factor? Why does it does this factor mean to me? So
Type of output (use staff planning lexicon)

influence the mission? what are we going to do about it in
Things we know or terms of activity?
questions that need Conduct analysis of factor
answering. Describe or and identify implications. Activity is summarised as outputs in
define the factor. accordance with the staff planning
1st order analysis Use flowing text or bullet lexicon.
points. State and develop
deductions as you go.
2nd order analysis
Some outputs become

factors for further
analysis.
3rd or 4th order analysis as necessary Recommendations to the

Comd, not just facts
Figure 3.5. 3CF template and guidance on its use
b. Staff planning lexicon. The staff planning lexicon is at Figure 3.6. It is a classification
system to be used in conjunction with the 3CF to categorise the outputs into a
commonly understood framework to enable subsequent action or analysis later
in the CE process. Staff must be rigorous and judicious with its use to ensure that
the analysis from the 3CF is fully exploited. The outputs from the 3CF will vary in
significance, certain outputs will be of such importance to warrant inclusion within the
commander’s guidance at Q3, these should be identified as such and recorded on the
Q3 commander’s guidance in Figures 3.50 and 3.51.
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LEXICON DEFINITION PROCESS
A judgement that falls short of a fact; used to Review all assumptions at Q2.4 to
bound the planning context so that the staff don’t manage any potential risks and again
become fixed by uncertainty. ASSUMPTIONS ARE at Q3.1, prior to developing the
Assumption
AT THE HEART OF THE ESTIMATE PROCESS. All key Intent and potential COAs. Review
(A)
assumptions must be Comd approved and reviewed assumptions throughout planning
on a regular basis. All assumptions carry an element and execution. Consider the use of
of risk (what happens if the assumption is wrong?) tools such as red teaming.
Military organisations broadly understand risk as: Captured and analysed in Q2.4.
potentially damaging; made up of cause, effect Review risk throughout planning and
and consequence; explained in terms of likelihood execution.
or probability and impact; and something that
has to be accepted on the route to success. Risks,
Risk therefore, are described as potential negative
(R) outcomes in relation to the force or the mission.
The events or conditions that lead to those negative
outcomes are causes. The interplay between cause
and effect is inherently uncertain and requires
commanders and staff to manage risk. Consider key
events that could be game changers.
The power or liberty to take one’s own actions. It Captured and analysed in Q2.3.
can be useful to identify those crucial freedoms Review freedoms throughout
Freedom that should be exploited. Freedoms in relation to planning and execution.
(F) the enemy (SWOT and Q2.3) can help formulate a
‘battle-winning idea’. Everything not a constraint is
a freedom.
A constraint is something that may limit the plan. Captured and analysed in Q2.3.
A constraint can be imposed (you will do this; or Review constraints throughout
Constraint you cannot do that) or it can be a matter of physics planning and execution.
(C) (science of the possible) or resources (I do not have).
Constraints in relation to the enemy should be
mitigated, possibly with deception.
Control measure A control measure is a pre-determined decision Drawn forward and analysed in Q7.
(CM) designed to increase tempo and/or protect forces.
THINGS THAT MUST BE DONE
The outcome is a statement of success for the Drawn forward and considered in
Outcome
given operation. It is the result of achieving your Q2.1. Link to intent development in
(Out)
objectives. Q3. Forms the first part of the intent.
Objectives are goals which will deliver the desired Drawn forward and considered in
outcome. Q2.2. Link to Intent development
Objective
in Q3. Are described in the intent,
(Obj)
can be mentioned in the SoM and
missions.
Effects are the changes brought about in a target by Drawn forward and considered in
the consequence of action or activity. At the tactical Q2.2. Link to Intent development
Effect
level, an effect contributes to the achievement of in Q3. Are described in the intent,
(E)
an objective. can be mentioned in the SoM and
missions.
Actions describe a physical or observable activity Drawn forward and considered in

Action carried out to achieve the commander’s desired Q2.2. May inform Q3.3 Comd’s
(Ac) effect. guidance. Are described in the SoM
and missions.
Something that you have been told to do (specified) A generic term that should be refined
or must do to achieve the specified (implied). Tasks into an effect, action or coordinating
can be objectives, effects, actions, administrative instruction idc.
Task
requirements, etc. They will be refined into
(T)
objectives and effects in Q2.2 and actions/admin req
in COA development following Comd’s guidance
in Q3.3.
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Information Information that you require to enable planning or IRs consist of CCIRs, RFIs, CL, D or
requirements execute operations. Receipt of information against W, and FQs. Assumptions may have
(IR) an IR should inform a decision or direction. to be made.
THINGS FOR THE STAFF
Planning guidance is an intellectual peg in the sand Will inform Comd’s planning
that is valid at the time of deduction. PG must be guidance in Q3.3 and shape the
Planning guidance
reviewed (and amended as required) throughout the development of the plan in Qs 4-7
(PG)
planning process (later deductions may alter past
deductions).
A question to the staff in the CP by the Comd. Falls Will inform planning and decision
Focused question
short of a RFI as the CP should have the answer. making throughout the estimate.
(FQ)
Answer as quickly as possible.
THINGS FOR HIGHER
Clarification A request to a higher CP to remove ambiguity from Will inform planning.

(CL) staff work.
Questions that your CP does not have the answer Will inform planning. An assumption
Requests for to: refer to higher. They should be specific, bounded should be made until a response is
information and focused towards informing an action or received.
(RFI) decision. Poorly defined RFIs fail to gain a response
that assists the planning process.
Requests for permission to operate equipment Will inform planning. Should be

Dispensations outside of its endorsed limit (dispensation) or assessed in Q2.3, considered in Q3.1
and waivers a request to operate outside of policy direction and consolidated in Q7.
(D or W) (waiver). Can be enduring (continuous) or timed
(operation specific).
THINGS FOR EXECUTION
Commander’s A critical piece of time sensitive information required CCIRs may be found from FFIRs, PIRs,
by the Comd to execute the operation. or EEFIs - often they are the key IRs
critical information
from these subheadings. May be
requirements criteria for DPs and inform the DSO
(CCIR) and DSM.
Friendly forces Information required about own forces. Will often result in control measures
information and R2.
requirements
(FFIR)
Information required about the enemy. Informs the ICP, DSO and DSM.
Priority information
requirements
(PIR)
Essential elements Information about yourself that you need to protect. Informs OPSEC measures. Should be
of friendly considered in Q2.3 and subsequently
information Q7.
(EEFI)
Figure 3.6. Staff planning lexicon
c. Risk. Risk and the management of risk and the linkage to the CE is detailed within
Chapter 5.
d. Requests for information (RFIs) and the RFI tracker. A RFI is defined as: a question
that the CP does not have the answer to, typically they arise during planning. The RFI
is therefore referred to the higher CP for an answer. RFIs should be specific, bounded
and focused towards informing an action or decision. A poorly defined RFI is less likely
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to gain a response that assists the planning process. Staff will have to use judgment
and assumptions to cover knowledge gaps and until RFIs are answered. RFIs should
be logged and managed in an RFI Tracker, ideally digitally; a template is at Figure
3.7. RFIs should be prioritised and it is essential for the conduct of a smooth CE that
the answers to RFIs are backbriefed to the staff at each convening of the staff. A RFI
Manager must be tasked and they must be capable to understand the context of
all the questions posed and be able to deal confidently with the staff to ensure an
efficient RFI management process.
Serial Unit Status DTG DTG Due Subject Priority Action Remarks
tracking received created DTG taken
number
Figure 3.7. RFI tracker template
53. Orders. The CE is used to develop a plan and the plan is delivered at an orders group.
Depending on the level of command, the time available, the content to be delivered and
the level of mutual understanding already achieved there are several methods (data,
written orders, oral orders, radio orders, fragmentary orders, overlays) which the CP may
choose to use. The delivery of orders should not be delayed until all information and detail
is complete; an 80% solution on time is better than a 100% solution late. It is critical to
avoid ambiguity. Detail may be ‘drip-fed’ to subordinates as it becomes available to allow
the tempo of an operation to be maintained. Orders must tell subordinates: what they must
do and why; when they must do it; and what resources are available to them. Battlegroup
orders must always have a verbal element, either direct or by radio. There must be the
bare minimum of supporting written material, in a usable format. Additional planning time
should result in better quality products rather than a larger quantity of paper.
54. General advice for the conduct of the CE:
a. All planning must start with, and be managed by, a robust planning timeline; this
underpins the 1/3 2/3 rule. Time is the critical resource.
b. The commander produces the intent and scheme of manoeuvre; the staff deliver the
detail.
c. Commander’s visualisation17. A commander, and staff, who are able to visualise the
battlefield, identify the key activities to be undertaken, and the frictions and risks to
be overcome will generally produce better plans. A clear picture should be developed
following the early steps of the CE (Q1- Q3) so that appropriate planning guidance
(PG) can be provided to the COA development teams. Visualisation requires experience
and practice, but there are numerous opportunities to aid its development including
through TEWTs, MAPEXs, wargaming and the utilisation of simulation. Wargaming
must be rigorous and adversarial, including Cbt, CS and CSS elements. Red team
actions must be consistent with realistic ‘most dangerous’ and ‘most likely’ enemy
COAs. Failure to wargame effectively often results in the plan unravelling during ROC
drill and subsequent execution.18
17 Similar to the ‘my role in the plan’ summary in Q2.1 of CE.

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d. The purpose of analysis is to enable the staff to make well founded recommendations
to the commander, don’t over think the problem. Often a simple plan, executed
effectively will prevail.
e. Analysis conducted during the CE must be recorded in the 3CF using the staff planning
lexicon and pulled though the process to ensure it is fully exploited and not lost as
wasted time and effort.
f. Use graphics and schematics widely to simplify and visualise the situation; digitise early.
g. Brief the detail that the commander needs to know; not what you know.
h. Use accuracy, brevity, and clarity in your work; make it clear whether you are briefing
a fact, an assessment or an assumption; use the staff planning lexicon and the
‘yardsticks of uncertainty’19 to provide rigour to analysis. It is easy for analysts to give
the wrong impression by using qualitative statements in their reports. This can be done
either inadvertently or deliberately (usually to inject an element of ambiguity into an
assessment in order to ‘cover themselves if an assessment turns out to be incorrect).
This can lead to both immediate problems and longer term erosion in staff confidence
of analysis. In order to overcome this issue the following standardised DIS approved
measure should be used within analysis (and explained to staff and commanders when
necessary), Figure 3.8 refers:
Qualitative statement Associated probability range
Remote/highly unlikely <10%
Improbable/unlikely 15-20%
Realistic possibility 25-50%
Probable/likely 55-70%
Highly/very probable/likely 75-85%
Almost certain >90%
Figure 3.8. Yardsticks of uncertainty
i. Passage of information is not the same as passage of understanding; brief the

implication of the information.
j. Do not be a slave to the process.
k. Rigour – Products (DSO/DSOM/DSM/synch matrix) are produced for a purpose, ensure

they reflect the plan accurately and use them to add maximum value: during the
wargame, within OSW and during subsequent execution.
l. Ensure that within the staff and during briefings everyone can see, hear and be
understood.
m. Logic flow must ensure that analysis is followed through to its natural conclusion and
acted upon.
n. Tempo must be achieved through a deep understanding the process and products,
sequencing, and concurrency.
19 Extract from the ISTAR Operational Intelligence Best Practice Handbook, Chapter 8, Section 1, paragraph 805.
Contents
o. Despite the planning and the plan itself, it is unlikely that the enemy will conform
entirely, therefore ultimately remember to fight the enemy, and not the plan,
understand when the situation has or is changing and seek to rapidly regain the
initiative.
Q0. Baseline preparation and understanding

Q1
COA Plan
Q0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 decision Wargame refinement
Brief Q4-7
OSW production
55. Overview. The aim of Q0 is for the commander and staff to prepare and understand
the context of the tactical problem they face and to focus on the key issues that must be
considered during the CE. Q0 is initiated by the input of the receipt of orders from the
higher CP and concludes with the release of warning order 1.
56. Process in general. Figure 3.9 summarises the Q0 process, products/outputs and leads;
the detail is covered in the paragraph below.
Process: Products/outputs: Lead:
Q0.1 Inform CP Distribute OSW/allocate responsibilities COS
CE 3CF template SPG

Q0.2 Staff preparation
RFI tracker SPG
Met overlay, physical terrain overlay and ISR (G2,

Q0.3 Analyse the environment
infrastructure overlays initiated Engrs, IA)
Q0. Baseline
preparation and Mission timeline COS
Q0.4 Analyse the timelines
understanding Planning timeline COS
Q0.5 ROOB ROOB COS
Q0.6 WngO1 WngO1 SPG
CSS estimate G4
Concurrent activity
CIS estimate G6
Figure 3.9. Q0 process, products/outputs and leads summary
57. Process in detail.
a. Q0.1 Inform CP. The CE is initiated by receipt of orders from a higher CP. The COS will
immediately inform the commander and staff. The COS will then establish the time
available for Q0, when and where the receipt of orders brief (ROOB) will occur. OSW
received into the CP will be coordinated and recorded via the iHub and distributed in
accordance with SOIs. The COS will update the staff to generate situational awareness
(SA) and staff focus. Areas to be covered will include:
Contents
(1) Overview of situation
(2) Key facts
(3) Key assumptions
(4) Critical issues
(5) Limitations
(6) Articulation of the problem
(7) Formation/unit role in the plan
(8) Draft planning timeline
b. Q0.2 Staff preparation. The COS then directs the staff to prepare for the ROOB by
completing the activity detailed in Figure 3.10.
Serial Activity Lead Remarks
Disseminate higher OSW and ROOB timing/location in

1 Issue higher OSW iHub
accordance with SOIs.
Time is short, therefore staff read into directed areas of their

2 Read into OSW All
specialisation only to prepare for briefing at the ROOB.
3CF, RFI tracker, risk (RIG), Comd’s guidance, DSO, DSM,

Prepare products/output
3 All synch matrix. Populate all with relevant info extracted from
templates
higher OSW and any initial analysis.
SPG and G2 to direct Geo to produce relevant mapping and

4 Prepare mapping GEO
start physical terrain analysis.
Develop timelines: mission and

5 COS Incl known enemy timings
planning
6 Confirm start state SPG
7 Prepare for ROOB SPG Details at Q0.5
Prepare staff working

8 SPG
environment and briefing areas
9 Prepare WngO1 SPG Details at Q0.6
Figure 3.10. Q0.2 Staff preparation activity
c. Q0.3 Analyse the environment. The Q1 staff: ISR, G2, Engrs, IA will focus on the
tactical environment, particularly the enemy and make a rapid (time allowing) analysis
to provide a limited context for the ROOB and to set the conditions for Q1; the Met
overlay, physical terrain overlay and infrastructure overlays should be initiated. As
concurrent activity, GEO should be tasked to start physical terrain analysis during Q0.
d. Q0.4 Analyse the timelines. Time is a critical resource and must be managed
robustly. The CP must use the period available judiciously to ensure that 2/3
of available time is passed onto subordinate units for their planning and battle
preparation, in accordance with the 1/3 2/3 rule. The time available for division into
thirds runs from receipt of higher OSW until the end of orders delivery. Time for rest
must be considered. Timelines can be developed in hard and soft copy but must be
large enough and positioned where staff can easily refer to them. Figure 3.11 illustrates
the application of the 1/3 2/3 rule and the implications for the CE planning timeline.
Contents
Level: Div Bde BG SU

Time until H-hr: 72hrs 48hrs 33hrs 21hrs
1/3 time allocation: 24hrs 16hrs 11hrs 7hrs
Taking the BG level 11hrs (660mins) available time for planning and applying the
recommended proportions below, would give the following timings for elements of the CE:
Plan OGp
Q0 Q1-3 Q4-7 COA DB Wargame OSW prep OGp
refinement rehearsal
Fixed 25% 40% 10% 15% 10% Fixed Fixed Fixed

60min 110min 180min 45min 70min 45min 60min 30min 60min
Figure 3.11. Application of the 1/3 2/3 rule
The COS will analyse the higher CP OSW and produce the mission and planning
timelines to achieve focus for the remainder of the CE process. Considerations for each
include:
(1) Mission timeline. The mission timeline will reflect all of the timings, both enemy
and friendly, that relate to the mission execution (no move before, preparatory
movement, H-hour, objective clear by, etc.). These can initially be drawn directly
from the higher CP OSW and will be refined as the CE progresses. As concurrent
activity the mission timeline can be extracted to the draft synch matrix.
(2) Planning timeline. The planning timeline is dictated by the events within the
mission timeline, and it determines the proportions of time that will be allocated
for the CE process. It will start with the time higher CP OSW was received
and finish when the orders are delivered. It should be noted that the planning
timeline can be refined continuously, and that proportions of time adjusted to
meet the requirement of the CE being conducted, e.g. a mission with a human
terrain focus may require greater time invested in Q1. In all circumstances the
timings for briefings must be specified. A recommend planning timeline template
is contained within the CE summary schematic at Figure 3.1.
e. Q0.5 ROOB. The ROOB is the first briefing of the CE. Its purpose is to give the
commander and staff situational awareness and an understanding of the facts of
the operation. Assessment is minimal, and staff should ensure that they brief only
what commander needs to know and not all that they know. The key output is staff
understanding of the problem and how it is going to be tackled, in addition to the
commander’s initial guidance for the CE, the mission and planning timelines, and
warning order 1. Products that must be displayed and available include:
(1) Sketch/print of 2-up and 1-up SoM
(2) TASKORG
(3) Own mission and 1-up intent
(4) Timelines: mission and planning

(5) Doctrine and definitions
(6) Map/bird table

Contents
The ROOB format is at Figure 3.12.
Activity Remarks Lead
Stated or likely mission Higher Comd’s OPLAN/OPORD Comd

1
Definition of effects/actions Appropriate doctrine/AFMs COS
2 Issued OSW OSW responsibilities as allocated COS
Locs, bdys, features Engr
Enemy/A3E Intent G2
Understand operational and HTA (HVTL/HPTL) G2

3
tactical environment Higher DSO ISR
Met Engr
Physical terrain Engr
Higher Comd’s intent SPG
Own TASKORG SPG
Mission and tasks SPG
Key constraints/initial assumptions SPG
4 Friendly forces CONOPS
Legal/ROE LEGAD
Key CSS factors G4
Key CIS issues G6
Other SME inputs SMEs
Mission and staff planning

5 Key known/assessed timings COS
timelines
6 Comd’s initial guidance Comd
7 Staff direction and work plan COS
Figure 3.12. ROOB format
f. Q0.6 warning order 1. A warning order must be issued to share relevant information
down the chain of command. The information enables concurrent activity and therefore
increases tempo. Warning orders should be numbered sequentially, e.g. WngO1,
WngO2 etc., each updating the information provided previously. The format for a
warning order follows the standard operation order (Chapter 12 OSW refers) sequence
and paragraph headings and is populated with the information available at the time;
where there are gaps, indicate that the information is ‘to follow’. Within the CE the
recommended minimum occasions for issuing a warning order are at the end of Q0, Q3
and after the COA decision brief.
g. Concurrent activity. At Q0 other parallel supporting activity should be initiated

including the CSS and CIS estimates; both should feedback key deductions into the CE
to ensure coherence.
Contents
Q1. What is the situation and how does it affect me?

Q1
Plan
COA decision
Q0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Wargame refinement
brief
Q4-7
OSW production
58. Overview. Q1 is the intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE), it provides

an understanding of the environmental context of the tactical problem and specific
recommendations made for the commander. It is the analysis of the environment
(physical, human and information) within the allocated area of intelligence interest
(AII)20 and area of intelligence responsibility (AIR)21, the enemy to identify its most likely
intentions, and how the environment will affect the mission and the likely actions of
the enemy. Q1 is conducted concurrently with Q2, to mitigate the concurrent analysis,
concise X-briefs must be conducted to share key information prior to the scheduled
backbriefs to focus subsequent analysis, Figure 3.13 refers. 22
What is the situation and how Q1 Final analysis

Q1 Initial Q1 Brief
does it affect me (70%) (30%) Q1 Final
Q2 Brief
Brief
What have I been told to do
Q2 Comd’s guidance Q2 Continued (PPG)
and why? (Individual)
Figure 3.13. Example format for a concurrent Q1 and Q2
Q1 is also continuous in that the Q1 analysis continues to be refined as the situation

develops beyond the Q1 backbrief, with regular feedback provided to update the ongoing
CE process.
the detail is covered at paragraph 60.
20 Area of intelligence interest (AII) is the area in which a commander requires intelligence on those factors likely to affect the
outcome of current and future operations.
21 Area of intelligence responsibility (AIR) is the area in which a commander is responsible for the provision of intelligence
within the means at his disposal, usually mirrors the AO.
22 Further detail in support of CE Q1 is in AFM ISTAR Vol 1 Part 3B, Chapter 6.
Contents
Met overlay
Met effects matrix
Physical terrain overlay
Infrastructure overlay
MC overlay
AA overlay
KT and VG overlay
Q1.1 Operational
area evaluation ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix
(OAE)
HT overlay
Prohibited target list (PTL)
Link analysis charts
Shade shift analysis
Information activities
Information systems analysis

Q1. What is the
situation and how Electromagnetic spectrum analysis ISR (G2/
does it affect me? Relative strengths table Engr/IA)
(IPE)
Enemy capability table
Enemy weapons range rings/markers

Q1.2 Threat
evaluation Enemy intent schematic
Enemy doctrine overlay
SWOT
Target lists (HVT and HPT)
Situation overlays
MLCOA and MDCOA

Q1.3 Situational
Integration Event overlay and enemy timeline
Draft DSO (Q4)
Draft DSOM (Q5)
ICP and CCIRS
Q1 Backbrief Q1 backbrief
60. Process in detail. Analysis of the environment, the enemy and the relationships between
them is complex. Q1 breaks each component of the environment into its constituent
parts and analyses them individually, and then layers the analysis of the enemy onto
the environment to show the commander what the enemy is most likely to do, where it
is most likely to be done and when it is most likely to take place. The Q1 IPE comprises
three sub-questions followed by the Q1 backbrief, as detailed above, each of the sub-
questions are further explained overleaf:
Contents
a. Q1.1 Operational area evaluation (OAE). OAE, Figure 3.15 refers, provides an
assessment of the effects of the operational area or battlespace on both enemy
and friendly operations and feeds into Q1.3 situation integration. The first step is to
identify the AOR and AII, then follow the four sub-elements of OAE as detailed below
taking each output/product in turn and analysing it using the 3CF. Identification
of knowledge/understanding gaps within OAE will inform the development of the
intelligence collection plan (ICP). OAE analysis should determine:
(1) Where can FF see the enemy?
(2) Where can the enemy see FF?
(3) Where can FF kill the enemy?
(4) Where can the enemy kill FF
Met overlay
Met effects matrix
Physical terrain overlay
Infrastructure overlay
MC overlay
AA overlay
KT and VG overlay
Q1.1 Operational area evaluation
ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix
(OAE)
HT overlay
Prohibited target list (PTL)
Link analysis charts
Shade shift analysis
Information systems analysis
Electromagnetic spectrum analysis
Figure 3.15. Q1.1 OAE process and products/outputs summary
(1) Meteorological analysis. Source meteorological (Met) data and create a Met
overlay show the effects of Met on the terrain, Figure 3.16 is an example that
shows the effect of flood plains.
Contents
A Met overlay
Figure 3.16. A Met overlay
The Met overlay is used to create a Met effects matrix, Figure 3.17 refers, which shows
the Met impact on capability in a table format with a traffic light system applied in
accordance with the categories below:
(i) Low impact (below 25%) - light green.
(ii) Moderate impact (25 to 50%) - amber.
(iii) High impact (50 to 75%) - red.
(iv) Severe impact (75 to 100%) - black.
Met effects matrix
Figure 3.17. Met effects matrix

Contents
A 3CF analysis of the meteorological impact on the mission should then be conducted.
Analysis should consider the factors below and the outputs include planning guidance to
constrain, or not, potential COAs and could impact on platform availability:
• Temperature - restrictions for use of Air/Avn/ISR, communications, thermal cross

over for optics.
• Wind - restrictions for use of Air/Avn/UAS.

• Cloud coverage and levels - affects visibility.
• Mist/fog - affects visibility.
• Dust storm activity - affects visibility, and use of Air/Avn/UAS/STA systems.
• Rain/snow - affects going, e.g. river crossings, may change terrain going from
restricted to severely restricted, visibility, degrades ISR/Air/Avn.
• Light levels - Millilux levels will affect use of Avn/Air and optics.
• Altitude - restrictions for Avn/UAS.
(2) Physical terrain analysis. Engineer and Geo staff then create a series of
physical terrain overlays, Figure 3.18 refers, built-in layers: built-up areas, water
obstacles, slopes, vegetation (woods), obstacles and routes, the combination of
which show the impact of physical terrain on movement for both friendly and an
enemy perspective. 23 It should be noted that overlays must not be overly cluttered
if they are to remain of value. Analyse the overlays using 3CF and the frameworks
of OCOKA 24 for offensive operations and ROBOT 25 for defensive operations.
Physical terrain should be classified in terms of going, as follows:
(i) Unrestricted going. No restrictions to movement for military or civilian

traffic/people. No depiction.
(ii) Restricted going. Terrain hinders movement to some degree. Manoeuvre

over restricted terrain is possible only at reduced speed, is likely to be
canalised or will only be possible with the deployment of additional assets,
principally manoeuvre support. Use hatching to depict.
(iii) Severely restricted going. Movement of A, B and C vehicles will be

severely reduced therefore reducing the manoeuvrability of armoured and
mechanised troops. Movement will be extremely slow, highly disrupted, and
both significantly canalised and delayed. Manoeuvre support (Engrs and
REME recovery) will be essential. Use cross hatching to depict.
23 Further detail on physical terrain accessibility yardsticks are in the SOHB 2018.
24 Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, Key terrain/vital ground, Avenues of approach.
25 Routes, Obstacles, Boundaries, Observation, Terrain.
Contents
A physical terrain overlay
Figure 3.18. A physical terrain overlay
A separate infrastructure overlay, highlighting key infrastructure within AO should be

created, and analysed with the 3CF and the framework of SWEARMSO.26 This analysis will
inform the prohibited target list (PTL).
Using the Met, physical terrain

An MC overlay
and infrastructure overlays
mobility corridors (MC) and
avenues of approach (AAs) can
be identified:
• Mobility corridors (MCs).

An area through which a
force can move, typically
unrestricted or restricted
terrain. MCs should be
depicted on a separate
MC overlay and each MC
classified by what size unit
could manoeuvre along it.
Figure 3.19 refers.
Figure 3.19. An MC overlay
26 Sewerage, Water, Electricity, Academic, Refuse, Medical, Security, Other.

Contents
• Avenues of approach (AAs). An AA overlay

A route available to an enemy
or friendly force, comprised
from a number of MCs is an
avenue of approach (AA),
Figure 3.20 refers. AAs should
be depicted on a separate AA
overlay and each classified
by what size unit could
manoeuvre along it.
• Key terrain (KT) and vital

ground (VG) overlay. Having
conducted OAE analysis
both KT and VG should be
identified, definitions are
below:
• KT. Any location or area

where its seizure, retention
Figure 3.20. An AA overlay
or control affords significant
advantage to FF or EF (to be refined throughout Q1).
• VG. An area of such importance that it must be retained/controlled for mission

success (to be refined throughout Q1).
(3) Human terrain analysis. The aim of HTA is to identify the human terrain groups
(A3E) within the operational area/battlespace, their motives, relationships and
threats. Human terrain is complex and the depth of analysis must be tailored to
time available; likewise the products/outputs must be configured the mission and
time available, not all outputs/products are required. The initial step is to list all
key groups to identify:
• Motivation.
• Key individuals.
• Links to other groups.
• Levels of influence.
• What we want the group to do.
• What could influence them for better or worse.
• How to measure effectiveness.
• What additional information is required?
(i) ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix. An ASCOPE27/PMESII-PT28 matrix, Figure 3.21
refers, should be produced to generate factors for 3CF analysis and to
identify the breadth of human terrain.
27 Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events.

28 Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infra, Info, Physical, Time.
Contents
P M E S I I P T
(Political) (Mil/Sy) (Economic) (Social) (Infra) (Info) (Physical) (Time)
Regional Mil controlled Market sites, Housing sites, Water supply, Radio, TV, Go-no go terrain, Time of travel
and district areas, adversary industrial sites, education transport routes media, coverage accessibility to and between
A
boundaries, controlled areas, banking centres. schools and locations
(Area)
party areas incident locations universities,
recreational sites
District centres, Govt buildings, Food storage Hospitals, Roads, bridges, Tel, TV coverage, Location and Programme of
S Shuras mil and police sites recreational, airports, print shops accessibility meetings
(Structure) barracks religious electrical lines
Access routes
Dispute Police capability Electrical Strength of Ability to build Literacy, access Location and Speed of
C resolution, and presence capacity and tribal, religious, and maintain to media accessibility development and
(Capabilities) leadership 24/7 reliability political groups roads and dispute resolution
utilities
Govt, political Structure and Industrial Tribes, families, Govt ministries, Media, govt, Location and Annual

O parties, NGOs governance of and service clubs, sports construction religious centres accessibility programme of
(Orgs) mil and police industries, industries, NGOs meetings and
forces unions gatherings
Governors, Mil and police Banking and Leaders in Guilders and Controllers of Availability Location,
P mullahs, elders leadership, industrial family, religion, construction media, govt, during various dispersal,
integrity and leaders, political, union firms, skill base, opposition, seasons accessibility, time
(People)
reliability opposition, and social division of religion in appointment
corruption activities labour
E Elections, RIPs, postings, Harvest, Prayers, holidays Infrastructure IA campaigns, Seasons, weather Annual
meetings leave business hours construction prayers, projects, with impact on programmes
(Events)
programme civcas activities
Figure 3.21. An ASCOPE/PMESII-PT matrix

Contents
(ii) Human terrain (HT) overlay. An HT overlay should be created. The HT

overlay is the process of using a geographic map to display comparatively
static demographic features, e.g. population density, demographics, income
distribution, social features (e.g. tribe, ethnicity, religion) or the location
of physical items of social importance. Specific ROE may prohibit the use
of certain institutional buildings, such as mosques and churches, museums
and power stations. HT analysis enables a prohibited target list (PTL) to be
created. The HT overlay effectively forms a HT DSO that the commander can
use to plot desired human effects and actions.
(iii) Link analysis charts. Create link analysis charts, Figure 3.22 refers, are a
visual representation of the linkages between individuals and entities in the
operating environment. Analysis of the linkages enables deductions to be
made regarding hierarchies and leaders and therefore provides opportunities
for further analysis and targeting where applicable.
20 Mel
9 Tom Swanson
30 Allen
Bartley Ruby
45 Leonard
Lyman
18 Kristine 19 Paul
Holmgren Hewett
53 Olive City
43 Richard
Melanson
32 Carl 6 Bob
Dupont Brownell
54 The Terraces
2 Olga
Cardoza 36 Grant
Mullin
33 Gerald 7 Edward
Marrs Fitzhugh
51 Cold Mountains 36 Eileen
52 The Steppes
Stevenson
34 Antonio 29 Steven
Coffey Sokol
31 Darlene
5 Patsy 17 Boris
Julien
Bachman Garrick
Figure 3.22. Link analysis chart
(iv) Shade shift analysis. Create a shade shift analysis, Figure 3.23 refers.
Shade shift analysis enables an indirect approach to shaping the HT; the
analysis should generate clear options for the commander. In practical
terms, a shade shift analysis presents the commander with an enhanced
understanding of the HT and enables the identification of risk areas
(consequence) and allows for potential exploitation during the planning
of operations. Further analysis will enable recommendations for effects
on specific groups of enemy, e.g: ISOLATE, EMPOWER, PROTECT etc. The
detailed understanding allows the commander to identify how best to
mitigate and exploit the HT consequences of actions during execution.
Contents
Shamil Basayev
(Head of SADVOL) Nikolay Labazanov
(Chief of Avon Prec)
DESTROY
DISCREDIT
EMPOWER
Boris Eltysn
(Head of SAPA) Viktor Defeat
(Chief Inspector Bath)
Influence
SADVOL Subunit
Commanders (15-18) Maxin Stanislov
(Dep Chief Inspector Bath)
Grigorii Potemkin
SADVOL Hardliners
(Mayor of Bath)
(~50)
ISOLATE
PROTECT
SADVOL Pressured Men

(~150 Men)
Supportive
Figure 3.23. Shade shift analysis
(4) Information environment analysis. The aim of information environment

analysis is to determine the impact of the information environment within the
AO and to the mission. The information environment is where humans and
automated systems observe, orientate, decide and act upon information, and is
therefore the principal environment for decision making. Relevant actors include
leaders, stakeholders and organisations. The centrality of influence in shaping
perceptions depends on commanders and their staffs understanding and utilising
this environment to best effect. At the tactical level this involves information
activities.
(i) Information activities. These are actions designed to affect or manipulate

information, or perceptions of information and information systems. They
include protective measures. Examples include information operations (Info
Ops), media operations (Media Ops) and OPSEC.
(ii) Informational systems analysis (ISA). ISA provides a clear understanding

of the enemy’s means of executing their communications and influence
strategy. This knowledge will provide the foundations to proactively track
and refute or interdict and disrupt their communications strategy messages
and thereby counter a significant element of their influence campaign.
(iii) Electromagnetic environment (EME).
• Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The EMS represents contested and

often congested operating space presenting opportunities (to exploit
use of the spectrum to enable freedom of manoeuvre), constraints
(restrictions in our ability to apply effective C2) and threats (to our
information and C2) to the mission. It is important that commanders
have a thorough understanding of the EMS, that it is considered both
fully and early during planning and subsequently during execution in
Contents
order to maintain freedom of manoeuvre and information superiority.

This includes own FE requirements and the use of the EMS by coalition
partners, the host nation, non-governmental organisations and wider A3E
• EMS intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).29

Conducting an
EMS IPB** early in planning will deliver an enhanced Q1 product. An
EMS IPB should seek to support commanders’ decision making based
on analysis on how the enemy’s EW capabilities will shape manoeuvre
in terms of understanding likely contested, constrained or permissive
ground. It will also consider the effects of non-enemy congestion within
the EMS and the resultant freedoms and constraints. Output from EMS
IPB will be integrated within the DSO/DSOM/DSM as required.
b. Q1.2 threat evaluation. Threat evaluation, Figure 3.24 refers, is designed to

understand the enemy capability and motivation unconstrained by the effects of
the operational environment and to determine how they might operate, their key
strengths and how to mitigate, their key weaknesses and how to exploit, what they
view as opportunities and threats and how to use them to manipulate the enemy via
the use of deception.30 It provides an assessment of enemy capability and intent to
determine the threat to own force and mission. The threat evaluation has three sub-
elements: enemy capability analysis, enemy doctrine and tactics analysis and enemy
vulnerability analysis which are detailed below.
Relative strengths table
Enemy capability table
Enemy weapons range rings/markers
Q1.2 Threat evaluation Enemy intent schematic
Enemy doctrine overlay
SWOT
Target lists (HVT and HPT)
Figure 3.24. Q1.2 TE process and products/outputs summary
(1) Enemy capability analysis. Analyse enemy capabilities using the 3CF and the
acronym COWARD31 to identify what capabilities the enemy has and how they are
likely to employ them. G2 staff must have a sound knowledge of friendly force
TASKORG capabilities to be able to make the comparative analysis and identify of
opportunities and threats for exploitation. Useful questions to satisfy are:
(i) What do I know about the enemy?
(ii) What do I not know about the enemy? Any knowledge gaps should be
recorded as IRs, which with further development may become PIRs that will
focus ISR efforts and potentially inform a commander’s decision.
29 Further development of the EMS IPB process and the refinement of its integration within the planning process remains
ongoing and is currently being developed separately.
30 Further detail on deception is at Chapter 6.
31 Capability, Organisation, Weapons and Equipment, Asymmetric Threat, Reserves, Doctrine.
Contents
Enemy capability analysis outputs are detailed below:
(i) Relative strengths table. Analysis of relative strengths by making an

assessment of force ratios between friendly and enemy forces, when
confronting a conventional enemy, the analysis should be captured on a
relative strengths table, Figure 3.25 refers. Analysis via 3CF should include
the identification of key equipment’s for the enemy and the quantities held.
Further analysis of equipment strengths and weaknesses will enable the
identification of areas of equipment capability overmatch and will determine
who has an advantage or is in possession of combat multipliers, e.g. night
viewing aids, armed UAVs etc.
FR FORCES EN FORCES RATIO So what?
Similar 30mm and 7.62mm

AFV/ IFV 44 x WR 66 x BMD 2 1:1.5 BMD2 AT4/5 (4km)
BMD2 in res
0 (but other Significant fr man adv

TANKS 14 x CR2 threats) 14:0
Lack of en MBT
16 x AS90 9 x 2S31 2:1 Must

Significant fr adv
ARTY Fr counter-battery will prevent en to
unmask arty until HPT (Br assets)
include
4:3 JAV rg 2.5km
AT 12 x Jav 9 x AT4 AT4 rg 4km analysis
SA16 man-portable
GBAD 12 x HVM SP 6 x SA16 2:1
AH64 vulnerable
Could negate tank adv

AH 2 x AH 6 (24) HIND E 1:12
Fr GBAD critical
MOR 9 x 81mm 9 x 82mm 1:1 Comparable
Figure 3.25. A relative strengths table
(ii) Enemy capability table. Enemy capabilities should be summarised in a

table and subsequently analysed with deductions captured.
(iii) Enemy weapons range rings/markers. The creation of key enemy

weaponry range markers and range rings provides a valuable analytical tool
to support further analysis, and for use during execution.
(iv) Enemy intent schematic. The enemy intent schematic, Figure 3.26 refers,
is produced to show the assessed intent and effects that an enemy is seeking
to achieve. Identify what enemy success looks like, their outcome, likely
objectives and effects and likely actions that achieve the effects. Use the 3CF
to analyse further.
Contents
Enemy intent schematic Enemy desired OUTCOME
MSN
Effect Purpose
Figure 3.26. An enemy intent schematic
(2) Enemy doctrine and tactics analysis. The second step of threat evaluation
is to analyse enemy doctrine and tactics to produce an enemy doctrine overlay,
Figure 3.27 refers. An enemy doctrine overlay depicts how an enemy force might
look on the ground for a particular tactical action (tactical march, defence, on
the assault, obstacle crossing) irrespective of physical terrain restrictions. Note
that the sophistication and skill of the enemy will be determined by his access
to weapons and training. It is vital that an accurate assessment is made of the
enemy’s true capability in relation to potential TTPs. Overlays should be produced
to scale for subsequent use as an analytical tool.
Recce element
Enabling (aka front
element security elm)
3-5km 3-5km
Action
element
Enabling through one of:
Security
Staff Fixing
4-5km
selection Assault
Addl support
roles
Support Comd
2-3km
element section
Support element often includes:

Comd section Reserve
The element conducting the primary action:
Staff section CSS
Raid Exploit Assault
Figure 3.27. An enemy doctrine overlay
(3) Enemy vulnerability analysis. Enemy vulnerabilities are deduced from the
initial two steps of threat evaluation. An appreciation of the enemy’s ME will
assist deductions as to where the enemy is likely to be strongest and may indicate
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areas to avoid, in accordance with the manoeuvrist approach. A SWOT 32

analysis, Figure 3.28 refers, from the perspective of the enemy is a useful tool
to breakdown further enemy motivation and characteristics for subsequent 3CF
analysis. Having identified enemy vulnerabilities, G2 staff must then determine
how best to exploit or target them. Any knowledge gaps identified should
become IRs. SWOT is explained below:
• Strengths examine the constituent elements that make up the strength and
identify those vulnerable to attack and feed into HV/HPTL.
• Weaknesses identify how these are protected and which protection

measures are vulnerable to attack and feed into HV/HPTL.
• Opportunities the enemy will try to seize these. Identify how to deny them, or
how to use them to deceive the enemy into a COA beneficial to your mission.
• Threats the enemy will try to mitigate these. Identify how to increase them,
or how to use them to deceive the enemy into a COA beneficial to the
mission or to distract them from your plan.
SWOT analysis of deductions from TE with specific emphasis on deconstructing key strengths and
weaknesses looked at from an enemy perspective
ENEMY STRENGTHS ENEMY WEAKNESSES

OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENEMY THREATS TO THE ENEMY

Figure 3.28. A SWOT analysis
(4) Target lists (HVT and HPT). Analysis of enemy doctrinal overlay, enemy intent
schematic and enemy vulnerabilities will enable further deductions to be made
and the identification of enemy high-value targets (HVT) and enemy high-
priority targets (HPT) which are captured on target lists, definitions for each are:
(i) High-value target list (HVTL). HVTs are those assets which if lost to the
enemy would significantly damage its ability to carry out its mission or to
achieve its intent.
(ii) High-payoff target list (HPTL). Targets which if lost to the enemy would
significantly contribute to the success of the commander’s mission (not
necessarily enemy failure) and which can be affected given the systems
available.
c. Q1.3 Situation integration. Situation integration identifies how enemy doctrine

and TTPs will be shaped by the operating environment and is the result of layering
and fusing the threat evaluation onto the OAE. Situation integration provides an
understanding of what the enemy is most likely to do, where they are most likely
to do it and when they are most likely to do it. It identifies the constraints and
opportunities (vital ground and key terrain) imposed by the environment (OAE) on
32 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.

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the range of tactics likely to be used by the enemy (threat evaluation). This leads to
the development of the enemy most likely and most dangerous courses of action,
and develops the SWOT analysis conducted during threat evaluation. Analysis of
the situation integration should be used to populate the draft decision support
overlay (DSO) and supporting decision support overlay matrix (DSOM) and enable the
development of the intelligence collection plan (ICP). The sub-elements of situation
integration are summarised at Figure 3.29.
Situation overlays
MLCOA and MDCOA
Q1.3 Situational integration Event overlay and enemy timeline
Draft DSO (Q4)
Draft DSOM (Q5)
ICP and CCIRs
Figure 3.29. Q1.3 Situation integration process and products/outputs summary
(1) Situation overlays. The situation overlay graphically shows how an enemy will
deploy (usually two levels of command down) at a particular stage in a COA,
Figure 3.30 refers and is intended to identify the opportunities and constraints
that the battlefield environment offers to enemy and friendly forces. G2 staff
must visualise from the enemy perspective. It shows the impact of terrain on an
enemy’s doctrine (OAE + threat evaluation = situation integration). A situation
overlay also shows the enemy force in motion through MCs and AAs and must be
annotated with time phase lines (TPLs) to situate enemy manoeuvre events within
time and space. These may be further refined into phase lines (PL) indicating
points in time and space where the momentum of the threat’s operation may be
lost and where FF may be able to seize the initiative. A situation overlay enables
an understanding to be gained of where and when the enemy will manoeuvre
over a given piece of ground, related to the operating environment, and how it
will shape enemy capability, doctrine and tactics.
LZ Exploitation Fixing force Exploitation force
force
Fixing force
Exploitation force
Fixing force
Fixing force
Exploitation
force
Bn reserve
Fixing
force
Fixing force
Figure 3.30. A situation overlay

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(2) MLCOA and MDCOA. The next step is to identify the enemy most likely
(ML) and most dangerous (MD) course of action (COA), note the requirement
to confirm coherence with the assessed higher ML /MDCOA. Using the
enemy intent schematic developed during threat evaluation and combining
analysis from Q1.1 OAE the enemy MLCOA and MDCOA can be deduced and
summarised on separate slides, an enemy MDCOA example is at Figure 3.31.
The advantages and disadvantages for each COA should be considered and
critically the indicators and warnings (I&Ws) deduced that will determine if the
enemy using this COA. The I&Ws will inform the draft DSO and the selection of
NAIs in due course. Definitions of MLCOA and MDCOA are below:
• MLCOA. The COA that presents an enemy commander the best chance of
achieving mission success while accepting the lowest possible degree of risk.
• MDCOA. The COA that presents the enemy commander with the opportunity
to have the most significant impact upon friendly forces, but at a greater
degree of risk to their own forces.
MLCOA: Provide a brief synopsis of the enemy’s COA here. This will enable whomever receives this product can
understand your assessment.
MSN: Using effects terminology, what is the

enemy’s mission
Winning concept and main effort: What
is the enemy’s desired end-state? (e.g. Are
they looking to defeat BF in place/protect
their own battlespace/gain ground?)
Scheme of manoeuvre:
Shaping: How will the enemy shape the
battlespace to best complement his plan
prior to its execution.
Decisive: How will the enemy execute his
plan?
Timeline Sustaining: Once the enemy’s plan is
H+O H+1 H+2 H+2 executed, how will he sustain ground held/
defensive positions etc?
Tactical functions: Strengths Weaknesses HPT

Firepower: Efficient and effective trained Time in position Extended LOC Things that will
artillery units grouped to provide support to Public support Support of hurt the enemy
forward elements. population and really help us if
High motivated removed.
Manoeuvre: In defensive posture. Sufficient depends on their
manoeuvre capability. Urban area heavily provision of sy
restricts them to roads and tracks. HVT
Opportunities Threat
Command: Effective. Designed to allow for Things that will hurt
quick decisions to be made - enables reactive Info Ops on Info Ops
GIRoH northern the enemy.
and robust action at Bde and Bn. Alienation from
plans HIM/AQ
Sustainment: Limited. Locs stretched.
Intel and Info: Wide intellience collection (All above are examples of what could be
network. Info Ops effective. mentioned in a SWOT analysis)
Figure 3.31. Enemy MLCOA and MDCOA slide
(3) Event overlays and enemy timeline. The event overlay graphically depicts
when and where enemy tactical events are expected to occur, it is a summary of
the enemy situation overlays to form a consolidated situation overlay that with
timelines applied becomes an event overlay. Timelines will show when key events
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can be expected and will assist in the development of I&Ws. Analysis of the event
overlay will provide supporting information for the enemy line within the synch
matrix and enables draft named areas of interest (NAIs) to be identified (see
definitions below), Figure 3.33 shows the process of event overlay development
and Figure 3.34 shows an event overlay.
(i) Named areas of interest (NAIs). A point, area or line, Figure 3.32 refers,
usually along a particular AA through which enemy activity is expected to
occur. NAIs confirm or deny an enemy COA and therefore facilitate the find
function. The enemy must be found using the ISR assets available, including
recce, snipers, etc. These assets and their find capability are tasked using the
NAIs. Note that higher CP OSW may require coverage of their NAIs in your
AO in addition to those determined by own CE.
Point NAI NAI

NAI 1/03
12/01 Area NAI Linear NAI
(road NAI 19/02 NAI 1/03
(valley floor) (road)
junction)
Figure 3.32. Point, area and line NAIs and respective symbology
(ii) Decision point/line (DP/DL). A point or line in time or space where a

commander must make a decision to influence the operation. DPs are linked
to CCIRs and are conditions based (several pieces of information combine to
meet the condition for the DP to be triggered). DPs can also be conceptual,
e.g. a subunit’s combat effectiveness that acts as a trigger. DPs form the
key linkage between the NAI and the action to take place in the TAI and are
clearly defined and recorded on the Q5 DSOM/DSM.
(iii) Target areas of interest (TAIs). TAIs are areas where the commander
intends to have an effect on the enemy, and act as foci for planning.
Examples of such effects are DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, BLOCK and DEFEAT. TAIs
should be shaped to the ground and named or numbered, and should be
integrated with combined arms obstacle integration (CAOI) planning. TAIs
can include non-lethal effects such as CONVINCE, REASSURE, etc.
Note: CPs must adhere to the higher CP’s numbering/naming convention for NAIs/TAIs/
DPs to avoid confusion.
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Situation overlay - COA 1
These become potential

NAIs on the draft DSO
Integrate EF MC, doctrine, and equipment
Situation overlay - COA 2 Consolidated situation overlay Event overlay
COAs 1&3 NAI 1
COAs 2&3 NAI 3
COAs 2&3 NAI 2

COA 1 NAI 4
Situation overlay - COA 3
Figure 3.33. The process of event overlay development
Event overlay
Figure 3.34. An event overlay
(4) Draft decision support overlay (DSO). The event overlay with draft NAIs
with the layering removed then becomes the draft DSO, Figure 3.35 refers, a
key product which is further developed at Q4 that originates as a draft in Q1.
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It identifies in time and space where and when the commander may need to
achieve an effect or make a decision based on timelines and enemy action.
Draft DSO
Figure 3.35. An example of a draft DSO
(5) Draft decision support overlay matrix (DSOM). From the draft DSO the
supporting draft DSOM, a tabulated summary of the draft DSO, is produced. It
lists the activity associated with each NAI. The allocation of FEs responsible for
each NAI will be identified subsequently during COA development during Q4-7.
Figure 3.36 refers.
Figure 3.36. A draft DSOM
(6) Draft intelligence collection plan (ICP) and commander’s critical

intelligence requirements (CCIRs). The ICP is a planning tool for G2 staff to
prioritise all IRs and articulate the appropriate methods of collection for each
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individual task, Figure 3.37 refers. The draft DSO feeds the draft ICP, both of
which are refined throughout the CE and during execution. As such the ICP
should be considered a live document which transitions from draft at the early
stages of Q1 and continues to evolve beyond the CE into the execution phase.
The ICP must be reactive to changing priorities and the emerging situation. G2
staff must understand the linkages and interactions between the ICP and the
DSO/DSOM/DSM to determine what needs to be known (IRs – defined with staff
planning lexicon), to make decisions (CCIRs – see detail below), that support DPs
detailed on the DSM, the context behind the decision (ICP), how/where and when
information will be collected (DSOM) and the map representation (DSO) of where
and how the information will be found.
Intelligence collection
Last time info is of value
(e.g. to CIED, Geo, HTA)

BGs
Collect no earlier than

and ISTAR assets
Collect no later than
Tasked internally
Link
to Essential Report
Ground recce
Priority
Ser PIR SIR NAI/TAI/ elements of recipient
HUMINT
ASTOR
SIGINT
BG 1
BG 2
BG 3
BG 4
BG 5
DP information (EEI)
FMV
EW
IEF
010101. What
Comd, Geo,
MCs/AAs are 1
BGs, Tgts G2
aval to them?
0101. How 010102. What
What Comd,
TAI 03 night cap do 2 G2 X X X X X X X X
manoeuvre many MBT and BGs, Tgts
they have?
1 capabilities SP arty wpns?
does the Comd,
enemy tank 010103 Who are G2,
1 TF, Info X X
Bn have? their Comds? HTA
activities
0102. What 010201 Where
NAI 02, Comd, G2,
state of repair are their supply 2 X X X X X X X X X X X
07 BGs, Tgts Geo
are they? lines?
Figure 3.37. An intelligence collection plan (ICP)
(i) CCIRs. Information concerning risks that are either critical to the success of
the mission, or represent a critical threat to the force, are expressed as CCIRs.
They are set by the commander (though the staff may recommend CCIRs) to
inform staff and subordinates regarding what information is necessary for
their decision making, and to focus resources on collecting that information.
CCIRs should be specific, and have an associated DP, and decision allocated.
CCIRs are not static; the commander adjusts and updates them throughout
the progress of an operation to reflect changing information needs. The
fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts, and allocate scarce
resources. CCIRs are:
• Specified by the commander for each mission or operation.

• Related to risks identified and planned DPs to mitigate them.
• Applicable only to the commander who specifies them.
• Situation dependent - directly linked to present and future missions.
• Time sensitive - answers to CCIRs must be immediately reported to the
commander by any communications system available.
• Always included in operational staff work (OSW).

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(7) Draft HVTL and HPTL. The final element of situation integration is to refine
both the draft HVTL and the HPTL (from Q1.2 threat evaluation) to incorporate
additional deductions as necessary.
d. Q1 backbrief to the commander. The Q1 backbrief is formed from the outputs

of the IPE process supported by recommendations and is designed to provide
the commander, and staff, with a comprehensive understanding of the complex
environment, including the relationship and interactions between all systems and
actors, Figure 3.38 refers. All analysis should be recorded in the 3CF and categorised
via the staff planning lexicon with outputs of the greatest significance highlighted
for inclusion to the commander’s guidance at Q3. ISR staff are the lead for Q1
backbrief. A backbrief rehearsal is recommended to ensure coherence, using products
(schematics/pictures to enhance visualisation where possible) tell the commander what
they need to know, not all that you know. Start with the recommendations and then
trace back the justification for each recommendation.
Minimum products that must be displayed include:
(1) IPE overlay
(2) MLCOA and MDCOA slides
(3) Draft DSO
(4) I&Ws
(5) HTA shadeshift
Serial Activity Remarks Lead
1 RFI update Answers to RFIs. RFI manager
2 Risk (RIG) update SPG
Introduce, aim, sequence, briefer(s) and duration

3 Introduction COS
of brief.
Any information of such critical importance that

Critical information and
4 the Comd may need to make instant decisions COS or G2
key deductions
and the key deductions from the brief up front.
5 Met Engr
6 OAE ISR (G2/Engr/IA)
7 Threat evaluation G2
8 Situation integration ISR
9 CCIRs and PIRs ISR
10 Draft DSO/DSOM ISR
11 Comd’s guidance Comd
Confirm planning timeline

Updates to RIG
12 Direction to the staff COS
Updates from concurrent activity (CSS, CIS
estimates etc.)
Figure 3.38. A Q1 backbrief format

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Q2. What have I been told to do and why?

Q1

Brief Q4-7
OSW production
61. Overview. Q2 is mission analysis (MA) and is conducted by the PPG. MA is the process
that allows the commander to develop an understanding of the role in achieving the
higher commander’s desired outcome, identify specified and implied tasks and the factors
that constrain decision making and the context of the mission. The analysis is recorded in
the 3CF as for Q1. Q2 can be conducted concurrently with Q1 but cannot be completed
until after the Q1 backbrief (see Figure 3.13). Q2 is complete when the commander has
a full understanding of the outcome to be achieved in the context of the overall design
for operations (higher intent and SoM), the objectives and tasks necessary to fulfill the
mission, what freedoms, constraints and risks apply and what further decisions are
required as the operation progresses.
62. Process in general. Figure 3.39, summarises the Q2 process, products/outputs and
leads; the detail is covered in the paragraph 63.
Q2.1 What is the higher Comd’s Intent? Outcome
Q2.2 What are the specified and implied Specified and implied tasks
Q2. What have tasks? Objectives, effects and actions
I been told
to do and Q2.3 What are the freedoms and
Freedoms and constraints PPG
why? constraints?
(Mission
analysis) Q2.4 How might the situation change and Risk (RIG)
how might it affect me? CONPLANS (for subsequent development)
Q2 Backbrief Q2 backbrief
63. Process in detail. Q2 mission analysis consists of four sub-questions followed by the Q2
backbrief, each of the sub-questions are further explained below:
a. Q2.1 What is the higher commander’s intent? What is my role in the plan? What
wider context is it being conducted in? The detail below should be used to assist
population of the Q2.1 template at Figure 3.40:
Q2.1 Higher commander’s intent
My mission:
My 2-up commander’s intent:

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Sketch of 2-up intent (if required):
FACTOR ANALYSIS (IMPLICATION) OUTPUT

My 1-up commander’s CONOPS
Sketch of 1-up op schematic:
FACTOR ANALYSIS (IMPLICATION) OUTPUT

Summary of my role in the plan (write in plain English what you have to do; do not just repeat your mission)
And my OUTCOME is (describe the overall purpose of what it is you are trying to achieve):
Figure 3.40. A Q2.1 template
(1) Read your mission. This is the lens through which the commander conducts the
analysis.
(2) Read into the problem. Understand tactical context from the perspectives of all
key actors. Gain a sense of actor/activity/relationship/time.
(3) 2-up. Confirm the 2-up mission, their outcome, their objectives, and their ME. If
helpful for visualisation, sketch their intent. Using the 3CF, analyse these factors
as required.
(4) 1-up. Confirm the 1-up mission, their outcome, their objectives, and their ME. If
helpful for visualisation, sketch their SoM. Using the 3CF, analyse these factors as
required.
(5) Other key actors. For other key actors, and using the 3CF, analyse their likely
sought outcome, ME (if any), and their likely SoM.
(6) Understand the type of problem that you face and the nature of the
problem that you must solve. Identify the real issues and ensure a sufficient
understanding of the context. Work out what is your business.
(7) Summary of my role in the plan. Write a statement that summarises your role
in the plan that can include33:
(i) A description of the 2-up and 1-up commander’s outcomes and objectives
and your relationship to them.
(ii) Who are the other actors are in the AO?
(iii) Your relationship to the ME.
33 Refer to commander’s visualisation at paragraph 15, general advice for the conduct of the CE.
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(iv) Your relationship to others (supporting/supported etc...).
(v) Your outcome34 (what success looks like for you if explaining it simplistically).
Figure 3.41 defines outcome, objectives, effects35 and actions (OOEA) in
detail, and Figure 3.42 shows the OOEA ‘pyramid’ template which depicts
how a single outcome comprises several objectives each supported by
a series of effects, each of which is achieved by completing a number
of individual actions; by listing and displaying OOEA in this format the
methodology becomes coherent.
(vi) The outcome is more than the ‘end-state’ or the ‘in order to’ from your
mission. It should incorporate your understanding of the wider context of
the operation. It should be no more than one line. It is a distillation of your
mission, your 1-up CONOPS and 2-up intent and what success is. This is the
start point for your analysis in Q2.2.
Outcome - objectives - effects - actions
The outcome is a statement of success for the given operation. The end-state of an operation is the
O
overall desired outcome. Your outcome will often be one of your higher’s objectives and will usually
form part of a commander’s intent. The outcome can be most reliably achieved – and the effects
orchestrated – by using objectives. Outcome is not to be confused with end-state. BGs will have an
Outcome outcome; higher formations will have an end-state (an overall desired outcome) which is achieved by
the sum of the activity by the subordinate.
Objectives are goals which deliver the desired outcome. At the tactical level, an objective is a tangible
object (e.g. a location, opposing force, element of local popn) and the change required in the object.
O
The change required is described as an, or a series of, effects.
OSW:
Objectives can be named
Objectives Objectives can be described in the intent statement
Objectives can be described in the SoM
Objectives can be used as a unifying purpose in a mission statement
Effects are the change brought about in a target by the consequences of action or activity. At the
tactical level, an effect contributes to the achievement of an objective. The different ways to achieve
the effects will usually form the basis of differing COAs.
Concentrate on matching the right action to the intended effect.
E
Effects
Effects can be created by one action or multiple actions. Like dominoes, effects can be created
by other effects. Measuring effects requires subjective and objective analysis.
OSW:
Effects are described in the intent statement
Effects can be described in the SoM
Only authorised effects terms should be used in order to aid comprehension
Effects should be written in full capitals to differentiate from everyday language
Actions are physical or observable activities to cause the desired effect. All actions have
consequences, some desired and some undesired. Subordinates are directed to conduct specific
actions to achieve desired effects. If the desired effect is not being achieved then the action should
be changed. Actions are delivered using the 4 ‘levers’ of joint action (fires, information activities,
A
outreach and manoeuvre). Actions are usually easier to measure/observe.
OSW:
Use actions to describe how effects are to be achieved
Actions Use task verbs in the SoM and in mission statements
Actions should never be described in the intent statement
Only authorised actions terms should be used in order to aid comprehension
Actions should be written in full capitals to differentiate from everyday language
Figure 3.41. OOEA
34 Outcome is not to be confused with end-state. Battlegroups will have an outcome; higher formations will have an end-
state (an overall desired outcome) which is achieved by the sum of the activity by the subordinates.
35 Effects, actions, terminology, definitions and graphics are in SOHB, Chapter 2.1.1.
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Secure and stable AOR, with iag interference prevented and conditions set for transition to
Outcome
enduring TSF security solution
Set conditions
STABILISE within
SECURE within Bdrys - RiP12X/ PREVENT IAG Interference- for transition
Bdrys - LIAISE and
Cover LLOC, Popn Centres, Key STRIKE IAGs ADVISE,
Objectives PROMOTE work
Infra- KAF: SCREEN/DECIEVE/ BPT MENTOR,
of Gov’t OGDs,
DEFEAT DEVELOP TAF
NGOs
and TNP
NEUTRALISE IAG narrative /Provide

DISRUPT IAG log, C2, Fin, linakges
DENY IAGs access to DPRE camps

NEUTRALISE IAG and SF advisory
PROVIDE secure env for activity
BPT DEFEAT KAF incursion
DENY border xings to KAF
ISOLATE IAGs from Popn

NEUTRALISE STE/ KAF SF
PROMOTE gov narrative

FIND and DECEIVE KAF
COVER DPRE Camps
Sp OGD/NGO Objs
PROTECT judiciary
SECURE Gambella
counter narrative
Sp local councils
EMPOWER TSF
REASSURE LN
SUPPORT TSF
DEVELOP TSF
with BLACK
DETER KAF
FIND IAGs
Personnel
Effects
Identify
Actions Track
Cross-
cue
Figure 3.42. An example of an OOEA ‘pyramid’ template
b. Q2.2 What are the specified and implied tasks? The purpose of Q2.2 is to analyse
your role in the plan to identify specified and implied tasks, objectives, effects and
actions (note that it may be possible to identify the actions to achieve the effects
at this time, or they can be added subsequently during COA development). Analysis
should enable an understanding of why your 1-up has given you the tasks in your
mission and how they relate to each other, as well as any implied tasks. Think 2-down;
plan 1-down. The detail below should be used to guide analysis and aid completion of
the Q2.2 template at Figure 3.43.
(1) Specified tasks
• Analysis of outcome.
• Restate the outcome from Q2.1.
• Analyse the outcome and identify objectives that deliver it. Identify how they
relate to each other to achieve the outcome.
(2) Analysis of objectives
• State the objective in the factor column.
• Analyse the objective and identify the effects to achieve this objective. Identify
how they relate to each other.
(3) Analysis of effects
• State the effect in the factor column.

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• Analyse the effect and identify any potential actions to achieve this effect.
Identify how they relate to each other.
• Effects verbs can be used to describe an action. Whatever verb is used, it

remains at the level of an action. It is the relationship to other actions and
effects that is key.
• Repeat as required.
(4) Comparison of mission and specified tasks to OOEA analysis:
• At the end of your analysis, confirm that all specified tasks have been
captured.
• If not, capture the specified task as a factor and conduct 3CF analysis.
Understand how these tasks relate to your previous analysis.
• Ensure that you are clear as to what you need to do and how it relates to your
outcome and part within the plan.
• Refer back to the higher commander if unsure as a misunderstanding at this

point has the potential to undermine the entire mission.
(5) Implied tasks:
• Hunt the implied.
• What must I do on the objective?
• What must I do concurrently?
• What must I do after?
• What must I do to support others?
• What do I need others to do for me?
Q2.2 What are the specified and implied tasks?
Specified tasks. Unpack and analyse your role in the plan using the OOEA methodology.
FACTOR ANALYSIS/IMPLICATION OUTPUT

Figure 3.43. Q2.2 template
c. Q2.3 What are the freedoms and constraints? Under mission command, a
commander may assume freedom of action unless otherwise constrained. Constraints
are those things that limit choices. Everything not a constraint is therefore a freedom.
Freedoms should be exploited, and freedoms in relation to the enemy weaknesses may
be a ‘battle-winning idea’.36 Focus your analysis of constraints on what you cannot
do, and what you must do, identify the constraints that shape your plan. Constraints
36 The idea that will give you a decisive advantage over the enemy, allowing mission success. In other words, the idea that
will provide the tactical edge over the enemy; or how you are going to out-think the enemy to win. Can be anything
but should be informed by the enemy SWOT and an understanding of freedoms and constraints. An FF freedom that is
coincidental with an enemy weakness may be a good battle-winning idea.
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in regard to the enemy should be mitigated, possibly with deception. You may need
to request a change of constraints or additional resource from higher. The process is
explained below and should be used in conjunction with the Q2.3 template at Figure
3.44.
(1) Pull forward the freedoms and constraints identified as outputs from the Q1 and
Q2 analysis.
(2) Conduct further 3CF analysis as necessary.
(3) Identify additional factors using thought generator: time, space, ROE, C2, physics,
nature and man, resources, media, restrictions; conduct analysis and record via
the 3CF.
(4) Consider the ‘battle-winning idea’.
(5) Consider potential control measures for refinement at Q7.
Q2.3 What are the freedoms and constraints?
Focus on ‘that which you cannot do’ and that which you must do’, all else is a freedom -
much brought forward from Q1, Q2.1, Q2.2. Thought generator: time, space, ROE, C2, physics,
nature and man, resources, media, restrictions.
FACTOR ANALYSIS/IMPLICATION OUTPUT

d. Q2.4. How might the situation change and how might it affect me? Where
is the risk? How can I mitigate it/protect against it/exploit it? Has, and then
might, the situation change? Remember, a risk is not the same as a threat. As well
as mitigating against problems, it is about knowing ‘when to take the decisive risks
rather than knowing how to avoid taking risk’ (Maj Gen Sharpe). In Q2.4 focus on
identification of risk to the mission outside the commander’s control and conduct
risk management to reduce probability or impact of risk occurring 37. Q3-7: Identify
risk to the force. Throughout: identify when to take decisive risk and how to be
in a position to exploit opportunities to take decisive risk. This must form part of
commander’s guidance in Q3.3. Think: General Slim’s anecdote - when there are
two COAs, take the bolder one. Further explanation is detailed below and should be
used to guide Q2.4 analysis in conjunction with the Q2.4 template at Figure 3.45. It is
essential to be able to recognise the moment when a situation is changing – the point
of inflexion, to enable appropriate follow on action(s) which must be considered in
detail during this stage.
(1) If time allows consider use of red teaming.38
(2) Pull forward risks from RIG and assumptions identified from the Q1 and Q2 3CF
analysis.
(3) Analyse assumptions and determine any further risks.
37 Further detail on risk (and the RIG) and changes of situation are contained within Chapter 5.
38 Further detail on red teaming is in Chapter 11.
Contents
(4) Identify additional factors using thought generator, see Q2.3 above.
(5) Conduct 3CF analysis of risks and add to the RIG.
(6) Apply risk management tool and 5Ts, plot new risks on the RIG.
(7) Continue to update RIG throughout planning and execution as new risks are
identified, particularly during COA development. A number of CONPLANs will
inevitably be required to mitigate certain risks; their staffing must be scheduled as
appropriate.
Q2.4 How might the situation change and how might it affect me?
Analysis of how the situation might change under the influence of both internal and external factors and
how these changes might be mitigated or exploited.
Thought generator. Enemy threat, human terrain, physical terrain and environment, other external,
internal. Confirm what you expect to happen (big handfuls): the big assumptions. What could change so
significantly that the assumptions have to change? Of these changes, which are for the better and which
are for the worse? Which ones are the true game changers?
FACTOR (Cause/ ANALYSIS/ ACTION

OUTPUT
Effect/Consequence) IMPLICATION [MANAGEMENT with 5Ts]

e. Q2 backbrief to staff. At the completion of Q2, the COS must deliver a Q2 backbrief
to the staff (SPG), based upon the Q2 analysis key deductions and outputs, providing a
summary of the 3CF key outputs.
f. Concurrent activity. As concurrent activity, preparation for warning order 2 and COA
Development should be conducted.
Contents
Q3. What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I

give to develop the plan?
Q1

brief Q4-7
OSW production
64. Overview. During Q3 the commander reviews and confirms the Q1 and Q2 analysis
including CCIRs, assumptions, freedoms and constraints before confirming the effects
to be imposed on the enemy. Having identified the effects, the intent and draft main
effort 39 can be developed. Ideally the commander will have the opportunity to conduct
a backbrief to the higher commander to confirm understanding, prior to delivering
specific direction for COA development. Command then delivers the Q3 commander’s
guidance to the staff and Q3 is completed with the dissemination of warning order 2 and
a commander’s recce.
65. Process in general. Figure 3.46, summarises the Q3 process, products/outputs and
leads; the detail is covered at paragraph 66.
Q3.1 Q1 and Q2 key deductions
Intent statement
Q3. What effects do I need Q3.2 Effects schematic Comd

to achieve and what
direction must I give to Comd’s backbrief to 1-up
develop the plan?
(Develop intent) Comd’s guidance
Q3.3 WngO2 (updated WngO1) SPG
Comd’s recce Comd/RGp
66. Process in detail. Q3 has two sub-questions, two briefs and warning order 2, each of
which are further explained below:
a. Q3.1: Q1 and Q2 key deductions summary table. The commander reviews the Q1
and Q2 key deductions and outputs from the respective 3CFs to confirm staff analysis,
in addition the commander must review, and test the assumptions to confirm their
validity and confirm the CCIRs. The Q3.1 template at Figure 3.47 is a start point for use
in recording the analysis.
39 The activity that the commander considers critical to the success of the mission; expressed as a single action together with
the principal force undertaking it. ADP Land Operations, Chapter 6.
Contents
Q3.1: Q1 and Q2 key deductions summary table
Restate the CCIRs/ASSUMPTIONS/CONSTRAINTS brought forward from Q1 and Q2 analysis
No Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)
1
2
No Assumptions
1
2
No Enemy identified that may affect your plan (output headings per threat group)
1 ML COA
2 MD COA
3 Strength
4 Weakness
5 Opportunities
6 Threats
No Self
1 Own strength
2 Own weakness
No Neutral
1 Key human terrain
No Ground
1 Key terrain
2 Vital ground
No Other
1
2
No Freedoms
1
2
No Constraints
1
2
No Risks
1
2

Contents
b. Q3.2 Draft intent statement and effects schematic. This sub-question seeks to
address the effects the commander wants to achieve and why.
(1) Intent statement. The effects schematic leads to the intent statement. Written
by the commander, the intent statement is, at its simplest, a statement of the
outcome that the commander wishes to accomplish. But it may be clearer to
express Intent using objectives, effects, and desired outcome. It represents what
the commander wants to achieve and why – the change required in a given
situation to be delivered by the operation, that binds the force together and sets
the tone for what is to follow. Intent must be written in language the recipients
will understand, noting that they may be from other nations, or not be military.
The best intent paragraphs are clear to subordinates without the requirement for
additional amplifying detail. A typical sequence for writing an intent is:
• Describe the overall purpose of what is trying to be achieved (the outcome).

• Describe the objectives and the effects using time or space to group them.
• Summarise what success looks like and indicate what follows next.
But, most importantly, an intent is personal to a commander. An intent should
therefore be creative and allow the commander to inject their own personality.
Ultimately, the Intent is what subordinates will refer too for guidance when the
situation changes. Detail for the Q3.2 approach is below including the template
at Figure 3.48:
• Pull forward the outcome, objectives, effects and actions identified in Q2.1
and 2.2.
• List all effects, the objectives and purpose (how they relate to each other).
Confirm the definitions of the effects before use and review selected effects
to those which are essential; note that a battlegroup should be tasked with no
more than 10 effects as a guide.
• Review draft ME and battle-winning idea.

• Compare this information against doctrine, including integrated action, the
manoeuvrist approach (Figure 3.49 refers), experience and intuition. Ensure
anything based on experience and intuition complies with previous deductions
and has been red teamed.
• Surprise and deception must be considered from the outset and must be
addressed during subsequent planning to ensure they are credible through
logic, resourced or synchronised. The more credible surprise and deception
plans are those where a FE is given a physical piece of ground to seize or an
enemy capability to defeat, rather than simply ‘posturing’.40
• Draw an effects schematic. Keep it simple and do not be too prescriptive. If

objectives are terrain based, put these on the sketch first.
• Place the rest of the effects on the schematic.
Contents
• Draft the intent statement. It is a statement that must endure the chaos of the
operating environment. Generally enemy focused, include all the effects and
make it unambiguous and as short as possible; distil several times.
• Start off with what success looks like (outcome).

• State the objectives and effects that will achieve the outcome and how they
relate to each other using time or space to group them.
• Summarise what success looks like and indicate what comes next.
• State the main effort (effect), the ME will be refined to an action and be
allocated to a FE during COA development.
• State the battle-winning idea.

Q3.2: Draft intent and effects schematic
Using effects brought forward from Q2.2, build an effects schematic and draft an intent
Own mission:
Effect (how) Target (who/what) Purpose (why) Effects schematic:

Draft intent:
Draft main effort:

Battle-winning idea:
Figure 3.48. A Q3.2 Template

Contents
Effect achieved is more important than how it is done

Manipulate human behaviour (manoeuvre the mind
Do the unexpected (emphasis on ingenuity and subordinate initiative)
Concentrate on seizing the initiative 1. Understand the situation
Apply strength to critical vulnerabilities 2. Influence perceptions
Take risk to achieve objectives 3. Break will and cohesion
Identify threats and solutions to threats (enemy focus) 4. Protect will and cohesion
Organisational agility and decentralisation
5. Seize and hold the
Determination to succeed (patience; endurance; boldness; decisiveness initiative
1. Surprise Attitude of mind 5 skills

(to have) (to apply)
2. Pre-emption
3. Dislocation 1. Simplicity
4. Disruption Manoeuvrist approach 2. Flexibility

‘essential elements’ 3. Tempo
5. Destruction
6. Shock action 4. Momentum
7. Collapse 8 methods 5. Simultaneity

6 enhancements
(to break will and 6. Air power
8. Exploitation (to any plan)
cohesion)
Figure 3.49. The manoeuvrist approach summary
c. Commander’s backbrief to 1-up. Having completed Q3 analysis, the commander

delivers a backbrief to the higher commander to demonstrate understanding and
compliance with direction received. This serves as a rehearsal for the commander
prior to delivering the brief the staff and more importantly ensures that the direction
is in accordance with the higher commander’s intent and is sanctioned prior to COA
development. A suggested format for the brief is as follows:
(1) Confirmation of mission.
(2) Main deductions from the CE.
(3) CONOPS:
• Intent to include effects.

• SoM to likely missions/tasks, consideration of the higher headquarters plan
(1-up, 2-up), compliance with the higher headquarters’ DSO, incl critical
information from specialist overlays (engineers, joint fires, routes, air/avation).
• Main effort.
(4) Key coordinating instructions: timings, resources, preliminary moves.
(5) Questions/RFIs/points of clarification to higher command. Identify constraints; key

resource shortfalls, indicating impact on operation (flexibility).
• Areas of concern and key risks.

• Short summary.
(6) Questions from higher commander (and staff).
Contents
d. Q3.3 Commander’s guidance. At Q3.3 the commander provides guidance to the

staff to inform them of the key considerations arising from Q3 analysis and provide
planning guidance for the development of COAs. It must clarify the detail and where
risk can or cannot be taken and define the COAs to be developed. If the commander
has decided on the way an effect should be achieved then it should be specified.
The sequence for completing Q3.3 is detailed below including the Q3.3 template at
Figure 3.50. Note that COA teams should be confirmed and established prior to the
commander’s guidance brief to enable them to apply greater focus to the COAs they
will develop.
(1) Pull forward the planning guidance identified in Q1 and 2 3CF and insert into
relevant boxes on Q3.3 template at Figure 3.50.
Q3.3 Commander’s guidance
Describe COAs for development by the staff, ensuring that they fit within the single Intent draft in 3.2.
Enemy COA to be planned against:
COAs to be developed
COA 1 (Using suitable framework, e.g. UNDERSTANDING, SHAPING, DECISIVE, SUSTAINING) remember feasibility,
acceptable, complete, exclusive, suitable (FACES)
COA1 Title:
COA 2 (Using suitable framework, e.g. UNDERSTANDING, SHAPING, DECISIVE, SUSTAINING) remember feasibility,
acceptable, complete, exclusive, suitable (FACES)
COA2 title:
Possible actions (identified in Q2.2)
Effect Possible ACTIONS Comments

Commander’s guidance (use tactical functions or principles). Draw planning guidance forward from Q1 and 2
Command Manoeuvre Information activity Protection

Intelligence Fires Capacity building Sustainment

Areas of risk and prioritisation (where is the commander willing to take risk)
Commander’s COA judgement criteria:

Contents
(2) Pull forward actions identified in Q2.2 in support of effects within the intent.
(3) State the enemy COA to be planned against.
(4) Name and describe the COAs to be developed using a suitable structure. These
should test an area of significant risk to the plan, and should concern the decisive
stage of the operation.
(5) Each COA should be scrutinised against the FACES41 framework to ensure it is
distinct. COAs can test time (synchronisation), space (geographic) resource (force
element), tone (e.g. lethal/non-lethal) or other considerations as necessary.
(6) If time is short then the enemy MLCOA and MDCOAs can be the basis for COA
development.
(7) In the event that COAs are challenging to identify, list the effects and three ways
of achieving each one (time, space, resource, tone) and select the most important
/different.
(8) Clarify how possible actions from Q2.2 relate to effects.
(9) Specify commander’s guidance for further planning against the tactical functions,
or other suitable framework.
(10) Clarify areas where the commander is willing to take risk.
(11) Using selected criteria (principles of the operation; tactical functions; own criteria
identified in Qs 1 and 2 etc…) articulate the COA judgement criteria and include
any weighting to be applied as appropriate.
(12) Conduct a final check that your direction fulfils the higher commander’s intent,
incorporates the Q 1 and 2 deductions and provides unambiguous direction to
the staff.
(13) Critique the Q3.3 using red teaming tools,42 including critical thinking skills, to
avoid bias, group think etc.
(14) Confirm and establish COA teams prior to commander’s guidance brief.
(15) Finally the commander delivers the commander’s guidance brief to the staff; a
format is at Figure 3.51.
41 Feasible, Acceptable, Complete, Exclusive and Suitable.

42 Further detail on red teaming is at Chapter 11.
Contents
Commander’s Q3.3 guidance brief
SER SECTION LEAD REMARKS
Coord COS
G2 update G2
G3 update G3
1
Human terrain G2
FF update G3
RFI update RFI manager
Risk (RIG) update SPG
COS or
2 Q2 MA key deductions
Comd
Intent
Effects schematic
Draft ME
3 CCIRs Comd
Enemy COA to plan
Normally either the ML or MDCOA
against
COA direction Judgement criteria and weighting
Risk appetite Brief RIG
Break (10mins, soak period for COA leads)
A detailed read back by the COA development team leads to

COA team ensure they are fully in line with the Comd’s intent and vision.
4 Read back
leads
Questions/clarifications with Comd
Confirm planning timeline

Confirm COA teams composition
Updates to RIG
5 COS direction to staff COS Confirm ongoing concurrent activity
Confirm new concurrent activity (BM/Info Ops products/asset bids
ISR/Avn/Air/movement orders/prep for wargame etc.)
Confirm WngO2 direction
Figure 3.51. A Q3.3 commander’s guidance brief template
e. Q03.3 warning order 2. Warning order 2 should be developed as an updated version

of warning order 1 to disseminate key information since warning order 1 was issued.
f. Concurrent activity. Following the commander’s guidance brief, there is the

opportunity, dependent on the situation, for the commander to conduct a recce with
the RGp to gain a better understanding of the operating environment which can
then inform the remainder of the CE process. The COS and staff remain at the CP to
develop COA(s). It is therefore essential that the COS and staff fully understand the
commander’s direction, prior to the commander’s departure, hence the requirement
for a read back to confirm understanding.
Contents
Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action or effect?

Q1
Plan
COA decision
Q0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Wargame refinement
brief
Q4-7
OSW production
67. Overview. Working to the commander’s guidance received at Q3, the SPG or COA
team(s) start the process of COA development with Q4. Q4 requires the COA teams to
identify where in more detail, the commander’s desired effects on the enemy will and
cohesion, and physical capability should take place. Each effect is laid onto the map and
then refined using the analysis and products from Q1. Each effect must be considered
in turn. The aim of Q4 is to start to turn the understanding of the situation and the
commander’s intent into an effective COA. Throughout the process, providing the detail
is critical; think 2-down and plan 1-down, following an iterative process that requires
constant revision, the use and resourcing of deception should also be considered. Q4 is
complete when the COA teams(s) have an understanding of where to allocate resources
to achieve the identified effects and supporting actions; summarised as where to look
(NAIs), where to decide (DPs/DLs) on a draft decision support overlay (DSO) supported by
a draft decision support overlay matrix (DSOM) and where to act (TAIs).
a. DSO, DSOM and DSM. 43 The DSO is an overlay which reflects where the activities
of a specific actor should be targeted by fires, manoeuvre, information activities and
capacity building. It will show how the enemy COA will be confirmed or identified.
It identifies, in time and space, when the commander might need to take a decision
based on own and enemy timelines. DPs can be related to time, such as time phase
lines (TPLs), or space as decision lines (DLs) on the DSO or as specified criteria as
explained in the DSOM. It is the graphical display of the commander’s plan. The DSO
must be supported by a DSOM, a table that lists all elements of the DSO and the
action that is to take place and who is responsible for that action. Likewise a DSOM
should be supported by a DSM, a table that summarises all the DPs, related CCIRs and
indicators and the conditions for subsequent/linked actions. At formation level a full
DSO might be produced for each assessed COA. The DSO is the precursor to the STAP,
which is simply a DSO that has been resourced with ISR assets.
Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect? DSO and DSOM COA teams
Figure 3.52. The Q4 process, products/outputs and lead summary
69. Process in detail. Q4 has no sub-questions associated. The Q4 process is explained

below and the principal product created is the DSO (decision support overlay) which
depicts the NAIs, TAIs and DPs on a map.
43 Extract from AFM Command, Chapter 6.

Contents
a. The COA team(s) should begin by overlaying the commander’s effects onto the map
and in the process refine the draft DSO from Q1, considering the commander’s ME
first. The next step is the refinement of NAIs by using the Q1.3 situation integration
products to more accurately predict where each effect needs to be achieved. Once
this is complete, COA teams(s) should identify the requirement for DPs that support
the NAIs and TAIs, and the DPs must then be mapped to the CCIRs and recorded on
the DSOM and DSM. Finally, the COA team(s) must record the location and purpose of
each NAI/TAI and DP/DL on the draft DSOM to inform Q5 and the identification of the
capabilities required to look (NAIs), act (TAIs) and decide (DP/DLs).
(1) Start with the commander’s main effort effect (or terrain-based objective).
(2) Draw the bubble on the map in the general area for each effect.
(3) Next draw the objective/effect as a TAI on the draft DSO.
(4) Then looking in the broad TAI, decide the actions which need to take place to
deliver the desired effect - think 2-down and plan 1-down.
(5) Consider using the doctrinal frameworks, e.g. tactical functions, geographic
framework etc.
(6) Now work outwards from the TAI, identify the NAIs and DPs which support the
each TAI, and map DPs to CCIRs. Figure 3.53 defines NAIs, TAIs and DPs.
Point:
Named area of interest (NAI) NAI
12/01
A point, area or line through which enemy

activity is expected to occur, observing Area:
into a NAI therefore confirms or denies an
NAI 19/02
enemy COA.
Linear:
NAI 1/03
NAI 1/03
Point: 11
Target area of interest (TAI)
A point or area where a Comd intends to Area:

have an effect on an enemy. 2
Point:
Decision point/line (DP/DL) 1
A point or line where a decision must be made.

Line:
2 2
Figure 3.53. Definitions of NAIs, TAIs and DPs
(7) During Q4 record the detail (location and effect desired) of the NAIs, TAI, and DPs
on the DSOM (this forms the list of tasks to be resourced at Q5).
Contents
b. The DSO which was initiated in Q0 (see Figure 3.54) is the principal product of Q4,
supported by the DSOM (see Figure 3.55) and DSM (see Figure 3.56). The DSO is
critical product which will be used to shape the SoM for a particular COA, will become
an annex in the OSW and will be used to aid decision making during the execution of
the mission.
Figure 3.54. A DSO
NAI/TAI/ Location Task start Task stop

Purpose Assets Remarks Comments
DP Name (Grid) (DTG) (DTG)
Figure 3.55. A DSOM
Where are we
seeking to
Which IR FFIRs Action
DP Decision Projected Enemy achieve the
does it (Capacity/ Authority taken/
name required DTG preconditions desired effect
relate to? capability) CONPLAN
(NAI/TAIs to
satisfy the IR)
Figure 3.56. A DSM
(1) Refine the locations of each of the NAIs, TAIs and DPs on the DSO.
(2) For each action, ask the ‘what if’ question and determine any CONPLANs that
need to be developed; refer back to Q2.4 to confirm CONPLAN requirement from
earlier analysis. Any CONPLAN TAIs/DPs should be included on the draft DSOM
these will form likely tasks for the reserve.
(3) Q4 is completed with a mature draft DSO and a draft DSOM, accepting that both
will be refined prior to OSW production.
Contents
70. Q4 checklist:
a. Ensure that all of the commander’s effects are represented on the DSO.
b. Ensure the analysis and key tasks from the Q1-3 3CF have been captured.
c. Ensure that the higher CP DSO/ops traces have been accurately represented.
d. Have risks identified during DSO development been captured on the RIG?
e. Does the DSO outline where to look (NAIs); where to act (TAIs); and where to decide
(DP/DLs); are the NAIs and TAIs of appropriate size?
f. Do the NAIs and DP/DLs support the TAIs?
g. Use of deception; has deception been given full consideration?
h. Have CONPLANs been considered?
Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect?

Q1
Plan
Q0 COA decision
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Wargame refinement
brief
Q4-7
OSW production
71. Overview. During Q5 the COA team(s) resource the actions to be taken to achieve
and support the effects on the Q4 DSO and DSOM. Each effect must be considered in
turn. Throughout Q5 providing the detail is critical; think 2-down and plan 1-down,
following an iterative process that requires constant revision. This process should not be
constrained to the combat power under command as additional FEs can be requested
from the higher CP or activity can be sequenced at Q6, to resolve shortfalls. Q5 is
complete when the COA teams have an understanding of what resources are required
to achieve each action and effect and how they should be grouped and allocated,
summarised on a decision support overlay matrix (DSOM) and supported by the updated
DSO from Q4. The DSOM should be supported by a DSM, a table that summarises all the
DPs, related CCIRs and indicators and the conditions for subsequent/linked actions. From
the DSO/DSOM/DSM the draft TASKORG, draft ops trace, draft SoM, draft missions and
tasks, draft synch matrix are developed. With the COAs starting to formulate, concurrent
consideration can be given to developing the STAP, the IA plan, the CAOI plan and the
fire plan.
Contents
DSO/DSOM/DSM
COA teams
Missions and tasks
Q5. What resources do I need to STAP ISR

accomplish each action/effect? IA plan IA
CAOI plan Engrs
Fire plan Fires
Figure 3.57. The Q5 process, products/outputs and leads summary
73. Process in detail. Q5 has no sub-questions associated. The Q5 process is explained

below and the principal product produced is the DSOM, supported by the DSO and DSM,
which details location, purpose and combat power allocated to each task on the DSO;
related products are also developed and detailed below:
a. The COA team(s) begin Q5 by resourcing the commander’s ME followed thereafter

by each TAI, NAI and DP/DL in priority order. This activity is must be conducted
collaboratively to ensure that the correct capabilities are grouped and allocated
appropriately without being constrained by the TASKORG. This process provides the
commander with robust justification for requesting additional resources from higher if
the effects cannot be deconflicted in time and space subsequently at Q6.
b. Determine what resources are needed to deliver the activity identified in the Q4 DSO?
c. All activity, including reserve tasks, must be resourced with appropriate combat power,
with particular focus being afforded to the ME and recorded on the DSOM.
d. Start with what is required for the mission, not with the just the TASKORG and assess
the resources needed to deliver each TAI (effect and supporting actions) and then NAIs
and DPs.
e. Consider the enemy strength in the TAI, consider what is needed to achieve the effect
the commander requires against what G2 predict is likely to be faced.
f. Allocate the resources, using ‘stickies’ with FEs and unit sizes, Figure 3.58 refers. This
allows the COA team(s) to visualise what capability is allocated to each effect.
Figure 3.58. ‘Stickies’ being used to resource the DSO

Contents
g. Resourcing should be conducted generically (i.e. a subunit task, not C Company

specifically), ensure that CS and CSS resources are also allocated. The COA teams must
keep a running tally of what resources have been committed, which then feeds into
Q6 and the sequencing of actions.
h. Review the TAIs and ask: taken as a whole do they deliver the commander’s intent?
Then for each TAI review the supporting TAIs; how do they all link together - are there
any synchronisation issues for consideration in Q6, if so note them.
i. During Q5, start giving consideration to time constraints associated with effects and
actions, for use during Q6.
j. The next step is to further refine the DSOM and resource allocations for each NAI, TAI
and DP.
k. Ensure that both primary and secondary assets are assigned and that each task will
have a FE allocated, e.g. 1 x subunit.
l. Consideration should be given to what impact changing Met, light levels or persistence
will have on the ability to observe or have an effect in the specified area; refer back to
Q1.1 Met analysis to confirm impact of Met.
m. For each action, ask the ‘what if’ question and determine any CONPLANs that need
to be prepared to mitigate; refer back to Q2.4 to confirm CONPLAN requirement from
earlier analysis.
n. Draft TASKORG. With generic FEs having been apportioned to the tasks on
the DSOM, a draft TASKORG (see Figure 3.59) can be created and the process
of nominating specific force elements from the TASKORG to the DSOM task can
commence. This will enable an initial assessment to be made as to whether sufficient
capabilities are available to conduct all tasks simultaneously, in advance of Q6. The
TASKORG groups together the capabilities required for each task and allows the COA
teams to draft the initial missions and tasks for each grouping.
Time effective: Related order:
Classification: Phase:
X
12X 3UKXX
Combat elements Combat elements Combat elements Combat elements Combat elements Troops Troops Troops Notes
II II II II II XX II II
- Excel/Clac TASKORGS
KRH 12X RL 12X 1YORKS 12X 1RWELSH 12X 1SG 12X 3UKXX 4REME 12X 4RLC 12X may have to be used
OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM where there is no access
I II II II II I II to ComBAT
A KRH MAIN RL HQ 1YORKS MAIN 1RWELSH BGHQ 1SG BHQ 4REME RHQ 4RLC
I I I I I I Map symbology is used
to depict elements of the
SP KRH A RL B 1YORKS A 1RWELSH RF 1SG 10ARMD 4REME 0A 4RLC
I I I I I I force in a table - map
1YORKS
symbols can be pre-
A 1YORKS B RL C C 1RWELSH B 1SG 17FD 4REME 0D 4RLC
I I I I I loaded onto DII as one of
1RWELSH C RL D 1YORKS D 1RWELSH LF 1SG
the fonts
B 41B 4RLC
I I I I I
Originator is shown
D RL C KRH B KRH LF 1SG 4RLC
75
I
top left
LAD 4RLC Units are shown

OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON horizontally. The HQ is
I shown in the top line
127- 38- 28143- 5- 52-
GUNGP 19RA BCTAC 19RA BCTAC 19RA BCTAC 19RA BCTAC 19RA(1) 176 19RA
of each unit column
I and subordinate units
237
SSQN
EW 14SREW are displayed in order
II of precedence in blocks
32RA 3UKXX showing command state
I
93 5RA
Command state order
is OPCOM, OPCON,
TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM
I
TACOM, TACON
I I I II I I
8 26ENGR RECCE 26ENGR 33 26ENGR 30 26ENGR JHF 3UKXX 4 4RLC 9ARMD 4REME Symbols may have
I I
additional detail added
14 -4MED
220-
EOD
LT1 4MED 34 -4MED 24 -4MED 21 101ENGR 33 4RLC 4 4MED to them using the notes
II I
column at the right hand
16SIG 3UKXX 60 4RLC side such as a grouping
II I
not before time
4RMP
MP 12X 11 4MED
I ComBAT TASKORGs must
13 4MED be enacted to enable
TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON correct data flow
I
58 12RA
I
27RLC 12X
Figure 3.59. A TASKORG example

Contents
o. Draft: ops trace, scheme of manoeuvre (SoM) and missions and tasks. The draft
ops trace is a graphical representation of the effects and supporting actions and links
together the NAIs, TAIs and DP/DLs on the DSO. The draft SoM is the plan in words
and should be recorded in the draft OSW. From the draft ops trace and the draft SoM,
the draft missions and tasks for subordinates can be developed. All will be refined
during Q6 and Q7 and will be key products for the COA decision brief.
p. Draft synchronisation matrix. The draft synch matrix is completed during Q6,
however during Q4 and 5 the COA team(s) will be able to identify a sequence of
events from the draft SoM and capture them on a draft synch matrix concurrently.
q. Surveillance and target acquisition plan (STAP). The STAP44 is developed from
the DSOM by the ISR cell, concurrently. The STAP allocates specific resources to the
priorities listed in the DSOM, refining and supporting the detail within the ICP. In
particular it considers the prioritisation of assets where there are insufficient to cover
all TAIs and NAIs, redundancy to ensure resilience of the plan, the impact of likely
environmental changes, cross cueing from sensor to shooter, battlespace management
(BM) and EMCON. It is essential that STAP planning begins as early as possible as it is
fundamental to the execution of the mission.
r. Information activities (IA) plan. Elements of 77 Bde, where available, will provide
targeted IA&O support to contribute to the success of military objectives in support of
the commander.
s. Combined arms obstacle integration (CAOI) plan. CAOI is an all-arms activity to

integrate direct and indirect fire, manoeuvre, engineer effort and ground to achieve
the commander’s intent. CAOI must support the overall SoM. CAOI planning must
consider the target (the element of the enemy and it capabilities), location (linked to
own SoM) and specific obstacle effects required.
t. Fire plan. At this stage the fires cell using the draft ops trace and scheme of
manoeuvre, can concurrently start drafting a fire plan (AB545B).
u. Q5 is completed with a mature DSOM and supporting DSO and DSM, accepting that
both will subsequently be refined.
v. The DSOM is a critical product which will be used to shape the scheme of manoeuvre
for a particular COA, will become an annex in the OSW and will be used to aid
decision making during the execution of the mission in parallel with the DSO and DSM.
74. Q5 checklist:
a. Check all the NAIs and TAIs have been resourced.
b. Does the DSOM fully support the DSO and DSM?
c. Check back to Q3.3 commander’s effects schematic, ensure the commander’s OOEA
has been resourced on the DSOM.
d. Check against the higher CP TASKORG, what resources do you need that you don’t
have? What resources must you bid for at this stage (where you know you can’t
sequence or take risk)?
e. Have the ME, deception and the reserve been adequately resourced?
44 STAP planning is covered in further detail in AFM Vol 1 Part 3a – ISTAR.

Contents
f. Does the TASKORG group together resources and do the groupings achieve the
desired effect and supporting actions as directed from Q3?
g. Has the draft SoM, ops trace and missions and tasks been produced to enable
sequencing of the plan in time and space at Q6?
h. Have the key timings to develop the draft synch matrix during Q6 been recorded?
i. Have the STAP, IA, fire and CAOI plans been initiated?
j. Have risks identified during DSO/DSOM/DSM development been captured on the RIG?
Q6. When and where do the actions and effects take place in
relation to each other?
Q1

brief Q4-7
OSW production
75. Overview. The purpose of Q6 is to synchronise and sequence the effects and supporting
actions resourced in Q4 and Q5, to mass the required combat power at the decisive point
in time and space. The Q6 key product is the synch matrix which is a visual and coherent
representation of the SoM. From the synch matrix, the SoM, the TASKORG and missions
and tasks (from Q5) can all be finalised.
Synch matrix
SoM COA teams
TASKORG
77. Process in detail. Q6 has no sub-questions associated, the process in detail is explained
below:
a. The start point is the draft synch matrix, initiated in Q0, combined with the mission
timeline, and refined during the CE process Q1-5, including known key timings, time
constraints and detail from the enemy COA being planned against. A synch matrix
template is at Figure 3.61, it must be configured to reflect the A3E as appropriate.
Contents
Mission timings
Estimate
Weather
Light
ENEMY FORCES
FRIENDLY FORCES
DPs
ISR
Unit
Manoeuvre
Unit
Unit
Unit
FSG
Mortars
Arty
Avn/CAS
AD
Engr
A1
A2
Info Ops
Figure 3.61. A synch matrix template
b. Amend the timeline, as necessary, to give an appropriate timescale for the mission.
c. Amend rows to reflect TASKORG.
d. Identify the key time constraint (likely to be the time by which the decisive act must
be completed), and how long it will take; this will become the anchor point for the
synch matrix around which all other activity will be synchronised. CPs must synchronise
actions around critical activities to achieve desired effects. The result will be a force
is concentrated in time and space to enable maintenance of momentum. Key is the
application of overwhelming fires synchronised through H-hour with rapid manoeuvre.
Commanders and staff need to think through control measures to help maintain or
regain the initiative. Too often plans and orders are focused on the initial stages of an
operation at the expense of the critical activity. The synchronisation and integration of
capabilities is the key to combined arms manoeuvre.45
e. Identify the tasks which must be completed to enable the decisive act; sequence
these activities. Concentrating force is critical to overwhelm an enemy with fires and
manoeuvre and rapidly cycle echelon forces to achieve and exploit momentum. When
forces are concentrated and held in echelon, a commander retains greater flexibility
and agility to react to the enemy, reinforce the main effort and exploit success.
However, commanders and planners must weigh up the benefits of concentrating
forces versus creating multiple dilemmas for the enemy across a number of manoeuvre
axes. A key component in the concentration of force is a commander’s criteria for
launching the reserve. Committing the reserve requires clear triggers, robust drills and
should be rehearsed.46
Contents
f. Consider time relationships: what needs to be done before, and how long before. This
will often be shaping, decisive and sustaining activity.
g. Ensure implied tasks are also considered, time for regrouping, moving, maintenance,
rest etc.
h. Consider resource relationships, tasks may need to be sequenced if there are

insufficient resources to do them concurrently. Include related DPs.
i. As the synch matrix develops, Q4 and Q5 will need revisiting as better locations for
tasks and methods of resourcing them become apparent.
j. Identify and prioritise the likelihood and impact of a FEs not being able to achieve a
task.
k. TASKORG. The draft TASKORG from Q5 should be developed and finalised taking
account of any changes resulting from the synch matrix development.
l. Ops trace. The ops trace from Q5 should be developed further taking account of any
changes resulting from the synch matrix development.
m. Scheme of manoeuvre. The SoM (the plan in words) should be developed and
finalised taking account of any changes resulting from the synch matrix development.
The SoM expands the Intent to describe how the commander sees the operation
unfolding – the method to achieve the change identified in the Intent. It explains
where, when, how and with what, in relation to each other, the force is to achieve its
outcome, so that subordinates can understand their roles in the plan and the effects
and actions that they and others are to realise. Because it is related to time, a SoM
can only be completed once the synch matrix has been confirmed. A clear intent
should minimise the length of the SoM. A SoM may helpfully use the conceptual
frameworks to provide clarity. In turn, the conceptual frameworks may be preceded
by a ‘preliminary activity’ statement and followed by an ‘enduring’ statement. Phases
should be used with caution as they can serve to stilt subordinate action. The main
effort (ME) is that activity that the commander considers critical to the success of the
mission. To give it substance sufficient resources must be allocated to the unit assigned
to deliver it. Illuminating the ME ensures that when the situation becomes more chaotic
that activity will be remembered and it will provide the rallying point for effort. The
ME may change throughout an operation in accordance with the situation. It should be
expressed as an action, together with the primary force responsible for its delivery.47
n. Missions and tasks. From the SoM and the TASKORG, missions and tasks can be
allocated to each FE. A mission statement is a clear and direct order to a subordinate
and consists of action/task verbs and a unifying purpose (effect), traditionally
preceded by the words ‘in order to’. There are three types of mission: a single
statement with a unifying purpose; a series of tasks with a unifying purpose; and
for reserves, a series of ‘be prepared to’ tasks, without a unifying purpose. Missions
should be listed in a logical order of activity, reflecting the SoM, rather than in Army
precedence as this will enhance the visualisation of the operation. Tasks contained
within mission statements should be substantive. Lesser tasks, such as conducting
prelim moves or establishing liaison should be omitted from the mission, and are
47 Extracted from AFM Command, Chapter 6.

Contents
better located within coordinating instructions. Mission statements will often be

written personally by the commander. Critical is that all effects in the commander’s
intent must be allocated as unifying purposes. 48
o. Control measures. Throughout COA development process the requirement for

control measures to enable the mission will become apparent; a clear understanding
of the priorities will set conditions for Q7.
78. Q6 checklist:
a. Does the synch matrix anchor the plan in time and space and outline the sequencing
of all activity with the plan?
b. Have the DSO/DSOM/ DSM, TASKORG, ops trace, SoM, ICP and RIG been updated to
reflect any changes in the plan resulting from synchronisation?
c. Does the activity required within the synch matrix now affect the planning timeline; are
there FEs that need to deploy imminently (e.g. prelim moves, ISR, CSS, and CIS)?
Q7. What control measures do I need to impose?

Q1
COA
Plan refinement
Q0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 decision Wargame
Q4-7
brief
OSW production
79. Overview. The control measures conference coordinates key actions to mitigate and
manage risk. It delivers the required detail to facilitate a wargame which tests the
developing plan. The control measures conference is chaired by the COS (a template
agenda is at Figure 3.64). G5 Plans must have the current OpPlan running and will directly
input identified control measures into coordinating instructions when possible. This will
slow the progress of the meeting but will ensure that data is captured. The key output
of Q7 is the confirmation of the BM trace produced the COA team and coordinating
instructions. Following Q7 rapid refinement should be conducted to ensure the COAs and
supporting products are coherent prior to the COA decision brief.
Ops trace
Q7. What control measures do I need to impose? SPG
Coordinating instructions
81. Process in detail. Q7 considers what control measures are required to support the plan.
As with many other aspects of the CE; the application of control measures are an iterative
process that should be considered throughout the CE, but are the particular focus of Q7.
48 Extracted from AFM Command, Chapter 6.

Contents
Control measures are the means by which the commander and the staff coordinate and
control activity. Q7 should be delivered in two phases, at this stage of the CE, and then at
the wargame where they are refined:
a. Control measures are delegated predetermined decisions or retained decisions that

control the tempo of an operation. By ensuring coordination and providing clarity
as to who can make the particular decision, they enable effective mission command
and control. At the very least, when two units are manoeuvring next to each other,
coordination from the higher CP will be required.
b. Control measures should be considered as the ‘glue’ which holds the mission together; it
is advisable to consider the consequences of each action and effect at two levels down.
c. The ops trace and coordinating instructions as products do not belong to Q7

exclusively, however they are shaped by it, with inputs from all staff branches, centrally
directed to ensure that the overall plan is integrated, synchronised and prioritised; they
should include FSCM, airspace and spectrum management, further details on BM are
in Part 3, Execute.
d. Higher CP OSW will impose control measures to be adhered to, and the CP should
integrate these and then add further appropriate and detailed measures.
e. Pull forward control measures identified from analysis with the CE so far.
f. Review the commander’s intent and planning guidance to understand how the
commander wants the operation to be conducted. (Fast, aggressive, deliberate,
controlled etc.)
g. Using the draft ops trace, SoM and supporting DSO/DSOM/DSM, TASKORG, and synch
matrix, identify the necessary control measures to coordinate the plan.
h. Throughout, think 2-down. Develop as much detail as is possible to inform the

wargame.
i. Control measures can be divided into four areas; those measures which enable the
integration and deconfliction of forces to deliver the mission, those measures to assist
in C2 of the mission, those measures to protect the mission, and those measures
to sustain the mission execution; each of which is explained in detail below and
supported by the checklists at Figure 3.63:
(1) First, think about the coordination required to ‘get into a position to start the
mission’.
(2) Where am I now? Where do I have to get to so I am in a position to start the

mission?’ then consider the control required to achieve this. Include any prelim
moves.
(3) Consider throughout - what if the situation changes - ‘have I issued enough
detailed control to enable the mission to deliver the intent if it does?’
(4) Then think of the required ‘deconfliction of forces to deliver the mission’. Think:
‘how do I manage the battlespace, providing the necessary manoeuvre space
while preventing fratricide?’
(5) First consider the objectives of each FE within the TASKORG - where do they have
to get to?; then consider how the objectives are defined;
Contents
(6) Next think what measures are needed to allow the units the freedom to achieve
their role (in the objective); then consider what impact this has on the other units;
(7) Then consider the CS functions impact on the operation and how you maximise
their impact while ensuring they do not undermine the units (i.e. though fire
control measures to prevent fratricide); now amend the STAP, fires and CAOI
plans.
(8) Then consider non-lethal measures (cover information activities: psychological

operations, engagement, deception, cyber electromagnetic activity, media
operations, and presence, posture and profile).
(9) Think through the whole mission and then consider what next - give detail of
what is expected of FEs at the end of the operations.
(10) Then consider the ‘C2 to execute the mission’. Getting the C2 right is a real art,
further guidance on command states is at Chapter 18.
(11) Start by working out who is responsible for C2 of each element of the mission;
then consider how that will be delivered and then coordinated. Think how will the
CP ensures the commander is in a position to command and make decisions.
(12) Then consider ROE: identify the higher ROE; what you need, when and why.
(13) Then identify the coordination measures required to ‘protect the operation’:
(14) Start by considering the commander’s intent, including the deception plan, and
then consider the measures (EMCON) to achieve that.
(15) Then balance these against maintaining freedom of action; consider how to
balance OPSEC while maintaining C2.
(16) Consider ‘what if’ - what CONPLANs are needed (and when will they be issued as
OSW); what is the reserve; what readiness do FEs need to be at each stage of the
mission?
(17) Finally, review the control measures, amend the synch matrix and coordinating
instructions and check they are integrated; concurrently review the SoM, and the
supporting concepts (engineer, fires, ISR, IA).
(18) The amount of time available will determine how Q7 is to be conducted, where
time is available individual staff branches should develop their own control
measures and then come together to integrate. If time is short, the process can
be done concurrently.
Contents
Get into a position to start the mission: Deconfliction of forces to deliver the mission:
Forward assembly area (FAA) (loc, actions on arrival, Boundaries (incl green/white)
unit locs within the FAA) Objectives
Routes (marking; alternatives; protection) Routes; axis
Start point (SP); release point (RP); action at SP/RP Battlespace management incl: fire support coord
CSS plans (recovery; repair etc.) measures (FSCM); airspace management; spectrum
management
Limits of exploitation (LOE)
Real estate management incl: Res Dems; reserved
areas/engagement areas, ARAs and AMAs
Limitations on recce
STAP
Med plan
C2 to execute the mission: Protect the operation (to maintain seizing and
HQ locs (incl blue/green/white locs) holding of the initiative):
EMCON and COMMSEC measures
Report lines/planning lines
Nick numbers/report points CONPLANs
Coord points CBRN measures
Dispensations and waivers OPSEC
Notice to move (NTM) Combat identification measures
Rules of engagement (ROE) Refugees
Liaison plan Protected locations (i.e. key infra etc.)
HVTL/targets Media plan and lines to take, as part of IA plan
Bypass and denial policy

PW policy
R2 and battle rhythm
Figure 3.63. Q7 checklist
Ser Subject Content
Prelims
Purpose
Time available
1 Prelims Chairs the conference and identifies the stages of the operation requiring greatest
coordination
Briefs tactics doctrine coord points (i.e. Bde rip)
2 Ops update
3 RFI update
Understanding the operational and tactical environment
4 FF SoM Use the map to brief the SoM and draft BM
5 DSO Brief the updated DSO

Contents
Ser Subject Content
Friendly force CONOPS
Prelim coordination: (G5)
Prelim coordination: (G5) Start/release points

FAAs CSS plans (DCOS)
Routes and prelim movement plan
Deconfliction:
6 Coordination Boundaries Coordination points
Combat ID Report lines
Axis NTM
Routes Liaison plan
LOEs Bypass policy
Limits of recce (G5/ISR) CSCM (G5/G6)
Potential interface with classified Coord with manoeuvre (G5)

7 ISR platforms (ISR) STAP (ISR)
DSO/DSOM (ISR)
FSCM including trajectory issues Protected locations (Fires)

(Fires) AD (AD)
No strike/restricted target list (Fires) HVTL/targets (G2)
8 Fires
ROE/CDE (LEGAD) Consequence management (Fires)
Target engagement authority (Fires) Gender considerations (G5)
ARAs/AMAs (Fires)
ATO- Air SoM. Allocation of CAS, Air go/no-go criteria (AIR)

Avn (AIR) Actions on air movement and landing
9 Air
Cfm ATO, ACO, SPINS timeline (AIR) plan (AIR)
Met (AIR)
Coordination of influence activity Distribution of product (Fires)

10 IA (Fires) Media coordination (Media)
Areas of particular sensitivity (G2)
Barrier free/restricted areas (Engr) Routes/mob corridors/obs Xing points

IED threat areas and UXO/hazardous (Engr)
11 Engr
areas (Engr) HN infra and restricted target areas
(Engr)
Staging plan (prelim moves) (DCOS) CSS locations (Log Rvs, ECCP,
12 CSS PWs refugees, freedoms/constraints echelons) (DCOS)
(DCOS) Med plans. (MED)
HQ locations (G6) Electromagnetic spectrum

13 CIS
management (G6)
Extant hazard areas for ground and HN infra risks (CBRN)

14 CBRN
air (CBRN)
15 Legal Multinational constraints (LEGAD) Dispensation and waivers (LEGAD)
CONPLANS (G5) ROC drill timing (G5)

16 G5
BGs brief back timing (G5)
Staff direction
Planning timeline (planning timeline board)

17 COS
Risks confirmation
Figure 3.64. A control measures conference agenda template

Contents
COA decision brief

Q1
COA decision
Q0 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Wargame Plan refinement Q4-7
brief
OSW production
82. Overview. A commander may decide to select a COA at any time during Q4-7
depending on the situation; the most important factors are typically the time available
for planning and the availability of information on which to base a decision. The
commander may decide on a single COA at Q3 (more likely when time is limited), or to
have multiple COAs presented after Q5 with DSO/DSOM/DSM or after Q6 with more
developed COAs with a synch matrix and SoM. To determine the most appropriate COA
for wargaming and refinement, the COA teams having developed COAs during Q4-7
brief the commander at the COA decision brief and the commander selects the most
appropriate COA. The decision made by the commander will be based on objective
analysis, underpinned by intuition (a commander’s understanding) but invariably can be
swayed by persuasive briefing. To ensure that the COA most likely to succeed is chosen,
the commander must be allowed to decide based on the advantages and disadvantages
of each COA, not the briefing skills of the COA team lead. Following the brief the
commander has the opportunity to provide additional commander’s guidance and
warning order 3 should be issued
83. Process in general. Figure 3.65 summarises the COA decision brief process, products/
outputs and leads; the detail is covered at paragraph 84.
COA DB COA teams

COA decision brief
WngO 3 (updated WngO 2) SPG
Figure 3.65. The COA decision brief process, products/outputs and leads summary
84. Process in detail
a. The COA decision brief to the commander allows the risk being tested by the
commander’s COAs to be explored and a decision on the final plan to be developed.
The brief is not a competition and each COA should be assessed impartially with
disadvantages as well as advantages highlighted, all products should be presented on
standardised templates for ease of comparison. Critical thinking49 tools are useful for
assessing COAs.
b. The format for the COA decision brief is at Figure 3.66 and the minimum products
required are listed below:
(1) COA decision brief template (Figure 3.67 refers), incl SoM, TASKORG.
(2) Draft DSO/DSOM/DSM.
(3) Synch matrix.
(4) Control measures.
49 Further detail in critical thinking tools is in Chapter 11, Red teaming.

Contents
(5) Ops trace.
(6) RIG.
(7) CIS, CSS and IA concepts.
(8) CONPLANs.
Serial Activity Lead Remarks
Coord COS
G2 update G2 By exception only
1 FF update G3
RFI update RFI manager Pri1 RFIs and overdue RFIs responses
Risk (RIG) update COS
COS or a COA team

2 Elements common to both COAs (Only if required e.g.: a common SHAPING phase)
lead
COA decision brief template is to be used, draft

COA 1
DSO/DSM, synch matrix, CMs ops trace
3 TASKORG COA team lead

Scheme of manoeuvre
Advanges and disadvantage
COA decision brief template is to be used, draft

COA 1
DSO/DSM, synch matrix, CMs ops trace
TASKORG
4 COA team lead
Scheme of manoeuvre
Advanges and disadvantage
Comparison of COAs:
5 Summarise the scoring COS
Make a recommendation
6 Comd’s decision Comd
Updates from other conconcurrent Movement plan for prelim moves, IA plan, fire
7 COS
planning activity plan, ISR plan, Avn/Air, CSS, CIS and C2
Direction to staff to complete the

8 CE; level of Q4-7 refine and OSW COS
production
Figure 3.66. A COA decision brief format

Contents
COA Title:
SoM Schematic
ME
TASKORG
Criteria Advantages Disadvantages Score
Figure 3.67. A COA decision brief template
c. The commander needs to understand the advantages and disadvantages of each COA -
this is achieved by a COA decision brief to the commander where the COA team leads
present their respective COAs clearly and concisely using the standardised template.
d. Each COA is judged against the criteria identified by the commander in Q3 (tactical
functions, principles of the operation etc.); it must include a clear explanation of the
risk (building on that identified in Q3).
e. The COS scores each COA in advance of the COA decision brief to provide a
perspective on the COAs to assist the commander in their judgement.
f. The COA decision brief should end with the COS recommending a COA and justifying
the reasoning supporting the recommendation.
g. The commander will then select the preferred COA, or a combination of the COAs
giving commander’s guidance for further development and or refinement as required;
if time permits the commander may direct a new COA to be developed.
h. Warning order 3 issued.
Wargame
Q1
COA decision
brief
OSW production
Contents
85. Overview. A wargame, and in this case the COA wargame is a systematic method
of analysing a plan in a conscious attempt to visualise the ebb and flow of a mission.
Adversarial by nature, a COA wargame superimposes A3E elements together to identify
risks and shortcomings in potential or selected COAs. It pitches planners against each
other in a deliberate attempt to spark debate and generate insights into a plan providing
a stress test. By COA wargaming, the commander and staff attempt to foresee the
dynamics of action, reaction and possible counteraction of the mission which enables the
plan to be tested and subsequently refined as necessary. COA wargaming is an essential
part of conducting an estimate and is covered in detail at Chapter 10.

Q1

brief Q4-7
OSW production
86. Overview. Plan refinement Q4-7 provides the final opportunity to make any
amendments, to bring coherence and staff rigour to the plan prior to final OSW
production and the OGp that follows. The COS will provide direction for the conduct of
this essential element of the CE process. The plan refinement stage should be considered
as an essential staff check period to ensure that all detail is finalised and unambiguous,
with any final direction from commander’s guidance after the COA decision brief and
the wargame fully implemented in all relevant areas throughout the plan, noting that
changes in one area generally have consequences elsewhere. Where necessary a more
comprehensive and structured run through of Q4-7 should be conducted to ensure that
any changes are implemented consistently and to ensure that details are not overlooked;
generally the level to which this step is achievable will be determined by the time
available. Referring back to the introduction: additional planning time should result in
better quality products rather than a larger quantity of paper; this is the time to ensure
that a quality product is produced.
Contents
OSW production
Q1
COA decision
brief
OSW production
87. Overview. OSW production is the bringing together of the refined plan and products
to create the written orders for dissemination to subordinates. The process itself is
straightforward and the specifics of who does what and when should be addressed in
unit SOIs, however the combination of time pressure, collaborative working, formatting,
proof reading and reproduction of OSW should not be underestimated. Slick drills, clearly
defined responsibilities and practice are required. ComBAT will be the tool used for OSW
production and dissemination. It is at this stage of the CE that the benefits and time
savings generated by early and concurrent digitisation are apparent. Further guidance on
OSW templates is at Chapter 12.
Contents
CHAPTER 4
Supporting planning activity
88. Introduction. Chapter 4 details the UK parallel

Contents
estimate processes that run concurrent with the
• Combat service support -
tactical estimate (TE) and the combat estimate (CE)
support to planning activity
and provides an aide memoire level of detail for the
• Communications information
corresponding allied planning processes.50
services - support to planning
activity
Combat service support (CSS) - support to • Air assault operations
planning activity planning considerations
• Allied planning processes
89. The sustainment planner when participating in the
• US
planning cycle, TE or CE, must be sufficiently robust
• FR
to provide sustainment reality to the process.51 They
• DE
must understand the commander’s intent, the CSS
capabilities available including any constraints/risks
and consider preparation for the forthcoming mission, executing that mission and then
preparing for subsequent missions. Therefore the sustainment decisive phase may not
be the G3 decisive phase although they will be inter-related. The G5/G3 planners will
generally have little concern for the minutiae of sustainment with their interest centring on:
a. Can the operation be launched on time with the correct start states?
b. Can combat power be maintained?
c. Can casualties be evacuated within clinical timelines?
d. Will the force culminate before the mission is completed?
90. The sustainment planners know that the force will always culminate, however, it is their
task to delay that point for as long as possible. Therefore the sustainment information
presented during the process should be relevant and sufficient to inform the G5/G3
planners. The sustainment planners need to consider the whole range of sustainment
activity and their plan will need to reflect:
a. Sustainability. Sustainability embraces both physical and moral components and

influences the tempo and duration of battle. Sustainability considerations should
include:
(1) CSS order of battle (ORBAT). The ORBAT must include sufficient CSS units or
capabilities to meet the task.
(2) Expenditure and resupply. Manpower, equipment and supplies are expended
even before contact has been made with the enemy. Once in contact,
expenditure rates will rise to levels commensurate with the type of operation
being undertaken.
50 Further detail on allied estimates is in AFM Command, Chapter 10.

51 Further detail on sustainment planning is in AFM Sustainment, Chapter 4.
Contents
(3) Equipment availability. The ability to maintain high levels of equipment

availability will influence sustainability.
(4) Availability of resources. Resources may include in-theatre holdings of stocks

of combat supplies and materiel and in-theatre replacements. These Army assets
may be supplemented by additional resources from a host nation, in-country
resources, allies, other Services and industry via the coupling bridge.
(5) Recovery and repair. Time and distance, facilities and equipment, spares and
assemblies, and manpower all influence sustainability.
(6) Replacing manpower and equipment casualties. Both manpower and

equipment casualties are estimated and reflected in the in-theatre replacements
and operational stocks requirements respectively.
(7) Health service support (HSS). Effective HSS measures are essential in
sustaining the physical and moral health of a force. A robust casualty
management system is required to minimise death and disability and to maintain
morale.
b. Survivability. Whatever survivability measures are taken, losses of materiel from

enemy action are inevitable. In recognition of this there should be some duplication of
holdings between groups of CSS units and/or installations. There are three options for
maximising survivability and the commander must weigh up the advantages of each
for the current threat:
(1) Concentration. Concentration/grouping simplifies control and eases defence

coordination, thereby increasing productivity, but it risks the presentation of an
attractive target, particularly to air or indirect fire.
(2) Dispersal. Dispersal reduces indirect fire, CBRN and air threats (as well as the
likelihood of loss due to accidents, e.g. fire) but renders defence more difficult,
increasing exposure to other threats such as infiltration and sabotage. It may also
complicate control, requiring a greater C2 footprint.
(3) Maintaining greater balance of stock further to the rear. Provided that
stocks can be delivered to the fighting formations promptly, a greater balance
can be held in more secure rear areas (including options for joint sea basing).
91. Supporting planning activities. The TE and CE processes will be supported by staff
checks conducted by all the branches within a CP providing the analysis necessary to
support the development and validate COAs. The CSS functional branches will conduct
their staff checks concurrently and in conjunction the estimate process with information
and direction flowing between the planners and the branches. The outputs will include
operational analysis and modelling and will draw upon the expertise of all relevant
agencies. The most commonly used sustainment staff checks are based on the 4Ds.
92. The 4Ds. This is a land component staff check which quantifies the fundamental
questions faced by the sustainment planners during a planning cycle. The 4Ds are
not an estimate process, they are a staff check which supports the estimate process.
They consider destination (the operating environment and its effect upon sustainment
operations), demand (quantifying the scale of sustainment), distance (over which
sustainment operations must be conducted) and duration (the length of the operation).
Contents
93. 4Ds checklist. Figure 4.1 provides a check list of factors under the headings of logistic
support (log sp), health service support (HSS) and equipment support (ES) to be
considered when conducting a 4Ds staff check. The list is not exhaustive and operational
and theatre-specific factors will require consideration. Likely deductions about force
laydown or activities are not shown.
Generic Log Sp HSS ES
Destination
Enemy effect on CSS ops. Threat to assets and Threat to assets and Threat to assets and
MLCOA and MDCOA. resources. Restriction on resources. Restriction on resources. Restriction
Intent. Capabilities. TTPs. movement. Effect on choice movement. Effect on choice on movement. Effect
of locations and laydown. of locations and laydown. on choice of locations
Force protection. Force protection. and laydown. Force
protection.
Own and coalition Shared capabilities. Lead Shared capabilities. Lead Shared capabilities and
partners. Intent. nation responsibilities. nation responsibilities. interoperability. Lead
Subsequent ops. Restrictions and freedoms to nation responsibilities.
Capabilities. C2. operate. MVBF data and standard
Control measures. The repair times.
coupling bridge. Pre-set
restrictions and factors.
Firm timings. Other
components. Boundaries.
Size of AO.
Host nation. Intent. Resources, facilities, Resources, facilities, Resources, facilities,

Capabilities. C2. SOFA. infrastructure and services infrastructure and services infrastructure and
Attitude to coalition available in-country. Effect available in-country. Effect services available in-
forces. Pre-set restrictions on freedom of movement. on delivering clinical care. country. Local resources.
and factors. Local resources. Civil labour. Shared capabilities. Location Availability of skilled
Traffic control. of facilities. Requirement for civilian labour.
MedCap.
Contractors. Capabilities Log Sp capabilities and Medical capabilities and ES capabilities and
and availability. Lead availability. Lead times. availability. Lead times. availability. Lead times.
times. Where can it Set up and stability of
mitigate? Risk. icons.
Civil population. Effect on freedom of Medical intelligence about Effect on freedom of

ASCOPE. PMESII. Attitude movement. local prevalent diseases and movement. Air and
to coalition forces. risk of infection. CBRN threats and
procedures.
Environment. Climate Effect on freedom of Effect on freedom of Effect of terrain and

and weather. Terrain. movement. Potential movement (ability to climate on eqpt reliability
Infrastructure (laydown, infrastructure for log sp CASEVAC). Medical and ability to recover.
quality, quantity, capacity, locations. Capacity and intelligence about local Availability and suitability
availability and cost). laydown of ports, airports, prevalent diseases and risk of of infrastructure for
MSRs, railways navigable infection. Climatic injuries. repair and production
inland waterways and Force protection measures. activity.
pipelines. Air, ground and
sea lines of communication
in and out of theatre.
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Generic Log Sp HSS ES
Demand
Mission (2-up, 1-up, Size of dependency to Size of population at risk. Vehicle casualty
own, manoeuvre units include BCRs. Lead nation Casualty estimate (including estimate (number and
and formations). responsibility. Estimated DBNIs). Medical requirement type) from usage and
expenditure rates by class. for CPERS and displaced enemy action. Mission
Consumption rates of fuel. pers. CBRN. Requirement critical equipment and
Scheme of manoeuvre. Specialist and theatre- to provide medical care priorities. Ability to
specific equipment. CBRN. to coalition partners and regenerate and repair.
Replacement vehicles Host nation (military and Production capacity.
Main effort. based on vehicle casualty civilian). Possible epidemics E&MA, LRUs and ES
estimate. Engineer stores and seasonal surges. Force materiel. Rehabilitation.
Size of own force. including defence stores protection measures, e.g. Modifications.
and aggregate. CPERS prophylaxis. Requirement to support
estimate and sustainment coalition partners.
Type of operation and requirement (e.g.
expected duration rations, water, tentage, The changing nature and
(SUSTAT). consumables, etc.). pattern of demand. The changing nature
Requirement to support and pattern of demand.
displaced pers. Ability to Expected surges.
Expected mileage of the pre-position stores.
force.
The changing nature

Requirement to support and pattern of demand.
the host nation or Expected surges.
coalition members.
Follow-on or subsequent
missions and type of
activity.
Distance
Distances (internally and Loop times. Notice to effect Distance and travelling Distance and travelling
into/out of theatre). Air, times to trigger an activity. time between medical time between ES
ground and sea lines of Comparison of loop times treatment facilities. (Ability facilities. Production
communication. MSRs, for different capabilities. to meet clinical timelines). or repair times against
railways, navigable inland SCPTs. Comparison of loop times equipment casualty
waterways and pipelines. for different capabilities, e.g. estimate. MVBF.
Avn or ground MERT.
Travelling times v
distance.
Duration
Duration of the operation Endurance of pers and eqpt. Effect of duration, Effect of duration on
(best and worst case). Total stock available and in demand and distance on equipment availability
supply chain. Subsequent the effectiveness of the over time (ability to
operations (nature and operational patient care repair and regenerate)
Time to establish in- demand). pathway.
theatre/time to draw
down. Support to enduring At what point will the
operations. At what point will the force culminate?
medical chain culminate?
No move before/not
before times. At what point will the force
culminate?
When do capabilities
come on/off line?
Key deadlines.
Figure 4.1. 4Ds checklist

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Communications information system (CIS) - support to planning

activity
94. Communications are an essential element within all operations and CIS planning
considerations will need to be integrated throughout the planning process. This
ensures a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and the development
of a communications plan, which may adapt as the situation changes, that supports
the commander’s scheme of manoeuvre. Early engagement and integration within the
planning process will significantly support the development of both achievable and realistic
COAs alongside a sufficiently robust communications plan.
95. CIS planning will be conducted in significant detail separately, in parallel to and in support
of the main TE or CE process. It will include mission analysis and the commander’s intent,
information needs analysis, a consideration of interoperability and support, analysis of
capabilities and the allocation of communication systems assets and resources.
96. Essential CIS planning is conducted in support of both the TE and CE processes. The
specific format for CIS planning in support of the TE is currently being reviewed and will be
confirmed in subsequent specific CIS doctrine however, considerations and staff checks will
be similar to those for the CE.
97. Further detail on the methodology, structure and application of CIS planning is available in
separate CIS doctrine publications, the detail at Figure 4.2 outlines key considerations for
the CE only and includes the following considerations, outputs and OSW:
CE
CIS output CIS OSW
question
Draft CIP
CIS planning timeline (ROOB to provide initial G6 freedoms and
constraints to include EMCON states and electronic operating
Q0 CIS WngO 1
environment; enemy intent, capabilities and threat; physical and
electronic environment; weather)
Draft initial Comd and Sig annex
ML and MD enemy COA

Considerations: Enemy CIS and EW capability, CIS freedoms and
Q1 constraints (e.g. jamming, intercept, deception, direction finding); the
electronic environment, degradation, denial and possible screening
opportunities; how the physical terrain and environment affect comms;
coalition and interop requirements; key locs, timings and ORBATs
CIS mission analysis

Considerations: TASKORG and FF locs; time and space; pri of comms;
Q2 EMCON; RRB; interop both intra UK and coalition; key locs to sp;
CIP considerations (and higher level G6 - to include IER: services,
classification, CIS C2 etc.); IM considerations
Intent and main effort (HF/ VHF, alt nets, data issues, redundancy,
station/net)
Q3 Update Comd and Sig annex WngO 2
Considerations: information requirements incl COP; priorities of stations
and nets; other CP locations; manoeuvre constraints
Allocate freqs (BSM)

Amend and disseminate Bowman plan (BSM)
Q4
Considerations: locations for current and future potential CPs; most
effective laydown of assets; flanking formations liaison
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Submit eqpt requirements

Considerations: Resources incl manpower and specialist; radios, masts,
veh fits, bats, crypto, freqs, CSups resupply, specialist comms (tacsat/ Draft CIS missions
Q5
satcom, LOs etc.); frequency and net management; timings and DPs and tasks
for nets; CP requirements; contingency and alternate capabilities;
implications of TASKORG changes
Synch matrix
Update planning timeline
Considerations: how comms plan fits into Comd’s intent to incl Comd’s
loc for each phase; allocation of resources and CIS sp requirements; Draft CIS orders.
Q6
timings incl NTM, key DPs and nets open, CP established by; main/tac/ Complete CEI
alt, boundaries; frequency management including synchronisation and
impact of sequencing; interop and flanking forces; where frequency
changes may be required for RPOL etc.
Codes/encryption
Active and passive protection measures (e.g. EMCON/CSCM)
G6 advice to BM (C Surv measures, screening, EW baseline etc.)
Q7 Complete Comd and Sig annex Complete CIP
Considerations: electronic and physical protect measures; frequency
management, net design and comms plan; additional CEMA defence
requirements (incl cyber)?
Figure 4.2. CIS planning considerations for the CE
Air assault operations planning considerations
Battlefield helicopters (BH) nomenclature

All helicopters commended by JHC are termed battlefield helicopters. BH can be broken down
as follows:
• Attack helicopters (AH - Apache)

• Support helicopters (SH - Chinook, Merlin, Puma)
• Light utility helicopters (LUH - Gazelle)
• Reconnaissance helicopters (RH - Wildcat)
• Light assault helicopters (LAH - Wildcat)
98. Introduction. This section is designed as an overview of air manoeuvre operations

planning. More detail can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 12 Air Manoeuvre, and for JHC
aviation within the JHC aviation operations manual and aviation TF CONOPs. The purpose
is to introduce elements of air assault operations planning that may assist non-specialist
staff incorporating SH movement into tactical action. It should not replace the SME
inputs of dedicated staff such as the air manoeuvre planning team (AMPT), mobile air
operations team (MAOT) and 16 Air Assault Brigade.
99. Aviation tasking. There are typically three types of aviation tasking:
a. Non-discretionary tasking (NDT). NDT consists of emergency and short-notice

tasking, such as a medical emergency response team (MERT) and response to
significant tactical activity involving the enemy or general population.
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b. Deliberate operations. Deliberate operations require combined planning, liaison and

coordination between all assets involved. The time required for the aviation planning
element will vary depending on the scale, complexity and immediacy of the operation,
see below for more detail.
c. Other operations (sustainment). Typically less complex than deliberate operations

due to the likely removal/reduction in enemy threat, other operations usually involve
direct support to the fighting echelon and the general sustainment of the force. The
degree of planning and coordination required will usually be less than for a deliberate
operation but will vary depending on the maturity of the operation and the threat.
100. Deliberate air assault operations. Deliberate air assault operations are the movement
of ground forces using the firepower and mobility of helicopters. Air assault operations
may be conducted as a discrete operation or be the precursor to subsequent ground
manoeuvre operations, shaping the environment by seizing key terrain and chokepoints
before the arrival of ground forces. Air assault operations allow manoeuvre over
extended distances and terrain barriers, using speed and surprise to attack the enemy’s
vulnerabilities.
101. Joint planning. It is essential that joint planning occurs between the ground tactical
commander (GTC) and air mission commander (AMC) – normally as part of an aviation
task force (aviation TF)), and their respective staffs, at the outset of a deliberate
operation planning cycle. Collaborative planning provides an understanding of aircraft
(A/C) availability, constraints, and sustainability, and ensures that all parties have a clear
understanding of the ground tactical plan and how it might be best achieved by the
supporting plans.
a. The ground tactical plan. This is the GTC’s preferred method of achieving the
required effect. In principle, it has primacy, but it must take into account all other
plans and consider A/C availability, type and capability. The estimate process will
identify the outcome required and the critical activity to allow staff to allocate force
package requirements, where they are required and in what order. In particular, the
following should be considered:
(1) Requirements for ISR soak of helicopter landing sites (HLS) and objectives.
(2) Primary and alternate HLSs and their identification.
(3) Pre-assault shaping activities, including EW and AH/close air support (CAS), which
may be used to protect HLS prior to insertion, to escort SH, and to provide direct
fire support on the objective.
(4) Fire support throughout the operation.
(5) Landing formations.
(6) Offload procedures.
b. The landing plan. The landing plan is the manner in which ground forces are
committed to the objective area. Air assault operations will generally be either enemy
or terrain orientated, and be delivered onto or offset from the objective. Factors that
need to be considered include terrain, threat, risk and ROE as directed and informed
through the aviation TF planning staff and SMEs. The AMC must consider:
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(1) Temporal and physical (lateral and altitude) separation of A/C.
(2) Landing heading and offload directions which affect door gunnery support
requirements.
(3) Repeated use of HLSs in a single operation increases the surface-to-air fire
(SAFIRE) risk to subsequent waves. Initial waves’ ability to protect subsequent
waves should be considered in the landing plan.
(4) Departure direction of A/C from HLSs.
Y-hour, L-hour and H-hour

• Y-hour: The time at which the first A/C of the first wave departs the pick-up point.
• L-hour: The time at which the first A/C of the first wave touches down in the landing zone
(nominated HLS).
• H-hour: The specific time at which an operation is due to commence (assault troops cross line of
departure). In amphibious operations; the time at which the first waterborne wave of the amphibious
assault lands on the beach.
There may be no requirement for an H-hour in air assault operations if no line of departure is
required between the drop off HLS and the objective. If this is the case, the GTC and AMC will
use L-hour as the critical timing around which supporting effects are coordinated, e.g. fires
may be planned from L-5 to L-2, therefore any amendment to L-hour will have the effect of
keeping fires synchronised with delivery of assault troops to the drop off HLS.
H-hour will be preferred for synchronisation of supporting effects if for the operation, assault
troops employ ground manoeuvre out of contact between the drop off HLS and objective.
c. The air movement plan. This covers routing to the objective, ingress, inload
of logistic supplies and egress of A/C. Depending on numbers of A/C versus the
complexity of the operation and numbers of HLS versus objectives, the plan will
generally select one ingress route and one egress route for each HLS for the assualt
A/C. Consideration should be given to:
(1) The air movement plan on insertion supporting the GTC deception plan.
(2) The threat to A/C posed by the enemy compared with the self-protection
capability of the A/C.
(3) Use of concealed air routes, utilising low altitude or terrain masking as required to
maintain the element of surprise.
(4) Air battlespace management and coordination measures in place.
(5) Emergency HLS and routes for MEDEVAC.
(6) Coordination with fast-air assets and fire planning, especially pre-assault shaping
activities.
(7) Location and suitable of alternate/deception HLS.

Contents
d. The loading plan. The loading plan provides the laydown of which A/C every troop/
individual will be loaded onto for each planned wave of the assault. It enables the
tactical integrity of each serial - each A/C load can be organised as a self-contained
fighting force, taking into account the requirement for balance in case of bump
plans.52 It is necessary to load mission-critical pax or stores across a number of A/C to
mitigate the potential for loss of an A/C en route.
e. Actions on the objective. Disembarkation from the SH must be well rehearsed

to minimise threat to A/C and ground troops and to maximise the exploitation of
surprise. Prior rehearsals of disembarkation drills (stage one drills) from the A/C are
essential to assist with this, especially given that not all A/C have the same method for
emplaning/deplaning. Abort criteria must be firmly established between the GTC and
AMC in advance.
f. Exfil and extraction plans. Some operations are not required to have an enduring
effect on the objective area (e.g. raid) and SH may be required to extract the force
relatively shortly after the air assault has taken place. Consideration should be given
to a ground exfil prior to extraction by SH to mitigate enemy SAFIRE threats at the HLS
used for insertion.
102. Joint battle procedure. There are three main events within joint battle procedure
which set the conditions for success. Orders delivered in the form of a joint mission order
(JMO), ROC drills and rehearsals. The OSW process preceding these main events are
detailed below:
a. Aviation warning order. The aviation warning order will be issued as soon as
the task has been confirmed between the GTC and aviation TF/AMC. The order
identifies the task outline in terms of intent, likely tasks and coordinating instructions.
Importantly, it also identifies key responsibilities, identifies resources and establishes
the enabling timeline and requirements to achieve mission success.
b. Mission planning conference (MPC). The MPC is a meeting normally chaired by

the aviation TF aviation planning element and attended by representatives of the
aviation and ground units. It enables the GTC to discuss the plan with the aviation
commanders and brief the intent, SoM and ME. Detailed coordination measures
including go/no-go criteria, actions on, and bump plans. It enables essential
coordination between the GTC and mission aircrew to understand and discuss the
context of HLS (location, orientation, landing planning factors etc.) and the ground
SoM post-landing to provide effective air-land integration (ALI) and fire support. The
MPC is typically where the mission is handed over from the aviation TF plans team, to
the AMC and crews who are going to fly it. Following the MPC an aviation operation
order or fragmentary order should then be issued, and the aviation input to the
ground unit operation order can be finalised.
c. Aviation operation order. The aviation operation order will contain all the OSW
required to inform the JMO. The operation order is a product of the MPC and will
direct decisions made for the JMO.
d. Joint mission orders (JMO). The JMO is a set of formal orders delivered by the AMC
to the aircrew involved in the operation, prior to aviation rehearsals/ROC drills. The
GTC and his JTAC/TACP should normally be present in person or be represented by a
suitable LO.
52 Bump plans take into account unscheduled maintenance of one or more A/C and may include revised load planning
options.
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e. Aviation rehearsals. Aviation rehearsals, where possible, will be mandatory for all
of those involved in air assault operations, this is due to the complexity of delivering
multiple aircraft, ground troops and supporting assets to what will likely be a small
area, at night and with the overarching consideration of the enemy threat. A key
product will be the ‘bump plan’ - the rapid reassignment of troops to A/C in the event
of A/C being unserviceable, which must also be rehearsed. Key risks, such as poor
troop embarkation or disembarkation procedures, or the potential for aircrew to be
unfamiliar with the key elements of the GTC’s plan, can be mitigated by thorough
rehearsals.
f. ROC drills. Just as the GTC and staff should attend aviation rehearsals, so the AMC
should attend the GTC’s orders and ROC drill. This enables ground commanders (GTC
and subordinates) to understand in advance the A/C landing orientation and the
direction they will be facing on disembarkation and to agree a method for aircrew
to indicate orientation to disembarking troops. Additionally, it allows decision points
(DPs) and any CONPLANs to be understood and alternate HLSs discussed.
g. Go/no-go brief. This is the final check of conditions and criteria required to launch
the mission. A risk assessment must balance mission success against risk. Both the
AMC and GTC must ultimately agree the go/no-go decision.
h. Deliberate operations timeline. There will be occasions when the normal planning
times for a deliberate operation, by necessity have to be compressed for a time-
sensitive target (TST). This will involve rapid liaison between the GTC and the AMC.
Higher-level authority would need to consider the potential risks of compressing the
process in terms of mission success, A/C availability, value of the target and most
importantly the threat posed by the enemy and the risk to life of such an operation
going ahead, it is likely therefore that the decision will require duty holder involvement
from an aviation perspective.
103. OSW. The following OSW will assist in air assault operations planning and coordination
between the staffs of the GTC and AMC:
a. HLS directory. HLS (incl alternate HLS) should be listed with a code name, grid
reference, physical site description and the number of SH they are capable of bearing.
b. Desired order of arrival staff table (DOAST).
c. Force elements table (FET) and air movement table.
d. For amphibious operations: Helicopter employment and assault landing table (HEALT).
e. BM trace.
f. AH, RH and SH time and distance schematic.
g. MAOT table, Figure 4.3 refers.
USL
Ser Type USL Internal Load Wt PUP DOP Comments
scheme
4x NY 6501 2 on front hook, 2 on

1 CH47 5 pax 8600 kg 5740 Carlisle rear (rigged as two pairs)
ATMP 7461
Figure 4.3. MAOT table (extract)

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h. Air load plan, Figure 4.4 refers.
WAVE ONE: CH47/MERLIN - Lift 1-4 – GRYPHON to MDP via LIVERPOOL and MANCHESTER
1 2 3 4
CH-47 MERLIN CH-47 MERLIN
7 Para RHA 2 PARA

2 PARA 23 Engr Regt
16 pax - I Bty 12 pax - D Coy
16 pax - B Coy 32 pax - 9 Sqn
1 x 105mm
W MG
1 x Pinz
Figure 4.4. Air load plan (extract)
i. Mission execution checklist, Figure 4.5 refers. The format may have wider utility
than air assault operations, but is primarily used by 16 Air Assault Brigade.
Code
Ser Event Net From To Conditions Mandatory Remarks
word
1 Recce insert Bde Comd MAIN ALL Air permissive X
Weather out of
2 Recce abort Bde Comd MAIN limits
Enemy in LS area
Relay to
HF/ Clear of enemy ABTF/ BG/
3 HLS marked Recce MAIN X
TACSAT Air permissive Air mission
Comd
Comd DZ/HLS secure

4 Bde Comd MAIN ALL X
decision - Go Air permissive
DZ/HLS
insecure not air
Comd decision permissive
5 Bde Comd MAIN ALL
- No-go
Weather not
permissive
Enemy on HLS Relay to

6 Enemy on HLS Bde Comd Recce MAIN
HLS not secure Comd
HLS clear
7 HLS clear Bde Comd Recce MAIN
Weather in limits
ABTF brakes/
8 Bde Comd AMC MAIN
Y-hour
Code
Weather delay word fol
9 ROLEX Bde Comd MAIN All by Brakes/
Tgt delay L/Y/H-hour
+ minutes
ABTF/BG
AT/JHF/
10 dropped/ Bde Comd MAIN X
AMC/BG
inserted
Drop/insertion AT/JHF/ Weather out of

11 Bde Comd MAIN
weather abort AMC limits
Contents
Code
Ser Event Net From To Conditions Mandatory Remarks
word
Drop/insertion AT/ JHF/

12 Bde Comd MAIN Threat increased
threat abort AMC
Abort - No
13 Bde Comd
AWACS
14 No CAS/SEAD Bde Comd
15 Loss of SH Bde Comd JHF AMC MAIN By enemy action
16 Loss of SH Bde Comd JHF AMC MAIN Mechanical
Avn BG
17 Loss of AH Bde Comd MAIN By enemy action
AMC
Avn BG
18 Loss of AH Bde Comd MAIN Mechanical
AMC
AD (system) Strike
19 A/R AMC
active primary
AD (system) Strike
20 A/R AMC
destroyed primary
Figure 4.5. Mission execution checklist
j. Go/no-go criteria. Figure 4.6 refers, the format may have wider utility than air
assault operations, but is primarily used by 16 Air Assault Brigade.
WEATHER EO CONDITIONS ENEMY FRIENDLY FORCES
CURRENT POS SITUATION

TACAT
MANAGEABLE UNCHANGED
GROUND-TO- MISSION
FAST-JET
AIR THREAT UNCHANGED
AIR-TO-
AH SUFFICIENT AT
AIR THREAT
SH SUFFICIENT SH
APPROPRIATE DEGREE
OF CONTROL OF
THE AIR
SUFFICIENT
COMBAT POWER
NO-GO RED SUFFICIENT CS
COMD
AMBER SUFFICIENT CSS
DECISION
GO GREEN GO/NO-GO
Figure 4.6. Go/no-go criteria

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Allied planning processes

104. Introduction. UK forces should expect to operate alongside our principal allies on
future military operations. As such, it is important to understand the subtle differences
between our planning processes to achieve ever greater levels of interoperability.53 Most
military planning processes are similar, in that they first seek to understand a problem,
develop courses of action to address the problem, test the plan through wargaming,
conduct further refinement and finally disseminate the plan through orders. Commanders
and staff with a sound understanding of own national planning processes will naturally
be able to relate to the fundamentals of allies planning processes. This is particularly
important in a CJIIM environment. Figure 4.7 provides a comparison summary of the
principal and commonly encountered estimate processes used at the operational and
tactical levels, with further supporting detail on the US MDMP, FR MEDO and the GE
MDMP below.54
Strategic
Operational Operational Operational Higher
Level to Operational
to tactical to tactical to tactical tactical
operational
UK tactical
NATO COPD
Process NATO OLPP US MDMP FR MEDO GE MDMP estimate
phases
(6 Step)
Phase 1- initial
assessment
Phase 2 - 1. Situation
1. Initiation of 1. Receipt of 1. Understand
operational 1. Initiation
Understand planning mission assessment the situation
appreciation
the situation/ of strategic
problem environment
2. Orientation
Phase 3a mission 2. Problem and 2. Mission 2. Mission 2. Understand
(mission
analysis mission analysis analysis analysis the problem
analysis)
3. COA 3. COA 3. Formulate and

development development Orientation consider COAs
Phase 3b
COA
4. COA analysis 4. COA analysis 3. Concept Estimate of the 4. Develop and
development
(wargame) development situation validate COAs
Consider and
(COA dev and
develop COAs Phase 4a CONOP 5. COA validation
and comparison 5. COA assessment) Friendly COA 5. COA
development
comparison development evaluation
6. Comd COA
decision 6. COA approval COA decision 6. Commander’s
decision
7. CONOP and 3. Planning

Communicate Phase 4b OPLAN CONPLAN
7. Orders 4. Plan
4. Issuing of
development production development
development orders
Execute Phase 5 - 8. Campaign

execution assessment and
and 5. Plan review
Phase 6 - plan review/
assess
transition revision
Figure 4.7. Estimate process comparisons
53 See Chapter 1, Multinational interoperability.

54 Further detail on Allied Planning processes is in AFM Command, Chapter 10.
Contents
105. United States Army model. The US Army uses three planning estimates. Commanders
and staffs determine the appropriate mix of these methodologies based on the scope of
the problem, their familiarity with it, the time available, and the availability of a staff:
a. US Army design methodology. Not covered in this publication.
b. US military decision-making process (MDMP). The US MDMP is an iterative

planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course
of action, and produce an operation plan or order. It is used at battallion level and
up for both the operational and tactical levels and consists of seven steps. It is
designed for a time-constrained problem, so is similar to the the UK TE. The MDMP
facilitates collaborative and parallel planning as the higher CP solicits input and
continually shares information concerning future operations with subordinate and
adjacent units, supporting and supported units, and unified action partners through
planning meetings, warning orders, and other means. Commanders encourage active
collaboration among all organisations affected by the pending operations to build
shared understanding, participate in COA development and decision making, and
resolve conflicts before publication of the plan or order. Commanders and staffs
generally perform the steps sequentially; however, they may revisit several steps in an
iterative fashion, as more is learned about the situation before producing the plan or
order. US MDMP is summarised in Figure 4.8.
Macro difference I: Key inputs Steps Key outputs Macro difference II:
Comd gives guidance rather Beware staff stovepipes
• Higher headquarters’ plan or order Step 1: • Commander’s initial guidance
than own direction (at Q3) and superficial PPT analysis
or a new mission anticipated by the Receipt of mission • Initial allocation of time
commander
Warning order
Difference 1:
“Q1” subsumed • Higher headquarters’ plan or order • Mission statement Difference 2:
• Higher headquarters’ knowledge • Initial commander’s intent Specified, implied and
within step 2 Step 2:
and intelligence products • Initial planning guidance “essential” tasks.
• Knowledge products from other Mission analysis • Initial CCIRs and EEF’s
organisations • Updated IPB and running estimates
• Design concept (if developed) • Assumptions
Warning order
• Mission statement Step 3: • COA statements and sketches

Difference 3: • Initial commander’s intent, planning Course of action • Tentative task organisation
Step 3 COA dev guidance, CCIRs and EEFIs. (COA) • Broad concept of organisations
contains Qs 4-7 • Updated IPB and running estimates development • Revised planning guidance
• Assumptions • Updated assumptions
• Updated running estimates • Refined COAs Difference 4:

• Revised planning guidance Step 4: • Potential decision points Step 4 uses war-
• COA statements and sketches COA analysis • Wargame results gaming early for COA
• Updated assumptions (wargame) • Initial assessment measures analysis. Can be very
• Updated assumptions
‘formal’.
• Updated running estimates • Evaluated COAs

• Refined COAs Step 5: • Recommended COAs
• Evaluation criteria COA comparison • Updated running estimates
• Wargame results • Updated assumptions
Difference 5:
The COA comparison
and approval briefs
• Commander-selected COA and
are entire “steps”. • Updated running estimates any modifications.
• Evaluated COAs Step 6:
• Refined commander’s intent,
• Recommended COA COA approval
CCIRs and EEFIs.
• Updated assumptions • Updated assumptions
Warning order
• Commander-selected COA with • Approved operation plan
any modifications or order
• Refined commander’s intent, CCIRs Step 7:
and EEFIs Orders production
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement EEFI essential element of friendly information
COA course of action IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
Figure 4.8. US military decision-making process (MDMP) steps

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c. US troop leading procedures (TLP). US TLP extend the MDMP to small unit level.
The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. TLP are used at subunit level and
below, Figure 4.9 refers.
US troop leading procedures (TLP)
Receive the mission. The leader may receive the mission in a warning order (WARNORD), an
Step 1 operation order (OPORD), or a fragmentary order (FRAGO). They immediately begin to analyse
it using the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time and civil considerations (METT-TC).
Issue a warning order. The leader provides initial instructions in a warning order. The
Step 2
warning order contains enough information to begin preparation as soon as possible.
Make a tentative plan. The leader develops an estimate of the situation to use as the basis
for the tentative plan. The leader updates the estimate continuously and refines the plan
accordingly. The leader uses this plan as the start point for coordination, reconnaissance,
Step 3
task organisation (if required), and movement instructions; the leader then works through
this problem solving sequence in as much detail as time available allows. As the basis of the
estimate, the leader considers the factors of METT-TC.
Start necessary movement. The unit may need to begin movement while the leader is still
planning or forward reconnoitring. The platoon sergeant or a squad leader may bring the
Step 4 platoon forward, usually under the control of the company executive officer or first sergeant.
This is where subordinate leaders prepare men, weapons and equipment for the coming
mission.
Reconnoitre. If time allows, the leader makes a personal reconnaissance to verify the terrain
analysis, adjust the plan, confirm the usability of routes, and time any critical movements.
When time does not allow, the leader must make a map reconnaissance. The leader must
Step 5
consider the risk inherent in conducting reconnaissance forward of friendly lines. Sometimes
the leader must rely on others (for example, scouts) to conduct the reconnaissance if the risk
of contact with the enemy is high.
Complete the plan. The leader completes the plan based on the reconnaissance and any
changes in the situation. The mission is reviewed (as received it from the Comd) to ensure
Step 6
that the plan meets the requirements of the mission and stays within the framework of the
Comd’s intent.
Issue the order. Platoon and squad leaders normally issue oral operations orders. To aid
subordinates in understanding the concept for the mission, leaders should issue the order
Step 7 within sight of the objective or on the defensive terrain. When this is not possible, they
should use a terrain model or sketch. Leaders must ensure that subordinates understand the
mission, the Comd’s intent, the concept of the operation, and their assigned tasks.
Supervise. The leader supervises the unit’s preparation for combat by conducting rehearsals
Step 8
and inspections.
Figure 4.9. US troop leading procedures (TLP)

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106. French Army model. The tactical level military decision-making process is the Methode
D’Elaboration D’Une Decision Operationnelle (MEDO). UK forces working with the French
Army should expect to use the MEDO, Figure 4.10 refers.
FRENCH MEDO/GENERAL OVERVIEW

TF
Comd
Phase 1: Analysis Phase 2: Manoeuvre
Assigned-implied tasks/
MISSION What? constraints - imperatives How?
ANALYSIS Why? COA
Commander’s intent
development
Lines of ops
Comd initial intent OPFOR - fdly ECOAs
COG
Historical - political -
Context economic - legal ROE Decisive points Blue COAs
factors/people at 1st approach
Own forces
Overall timeframe Margin KEY EFFECT COAs
When? for proposal comparison
Operation tempo initiative
General Comd Wargaming
commitment Terrain Key area/
Where? analysis decision
overview points
weather
SITUATIONAL
Enemy forces Selection:
OVERVIEW Strengths
OPFOR Weaknesses Key effect Selected own
Hostile parties
Lines of ops forces COA
OPFOR - fdly COA decision
Friendly Own Capabilities COG
forces forces limitations brief
Decisive points
Key timings
Strength and points
ratio for action Requirements
ANALYSIS INTERMEDIATE CONCLUSIONS SYNTHESIS CONOPS

WINGO OPLAN/OPORD
Figure 4.10. French Army MDMP – the MEDO
107. German Army model. At the tactical level the German Army employs the German
military decision-making process (MDMP), Figure 4.11 refers. The German land forces
MDMP used to exercise tactical C2 of land forces is based on the supreme leadership
principle of German armed forces, mission command. The freedom of action afforded to
subordinate commanders in executing their orders is reflected in an unmistakably defined
concept of operations and in a mission with clear and realistic objectives. To this end,
they are provided with the necessary assets and given the time required for planning and
implementation.
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New mission/
need for action Situation assessment and control
Decision-making-stage
Mission analysis Warning order,

if applicable
Staff work plan
Information briefing to initiate Warning order

the estimate of the situation
Estimate of the situation part 1
Interim meeting(s) Warning orders

(staff backbriefs as required)
Orientation
Identify friendly courses of action
Estimate of the situation part 2
Decision briefing Warning order
Decision
Planning
Develop and prepare operation plan
Issuing of orders
Prepare operation order
Issue operation order Issue orders
Figure 4.11. German Army MDMP

Contents
CHAPTER 5
Risk
108. Introduction. Risk and risk management are described

Contents
in ADP Land Operations 2017 Annex 9A and AFM
• Definitions
Command Chapter 6, Section 6. This section will
• Risk tolerance
extract the key elements and provide further detail
• Risk management and the
on how risk should be managed during planning,
estimate
noting that the process is equally applicable during
• Completing the RIG
preparation and execution.
• Summary
Definitions
109. Risk. Military organisations broadly understand risk as: potentially damaging; made up
of cause, effect and consequence; explained in terms of likelihood or probability and
impact; and something that has to be accepted on the route to success. Risks, therefore,
are described as potential negative outcomes in relation to the force or the mission.
The events or conditions that lead to those negative outcomes are causes. The interplay
between cause and effect is inherently uncertain and requires commanders and staff to
manage risk.
110. Risk management. Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, planning
and managing risk arising from factors considered during planning, preparation and
execution, and making informed decisions that balance risk with mission benefits. Risk is
managed using the risk management tool, Figure 5.1 refers.
Contents
Risk analysis Risk management
Identify
Assess
• Risks
(activities and events)
Plan
• Likelihood
• Impacts
• Owners/those at risk
Manage
• Terminate
• Treat
• Tolerate
• Transfer
• Take • Responsibility
• Indicators & warnings
• Reassessment
Figure 5.1. The risk management tool
111. Operational risk. Involves two areas which are not mutually exclusive:
a. Risk to force. Comprises loss of elements of the force, or damage to its fighting
power.
b. Risk to the mission. Is the risk that the mission will not succeed? If risk to force is
realised, it may then contribute to mission failure.
112. Operating risk. Relates to the potential negative outcomes born out of operating
technical military capabilities. Such risks can only be fully understood by qualified and
experienced specialists and are not the focus of this chapter.
Risk tolerance
113. The risk envelope in which the force operates is dynamic and will change throughout an
operation depending on the context. Risk tolerance will ebb and flow depending on for
example: host-nation perceptions, alliance perceptions, international perceptions, home
and public perceptions, enemy capability, own combat effectiveness. Each of these will
have its own set of influences which will increase or decrease the risk tolerance level. Risk
should not be considered in its entirety, and while some risks are related, the majority
are likely to be independent of one another and therefore risk management must be
conducted on individual risks, and not on the whole risk envelope. The totality of risk is
referred to as the risk held. Risk tolerance is not binary and commanders must clearly
convey their attitude to risk to their subordinates; doing so will inform subordinates’
freedom of action. Risk tolerance is represented in Figure 5.2 and is described as follows:
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Untreatable within
means: transfer or
Untreatable
Exposure terminate (elevate)
Risk can be treated by

specific action. The
Requires treatment Capacity
residual risk should
then be broadly
acceptable
Broadly tolerable Tolerance
Figure 5.2. Risk tolerance
The green row is defined as broadly tolerable – this section depicts the level of risk a
commander is prepared to hold, at their level, and prior to any action to reduce risk. The
yellow row defined as requires treatment depicts the levels of risk that can be treated
by specific actions to make the residual risk acceptable. The upper edge is referred to
as risk capacity and is defined as the maximum level of risk an organisation can tolerate
to achieve its mission. If a risk cannot be sufficiently treated it becomes untreatable
illustrated by the red row, which leads to risk exposure which is the level of risk to which
the formation is actually exposed. At this level of risk the commander does not hold the
assets needed to treat the risk which exceeds their risk capacity. Engagement with the
higher CP is then required to transfer the risk to the higher commander, or to justify
requests for additional resources to enable treatment, and the subsequent reduction of
the risk to a tolerable level. If the risk cannot be transferred, then the only other option
is to terminate the risk by not pursuing the activity that generates the risk, with the
selection of a different course.
A clear understanding of risk tolerance enables the application of the 5Ts: tolerate; treat;
transfer; terminate; take (definitions of each at Figure 5.4).
Risk management and the estimate process

114. Risk management and the estimate process (TE and CE). Risk management and the
estimate processes (TE and CE) are linked, with risk(s) identified during the estimates
subsequently managed with the risk management tool. Risk(s) must be owned within a
CP but require input from all staff branches and constant review.
a. Articulating risk. Risks must be articulated correctly during 3CF analysis. The risk
must present a first order effect to mission success or force survival; if it does not then
it is a factor that needs further analysis, for example:
Contents
the risk is not that a helicopter gets shot down (that is the factor), the risk is that
the brigade cannot deliver MINFORCE onto the objective, or the brigade cannot
then sustain the force.
By articulating the risk correctly the appropriate mitigations for the risk (and not the
factor) can be considered, for example:
a CONPLAN, a branch plan or adjustment to COA development. Which may result

in the identification of an alternative way to deliver the force onto the objective; or
providing an alternate resupply CONPLAN; rather than focusing on how to prevent
the helicopter getting shot down.
b. Recording risk. All risks identified should be captured on a risk register, Figure 5.3
refers, and it should be noted that the individual identifying the risk must be prepared
to provide the supporting analysis for that risk. Risks are then managed using the
risk management tool and then displayed on the risk impact graph (RIG), Figure 5.3
refers, to visually depict the risk in terms of likelihood and impact both pre and post
mitigation and relative to other risks. Risks are reviewed as necessary thereafter. A
risk must be linked to a decision point (DP), and have associated commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs) to inform the DP. As it is likely that multiple factors
will result in the same risk, there can be multiple DPs and several mitigations for any
risk.
Ser Owner Risk Factor Action (5Ts) DP CCIR
Enemy air Treat: CONPLAN to Enemy Where Is enemy

defence (AD) use alternate HLS with AD not AD?
1 Air shoots down subsequent ground destroyed Is enemy AD
Unable Chinook on infiltration to objective. by H-1 on objective
to deliver insertion. destroyed?
MINFORCE
onto Troops not Terminate: Request Waiver not Have we
objective. qualified to waiver from higher HQ. received by received a
2 Air fly over water. Go/no-go criteria H-6 waiver to fly
troops over
water?
Engrs will Treat (subject to Water Is there a water

take longer CCIR): TASKORG Asslt source on source within
than 3 days Pioneer Pl with A Coy, objective reasonable
Unable to to bring and provide water not distance (1km)
sustain the MSR up to purification task in identified of the objective
3 Med
force with sufficient orders. by D-2 capable of
water. MLC to supporting
Transfer: Request
support water helicopter or airdrop of a Coy-sized
CST. water to sustain force. force?
Figure 5.3. An example risk register

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High
Risk
Risk impact graph (RIG) Risk to mission
Risk to force
IMPACT:
HIGH. Will have a major effect
IMPACT
Post mitigation (with tail)
on the operation. Will likely
result in significant casualties.
May result in major disruption
MEDIUM. Will have a ACTION (5Ts):
noticeable effect on the TOLERATE. Accept the risk
operation. May result in
significant loss. Will cause a TREAT. Take effective action to
degree of disruption reduce the risk
LOW. The consequences and Low LIKELIHOOD

TRANSFER. Let someone else
losses will not be severe. take the risk (e.g. by passing
Negligible effect on action the responsibility for the risk to
LIKELIHOOD: a superior)
HIGH. Very likely to happen TERMINATE. Agree that the
MEDIUM. Likely to happen infrequently risk is too high and do not
and difficult to predict proceed with the activity
LOW. Most unlikely to happen TAKE. Integrate into COA
development.
Action
Ser Risk Impact Owner Mitigation measure
(5Ts)
1
Figure 5.4. An example risk impact graph (RIG)
Completing the RIG

115. The RIG is a visual method for displaying risk that allows relative judgment of the variety
of risks facing an organisation. The RIG should only feature the risks that remain current;
those that have been removed by effective planning should remain in the risk register as
a record, but be removed from the RIG. When placing specific risks on the RIG a relative
assessment must be made of the likelihood of the risk coming into fruition, and the
impact on either the mission or the force if it did. An arrow to indicate the post mitigation
likelihood and impact should be added.
Summary
116. Commanders must identify the critical activity that needs to be conducted to enable
success (critical success factors) and then identify the key risks to the mission and to the
force. These risks feed CCIRs and decision points. The conditionality for each DP needs to
be reflected in the decision support matrix (DSM) which in turn must be used during the
execution of operations. Once a risk has been identified and articulated, it can then be
resourced and potentially becomes an opportunity.55
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CHAPTER 6
Deception
117. Introduction. The increasing sophistication and Contents

proliferation of surveillance systems, now available
• Purpose
to opposing armies and civilians alike, has made the
• Deception techniques
battlefield more transparent, making deception56 harder
• Deception types
to achieve. However, such systems can be deceived,
• Planning considerations
degraded, neutralised or destroyed. Modern surveillance
• Monitoring success
systems, the internet and social media also open up
• Failure to deceive
opportunities by supplying a greater number of channels
through which to influence an opponent. The human
mind is the target of deception and remains susceptible to being deceived.
118. There undoubtedly exists a greater requirement to think more deeply and more
imaginatively about how deception can be achieved. On a modern battlefield, where the
smallest advantage could be decisive, it is in the successful employment of deception that
the advantage may be found. Deception must be included in planning from the outset
resulting in a considered and resourced plan that is likely to succeed. Deception activity
that is included late and is limited by resources will probably not succeed. To
exploit deception opportunities it is necessary to understand what the enemy is willing to
accept, condition the enemy’s behaviour and reinforce their expectations. The aim is to
influence the enemy’s behaviour, not their thinking, achieved by creating distractions (hide
the real) and presenting illusions (show the false) and by using methods and techniques
that ensure the deception is credible, consistent, verifiable and executable.
119. Deception requires considerable planning effort, and a high degree of operations security
(OPSEC) to ensure that the real intent is unknown to the enemy – deception and OPSEC
are symbiotically linked. In addition, countersurveillance protects our true intentions and is
therefore a critical enabling activity for deception.
Purpose
120. Purpose. The purpose of deception is to mislead and confuse the enemy thus persuading
them to adopt or continue with a COA that is to their disadvantage and which can
then be exploited. Where possible, this is achieved by reinforcing the enemy’s existing
preconceptions and/or conditioning their behaviour. Deception is a force multiplier and
the employment of a relatively small proportion of a force on deception-related tasks
can achieve significant effect. Deception plans must have a clearly defined aim, be
convincing by playing to enemy’s perceptions, prejudices and likely reactions, and be
flexible, without consuming disproportionate resources or time. A commander and staff
must consider the enemy’s use of deception. Deception is not an intellectual battle of
wits for its own sake, neither is it a capability merely to confuse the enemy - the object
of deception is to convince the enemy to take a specific action (or inaction) in support
of an overall military objective. Therefore, any deception plan must be derived from, and
56 Further detail on deception is contained within AFM Warfighting Tactics Part 1: The Fundamentals.
Contents
be directly supportive of, the commander’s mission. Deception supports the mission by
trying to achieve:
a. Surprise. To disguise or conceal our intentions, strengths, vulnerabilities and

movement.
b. Security. To portray a false friendly course of action, enhanced by the OPSEC.
c. Freedom of action. By occupying enemy forces in meeting a supposed threat, the

commander achieves greater freedom of action elsewhere on the battlefield.
d. Economy of effort. Effective deception may reduce expenditure of time and

resources, and save lives of friendly troops.
121. Principles. The principles for deception are as follows:
a. Select and maintain a clear aim.
b. Planning and control is command led.
c. Deception activity is comprehensive and coherent.
d. Deception activity must appear competent and consistent.
e. Deception activity must be convincing.
f. Confirm the enemy’s expectations.
g. Conceal the real plan.
h. Be prepared to change the plan.
i. Creativity underpins deception.
j. Accurately calculate when deception activity is conducted.
122. Incorporating deception. Deception must be an integral part of all operations. The
commander must consider deception as part of the analysis, rather than arriving at
a decision, and only then considering how deception could support the operation.
Deception can assist in:
a. Masking intentions and objectives, vulnerabilities, deployments, timings and locations

of crucial phases of an operation, and capabilities (therefore increasing the surprise
effect of those capabilities).
b. Forcing the enemy onto ground of our choosing and the premature deployment of
enemy forces.
c. Diverting enemy reconnaissance, fires, and EW effort.
123. Methods of deception. There are two methods of deception; these are simulation and
dissimulation activities:
a. Simulation. Simulation involves showing the enemy false activity, equipment and
positions. For a simulation to appear believable the enemy must be presented with the
picture they have reason to expect.
b. Dissimulation. Dissimulation involves hiding the real; concealing it completely or

making it appear to be something else.
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Deception techniques
124. There are a number of techniques that can be used as part of an overall
deception plan, for example:
a. The obvious solution. Deception activity reinforces the impression that an obvious
way of achieving the objective has been adopted, while actually taking a different COA.
b. The false routine. This is conditioning of the enemy by repetition to believe that an
apparently standard routine will be pursued while in fact preparing a quite different
COA.
c. The substitution. Activity that leads the enemy to believe that nothing has changed
by covertly substituting the false for the real and vice-versa.
d. The lure. Presenting the enemy with what appears to be a sudden or ideal opportunity
which they must exploit, whereas they are in fact being lured into a trap.
e. The deliberate leak. The deliberate dissemination of information via agents or other
clandestine links in such a way that the enemy believes they have obtained a piece of
vital intelligence through skilful work.
f. The mistake. Leading the enemy to believe that valuable information has come into
their possession by mistake, through a breach of security, negligence or inefficiency.
g. The piece of bad luck. Convincing the enemy that they have acquired information of
vital importance by accident, because of a train of circumstances over which the enemy
had no control.
h. Exploiting the enemy’s C2 and sources of intelligence. Exploiting processing

systems in an opponent’s C2 through information overload and exploiting over-reliance
on a trusted source such as SIGINT or espionage.
Deception types
125. Types of deception activity. Within these techniques, five types of activities can be
used in combination to help build the desired impression:
a. Countersurveillance. 57 Countersurveillance covers ‘hiding and disguising’, normally

through camouflage, concealment, track discipline, absence of movement, emission
control (EMCON) 58 measures such as radio silence, and other passive measures taken to
conceal the presence of a unit, formation or installation.
b. Display. A display is any means used to attract an enemy’s attention. In the case of
deception this is aimed at confusing and misleading, principally over the nature, size,
locations and intentions of the force opposing them. Useful tools include decoys,
mock-ups, dummy positions, equipment and obstacles, simulated tracks, heat sources,
radio traffic, radar reflectors (‘corner’ reflectors) and other means of portraying a unit
that does not exist, or giving a false impression over the size of the unit/formation
c. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract an enemy force by seeking contact with
it. Contact is sought for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the location and/
57 See DN 16/03 OPSEC and Countersurveillance.

58 EMCON is the selective control of emitted electromagnetic, thermal or acoustic energy to minimise the enemy’s detection
of emissions and exploitation of the information so gained, or to improve the performance of friendly sensors. DN 16/03
OPSEC and Countersurveillance, page 7-f.
Contents
or time of the actual main tactical action, to fix an element of the enemy and distract
its commander to persuade the enemy to redeploy their forces, alter the supporting
fire plan, deploy reserves in the wrong place at the wrong time, or reveal a carefully
concealed position by firing prematurely.
d. Demonstration. The purpose of a demonstration is to distract an enemy’s attention

without seeking contact. Like a feint, a demonstration must appear as a threat, be
resourced, and conform to enemy expectations to be convincing.
e. Ruse. A ruse is a trick, stratagem or artifice designed to deceive the enemy.
f. Electronic deception. Electronic deception is the deliberate radiation, alteration,

absorption or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner intended to confuse,
distract or seduce an enemy or electronic systems (AAP-06).59 While deception based
solely on electronic deception is unlikely to succeed, it is an essential part of most
deception planning and works best when integrated in the overall plan. Electronic
deception may be considered as follows:
(1) Manipulation. Manipulation is the alteration of a force’s electronic

characteristics to counter enemy electronic support measures.60 The object of
manipulation is to fool the enemy into accepting the electronic characteristics
presented as the real thing, leading to an incorrect assessment of ORBATs,
capabilities and intentions.
(2) Simulation. Simulation is the electronic representation of own forces used

to portray false locations, deployments, ORBATs and capabilities and is most
effective when there is a force mass in which to mask the true intent.
(3) Imitation. The injection of false and misleading information direct to the
enemy’s communication systems.
Planning considerations
126. Deception planning considerations. The principal considerations when planning for
deception are as follows:
a. Commanders must see the value of deception and be willing to employ it coordinated
and synchronised across the physical, virtual and cognitive dimensions.
b. Direction and authorisation for the use of deception must come from the highest levels
of command.
c. A commander and staff need to understand the legal obligations (e.g. Law of Armed
Conflict) and the implications for permissions and authorisations.
d. The deception plan must support the overall narrative; this could be HMG or coalition.
e. Deception planning needs to be centralised, coordinated and synchronised with other

plans and activities.
f. Plan for the intended and unintended consequences (second and third- order effects).
59 Conversely, a reduction in friendly emissions and reducing the release of routine info puts the enemy in a position whereby
they must accept a gap in his knowledge or be forced to look for information and in doing so potentially lead the enemy
to ‘see’ the deception, e.g. a build-up of forces.
60 DN 16/03 OPSEC and Countersurveillance, page 12. ESM. These include search, intercept, direction finding and analysis of
communication and non-communications transmissions.
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g. Monitoring (feedback channels) and evaluation (assessment) are to be considered early

and not as an afterthought.
h. Deception planning is normally conducted as part of G5 plans but it is a multi-branch

activity.
i. Deception planning takes time and requires resources.
j. OPSEC is essential to success but plan for compromise, change and if required the
termination of the deception plan.
127. The table at Figure 6.1 captures considerations for deception planning integrated within
the estimate process.61
Understand the situation/problem (TE: Steps 1-2; CE: Q0-3)
Consider national characteristics What enemy preconceptions or Will the higher CP agree the
and background, including: expectations can be exploited? use of deception and does the
dictatorial/democratic, Conduct an assessment of an deception support the higher
centralised/decentralised, enemy’s ISR capability. What own Comd’s intent?
secretive/open, suspicious/ ISR is available to support? Analyse the enemy’s
receptive, Comds selected on communications infrastructure
ability or loyalty to regime Which enemy ISR is most easily
deceived for exploitation; how do to identify that which may be
What is the profile of national I neutralise the remainder? exploited by EWSI
leadership, their biases and Is there a local population
perceptions? Where can I take advantage of
the weather and ground1? present, what are their
Assess the enemy’s experience of sympathies, and can they be a
deception in recent conflicts. How can I take advantage of conduit for deception?
the enemy’s vulnerability to data
Evaluate the enemy Comd in saturation? Is there media present3?
detail; their characteristics, How long do I need to maintain
leadership style, experiences, What constraints and
opportunities exist in time, space, the deception for?
biases, preconceptions and
expectations for exploitation resources (EWSI2, materiel, men What support might be available
and equipment), ROE, etc. that form higher, OGD or national
What knowledge of friendly might impact the deception plan? agencies?
forces’ capabilities, intentions,
and tactics does the enemy hold? Does the enemy routinely employ
deception, if so how? consider
development of a counter-
surprise plan.
Consider and develop COAs (TE: Steps 3-5; CE: Q4-7)
How quickly will the enemy Higher CPs approval of the Do the benefits of the deception
respond to deception activity, deception plan is required outweigh the resources allocated
how does this effect deception does the effect on the enemy to it?
activity timings? behaviours have adverse effects What is the risk to the mission
Is the deception plan for own forces elsewhere? if the deception is compromised
aligned with the OPSEC/ Is the plan coordinated with or does not result in the enemy
countersurveillance plan? flanking forces on a need to taking the intended action:
How can I dominate the enemy’s know basis to reduce the risk of does it expose friendly forces to
use of the EMS for exploitation? compromise? unacceptable risks?
What control is required over Assess the risks involved in

friendly force use of the EMS? each COA against compromise;
consider adequacy of resources,
What CI activity is required to enemy ISR capability, impact of
support the deception plan? local population and media, and
knowledge and ability of own
trips to execute the plan?
61 The table groups the categories of considerations consistently with AFM Command, Chapter 6, Plan 6.1-9, Figure 6.1.7-
Stages of UK estimate process.
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Make a decision/communicate (TE: Step 6; CE: COA decision brief)
The Comd decides which The plan should include the Current intelligence on enemy’s
deception plan to adopt. They desired enemy reaction to each ORBAT, force dispositions and
may decide not to employ event, for use in the monitoring any changes/redeployment as a
deception, but should only do process result of deception operations
this after full consideration of The deception activity within Indicators and enemy response
the COAs and associated risks the plan should be distributed must be identified to monitor the
A detailed operational plan on a strict “need to know” basis progress and effectiveness of the
incorporating deception is usually as an annex deception plan
produced. Deception and real To reduce the risks of
activity should be integrated to compromise, forces involved in
develop the desired picture. the implementation of deception
The deception plan will need should only receive extracts
extensive coordination as covering their immediate part in
failure to implement a stage, the operation
or a deviation in timings, could
compromise the operation
or result in the enemy
misinterpreting the indicators
Execute and assess
The conduct of a deception Actual military activities may EW, SIGINT and HUMINT may
operation has to be carefully be required; only when it is need to be tasked to identify any
synchronised to build up the apparent to forces involved that failures of the enemy to respond
desired picture; failure to meet their actions are unusual that the as intended to deception activity
the timings has to be reported minimum amount of detail on the It may be necessary to mount
immediately for corrective action deception plan should be released specific actions to take prisoners
Minimise the chance of Intelligence staff must monitor for interrogation for this purpose
compromise for indicators and responses that Remain aware of the possibility of
Those involved in obvious the enemy is responding to the counter-deception as the enemy
simulation, such as constructing deception in the manner intended may implement a deception that
dummy equipment and EW, SIGINT and HUMINT matches friendly expectations
positions, or transmitting false may provide insights into the
communications should be perception of developing events
briefed only on their immediate in the minds of the enemy
role
1 The nature of the terrain will dictate the complexity of the deception plan and its implementation. Open terrain
will require “display” techniques whereas complex terrain (urban, woods and forests) can make better use of
concealment. It is possible to take advantage of poor weather to conceal movement but may make the deception
activity less visible to the enemy.
2 DN 16/06 pages 52 and 63 describes electronic warfare signals intelligence support at division and below.
3 The media must not be used for the passage of false indicators, nor can they be told untruths. They can,
however, be given access to real activities within the deception plan. The OPSEC plan must consider the media in
the AOO.
Figure 6.1. Considerations for deception planning
Monitoring success
128. Monitoring the success of deception. ISR assets need to be allocated to the task of
monitoring deception, although they must be used in a manner so as not to compromise
the operation. Overt deployments and actions of the enemy will give an indication of
an effective deception. Prisoners, human intelligence and open sources should also
provide further evidence. Plans should be prepared for a failure in deception and its
re-evaluation. When assessing the effectiveness of the deception plan, the following is
required:
Contents
a. Monitoring of the effectiveness of OPSEC measures.
b. Monitoring of the effectiveness (evidenced) of the deception.
c. Assessing the requirement for remedial action to the deception plan.
d. Deciding whether to continue, adjust or terminate the deception plan.
Failure to deceive
129. If the deception plan is failing, a revision may be required. There are many
potential reasons why a deception can fail, but the main causes are:
a. Compromise. The enemy identified the deception, and deliberately did not respond in
the intended manner.
b. Failure of story. The enemy failed to recognise the story presented (inadequate
indicators or failure to detect).
c. Misinterpretation. The enemy misinterprets the indicators and fails to respond in the
desired manner.
d. Inadequate analysis. The enemy’s potential COAs are not correctly identified during
the analysis phase of deception planning.
e. Restraints. While the enemy may have interpreted the indicators correctly, they may
be constrained in responding to them, e.g. directed by higher command or a lack of
resources or capability to do so.
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CHAPTER 7
Tactical-level fires and targeting
Tactical fireplan Contents

130. A fireplan is a tactical plan for using the weapons of a • Tactical fireplan
unit or formation so that their fire will be coordinated. • Fires and division-level
The ability to rapidly concentrate fire and to move it operations process
around the battlespace enables the fires commander to • Fires and brigade/
quickly reallocate priorities in support of the manoeuvre battlegroup-level
commander’s intent. Fireplan priorities are usually based operations process
upon fighting the deep battle, resourcing the close • Targeting
battle and protecting the rear. Fireplans are articulated • Target engagement process
on the AB545 fireplan proforma and the AB545B • Assessment
resources proforma. A fireplan will evolve and develop • Annex 7A: Target lists and
in tandem with the manoeuvre plan, which will be effects guidance
illustrated throughout this chapter at different command
levels. Figure 7.1 provides an overview showing the key
stages in the tactical and combat estimate processes and how the targeting cycle and fire
planning are synchronised.62
Estimate/targeting cycle/fire Assess

planning Plan Execute
Tactical estimate: Steps 1-2 Steps 3-6
Combat estimate: Q0-3 Q4-7
Targeting cycle:
1. Deliberate targeting: Understand
Targeting board (TB) Decide

Formal CDE Detect
LOAC/ROE
Deliver
Assess
2. Targeting in contact:
No formal TB (ad hoc as required)
LOAC/ROE for combat engagement Combat engagement
Inherent right (necessary/

proportionate) Self-defence
Fires resource
allocation
Fire planning:
Fireplan development
Figure 7.1. Synchronisation of estimates (TE and CE), the targeting cycle and fire planning
62 Further information is within DN 16/01 Fires; from which this chapter is extracted.
Contents
Fires and division-level operations process

131. The process of how fires supports the division-level operations process, based on the
tactical estimate (TE) is detailed in Figure 7.2. The TE is explained fully in Chapter 2.
Steps Activity
DCOM Joint Fires and fires staff will consider a range of factors, including:
Targeting priorities. Identifying the high payoff targets that will have a significant
effect on the enemy’s will and cohesion if destroyed
Find and understand. Determining the find activities that will enable a sufficient
Steps 1 and 2:
level of understanding to enable targeting
GBAD. Identifying priorities for protection
Battlespace management. An initial understanding of requirements focusing on the
FSCM, ACM and BSM that will need to be supported during the operation
The PPG will formulate two potential COAs based on the Comd’s direction, by this point
there will be a firmer understanding of the fires requirement for the operation as well as
the necessary find and understand activities
Detailed planning will continue for the following fires activities:
Deep target strike, including counterfires
Lethal and non-lethal counter command fires
Step 3: Formulation
of COAs The allocation of close supporting fires assets to manoeuvre forces, including
precision attack
Suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) tasks
GBAD asset allocation to support the joint prioritised defended asset list (JPDAL) or
the critical asset list – which will direct where assets are initially located
The detailed development of the FSCM, ACM and BSM that will need to be adopted
and how they will be dynamically managed
Formulation of the draft concept of fires and the AB545B (fires resources proforma)
Steps 4-6: Decision
commences
Refinement of the concept of fires and the AB545B

Refinement of the high payoff target list (HPTL). Refinement of the effects guidance
matrix (EGM) – which provides the detailed direction for the use of lethal and non-lethal
TE fires outputs fires, mainly in support of the deep battle
Refinement of the critical asset list
Refinement of battlespace management led by SO2 BM and supported by functional
leads from manoeuvre, fires, air, aviation and GBAD
As part of the Div daily battle rhythm, three boards are critical to the assessment and
refinement of plans:
Evaluation board – chaired by the Comd, it is the main board where direction and
guidance is issued relating to plans being refined. The Comd directs the effects that he
wishes to achieve with integrated action for the next 96 hours. DCOM Joint Fires will
take this direction to enable the deliberate targeting effort that takes place in the Div
JFC.
Daily battle rhythm Integrated action working group (IAWG) – Chaired by SO1 Joint Fires and enabled by
the Comd’s direction from the evaluation board. The IAWG deals with the integration,
refinement and prioritisation of target sets into a single target list. It ensures Div collect
assets meet both the target collection priorities, as well as the G2 intelligence and
understand requirements across the Div area of operations. The resultant target list also
permits refinement of the EGM and ISTAR collection plan (ICP).
Synchronisation board – chaired by the COS, its purpose is to validate the integrated
target list, endorse the ICP and the EGM against the Comd’s priorities, arbitrating as
necessary, as well as synchronising the intended delivery of lethal and non-lethal actions
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Execute
Pre-planned targets. G3 conducts the engagement of pre-planned targets that appear

on the joint prioritised target list (JPTL) and which have been processed through the
deliberate targeting cycle that is conducted within the JFC
Dynamic targets. G3 will also engage dynamic targets as they emerge in accordance
with the guidance provided by the EGM. Dynamic targets are still subject to the targeting
process and engagement approval. However, approval is delivered by convening a hasty
targeting board that uses the five pillars (ROE, PID, PoL, TEA, CDE) plus BDA clearance
process.
Fires execution Combat engagement. Will also be conducted by G3. With a combat engagement, a
target does not require to be considered by a formal TB. However, before engagement
the Comd must be satisfied that the five pillar plus BDA criteria have been met.
Targeting. G3 is supported by a targeting team that can quickly process dynamic and
time sensitive targets using the five plus BDA pillars clearance, ensuring that the time
taken from the point the target is seen to the point of engagement is minimised
Battlespace management. BM measures are dynamically applied and adjusted by a BM
team that supports G3. The air support operations centre (ASOC) can deploy with G3 to
provide support with airspace control.
Assess
An ongoing process that compares how events have unfolded, against how they were
Evaluation expected to unfold, enabling adjustments to be made to mitigate or exploit a changing
situation
BDA is the act of determining the effectiveness of target engagement, while measures of
effectiveness (MOE) are criteria by which success is judged and are established prior to
target engagement
Battle damage Immediate effects may be obvious from the physical damage to a target. However, it
assessment may take time to determine whether an engagement has been successful in terms of the
targets ability to carry out its intended mission. The ‘Assess’ column in the EGM notes
the range of systems that may be used to conduct BDA (EW/CAS/UAS – assets operated
by the information and understand functional cell) and the MOE that may be used to
judge success
The output from the evaluation of the activities conducted by the Div is fed into the
Evaluate output evaluation board in order for the Comd to make his assessment and issue further
direction and guidance
Figure 7.2. Divisional fires planning
Fires and the brigade/battlegroup-level operations process

132. The process of how fires supports the brigade and battlegroup-level operations process,
based on the combat estimate (CE) is detailed in Figure 7.3. The CE is explained fully in
Chapter 3. At the brigade level, the CO and JFC of a brigade’s affiliated close support
artillery regiment enable the delivery of the fires function, with the CO as a member of the
brigade PPG supported by SO2 Air, SO2 Aviation and SO2 Air Defence. At the battlegroup
level, the fires function is enabled by the battlegroups affiliated close support BC and his
JFC. The BC is an integral member of the battlegroup’s PPG.
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Question Bde JFC BG JFC
Receive Div OSW Receive Bde OSW

Understand the context of the coming operation to Understand the context of the coming
enable Bde response operation to enable BG response
CO Guns reviews fires annex within Div OSW BC reviews fires annex within brigade
Circulate AMAs/ARAs/NFAs from op order OSW
Targeting cell – liaises with Bde Sound understanding of TD and ROE

required
G2, identify enemy composition, capabilities,
locations and strengths ROOB:
Q0
Review of campaign TD and ROE BC – briefs fires assets are available
and for how long. This will impact on
ROOB: what the BG can actually achieve
CO Guns – delivers fires overview: assets BC presents coherent picture when
available, key assumptions and constraints, STA and GBAD elements are present
understanding of initial RFIs in the BG
SO2 Air/Aviation – deliver Met brief C2 relationship with these assets
SO2 AD – deliver outline of key AD deductions must be understood
emanating from received orders
CO Guns and JFC staff contribute to Bde BC and JFC staff contribute to BG
assessment of Q1 assessment of Q1
Concurrent activity includes: Concurrent activity includes:
Contribute to collation of brigade RFIs Contribute to collation of BG RFIs
Initial understanding of fires specified and Initial understanding of fires specified
implied tasks, including STA and AD and implied tasks, including STA
Identify likely gun areas and ACP location and AD
Q1 Issue warning order to FDC Develop initial understanding of BM
issues (which will continue to be
Develop initial 3D BM – TM, FSCM and developed throughout the estimate
ACM (which will continue to be developed process)
throughout the estimate process)
Key BM issue for BC and BG Comd is
Targeting cell – continue review of ROE and terminal control of fires linked to the
conduct CDE proximity of friendly forces and how
Targeting cell – generates Bde HPTL/HVTL/EGM this will be managed
from Div product. Develops NSL and RTL Issue warning order to FSTs
CO Guns and JFC conduct fires MA and contributes BC conducts fires mission analysis
to wider Bde analysis Contributes to the wider BG MA
Need to understand the specified and implied Need to understand the specified and
fires tasks that will frame the AB545B (resources implied fires tasks that will ultimately
proforma), EGM, DSM frame the BG fireplan
Understand freedoms and constraints regarding Understand freedoms and constraints
the use of fires at Bde level and develop initial fires regarding the use of fires at BG level and
priorities to support manoeuvre develop initial fires priorities to support
Q2
Determine required fires resources (which may result BG manoeuvre
in a resource discussion with the Div JFC) Determine required fires resources (which
CO Guns must be an advocate for the maximum may result in a resource discussion with
allocation of fires resources the Bde JFC)
When to unmask guns? Implications for adjustment BC must be an advocate for the
of targets, target guarantee and requirement for maximum allocation of fires resources
registration Discuss requirement for target
adjustment with BG Comd
CO Guns provides fires advice to the Bde Comd and BC provides fires advice to the BG Comd,
Q3
injects initial responses to RFIs includes STA and GBAD
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Question Bde JFC BG JFC
The JFC continues to develop the themes identified BC and BG JFC staff provide fires
in the earlier questions and will contribute to the advice to COA teams integrating fires
development of the DSO considerations into proposed COAs
CO Guns and JFC staff provide fires advice to (including STA and GBAD)
COA teams integrating fires considerations into BC should not be nominated as a COA
proposed COAs team leader but should act as an SME
Q4 Initial intent schematic for AB545B is drafted. BC and BG JFC contributes to the
Air/aviation and GBAD SMEs advise COA teams as development of the DSO and DSM
necessary A more detailed understanding of how
BM – more detailed focus on how FSCM and BM will affect the BG will be developed
ACM will be dynamically managed as operation
progresses (SO2 Effects/SO2 Air/Aviation, SO2 AD)
Targeting cell will refine and issue EGM
JFC contributes to the ongoing development of Development of how fires resources

the DSM should be grouped and allocated to
Development of how fires resources should be deliver each effect within each COA
grouped and allocated to deliver each effect within Allocated resources should include STA
each COA assets not owned by the BG
Q5
Entire requirement must be identified before Entire requirement must be identified
synchronisation before synchronisation
Identify and request additional fires resources if Identify and request additional fires
required resources if required
Confirmation of the location of ARAs/AMAs Review FST allocation
CO Guns and JFC staff identify the sequence in BC identifies the sequence in which
which actions take place within each COA actions take place within each COA
Allocate fires assets to support Bde Comd’s ME and Allocate fires assets to support BG
Q6 overall intent Comd’s ME and overall intent
JFC staff contribute to the development of the BC to ensure that fires, STA and GBAD
synch matrix and other OSW ensuring that fires tasks fully represented in synch matrix
tasks are fully represented and other OSW
Finalise detailed FSCM/ACM for each phase of the FSCM and ACM as pertains to the BG
action agreed and understood
Q7
Will need to be dynamically applied as action How this will be managed as action
progresses progresses must also be understood
CO Guns and JFC team briefs fires intent and assets BC briefs how supporting fireplan will
allocated for each phase support BG Comd’s overall plan
Wargame
Red team critique Red team critique
Adjustments to the plan as required Adjustments to plan as required
JFC produces fires intent schematic, AB545B BG JFC produces fires, STA and GBAD
resources proforma (who is being supported by elements of OSW as estimate progresses
what fires assets during which phase) Covers concept of how fires will support
OSW
Fires annex detailing concept of fires the BG
production
GBAD annex Summarises who is being supported by
Transmit to BGs what fires assets during which phase
AB545 fireplan proforma
Figure 7.3. Brigade and battlegroup fires planning

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133. At battlegroup level, the BC must ensure that fires resources are included in the TASKORG
and DSM, as well as any additional STA capabilities owned at the higher command levels,
coupled with any implications that this integration may have for the battlegroup.
134. Fire support teams (FST). The allocation of FSTs by the BC will usually have been laid
down prior to the current action and sound working relationships developed between
subunit commanders and their respective FST commanders. However, it should be
understood that FSTs are assets that require to be managed holistically for the benefit
of the battlegroup and its commander. This may well see an FST temporarily removed
from its associated subunit and deployed to conduct a specific task, such as an anchor
observation post (OP), during a particular phase of a tactical action.
135. Orders group. At the battlegroup commander’s orders group the BC will deliver the
details of the fireplan, including:
a. The concept of how fires, STA and GBAD will support the battlegroup action.
b. The fires, STA and GBAD assets that have been allocated to the battlegroup for the
specific action; who is being supported by which assets during which particular phase
of the action.
c. The fires assets that are not immediately available to the battlegroup but which are
within range and can therefore be called on if required. This would also relate to fires
assets and STA assets allocated to the counterfires task. If elements of the battlegroup
are subject to indirect fire during the coming action, it will provide a degree of
reassurance that fires assets are allocated and ready to deliver an immediate riposte
against enemy.
d. The locations of FSTs, STA detachments and GBAD fire units deployed within the
battlegroup area. The various elements of the battlegroup need to know who will be
operating in their respective areas.
136. Rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill. The BC will brief at each turn of the ROC drill,
giving an overview of how fires are to contribute to shaping activities in the deep battle,
including counterfires and will then cover the detail of how the fireplan will be providing
close support to battlegroup manoeuvre during each separate phase. The relevant
FST commander will also brief at each turn, which will provide confirmation to the
battlegroup commander, the BC and the subunit commanders that the FSTs understand
the plan and their role in it.
137. Execution. At some stage, adjustment to the original plan will be required. The fires
commander at each level must understand this and be prepared to modify the fireplan as
necessary. Modifications may include:
a. The unplanned movement of FSTs, which may result in delay.
b. Dwelling on targets to ensure the continuity of fire support to force elements that are
encountering harder than expected resistance.
c. The reallocation of fire units to reinforce a unit or subunit.
d. The requesting of additional fires assets from a higher command level.
e. The engagement of opportunity targets by a superimposed battery.

Contents
f. If a tactical action lasts longer than anticipated, as does the supporting fireplan, there
may be ammunition resupply implications. Building in a reserve of ammunition during
planning is essential. A simple fireplan will be easier to modify.
Targeting
138. Introduction. A target is an area, structure, object, mindset, thought process, attitude
or behaviour pattern against which weapons or military activity can be directed. It
is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them,
taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. The process underpins
the lethal and non-lethal actions that must be directed at specific targets to realise the
commander’s intended effects in the physical, virtual and cognitive dimensions. Targeting
is fundamental to integrated action.
139. Purpose. The purpose of targeting is to enable the commander to have such an effect
on an enemy that they have neither the will nor the capability to pose a significant risk to
the success of the mission. In MCO, targeting is an important activity that will enable the
successful conduct of manoeuvre operations. In a COIN campaign, targeting may be the
main method by which insurgent networks are attacked and may come to dominate the
operation. Targeting is a commander-led CP function, controlled by the COS. Targeting:
a. Ensures that all actions are effectively coordinated.
b. Ensures that actions are mutually supporting and undertaken in accordance with the
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and applicable ROE.
c. Provides coherence between the activities that take place in the land environment and
those within the joint operations area (JOA).
d. Takes into account national, and multinational legal direction and policy.
140. The targeting process delivers a better understanding of the resources needed to find
targets and allows commanders to make judgements regarding how best to employ these
resources. It also provides the command oversight that enables decision making regarding
effects coherence and where to direct specific actions. Targeting, nested within the general
planning framework, supports an efficient battle rhythm and allows a better understanding
of the risks relating to unintended consequences.
141. Ineffective targeting will not only result in sub optimal tactical and operational outcomes,
but will also increase the risk of avoidable collateral damage and potentially mission critical
consequences.
142. The targeting continuum. The requirement to conduct formal targeting will be
stipulated within the operational targeting directive (TD), which may be issued both
nationally, or within a coalition framework. The distinctions between deliberate
targeting, combat engagement and self-defence must be understood, along with the
requirements that relate to each:
a. Deliberate targeting. Deliberate targeting usually occurs within formation-level

CP where specialist staff are integrated to conduct the process as part of the overall
planning effort. Pre-planned targeting, accelerated targeting and time-sensitive
targeting (TST) sit within this category and are usually conducted within the context
of the deep battle. Targets that are subject to this process require to be cleared by a
formal target clearance board (TCB) before they can be engaged.
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b. Combat engagements. Combat engagements and actions conducted in the context

of self-defence are more likely to occur during the contact battle where the convening
of a formal TCB at formation level is not required. However, depending on the
target circumstances, the time available and the understood potential for negative
consequences resulting from engagement, the convening of an ad hoc TCB using
five pillar plus BDA clearance may be deemed appropriate, when time permits. For
example, during MCO, divisional ISR assets discover a high payoff enemy capability
that has the potential to be prosecuted immediately, but is concealed in a populated
area or near critical infrastructure. While an immediate combat engagement may be
warranted, the potential for collateral damage may harm the achievement of military
objectives. The particular target factors may lead to a decision to convene an ad hoc
TCB which may make the decision not to engage, or may impose stricter guidance on
the weapons systems that may be used.
143. The targeting continuum and targeting categories are illustrated in Figure 7.4.
Increasing time imperative, reducing policy and legal constraints
Deliberate targeting In contact
Accelerated target Combat Self-

engagement defence
Pre-planned Dynamic Time sensitive
targeting targeting targeting
Targeting board required No targeting board required

formal CDE required weapon system operator collateral
assessment required only
LOAC applies - offensive ROW permissions

Inherent right -
must be
necessary and
proportionate
Figure 7.4. The targeting continuum and targeting categories
144. Targeting principles. The principles of targeting apply regardless of the component
concerned or the operational environment:
a. Focused. The targeting cycle is integrated with the planning, intelligence and
operations cycles and is focused on the commander’s priorities and direction.
b. Effects-based. Targeting is linked to the production of specific effects.
c. Interdisciplinary. The targeting effort relies on the coordinated contribution of CP

and staff functions. Targeting efforts and systems should be networked to ensure
intelligence can be exploited.
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d. Systematic. Targeting seeks to manage effects in a systematic manner. Targets that

are policy and legally compliant are only attacked when it is necessary to achieve
desired effects and not just because the target can be attacked.
145. The fires commander at each command level leads the targeting effort and ensures
that lethal and non-lethal fires support integrated action. Informed by a comprehensive
understanding and clear command direction, targeting allows CP staff to:
a. Select and prioritise targets.
b. Decide how they will be engaged (lethal or non-lethal).
c. Coordinate ISR assets to find and track targets.
d. Coordinate target engagement.
e. Assess the effectiveness of target engagement.
f. Exploit opportunities.
146. Targeting in the land environment. Targeting is an integral activity within integrated
action, delivering the precise and timely engagement of targets via the employment of
manoeuvre, joint fires, information activities (IA) and capacity building. The relationship
between targeting at the joint level and at the component and formation levels is
illustrated in Figure 7.5.
Higher targeting Joint action

authority
Joint targeting process/cycle
Maritime targeting Land targeting Air targeting SF targeting
Formation-level
targeting processes
Integrated action
Figure 7.5. Joint targeting/component and formation targeting relationship

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Execution
Target engagement process
147. Target clearance. Targets should be cleared in advance, usually at a formal TCB, by a
commander with the appropriate level of delegated authority. This should always be the
case for pre-planned, dynamic and time-sensitive targets (TST), which are owned by the
JTFC, but usually delegated to an appropriate level of command within the operational
environment.
148. Target approval. It is essential that all targets are approved immediately before mission
execution by a commander who has the appropriate delegated authority. The commander
should confirm that the target was cleared at a TCB and that it is still valid. Where a
target has not been previously cleared by a TCB, a hasty board must be convened to
conduct the clearance. TCBs must be configured to be agile enough to meet the tempo of
a given operation, particularly to deal with opportunity targets that present themselves
during the execute phase. The five pillars plus BDA process is a commander’s final
checklist prior to target engagement approval. It is essential that all targets are reviewed
prior to approval to ensure that the engagement criteria remain extant. The five pillar
target approval process is summarised in Figure 7.6.
Pillar Description
Rules of engagement
Compliance with ROE and the LOAC
(ROE)
Collateral damage Lethal targeting - CDE undertaken prior to TCB clearance of target.
assessment (CDE) Non-lethal targeting - analysis to understand any unintended effects
Provide reasonable degree of assurance that target is a valid military objective within
Positive identification operational specific TD and ROE
(PID)
Positive - described as beyond reasonable doubt; not a 100% certainty
Indicator of civilian activity in and around target area - aids CD risk assessment
Pattern of life (PoL) Operation specific TD will articulate PoL requirements
Nature of target - expected benefits balanced against perceived risk
Every engagement requires clearance by an individual with the appropriate delegated

authority, less for self-defence
Target engagement Approval level can range from a direct fire weapon controller (in self-defence), to a
authority (TEA) qualified controller conducting a combat engagement, through the levels of Comd up
to the Secretary of State, for pre-planned targets
Delegated authority will be articulated in the operational specific TD
Figure 7.6. Five pillar target clearance
Assessment
149. Battle damage assessment (BDA). BDA is the timely and accurate assessment of
offensive action resulting from the application of lethal or non-lethal military force and
must be considered early in planning. There are three phases of BDA:
a. Phase 1: Confirmation of effect delivery and initial function. Phase 1 is planned

and conducted at the tactical level and quantifies the extent of physical damage to a
target. The assessment is based on observed or interpreted damage.
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b. Phase 2: Functional damage assessment. Phase 2 is usually conducted at the

higher tactical or operational levels of command and estimates the effect of action in
terms of a target’s subsequent ability to carry out its intended mission.
c. Phase 3: Target system analysis. Phase 3 is usually conducted at the operational

level. It is a broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of all actions
undertaken against the capability of an entire target system.
150. Measures of effectiveness (MOE). MOE are measurable criteria that can be used to
assess the effect or influence achieved as a result of an action or activity. Accurate and
timely MOE enable the commander to gauge the progress of a campaign, reassess aims
and objectives and provide evidence as to whether the military campaign is serving its
strategic aims. Work must be conducted early during planning, as well as throughout a
campaign, to identify the measures that will provide the commander with valid evidence
of success, or whether adjustments to the campaign are necessary.
151. The targeting cycle. The targeting cycle shown illustratively in Figure 7.7 and described
more fully in Figure 7.8, reinforces the principles of targeting:
Joint
Manoeuvre fires Understand:
Campaign plan, national direction,
targeting directive (TD), cultural awareness,
IPE, human terrain analysis, OA, commander’s targeting priorities,
Capacity Information synchronisation of integrated actions
building activities
DECIDE
Target lists, target packs,
target audience analysis
ASSESS COORDINATE DETECT
BDA, MOE, OA,

campaign effectiveness, Execute collection plan:
recommendations to maximise effectiveness of
commander scarce resources
DELIVER:
Achieve effects
TARGETING:
• Mechanism to coordinate fires and IA Effect target:
• Command led • ROE
• Synchronised - intent & ISTAR cycles • PID
• Underpins legal use of force • PoL
• Necessity • CDE
• Humanity • TEA
• Distinction • BDA
• Proportionality
Figure 7.7. The targeting cycle

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Targeting
Description
cycle
The Comd decides effects and how they intend to achieve them
The Comd provides staff with targeting priorities in accordance with the TD to enable the
identification and prioritisation of the appropriate target sets
Target sets are analysed to identify what targets can be developed and ultimately acted against
Analysis informs the ICP and influences allocation of ISR assets to enable PID
Planning and synchronisation
Staff must ensure lethal or non-lethal activities against a target accord with the TD and Comd’s
intent
Decide Negative unintended effects need to be predicted, analysed and mitigated

Potential exploitation opportunities should be identified – allocate appropriate resources
Develop BDA criteria and MOE
Target development
Concurrent, intelligence-led activity – takes a target to point where it can be acted against
Commences as soon as a target has been selected
Ceases when a target has been acted against successfully
Informs target listing – nomination, removal, prioritisation of targets from target lists.
A summary of target lists is at Annex 7A
Priority targets - acquisition and processing of clear and concise target information
Information used to produce, update and amend HPTL and EGM
Detect activities feed into ICP
HPT must be detected in a timely and accurate manner
Once detected a target may need to be tracked - will need allocation of ISR assets
Target engagement authority (TEA)
Detect When target intelligence is sufficiently mature, TEA should be gained to enable rapid engagement
when the target presents itself. Usually, authority given at a formal TCB.
LEGAD – will advise the Comd as to whether a target can be lawfully engaged
Some targets may need the authority of higher CP, or ministers – requirement to pass target
information up chain of command
National authority may be required when CP providing the TEA is operating under a non-UK TD
ROE for indirect fires likely to be more restrictive than for direct fires. Details will be in the TD
The delivery of the planned action against the target

Once authorised for prosecution, a target must be located, positively identified and tracked – may
require the cross cueing of a range of ISR assets
Conduct CDE
Must obtain TEA at this point if target not previously authorised
Deliver
Immediately prior to engagement, Comd must confirm approval and that target remains valid
Target may be fixed in location, in time or by maintaining a PID
Option to synchronise lethal and/or non-lethal action
Exploitation activities may enable the launch of follow on operations, or generate a deeper
understanding of the enemy
Assess action against BDA and MOE developed during decide phase
Determine to what extent action against the target has been successful
Assess Continuous process – enabling Comd’s planning review
May be a simple damage assessment, but may also involve DSS* and scientific evidence
Analyse the effect of negative consequences
* Deployed scientific support (includes OA), Chapter 1 Section 9 refers.
Figure 7.8. Description of the targeting cycle

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152. Judgement. A target engagement may be legally and morally justified. However, this
does not mean the target should be engaged. Judgement is essential to ensure that any
action taken is proportionate, necessary and humane. ROE, PID, CDE and PoL provide
information on whether or not an engagement can be carried out lawfully, or the use of
means other than lethal force. This is where the commander’s judgement is most needed
to balance risk and reward. The critical questions to consider are:
a. Can I? The first four pillars of the engagement process inform this question. ROE, PID,
CDE and PoL provide information on whether or not an engagement can be carried
out lawfully and physically.
b. Should I? There may be means available, other than the use of lethal force,
particularly in stabilisation operations. This is where the commander’s judgment is
needed to balance risk and reward.
c. Must I? Is the engagement necessary for self-defence, or does the target pose an
immediate risk to life? If not, there may be non-lethal ways to achieve the desired
effect. In MCO this question must balance the potential future threat of not targeting
an enemy. In stabilisation or COIN operations, opportunities may be fleeting and the
balance of risk versus reward may be markedly different to that during MCO.
153. Operational record keeping (ORK). Due to the legal implications of lethal strikes on
targets, ORK is particularly important to the targeting staff. The TD for each theatre
remains the authority and must be complied with.
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7A-1 | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018
ANNEX 7A
Target lists and effects guidance
154. Target lists. Figure 7A1 shows the target lists used at the tactical level.
Ser Title Level Description
Tactical
Joint prioritised PJHQ/JTFHQ/ TNL targets which have been reviewed, combined, and prioritised at a
1
target list (JPTL) component CP TCB or JTCB.
Component Component Targets that may or may not already be on the JTL, which need to be
2 prioritised target attacked in support of component activities. They are coordinated and
list (CPTL) CP validated by PJHQ/MSE before being placed on the JTL.
Div target list incorporating JPTL targets within AO and additional

Integrated
Component/ targets included through Div planning. The IATL combines targets
3 action target list
Div CP requiring both lethal and non-lethal effects to support integrated action
(IATL)
in the land environment.
High-value High-value targets are detailed in the HVTL and are those assets which,
Component/
4 target list if lost to the enemy, would significantly damage his ability to carry out
formation CP
(HVTL) his mission or to achieve his intentions.
The HPTL identifies those targets, the loss of which would significantly
High-payoff Component/ contribute to the success of the Comd’s mission and which can be
5
target list (HPTL) formation CP affected given the systems available. Derived from planning, the HPTL
informs targeting decisions and the EGM.
Figure 7A1. Tactical target lists
155. Effects guidance. The effects guidance matrix (EGM) provides more detailed direction for
the application of lethal and non-lethal fires. The EGM provides a mechanism for matching
responses to specific target types. Historically it has been a tactical tool used at division and
brigade levels, but is scalable and has utility at battlegroup and subunit levels.
156. Target selection standards (TSS). TSS are criteria associated with specific targets that
offer the best chance of a strike being delivered successfully. The accuracy and timeliness
with which a target must be located will guide the selection of the most appropriate ISR
system to acquire it. The dwell time of the target at the point of detection will then guide
the selection of the most appropriate and available strike system.
157. The EGM. The EGM combines the HPTL and target selection standards (TSS). It details
the desired action on each target and allocates assets capable of delivering the required
effects, together with any restrictions that may apply to mitigate civilian casualties and
collateral damage. In addition, it enables targets to be linked to relevant NAIs, TAIs
and DPs, as well as the ISR systems that must be tasked to find and track. Figure 7A2
illustrates the EGM sequence.
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Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | 7A-2
Inputs Effects Actions/ Output

weaponeering
EGM
Expert
input SWs for targets by phase
Operational targeting ROE/LOAC
Direction from JPTL/
Determine trigger for TCB
IATL relevant to AO
Understanding
or command direction
Effects which
require targeting EGM Potential weaponeering
Outputs from plan-
through the use of production solutions included
ning HPTL, HVTL, TSS,
DSO offensive action REDs/CD guidance may be
included to aid decision
making
Target development
TSA/TAA Considers characteristics of
Apply
fires: scalable, responsive,
guidance on
networked, synchronised,
the use of
concentrated
force
Figure 7A2. The effects guidance matrix sequence

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CHAPTER 8
Assessment during planning
158. Introduction. Assessment within the context of the

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operations process is the monitoring and evaluation
of the common operational picture (COP). It is • Process
continuous throughout planning, preparation and • MOEs, MOPs and indicators
execution and is dependent on good situational • Information requirements
awareness (SA), to which it also contributes. • Commander’s critical
Assessment is a function of G5 Plans. The process information requirements
of assessment is procedurally engrained within UK
estimates during the intelligence preparation of the
environment (IPE), mission analysis and COA evaluation. As the plan develops within the
estimate process, either tactical estimate (TE) or combat estimate (CE), it is tested against
the constantly changing situation to refine the decisions made, and to manage risks.63
This refinement exploits the use of:
a. Operational analysis (OA) element of the deployed scientific support (DSS) (Chapter 9
refers).
b. Wargaming (Chapter 10 refers).
c. Red teaming (Chapter 11 refers).
159. Planning is typically the stage in the operations process where the staff creates the initial
COP from which shared SA and opportunities, threats and information requirements are
identified. Assessment during planning also identifies measure of effectiveness (MOE)
and measure of performance (MOP) that are used for subsequent assessment during
preparation (Part 2) and execution (Part 3).
160. Seizing the initiative. Initiative is the ability to dictate the course of events, to decide
and act before the enemy to gain advantage. Seizing and holding the initiative is one
of the tools of the manoeuvrist approach and is dependent on effective and timely
assessment to generate quicker decision making in relation to the enemy. This generation
of tempo and momentum provides opportunities for exploitation and pre-emption, all of
which enable the commander and staff to gain, retain and exploit the initiative.
Process
161. Assessment consists of two distinct tasks: monitoring the current situation and the
progress of the operation, and evaluating the operation against MOEs and MOPs.
Together, they allow a commander to assess the situation in terms of their expectations
and the actual progress of an operation.
a. Monitoring:
63 Further detail can be sourced from AFM Command, Chapter 5; TDN 17/03 Measuring of Effectiveness of Operations and
execution-related assessment in Part 3, Chapter 23 of this publication.
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(1) Definition. Monitoring is the continuous observation of the COP which produces
SA. The commander and staff will typically focus on priority information
requirements (PIRs) which can include confirmation of current understanding
and planning assumptions. In addition, monitoring should identify indicators that
relate to opportunities, threats to the force and gaps in information. Information
requirements are described further below.
(2) Relationship to situational awareness (SA). Monitoring informs SA; SA

is perception of a situation, bounded by time and space set in context by
the mission. SA provides the ‘what has happened and what is happening’;
assessment of SA provides the ‘why it has happened’, applying judgement
provides understanding.
(3) Considerations. R2 enable monitoring at the lower tactical level. As the

complexity of the battlefield increases, CIS enable more timely and accurate
representation of the COP. The best monitoring mechanisms are those that are
the least intrusive.
b. Evaluating:
(1) Definition. Evaluating compares information, typically from the COP, on a

situation against criteria to determine progress against MOEs and MOPs, to
identify variances from the plan. The commander considers these assessments,
makes decisions and directs action.
(2) Considerations. The commander and the staff continuously evaluate the current
and projected situation to determine if changes are necessary to accomplish
the mission. Information requirements are an aid to evaluation and enable the
commander and staff to determine variances and act as appropriate.
MOEs, MOPs and indicators

162. MOEs and MOPs are fundamental to evaluation of operations. Both are criteria developed
during planning to measure mission accomplishment; neither equate to assessment in
themselves.
a. An MOE helps to determine if a task is achieving its intended results.
b. An MOP helps to determine whether a task is completed as directed.
163. There is no hierarchical relationship between an MOP and an MOE, they are distinct
entities and they require indicators to provide insight. MOE, MOPs and indicators are
defined below and summarised in Figure 8.1.
a. Measure of effectiveness (MOE). An MOE is a criterion used to assess changes in

a situation linked to measuring the attainment of an outcome, objective, or effect.
MOEs assist the measurement of changes in conditions, both positive and negative.
MOEs assist the judgement regarding whether a force is conducting the right actions.
b. Measure of performance (MOP). An MOP is a criterion used to assess friendly

actions linked to task completion. MOPs help determine whether a specific action was
taken, and whether it was completed to the standard. MOPs are commonly tracked in
a synch matrix.
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c. Indicators. An indicator provides insight into an MOE or MOP, typically a response to

an information requirement. A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs.
Measure of effectiveness (MOE) Measure of performance Indicator

(MOP)
Used to measure attainment of an Used to measure task Used to provide insight into an MOE or
outcome, objective, a desired effect. accomplishment. MOP.
Answers the question: Answers the question: Answers the question:

Are we doing the right things? Are we doing things right? What is the status of this MOE or
MOP?
Based on changes in behavior, Based on activities including but Based on things that can be counted.
capability or op environment not limited to those specified in
(outputs) the OPORD (inputs)
Measures why (unifying purpose) in Measures what (completion of Information used to make measuring
the mission statement. tasks specified) in the mission. what or why possible.
No direct hierarchical relationship No direct hierarchical Subordinate to MOEs and MOPs.

to MOPs. relationship to MOEs.
Often tracked in formal assessment Often tracked using the synch Often tracked in formal assessment plans.
plans. matrix.
Typically challenging to choose the Typically simple to choose the As challenging to select as the supported
appropriate criteria. appropriate criteria. MOE or MOP.
Figure 8.1. Summary of MOEs, MOPs and indicators.
Information requirements (IRs)

164. IRs represents the full spread of information that must be collected to meet the
requirements of the commander and staff for the successful execution of operations.
Therefore they must be focused, prioritised and managed to ensure that mission-focused
information is with the right person at the right time. IRs are subdivided into five categories:
a. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). A PIR relates to the enemy and its
operating environment, they are essential to the planning and execution; and their
identification initiates and drives the intelligence collection process. PIRs can be
subdivided into specific intelligence requirements (SIR), which are specific questions
for input to the intelligence collection plan (ICP).
b. Neutral information requirements (NIRs). NIRs relate to information regarding

the environment or human terrain and are likely to be collected by a range of non-
traditional ISR methods (NTISRs).
c. Friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). An FFIR relates to friendly forces,

or local indigenous forces; ‘how we see ourselves’. They are not the responsibility of
ISR staff to answer and are more usually answered by the commander or staff.
d. Essential elements of information (EEI). An EEI is a more detailed question which

adds to the SIR and enables the production of a collection task list within the ICP.
EEI could be related to several IRs and should provide guidance to allow analysts to
produce a satisfying answer. EEI are the basis for creating collection requirements and
for establishing the relevant tasking and coordination with organic sources, or relevant
agencies.
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e. Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). EEFI are not IR in the traditional
sense, but are those elements of information regarding friendly forces that must be
protected from compromise. EEFI will inform OPSEC and deception planning (see
Chapter 6). As with FFIRs, they are not the responsibility of the ISR staff to answer
directly.
Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs)

165. CCIRs are information that concerns areas that are either critical to the success of the
mission, or represent critical threats. CCIRs are approved by the commander (though the
staff may recommend CCIRs) to determine information that is critical decision making. The
fewer the number of CCIRs, the better the staff can focus effort and allocation of scarce
resources. CCIRs range across all of the IR categories and are the most significant in terms
of importance and OPSEC, Figure 8.2 refers. CCIRs are covered further in Chapters 2 (TE)
and 3 (CE).
importance
Increasing
Increasing
OPSEC
CCIR
IR
PIR NIR FFIR EEFI

EEI EEI EEI
EEI EEI EEI
Figure 8.2. Relationship between IRs and CCIRs
a. CCIRs are:
(1) Specified by the commander for each mission.
(2) Related to planned decisions.
(3) Applicable only to the commander who specified them.
(4) Situation dependent - directly linked to present and future missions.
(5) Time sensitive - answers to CCIRs must be immediately reported to the

commander by any appropriate means available.
(6) Always included in operational staff work (OSW).

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CHAPTER 9
Deployable scientific support (DSS)
166. Introduction. Integrated action is based upon
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understanding audiences and the operational
• When to use OA and
environment. Deployable scientific support (DSS)
SCIAD support
enables greater understanding of these factors through
• Effective use of DSS
rigorous data-driven evaluation and specialised technical
• DSS support to the
expertise. DSS staff are normally concentrated at the
planning process
senior higher land formation CP, but can be tasked to
• Other considerations
support lower levels via the chain of command. DSS
capacity will be prioritised to inform key decisions.
When to use OA and SCIAD support

167. Overview. Science and technology (S&T) influences all aspects of modern military
capability, from development of new equipment and methods to explaining how human
factors influence a decision-making process. DSS includes the provision of operational
analysts (OAs) and scientific advisers (SCIADs) to deploying CPs. OAs and SCIADs are
MOD civilians with a range of backgrounds including: science, engineering, technology,
psychology and mathematics, and are the deployed element of the MOD’s S&T capability
with the ability to reach back to the broader UK S&T community that includes the
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and Warfare Development, HQ Field
Army S&T. The role of the DSS 64 is to provide timely, credible and independent analysis,
assessment and advice in support of the decision-making process.65 They can deploy
on the ground if required, subject to appropriate risk assessment. Regardless of their
particular scientific expertise, they will all have a breadth of knowledge and offer critical
thinking and problem solving skills.
a. OAs. OA is the application of scientific and mathematical methods, models or tools

to understand operational problems. OAs can provide a range of specialist analytical
and assessment products and advice to support mission planning, preparation and
execution, such as assessment of local variation from standard planning data (e.g
movement rates, rates of advance, equipment breakdown rates, ammunition and
fuel requirements) or in support of course of action (COA) evaluation. OA informs
decisions by conducting rigorous analysis of data to provide a more detailed problem
understanding that is independent, timely and evidence based. In addition, OAs will
also be able to advise on setting, collecting, and analysing measures of effectiveness
(MOE) in support of the effects matrix or campaign plan.
64 Science and technology within CFA Warfare Branch is the Army proponent for DSS. Head of Warfare Development is
responsible for its delivery. DSS is the provision of SCIAD and OA support to formation CPs. The requirement in overview is
articulated in the Vanguard Readiness Order.
65 This is described variously in JDPs 5-00, 3-00, 3-65.
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b. SCIADs. SCIADs provide the CP with specialist scientific advice on current and
emerging threats and are able to conduct trials and experimentation in-theatre to
answer equipment and capability questions. Deployed SCIADs regularly work closely
with equipment capability (EC) cells to support testing and fielding of new equipment
or assist in identifying and analysing capability gaps. SCIADs also act as the gateway
back to the wider scientific community.
Both OA and scientific advice more fully develop understanding and enable informed
decisions. In order to inform key decisions, the related problem must be identified first.
This will define the question that DSS is to answer. Then data must be gathered and
transformed into useful information in time to support CP decision making.
168. When present in a CP, DSS staff will be members of planning and other multidisciplinary
groups, to maintain situational awareness, receive tasking and present results. This will
include identifying and proposing potential analysis and scientific tasks.
169. Scope. When applied to the planning, preparation and execution of military operations,
OA is a cyclic process that may provide input to a series of critical decisions, develop
understanding of a specified problem, or identify trends or significant changes in the
operational environment. Analytical methods, models or tools can also be focused
internally to determine more efficient processes or answer difficult questions relating
to how our own forces operate. These activities are distinct from the assessment that
measures the achievement of the operational plan.
170. When should operational analysis and scientific advice be used? OA is used to
examine complex problems that cannot be appropriately answered by simply applying
judgement or expertise. The results of OA provide a more detailed understanding of the
problem and related system interactions, identify probable effects within the systems and
may recommend better solutions. Scientific advice is needed when specialist knowledge
or capabilities not resident in the CP are necessary to fully examine a problem.
171. Potential requirements for DSS should be discussed with DSS staff to define the problem
and assess the suitability of support. Authority for prioritisation of DSS tasking and
allocation of effort will be detailed within SOIs, however usually resides with the COS
of the supported formation.
Effective use of DSS

172. The DSS that are involved early in mission planning will add the most value through
better understanding the context, the workings of the CP and the likely challenges. Key
considerations include the following:
a. The question. A well-defined and clearly understood question is required to enable

the collection of useful and usable data. The CP and DSS should work together to
define the questions to ensure the DSS is likely to be able to provide an answer in a
format that will be of use to the CP.
b. Assumptions. The CP and DSS need to understand and agree the assumptions
around which the problem and analysis are framed. These will need to be reconsidered
as the situation evolves.
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c. Data. The availability or accessibility of the data required for scientific analysis is
likely to be limited by operational conditions and collection timescales will often be
compressed. It is therefore essential that the CP and the DSS share an understanding
of the limitations of the data and any relevant caveats to its interpretation,
extrapolation and application in order for the CP to make best use of the DSS advice.
DSS support to the planning process

173. OA can generate a range of products and results to inform planning of combat operations,
from overall estimates of force balance to estimates of likely outcomes of specific
engagements. OA can support wargaming and other COA analysis activities during the
planning process but can also provide support at any stage of planning. Typical approaches
used include rules of thumb and force correlation:
a. Rules of thumb. These are static mathematical relationships. They are used to
provide adequate first-order approximations based on agreed factors for which a
mathematical relationship has been developed from validated historical analysis and
experience. They may also be used as a form of validation for assessments conducted
by other branches where time is short.
b. Force correlation. The combat power of opposing formations is estimated by taking

weighted sums of the fighting equipment in their ORBATs; the weights reflect the
relative contribution of different systems to the all-arms battle. The ratios of these
sums, in combination with rules of thumb linking force ratios to likelihood of success
in combat under different conditions, give rough estimates of the relative capabilities
of different forces.
174. DSS support to CSS planning. This area includes the assessment and modeling of
equipment non-battle losses, fuel and ammunition consumption rates, DPRE movements,
route networks/logistics chain, rehabilitation and resupply times. Support to medical
planning (e.g. casualty estimates, MEDEVAC asset distribution) is included within CSS
work and in support to combat operations planning.
175. Combat resolution and casualty estimation. Specific engagements, with given
supporting elements, can be modelled in OA tools. These tools generate information
about the engagement outcome and duration and the losses of both equipment and
personnel. A range of cases with slightly differing assumptions would normally be run, to
identify critical factors and improve the robustness of results. The course of a campaign,
or element of it, can be represented as a sequence of runs of the tools, possibly
combined with use of tools to estimate CSS effects such as breakdowns, resupply and
reconstitution. Tools may be run during planning wargames.
176. SCIAD. A SCIAD is a senior scientist confirmed as suitably qualified and experienced to
provide scientific advice to senior military staff. The SCIAD will provide advice directly
within their own area of expertise, but will provide a conduit to more detailed and wide
ranging scientific and technical advice through reach back to national means. Most (but
not all) SCIADs in UK are sourced from DSTL.
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177. Typically, the SCIAD will provide advice to support decisions on policy (for example force
protection), can form part of the investigation team for events or serious incidents, and
support the understanding technical aspects of threat evolution. The SCIAD will work
to refine the question and then either undertake investigations (where appropriate) in-
theatre or seek specific advice from subject matter experts through reach back.
Other considerations
178. Communications. DSS staff reach back through links to UK-based government and
academic analytical and scientific organisations to leverage their capabilities to inform
decisions. On NATO operations, NATO organisations will also contribute.
179. Continuity. DSS staff will maintain records of all tasks in sufficient detail to provide an
audit trail and to permit work to be repeated or used as the starting point for further
analysis. The DSS staff would expect a handover of previous analytical work from a
departing CP in-theatre and would conduct a similar handover to the relieving CP
understanding that the relieving CP may not have an extensive analytical capability. The
handover of these functions will be affected by early liaison with the incoming DSS team
and involving them in a rolling transfer of live tools and the data archive.
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CHAPTER 10
Wargaming
180. Introduction. Wargaming 66 is a systematic method of
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analysing a plan in a conscious attempt to visualise the ebb
and flow of a mission. Adversarial by nature, wargaming • Purpose
superimposes A3E elements together to identify risks and • Who participates
shortcomings in potential or selected COAs. It pitches • When to wargame
planners against each other in a deliberate attempt to • How to wargame
spark debate and generate insights into a plan providing a • Wargaming top tips
rigorous stress test, if conducted well. Wargaming enables
the commander and staff attempt to foresee the dynamics
of action, reaction and possible counteraction of the mission which enables the plan
to be tested and refined as necessary. Wargaming is an essential part of the planning
process (both TE and CE).
Purpose
181. The purpose of a wargame is: to identify risks (opportunities and threats) and areas of
weakness in a forming plan; provide a thorough understanding of the interactions of
various A3E to the plan; highlight additional tasks which may have been overlooked
during the planning and; refine the synchronisation, resourcing, activity, prioritisation
and coordination of a plan. Wargaming can be applied to multiple COAs for comparative
reasons or to a single selected COA to refine it and add robustness. It is essential that the
aim, objectives, purpose, focus of a wargame are clearly understood by all participants so
that maximum benefit may be derived and the plan shaped accordingly.
Who participates
182. Who participates in a wargame. The CP personnel listed below are typically involved
in wargaming:
a. Chief controller. The chief controller, typically the COS, directs and controls the
wargame.
b. Blue team (COA teams). The blue team comprises the COA team that developed the
plan and can be supplemented with other staff as necessary to provide inputs across
all relevant tactical functions. The blue team, usually through a spokesperson, controls
the friendly forces.
c. Red cell (enemy). Generally comprises G2 staff, and can be supported by engineers/
log to provide breadth; red cell control the A3E and other frictions. The enemy
aspect must be adversarial and cannot be bullied or swayed by the commander, chief
controller or blue team. The red cell must fight from a doctrinal standpoint and use
the analysis establish during the estimate process (TE: Step 2B/CE: Q1).
66 Further detail is contained in the DCDC Wargaming Handbook, August 2017.

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d. Red team (devil’s advocate). Rarely resourced, but very effective, the red team
should be an independent group, is generally contrarian and challenges the accepted
wisdom on all aspects of the plan to improve its effectiveness. The red team is not
to be confused with the red cell who play the enemy; the roles are distinct. To be
of greatest benefit to the commander, the red team should stand back and take an
independent view of the wargame, offering advice to the commander as appropriate,
based on its broad perspective of the overall plan. They can also inject situational and
contextual changes, ‘friction’ factors and challenge assumptions where appropriate.
e. SMEs. Available SMEs should support wargaming, sharing their time between the
blue team and red cell as necessary.
f. Deployed scientific support (DSS). DSS (see Chapter 9) delivers quantitative rigour
and objectivity to planning and decision making. Operational analysis (OA), when
available, should be engaged as early as possible (at the outset of planning) to give
analysts time to conduct meaningful analysis to feed into the wargame.
g. The commander. The commander, as final arbiter, may wish to attend a wargame
personally for the greater insights they can bring and derive. These benefits, however,
should be balanced against other effects that may be realised by their presence: staff
may be uneasy about criticising elements of the commander’s plan that they assess as
unsatisfactory, resulting in the plan not being subjected to a rigorous stress test.
h. Subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders may be invited to observe a

wargame - when time is short, it can act as a visual warning order. The commander
must weigh up the benefit of doing so against the likelihood that the subordinate will
take away a snap shot which, by nature of the purpose of a wargame, will change.
When to wargame
183. There are three occasions when a wargame is appropriate:
a. COA development and validation. Wargaming can help to visualise an embryonic

COA, indicating the art of the possible and enabling impractical COAs to be discarded
at an early stage. Early wargaming should yield a better understanding of a proposed
COA. Finally it also helps to ensure that that COAs are distinct and not merely a variant
on the same SoM.
b. COA evaluation and comparison. Wargaming can be used to compare each friendly
COA with appropriate enemy COA and any other relevant factors to determine the
likelihood of success. Wargaming at this stage provides information on the advantages
and disadvantages of each COA for evaluation against the commander’s COA selection
criteria.
c. Plan refinement. Once the commander has selected a COA, wargaming can
contribute significantly to plan refinement, including identifying risks, areas of
weakness and further CCIRs. In addition, wargaming assists in the development of
coordinating instructions, indicates the specific requirements for BM and highlights
potential tasks and associated readiness levels for reserves.
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How to wargame
184. An effective wargame requires three phases for successful delivery: plan; prepare; and
execute:
a. Plan.
(1) Select the event(s) to be wargamed. The first task is to identify the event(s)
to be wargamed, based on the command direction and the time available. The
event(s) should be those the commander believes to hold the most risk, either
due to vulnerability to enemy action or the complexity of coordination required.
(2) Determine the time available. Wargaming is time pressured; there is rarely
sufficient time to wargame all desired aspects of a COA or a plan. Hence the time
available will dictate the number of critical events that can be wargamed and the
time dedicated to each, which becomes the length of the relevant ‘turn’.
(3) Select the method. The wargame method selected will depend on the events
to be wargamed. The scope of the wargame will be bounded by time, space
and resource. Thus the wargame could focus on the activity of a single unit, or
an entire formation. It could focus only on activity on the objective, or solely on
preliminary moves. Or it could look at activity from a point in time to another.
It is tempting to wargame the whole plan, but time for wargaming will always
be limited and it is therefore best to restrict the wargame to those areas likely
to induce the most friction and where the plan needs testing most. Figure 10.1
illustrates the most common methodologies for wargaming:
Figure 10.1. Wargaming methodologies
(4) Select the enemy COA. The red cell should advise the commander/chief
controller which enemy COA to select, if not already directed by the commander.
As wargaming is an adversarial activity, consideration should be given to
selecting the enemy MDCOA as a default setting; the blue team plan will be only
be fully tested if red cell is doing everything it can to win.
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(5) Select the recording method. The output of the wargame should be captured
as a consolidated standalone product, in addition to any amendments made by
individual branches to staff products.
(6) Identify the personnel required. Figure 10.2 provides recommended wargame
roles, responsibilities and leads at brigade and battlegroup levels; further detail
should be prescribed in the unit’s SOIs.
Serial Role (responsibilities) Bde level BG level

1 Final arbiter Comd CO
2 Chief controller (yardsticks) COS COS
3 Blue team (FF COA, CONPLANs) COS Fires Ops offr
4 Fires planner (HPTL) SO2 G35 BC
5 Red cell (A3E, HVTL) SO2 G2 IO +1
6 CSS and Med planner SO2 CSS (and Med LO) BGLO (and Med LO)
7 Scribe (TASKORG, risks) SO3 G3 Adjt
8 Engineer planner Bde engineer BGE
9 CIS planner (synch matrix, coord instrs) SO2 CIS RSO
10 SMEs Ch fires, Ch Engr, LEGAD Subordinate Comds
11 ISR planner (DSO/DSM, STAP) ISR offr ISR offr
12 Information activities IA offr IA offr
Figure 10.2. Wargame roles, responsibilities and leads at brigade and battlegroup levels
(7) Task DSS (if not already done).
b. Prepare.
(1) Situational awareness (SA) aids. Despite the increasingly digital nature of C2
there is an argument for considering manual forms of SA to enable wargaming.
Digital media such as Bowman/ComBAT and PowerPoint have their advantages,
but so do manual media such as a birdtable, map(s) and ‘stickies’ or counters:
Whatever media are used, visual aids need to be prepared in advance (concurrent
activity):
(i) Mapping. Mapping providing both an overview of the operational area and
insets for areas where greater tactical detail might be needed.
(ii) Counters or iconography. The required map symbols must be available,

be these digital or manual. The latter can range from traditional ‘stickies’
through large mounted counters to models.
(2) Location. A suitable location should be arranged, with front row seats
designated for players and key SMEs and additional seating for other participants.
(3) Staff products. Relevant draft OSW must be available (e.g. DSO, DSM, synch
matrix, TASKORGs, CCIRs, DSS inputs etc.).
(4) Rehearsals. In a particularly complicated or large wargame, rehearsals will be

required.
c. Execute. A sequence of events for a wargame is described below and summarised

in Figure 10.3. This uses a formation-level CP for illustrative purposes where the blue
team is assumed to have the initiative.
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Conduct of a COA wargame

Introduction Attendance + appts
a Purpose & focus
Method
Key deductions from estimate
Comd’s guidance
Review of white, green
Red COA
Blue COA Mission SoM
Intent Joint action
End-state CSS
TASKORG C2
Action & reaction

& counteraction COS Plans Scheme of manoeuvre at this point
b Action
Joint action
ISTAR
Consolidation Reaction Engrs
C2
CSS
Counter-
Specialists (as reqd) and OA
Plans action Red cell
Consolidation and judgement

c
Principles Principles of TacticaL FACES Comd’s own

of war military activity functions criteria
Effect on Effect on Decision

Timeframe Action Reaction Counteraction friendly taken
adversary
forces
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Conclusions
d Concept Coord Resources Other Issues
• Missions/tasks • Con measures • Manoeuvre • Clarification
• Grouping/C2 • Liaison • ISTAR • RFIs
• CONOPS amdts • ROE • Fires plan • Assumptions
• CONPLAN reqd • Bdries • ISTAR • Risks
• Reserve options • Flanks • Engrs • Cultural
• DSO changes • Time/space • CSS plan/pris • MOE
• CCIR changes • Deconfliction • Reserves
• DPs • Mov planning • Info activities
• Sync
• Go/no-go
Staff changes Scribe - record amdts, CCIRs, RFIs etc.

G3/5 - record amdts to concept
e
ISR - record amdts to DSO, DSM, STAP
Identification of constraints, freedoms, risks
Preparation of CONPLANs, branches/sequels (OE, TE)
Adjustment to schematics
G2 - record amdts to EF casualties/effects on
CSS - record amdts to CSS plans
Joint action levers and SMEs record amdts
Figure 10.3. Execution of wargame
(1) Wargame ‘turn’ mechanics. Wargaming is turn-based. Each turn covers one or
more area or event of the plan being developed or refined. The basic mechanism
for each turn is: action - reaction - counteraction – consolidation; use as many
turns as necessary. Traditionally the side with the initiative has the first action.
However, consideration should be given to the blue team always having the first
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action irrespective of who has the initiative as it is the blue team plan being
tested and the ability for the blue team to always have a counteraction phase and
making amendments as required obviously has merit. Whichever side goes first,
the mechanism remains the same. Therefore, assuming blue team has the first
action the sequence is as follows:
(i) Action. The blue team spokesperson describes the friendly forces intent
and SoM to the required level of detail, to include: ME, missions, tasks and
coordinating instructions within the time period specified for that turn.
Relevant icons or counters should be moved as appropriate.
(ii) Reaction. The red cell spokesperson describes the enemy’s reaction to the
blue team action, to whatever level of detail is required, moving icons or
counters as required.
(iii) Counteraction. The blue team spokesperson explains the friendly forces
counteractions required to mitigate or exploit the red cell reactions.
(iv) Consolidation. At the end of the turn the chief controller summarises the
key findings and actions arising and ensures that these are recorded. A rapid
staff check is conducted, however, most participants should analyse the
game turn as it develops within their area of expertise, noting conclusions
and amendments to their own staff plans and products, and only comment
where there is a significant impact on the overall plan. The conclusions
checklist (serial d of Figure 10.3) provides a useful checklist for the chief
controller. If the turns are sequential, the chief controller may wish to declare
an end-state to the turn such that it becomes the start state for the next turn
(for example, by awarding casualties to either side).
(v) Force ratio risk levels. As a tool to assist with possible outcomes of actions
and reactions, a table showing force ratio risk levels is at Figure 10.4. This
table is based on operational and historical analysis.
Force ratio risk levels
Unfavourable
Risky
Meeting engagement
Nominal
Good/safe
V Good
Hasty attack vs hasty defence
Hasty attack vs prepared defence
Hasty attack vs breaching
Prepared attack vs hasty defence
Prepared attack vs prepared

defence
Prepared attack vs breaching
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
Figure 10.4. Force ratio risk levels – ONLY TO BE USED FOR WARGAMING
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(2) SME input. Additional inputs to this action-reaction-counteraction are injected

as appropriate. These could include DSS produced outcomes, SME delivered
judgments or other staff branch significant insights.
(3) Time management. The chief controller must strike a balance between useful
discussion and driving the wargame forward. Most points raised can usually be
noted for subsequent action or captured by staff branches for their own use.
Points raised during the action-reaction-counteraction phases should be quickly
noted and then summarised during the consolidation phase.
(4) Scribing. Accurate recording of findings is vital and the task should be allocated
to an individual who is fully conversant with the plan and able to pick out key
findings without prompts from the chief controller. A simple wargame record
sheet is essential, with suggested headings at Figure 10.5:
Effect on Effect on Decision

Timeframe Action Reaction Counteraction
adversary friendly forces taken
Figure 10.5. Wargame record sheet headings
185. Conclusion of the wargame. At the conclusion of the wargame, the chief controller
provides direction to the staff to refine the plan based on the wargame results, enabled
by a read back from the scribe. If the commander was absent, a backbrief should be
prepared covering the key wargame findings.
Wargame top tips:

186. The following tips are recommended for wargaming
a. Be adversarial.
b. Remain unbiased.
c. Record accurately.
d. Continually assess feasibility.
e. Avoid drawing premature conclusions.
f. Invite discussion and participation from SMEs.
g. Adhere to agreed planning yardsticks.
h. Consider tasks one level down and actions two levels down.
i. Focus at appropriate level of detail.

Contents
CHAPTER 11
Red teaming
187. Introduction. The role of the red team is to challenge

Contents
the perceived norms and assumptions of the commander
and the staff to improve the validity and quality of the • What is red teaming
final plan. The principles of red teaming are described • Techniques
fully in AFM Command, Chapter 6 Section 5.5 and are • Thinking skills
therefore not reiterated in this publication. Additional
detail can be sourced from the DCDC Guide and the red
teaming page on the AKX.
What is red teaming?

188. A red team, comprised of individuals not intimately involved in the planning, should be
set with the task of subjecting the CPs plans to rigorous analysis and challenge to assess
validity of the assumptions, if alternate options exist, freedoms, vulnerabilities, limitations
and risks etc. Red teaming is a tool set the use of which is dictated by time available
and staff capacity. There are multiple techniques available the most common of which
are described below. Using red teaming will provide the commander with a more robust
baseline for decision making.
189. What red teaming is not. Red teaming must not be confused with the red cell function
which is conducted by G2 staff in support of planning and is focused on the activities of
potential enemies and associated threats. Both the red team and red cell have a specific
and distinct role, and both should be fully exploited to the benefit of the commander.
Techniques
190. A wide range of analytical techniques are available to assist a red team, their use is
dependent on the level of staffing and the time available, but should be considered where
appropriate. A brief description of the methods applicable for planners, categorised under
the headings of diagnostic, contrarian and imaginative techniques are summarised below,
Figure 11.1 refers.
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Ser Method What When Method1
Diagnostic (distinctive characteristics) techniques
Four steps:
1. Review current thinking.
Key Review the key working
Throughout planning and 2. State all premises/assumptions.
assumptions on which
1 assumptions should include CSS and 3. Challenge each, asking why it
fundamental judgements
check CIS considerations. must be true.
are based.
4. Refine list to include only
those that must be true.
Throughout planning -
Quality of Establish a database, e.g.
Evaluate integrity and establish confidence in
HUMINT sources with indications
2 information reliability of available decision-making process.
of strengths/weaknesses of
check information. Review what is known
source. Periodic reviews essential.
and what is not known.
Review list of observable Throughout planning 1. Identify a set of competing

events/trends to track but requires time, hypotheses.
events, monitor targets therefore more suited 2. Create separate list of
for early warning. to operational planning potential activities/events for
Indicators/ (tactical estimate and each hypothesis.
3 warnings of above).
3. Regularly review/update
change indicators list.
4. Identify most likely/most
correct hypothesis based on
number of changed indicators.
Systematic use of Part of blue team 4 sets of criteria:

checklists to determine process. Requires time. 1. Does enemy have motive,
when deception may be Does the enemy have opportunity and means to
present and how to avoid a history of deception; deceive?
being deceived. what means/options are
available? 2. Would this potential deception
Deception
4 be consistent with past
detection
operations?
3. Concerned over manipulation
of sources?
4. What can be learned from
evaluation of evidence?
Contrarian (opposes or rejects popular opinion) techniques
Used to challenge a Throughout planning, 1. Consider main line of thinking

consensus or a key particularly where strong and assumptions.
assumption regarding a consensus or established 2. Select 1-2 assumptions most
critically important issue. mindset exists. susceptible to challenge.
Devil’s 3. Review validity of assumptions.
5
advocacy 4. Highlight any evidence
to support alternative
assumptions.
5. Present findings if review
uncovers major flaws.
Use of separate teams to Useful if there are two or 1. Create alternative judgements
contrast two (or more) more competing views on to capture essential
Team A/ strongly held views or an issue. differences, similarities, pros/
6
team B competing theories. cons, building consensus.
2. Method of analysis - debate.
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Ser Method What When Method1
Highlights a seemingly When staff are convinced 1. Define high-impact outcome

unlikely event that would that an event is clearly to scope unlikely
have major consequences unlikely and have given events.
if it occurred. little thought to the 2. Devise plausible pathways to
implications. low probability outcome, e.g.
High
7 impact/low death of key leader, collateral
probability damage.
3. Identify a set of indicators for
low probability event
4. Identify factors to deflect a
bad outcome.
Assumes that an event has Challenge strong 1. Assume ‘event’ has happened.
occurred with potential mindsets. Similar to high- 2. Select trigger events and a
(-ve/+ve) impact, and then impact/low probability logical argument to make a
‘What if’ explains how it might analysis.
8 ‘what if’ scenario plausible.
analysis occur.
3. Work backwards from
event and identify plausible
pathways to the event.
Imaginative (showing creativity or inventiveness) thinking techniques
An event to simulate a During COA 1. See Part 1, Chapter 10 for

military operation; testing development, COA further detail on wargaming.
9 Wargaming underpinning assumptions evaluation and COA
and testing/comparing refinement.
COAs or the plan.
An unconstrained group To stimulate new 1. Paradoxically, more effective if

process designed to thinking. A red team structured. Ineffective if done
generate new ideas, will brainstorm when as group. Allow individuals to
theories or concepts. they begin a project brainstorm pre-group session.
to generate a range of 2. Never censor an idea.
10 Brainstorming hypotheses about an
issue. 3. Take time to set rules of
the game, make group
comfortable etc.
4. Involve at least one outsider to
generate fresh thinking.
Consideration of the Used to identify all issues 1. List all key forces (PMESII) that
external changes that that would indirectly might affect issue/plan/problem.
might, over time, shape a plan. Useful 2. Focus on key factors which
Outside-in profoundly affect the issue/ during intial stages of
11 might be able to exert some
thinking plan. both the TE and CE influence.
processes.
3. Assess how each force affects
the issue.
Role play/ Models the behaviour of Initial stages of both TE 1. Role players must have cultural
surrogate an individual/group by and CE processes. capability and the group must
12 trying to replicate how they have SMEs.
enemy (role
storming) might think
1 Further detail on methods is in the DCDC Guide, page 3-10.
Figure 11.1. Red teaming analytical techniques
Thinking skills
191. During planning, and despite the techniques described above, it is essential to understand
thinking skills and identify how to exploit them effectively. To enable efficient planning,
which is a leadership challenge in itself, conducted under time pressure, the different
types of thinking, convergent and divergent, and conscious and unconscious need to be
Contents
recognised, managed and exploited to best effect. A CP that efficiently harnesses the
different types of thinking will produce better results and be more agile during planning.
A conceptual framework for thinking can assist in finding and then applying the right
thinking strategy to a particular situation. Figure 11.2 depicts a framework with two
thinking dimensions – ways and means. The ways of thinking (the method adopted)
contrasts divergent methods that explore, develop options, generalise and use inductive
reasoning with convergent methods that conclude, decide, deduce and deconstruct. The
means of thinking (the resources applied) contrasts conscious methods applying logic,
analysis, rules and procedure, and scientific method with unconscious methods of intuition,
creativity and insight, social understanding, instinct and heuristics. This provides four
potential models for the application of thinking skills to assist in reviewing how best to
exploit the full scope of thinking available for a particular situation.
Q4. W
at rix nd h
ow Divergent ways here
ch m on a b
Syn a t i (exploring and construction) each est c an I a
s itu me? ac tio c
i s th e
f e c t n/ef f complish
t af e c t?
1 . W ha o e s it Creative innovation Systematic exploration
Q d ts Time available, problem Time available, Sp ec
ra i n ified
nst unbounded and complex, information available, t ask
s & co s
d o m addressed using a social staff-led team
e
Fr e collective NAI
Unconscious Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect? Conscious
means means
(intuitive and (deliberate and
creative) Intuitive decision TAI Logical decision rational)
s
t ask Time critical, problem Time critical, criteria nd
p l ied ons a r?
Im unbounded or complex, available, command led e ac ti e
experience available h e re do th e a c h oth
Q2 . dw n to
Wh
at h . W h en an e in relatio
Q6 plac
Com t o d ave I TASKORG s t a ke d to
mand o an b
d w e e n to
Intent ef fec t I nee ust I
er ’s d t s do m
ecisio h y? l d
h a t ef fec direc tion lan?
n p
Convergent ways Q3. W nd what velop a
v e a o d e
How might the situation change (concluding and achie in order t
and how might this affect me? giv e
deciding)
Figure 11.2. Different types of thinking skills
192. Assumptions. Assumptions are required to support planning effort where knowledge
gaps exist until information is gained such that the assumption can become fact, or not.
Assumptions may be both explicit and implicit, and are made to enable information gaps
to be bridged and complexities to be rationalised. Both planning and the plans produced
are inevitably based upon a degree of assumption, the better the understanding of a
complex problem the more likely that any assumptions made will be of greater value,
however staff must:
a. Challenge and rigorously test underpinning assumptions.
b. Identify implicit, invalid or unnecessary assumptions.
c. Validate central assumptions.
d. Offer missing and alternative assumptions as appropriate.
e. Identify critical assumptions and those that are particularly sensitive to change.
f. Record all assumptions made and track until confirmation is gained.

Contents
193. Bias. Bias is defined as a prejudice or disposition that leads to distortion of thinking and
perceptions and is highly likely to lead to false assumptions and flawed analysis.
194. Confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for or interpret new
information in a way that confirms one’s preconceptions and to irrationally avoid
information or reject new evidence that contradicts an established view. Red teaming is a
vital tool to expose and mitigate confirmation bias.
195. Critical thinking. One of the key characteristics of red teaming is critical thinking to
expose weakness and vulnerability during planning or in the plan. A useful tool is the six
hats, Figure 11.3 refers, and the key points of which are:
a. Six hats is a powerful technique for looking at decision making from different points
of view.
b. It allows emotion and scepticism to be brought into what might normally be a purely
rational process, and opens up the opportunity for creativity within decision making.
c. Decisions made using the six hats technique will more sound and resilient than would
otherwise be the case. It can also help to avoid possible pitfalls before committal to a
decision.
Staff can have an instinctive approach to decision making. For those who are naturally optimistic,
then potential downsides might not be considered. Similarly, for those who are very cautious or
with a risk-averse outlook, they might not focus on opportunities that could be available. Often,
the best decisions come from changing the way that problems are considered, and examining
them from different viewpoints. Six hats mitigates this issue by examining issues from different
perspectives, one at a time, to avoid confusion from multiple angles crowding the thinking. Six
hats is also a powerful decision-checking technique for group situations, with staff exploring the
situation from each perspective concurrently, forcing the staff to move outside habitual thinking
styles, and to examine issues from a number of different perspectives giving a more rounded
view of the situation. Failure to consider all perspectives could lead staff to underestimate the
situation and therefore miss the requirement for a CONPLAN for example. The more complex the
problem the more applicable the six hats becomes.
The white hat: The yellow hat: The black hat:

calls for information symbolises brightness signifies caution and
known or neded. and optimism. You can critical thinking - do
“The facts, just the explore the positives not overuse! Why
facts.” and probe for value and something may not
benefit. work.
The green hat: The blue hat: The red hat:

focuses on creativity, is used to manage signifies feelings,
possibilities, the thinking process. hunches and intuition-
alternatives and It ensures that the the place where
new ideas. It is ‘six thinking hats’ emotions are placed
an opportunity to guidelines are without explanation.
express new concepts observed.
and new perceptions-
lateral thinking could
be used here.
Figure 11.3. Six hats

Contents
CHAPTER 12
Operational staff work (OSW)
196. Introduction. Directives and orders provide the Contents

principal means by which a commander’s intentions
• Terminology
are conveyed to their subordinates. Commanders
• Dissemination
and staff must be aware of the appropriate decision
• Staff duties
point to allow timely preparation and dissemination
• OSW formats:
of directives, plans and orders. The time required for
• Ops summary
dissemination is easily under estimated. Late directives
• Ops schematic with
or orders risk becoming inappropriate before they are
elements of DSO
implemented; ultimately their execution may prove
• Synch matrix
impossible. Directives, plans and orders must be
• Reversionary warning
concise, clear and accurate.
order
• Reversionary operation
Terminology order
197. The terms ‘directive’, ‘plan’ and ‘order’ may appear to • Reversionary
be close in meaning but have distinct definitions: fragmentary order
• Reversionary combat
a. Directives. A directive is used at the higher levels
service support order
of command to initiate activity and to give both
• TASKORG
general and specific guidance to subordinate
commanders. It will be less formal, rigid and
prescriptive than an order. It may include missions to subordinates but need not
necessarily do so.
b. Plans. Plans are mainly issued for contingency purposes and have no executive
authority until activated by an order. They are also the term used to describe the
output from the planning process prior to being converted into directives and orders
by the commander.
(1) Contingency plan (CONPLAN). CONPLANs are devised and written for
alternative COAs, or as part of a branch or sequel on the principal line of
operation. This may include occasions when unintended but examined effects
occur or when risk presents an opportunity or threat to the principal operation.
There are a number of guidelines for their use:
(i) Assumptions. A list of assumptions should be drawn up, the realisation of

which will cause the CONPLAN to be activated.
(ii) Format. The format for a CONPLAN is similar to that of the fragmentary
order (FRAGO), but includes the assumptions.
c. Orders. Orders are defined as ‘a communication, written, oral or by signal, which

conveys instructions from a higher to a subordinate’. Orders are used in all spheres
of military activity and at all levels of command. They include sufficiently detailed
direction to subordinates (in the form of missions and/or tasks) so that they can
achieve specific activities, such as the deployment and employment of troops.
Contents
(1) Warning order (WngO). The warning order is delivered on three occasions
during the TE and the CE - on completion of the ROOB, once the commander has
completed mission analysis, and once they have decided on a COA. A template
is at Figure 12.3. At all times, maximum information should be disseminated
to facilitate subordinates’ planning processes. Warning orders are also issued
immediately after the receipt of a warning order from a higher CP and may be
issued at any other time it is judged to be useful to subordinates.
(2) Operation order (OPORD). To give subordinate commanders the essential

information and direction required to plan and execute an operation.
(3) Fragmentary order (FRAGO). Fragmentary orders are an abbreviated form of

operation order. They may be used in three ways:
(i) To issue timely changes to existing orders. This is the most commonly used
form of a fragmentary order.
(ii) To issue key sections of an order before the complete order has been
produced.
(iii) To provide specific instructions to commanders who do not require the

complete order.
(4) Combat service support order (CSSO). A CSSO may be produced in support of
the main operation order to explain the CSS plan. Details of the operational plan
should be included in the CSSO to inform those CSS units which do not receive
the main operation order.
Dissemination
198. At the tactical level the means of disseminating orders are:
a. Oral orders. Oral dissemination of orders will usually involve a formal O Group (see
Chapter 13). Orders may also be passed over combat net radio, by liaison officers
or staff officers representing the commander, or by briefings by the commander
themselves during visits to subordinates.
b. Written orders. Written orders are more likely when time is available to produce
them. They are particularly useful for conveying complexity where detail may be lost
if delivered verbally. Staff should be particularly aware of the ability of those they are
ordering to print or reproduce orders and traces if disseminating the written order
by data. It is usual for attendees at verbal O Groups to receive printed OSW and
traces from the higher CP. The requirement for written orders will increase as fatigue
begins to impair mental performance and comprehension of verbal orders. Note that
much of the detail of written orders can be inserted during the planning process.
It is inefficient, and frequently impossible to leave the writing until the end of the
estimate. Clarity, accuracy and brevity are essential. There are three principal types of
written order:
(1) Word. An order may be written in Word as free text, usually using a two-column
format on a landscape A4 page. The structure remains that of an order, but the
commander can insert as much detail as is relevant by increasing the number
of sub-paragraphs used. This method allows detailed and complex plans to be
recorded fully. It is best suited to OPlans and large operation orders.
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(2) ComBAT. The ComBAT OSW standalone tool is useful at the tactical level. It
allows for collaborative working in its construction and it is easily disseminated by
data. It also links to the other standalone tools which will have been used during
the estimate. Chapter 3, paragraph 7 has further detail.
(3) Ops summary. An ops summary format allows for units that have sufficient
mastery of OSW and familiarity across the command group of the situation which
faces them. They are particularly useful for relatively simple operations but will
usually be supported by verbal orders. An example ops summary is included at
Figure 12.2.
c. Quick verbal or radio orders. Although a variation on oral orders, quick verbal, or
radio orders provide an important option for disseminating orders. Common formats
such as secure orders cards (SOCs) should be used to improve comprehension and
efficiency of delivery.
199. The need for confirmation. Receipt of OSW must be acknowledged by the subordinate
CP to the Issuing CP. Comprehension may also be confirmed through the use of
backbriefs and ROC drills (see Part 2).
Staff duties
200. General points. The main rule is that in operational writing the maximum use is to be
made of abbreviations and the text is to be written in note form to save time and space,
remembering always that the meaning remains clear. Paragraph headings can form part
of the opening of a sentence, e.g. ‘Ammo. Issued 1300hrs’. Note that the syntax rules of
JSP 101 apply, but the remaining conventions will not.
201. Structure. Written orders should be constructed using Word/Writer using two columns
on a landscape (usually A4) page. All paragraph numbers should be left aligned and not
indented.
202. Minor rules. The following minor rules apply:
a. Exercise protective markings. In exercise protective markings the word ‘EXERCISE’

is always to be abbreviated to ‘EX’, e.g. ‘EX SECRET’.
b. Proper nouns. Proper nouns are written in capital letters, e.g. ‘SWINDON’, ‘River
TONE’.
c. Composite nouns. Any composite noun, or one containing a prefix or suffix is

to be abbreviated by abbreviating that part of it for which there is an authorised
abbreviation, e.g. ‘mob’ (mobilisation), ‘demob’ (demobilisation).
d. Abbreviations. Only those recognised abbreviations included may be used without

an introduction. Where unofficial abbreviations are to be used they are to be
introduced into the order correctly. Some abbreviations indicate both the singular
and plural. If the addition of an ‘s’ is necessary it is always placed at the end of the
abbreviation e.g.: ‘CinCs’ (Commanders-in-Chief). An ‘s’ may be added only to the
abbreviation of a noun; it is never to be added to the abbreviation of a verb, e.g.
‘follows’ should be abbreviated to ‘fol’.
e. Times. Times are to be expressed using the 24-hour clock and the time zone suffix,
unless an expedient such as ‘Time Zone Used throughout the Order: BRAVO’ is
inserted below the references.
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f. Description of attachments/detachments. Units which have elements detached

are to be described using the convention illustrated below. The quantity of units/
subunits is always written in full, e.g.:
(1) 12 AI Bde (less two Bns).
(2) 1 PWRR (less one Coy).
g. Reported speech. Reported speech is written as spoken without abbreviations and

indented in single inverted commas. For example:
(1) We captured 3 offrs and 2 NCOs. They revealed en morale to be very poor. One
of the NCOs said: ‘We have had no food supplied since 3 o’clock on Thursday
of last week and we were promised that large stocks would be captured on the
objective.’
203. Ground locations, areas and boundaries. The following points should be noted:
a. Locations and points on the ground. Locations and points on the ground may
be described by grid reference or by giving the direction and distance from a simple
reference point.
b. Cardinal points. The four cardinal points of the compass are written in full, e.g.
south. For intermediate points the letters N, S, E and W are used, e.g. NE, SSW. Points
of the compass should always be considered in clockwise order from north.
c. Names of places and features. The names of places and features are spelt exactly as
on the map in use, except that the word ‘River’, written in full, is to precede the names
of all rivers regardless of the language in which this word appears on the map. The
grid reference is to be given the first time the name of the place or feature occurs. It
should be shown as a bigram map code followed by the grid reference number, e.g.:
‘CN 493246’.
d. Roads, tracks and railways. Roads, tracks and railways are described by the names
of places located on them. The word ‘road’, ‘track’ or ‘railway’ is to precede the place
names, e.g. ‘railway Winchester-Basingstoke’. Sufficient place names should be used
to ensure the correct road/track/railway is identified.
e. River banks. River banks are described as right or left from the point of view of
an observer facing downstream or, if this cannot be done, by using cardinal points.
‘Near’ and ‘far’ may be used with reference to friendly forces involved in river crossing
operations.
f. Canals. The names of a canal, or names of places on it, are used to describe a canal.
The banks are usually described by means of the cardinal points, e.g.: ‘the north bank
of the Kiel Canal’.
g. Routes. When movement is involved, a route is described by a sequence of points on

the route named, in the direction of movement. When no movement is involved, the
sequence of points named is to be from left to right or rear to front, assuming that
the person designating the route is facing the enemy. Cardinal points may be added if
required. It is common to give a route a nickname for ease of reference.
h. Areas. An area is described by taking the northernmost point first and giving the
remaining points in clockwise order.
Contents
i. Ground/positions. Ground and positions are described from left to right and front
to rear facing the enemy. To avoid confusion, cardinal points may be used to describe
flanks, rather than ‘left’ or ‘right’.
j. Boundaries. Boundaries are designated by easily distinguishable features on the

ground in the sequence in which they occur. They are to be described from rear to
front during an advance and from front to rear in defence and withdrawal. If generally
parallel to the front, e.g. rear boundaries, they are to be described from left to
right facing the enemy. Cardinal points may be added if required. When describing
boundaries between units and formations, the words ‘inclusive’ or ‘exclusive’ are
used before the place to which they refer. The description of a boundary must state
specifically to which unit or formation an area or a point is inclusive or exclusive.
k. Directions. A direction may be indicated in one of three ways:

(1) By use of two locations or places, e.g. ‘direction Hannover-Dortmund’.
(2) As a point of the compass, e.g. ‘north’, ‘SE’.
(3) Using a compass bearing, e.g. ‘5600 mils’.
204. Time. Time is specified using the 24-hour clock. The first pair of digits define the hour
and the second pair the minutes past the hour, e.g. 1147 is 47 minutes past 11 o’clock in
the morning. The following rules should be noted:
a. Quoting the time. The time can be followed by a time zone suffix or the word
‘hours’ if confusion with other figures is possible, e.g.: 1432 or 1432hrs.
b. Midnight. The word midnight is not to be used. The time 0000 hours defines the
time and the date defines the day, e.g. it is common practice to use either 2359 hours
or 0001 hours to avoid confusion. The term ‘2400hrs’ is never to be used as a time of
day.
c. Date time groups. Date time groups are a method of showing times and dates in
signal messages or operation orders. An example:
(1) 031404AJUL17 for 3 July 2017, 1404 hours, Time Zone ALPHA.
Contents
OSW formats
205. Introduction. It is widely acknowledged that the formats for operation orders, warning
orders, fragmentary orders and CSSOs are essentially the same with varying degrees of
detail. A generic format is shown below.
OPORD/WngO/FRAGO CSSO
Prelims Prelims
TASKORG TASKORG
Ground Situation
White (LN and govt)
Green (indigenous armed

forces)
Red (enemy forces)
Situation Black (criminal elms)
Fr forces 2-up - intent and ME
1-up - mission and CONOPS
Flanking formations
CS
Air/Avn
Mission Mission
CONOPS Intent CONOPS
Scheme of manoeuvre Scheme of manoeuvre
Main effort Main effort
Outcome Outcome
Subordinate missions Subordinate tasks
CS missions/tasks/ Materiel and services

priorities Medical
Execution
Personnel
Civil - Military
Miscellaneous
Coord instrs Timings

Locations
Con measures fireplan
Deception and sy movement
Key information from annexes
Concept Contained in execution
Log
ES
Service support
Health service support
(HSS)
Pro
Command and signal Command and signal
Figure 12.1. Generic orders format

Contents
206. Templates. Templates for orders follow. Reversionary modes are included for
completeness. The tabular format has been adopted to provide a more efficient
collaborative working structure. This should include annexes. These have been populated
with direction for their completion. In the reversionary template, text in italics provides
general guidance on the content. Footnotes have been used to provide additional
information and detail where required. The importance of enacting the ComBAT
operation order via BCiP 5.6 should not be underestimated, and a common time must
be set for this to happen. Bottom line up front (BLUF) allows a synopsis of the order/
presentation to be made at the outset.
Contents
Ops summary
TASKORG: Unit mission:
This area is simply a This should be only the unit mission, subunits
breakdown of key missions are detailed later with the synch matrix.
elements of your
TASKORG and can be
done graphically or text
descriptions of your
subunits TASKORG. This
TASKORG should reflect Key coordinating instructions and BM:
the unit TASKORG for These next two block areas should be focused on
the decisive phase of the the detail you need to conduct the decisive phase
operation. of the operation.
Some areas that can be considered for use are:
Concept of operation:
Key timings
Intent: If wider intent is
too lengthy this should Bypass criteria
be shortened to capture Limit of advance or exploitation
the decisive part of the
operation. Notice to move status
SoM: Narrative Assembly area locations

description of the decisive FSCMs and air space measures
part of the operation.
Report lines or phase lines
Main effort: One
Code words
sentence detailing what
is the ME for the decisive Combat ID (CID) markings or procedures Signature:
phase. Aid post locations
CASEVAC procedures
Resupply coordination
Alternate Comd
Basic comms plan (primary and alternate nets)
OPSEC
Friendly forces positions within our AO and
CID for those forces
ROE or ROE restrictions
Contents
Ops schematic with elements of DSO:
Note: If you chose to use the ComBAT DSO then use the ComBAT screen capture tool to select
the part of the DSO needto best illustrate the decisive phase of the operation and ‘paste
special’ as “Picture (Enhanced Metafile).”
If ops schematic is used then copy the schematic and follow same paste special procedure.
Subunit missions and tasks: CCIR: This is exactly what it sounds like.
Use the next two blocks to detail CCIR really shape the mindset of Comds
subunit missions and tasks. This and should be given the attention they
coupled with the synch matrix deserve.
below will be the key sheet that the HVTL: This is the only enemy-focused area
subunit Comds fight the battle off. on the ops summary and should focus the
subunit Comds on key enemy formations
and equipment.
Contents
Synch matrix:
Note: It is important to tailor this synch matrix to the decisive part of the operation;
preliminary movements in or reorganisation plans should not be included for the purposes
of an ops summary. Leave the detail for the wider parts of the operation for the base order
complete synch matrix. You can include decision points (DPs) at the bottom of this page
and/or with the DSM.
Note: Only insert the parts of the DSO that are applicable to the decisive part of the operation where
DSOM subunit Comds are likely not to have access to the full OSW. This chart here can be utilised or conversely
you can input it via a screen capture from ComBAT. With either choice, simply select the print areas you
desire and allow excel to ‘shrink to fit.’
Primary and
NAI/TAI Location Description Purpose Link to DP
secondary asset
DSM
Decision points
DP Decision Criteria Action
Figure 12.2. Ops summary

Contents
Reversionary warning order

DTG: 2010120891_1037 (LOCAL2) From: FMN/UNIT 38R TP 183292733
To: FMN/UNIT SUs/Atts/Dets
Copy of 4
WngO 1 TO 010/0245 OP NAME6
Ref:
A. Any docs on which this WngO is based should be referenced here.
BLUF 2-3 lines of text to describe the operational context and outline activity.
Time zone Indicate what time zone is in use throughout WngO, written in full in CAPITALS
(e.g. ZULU)
TASKORG TASKORG7 is written in text format and is likely to be in draft at this stage.
SITUATION 8
Paras describing physical environment, human terrain and threat.
Ground
Local actors
White forces Govt dept pers.
Green forces Host-nation armed/sy forces (AF).
Red forces Enemy forces.
Black forces Criminal elms.
Friendly forces (FF) All info for this para comes from SITUATION and EXECUTION paras from higher fmn
OPORD. If there has not been a change, state NO CHANGE
2-up Intent and ME.
1-up Mission, concept of operations.
Neighbouring fmns
Arty/fires
Engineers
Air/Avn Allocations from higher fmn are highlighted here if known. Allocations to
subordinates incl in coord instrs in OPORD.
MISSION
From higher fmn EXECUTION para and should be copied here verbatim.
EXECUTION
Concept of operations.
Intent
Scheme of manoeuvre (SoM)
Main effort (ME) Unlikely to be clear at this stage.
Dependent on command status, mission statements for atts will be given by either
Atts
their parent CoC or by the designated Comd. Additional tasks may be given.
Partnered forces Partnered forces will be listed here, incl command states.
Electronic warfare (EW) An indication of assets available, incl command states.

(TACON)
Contents
Engrs (TACOM) An indication of assets available, incl command states.
Concept of joint fires and An indication of assets available, incl command states.
targeting (TACON)
ISR An indication of assets available, incl command states.
Aviation An indication of assets available, incl command states.
MWD An indication of assets available, incl command states.
EOD and search An indication of assets available, incl command states.
Probable timings:
DTG EVENT
20100723_1200 (D-5
1200hrs)
Service support
CSS concept
ES
Log Sp
HSS
Command and Signal
Original signed Original signed
Acknowledge:
Authenticate:
Sig block Sig block

Comd Principal staff officers
1 This DTG refers to the time at which a WngO is issued and is to be written
in accordance with Defence electronic working practices
2 Show time zone in use throughout the op - spell out in capitals.
3 Place of issue - may be a place name, grid ref or both. GR is to follow MGRS format.
4 Each document is allotted a copy no, irrespective of sy classification.
5 Indicates the cumulative total of OPORDs issued by a CP during the year.
6 File ref is a combination of DTG fol by WngO title - 20101209_1437_FMN_
FRAGO_010/024_OP_NAME-org-role-version-fileref-classification.
7 Where units are attached or detached, the outline timings of enactment should be recorded.
8 Text is to be abbreviated, using official abbreviations unless working in a MN environment.
Figure 12.3. Reversionary warning order

Contents
Reversionary operation order

DTG: 201012091_1437 (LOCAL2)
From: FMN/UNIT 38R TP 183292733
Copy of 4
OPORD 010/0245 OP NAME6
Ref:
A. Any docs on which this OPORD is based should be referenced here.
Indicate what time zone is in use throughout OPORD, written in full in CAPITALS (e.g.
Time zone
ZULU).
TASKORG TASKORG7 is written in text format here or referenced in Annex A.
SITUATION8
Paras describing physical environment, human terrain and threat may be alternatively found in Annex B (situation).
Ground
Local actors
White forces Govt dept pers.
Green forces Host-nation armed/sy forces (AF).
Red forces Enemy forces - composn, disposn, loc, mov, estb str, capabilities.
Black forces Criminal elms.
All info for this para comes from SITUATION and EXECUTION paras
Friendly forces (FF)
from higher fmn OPORD. If no change, then state NO CHANGE.
2-up Intent and ME.
1-up Mission, concept of ops.
Neighbouring fmns Key activities from flanks, front and rear.
Allocations from higher fmn are highlighted here. Allocations to

Air/Avn
subordinates incl in coord instrs.
Arty/fires May be incl if not in Annex I.
Engrs May be incl if not in Annex J.
Atts and dets May be covered here if not incl under TASKORG.
MISSION
From higher formation EXECUTION para and should be copied here verbatim.
1 This DTG refers to the time at which an OPORD is issued and not the enact time, issued separately
in coord instrs. It is to be written in accordance with Defence electronic working practices.
5 OPORD number indicates the cumulative total of OPORDs issued by a headquarters during the yr.
6 File ref is a combination of DTG fol by OPORD title - 20101209_1437_FMN_
Contents
EXECUTION
To incorporate the effects from the effects schematic e.g. CE Q3. Reference to effects
Intent
schematic Annex C.
Outline activities in chronological order.

Scheme of manoeuvre
May be broken down using tactical, operational or geographic frameworks.
(SoM)
Frameworks may be preceded by ‘Preliminary Activity’ and followed by ‘Enduring’.
Main effort (ME) Critical activity upon which success/failure of the plan hinges.
Outcome
Subordinates’ msns and

tasks1
MISSION VERB (e.g. ATTACK).

Subordinate 1 (OPCOM)2 Task 1
(1,0,1 / 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)3 Task 2
Unifying purpose (e.g. in order to SECURE Radio Station).
MISSION VERB (e.g. SECURE).

Task 1
Subordinate 2 (OPCOM) Task 2
Unifying purpose (e.g. in order to DENY EF FoM).
Be prepared to (BPT) provide humanitarian assistance (HA) to local pop.4
Dependent on command states, mission statements for atts will be given by either
Atts their parent chain of command or by the designated Comd. Addl tasks may be given.
Further info avail in Annex A (TASKORG).
TASK 1
Armd Cav (TACOM) TASK 2
Unifying purpose (e.g. in order to SECURE LD).
DISRUPT, SEIZE, CLEAR

TASK 1
Partnered forces
TASK 2
Unifying purpose.
Electronic warfare (EW) Pris:5 TASK 1

(TACON) TASK 2
Engrs (TACOM) See Annex J.6
Concept of joint fires and See Annex I.7 The TASKORG will denote command relationships between Arty tac
targeting (TACON) parties and their manoeuvre Comds.
Targeting (TACON)
1 To comprise a clear, concise statement of task(s) and a unifying purpose.

Subordinates fulfilling reserve tasks do not receive a unifying purpose.
2 Command states should be reiterated beneath the unit name - amplification can be found in Sect xxx.
3 Denotes the number and type of subordinate groupings.
4 Secondary tasks may be issued in this manner, and come after the unifying purpose.
5 See command states in Part 2.
6 Tasks will be allocated in priority order.
7 Where greater clarity is required, annexes may be used.
Contents
ISR For ISR concept, see Annex H.
Avn
MWD
EOD and search
Coordinating instructions1
Timings: Timings are given in detail and chronologically. Further details are specified in the SM.
Annex E.
DTG EVENT
20100724_2100 Enact ComBAT OPORD.2
20100725_0800 (D-7 Subordinate 1 and Subordinate 2 conduct demonstration.

0800hrs)3
20100723_1200 (D-5 Recce elms deploy to SCREEN EF to west.

1200hrs)
20100728_0530 (H-hr)
EOD and search See Annex L.
Legal See Annex N.
ROE Often complex and therefore refer to Annex O.
Lessons See Annex P.
BM Often complex and therefore refer to Annex G.
SH coord Reliance on Avn will necessitate detailed coord instrs for use of SH. See Avn/Air Annex
F.
TAI See Annex D.
Key locs List key locs by MGRS grid ref.
ISR packs
EW Ensure spectrum deconfliction across AO.
OPSEC List specific measures not covered in SOI.
Searches
Interpreters Details for the RV with interpreters must be considered.
Partnering See Annex U.
CONPLANS List all CONPLANs that exist:

Enemy most dangerous COA. No-fly plan.
Media Outline the media plan, incl timings. Annex V.
Final laydown Incl limits of exploitation (LOE), arcs to be covered, ln responsibilities.
Pro See Annex S.
Mov See Annex T.
SERVICE SUPPORT The fol headings provide a framework when CSS is covered in the main OPORD.
CSS concept See Annex K. To incl key log considerations:

e.g. key affiliation changes, control of critical supplies.
ES
Log Sp
HSS
Contents
Command and Signal
Overall Comd List overall Comd, followed by alt Comd in precedence.
Concept of comms
Intent State comms intent. Annex R.
Key CP Locs
Liaison
RRB List rebros and how comms will be maint throughout op.
EMCON
Code words List in chronological sequence of use.
COMSEC period
Acknowledge:4
Authenticate:
Sig block5 Sig block6

Comd Principal staff officer
Annexes: Annex titles are non-discretionary. It is acknowledged that local variations will exist for appendices and
overlays.
A. TASKORG. L. EOD and search.

B. Situation. M. Information activities.
C. Ops trace and effects schematic. N. Legal.
D. DSO/DSM/DSM. O. ROE/use of force.
E. Outline SM. P. Lessons.
F. Air and Avn. Q. Civ/mil coord and assessment.
G. BM. R. CIS.
H. ISR. S. Pro.
I. Joint fires and tgting. T. MovO.
J. Engrs. U. Indigenous Forces Dev/Partnering.
K. CSS. V. Media.
1 All pertinent con measures must be incl here. Some of the detail may be incl in the overlay.
2 DTG at which ComBAT OPORD is enacted.
3 See designation of days and hours.
4 Fmns/units are to ack receipt of an order.
5 It is a legal requirement for OPORD to be signed by the commander or his appointed representative
(usually COS). All original OPORD are to be printed off and signed for ORK.
6 If neither commander nor COS are available at time of issue, commander’s name is typed and a staff officer
authenticates the OPORD (commander or COS signing original/file copy at the earliest opportunity).
Figure 12.4. Reversionary operation order

Contents
Reversionary fragmentary order

DTG: 201012101_1027 (LOCAL2)
Copy of 4
FRAGO to OPORD 010/0245 OP NAME6
Ref:
Any docs on which this FRAGO is based should be referenced here. This
A.
will incl the OPORD on which it is based.
Indicate what time zone is in use throughout FRAGO, written in full in

Time zone
CAPITALS (e.g. ZULU).
TASKORG TASKORG7 is written in text format here or referenced in Annex A.
SITUATION8
Paras describing physical environment, human terrain and threat may be alternatively found in Annex B (situation).
Ground
Local actors
White forces Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Green forces Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Red forces Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Black forces Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
All info for this para comes from SITUATION and EXECUTION
Friendly forces (FF)
paras from the OPORD. If no change, stated here.
2-up Intent and ME.
1-up Mission, concept of ops.
Neighbouring formations Key activities from flanks, front and rear.
Arty/fires May be incl if not in Annex I.
Engineers May be incl if not in Annex J.
Air/Avn Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
EXECUTION
Intent Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Scheme of manoeuvre (SoM) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
MISSION
From higher fmn EXECUTION para and should be copied here verbatim.
1 This DTG refers to the time at which an OPORD is issued and not the enact time, issued separately
in coord instrs. It is to be written in accordance with Defence electronic working practices.
6 File ref is a combination of DTG fol by OPORD title - 20101209_1437_FMN_
Contents
Scheme of manoeuvre (SoM) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Main effort (ME) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Outcome Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Subordinates’ missions and tasks 9

Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Subordinate 1 (OPCOM)10 Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.

(1,0,1 / 0, 0, 0, 1, 1)11
Subordinate 2 (OPCOM) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Specified changes to main OPORD listed here. Further info avail in

Atts
Annex A (TASKORG).
Armd Cav Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Partnered forces Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Electronic warfare (EW) (TACON) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Engrs (TACOM) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Concept of joint fires and targeting (TACON) Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Targeting (TACON)
ISR Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Avn Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
MWD Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
EOD and search Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Coordinating instructions12
Timings are given in detail and chronologically. Further details are

Timings: specified in the SM (Annex E). Specified changes to main OPORD
listed here.
DTG EVENT
20100725_0800 (D-7 0800hrs) 14

Subordinate 1 and Subordinate 2 conduct conduct recce screen.
20100723_1200 (D-5 1200hrs) A Coy defeat stronghold at GR 123456.
20100728_0530 (H-hr)
EOD and search Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Legal Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
ROE Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Lessons Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
BM Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
SH coord Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
TAI No change.
9 To comprise a clear, concise statement of task(s) and a unifying purpose. Subordinates fulfilling reserve tasks do not
receive a unifying purpose.
10 Command states should be reiterated beneath the unit name.
11 Denotes the number and type of subordinate groupings.
12 All pertinent con measures must be incl here. Some of the detail may be incl in the overlay.
Contents
Key locs Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
ISR packs Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
EW Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
OPSEC Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Searches Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Interpreters Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Partnering Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
List all CONPLANs that exist:

CONPLANS
Enemy most dangerous COA. No-fly plan.
Media Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Final laydown Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Pro Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Mov Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Service support
CSS concept Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
ES
Log Sp
HSS
Command and Signal
Overall Comd Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
Concept of comms Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
RRB Specified changes to main OPORD listed here.
COMSEC period
Acknowledge:15
Authenticate:
Sig block16 Sig block17

Annexes: Annex titles are non-discretionary. It is acknowledged that local variations will exist for appendices and
overlays.
A. TASKORG. I. Joint fires and tgting. Q. Civ/mil coord and assessment.

B. Situation. J. Engineers. R. CIS.
C. Ops trace and effects schematic. K. CSS. S. Pro.
D. DSO/DSOM/DSM. L. EOD and search. T. MovO.
E. Outline SM. M. Information activities. U. Indigenous Forces Dev/Partnering.
F. Air and Avn. N. Legal. V. Media.
G. BM. O. ROE/use of force.
H. ISR. P. Lessons.
15 Fmns/units are to ack receipt of an order.

16 It is a legal requirement for OPORD to be signed by the commander or his appointed representative
(usually COS). All original OPORD are to be printed off and signed for ORK.
17 If neither commander nor COS are available at time of issue, commander’s name is typed and a staff officer
authenticates the OPORD (commander or COS signing original/file copy at the earliest opportunity).
Figure 12.5. Reversionary FragO

Contents
Reversionary combat service support order

DTG: 201012101_1027 (LOCAL2)
Copy of 4
CSSO to OPORD 010/0245 OP NAME6
Ref:
A. Any docs on which this CSSO is based should be referenced here.

This will incl the main OPORD.
BLUF 2-3 lines of text to describe the operational context and outline
activity. This may incl manoeuvre Bde mission.
Time zone Indicate what time zone is in use throughout CSSO, written in full
in CAPITALS (e.g. ZULU).
TASKORG CSSO TASKORG7 is written in text format here or referenced in

Annex A.
SITUATION8
Paras describing physical environment, human terrain and threat which are pertinent to the CSS community would be
included here.
Ground
Local actors
White forces
Green forces
Red forces
Black forces
Friendly forces (FF) All info for this para comes from SITUATION and EXECUTION
paras from OPORD.
Bde mission Repeated verbatim from Bde OPORD.
Bde CONOPS Repeat Bde CONOPS.
CSS higher fmn 9

CONOPS should be incl (broken down by: Log, ES, HSS, Pro).
CSS overlay See Annex B.
Atts and dets May be covered here if not incl under TASKORG.
1 This DTG refers to the time at which an order is issued and not the OPORD enact time, issued separately
in coord instrs. It is to be written in accordance with Defence Electronic Working Practices.
6 File ref is a combination of DTG fol by title - 20101209_1437_FMN_
FRAGO2_010/024_OP_NAME-org-role-version-fileref-classification.
9 CSS higher fmn may be BSG, DSG or NSE.
Contents
MISSION
From Bde OPORD and should be copied here verbatim.
EXECUTION
Intent
A synopsis of how CSS elms are to sp the combat elms (Log,

ES, HSS, Pro). These may be broken down by discrete headings.
Scheme of support
CSS affiliations at Annex E. It may be helpful to use the same
framework as in the main OPORD.
Main effort (ME)10 CSS ME written here.
Log Log intent written here, sp by ME.
HSS HSS intent written here, sp by ME.
Pro Pro intent written here, sp by ME.
ES ES intent written here, sp by ME.
Subordinates’ Missions and tasks 11
MISSION VERB (e.g. MAINTAIN).

Task 1
Subordinate 1 (OPCOM)12
Task 2
Unifying purpose.
MISSION VERB (e.g. SUSTAIN).

Task 1
Subordinate 2 (OPCOM)
Task 2
Unifying purpose.
MISSION VERB (e.g. BUILD-UP).

Task 1
Subordinate 3 (OPCOM)
Task 2
Unifying purpose.
Coordinating instructions 13
C/S providing FP to CSS units and convoys (CLP) listed here.

FP
Individual FP measures reiterated here.
Timings are given in detail and chronologically. Further details are

Timings: specified in the SM (Annex D). Specified changes to main OPORD
listed here.
DTG EVENT
20100725_0800 (D-7 0800hrs) 15
20100723_1200 (D-5 1200hrs)
20100728_0530 (H-hr)
10 Functional ME are listed here, which sp the CSS ME.

11 To comprise a clear, concise statement of task(s) and a unifying purpose.
12 Command states should be reiterated beneath the unit name.
13 All pertinent con measures must be incl here.
Contents
CSS mov plan outlined here. May refer to Annex F for further
Mov
detail.
CONPLANS
Service support
Locations Key locs to be listed here; e.g. DSG, BSG, DP.
Holdings to be tabulated here, by FCU/DCR and commodity. A

CSups
SUSTAT may be incorporated separately within Annex C.
Arty Log Key Arty log issues from Arty/Fires annex highlighted here.
Engr Log Key engineer log issues from engineer annex highlighted here.
LSD LSD affiliations listed here (table format).
Repair Repair pris to be listed here.
Recovery To incl recy directive.
ES mat To incl mat supply directive.
Eqpt denial
BDR BDR methodology incl cross-servicing and cannibalisation.
Emergency burials Emergency burials directive incl here.
CPERS CPERS handling directive incl here.
Command and Signal
Overall Comd List overall Comd, fol by alt Comd in precedence.
Concept of comms
Intent State comms intent.
Key locs
Liaison
EMCON
Code words List in chronological sequence of use.
COMSEC period
Acknowledge:
Authenticate:
Sig block Sig block

Annexes: Some CSSO annexes are listed below.
TASKORG
CSS overlay
SUSTAT
Synch matrix
CSS affiliations
CSS mov plan
Figure 12.6. Reversionary CSSO

Contents
TASKORG

Time effective: Related order:
Classification: Phase:
X
12X 3UKXX
Combat elements Combat elements Combat elements Combat elements Combat elements Troops Troops Troops Notes
II II II II II XX II II
Excel/Clac TASKORGS
KRH 12X RL 12X 1YORKS 12X 1RWELSH 12X 1SG 12X 3UKXX 4REME 12X 4RLC 12X
may have to be used
OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM OPCOM where there is no
I II II II II I II
access to ComBAT
A KRH MAIN RL HQ 1YORKS MAIN 1RWELSH BGHQ 1SG BHQ 4REME RHQ 4RLC Map symbology
I I I I I I
is used to depict
SP KRH A RL B 1YORKS A 1RWELSH RF 1SG 10ARMD 4REME 0A 4RLC elements of the force
I I I I I I
in a table - map
A 1YORKS B RL C 1YORKS C 1RWELSH B 1SG 17FD 4REME 0D 4RLC symbols can be pre-
I I I I I loaded onto DII as
B 1RWELSH C RL D 1YORKS D 1RWELSH LF 1SG 41B 4RLC
one of the fonts
I I I I I
Originator is shown
D RL C KRH B KRH LF 1SG 75 4RLC top left
I
Units are shown
LAD 4RLC horizontally. The
OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON OPCON HQ is shown in the
I top line of each
127- 38- 28143- 5- 52-
GUNGP 19RA BCTAC 19RA BCTAC 19RA BCTAC 19RA BCTAC 19RA(1) 176 19RA
unit column and
I subordinate units are
237 EW 14SREW
displayed in order of
SSQN
II precedence in blocks
showing command
32RA 3UKXX
I
state
93 5RA
Command state
TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM TACOM order is OPCOM,
I I I I II I I OPCON, TACOM,
TACON
8 26ENGR RECCE 26ENGR 33 26ENGR 30 26ENGR JHF 3UKXX 4 4RLC 9ARMD 4REME
I I Symbols may have
14 -4MED LT1
220-
4MED 34 -4MED 24 -4MED 21
EOD 101ENGR 33 4RLC additional detail
4 4MED
II I added to them using
16SIG 3UKXX 60 4RLC
the notes column at
II I the right hand side
MP such as a grouping
4RMP 12X 11 4MED
I not before time
13 4MED
ComBAT TASKORGs
TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON TACON must be enacted to
I enable correct data
flow
58 12RA
I
27RLC 12X
Contents
CHAPTER 13
Orders groups
207. Introduction. The output of an estimate process is
Contents
a plan. But the plan is worthless unless subordinates
who will execute that plan understand what it is the • Principles
commander wants them to do. Orders may be verbal • Preparation
or written and delivered personally to an orders group • Timings
(O Gp) or remotely by radio, data transfer, or runner. • Seating plan
Commanders will usually prefer to issue orders in person • Aids
so that they can impose their will and personality on • Orders group format
their subordinates, emphasise key points and allow • Post orders group
subordinates to ask any questions immediately.
Principles
208. The orders group must be delivered with simplicity, clarity and brevity. It must be complete
within one third of the available planning time and, as a consequence must last no more
than one hour, including time for questions.
209. Rehearsals. An orders group is a stage-managed affair; therefore a rehearsal is

desirable if not always practical. If a rehearsal is not held the individual responsible for
organising the orders group should ensure that the content and delivery of the orders are
coordinated.
210. Execution. The commander and COS identify the requirement for an orders group as
part of the timeline analysis (vice radio orders, written orders, ComBAT, etc.). The iHub is
generally tasked with coordination of an orders group.
Preparation
211. The following is a checklist for consideration when conducting preparation for an orders
group:
a. Briefing tent/room with power/quiet external area
b. Benches and tables
c. Lighting
d. Projector and screen
e. Refreshments
f. Maps/traces and boards
g. Bird table
Contents
Timings
212. Subordinate commanders will often have to travel some distance to get to an orders
group. Where possible ComBAT orders should be transmitted to subordinate commanders
as soon as possible. This should allow them to be at least partially read in prior to arrival
at the orders group. It is a fine judgement for an orders group to be delayed. To do so will
invariably eat into a subordinate’s own battle preparation time. Note that the production
of OSW takes time – COSs should consider producing the OSW early and issuing pencil
amendments at the start of the orders group, rather than delaying an orders group
because the OSW is still being reproduced.
213. Reception arrangements. The larger the CP the more important the reception
arrangements for those attending the orders group. In particular consider:
a. Arrangements for arrivals from outside the CP, including guidance on where to park
and how to get to the orders group.
b. Reception arrangements at the orders group site, to include:
(1) When those attending will be allowed access to the site.
(2) Arrangements to meet early arrivals.
(3) A location for copying of traces and marking maps, and for subordinates to read
written orders prior to receipt of oral orders. Ideally the CP will already have
prepared traces and OSW for subordinates.
(4) Personal equipment stowage
(5) Refreshment/feeding requirements
(6) Communication facilities.
Seating plan
214. The general principle is for the main subordinate commanders to sit centrally at the front
while other individuals, including the staff, sit at the sides. Consideration should be given
to the availability, number and marking of seats, and displaying a seating plan.
Aids
215. The following aids should be considered, the actual requirement will vary depending on
the situation and reversionary methods should be available and rehearsed:
a. If slides are utilised they should be created on the standard template and wherever
possible created within, or utilising product from ComBAT.
b. If slides are not required place markers are to be used to signpost the orders group.
c. The core ‘brief and fight’ tools (including: synch matrix, DSO and operations trace) are
to be displayed both on the bird table and on slides; this is a key element of orders
group preparation.
d. BAE and enemy laydown should be on overlays.
e. A map in general and in detail are essential.

Contents
Orders group format

216. Figure 13.1 details an outline orders group format which can be refined as necessary.
Serial Orders section Lead Product
1 Intro Comd
2 Security iHub
3 Prelims COS Changes to the TASKORG
4 Met Air Met slide
5 Ground Engr BAE overlay
Situation: G2 Human terrain (where applicable)

White forces and Enemy situation in general
6
Threats Enemy situation in detail
MLCOA and MDCOA
Situation COS Higher SoM schematic

7
Friendly forces
8 Mission Comd
Execution Comd
9
Concept of ops (intent, SoM, ME)
10 Missions/tasks Comd 1 x slide per mission
11 Concept of ISR ISR lead DSO slide
12 Concept of joint fires Joint fires lead Slides as required
13 Concept of engineers Engineers lead Slides as required
Coordinating instructions COS/G35 To include key timings, phase/report lines

14
and DPs
Combat service support DCOS Slides as required

15
Concept of CSS
Command and signal CIS lead Slides as required

16
Concept of CIS
17 Summary Comd SoM schematic slide
18 Time Joint fires lead GPS (Bowman) time
19 Questions Comd
Total time: 60mins
Figure 13.1. Orders group format
Post orders group

217. After the orders group, staff cells may use the opportunity to amplify areas of the
orders with subordinate specialists who may have attended the orders group with their
commander. For example, at battlegroup level, the BC will often wish to gather the subunit
FST commanders to expand on the fireplan. Staff should be careful not to overly consume
the subordinates’ ‘2/3’ of planning time in doing so. Once subordinates have had sufficient
time to plan, it is usual for them to backbrief the commander on their plan and for the
commander to host a ROC drill both of which are covered in Part 2, Prepare.
Contents
P2-1 | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018
Part 2
Prepare
218. Introduction. Preparation starts with the receipt of a warning order (WNGO) and ends
when execution begins. Preparation includes all activities conducted by a formation or
unit prior to execution which will improve its ability to operate. These activities include,
but are not limited to, those listed in Figure 14.1. Part 2 will describe the processes and
procedures associated with a CP’s preparation.
ISR activity
and G2
update
CP Refinement of
pre-execution the plan
checks
Activities during Subordinate’s

Rehearsals
preparation backbrief
Coordination
TASKORG and and liaison
integration
Figure 14.1. Activities during preparation

Contents
CHAPTER 14
ISR activity and G2 update
219. During preparation it is important to ensure that the
Contents
intelligence assessment remains coherent with the
• ISR activity execution
developing situation. The process of continuously
• Tracking
developing the common intelligence picture (CIP) may
result in refinement of the plan prior to execution. ISR
activity should be focused on answering the commander’s critical information requirements
(CCIRs). ISR feeds will commence during the planning process therefore the operations
centre G2, G3 and ISR cells must be ready to coordinate activity and receive information.
Figure 14.2 depicts the range of intelligence collection disciplines available. Some of
these feeds will be organic to the CP; others will require a formal request to higher. It is
important that the CP understands the level at which assets are held.67
Foreign
Strategic Intelligence collection disciplines instrumentation &
HUMINT signals intelligence
(FISINT)
Agent Electronic warfare Electronic

handling & (EW)4 & signals intelligence
CASCON intelligence (ELINT)
(SIGINT)
Communications
Human
Debriefing Geospatial intelligence
intelligence
intelligence (COMINT)5
HUMINT
(GEOINT)
Interrogation
& tactical Electronic support
questioning measures (ESM) -
(TQ)1 comms &
non-comms
Surveillance Measurement &
signature Acoustic
All-source fusion intelligence intelligence
(MASINT) (ACINT)
Forensics
& biometrics Synthetic
intelligence apeture radar
(FABINT) (SAR)6
Imagery
Seized
intelligence Infrared (IR)7
media analysis
Open source (IMINT)
(SMA)
Material & intelligence
personnel (OSINT)
Document exploitation Electro-optical
exploitation (MPE) (EO)7
(DOCEX)
Limited Sources
Technical 1. AFM ISTAR Part A Chapter 3 Annex A.
intelligence Internet Media distribution
material 2. JDP 2-00 Chapter 2 Section V.
(TECHINT)2
Notes on all-source fusion: is supported by a number of specialist processing disciplines including intelligence applications
1. Interrogation and TQ are HUMINT disciplines but are integrated with MPE disciplines operationally. management and intelligence requirements management and collection management.
2. TECHINT incorporates weapons intelligence and CHEMEX. 4. EW also includes ECM and EPM.
3. Depending upon the task, all-source fusion and further processing produces intelligence in support 5. COMINT includes cyber exploitation activities.
of operations (OPINT), including specific functions such as targeting, or it produces security 6. SAR may be classed as IMINT or MASINT.
intelligence (SI) which informs counter-intelligence activities and security measures. This function 7. Both IR and EO IMINT may be produced from imagery or FMV.
Figure 14.2. Intelligence collection disciplines
67 Further detail can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 3A ISTAR – The Enduring Doctrine.
Contents
a. The relationship between ISR and G2. The key to success is in cooperation and
coordination of ISR and G2 effort. The two branches should be integrated and work
together at every stage.68 G2 must understand the ISR capabilities and their operating
procedures. Figure 14.3 shows the differentiation in ISR and G2 asset tasking.
Assets normally tasked by ISR group Assets normally tasked by G2 cell
UAVs (FMV and SIGINT) HUMIT – national and FHT

EW SIGINT – through GCO
Formation recce IMINT – through JARIC LO
Specialist patrols Human terrain teams
Artillery radar and sound ranging CULADs (via influence)
Tactical recce aircraft Reachback (LIFC or DIFC)
GMTI/SAR aircraft (e.g. ASTOR)
Base ISTAR
Figure 14.3. ISR and G2 task deconfliction
b. A typical ISR deployment for a division-led operation is shown in Figure 14.4.
DCom ISR
(1ISR X)
SO1 ISR OISG COS ISR DCOS ISR

(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X, SANDA, PAG) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) Sustain cell
SO2MPE Int WO
SO2 ISR & CM (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
(3UKXX)
Integrating cells
IRM SNCO ASC

(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) FUTURE FUTURE CURRENT
PLANS OPS OPS
CM WO Arty Int SNCO
(1 ISR X) (1 Arty X) SO3 INT
SO2 INT SO3 INT
(3UKXX) (3UKXX) (1 ISR X)
IM SNCO Engr Int SNCO

(3UKXX) (8 Engr X) INT JNCO
G2 cell SO2 ISR
(3UKXX)
SO2 ISR
(1 ISR X)
(1 ISR X)
SO3 ISR
ISR capability SME cells (As required) (1 ISR X)
May be based on CO’s Tac parties or LO party
ISR JNCO
STA (1 ISR X)
HERA HUMINT EWCC RMP
(1 ISR X) (DHU) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 MP X)
CULAD & HTA GEOINT STAPCC CEMA MEDINT

(1 ISR X) (JFIG) (1 ISR X) (JCU) (2 Med X)
Protect cell
GMR LO UAS Avn LO Air LO
(ACR or LCR) SO3 CI
(1 ISR X) (JHC) (RAF) (1 ISR X)
Key:
SNCO CI
(1 ISR X)
Other FTC Bdes to Defence & OGD
1 ISR X to FGen 3UKXX to FGen
FGen to FGen
Figure 14.4. A typical ISR deployment for a divisional operation
68 The concept of ISR/G2/IA being collocated to form the information manoeuvre group as a staff cell in a CP is being
developed.
Contents
c. Division ISR group. The division ISR group is a stand-alone functional cell and
command node for the ISR commander. The ISR group is formed from the division’s
core ISR staff and is reinforced with individual augmentees from 1 ISR Bde in advance
of an operation or exercise. Further specialist tacical parties and LOs provide the
capability SMEs who control, integrate, synchronise and deliver ISR activities in
support of the manoeuvre plan. The structure of a division ISR group is illustrated at
Figure 14.5.
DCom ISR
(1ISR X)
SO1 ISR OISG COS ISR DCOS ISR

(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X, SANDA, PAG) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) Sustain cell
SO2MPE Int WO
SO2 ISR & CM (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
(3UKXX)
Integrating cells
IRM SNCO ASC

(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) FUTURE FUTURE CURRENT
PLANS OPS OPS
CM WO Arty Int SNCO
(1 ISR X) (1 Arty X) SO3 INT
SO2 INT SO3 INT
(3UKXX) (3UKXX) (1 ISR X)
IM SNCO Engr Int SNCO

(3UKXX) (8 Engr X) INT JNCO
G2 cell SO2 ISR
(3UKXX)
SO2 ISR
(1 ISR X)
(1 ISR X)
SO3 ISR
ISR capability SME cells (As required) (1 ISR X)
May be based on CO’s Tac parties or LO party
ISR JNCO
STA (1 ISR X)
HERA HUMINT EWCC RMP
(1 ISR X) (DHU) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 MP X)
CULAD & HTA GEOINT STAPCC CEMA MEDINT

(1 ISR X) (JFIG) (1 ISR X) (JCU) (2 Med X)
Protect cell
GMR LO UAS Avn LO Air LO
(ACR or LCR) SO3 CI
(1 ISR X) (JHC) (RAF) (1 ISR X)
Key:
SNCO CI
(1 ISR X)
Other FTC Bdes to Defence & OGD
1 ISR X to FGen 3UKXX to FGen
FGen to FGen
Figure 14.5. Structure of a division ISR group
d. Brigade ISR group. The brigade’s ISR group comprises the ISR staff in the brigade CP
and its recce unit. Commanded by CO ISR group, it identifies those ISR capabilities that
are allocated to the brigade from division and will apportion its organic ISR capabilities
among its manoeuvre units according to the operational priority. The structure of a
brigade ISR group can be seen in Figure 14.6.
Contents
HQ C2 Capabilities
MFMI
STAPCC 2 HTR LO TUAS STA patrols DHU FHTs
GS section1, 2
CI & Sy EWSI
EWCC 2 DHU LO sensor group HTR patrols
section 2
Div
IS section 2 TUAS cell SO2 MPE BRH AH
AIR LO Avn LO
MFMI
STACC Recce Regt LO Recce Regt MUAS Bty
CS Section
MUAS Bty Engr Regt LO STA Bty

Bde MPE LO Pac party Engr Recce Tp
CULAD FSTs MPE FEC
ISTAR Tac Close Recce Close Recce MUAS Tac

BGISD Lt WLR 4
Party 3 LO PI/Tp Party 4
BG MFMI MFMI
CULAD EW SGC 4 MUAS Det 4
GS section 1, 2 GS section 1, 2
MPE FET 4
Subunit COIST Close Recce Pl
Notes:
1. GS section becomes the OISG when reinforced with OGD and other national SANDA.
2. These cells reinforce the ISR group at the highest deployed UK HQ in the land component.
3. ISTAR Tac parties contain UAS and STA SMEs.
4. If allocated to BG.
Contents
CO ISR Gp
(1ISR X)
COS ISR
(1ISR X)
SO2 G2 G2 cell Protect cell SO2 ISR ISR cell

(1 ISR X) (Bde HQ)
SO3 G2 OC CS Sect OC CI Sect ISR WOCIS

(Bde HQ) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
MPE cell
(1 ISR X)
CS Sect IRM SNCO IM NCO CI Sect

(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
GMR LO
(ACR or LCR)
HUMINT
(DHU)
FUTURE SO3 ISR Plans Engr IO

(1 ISR X) (8 Engr X)
OPS
UAS
(1 ISR X)
G2 Plans NCO Engr Int SNCO
(1 ISR X) (8 Engr X)
STACC
(1 ISR X)
CURRENT EWSI CULAD & HTA

OPS (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
SO2 ISR SO3 ISR Ops ISR Ops WO

(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
HERA Avn LO
(1 ISR X) (JHC)
Integrating cells
Key: ISR capability SME cells
(As required)
Other FTC Bdes to Defence & OGD May be based on OC’s Tac parties or LO party
1 ISR X to FGen Bde to FGen
FGen to FGen
Figure 14.6. Structure of a brigade ISR group
e. Battlegroup ISR group. At battlegroup the composition of the ISR group is task-
organised to suit the operation, and comprises a headquarters staff and a recce
group. An example of a battlegroup ISR group is at Figure 14.7. The battlegroup CP
ISR staff is normally based around a subunit CP, and commanded by the OC of that
subunit. The OC takes up the role of OC ISR, and in conjunction with the battlegroup
intelligence officer (IO).
Contents
OC ISTAR
(OC Fire Sp Coy)
G2 cell
BG IO BGE
(BG HQ) (8 Engr X)
BG ISD
(1 ISR X)
ISR cell GMR cell Engr Recce

(8 Engr X)
Close Recce Pl/Tp
(BG)
ISTAR Tac party
1
EWSI LO or SGC
2
FST
(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X) (1 Arty X)
CULAD
(1 ISR X) Technical MUAS Tac party LCMR detachment
(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
ISR cell
MUAS detachment EWSI baseline
(1 ISR X) (1 ISR X)
MPE FET
1 ISTAR Tac party contains a mix of UAS and STA SMEs. (1 ISR X)
2 EWSI LO or SGC, deploy to BG HQ as required As allocated by Bde ISR Gp
Key: Other FTC Bdes to

1 ISR X to FGen BG to FGen
FGen
Figure 14.7. Structure of a battlegroup ISR group
ISR activity execution

220. ISR activity execution. Execution is managed through referral to the ISR tasking
plan (ITP), which details the block allocations of ISR assets showing both allocated and
requested assets. A daily ISR allocations matrix giving a 36-hour summary of allocated
resources is also produced. Short-notice dynamic tasking of opportune ISR capabilities
and non-dedicated ISR (NDISR) is coordinated through the common intelligence picture
(CIP) in the unit CP, facilitated by liaison between ISR and joint effects staff. Though ISR
capabilities may be allocated to units, the CIP retains the ability to retask assets at short
notice. All use of ISR assets must support the requirements of the DSM; if the IRs of the
unit change then the DSO and DSM must be refined too.
a. Receiving information. The watchkeeper will record information received either via
data or voice. The information should be replicated on hard copy serial sheets and on
an electronic log within a ComBAT table. The information must be disseminated to
all relevant areas of the CP and passed onto the CIP lead. Figure 14.8 illustrates how
intelligence updates should be used to refine the plan.
Contents
Refined intelliegence picture

Monitor CM against ICP Future operations
Execute ITP Refine NAIs, TAIs, DPs in DSO/DSM
Refine ICP Produce OSW
Process and disseminate INT Refined direction ISR Annex
Figure 14.8. G2 Preparation and refinement schematic
Tracking
221. To ‘track’ is the action of maintaining the identification and location of a unit, activity,
situation or person(s). A track number is a control measure that is allocated to ensure
coherence to the CIP. This will assist the coordination of surveillance activity when there
may be multiple and dynamic targets.
222. Use of track numbers. Not all enemy sightings will be allocated track numbers. A track
number shows intent to maintain identification and asset allocation. A track number will
be given to enable an effect on the track at a time and place of the unit’s choosing.
223. Persistent surveillance. Surveillance implies the ability to dwell on a particular NAI
over time. In major combat operations, the amount of available ISR assets may not allow
persistent surveillance of a track. This period is called an ISR blink. Although ISR planning
must seek to avoid these, ISR cells must be comfortable with dealing with this uncertainty
as they may be unavoidable where multiple tracks are prioritised. ISR blinks can be
reduced through the use of ground-manned recce.
224. Comprehensive ISR plan. Subordinates must pass their DSOs and DSMs to the higher
CP to fully understand the detail of how ISR assets will be allocated throughout the battle
space. Where required, higher CPs should adapt their master DSO to prioritise certain
subordinate NAIs and use them to control the execution of the operation.
225. Tracking management. The tracking process must be responsive to allow prioritisation
of assets. Data between the unit and subordinate CPs allowing for the dynamic and
consistent information flow of tracks augmented and supported through the use of voice.
Track management is to be conducted using the published and subscribed ComBAT track
board.
a. Track numbers.
(1) Track numbers are to start at 001 and should ascend until reset to 001 at the
end of a specified operation or on orders from the unit ISR cell. The unit which
initiates the track will prefix the track number to allow concurrent identification.
Tracks initiated by UK units will use the unit short-form name (e.g. 1PWRR/001).
(2) Once allocated, a track number will remain associated to the specific grouping
wherever it moves. If the grouping is known to (or assessed to) have split into
smaller packets then additional track numbers will be added. These may be a
new track number or the original track number may be suffixed by numbers
(e.g. 1PWRR/001/2). Track numbers should be referred to in all radio and data
communications.
Contents
(3) Battlegroups should use allocated track numbers down to subunit level.
b. Track authority.
(1) The authority on allocation, recording and review of all track numbers in the CP
lies with the ISR cell. Subordinates may allocate, delete or review tracks as enemy
are identified, destroyed or reorganised. However the CP ISR cell retains the
authority to overrule this, in consultation with the CIP.
(2) The authority to issue the priority of tracks and therefore allocate resources is
held by the ISR cell.
226. Tracking process.
a. Enemy sighted. When an enemy is identified but will not be engaged immediately,
it should be allocated a track number. A sighting report giving this track number is
posted in the CP ISR chat room. The priority of the track may also be given.
b. Lost tracks. If a track goes unsighted due to an ISR blink an update should be posted
in the CP ISR data chat room. This must include the track number direction of travel,
approximate speed where possible and the date and time of last sighting.
c. Purpose. Once a track is allocated the purpose should be recorded and distributed
as early as possible. For example, an UAS operator can conduct ongoing collateral
damage estimates if they know that the intent is to eventually strike the track.
d. Recording. Tracks should be logged by both unit and subordinate ISR staff in hard
and electronic copy.
(1) Logging. The tracks log table is shown at Figure 14.9:
Figure 14.9. Tracks log table

Contents
(2) ComBAT recording. Tracks are primarily maintained on the CIP table by the G2
battletracker. The ComBAT Bowman overlay displaying the CIP will be distributed
by the CIP and the tracking board released through publish and subscribe.
(i) Review. The CIP updates will review unit tracks as part of their routine battle
rhythm. The G2 cell is responsible for sending regular updates on the CIP
to the unit ISR chatroom (every 30 minutes while in contact and every two
hours out of contact).
e. Priority of track. Limited ISR assets will mean tracks are prioritised by the ISR cell.
This will ensure that resourced tracks are aligned to CCIRs, PIRs and the DSM.
(1) Priority 1. The track must be maintained.
(2) Priority 2. The track should be maintained. If the track is lost it should be re-
established as soon as possible.
(3) Priority 3. The track may be intentionally gapped in order to service higher
priority tracks.
Contents
CHAPTER 15
Refinement of the plan
227. Refinement of the plan. After orders and with new
Contents
intelligence the plan may need to be refined. This
will involve revisiting some or all of the stages of the • Process
respective estimate process. The level of refinement • Formation-level process and
will depend upon the current battle picture, the outputs
maturity of the plan and the time and staff resources
that can be allocated to the task. At corps and
division levels, there may be a significant time gap between the initial preparation of a
plan and its execution. This is a G3/5 staff function using a formalised process to refine
the plan so that it may constantly reflect the evolving context and situation. At brigade
level and below, planning may flow immediately into execution and any deliberate
refinement of a plan will typically take place within the estimate process itself or through
preparation of the execute.
Process
228. Commanders must have the agility to adjust the plan based on new information and
changing circumstances. For example, the enemy may do the unexpected, unforeseen
opportunities may arise, assumptions on which the plan is based may be proven true or
false and friendly forces status may change. In any of these cases the change must be
assessed against the plan and the commander must decide if the new information:
a. Validities the plan with no further changes.
b. Requires minor adjustments to the plan.
c. Requires major adjustments to the plan.
d. Means the mission is no longer valid and direction from higher is required.
229. The operations process therefore places significant emphasis on the requirement to
continually assess and refine a plan, even after orders have been delivered. Staff must also
note that refinements to a communicated plan will add another layer of considerations
onto time-constrained subordinate battle procedure; the process therefore requires agile
staff procedures driven by sharp situational awareness if it is to deliver mission success.
230. Refinement of a plan will involve revisiting some or all of the stages of the respective
estimate process. This level of refinement will depend on the current battle picture, the
maturity of the plan and the time and staff resources that can be allocated to the task.
At divisional and corps levels, there may be a significant time gap between the initial
preparation of a plan and its execution. This therefore demands a dedicated staff and
formalised process to refine the plan after orders have been delivered in order to reflect
evolving understanding of the context and requirement. At brigade level and below in
combat operations, planning may flow immediately into execution and any deliberate
refinement of a plan will typically take place within the estimate process itself. For
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example, as the result of a wargame, BGHQ staff could be tasked to develop a CONPLAN
or to revisit battlespace management.
Formation-level process and outputs

231. Within formation headquarters, planning staff (G5/FPlans) will typically handover the plan
to operations staff (G3/5/FOps or G3/COps) once the allocated 1/3 of planning of time has
been used. The operations staff, then responsible for the plan, have three key outputs as
described below:
a. Refinement of the plan. Further detailed refinement of the plan can be initiated by
the commander at any stage but is likely to be triggered by the following deliberate
procedures/factors:
(1) Receipt of the plan. Following the handover of the plan from plans to
operations staff, the fresh eyes of another layer of SMEs may identify critical
areas of weakness or incoherence for refinement.
(2) Subordinate commander’s backbrief. Subordinate commanders deliver

backbriefs to the commander following their own mission analysis. This
invaluable step in the planning process will regularly identify areas for refinement,
especially with regard to BM.
(3) ROC drill. By the time of the ROC drill, subordinates should have completed their
planning and issued their own orders. Any changes to the plan must be captured
in a sweep up FragO.
(4) Impact of the current battle. Staff must continue to routinely reassess the
plan against the current battle. This must include a deliberate staff check of
assumptions.
(5) Operations updates/resource availability. Many of the bids for critical

resources (such as air and aviation) will not have been confirmed on takeover of
the plan. Staff must track availability and refine where appropriate.
b. CONPLAN development. Contingency planning can be initiated as a result of risk

identification at any stage of the planning process. On an operational schematic using
Planning Concepts they will typically fall into two categories: Branches or Sequels.
CONPLANS that cannot be developed by the plans staff may be prioritised and handed
over to operations staff. The typical format for the communication of CONPLANS
developed after delivery of orders will be a FragO containing a series of ‘be prepared
to’ tasks, the criteria for enactment of the CONPLAN and any assumptions.
c. Reactive planning. The current battle picture may dictate that, while the mission
is still valid, major amendments are required to the plan. In this instance staff
must revisit key stages of the estimate. The level of tactical understanding and the
planning horizons will drive whether the tactical estimate, combat estimate or rapid
commander’s direction is used.
d. Planning considerations for teams responsible for plan refinement:
(1) Continuity within planning teams. Within any headquarters where a plan
is handed over from one team to another, thought must be given to creating
a level of staff continuity within each team. This level will be driven by the
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complexity of the plan and the time available for subsequent refinement.
However, due consideration should be given to embedding some operations
staff in the initial planning cell so that they can move with the plan on handover
and operations staff attendance at key planning backbriefs. In some cases (most
likely for complex plans requiring input from an SME pool of limited depth) it
may be necessary to maintain an operational planning team (OPT) in its entirety
throughout both the plan and refinement.
(2) Handover procedure. To mitigate the risk of information being lost during
handover from plans to operations and to maximise the benefits of a fresh set
of eyes looking at the plan, a very deliberate and detailed handover from one
team to the other is essential. Typically, this handover will be tied to a key stage
of the planning process such as the wargame, delivery of orders or the ROC drill
and must be outlined in detail in formation SOIs to ensure that the appropriate
versions of OSW are transferred efficiently. Efficient IM is critical.
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CHAPTER 16
Subordinate’s backbrief
Subordinate’s backbrief Contents

232. The subordinate commander will deliver a backbrief • Subordinate’s backbrief
to the commander following their mission analysis. It
offers the subordinate an opportunity to demonstrate
understanding and compliance with the direction received. The subordinate will confirm
unit plans and be offered a final opportunity to raise risks, clarify points or request
additional assets. Importantly the commander retains an opportunity to refine the
plan should it not meet the current intent or changing situation. Figure 16.1 depicts a
recommended format.
Ser Title Remarks
1 Confirmation of mission
2 Main deductions from the estimate
CONOPS:
Intent to include effects
3 SoM to likely missions/tasks, consideration of the higher CPs plan (1-up, 2-up),
compliance with the higher CPs DSO, incl. critical info from specialist overlays
Main effort
Key coordinating instructions – timings, resources, preliminary moves

4
Questions/RFIs/points of clarification to higher Comd. Identify constraints; key

resource shortfalls, indicating impact on operation (flexibility).
5
Areas of concern and key risks
Short summary
Questions from higher Comd (and staff)

6
Figure 16.1. Subordinate’s backbrief template.

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CHAPTER 17
Coordination and liaison
Coordination and liaison Contents

233. During preparation, liaison is especially • Coordination and liaison
important. It sets the conditions for collective • Coordinating points
situational awareness as well as the delivery of the • Liaison officers
overall execution. This is essential when operating
with multinational formations, flank formations,
or during complicated transitional phases of war. The presence or absence of a liaison
officer (LO) can influence the outcome of a battle and may provide the vital human
link that a communications asset cannot replicate. Liaison can be achieved via personal
contact between commanders, staff visits, the establishment of inter-unit coordinating
points and the provision and receipt of individual LOs to improve the situational
awareness of own forces and organisations.69
234. Purpose. Liaison is established between formations/units to improve:
a. Cooperation and understanding between commanders, CP staffs, and forces that are
working together.
b. Coordination of tactical matters to achieve unity of effort, mutual purpose, support,

and action.
c. Exact and precise understanding of implied or inferred coordination measures to

achieve synchronised results.
d. Coordination between military forces and non-military agencies.
235. Establishing liaison.
a. Reciprocal liaison. Liaison must be reciprocal when:
(1) A force is placed under OPCOM or OPCON of a CP of a different nationality.
(2) Brigade size, or similar assets, and higher formations of different nationalities are
adjacent.
(3) A national, and/or combined, joint force headquarters (JFHQ) and appropriate
echelon of any non-military agency are involved.
(4) Liaison between allied commands is always reciprocal.
b. Non-reciprocal liaison. Where circumstances or resources do not allow the exchange

of liaison teams, responsibility for establishing liaison is governed by the following
principles:
(1) Liaison is established from a higher echelon force to a lower echelon force.
69 As per ATP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces, Annex E Liaison.
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(2) Liaison is established from left to right.
(3) Liaison is established from rearward to forward units of the same echelon.
(4) Supporting forces establish liaison with forces they support.
(5) An incoming force establishes liaison with the outgoing force during a relief of
combat troops.
(6) The military establishes liaison with non-military agencies.
c. Re-establishing liaison. In the event that liaison is broken, all parties are to attempt
to re-establish liaison. However, the primary responsibility sits with the CP or force
originally responsible for establishing the liaison.
Coordinating points
236. Establishing and manning coordinating points. Coordinating points are the designated
points at which, in all types of combat, adjacent units must make contact for the purposes
of control and coordination. This may be to achieve tactical coordination, understanding
and/or mutual support between formations and units that are working together.70
237. Terminology:
a. Coordinating point. A designated point at which, in all types of combat, adjacent

formations or units must make contact for the purposes of control and coordination
b. Establishing unit. The element from the formation/unit designated to establish and
secure the coordinating point and receive the approaching unit.
c. Approaching unit. The element from the formation/unit designated to arrive at the
coordinating point after the establishing unit has secured it.
238. Manning. Coordinating points may be manned in one of the following ways, normally
specified by the higher CP:
a. Full time by liaison teams from both adjacent formations/units. This will be normal
when adjacent formations/units are of different nationalities, and may also be ordered
when the tactical situation requires close, continuous liaison.
b. Full time by the formation or unit designated to establish the coordinating point, and
visited by a liaison team from the flanking formation or unit at specified times.
c. Periodically by liaison teams from flanking formations/units at a specified time or

times. The coordinating point is manned periodically at the times stated by the higher
CP; normally a 6-hr interval, working from 0001hrs. This is the norm unless ordered
otherwise.
239. Coordinating instructions. The following must be specified by the CP ordering the
coordinating point, confirmed by the formations/units involved and known by the liaison
teams that will man the point:
a. Location of the coordinating point including a grid reference and description of the
terrain feature.
70 AAP-06 also includes the term ‘contact point’, which it defines as in land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable,
where two or more units are required to make contact.
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b. Formation/unit responsible for securing (establishing unit) and the time by which the
coordinating point must be secured/established.
c. Times at which approaching teams are to RV.
d. Description of each formation/unit’s liaison team (number and type of vehicles/

personnel, C/S, radio frequencies, etc.).
e. Route to be used to and from the coordinating point by both liaison teams.
f. Recognition signals to be employed.
g. Working language at the coordinating point.
240. Designation. When required, coordinating points are to be designated in formation

OSW with the minimum of: a description, UTM grid zone designator and grid reference,
nominated establishing/approaching units, ‘open from’ time, opening interval, working
language, recognition signal, and the description of each formation/unit’s liaison team
(number and type of vehicles, C/S and frequencies). They are also to be displayed on
overlays using APP-6 map marking symbols.
Liaison officers
241. Liaison groupings. The LO is an officer who is exchanged between two or more forces
and is empowered to represent and make appropriate recommendations on behalf
of his commander. They assist their own commander through the timely exchange of
information, intent, and situational awareness. Military liaison staff fall into the following
groupings.
a. Liaison officers or teams. LOs and teams represent the commander or a special
functional area. Chosen individuals should understand their commander’s plans, and
be able to cognitively express their commander’s views and intent to the commander
or CP staff to which they are attached. LOs may deploy with a small supporting
staff including a liaison NCO, clerical personnel, specialists, drivers, interpreters, and
communications personnel and their equipment. The size, composition and ranks
of liaison teams will vary according to task. As a guideline, Figure 17.1 provides a
summary of the ranks/grades for the senior LO of a liaison team/detachment.
Echelon NATO grade Rank*
Corps OF-5 or OF-4 Colonel or lieutenant colonel
Div OF-3 Major
Bde OF-2 Captain
BG OF-1 Lieutenant
* It is understood and accepted that certain NCOs will possess the skills required to perform liaison duties
effectively. To alleviate any discrepancy between officers and NCOs, the commonality of officer skills is used as the
template because it is better understood and accepted.
Figure 17.1. Senior LO guidelines for rank and grade
b. Liaison detachments. Detachments consist of individuals or teams with suitable

experience to make the appropriate liaison contribution. Suitable experience comes
from background in maritime, air, intelligence, fires, engineering, CSS or other
employment.
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c. Couriers or messengers. Couriers and messengers are responsible for the secure
physical transmission and delivery of documents and material.
242. Consideration for the selection of an LO. A trained, competent, trusted and informed
LO is central to effective liaison. An LO must have appropriate rank and experience for
the task. LOs should be in possession of the following information:
a. Own unit’s plan – especially key timings, DPs and any CONPLANs, branches or sequels.
LOs should be aware of any OSW scheduled to be released during the period of
their liaison task. LOs may deploy prior to their CP’s orders group and must make
arrangements to receive both orders and any amendments or clarifications made
during or after orders or during ROC drills.
b. Clarity on the extent of their delegated authority to represent their commander’s point
of view, if any.
c. Be conversant with the commander’s stated intent, concept of operations and ROE.
d. Transmit and clarify the recommendations that they make on the behalf of their
commander.
e. Understand the operations of their own formation or unit and should be familiar with
their general organisation C2 and staff procedures of the receiving organisation.
f. Have a working knowledge of current operations and future plans.
g. Have an understanding of the tactical doctrine of the formation, unit or non-military

agency to which they are attached.
h. Be proficient in the appropriate language of the receiving organisation or ensure an

interpreter is available.
i. Have appropriate clearance for access to communications and material of the

appropriate classification consistent with their duties.
243. Administration. It is the responsibility of G3/COps and other parent units to brief,
deploy and maintain day-to-day operational contact with their teams. It is expected
that LO teams will be self-sufficient with own vehicles, communications and appropriate
operational documents; however, it is the responsibility of the receiving organisation
to administer incoming LOs, ensure they are correctly sited, and that resources are
provided to facilitate the passage of information. As a minimum the following should be
confirmed:
a. R2 schedule and any conditions under which they may be required to report more or
less frequently, including EMCON measures and their commander’s CCIRs.
b. The DTG or conditions for the end of their liaison task.
c. CSups to maintain LOs, vehs and commander for the duration of task, plus travel time,
plus a buffer to pre-empt extension of task.
244. Communications. Liaison elements are to provide their own communication links to
their parent CP where possible and apply the relevant CIS procedures and classified
material protection measures. Where an LO is required to communicate within the
receiving force, the receiving force is to ensure that the required equipment and links are
in place.
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245. Checklist for LOs.
a. Before departing.
(1) Have you understood what the commander wants the receiving commander to
know?
(2) Have you arranged for a briefing by operations/intelligence and other staff
elements concerning current and future operations?
(3) Have you verified the receipt of and do you understand the tasks your staff has
given you?
(4) Have you obtained the correct maps, and overlays?
(5) Have you ensured arrangements have been made for transport, communications
equipment, and codes and signals instructions? Have you arranged for the
replacement of these items?
(6) Have you arranged for the departure of the liaison team?
(7) Have you completed your route reconnaissance and time appreciation so that you
will arrive at the designated location on time?
(8) Have you obtained the correct target lists, OPLAN/OPORD, maps, overlays and
at least two blank overlays? Do you have a copy of the relevant command,
formation, and unit SOPs/SOIs with you?
(9) Have you ensured that liaison personnel and interpreters have security clearances
and access appropriate to the mission? Have you verified that the receiving unit
obtained the liaison teams security clearances and that the receiving unit will
grant access to the appropriate level of information the mission requires?
(10) Have you visited all CP staff elements and asked if they have tasks for you?
(11) Do you know the passwords? Do you have a copy of the CEI?
(12) Have you informed the operations centre when you are leaving, your route and
estimated time of arrival, and, if applicable, your estimated time of return?
b. At the receiving unit.
(1) Have you notified your operations centre of your arrival?
(2) Have you visited the relevant staff branches to brief them on your unit situation
and collected information on theirs?
(3) Have you ensured that on any overlays received you have annotated the map
scale, grid intersection points, DTG of info, DTG received and from whom
received?
(4) Have you confirmed with your own operations centre if there has been a change
in situation or a requirement for further RFIs since your departure?
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CHAPTER 18
TASKORG and integration
246. To prepare for the execution of an operation there
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is a requirement to organise available resources
and establish command and support relationships • Regrouping
according to the plan. The process sees new units • C2 relationships
and personnel being assimilated into the force for • Control and coordination
the upcoming operation. Formations and units must terms
develop SOIs and practise rapid retasking and task-
organising before, during and after missions in order
to better integrate capabilities and to ensure they are all utilised to their full effect.71
a. As a handrail, the key tasks involved during integration are:
(1) Receiving and introducing new units and military personnel to the force and
environment.
(2) Orienting them on their places and roles in the force and operation.
(3) Establishing C2, sustainment, and communications for and with them within the
force.
(4) Exchange of LOs.
b. Additional multinational considerations include defining when and where transfer

of authority takes place; clarifying command states; understanding any national
reservations or caveats and clarification of ROE.
Regrouping
247. Regrouping refers to the changing of a formation or unit’s TASKORG. The
requirement to regroup rapidly is essential in maximising combat potential, improving
tempo, maintaining momentum, responding to dynamic battlespaces, and ensuring
balance across an area of operations.
248. Definitions. The ‘receiving CP’ represents the formation that will be assuming command
or control of the regrouped unit, the ‘sending CP’ represents the formation that is giving
up the unit.
249. Actions. Figure 18.1 contains generic guidance to units involved in regrouping:
71 Training Branch, HQ Field Army, Observations from Training 17, paragraph 18.
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Ser Responsibility Event
1 Fmn/unit CP Decide to regroup units, conduct cross branch brief prior to the issue of a WngO.
Initial planning with receiving and sending CP and the unit to be regrouped.
Logistic support requirements and constraints
Enabling requirements
2 Fmn/unit CP CI plan and any requirements to revert to Bowman ‘ghost fill’ with loss of data
capability
Movement plan
Rebasing requirements/constraints
Rendezvous (RV), coordination points and combat ID measures
WngO released, including:
Unit to be regrouped Future tasks

3 Fmn/unit CP Time when regrouping is to be Likely duration
complete Outline movement plan
Receiving CP/sending CP Key locations
Command relationships Despatch of LO to assist with regrouping
Planning with receiving and sending CP and the unit to be regrouped.

Logistic support requirements and constraints
Enabling requirements
4 Fmn/unit CP CI plan and any requirements to revert to Bowman ‘ghost fill’ with loss of data
capability
Movement plan
Rebasing requirements/constraints
RV, coord points and combat ID measures
On receipt of the WngO the receiving CP is to:

Confirm receipt of the WngO
Inform higher and sending CP of the RV for the recce party/advanced party of the
regrouped unit
A regrouping pack should be prepared, containing the following information:
Receiving unit OSW and overlays
Boundaries Routes
Fire support control measures Coordination points
5 Receiving CP Unit locations Mobility and counter-mobility plan
INTSUM/PICINTSUM
CI plan
On arrival of the recce party:
Local/key G2 Liaison requirements

Outline plan and likely tasks Combat support
Control measures Combat service support (medical, ES,
sustainment, transport)
FRAGO issued including:
SITREP Combat service support relationships

6 Fmn CP New grouping Outline tasks
Receiving/sending unit Timings
Command relationship Duration of the regrouping
Inform higher of:

Sending CP or Any anticipated problems, during Movement plan
7 regrouped fmn/ planning phase Dispatch recce party
unit The subordinate unit to be Regrouping complete
regrouped (if appropriate)
Figure 18.1. Task organisation and integration process

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Command and control (C2) relationships

250. A common understanding of the degrees of authority is a prerequisite for effective
cooperation. The following definitions form the basis for this common understanding
within NATO under the authority of AJP-3.72 The descriptions which follow enable a
full understanding of C2 terminology and illustrative examples are included below the
descriptions. Command arrangements must always be qualified by the DTG at which they
begin, should also specify the DTG at which they are likely to end, and must accommodate
the situation prior to and after transfer of authority (TOA). Note that when working in
a multinational environment, the authority granted through command states must be
clarified with the issuing commander.73
251. Full command (FULLCOM). FULLCOM is the military authority and responsibility of a
commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations
and administration and exists only within national services. The term ‘command’, as
used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely
national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has FULLCOM over other nations’
forces assigned to them; only OPCOM or OPCON (see below) can be delegated across
national lines.
252. Operational and tactical C2 terms:
a. Operational command (OPCOM). Is the authority granted to a commander to assign

missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units and to reassign forces,
and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as it may be deemed
necessary?74 It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics
(see ADCON, below). OPCOM may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a
commander.
b. Operational control (OPCON). Is the authority delegated to a commander to direct

forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks
which are usually limited by function, time, or location and to deploy units concerned,
and to retain or assign tactical control to those units?75 It does not include authority to
assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of
itself, include administrative or logistic control.
c. Tactical command (TACOM). Is the authority delegated to a commander to assign

tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by
higher authority?
d. Tactical control (TACON). Is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of
movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
253. Command states are summarised in Figure 18.2:
72 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (Mar 11).

73 US command states are very different to NATO.
74 For clarity, the UK interpretation of OPCOM includes authority to assign separate employment to components of the units
concerned.
75 For clarity, the UK interpretation of OPCON allows a commander to issue missions and tasks to subordinates within the
scope of the mission issued by higher authority.
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Authority FULLCOM OPCOM OPCON (2) TACOM TACON (7)
Task-organise the assigned

X X
element (1)
Assign missions to the

X X X (4)
assigned element (3)
Assign tasks to the assigned

element for the purpose of X X X X (5)
which it has been assigned.
May further delegate OPCOM OPCOM

command authority (6) OPCON
OPCON OPCON TACOM
TACOM TACON
TACOM TACOM TACON
TACON
TACON TACON
Coordinate movement,
local defence, and force X X X X X
protection.
Planning and coordination X X X X X
Administrative and logistic

X
responsibility
FULLCOM full command OPCON operational control TACON tactical control

OPCOM operational command TACOM tactical command
Notes:
(1) The gaining commander may task-organise the assigned unit and thus assign separate missions to it and its
component parts. This is limited to FULLCOM and OPCOM. A commander assigned forces under FULLCOM or
OPCOM may employ those forces for any purpose.
(2) For forces allocated under OPCON the gaining commander may not break up the organisational integrity of the
force for separate employment. Under OPCON forces assigned may only be employed within certain constraints
such as function, time or location imposed by the higher authority. For example, the forces may only be assigned
for a single phase of a particular operation. This may be done for national purposes in the case of a multinational
context, where it is in a participating nation’s interest to constrain in some fashion the employment of the
contributed force. In other cases the assigning commander may require the force for other purposes later in the
operation.
(3) A mission is defined as: A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose (AAP-06).
(4) Under OPCON the gaining commander may assign a mission to the assigned element that is distinct from, but
related to, the gaining commander’s overall mission. OPCON is normally applied to assigned manoeuvre elements
such as infantry and armour forces.
(5) Under TACOM the gaining commander may only allocate to the assigned force a specific task consistent for the
accomplishment of the mission and purpose assigned by the higher commander, that is, within the parameters
of the current mission given by the higher authority. TACOM is used where the superior commander recognises
the need for additional resources for a task but requires the resources intact for a later role. Under TACOM the
assigned force is allocated for specific tasks and is allocated normally for a limited period of time. This prevents
the gaining commander from employing the assigned force in a role or manner not intended by the higher
commander. When the task is complete or the specific timeframe expires, the TACOM relationship with the
gaining force ends. TACOM is usually applied to specific situations and to combat support elements that have
unique capabilities. Example of forces and situations in which TACOM would likely be used is: an engineer subunit
assigned to an infantry unit to assist in building field fortifications for a specific period of time.
(6) With the exception of FULLCOM, a gaining commander may further delegate the same or a lesser command
authority over the allocated force to a subordinate commander, but within the same constraints initially given.
(7) TACON is generally used to indicate those units that will be located within another unit or formation’s assigned
geographical boundaries, and by so assigning, the gaining unit becomes responsible for coordination aspects
within the shared area of operations. The gaining commander has authority to coordinate local defence, force
protection and terrain allocation.
Figure 18.2. Command states

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254. Understanding C2 authority. To understand the status of assigned forces, commander

and staff must consider the following:
Can I break up force elements and Only OPCOM authorises the commander to split force elements and use
direct the separate employment of component parts separately.
their component parts?
Can I use force elements for any Only OPCOM authorises the commander to assign missions to force
purpose (give them missions)? elements. OPCON authorises the commander to assign missions or tasks for
the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
Can I give force elements tasks in TACOM allows tasks to be issued to subordinates within the mission given
accordance with their mission? to them by their OPCOM or OPCON commander.
Can I delegate control to other force Only OP command states (OPCOM and OPCON) can authorise delegation of
elements (is the relationship OP or control to another force element.
TAC)?
Figure 18.3. C2 considerations
255. Example employment of assigned FEs:
Command
Ser Example Authority
state
A BG Comd issues orders to organic The commander has the authority to employ forces for
1 FULLCOM subunits. any purpose. FULLCOM only applies to national force
elements.
A BG Comd is assigned an Armd The commander has the authority to give the Sqn a
2 OPCOM Sqn OPCOM. mission or they can break it up and give a separate
mission to each Tp.
A BG Comd is assigned an Armd The BG Comd cannot give the Sqn a mission that varies
Sqn OPCON. The BG’s mission is from that which was issued by higher authority. The BG
to ‘defend Warminster in order to Comd can issue a mission to the Sqn in order that the
protect key infrastructure’. BG can accomplish its mission to defend Warminster. For
3 OPCON
example, a mission to ‘secure the railhead’ or ‘delay the
enemy for three hours between line TIGER and line DOG
in order to enable preparation of the MDA’, would be
appropriate.
A BG Comd is assigned a Heavy PM As this Pl is TACOM, the BG Comd can assign tasks to
Inf Pl TACOM. The Pl’s mission is to it, (VCP on rte SALAMANCA), as long as it is part of the
4 TACOM
escort CPERS from the unit holding Pl’s mission.
area to the Bde collecting point.
A BG Comd is assigned an AD Det The BG Comd can direct the location of the det’s
TACON. The AD Det’s mission is position and can control their movement in the
5 TACON to defend A1 Ech and the CPERS battlespace. The BG Comd cannot give them additional
handling facility against air attack. tasks (VCP on rte SALAMANCA), or defend BG main
against air attack.
Figure 18.4. Command state example
Control and coordination terms

256. The following terms may be ascribed independently to operational and tactical C2 states to
delegate elements of authority:
a. Administrative control (ADCON). Is the direction or exercise of authority over

subordinate or other organisations in respect of administrative matters such as
personnel management, supply, services and other matters not included in the
operational mission of the subordinate or other organisations? ADCON is assigned
separately to C2 state.
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b. Logistic control (LOGCON). Is the authority granted to a NATO commander over

assigned logistics units and organisations in the JOA, including national support
elements (NSEs), that empowers him to synchronise, prioritise, and integrate their
logistics functions and activities to accomplish the joint theatre mission? It does not
confer authority over the nationally owned resources held by a NSE, except as agreed
in the TOA or in accordance with NATO principles and policies for logistics.
c. Coordinating authority (CA) or direct liaison authorised (DIRLAUTH).76 Is

granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific
functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or
two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander
has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their
representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of
disagreement between the agencies involved, they should attempt to obtain essential
agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he
shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.
d. DIRLAUTH. Although AJP-3 uses DIRLAUTH synonymously with CA, UK usage means
direct liaison authorised.77 Clearly there is potential for confusion, especially when
operating with multinational partners.78
76 As defined in AJP-3.
77 AAP-15 NATO Glossary of Abbreviations (2016).
78 AAP-39 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (2015) does not recognise the term DIRLAUTH.
Contents
CHAPTER 19
Rehearsals
Rehearsals
Contents
257. Rehearsals occur after orders have been delivered and
• Rehearsals
subordinates have had time to assimilate them and
• Sequence of a ROC drill
produce their own plans. The aim of the rehearsal is
to enhance an understanding of a plan by a visual,
sequenced representation. A rehearsal should ensure a greater degree of familiarity with
an operation, particularly the scheme of manoeuvre; ensure battlespace management and
synchronisation is understood, provide an opportunity for the commander to reinforce
intent and ensure that subordinates understand their role in achieving it.
258. Purpose. The intention is to rehearse participants in a formed plan and synchronise
details rather than amend them. No new factors should be identified. As such rehearsals
are often referred to as a rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill. The red team is no longer
adversarial and will simply describe the selected adversary COAs.
259. Participants. A guide to ROC drill attendance is below:
Role Bde BG
Command group Comd, COS, DCOS, unit Comds Comd, COS, BC, subunit Comds
Staff As required IO, BGLO, BGE, Ops Offr, Adjt, RSO, RMO
CO ISR, CO Joint fires, CO Engr, STABAD, CJIIM elements, atts and dets as
Enablers
CJIIM elements required
260. When. The ROC drill occurs only after orders have been delivered and recipients have
had time to produce their own plans.
261. How. ROC drills generally only require a preparation and execution phase. Some
consideration is required as to the time available and attendance.
a. Preparation.
(1) Model built/Bowman map prepared:
(i) Mission area in general.
(ii) Mission area in detail.
(3) CONOPS (intent, scheme of manoeuvre, mission/task).
(4) OSW.
(5) Control measures shown on model.
(6) Key messages.
b. Execute. The sequence of a ROC drill is shown at Figure 19.1.

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Sequence of a ROC drill

Ser Section Remarks
Prelims
Key personalities
Introduction Roll call
1 Chief controller Comment on roles of units/subunits
Unit Comds Visitors
Scribe Explain/describe the model
Model and G3/5 Update participants on current

ground Chief controller operational situation Some FEs may
2 description already be executing (e.g. adv forces)
Designate rehearsal start point in (chief controller)
ROC drill process relation to operation as whole chief
(turns etc.). controller
Situation update
White Red POLAD, G2 cell G2

3
Green Blue Respective cell G3/5
Overview and deployments
4 Overview Comd gives intent and SoM
Deploy enemy on the model as they would appear just prior to the operation. G2 to
5 Enemy deployment
explain en ML and WC/MD COAs.
Deploy own forces, including flanking units, to the point in time the rehearsal will start.
Friendly forces
6 As friendly units/subunits are placed on the product (unit/subunit reps) they should state
deployment
their TASKORG, mission and tasks. To incl: logistics, Med, CIS, Air/Avn, ISR etc.
Conduct of the ROC drill
Initiate activity Begin military activity/tactical action and continue in accordance with the SoM
Blue On completion of phases of action, assess conditions to determine if any DPs have
Green been reached. If DP reached the Comd states whether they want to remain on current
7 Red course or select a branch.
White Each SME briefs his part of the plan
Joint effects Ensure that the ROC drill does not become adversarial; that is the purpose of the COA
Logistics (incl. Med) wargame
After a branch end-state is reached, ‘recock’ to the situation where the first DP was
8 Recock after branch triggered. Continue the mission from that point forward until the desired end-state is
reached reacting to subsequent DPs as required.
Conclusion and Comd’s summary
Complete any coordination to ensure understanding and Comd’s requirements are met
9 Conclusion
Review any actions captured by the scribe (chief controller)
Comd’s closing
10
remarks
11 Post rehearsal Sweep op FRAGO issued with any changes resulting from the rehearsal
Figure 19.1. Sequence of rehearsal template
262. Ensuring comprehension. Although backbriefs should occur prior to a ROC drill,
the mechanism provides a useful opportunity for all levels of command to gain a
comprehensive understanding of the plan.
263. Post ROC drill. Changes to the plan may occur as a result of backbriefs and the ROC
drill itself. A sweep up fragmentary order should be produced following the ROC drill
ordering the changes.
Contents
CHAPTER 20
CP pre-execution checks
Conditions checks Contents
264. Conditions checks provide assurance at staff and unit • Conditions checks
level that they are ready to execute. They are different • CP pre-execution checks
from the go/no-go criteria which will have been
captured as CCIRs and DPs and are monitored as part
of the assessment process. That said conditions checks may be closely linked to DPs and
therefore any risks to operational success identified during a conditions check should be
briefed to the commander.
CP pre-execution checks
265. Conditions checks should be aligned to the tactical functions where appropriate. Figure
20.1 provides an example of staff branch considerations.
Ser Check Responsibility
Command
1 Appropriate C2 element in position? G6
2 Tactical satellite channel available? G6
3 High frequency channel available? G6
4 Comms rehearsals complete? G6
5 LO teams to higher, adjacent in place, and aware of plan? G3/5
Ops overlay, synch matrix, DSO, DSM, CCIRs and any other supporting plans and
6 G3/5
overlays handed from plans to ops?
7 Has the deception plan commenced? Has it influenced en activity? G2/ISR G3/5
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
8 Current weather and light data known? Engr
9 Enemy C2 warfare capabilities identified? ISR
10 Enemy indirect fire capability identified? ISR
11 Enemy direct fire in range of primary and alternate FUP/LD/LS? ISR
12 ISR viewing key NAIs with DPs in place? ISR
13 Higher CP priority of higher collection effort? ISR
14 Have we received a SITREP and assessment from formation recce? ISR
15 Media plan in place? G3/5
16 Influence campaign commenced? G3/Info Ops
17 Changes in human terrain/political situation? G2/Info Ops

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Ser Check Responsibility
Manoeuvre
18 Manoeuvre elements ready? G3
19 CS/CSS elements in place, equipped, resourced and prepared? G3
20 Sufficient lift available for minimum force requirements? G3
Higher and adjacent units notified of plan and assets available to reinforce and
21 G3
support operations?
22 Battlespace management control measures in place? G3
Fires
23 Intelligence and electronic warfare coordination complete? G3/5
24 Fire support coordinating measures coordinated? Fires
25 Firing units in position? Fires
26 SEAD fires planned on suspected locations/fire plans forwarded to subordinate units? Fires
27 Close air support coordinated and available? Fires
28 Appropriate communications established? Fires
29 Counterfire, radar coverage in place and planned? Fires
30 Fire plan rehearsed? Fires
31 Non-lethal SEAD covers critical portions of operation? Fires
32 Coordinated friendly and cross boundary air defence artillery locations and coverage? Fires
33 Weapons control status confirmed? G3/5
Protection
CBRN SME (as

34 CBRN SITREP?
required)
35 Counter-mobility plan in place? Engr
36 Air defence coverage of critical nodes? Fires
37 EOD in position at NTM? Engr
Sustainment
38 Sufficient supplies ready? G4
39 Medical and casualty evacuation planned and ready? Med
40 Essential transportation plan and assets ready? G4
Figure 20.1. Conditions check template

Contents
Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | P3-1
PART 3
Execute
266. Introduction. This part describes the means of command and control that enable the
execution of a plan. That said, execution is more than just putting a plan into action. It is
the continuous cycle of three broad activities: assessing the current state of the operation
and forecasting progress, making execution and adjustment decisions to account for
unforeseen enemy actions and to exploit opportunities, and directing actions that apply
combat power to accomplish the mission (shown in Figure 21.1). Once an operation has
been planned and prepared its execution becomes the responsibility of the operations
staff within the CP’s operations centre (Ops Cen).
COMMAND
CONTROL
Assess Decide Direct
Monitor Evaluate
Update reconnaissance
and surveillance tasking Execution
Criteria of success
Apply
Progress
Situational Yes combat

CCIR awareness power
No
Adjustment
Modifies information
requirements
Changes
Chan
ges
Creates new reality

start process again
CCIR commander’s critical informantion requirement
Figure 21.1. Functions of execution
267. The execution of an operation begins when committed assets physically enact their issued
orders. When vehicles start moving as per the movement order, for example. Command
is exercised by the commander throughout and cannot be delegated. Control is the
responsibility of the operations centre. As such operations centre staff must be clear on the
level of referral desired by their commander for decision making. If a commander exerts
too much control they can inhibit their own ability to command and their staff’s ability
to manage the battle. Commanders must have the confidence to take risk and delegate
control. To aid this, they need to provide clear guidance on how command and control is
to be conducted prior to deploying. In return the staff must practise clarity and brevity in
reporting, focusing on quality over quantity.79
Contents
P3-2 | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018
268. There is an expectation that the enemy will conduct operations in the manner that we
expect them to. When this does not occur momentum is lost. Commanders must be
prepared to confront an enemy that is capable and seeks to win through ingenuity and
adaptation.80 The constant assessment of an operation will identify whether the plan is on
course, or will require adjustment, Figure 21.2 refers.
EXECUTE
Command
Control Coordination
Monitor Comd SA Comd direction
Evaluate Comd decision making
Figure 21.2. The hierarchy of execution
269. This chapter will explore the functions of command and control during execution, describe
the process of assessing, deciding and directing actions, and provide the staff tools
necessary for the smooth conduct of an operation.
270. Practising execution. Commanders are empowered to make bold and aggressive
decisions whenever they feel they have the initiative. A commander’s ability to decide
swiftly requires practice, initiative, experience and intuition, all supported by an
understanding of the situation, any inherent risks and the capabilities and limitations of
their force. Decisive decision making is the key to unlocking tempo during operations.
CP training must therefore create the conditions for commanders to decide. This
training will develop a CP’s maturity and mitigate against risk aversion during formalised
training events. Truly informed and confident decision making is the acid test of a CP’s
performance. To simulate the friction and pressure of force on force execution a number of
simulations are available:
a. The Camberley Kriegsspiel. The Camberley Kriegsspiel is a bespoke wargame system

designed for use within the British Army to provide a simple tool for the conceptual
development of commanders. It is an adversarial, free-play wargame requiring umpires
to oversee the execution of the opposing team’s plans. The focus of the game is on
command, intelligence, manoeuvre and combat. Further information can be found
on the following link; http://akxportal.landforces.r.mil.uk/sites/akx/conceptual-support/chacr/
camberley-kriegsspiel
b. Battlegroup Command and Control Trainer (BC2T). The BC2T system is a

constructive simulation designed to allow for a plan to be executed using a computer-
based system, which stimulates Bowman ComBAT. It enables a battlegroup CP to
exercise command and control as a result of the outcomes of the system. It is not a
tactics trainer and is best utilised to rigorously test CP process and procedures during
execution.
Contents
CHAPTER 21
Command
The role of the commander Contents
271. A commander will exercise leadership, decision • Role of the commander

making and control during execution to overcome • Commander’s checklist
friction, maintain tempo and enable mission • Decision making
command. Key to successful command during
execution is clear direction to the staff of the
commander’s intent, planning assumptions, remaining CCIRs and concerns.
Commander’s checklist
272. The British Army’s command philosophy is mission command. This philosophy is founded
on the clear expression of intent by commanders, and the freedom of subordinates to
act to achieve that intent. Assessment in execution allows judgements to be made on the
success or progress of an operation, but the commander and their staff must not become
slaves to the process. Assessment should support, not drive, decisions. As such for mission
command to succeed, commanders should consider the following questions:
a. Have I:
(1) Produced a simple plan?
(2) Given clear, unambiguous direction?
(3) Made my intent clear?
(4) Thought to the finish?
(5) Slept?
b. Have the staff met the 1/3 – 2/3 rule?
c. Am I generating/will I generate tempo throughout?
(1) Flexibility?
(2) Integration of effect?
(3) Synchronisation?
(4) Simultaneity?
d. Are my subordinates:
(1) Aggressive?
(2) Balanced?
(3) Maintaining their combat effectiveness throughout?
(i) Preventative maintenance?

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(ii) Administration, including rest?
e. Commander’s critical criteria checklist.
(1) Do I know enough about the enemy/situation?
(2) Is the enemy fixed effectively?
(3) Have I got fires that can support?
(4) Are engineer assets available?
(5) Do I have sufficient force elements to complete the action?
(6) Will the current C2 laydown support this action?
f. Commander’s pre-execution considerations. The commander should consider the

following as a final checklist:
Ser Commander’s considerations
1 Are recce/ISR assets deployed? Is the enemy found and fixed?
2 Is the main CP in control?
3 Are all my forces out of the required ops boxes?
4 Are the fighting troops set?
5 Are my flanks secure?
6 Are the fires cell ready on the fire plan?
7 Is tactical CP well sited?
8 Is the comms plan working?
9 Are Med assets sited and ready to receive casualties?
10 Are CSS assets deployed forward for in battle replen and are they protected?
11 Are the engrs ready and positioned correctly?
12 What is the enemy’s counter-attack plan?
13 Who is my uncommitted reserve?
14 What is my counter-attack plan?
15 What FF are ahead of me?
16 What is my LOE?
Figure 21.3. Commander’s checklist template
Decision making
273. The key to successful execution of an operation is the clear direction from the commander
to the staff of their intent, planning assumptions, success factors and concerns. The
commander must make clear the level of detail required for making decisions; which
decisions they anticipate making, which decisions they are content for others to make,
and the amount of risk they are prepared to accept. A commander’s direction should be
informed by the continuous assessment process expanded upon in Chapter 4, Decide.
Contents
CHAPTER 22
Control
Control
Contents
274. Control is the oversight, direction and coordination of
• Control
assigned forces in accordance with the commander’s
• Coordination
plan and intent. Above subunit, a defined level of
• Operations centre:
control may be delegated to the staff. This empowers
• Log sheet
them, through standardised processes and procedures,
• Staff duties
to coordinate actions in line with the commander’s
• Battle rhythm
intent. As a guiding principle, staff controlling the
• Reports and returns
execution of operations should maintain an enabling
• Notice to move
mindset focused on the provision of appropriate
• Briefings
resources and freedom of action to subordinates –
• Battlespace management
using control measures only when necessary. The staff
• Land battlespace
must use robust drills, and a thorough understanding
management
of doctrine and information management to maintain
• FSCM
shared situational awareness.81
• Combat identification
(CID)
• Airspace management
• Battlespace spectrum
management
• EMCON
Contents
Coordination
Operations centre
275. Operations centre (Ops Cen). 82 The operations centre within a CP is central to
assessing, deciding and directing activities. The operations centre has two key functions:
a. Controlling the execution of an operation - ‘fighting the battle’.
b. Packaging and passing relevant information to branches, subordinates, flanks, higher

CPs and the commander to generate SA and to allow decisions to be made.
276. G3 Current Operations (often referred to as COps) fight the current battle. Procedures vary
depending on whether or not the unit is in contact. The battle is to be run by G3/COps
staff, supported by several battle captains and watchkeepers who maintain the common
operating picture (COP). Primary functions include the sharing of situational awareness
(SA), exercising control of the battle on behalf of the commander through the use of
control measures and low-level decision making as well as the tracking and management
of IRs and DPs for the commander. Improved COP SA is facilitated by the continuous feed
of information from the common intelligence picture (CIP) as per Figure 22.1.
Watchkeeper Engr
Battle G2
captain ISR
COS Fires
CONTROL COP CONTROL UNDERSTAND CIP UNDERSTAND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Figure 22.1. COP and CIP fusion
277. Should the situation change and adjustments to the plan become necessary, the operations
centre will gather relevant information to allow the plans staff to propose an appropriate
alternative COA to the commander.
278. Operations centre products. A series of products provide the framework through
which G3/COps achieve their task. The following information should be displayed to
enhance CP management:
a. CE by unit, highlighting commander’s key equipment.
b. Op checklist (thematic).
c. C/S matrix.
d. Comms matrix (proof of comms).
82 AFM Command, paragraphs 8-36 to 8-42.

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e. Unit ERV location.
f. Commander/COS/key staff locations.
g. Battle rhythm chart.
h. CCIR list.
i. Current synch matrix.
j. Operation or exercise day (normally D-day or G-day).
k. Large clock(s).
279. Common operational picture (COP). The COP is an operational picture tailored to the
user’s requirements, based on common data and information shared by more than one
command. CIS can now provide all levels of command with near real-time information on
the current situation as a COP. The COP is derived from data, information and knowledge
common to all echelons. The command and staff tailor its display for resolution and
content appropriate to their echelon of command and the mission. Reports and returns
(R2) generally conveys information which informs the COP.
a. The COP is primarily maintained through a series of ComBAT overlays which enable
the sharing of SA with higher and subordinate formations. Subordinate and flanking
unit locations are essential. Red force representation (both actual and assessed) will be
situation dependent and directed by the battle captain. Both digital and reversionary
COPs will be built around mapping that shows the unit AO in detail, and where
possible the wider operational area of responsibility (AOR).
b. The detail shown in the COP will vary depending on the situation and command level.
It presents geospatial, textual, pictorial and verbal information to the CP. Once an
order has been enacted, its execution will be monitored through the COP to enable
SA. The accuracy of the COP is critical and must be controlled by the operations centre
director. If practising distributed or dispersed command mirror image COPs should be
maintained cognisant of bandwidth constraints. Recommended COP content is shown
in Figure 22.2.
Contents
Geospatial information Detail Other detail Remarks
FF locations Net diagram Much of this

Bdys Comms states information can
be displayed
FSCMs routes C/S matrix electronically, but
Obstacles TASKORG doing so detracts from
the space available
Report lines NTM details to display map-based
Ops overlay Objectives Key staff locs information.
AD coverage Own combat
DFs effectiveness
Key weapon range Key battle rhythm

events
Installations
Effects schematic
Key CSS locs
Comd’s intent
DSO/DSM
Synch matrix
Route class
Physical terrain
Bridge class
overlay
Going
Met overlay
Locations
EF Weapon effect (particularly
CBRN)
Figure 22.2. Content of the COP
280. Common intelligence picture (CIP). The CIP feeds information to the COP allowing
the battle captain the space to control the battle. The key elements feeding into the CIP
are: G2, ISR, fires and engrs. Once understanding is achieved at the CIP, the CIP lead
updates the track board and feeds recommendations across to the COP. An effective way
to achieve this is to physically draw these elements together around two bird tables/map
boards, displaying the CIP and the COP. The frequency of CIP updates to the COP will
vary depending on the CP battle rhythm, enemy situation and operational tempo at that
time. In summary, raw data/information (typically in the form of R2) is received by the
CIP. This is then processed and analysed (intelligence) before a consolidated battle picture
and recommendations are offered across to the COP.
281. Ops update. The purpose of the ops update is to share SA across the functional cells of
a CP so that resources can be allocated and required actions anticipated. It also provides
a touch point for G5 (sometimes referred to as future ops (FOps)) to brief future activity
and DOWNREP feeds. The operations centre may require an ops update outside of battle
rhythm as required. Normally there will be an extraordinary ops update whenever the
unit is declared as ‘in contact’ which will mark the change in battle rhythm as well as
providing immediate SA across the CP.
a. ComBAT uses GPS to receive, fuse and distribute consolidated position reports (CPR).
The CP will receive locs at subunit level and above. The battle captain will dictate the
frequency of both of these reports. The table below recommends the initial settings
to be selected on all data terminals. More detail on information management can be
found in Chapter 26.
Contents
Radio Manoeuvre Manoeuvre (out Admin Conc/assy area

CPR field
silence (in contact) of contact) move etc.
Report own position on net Radio net ID (refer to the CEI; this must correspond directly to those listed at the
Radio IP Screen)
When own unit moves 500m 1000m 2000m -

Clear all tick
Automatic reporting time 5min 15min 30min 120min
boxes
With remote interrogation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Precedence - PRIORITY PRIORITY ROUTINE ROUTINE
Figure 22.3. CPR settings
282. Control of the operations centre. The operations centre is controlled by the operations
centre director, usually the senior G3 officer in the CP. At battlegroup level, this role is usually
fulfilled by a battle captain. The director/battle captain’s responsibilities include those listed
below and the key questions for the operations centre summarised at Figure 22.4:
a. To fight the battle.
b. To report and monitor friendly force information (strengths, dispositions, capabilities,

readiness, holdings, activity and critical assets).
c. To report and monitor enemy force information (usually provided by G2).
d. To report and monitor flank and higher activity (including air, aviation, maritime, SF,
NGO and OGD activity as required).
e. To maintain visual displays and a COP.
f. To brief the commander and staff as required.
g. To monitor and report on CCIRs.
h. To identify and predict deviations from the plan in accordance with MOEs and MOPs.
i. To initiate and cue decisions within the authority granted by the commander.
Key questions for the operations centre
Anticipate Decide/operate
What could change? What is the priority?

What next? What else should I be doing?
What/where is the risk – is it an opportunity or Whose decision is it and when does it need to be taken?
a threat? Is this what we expected?
Where is the reserve; what is its NTM? What is the impact?
Inform Am I integrating, synchronising, easing and facilitating
activity?
When was the last SITREP – up and down?
What is happening on the flanks?
Am I in a position to give an accurate SITREP?
Are we being calm and disciplined?
Who else needs to know?
How can I add value?
Is what I am telling them fact or assumption?
Is the force balanced?
Can we communicate with all elements of the
force? What is our combat effectiveness?
Do we need to move?
Is this a CCIR?
Figure 22.4. Key questions for the operations centre

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283. Operations tracker (ops tracker). The ops tracker is a necessary tool for managing the
complexity of staffing CONOPS even at relatively low levels. The complexity of working in
a CJIIM environment necessitates the recording of the staff and resource planning aspects.
Operations increasingly involve collaborative planning both within and across varying
levels of command. The purpose of an ops tracker is to provide clarity and a written record
of activity that subsequently supports operational record keeping (ORK) throughout
planning, execution and recovery. An example version is shown at Figure 22.5:
20110209_1600LOCAL G3/5 OPERATIONS TRACKER

DATE CHANGE
ONGOING
ON HOLD
FINISHED
SB (due 6 days after op)

CIED (Incl search dogs)
HIGHER FMN BRIEFED

APPROVED BY G3/5
CONOPS RECEIVED
RENEWAL REQ’D
DOG NON-CIED
TASK PURPOSE
CONOP LEVEL
CONOPS DUE
EVENT
FROM
ENGR
UNIT
LOC
CAS
SER
SIG
EW
AH
PRI
ISR
TO
SH
SF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Notes:
1. Ops must be categorised by the originator in accordance with theatre SOI.
2. Grids must follow MGRS format.
3. Dependent on theatre SOI, CONOPS may be categorised by the level of clearance required for approval.
Figure 22.5. Example ops tracker
284. Log keeping. The log is a record of all activities, all information received and all
decisions taken by the CP. This detail is recorded either electronically or on a log sheet
(AF B58), a completed example of which is at Figure 22.6. All operational messages must
be logged and acknowledged by a watchkeeper and the information passed to those
concerned, both inside and outside the CP. Watchkeepers themselves must understand
the commander’s intent and be able to analyse, interpret and act on information
received.
a. The importance of accurate and comprehensive log-keeping cannot be overstated; logs

may be required for after action analysis and could be of relevance to other operations.
The detail on the operations log should be circulated within the CP at formation level
and above. The need for a hard copy of the log to be passed around a CP will be
reduced as more information is stored digitally. The following items should be included
in the log:
Contents
(1) The essence of all radio and telephone conversations, with exact local time and
date group.
(2) All written messages and reports (hard copy only), both in and out of the CP. A
long message may be paraphrased or referred to by file reference and subject.
(3) Reports from LOs and visitors, as well as any other relevant information received.
(4) OSW time of issue, and the dispersal time of conferences and orders groups.
(5) The movements of the commander and senior staff officers.
(6) Own or enemy action. Items to be included in SITREPs and the commander’s diary
to be written up from the log.
(7) Any other significant action such as those of non-military agencies.
b. The simple facts of events recorded in the log can be obscure to a reader unless
they are closely involved with the situation. Time and mental effort can be saved by
recording ‘comment’ in the action column of the log to underline the significance
of a particular item and by marking up items which are likely to be included in the
compilation of OWNSITREPs or COMBATREPs.
285. Recording information. Information is to be logged and recorded in the following

manner:
Order Example
Time (when?) Contact at 1403hrs
Place (where?) Grid 020803
Activity (what?) Enemy anti-tank gun destroyed 1 x tank
Action taken K10 (guns) engaging
Figure 22.6. Example of how information should be logged
286. Methodology. Watchkeepers will develop their methods for processing information.
Acting on information, e.g. informing others (both inside and outside the CP) or passing
on orders, is the most important but most frequently neglected part of the watchkeeper’s
task. The log is necessary as a record and the following method is recommended:
a. Note down the key detail in the log.
b. Mark the information on the map/ensure that the COP is updated.
c. Take any action necessary.
d. If necessary complete the entry in the log, including the action taken.
287. Aids. Watchkeepers are always pressed to process information, particularly when the
tempo is high. AAP-06 NATO Glossary of terms and definitions, APP-15 NATO Glossary
of Abbreviations and APP-06(D) NATO Joint Military Symbology provides an authoritative
list of shorthand terms to be used. Where an official abbreviation does not exist use
shorthand that is standard through the CP for example:
a. ‘1 GREN GDS battlegroup’ can be shortened to ‘1GG’.

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b. Although unit titles must to be written in the log (i.e. not just their call sign), the
shorthand for own CP may be known as ‘+’.
c. Condense the information as much as possible while ensuring it is intelligible. The

message ‘Contact at 1436 hours in small wood South of Chipstable. Call sign Y23
reports that they can see what appear to be 2 enemy tanks. They are camouflaged and
do not seem to be moving’, might appear on the log as ‘Contact 1436 hrs. Wood, SU
709385, 2 enemy tks, static’.
288. An example of a completed AFB58 log sheet is at Figure 22.7:
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
LOG SHEET
ARMY FORM B58
Formation/unit: CP 20 Armd Unit Date: 19 Sep 17 Log Keeper(s): Capt A Watchkeeper
Sheet No: 3
Ser DTG To From Event Action Sign
24 1905 + 1 RRF Wood at Gr 123456 Clear. Fires cell informed AW
Enemy ATGW destr 2 x WR 1 YORKS warned that they will

5
25 1907 + at Gr 334567. My B Coy have to deal with this posn. Battle AW
RIFLES
engaging. Am bypassing HOTO detail to fol from 5 RIFLES
(1) Ordered to find extent of

Enemy minefield at Gr mine field
26 1909 + 1 RRF 123457. 1 x WR destroyed. AW
Request Engineer sp. (2) Engr Ops tasked to provide
suitable breach
Ref Ser 26. Engr Ops Det 1

DIRLAUTH given. RV to be
27 1915 Log Info x Armd Tp from 3 SCOTS AW
nominated by 1 RRF
to 1 RRF.
FRAGO 1/13 (Defence of

1 RRF, 5 RIFLES, QDG ack receipt
28 1920 Log Info BARTON STACEY) issued
1921hrs AW
by iHub
Comd and unit TCP depart

29 1921 Log Info on Recce of BARTON COS informed. AW
STACEY. ETR 2200hrs.
Figure 22.7. Example of an AFB58
289. Battle rhythm, reports, returns and briefings. Successful operational execution will
depend on the flow of information between formations, units and all out stations. R2
are a key aspect of CP battle rhythm and are increasingly sent as data, rather than voice,
between digitised CPs. Land Component Handbook (Reports and Returns) (AC71716) contains a
comprehensive list of NATO, joint, Army and special to arm messages and is the definitive
reference for R2 formats. Battle rhythm, R2 and briefings are covered separately in this
chapter.
Contents
290. Operations centre composition. The composition of the operations centre depends
upon the availability and effectiveness of voice and data communications, SA feeds,
space, the level at which the CP is operating and the type of operation being conducted.
Membership is not necessarily a strictly defined single entity. It will frequently include
staff from outside the core CP. Composition may change during an operation. The COS
will usually be responsible for the design and manning of the operations centre and will
do so based on the following criteria:
a. Complexity of the operation. Operations comprising a large number of differing

capabilities provided by different organisations, or CJIIM operations may require an
uplift of SME staff in the operations centre.
b. Stability and reliability of communications. Typically, the operations centre will be

sited as part of the CP, but on some occasions, specialist communication users may be
required to operate from separate locations.
c. Phase of operation. Specialist staff uplift may be required for different phases of
the operation and the COS or operations centre director will set the conditions for
appropriate manning in accordance with the mission.
d. Location of other CPs. Where a forward CP is deployed, the operations centre may
split. The forward operations centre will restrict its activity to providing SA for the
commander. When a CP element is moving (such as during a CHOC), the operations
centre will also split so that control can be exercised from either location.
e. Branch cells. Within a CP, different cells (e.g. engineer, fires, CSS) support the
commander as well as the main operations centre. Depending on the complexity and
size of an operation and the attendant size of the staff cells, it may be necessary for
branch operations centres to be established to support the main operations centre.
The greater the number of branch operations centres, the greater the potential
of decreased SA in the main operations centre. It is critical that defined relevant
information is passed from branch operations centres to the main operations centre by
a cell LO.
f. Manning. Manning will be dictated by tempo, activity and availability. An example

of operations centre manning at division, brigade and battlegroup is shown at Figure
22.8.
Contents
Div Bde BG
Core staff
Ops Cen director Battle capt BG COS

Battle capt Sufficient signallers to man ISR officer
Sufficient signallers to man comms comms feeds (voice and data) IO (G2 cell)
feeds (voice and data) Watchkeeper (Bde and Div nets) Battle capt
Watchkeeper (higher and lower) Fires cell Sufficient signallers to man
Fires cell Air/Avn cell (TACP) comms feeds (voice and data)
CSS Ops G2 Ops Watchkeeper
Air cell BM Fires cell
G6 Comms Ops BEME BGLO
G2 Ops Med BG EME (OC LAD)
BM Log
ISR Ops
Engr Ops
UAS Ops
Engr Sp
Mov Ops
AD Ops
Health service support (HSS)
Patient evacuation coord cell (PECC)
Pro Ops
May include
LEGAD Engr Ops Ops officer

CBRN CJIIM capability Battery Comd (BC)
Consequence management ISR Ops Adjutant
LOs Med Ops RSO
EOD Ops CBRN BGE
CJIIM capability CSS Ops BG detention officer
AD Ops Recce Tp leader
EOD Ops Atk Pl rep
LOs Mor Pl rep
LEGAD Air cell
Consequence management Atts:
AD Ops
EOD operator
LOs
Med LO
Figure 22.8. Operations centre manning table

Contents
Staff duties
291. Staff duties during execution. The manning of a CP will vary depending on the
echelon of command; scale and type of operation (see Figure 22.8 operations centre
manning table). A CP’s manning must be kept at the irreducible minimum and only grown
if the additional staff genuinely adds value to operational understanding, assessment and
decision making.
292. Brigade staff duties. Possible brigade staff, their principal C2 effect and their
responsibilities are explained in Figure 22.9.
Bde Principal
Ser CP element Key responsibilities
appointment C2 effect
Responsible for all Bde output.
Implement Comd’s decisions.
Attend planning meetings.
1 All COS Control Write subordinate unit missions/tasks and CONOPs.
Comd of all elms of the CP.
Brief Comd.
Maintain Bde LO SA.
Lead on all CSS planning.
Attend planning meetings as follows: PPG and SPG (if available).
Support FOps with planning and writing of CSS paragraph/annex

and movement orders.
2 All DCOS Control
Comd’s adviser on all CSS matters.
Initial deployment to and recovery from op theatre.
Overall responsibility for routine sustainment of Bde.
Responsible for liaison with BSG, higher CP and oversight of R2.
Maintenance of correct standard of battlefield discipline and

dress across the Bde.
3 All Comd SM Control
Voice of experience/reality check.
Any task given by the Comd.
Overall responsible for Bde COps (main and step-up).
Management of COps day shift (and step-up during ChoC).
Oversee compilation and submission of R2.
Responsible for control and manning of Bde and Div command

nets.
Conduct COps staff briefings.

4 All COps Control
Write hasty orders and movement orders as required in
execution.
Coord BG LOs.
Control step-up (and step-up staff) during ChoC.
Provide update briefs to FOps planning.
Management of COps night shift (and main during ChoC).

Contents
Bde Principal
Oversee COP creation and maintenance. Amend in real time.
Observe CIP updates. Confirm en activity is acknowledged and

tracked by G2. Integrate G2 assessments into DPs.
Deconflict movement outside of AO.
Hold subordinate units to the synch matrix, use the DSO

particularly DP and CCIRs to inform decisions. Elevate events
to COS or Comd including bdy change requests, decisions to
launch the reserve, RESDEM authority and complex RFIs.
5 Ops Cen Battle captain Control Oversee wkpr collation of SITREPS and creation of DOWNREPS.
Prepare and send routine higher SITREPs and the daily
OWNSITREP to higher as per battle rhythm.
Manage layout and order of COps area within Ops Cen:

protectors, bird tables, radio speakers and handsets.
Control shift rotations ensuring all nets (incl. data) are

monitored, logged and acknowledged.
Assist COps (and backfill as required).
Liaise with higher or flanking formation LOs.
Monitor and record Div voice and data nets.
Maintain battle maps in COps (digital and reversionary COP).
Maintain logs and boards. Record all decisions made by the

Comd. All boards must be fully maintained and kept up to
date, with priority lying with combat effectiveness, TASKORG,
Div and Bde LOCSTATs (Div, Bde, BG), NTM, main events, significant info,
6 Ops Cen Inform
wkprs passwords, ERV locs, Comd and LO locs.
Compile and send unit DOWNREPS.
Maintain separate logs for own CP and higher Comd.

Numbering of log serials restarts at 001 at midnight. Numbering
of sheets continues throughout the operation. Entries are to be
logged by unit title as opposed to unit C/S.
Principal manager of the CIP in current operations.
Control the employment of ISR collection assets to meet the

requirements of the ICP.
Dynamically retask ISR assets in support of COps to meet the

7 Ops Cen ISR Ops Understand Comd’s priorities.
Liaison with ISR collection assets and tac parties.
Principal manager and controller of ISR in COps.
Lead for all ISR reports and returns.
Liaise between Bde understand cell and ISR units.
8 Ops Cen ISR ‘plugs-ins’ Understand Provide specialist ISR advice to FOps and COps.
Asst ISR Ops with preparation and use of ISR products.
Lead intelligence support to COps: Maintain the CIP.
9 Ops Cen G2 Ops Understand Draft the INTSUM.
Oversee the implementation of the ICP.

Contents
Bde Principal
Monitor the Engr Comd net and chat.
Produce an engineer overlay and keep up to date with critical

information such as obstacles, bridge data, river data, minefields
etc. and ensure that BGs, units and Div are informed of any
changes.
Allocate resources in order to achieve the Bde plan:

10 Ops Cen Engr Ops Target Understand vehicle availability within the engineer fleet, in
particular the Titan, Trojan, Terrier, Tank Bridge Transporter (T4)
fleet.
Provide liaison between unit and attachments such as MWD,

EOD and search, wks gp and any other engineer-related
organisations, civilian or military.
Submit engineer R2.
Coord all joint fires support to Bde manoeuvre.
Input SME knowledge into the joint effects group.

11 Ops Cen Fire cell Target
Provide C2 for land-based lethal and non-lethal joint fires.
Brief joint fires assets in sp of Bde.
Coord all air, Avn and SH support to Bde.
Input SME knowledge into the JEG.

Air/Avn cell
12 Ops Cen Target Provide C2 for any air support operations cell (ASOC) that
(TACP)
support the Bde.
Brief CAS assets in sp of Bde.
C2 all AD assigned to Bde.

13 Ops Cen AD Ops Target
Coord BM, especially airspace management.
Facilitate staffing RFTDEM from BSG for release of BCR/ITRs.
Advise forward on discipline.
Advise on emergency burial/repatriation.

14 Ops Cen G1 cell Sustain Coord casualty procedures.
Coord the compilation of the Bde G1 R2.
Facilitate the completion of NOTICAS from HQ BSG to higher

formation.
Coordinates all Med R2.
Maintain COP with Med RVs, AXPs and any other relevant
medical information (digital and reversionary).
15 Ops Cen Med Ops Sustain Implements and monitors Med plan. Update the unit casualty
tracker for all medical assets to have overarching view on
casualties, their movements and Med asset capacity.
Coords grd and air MEDEVAC within and movement of returning

evac assets fwd within AOR.
Prep and processes all ES related R2 as req.
16 Ops Cen BART Sustain Oversees all current ES ops and briefs ES and DCOS as req.
Monitors and reports on combat effectiveness.

Contents
Bde Principal
Coord CSS sp to the Bde in accordance with the Bde plan.
Monitor CSS situation during battle and update DCOS.

17 Ops Cen BOWO Sustain Maintain log SA.
Responsible for the provision of spec cat and local resources

advice to DCOS.
Responsible for all CPERS and policing matters.
Advise Bde staff on route regulation movement.

18 Ops Cen BPO Sustain
Liaise with Force Provost Marshall/Pro Coy on behalf of Bde.
Formulation of provost input to G5 plans.
Ensure effective running of FOps.
Lead execution of the combat estimate.
Lead on writing orders product as follows:

Situation - friendly forces
Execution –
Missions and tasks (unless completed by Comd/COS)
SoM (unless completed by Comd/COS)
Synch matrix, taskorg, ops trace
19 Plans FOps Plan
Coord work of FOps cell staff.
Lead production and distribution of ComBAT WngOs, OPORDs,

FRAGOs, and CONPLANs.
Responsible for supervision of LOs.
Manage FOps to COps hand-over of Bde plans.
Delegated tasks by FOps.
Scribe for PPG and SPG.
Scribes for COA development teams and wargame.
Lead on planning and writing product as follows: DSO/DSM, ISR

annex.
20 Plans ISR Ops Plan
COA team lead.
Deputise for COS as required.
Command the Bde’s MFMI Coy.
Lead G2 plans officer.
Production and dissemination of Q1.
21 Plans G2 Ops Plan Draft G2 contribution to OSW.
Collection, processing and dissemination of info/int from all

sources.
Ensure Q1 products are correctly fused during briefing and

dissemination.
Contents
Bde Principal
Prep and brief ground and mobility traces (BAE).
Write ground appendix to situation annex.
Asst production of DSO.
Attend planning meetings as follows: PPG, SPG.
Comd’s Engr Ops and Engr int cells.

22 Plans Engr Ops Plan
Engr planning in sp of Bde ops.
Write engineer concept in main body and engineer annex of

Bde OSW.
Responsible for protection elements of Bde OSW.
Coord with HQRE at Div.
Lead on planning joint fires.
Attend planning meetings as follows: PPG, SPG, JEG.
Lead on ROE (if no LEGAD) and effects guidance matrix.
23 Plans Fires cell Plan Principal staff officer to CO joint fires.
Provide joint fires main body and joint fires annex for Bde OSW.
Coord joint fires planning and oversee execution.
Coord of joint fires BM.
Provide meteorological input to Q1.
Attend planning meetings as follows: PPG, SPG, JEG.
Write Met paragraph, air scheme of manoeuvre and Air and Avn
annex.
Air/Avn cell
24 Plans Plan
(TACP) Advise Bde staff on use of air, Avn and SH sp.
Assist CSS/Med to optimise SH CASEVAC plan.
Coord ASOC or AMPT sp to Bde.
Plan Bde air space management.
Advise Comd and Bde HQ on employment of AD.
25 Plans AD Ops Plan Support air airspace management planning.
Contribute to joint prioritised defended asset list (JPDAL).
Comd’s adviser on all Bde G6 matters.
26 Plans G6 Plan Write command and signals paragraph and CIS annex.
Provision of Bde CNR comms and access to Div trunk comms.
Lead on CBRN planning and IPE.
27 Plans CBRN Plan Write CBRN annex.
Coord CBRN threat assessment, defence, warning and reporting.
Lead on Log planning in support to the manoeuvre plan.
Write CSS SoM, CSS and movement orders under DCOS

28 Plans CSS Ops Plan
(including WngOs).
Primary link between sustain cell and FOps.

Contents
Bde Principal
Lead on Med planning in support to the manoeuvre plan.
Writes medical components of CSS paragraph and CSS annex.
Allocates Med FEs to task and identifies and request addl

29 Plans Med Ops Plan
resources.
Identifies medical risks and mitigation measures.
Formulates medical input to CSSO and relevant CONPLANS.
Lead on ES planning in support to the manoeuvre plan.
Plan recovery and repair plan including the siting of rec points
(RX), ECPs and BLPs.
30 Plans BEME Plan Write ES components of CSS paragraph and CSS annex.
Overall responsibility for ES to the Bde.
Tasking of Bde ES resources to meet mission specific req.
Provide advice to DCOS on all ES matters.
Coord all media plans.
31 Plans Media Plan Support joint fires with IA planning.
Coord visits and media to the Bde.
Provides all relevant geo advice and product as required.
Create copies of hard copy material (e.g. DSO during planning)

32 Plans GEO Sgt Operate
for ORK.
Member of SPG.
Distribute and reproduce OSW (on Bowman and in hard copy)

as appropriate.
33 Plans IMWO Operate
Manage RFI matrix to subordinate units.
Maintain ORK.
OC GS Sect Comd Bde’s general support section.
34 ISR Hub Located in the Understand Provide deep analysis with access to above SECRET access.
ISR Hub with
the BSG Support Bde planning.
Command the multirole signals squadron.
Enable the manoeuvre of the Bde CP.

OC Signals
35 ALL Operate Provide the staff working environment and CIS infrastructure to
Sqn
the Bde CP.
Enable comms across the Bde AOR.
Figure 22.9. Brigade staff duties
293. Battlegroup staff duties. Battlegroup CPs are designed to plan and coordinate
execution, but not concurrently. Battlegroup staff, their principal C2 effect and their
responsibilities are explained in Figure 22.10.
Contents
BG Principal
Assembles planning team when necessary. The composition

of which will depend on the nature of the operation being
planned.
Heads CONPLAN process.
Runs main. Runs the contact battle.
Ensures UP and DOWNREPS in accordance with battle rhythm.

1 All COS Control
Gives direction to BGLO, in particular the coord of MEDEVAC.
Takeover from CO as required
Plans future ops as necessary.
Coordinates dynamic targeting cycle.
May command step-up if required.
Responsible for resourcing STAP, ICP and fire plan with ISR
assets iaw BG Comd priorities.
Physically confirms STAP in position.
Tracks intelligence battle with IO.
Tasks and confirms Bde assets.

2 Ops Cen ISR officer* Understand
Adjusts STAP as necessary.
Bids for allocation of ISR assets or their products, controlled

from higher CP.
Acts as focus for fusion of feeds and products from ISR group,
joint fires and Bde to ensure shared SA across BG and support
to Comd decision making.
Continues to refine the IPE, high priority targets (HPT) and ICP.
Briefs significant changes in the situation.
Regular and timely liaison with Bde G2 and MI section.
Must liaise closely with BC and COP. Monitors radio net with
reference to BG STAP and DSO and advises BG Comd regarding
Intelligence SA.
3 Ops Cen Understand
officer (IO)
Completes kill charts as reports are received. Liaises with
higher CP, especially Bde ISR assets.
Briefs BG COS on enemy assessment and options.
Updates enemy int picture.
Advises in relation to ML/MD COA and actual en activity.
Assist in CONPLAN development.
Deploys to TCP with Comd.
Coord/monitor input for SITREPs on BG/Bde nets.

Operations
Ops Cen/ Control/ Issue amdts to plans.
4 officer (ops
TCP plan
offr) Advise Comd on enemy use of CBRN.
Maintains updates to TASKORG and friendly forces combat

effectiveness board.
Updates Avn flt briefing trace.

Contents
BG Principal
Confirms and updates engineer annex and CAOI.
In defence:
Monitors progress of obstacle emplacement.
Track asset capabilities effecting BG mission.
Track status of routes and lanes in BG AO.
In offence:
BG engineer Control/ Organises asset TASKORG link-up.
5 Ops Cen
(BGE) plan
Monitor BG obstacle reduction.
Tracks asset capabilities effecting BG mission.
Both:
Assist in CONPLAN development.
Coordinate reserve/situational obstacle execution.
Maintain the BG obstacle overlay, ensuring that the COP is
up to date.
Confirms fires contribution to STAP after recce and backbriefs.
Can be employed as the focus for CIMIC and Info Ops activity.
Tracks battle with Comd in TCP.
Execute AB545B and amend as necessary.
Ops Cen/ Battery Comd Control/ Resource and int management with joint fires cell.
6
TCP (BC) plan Monitors DPs and trigger pts.
Asst Comd with forward planning.
Manage FSCM.
Ensure fires coord in support of subunit level tactical activities.
Participates in the targeting cycle.
Principal G3 offr responsible for passage of information on BG

Comd net.
7 Ops Cen Battle captain Control
Tracks and coordinates movement of friendly forces.
Oversees control of BG.
CAS tracking in conjunction with RAO.
Responsible for the collection, collation and dispatch of the BG

8 Ops Cen Adjutant Control
operational record.
Responsible for road movement.

Contents
BG Principal
Occupy and secure initial CP locs.
Estb comms.
Site step-up and next main locs.
Act as wkpr.
Regimental Confirm radio states.

Plan/
9 Ops Cen signals officer Monitor COMSEC.
operate
(RSO)
Activate comms deception plan.
Compile JAMREPs.
Supervise admin of CP.
Liaises with Bde Sig Sqn to ensure provision of specialist

comms and info systems equip req to complete the mission.
Briefs BG CSS staff and subunit 2ICs.
Monitors the CSS state of the BG, in particular CASEVAC.
BG logistics Plan/ Monitors CSS R2.

10 Ops Cen
officer (BGLO) operate
Anticipate requirements. Plans initial post battle replen plan
and bids to BSG.
Monitors subunit battle replen requests.
BG detention Ensures CPERS plan is coordinated.

11 Ops Cen Operate
officer Ensures CPERS are processed as per JDP 1-10.
Adjust STAP within resources where possible.

Recce Tp
12 Ops Cen Operate Takes under Comd reconstituted recce group assets as
leader
required.
Confirms anti-Armr contribution to STAP.

13 Ops Cen ATk Pl rep Operate
Assists in the development of CONPLANS.
Confirms mor contribution to STAP.
Track battle with BG Comd in TAC.
14 Ops Cen Mor Pl rep Operate Execute AB545B and amend as necessary.
Monitor and manage ammunition requirements.
Monitors DPs and trigger pts.
*This role is fulfilled by either OC Sp Coy or OC HQ Coy depending on unit role.
Figure 22.10. Battlegroup staff duties83
83 Current: AFM Vol 1 Pt 2 Battlegroup Tactics. Chapter 2, Annex A until July 2018.
Future: AFM Warfighting Tactics, Part 3 Battlegroup Tactics.
Contents
Battle rhythm
294. Battle rhythm is detailed from the higher CP. It must be appropriate to the level
of command and configured to the operational environment with mission specific
requirements. An example battle rhythm is shown at Figure 22.11.
R2 expected
Ser Time Event R2 to higher
from units
On SITREP
1
demand INTREP
Wkpr A shift change COMBATREP

2 0001 Bowman back-up
Open new wkprs log
3 0300 LOGSITUNIT
4 0330 Ops room SITREP
5 0430 INTSUM
Bowman back-up COMBATREP

6 0600
Wkpr B shift change
7 0800 Staff update (briefing tent) - key staff to attend
Ops O shift HOTO

8 0900
Comd’s conf call/update to 1-up
10 1030 JEM
Wkpr A shift change COMBATREP

11 1200
Bowman back-up
PERSREP
12 1400
ENGREP
13 1500 INTSUM
15 1600 DOWNREP to subordinates
Wkpr B shift change COMBATREP

16 1800
Bowman back-up
Comd/staff update (briefing tent) - key staff ASSESSREP

17 2000
to attend
Ops O shift HOTO

Comd’s conf call/update to 1-up
18 2100
Backbrief units (COS to conduct by exception)
ES SITREP (Mon
20 2200
and Thur)
21 2359 Close wkpr log
Figure 22.11. Example battle rhythm

Contents
Reports and returns

295. Reports and returns (R2). R2 templates can be found within the BAeBB, 84 including MS
Word templates. Alternately, R2 are hosted on ComBAT via the ‘R3’ dropdown menu.
R2 on ComBAT utilises the land environment message set (LEMS). LEMS messages are
based on the NATO ADatP3 and APP-11 standards. R2 on ComBAT is covered in Chapter
6 (Messaging) of the ComBAT user handbook (UHB).
a. Bowman R2 format. The primary means of R2 transmission will be via the integrated
Bowman R2 format. In cases where no R2 exists, a template of the correct R2 format
should be created using doctrinal references and the R2 should still be sent via
ComBAT free text.
b. Amendments. Where an appropriate R2 format has been directed, its use is

mandatory. Local modifications or amendments to messages are not permitted. The
Land Component Handbook is the NATO compliant authority for R2.
296. DOWNREPs. The purpose of the DOWNREP is to share SA with subordinate units so
that they understand relevant ongoing force activity. It is provided every two hours in
routine and hourly when the unit is in contact. Data command net (DCN) is the primary
means of communicating the DOWNREP but this may vary dependent on unit EMCON
states. The ops update feeds the DOWNREP which is generated by the watchkeeper and
supported by the functional cells. The battle captain will approve the DOWNREP before
it is sent. Battle captains may provide impromptu DOWNREPs as required and there may
be a requirement for an extraordinary DOWNREP following the unit being declared as ‘in
contact’ and conducting an extraordinary ops update. Points should be by exception only
and net activity should be minimised when in contact.
a. CP DOWNREP. This will be sent as per unit battle rhythm. It will begin with
‘DOWNREP as at DDHHMMGMonYY’ and then cover the following:
Ser Agenda
Combat effectiveness (by unit). Using these classifications:
Designator Meaning Personnel Eqpt
GREEN Fully op 90%+ 90%+

1
AMBER Substantially op 75%-90% 75%-90%
RED Marginally op 60%-75% 60%-75%
BLACK Non-op Below 60% Below 60%
2 Situation enemy forces.
Situation friendly forces (to include ISR, COps, joint fires, Air/Avn, AD, engineers, logistic, medical, provost,
3
IS as appropriate).
4 Intentions (DOWNREP; D&G from Comd/COS).
5 Concerns.
Figure 22.12. Example DOWNREP format
84 Land Component Handbook (Reports and Returns) (AC71716)

Contents
a. Voice DOWNREP. Where the EMCON state allows the commander/COS may direct
that the DOWNREP be delivered by voice. This may involve the relaying of the routine
DOWNREP by voice to the battle captain or a member of the command team. It
may see functional cell heads delivering their respective element of the DOWNREP
personally using the COP handset. If this is directed the order of delivery will be the
same as for an ops update brief. Points will be by exception and the purpose is to
improve subordinate SA.
297. SITREPs. The purpose of a SITREP is to inform the higher CP of the situation within
the unit AOR. It provides a formal opportunity to request support and resources. It
is submitted by the battle captain every four hours at a time dictated by higher. The
watchkeeper continually contributes to the construction of the SITREP by drawing
relevant information from unit DOWNREPs. The battle captain adds analysis and
information focused at the higher CP and the operations centre director/COS will
approve the SITREP before it is sent. SITREPs during the current battle are to be sent from
subordinate units to higher CPs according to the following metric:
a. When in a FMA or FAA where CPs are collocated: by exception only.
b. When in a planned operation out of contact: every two hours on the odd hour.
c. When in contact: every 60 minutes from all subordinates.
d. Additionally, SITREPs are to be sent in the following circumstances:
(1) CHOC. Before the CHOC commences and there is also to be confirmation on the
command net when the CHOC is complete.
(2) On first making contact with the enemy.
(3) On commencing/completing any phase of a phased operation.
(4) On the loss of any critical pieces of equipment or capability. Generally, T4,
CRAARV, AD and CP nodes, but can include anything that is fundamental to the
success of the mission.
(5) When a subordinate breaks contact.
e. CP SITREP to higher. This will be sent as per unit battle rhythm. It will begin with
‘SITREP as at DDHHMMGMonYY’ and then cover the following:
Ser Agenda
1 Int 7 Engineers
Sustain (logistic, medical, equipment

2 ISR 8
support, provost)
3 G3/Cops update 9 G6
4 Fires 10 Intentions
5 Air 11 Concerns
6 Air defence
Figure 22.13. Example SITREP format

Contents
298. Combat effectiveness. To enable rapid regrouping, it is essential that G3/COps

maintain awareness of subordinates current combat effectiveness. This requires intimate
and accurate knowledge of critical equipment and personnel states. It must also include
knowledge of what is held in the ES/Med chain and the quantity of replacements
allocated by higher, both of which need to be expressed in terms of availability by time.
To obtain such knowledge requires specific input from the subordinates and staff cells.
Information will continue to be gathered routinely every six hours using the COMBATREP.
However, there is a requirement for a rapid combat power availability assessment so as to
allow more rapid reorganisation and response.
299. Reporting responsibilities.
a. COMBATREP. Each subordinate completes the COMBATREP as dictated by R2,

reporting on equipment and personnel held at first line. When subordinates are in
contact with the enemy, the COMBATREP should be reported to G3/COps as necessary
or as requested. Data should be used where possible to ensure the command net is
kept clear. This includes all equipment and personnel that is capable of being repaired
or treated at first line (LAD/RAP). Once equipment and personnel are handed over to
second line, the subordinate ceases to report on them. The delineation of reporting
responsibility is determined by the request for second line support. Such that when a
BATRECEVACREQ or CASEVACREQ is placed with ES or Med Ops at main, subordinates
cease to report on that casualty. Clearly RAP and LAD commanders must report
to their main CP indicating timelines for the first-line repair/treatment, as well as
reporting on the number of equipment and personnel that have been handed over to
second line.
b. MATDEM/AVDEM/EQUIPMENT DEMAND. Once an item of equipment is beyond

repair subordinates demand to the BSG for replacement using either MATDEM,
AVDEM or EQUIPMENT DEMAND. Subordinates have no requirement to report on
equipment being repaired at second line when evaluating combat effectiveness.
c. RFTDEM (PERS). Once a casualty is evacuated to role 2 medical care, the unit places
a RFTDEM (PERS) to the BSG. This demand will be met from casualties treated at
second line or by allocation of in-theatre reserves (ITR) from division. Units have no
requirement to report on personnel being treated at role 2/3 medical care facilities
when evaluating combat effectiveness.
d. Engr Ops. Engr Ops within a main CP reports to G3/COps on availability of critical
engineer resources.
e. Fires. Fires at a main CP are to report the availability of AD and artillery resources to
G3/COps.
f. CSS Ops. CSS Ops reports on the following every six hours:
(1) CSups holdings at first and second line identifying critical shortfalls. They also
report on reinforcement information received from the BSG.
(2) Equipment under repair at second line, giving a time indication of when
equipment will be returned for use at first line.
(3) Personnel undergoing treatment at second line, giving a time indication of when
personnel will be returned to first line. Once casualties are evacuated to role 3
care Med Ops no longer has reporting responsibility for those casualties.
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g. Pro Ops. Pro Coy Ops reports on availability of RMP resources.
h. BSG. The BSG reports routinely to CSS operations, once every 24 hours, or on request,
on all reinforcement demands (eqpt and pers) giving an indication on the number and
timing of allocations made by division.
300. Information flow. Routine information is dealt with by standard R2. The method of R2
transmission will differ between operations and will be detailed in the CEI. Information
on demand will be placed into two categories; immediate and follow on:
a. IMMEDIATE (within five minutes of request). The following information is to be

reported to G3/COps within five minutes of a request:
Ser Responsibility Information requirement
Number of effective critical equipment available for immediate tasking.

1 Subordinates
Number of effective infantry platoons available for immediate tasking.
2 Engineer Ops Number of critical engineer resources.
Number of AD resources.
3 Fires/AD Ops
Number of FST parties per unit.
4 Pro Ops Number of avail RMP sects.
b. FOLLOW ON (within 30 minutes of request). The following information is to be

reported to G3/COps within 30 minutes of request:
Ser Responsibility Information requirement
Confirmation of number of effective critical equipment available for immediate tasking.

Number of critical equipment in repair at first line and availability, by time.
1 Subordinates
Confirmation of number of effective infantry platoons available for immediate tasking.
Number of infantry platoons available after sufficient R&R, by time.
2 Engr Confirmation of number of critical engineer resources.
Confirmation of number of AD resources.

3 Fires/AD
Confirmation of number of FST parties per unit.
4 Pro Confirmation of number of avail RMP sects.
Numbers of critical equipment being repaired at second line and time available for
return to first line. ES staff at CSS Ops to monitor combat effectiveness for each
5 CSS subordinate unit and inform G3/COps when critical combat effectiveness is reached.
Assist in maintaining the combat effectiveness stateboard in conjunction with G3/COps.
Number of casualties that can be returned to first line from role 2 medical care.
In-theatre reserve availability timeline – from Div allocation.

BSG
6 Critical equipment replacement availability timeline – from Div allocation.
(through CSS)
CSup holdings – critical deficiencies and timeline for restoring capability.
c. Stateboards. Stateboards and combat effectiveness logsheets are to be maintained

by G3/COps using information provided by combat effectiveness reports. The
frequency of combat effectiveness reporting is determined by G3/COps in response to
the intensity of operations.
Armd Inf unit CP
Held at Second
Allocations
Div ITR
UNIT 1
UNIT 2
UNIT 3
UNIT 4
UNIT 5
TOTAL
SPARE
SPARE
SPARE
SPARE
SPARE
SPARE
SPARE
SPARE
Line
Time No Time
CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE CE No
available available
CR2
CRARRV
IMA
WR
WR OPV

WR REP/REC
430 series
430 MAINT
RECCE CRV(T)SC
RECCE CVR(T)SAB
Figure 22.14. Example combat effectiveness logsheet

Ser Item Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Unit 4 Unit 5 SPARE SPARE
1 Comd’s assessment (see below)
2 No of effective MBTs
3 No of tank troops
4 No of mechanised tkd Pl/Tps
5 No of mechanised (whld) Pl/Tps
6 No of Inf Pl/Tps
7 No of effective CVR(T)
8 No of ATGW posts
9 No of ATGW missiles
10 No of mortars
Figure 22.15. Example CE stateboard

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Notice to move
301. Notice to move times. Notice to move (NTM): Defined as a warning order that specifies
the time given to a unit or CP to be ready to deploy. This order normally precedes an
order to move and may increase or decrease the time to prepare (AAP-06). 85
a. Personnel, vehicles and aviation.
NTM Preparedness
Immediate Crews mounted, engines running, radios on, weapons made safe, sentries in.
5mins Eqpt loaded engines off, no camouflage but concealed, troops fully equipped sentries out.
15mins Eqpt loaded, thermal camouflage only, troops resting, sentries out.
30mins Eqpt out. Thermal + visual camouflage deployed. Sentries out, troops admin.
1hr Visual and thermal camouflage deployed. Sentries out. Maximum maintenance and rest.
Not to be employed on any tasks without the authority of superior CP. Not to leave base loc.
2hrs
Undertake maintenance and rest.
Allows recce and confirmation of task prior to main body move. Elms (e.g. R Gp) likely to be at
6hrs
reduced NTM. Troops may be deployed in local area. Troops may be retasked.
Figure 22.16. Unit NTM table
b. CP notice to move.
NTM
Black shading denotes measure
implemented or permitted 2 60 30 15 5
Immediate
hrs mins mins mins mins
Command post (CP)
CP fully functional
Dismounted CP fully functional
Radio stag from inside vehicles
Primary communications
Primary antennae (Ae) deployed
Secondary Ae deployed
Ae – veh whips only
Alternate communications
Line laid as per comms plan
Coy line plan in place
Alt comms plan in place
Line only within BG CP
85 NATO has declared the term ‘state of readiness’, previously ‘the readiness posture of a unit for operations or exercises’,
obsolete. Current NATO terminology (AAP-06) reserves the term state of readiness for the state of a demolition target
(state 1, safe; or state 2, armed). The term ‘readiness state’ has been deleted from AAP-06.
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NTM
Black shading denotes measure
implemented or permitted 2 60 30 15 5
Immediate
hrs mins mins mins mins
Power plan
Charging as per EMCON policy
Charging engines deployed
Generator loaded
Camouflage
Vis and therm cam fully depl
Only therm sheets depl
Veh concealed
Tlrs fitted to veh
Personnel and equipment
Sentries depl
Stag roster in place
Admin for non-employed troops
Dvr and crew mtd
Veh ready to drive off
Figure 22.17. CP NTM table
Briefings
302. The requirement for a staff officer to be able to convey a verbal message is extant across
the operational and non-operational environments. Briefers should comply with the
following simple guidelines by considering:
a. Time available to the briefer.
b. Base level understanding of the recipient.
c. The context of the information to be presented.
d. The precision of language - say what you mean and mean what you say.
303. Type. The brief is likely to differ according to its purpose. Types of brief include, but are
not restricted to those listed in Figure 22.18.
Contents
Ser Brief Description Para
The decision brief is delivered by the staff to the Comd (or senior officer in a
1 Decision brief non-operational setting) seeking a decision on a COA or subject, the detail of 305
which has been generated by the planning process or other staff procedure.
The information brief is given by the staff to the Comd or senior officer to
2 Information brief inform of an ongoing situation, to provide an update on the progress of a task, 306
or to provide information that may lead to a decision brief in time.
A Comd’s backbrief is delivered to the Comd or senior officer by a subordinate

Comd’s to demonstrate understanding, risks, constraints and approval for the manner in
3 307
backbrief which the plan has been drawn up (key outputs from planning process) and is
to be executed.
The CONOPS brief is delivered by the staff or a Comd (to their superior) and
outlines a COA using the principal headings of an OPORD. It encompasses
4 CONOPS brief elements of both a decision and information brief – the superior Comd may 308
approve or reject the CONOPS, or seek further clarification. It also allows for the
opportunity to request additional resources.
A HOTO brief is aimed at Comds, staff and others handing over at the end of
Handover/
their tour of duty, e.g. on relief in place or on assignment. HOTO briefs for
5 takeover (HOTO) 309
watchkeepers and CP staff at routine shift changes should use the oncoming
briefs
staff brief.
Oncoming staff The oncoming staff brief is designed to ensure that all relevant information is
6 310
brief passed between staff on shift change.
Ops Cen visitor

7 The Ops Cen visitor brief is for the briefing of visitors to a CP or Ops Cen. 311
brief
The ops update brief is a brief given mid-operation to ensure SA is maintained

8 Ops update brief 312
within the staff cells of a CP.
Storyboards are usually a post-incident analysis tool which pictorially represents

an event in time and space. It is prepared by the staff on behalf of the Comd
9 Storyboard and allows them to rapidly assimilate information of a complex nature. 313
Storyboards may also be used to assist in briefing decisions to be taken (for
example during the targeting process).
Figure 22.18. Types of briefings
304. Process.
a. Preparation. The individual being briefed will invariably be short of time. The briefer
must establish how much time is available before they construct their brief and tailor
it accordingly. Briefs must be rehearsed; at the very least to establish how much time
it will take.
b. Delivery. The briefer must select an appropriate method of delivery. The options
range from a written or point brief, to a desktop brief using a laptop or handouts, to
a formal verbal brief. Either way, the briefer will often wish to support their brief with
aids. These could range from a sketch, to a map, to PowerPoint. The briefer should
always start their brief with any critical information which the recipient being briefed
may have missed while en route to the brief, or any key information of which they may
not yet be aware. The briefer must also frame the brief to tell the recipient what the
expected output is to be. If a decision is required, declare it up front.
c. Post brief. The individual being briefed will often comment or give direction and
guidance (D&G) as a result of the brief. This must be checked prior to it being
disseminated. This may take the form of a record of decisions or a simple verbal read-
back of the key points made. Briefers must consider the amount of time it will take for
the person being briefed to deliver their D&G.
Contents
305. Decision brief. The decision brief is delivered by the staff to the commander (or senior
officer in a non-operational setting) seeking a decision on a COA or subject, the detail of
which has been generated by the planning process or other staff procedure. The format
is likely to include:
Ser Title Example
Introduction - to include the available “Sir, this is a decision brief and will take approximately 10mins”.
1 briefing time and what aids will be
used
What decision is required? “A decision needs to be made about whether the RTR CR2
2
squadron should support 1 RRF or 4 RIFLES.”
Key information in order for the Comd “The CR2 squadron is 30 miles away from 1 RRF and will require
3
to make the decision 24hrs refit and resupply if it is support them.”
The choices or COAs available, and, if “The squadron could support 1 RRF by limiting their refit to
necessary, the supporting logic 12hrs; it would then reach 1 RRF by COP today but would not
The staff must be able to explain in be able to support them beyond D+2.”
detail each choice or COA, to include:
TASKORG
4
Draft SoM incl. ME
Areas of concern
Advantages/disadvantages criteria
Scoring/weighting
The Comd’s decision and further “Thank you for the brief. The squadron will refit for 12hrs and
5 direction then support 1 RRF but keep me informed on those 3 tanks that
need urgent repair.”
Figure 22.19. Decision brief
306. Information brief. The information brief is given by the staff to the commander or
senior officer to inform of an ongoing situation, to provide an update on the progress of
a task, or to provide information that may lead to a decision brief in time. Information
briefs can occur in numerous settings. The format is likely to include:
Ser Title Example
The introduction to include the available briefing time “Good morning sir, this is an Information Brief; it
1
and what aids will be used will take about 15mins.”
The key subject to be informed “This briefing will inform you about the ongoing
2 issue with the reopening of the APOD by COP
tomorrow.”
Key details to include (if relevant): “There remains a substantial threat from the
TASKORG enemy’s surface-to-air systems, although we
3 destroyed three SA-24s last night.”
Schematics
CONPLANs and resource issues
Closing comments with an outline of when the next “We will keep you informed but will need a
4 brief is due, or what format is required decision at 1900hrs on COA 2.”
Figure 22.20. Information brief

Contents
307. Commander’s backbrief. A commander’s backbrief is delivered to the commander

or senior officer by a subordinate to demonstrate understanding, risks, constraints and
approval for the manner in which the plan has been drawn up (key outputs from planning
process) and is to be executed. A suggested format for the brief follows:
Ser Title Remarks
1 Confirmation of mission
2 Main deductions from the estimate
CONOPS:
Intent to include effects
3 SoM to likely missions/tasks, consideration of the higher CP’s plan

(1-up, 2-up), compliance with the higher CP’s DSO, incl. critical info
from specialist overlays (Engrs, fires, rtes, Air/Avn)
Main effort
4 Key coordinating instructions – timings, resources, preliminary moves.
Questions/RFIs/points of clarification to superior Comd. Identify

constraints; key resource shortfalls, indicating impact on operation
5 (flexibility)
Areas of concern and key risks
Short summary
6 Questions from higher Comd (and staff)
Figure 22.21. Commander’s backbrief

Contents
308. CONOPS brief. The CONOPS brief is delivered by the staff or a commander (to their
superior) and outlines a COA using the principal headings of an operation order.
It encompasses elements of both a decision and information brief – the superior
commander may approve or reject the CONOPS, or seek further clarification. It also
allows for the opportunity to request additional resources. It should be emphasised that
the brief does not remove the requirement for a formal set of written orders.
Ser Title Remarks
1 Executive summary
2 Executive summary checklist
3 CONOPS categorisation matrix
Intelligence picture:
4 Situation enemy
Human terrain
5 Indigenous forces partnering
6 TASKORG
CONOPS:
Intent
7 Scheme of manoeuvre
Missions/tasks
ME
Battlespace management:
8
Ops boxes, FLET/FLOT, DSO etc.
Coordinating instructions (in brief) incl. Synchronisation:

9 Organic assets
External assets
10 Consequence management Planned mitigating actions.
11 ROE authorisation
External resources checklist Must be supported by separate bids for

12
resources.
13 Conditions check (go/no-go)
14 Summary, highlighting key opportunities and concerns
Figure 22.22. CONOPS brief

Contents
309. Handover/takeover (HOTO) brief. The purpose of a HOTO brief is to ensure that the
outgoing commander or staff officer passes all essential information to their replacement,
thereby ensuring continuing SA, consistency of approach and maintenance of progress,
tempo and corporate knowledge. Preparation for HOTO must start as soon as a post is
assumed. Once the HOTO or relief in place (RIP) window is known, an estimate must be
conducted by the incumbent such that the role is handed and taken over in an efficient,
timely and complete manner. Figure 22.23 gives a generic template to consider both
for the HOTO of individual posts and deployed force elements. All serials should be
subdivided into ‘past’ and ‘future’ such that the successor can understand the context
and background of the situation and decisions made.
a. Facilitation. HOTOs are best facilitated by recces, a staggered RIP and by the use of
continuity posts. The implication is that for each post in a CP, there must be others
who are familiar with the role. A step-up or deputy should be in place to allow for
absence of the incumbent.
b. Method. The HOTO is delivered in a combination of three methods: reading, verbal

briefing and physical interaction (including visits and ‘on the job training’). The
extent to which each is used will depend on the time available and the recipient’s
level of knowledge. There are broadly three phases to the HOTO: preparation by
the incumbent (which may include some reading by the successor), briefings and
familiarisation, and shadowing (two sub phases starting with the incumbent having
authority and finishing with the successor having authority). The HOTO must be
supported by written notes to which the successor can refer after the incumbent has
departed. Throughout the HOTO period, higher CPs and personnel must give the
subordinate sufficient space for the HOTO to be conducted. Discretionary tasks and
visits in particular, must be minimised so that the impact on the HOTO is reduced. The
most critical aspect to the success of a HOTO is the honesty of the incumbent.
Ser Title Subtitle Remarks
TASKORG and laydown Best achieved by briefing and physical

Units interaction (visits)
Staff
Atts
Dets
Physical terrain
Human terrain Key leaders:
Context/ White Capability, laydown, intention.
1
situation
Green
Red
Information terrain
2-up plan and post/unit role in Who does what? Who are the key
supporting it. stakeholders? Who are reliable/helpful/difficult?
1-up plan and post/unit role in

supporting it IOs, NGOs, coalition, alliance.
External linkages and flanks
2 Mission Tasks
Contents
Intent Baseline OPORD/OPLAN

Scheme of manoeuvre
Current state What has been planned for, what is likely to
3 CONOPS happen, which have been enacted.
Outstanding actions
Risks and issues
CONPLANs
Timings Including personal routine.

Synch matrix
Diary Which are non-discretionary?
Battle rhythm
SOPs/SOIs/TTPs
Constraints DSO/DSM/STAP/ops overlay/ops tracker/ops.
Physical Forecast.
Legal Who holds authority for the ROE?
Coordinating Political What is mandated? What is recommended?
3a Responsibilities, access, codes and
instructions Control measures
combinations.
Tools
What has been granted? What has been
ROE applied for?
Training policy and execution
Security
Risk
Risk impact graph and register
Dispensations and waivers
CCIRs
SUSTAT and log situation Who has what? What are the surpluses and
Tools: deficiencies? What are the constraints?
Hardware
3b CSS Office, weapons, equipment, transport.
Software
IM architecture
Personal admin
Command states comms What are the command channels. Who can do
Equipment liaison what to who?
4 C2
CNR, data, telephone, contact lists, address
groups, Points of Contact.
Lessons identified What has been identified but not resolved?

5 Lessons What could have been done better?
Lessons learned
Key issues and

6
concerns
There will invariably be insufficient time for

a HOTO - the HOTO plan will have been
What has not overtaken by real world events. The incumbent
7
been covered must be honest with their successor as to what
has not been covered and where to go to
acquire the information.
It is often helpful for the incumbent to

recommend what the first actions for their
Recommended
8 successor should be post TOA. Ideally, these
first actions would already have been planned for and
prepared by the incumbent.
Figure 22.23. HOTO brief

Contents
c. Transfer of authority (TOA). The TOA must be set and agreed between the
outgoing and incoming commander, or outgoing and incoming staff officer and
the higher formation chain of command. It must also be promulgated such that
subordinates and seniors know who has authority. The TOA point must be flexible to
allow for delays in the HOTO programme.
d. Post TOA. TOA must not be seen as the end of the incumbent’s role. The outgoing
commander or staff officer should provide reachback contact details so that
subsequent questions can be raised (although clarification in the first instance should
be sought from HOTO material and in place staff). The incumbent should also have
planned ahead and prepared as much as possible of their successor’s activity post TOA
to give the successor the best chance of success while they are still learning.
310. Oncoming staff brief. The oncoming staff brief is designed to ensure that all relevant
information is passed between staff on shift change. The following format may be used
to brief oncoming staff. It is suitable for routine shift changes for briefing staff that are
already familiar with the environment, general situation and area. It assumes the staff
shift change occurs out of contact. If a contact is on-going the oncoming staff should
shadow and assist the outgoing staff while building their situational awareness. An
abridged oncoming staff brief should then be delivered when appropriate.
Contents
Update at………….hrs on…………. The Comd is/is not present.
Ser Title Remarks
Confirm shift change roster for own appointment and others, including feeding
plan
Confirm guard and security arrangements and responsibilities
1 Prelims Brief any OSW received or issued in last 24hrs
Make aware of any planning currently ongoing
Locations of key staff
Outline any faults or issues with ops room infrastructure, equipment and set-up
Operational Current phase of execution

2
timeline Upcoming key timings, e.g. prelim moves, H-hour, asset allocation
Patrols out; operations ongoing

Current plan – OSW, CONOPS, DSM, synch matrix
3 Current situation
Brief all relevant serials from ops update brief
Summary of all activity in last 24hrs
4 CCIRs What information is required and how will it be gained and exploited?
Risks and
opportunities
Likely changes What are the likely changes to the situation? What are the indicators and
warnings?
How will conditions be monitored and the plan adjusted?
Risk management Key risks to mission success and risk management plans:
Treat. How? How will effectiveness be assessed?
Transfer. To whom?
5 Terminate. How?
Tolerate. Is there a limit to tolerance and associated DP and CONPLAN?
Take. What gains are likely to be made by a conscious decision to take risk? Will
the plan be amended if a risk becomes an issue?
Opportunities
What opportunities may the situation present?
How will they be identified and exploited?
Authority to
amend plan Who has authority to amend the plan?
What are the DPs or trigger conditions?
What are the occurrences for which the Comd, COS or other key staff must be
roused immediately?
Confirm the oncoming staff understands the situation

6 Confirmation
Remain in background for 10mins should any questions arise
Figure 22.24. Oncoming staff brief

Contents
311. Operations centre visitors’ brief. The operations centre visitors’ brief is for the
briefing of visitors to a CP or operations centre. The format below provides a checklist
for operations centre visitor briefs when the full details within the ops update brief is not
required. At the earliest opportunity provide any vital information that cannot wait until
later in the briefing.
Ser Title Remarks
Orientation to Ops Cen and visual Present location

aids. Explain model, map and other aids (e.g. synch matrix, DSM, ISR
Orientate to Ops Cen and brief feeds, airphots, G2/tgt packs, HTA, etc.).
prelims, incl. Ops Cen security Explain environmental conditions that may impact on ops (e.g. FL/
1 and actions on attack. LL), storms that may affect STA and assets, e.g. (SH, UAS), etc.
Introduce relevant staff, e.g. G2 ID major features pertinent to brief – towns, ground features
and Fires. (especially those that form vital ground), water features (especially
Use maps and visual displays to key obstacles), etc.
point out: Unit layout, incl. bdrys, flank units and BM
Outline A3E within area: Left to right, front to rear. Incl. locs,
posns, AAs, rtes, bdrys, etc.
Outline situation friendly forces within area and to flanks, where
2 General situation relevant (also consider CJIIM and host nation): Left to right, front to
rear. Incl. locs, posns, AAs, ISR assets and coverage, bdrys, routine
ptls, etc. Incl. asset allocation and changes to it through time (e.g.
fires and ISR windows. Use synch matrix)
3 Op timeline
Current situation Describe the following, using visual aids:

Context Higher Comd’s intent, outcome and ME
White forces The civilian population(s), incl. local governance
4 Red forces The enemy or enemy factions. Indigenous forces – possibly military,
Green forces police and other – working alongside own forces
Blue forces Own forces incl. subordinates, flanks, MN allies and any assets
temporarily allocated
5 Mission, tasks and constraints
6 CONOPS
7 DSO/DSM
8 C2 and CSS issues
Discuss how the battle is likely to develop

Outline NAIs, DPs, TAIs and effects
9 Future intentions Cover any relevant actions on, exploitation opportunities,

CONPLANs/sequels and extraction plans
Detail any major alternate variations, e.g. to mitigate risks, seize
opportunities, exploit success
10 CCIRs
Recap msn
Detail the likely conclusion of the mission and its longer-term effect
11 Summary on WF, RF, GF and BF
Conclude briefs to visitors with any ways in which they may be able
to influence mission success
Figure 22.25. Operations centre visitors’ brief

Contents
312. Ops update brief. The ops update brief is a brief given mid-operation to ensure SA is
maintained within the staff cells of a CP. This format may be used as a guideline when
conducting operational updates. The update brief should be exactly that – an update
only. Briefers must be concise and not stray into information which is already known.
Briefers may wish to consider briefing their information prefaced as: ‘fact’; ‘assessment’;
‘recommendation’. In the absence of higher unit SOI, the following format may be used
as a guideline, when conducting operational briefs either over VTC or in person:
Update at………….hrs on…………. The Comd is/is not present. COS is/is not present.
Ser Title Remarks Brief Y/N?
Meteorological update:
Visibility Min/max temperatures

1 Air
Cloud cover FL/LL
Precipitation Night-time millilux levels
Vital intelligence
Situation in general
Situation in detail:
Close
Deep
Rear
Flanks
2 G2 (incl. enemy air)
Arty/AD
Air/Avn
Engrs
CBRN
Assessment:
Next 12 to 24hrs
Next 24 to 48hrs
Higher CP/formation activity

Flanks (if LO not on conference)
Incidents during past 24hrs
Update on ongoing operations
3 G3
Next 24hrs
Changes of grouping
Reserve locs and NTM
Real estate (if necessary)
Ops programmed for next 48hrs+ (CONOPS)

4 G5 / G3/5 OSW issued and received since last update
Planning update
Combat effectiveness
EF/other actors
Subordinate/assigned
5 Unit/subordinate units/assigned units update (sequence: CE,
units’ update
enemy forces, FF, intentions, concerns)
Opportunities/threats/issues
Loc/employment of assets
6 ISR
Allocations
Contents
7 POLAD/LEGAD
Targeting
Information activities and outreach
8 G3 Ops sp
Media operations
CIMIC
Combat Coverage (incl. mortars)

effectiveness OS capability (ammo, sustainable
Enemy forces rates of fire)
9 OS/Joint Fires
Engagements FSCM (key changes only)
FF Intentions
Dispositions Opportunities/threats/issues
Aircraft/sorties aval now

10 Air/Avn Forecast of sorties over next 12 to 24hrs. (incl. due to bad wx)
– impact on ATO
Summary of AD cover and capability

11 AD
Tgts engaged and eqpt state
12 BM Brdys, airspace control measures, other control measures
State of engineer plan Engineer group changes

13 Engr Counter-mob update Opportunities/threats/issues
Pri of tasks and timings
Current threat state/dress state

Summary of current CBRN activity
14 FP/CBRN
Assessment
Recommended remedial action
Review of current situation and critical areas

15 Log
Log plans
Review of current situation and critical areas

16 ES
ES plans
Health service support Hospital states

17
(HSS) Casualty states
Detention facilities states

18 Provost
Numbers in custody
State of CIS
19 CIS CP locs and changes due
EMCON state
20 Questions
21 Comd/COS Direction
Figure 22.26. Ops update brief

Contents
313. Storyboards. Storyboards are used to portray information graphically. This can be
post event or pre-event as a method of supporting a decision. It should be kept simple,
allowing those being briefed to glean pertinent information to augment the verbal
message. Use imagination but remember that the recipient is unlikely to be as familiar
with the situation as the author. It remains a living document and may be used by a
higher (non-UK) CP, knowledge of UK TTPs must not be assumed when compiling it.
Storyboards have particular use in: consequence management incidents, targeting
briefings, post-operation reports and analysis, lessons exploitation, and displaying good
practice. Figure 22.27 shows an example of storyboard headings. The storyboard’s value
is often dependent on the inclusion of the actions that have been taken in support of an
incident, and those which are planned. These should be presented as distinct headings.
Example storyboard format
Figure 22.27. Example storyboard format

Contents
Battlespace management
314. Battlespace definition. 86 Battlespace encompasses ‘all aspects of a JOA within
which military activities take place’. It has seven dimensions: maritime, land, air, space,
information, electromagnetic, and time – none of which can be considered in isolation,
as activity in one may have implications for the others. All the components involved in an
operation will have their initial battlespace conditions set by the joint task force CP. This
will be promulgated in either a discrete joint battlespace management force instruction
document (JBM FID) or a battlespace management (BM) annex to an OPORD/OPLAN.
Joint and combined level fires, air and ground manoeuvre and the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS) is controlled and coordinated to achieve maximum desired effect while
minimising constraints.
315. Battlespace management (BM) definition. BM is a G3/5 function defined as ‘the

adaptive means and measures that enable the dynamic synch of activity.’ The purpose of
BM is to maximise freedom of action and to minimise constraints for all battlespace users,
while managing and reducing the risk of blue-on-blue.
a. Level 1. Requires a formation to have the structure, C4I systems and capacity to
plan and liaise across components throughout the JOA. Should be able to plan, liaise
and execute BM across its area of operations (AOO). Planning is conducted 48+hrs
in advance of operations, although BM can be more dynamic if required. Typically
applies to a corps or division which have the organic SMEs and resources to be able to
conduct this BM.
b. Level 2. Requires a formation to be able to plan, liaise and execute BM within its
AOO. Limited C2 structure and C4I capability, inter-component liaison is conducted
through level 1 BM cell. Division or brigade CPs, supported by air support operations
cell (ASOC) or elements of, have ability to conduct this level of BM in low-intensity
operations.
c. Level 3. Focused on the terminal control of weapon effects, typically at the tactical
level. Fire support teams (FST), forward air controllers (FAC), attack helicopter (AH)
crews and fire planning cells (FPC) are examples of organisations that are able to
conduct this level of BM.
316. BM components. Joint BM may be divided as follows:
a. Land BM. Unlike air and maritime, land BM is likely to require a combination of
integrated measures. Each component commander will need battlespace to conduct
operations. It consists of four requirements:87
(1) Manoeuvre.
(2) Air defence (AD).
(3) Airspace control (ASC).
(4) Fire support coordination measures (FSCM).
86 For a full description of BM see AFM Vol 1 Part 11 - Battlespace Management and JDP 3-70 Battlespace
Management. The AFM Warfighting Tactics series (Corps, Div, Bde & BG) provides formation specific guidance.
87 Establish temporal/spatial controls of deployed forces to coordinate all activity/avoid blue-on-blue.
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b. Airspace management (ASM). Routine ASM is delegated to a single airspace control

authority (ACA). The air component commander (ACC) will usually be the ACA for all
airspace in the JOA/ASC-area, including LCC’s AOO. LCC does control air-to-surface
operations and surface-to-surface fires within their AOO. 88 Embedded air staff will
coordinate the allocation of airspace for land operations during planning. Airspace
control means (ACM) are promulgated through the air tasking order (ATO), airspace
coordination order (ACO) and special instructions (SPINS). The ASOC is an air tactical
C2 unit primarily responsible for the control of offensive air missions, but equally
capable of the coordination of all air effects within the land commander’s area of
responsibility. The ASOC is embedded within the operations centre of a supported
land CP, normally the highest level of command deployed.
c. Maritime BM. Maritime BM consists of four aspects; waterspace management, naval

cooperation and guidance for shipping, amphibious operations, and maritime/land
interface.
d. Battlespace spectrum management (BSM). BSM is the planning, coordination and

management of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) through operational, engineering
and administrative procedures. It enables military electronic systems to perform
their functions within intended environments without causing or suffering harmful
interference. 89
317. Principles. The principles of BM are:
a. Command led.
b. Define the battlespace.
c. Shared situational awareness.
d. Identify the level and type of BM.
e. Continuous process.
f. Collaborative planning.
g. Simplicity.
h. Resilience.
i. Comprehensive.
88 ‘Control’ under these circumstances denotes a/c control procedures. It does not imply that the surface force commander
has operational and tactical control of the aircraft. AP-3002.
89 Allied Communications Publication (ACP) 190(B) - Guide to Spectrum Management in Military Operations.
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318. Battlespace management definitions. 90
Ser Term Abbreviation Definition
Manoeuvre
Airspace which is laterally defined by the boundaries of the area of

Airspace control
1 ACA operations. The airspace control area may be subdivided into airspace
area
control sub-areas (AAP-06).
A restricted area or route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft

Airspace and established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from
2 ACA
coordination area being fired on by friendly forces so as to allow the safe operation of
helicopters and aircraft. (UK specific)
Artillery An area within which artillery is authorised to deploy but which is not
3 AMA
manoeuvre areas reserved for its exclusive use (AAP-06).
Artillery reserved An area reserved exclusively for the positioning of artillery assets
4 ARA
area (AAP-06).
An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further

5 Assembly area AA
action (AAP-06).
In land warfare, a line by which areas of responsibility between

6 Boundary Bdry adjacent units/formations are defined. (AAP-06)
All boundaries are restricted fire lines (RFLs).
A CFL is a line short of which indirect fire systems do not fire except
Coordinated fire on request or approval of the Comd who established the line, but
7 CFL
line beyond which they may fire at any time without danger to friendly
troops.
Designated point at which, in all types of combat, adjacent units/

8 Coordinating point Coord pt formations must make contact for purposes of control and
coordination. (AAP-06).
An area in which you seek to have an effect (either lethal, or non-

9 Engagement area EA
lethal) on the enemy, e.g. turn, delay, reassure etc. (UK specific).
An area with specified restraints into which fires in excess of those

Fire coordination
10 FCA restraints will not be delivered without approval of the authority
area
establishing the restraints (AAP-06).
Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land

or amphibious force Comd to denote coordination requirements for
fires by other force elements which may affect the Comd’s current
and planned operations. The FSCL applies to fires of air, ground or
sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground
targets. The establishment of the FSCL must be coordinated with the
appropriate Comds and supporting elements. Attacks against surface
Fire support
11 FSCL or ground targets short of the FSCL must be conducted under the
coordination line
positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or
amphibious force Comd. Unless in exceptional circumstances, Comds
of forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must coordinate with all
affected Comds to avoid fratricide and to harmonize joint objectives.
Note: In the context of this definition the term ‘surface targets’
applies to those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area
of operations (AAP-06).
Forming-up point
(UK) The last position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing the
12 FUP
Forming-up place start line/line of departure (AAP-06).
(NATO)
90 Pink boxes denotes those measures which are UK specific.

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The foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground combat units

Forward edge of are deployed, excluding the areas in which the covering or screening
13 FEBA
the battle area forces are operating, designated to coordinate fire support, the
positioning of forces, or the manoeuvre of units (AAP-06).
Forward line of A line which indicates the most forward positions of enemy forces in
14 FLET
enemy troops any kind of military operation at a specific time (UK specific).
Forward line of A line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in
15 FLOT
own troops any kind of military operation at a specific time (AAP-06).
A specific designated area into which any weapon system may fire
without additional coordination with the establishing headquarters.
(UK specific) The FFA is used to expedite fires and to facilitate the
16 Free-fire area FFA
jettison of CAS munitions if aircraft are unable to use them on target.
Established by a supported Div or higher Comd following coord with
the host nation if appropriate.
High-density Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control

17 airspace control HIDACZ authority, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous
zone and varied weapons and airspace users (AAP-06).
Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a

18 Key terrain KT
marked advantage to either combatant (AAP-06).
An area in which you seek to DEFEAT or DESTROY the enemy using a

19 Killing area KA
lethal effect (UK specific).
Limit of In land warfare, a line (normally beyond a physical objective) which

20 LOE
exploitation friendly units may not cross (UK specific).
In land warfare, a line designated to coordinate the departure of

21 Line of departure LD
attack elements (AAP-06).
An area into which no fires or the effects of fires are allowed except
when the establishing CP approves fires (temporarily) within the NFA
on a mission by mission basis, or when an enemy force within the NFA
22 No fire area NFA
engages a friendly force, the Comd may engage the enemy to defend
their force. Established by a corps or Div in concert with a host nation
if applicable. (UK specific)
No penetration In land warfare, a line beyond which enemy forces may not cross (UK
23 No pen line
line specific).
A line utilised for control and coordination of military operations,

24 Phase line PL
usually a terrain feature extending across the zone of action (AAP-06).
A line at which troops, after having reached it, must report to their
25 Report line RL
command echelon (AAP-06).
A line established between converging friendly forces (one or both

may be mov) that prohibits all fire, or effects from fires, across the
26 Restricted fire line RFL line without coord with the affected force. The purpose of the RFL is
to prevent fratricide between converging friendly forces and is usually
coincidental with a boundary. (UK specific).
An area in which specific restrictions are imposed and in which fires

Restricted fires that exceed those restrictions are not delivered without coordination
27 RFA
area with the establishing CP. Established by a manoeuvre BG or larger
ground force, or by an independently operating Coy.
Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the airspace control

Restricted authority in response to specific situations and/or requirements,
28 ROZ
operating zone within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted
(AAP-06)
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Standard use Army Route established below the coordination level to facilitate movement
29 aircraft flight SSAFR of army aviation assets in the forward area in direct support of ground
route operations. AJP-3.3.5 (B1)
Weapon effects
zone (UK)
In air defence, airspace of defined dimensions within which the
30 Weapon WEZ responsibility for engagement normally rests with a particular weapon
system (AAP-06).
engagement zone
(NATO)
In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby

31 Weapons free weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized
as friendly. (AAP-06)

32 Weapons hold weapons systems may only be fired in self-defence or in response to a
formal order (AAP-06)

33 Weapons tight weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as hostile.
(AAP-06)
Figure 22.28. Land battlespace management definitions
319. BM datums. Various datums should be defined in the JTFCP force instruction document
(FID) to coordinate any cross component activity and ensure common terms of reference.
Datums such as time, geographic datum, geographic coordinate system, geospatial
data, JOA boundaries, component battlespace responsibilities and battlespace spectrum
management should be listed. While boundaries may be adjusted throughout an
operation, reference datums are expected to remain unchanged through an operation.
The two main reference system methods are common grid reference system (CGRS) and
global area reference system (GARS).
Land battlespace management

320. Land management. Land management controls incorporating the four aspects of land
BM (manoeuvre, AD, FSCM and ASC), are split into two areas; terrain management (TM)
and FSCM.
a. TM. Control measures such as boundaries, defined routes, terrain allocation and other
restrictions, reduce the risk of fratricide while enabling manoeuvre and maximising
terrain use.
(1) Scope. TM encompasses the establishment of priority for use of the ground
and allocation of land, the delegation of landspace control, tracking, activating
and promulgating changes, monitoring of force levels within given landspace,
EMCON, and establishing robust coordinating instructions.
(2) Priorities. Priority of use will be dictated by the nature of the operation but
should include those shown in Figure 22.29.
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Priorities
Int collection assets Comms assets
Div reserve GS engineering assets
Formation CP Utility Avn AH and SH
Ground manoeuvre assets Second-line CSS
OSG assets (incl. ARAs/AMAs) Unoccupied AMAs
Figure 22.29. Land management priorities
(3) Bids for land space. The G3 Ops terrain/ops overlay is the authority for unit
locations and control measures. Units requiring land space in an area controlled
by another formation or component must bid through G3 Ops. Bids are to include
the following information:
(i) Size of area required.
(ii) Preferred location/alternative.
(iii) Expected DTG of occupation/ETD
(iv) Whether area can be shared.
(v) Special requirements (e.g. ‘not under power lines’, ‘wheeled access to rte
VIPER reqd’).
(vi) Any multidimensional requirements.
Fire support coordination measures

321. Fire support coordination measures (FSCM). Fire support coordination is used
to coordinate and integrate land, air and maritime fires to support the manoeuvre
commander’s intent and operations plan, and to allow the maximum exploitation of
available fire support assets while ensuring the safety of own troops against the effects
of own fires. In the event that fire or the effects of fires has effect outside the zone of
responsibility of that commander, permission must be obtained prior to execution. It
also follows that, when requested to clear fires, the commander controlling that zone
of operation has a clear responsibility to provide either clearance or denial of clearance
to execute those fires. To facilitate this clearance of fire, FSCM may be used. All FSCM
are established on the authority of the manoeuvre commander and their fire support
advisers. These measures can either be permissive or restrictive in nature. A schematic
showing an overview of FSCM employed within a subordinates’ TAOR, with details, must
be passed to the higher CP at the earliest opportunity.
a. Permissive measures. Permissive FSCMs facilitate the attack of targets. With the
establishment of a permissive measure, no further coordination is required for the
engagement of targets affected by the measure. Permissive measures include the
FSCL, free-fire area (FFA) and the coordinated fire line (CFL). These facilitate the attack
of targets. No further coordination is required within permissive areas.
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b. Restrictive measures. Restrictive FSCMs provide safeguards to friendly forces or

objects. The establishment of a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements
for specific coordination prior to the engagement of those targets affected by the
measure. Restrictive measures include airspace coordination area (ACA), restrictive fire
line (RFL), no fire area (NFA), restricted fire area (RFA) and the no fire line (NFL). These
provide safeguards to friendly forces or objects. Their establishment requires certain
coordination to occur prior to the engagement of those targets.
322. FSCM are described in the SOHB 2018 Section 2.1.2. Further reference material of
relevance to land battlespace management can be found at the following sections:
a. PEHB 18 Chapter 22 - Combat identification (CID).
b. SOHB 18 Section 2.1.5 - GBAD WCS and ASM.
c. SOHB 18 Section 2.6.1 - Countersurveillance control measures (CSCM)/emission

control measures (EMCON).
d. SOHB 18 Section 2.6.2 - Combined arms obstacle integration (CAOI).
Combat identification (CID)

323. CID is the process of attaining an accurate and timely characterisation of detected objects
in the battlespace to support an engagement decision or of ‘combining situational
awareness (SA), target identification (Tgt ID) and specific tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the
incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire’.91 The same principles apply to minimising
collateral damage and casualties among neutrals. CID affects all aspects of a joint force
across the JOA. The LCC is responsible for ensuring CID is established to an appropriate
degree prior to all surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and air-to-surface engagements
and working with ACC and MCC to minimise the risk of fratricide in cross-component
engagement.
324. CID minimises unintended consequences of engagements. The repercussions of ineffective

CID may be profound and disproportionate to the actual effects on life, limb and property.
The impact of fratricide, or a significant fear that it may occur, will damage morale and
undermine trust and cohesion. Domestic and political relations between multinational
allies’ nations may be affected and collateral damage can undermine host-nation support.
Furthermore, confidence in CID can decrease speed of orientation and reaction times,
thereby increasing the ability to seize opportunities to engage fleeting targets and
decreasing the possibility of missed opportunities.
325. Human factors (e.g. stress, fatigue, fear, mental capacity, personality, experience,
expectation and briefing, culture and survival) and operational characteristics (e.g.
sensitivity, complexity, environmental impact and flux in ORBATs and groupings) impact on
an individual’s ability to understand and judge the situation and establish CID. Aides to CID
sit across the three domains of SA, Tgt ID and TTPs.
a. SA. SA affects the expectation of an object’s presence in space and time being
friendly or enemy. Familiarity with both the plan and the current situation are essential
and may be aided automatically (e.g. OSPR detected by Bowman and displayed on
ComBAT) or by interaction (e.g. CNR voice comms). Observation (including use of ISR
91 JDP 3-62: Combat Identification.

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and reports from inorganic assets) and visualisation (e.g. plotting on a map) increase
SA. Threats to SA include ‘blindness’ across boundaries; different ‘pictures’ within
different FEs (as a result of different visualisation tools, different plans or different
interpretations); alternate versions of mapping; lack of knowledge of reference points,
nicknames and objectives; and reliance on voice comms which may not be universally
accessible across all FEs.
b. Tgt ID. Tgt ID involves recognition of the target or a component part (e.g. an indicator
beacon). Positive ID (PID) is established when the observer identifies an object. They
may PID it as enemy, friendly or neutral. Negative ID is established when the observer
is certain the object is not of a certain type but cannot confirm which type it is.
Threats to Tgt ID include lack of commonality or ubiquity across platforms (incl. the
dismounted soldier) and lack of recognition across all sighting systems and spectrums.
c. TTPs. TTPs affect the speed at which CID can be established and includes aspects of
positive control, e.g. ensuring all FEs report their current location or when they are
clear of an area prior to targeting, and procedural control through BM measures, e.g.
boundaries/RFLs and OOB boxes. TTPs for IM/IX assist with the rapid visualisation
and dissemination of the COP. Comms TTPs assist in ensuring commonality of the
picture and SA. Threats to TTP methods of CID include a lack of training; variance
between FEs, especially in a multinational context and between FEs working together
unexpectedly or infrequently; language barriers; and step-up commanders with
incomplete knowledge of TTPs.
326. Failures in CID require a combination of a lack of both Tgt ID and SA that is not mitigated
by TTPs. For an undesired engagement to take place, human factors must also contribute
towards (or at least fail to mitigate) a simultaneous failing in Tgt ID, SA and TTPs, as
illustrated by the ‘Swiss cheese’ model, below.92
Tired, scared, inexperienced

commander and troops HF
Low SA; incomplete scaling of recognition
beacons; poorly understood plan SA
Lack of familiarity with TTPs; no prior trg
with all UK and MN FEs TTPs
Object not accurately recognised as friendly
Tgt ID
Figure 22.30. The ‘Swiss cheese’ model of CID failure – an example
92 Identify friend or foe (IFF) remains a significant weakness, with AFV and vehicle recognition remaining a
continuing issue. Identification of friendly forces and partnered troops requires improvement, especially when
they operate former Warsaw Pact AFVs and vehicles. Contemporary warfare in a Joint and Multinational
environment where partnering is likely to be the norm, makes Combat ID, aided by excellent shared situational
awareness, even more pertinent. Training Branch, HQ Field Army, Observations from Training 17, paragraph 19.
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327. CID commander responsibilities:
a. Pre-action check:
(1) You understand the ROE.
(2) CID measures and FSCM are in place.
(3) You are familiar with CID measures employed by own and allied forces, and vice
versa.
(4) Likely location and intent of EF units, veh and A/C.
(5) Location and intent of close FF units, veh and A/C.
(6) Action to be taken if lost.
(7) All above info is current.
b. In action check:
(1) You are where you expected to be.
(2) You have informed the CoC and adjacent units if you are not where you expect
to be.
(3) Any potential target is in a location and acting in a way that makes sense iaw the
operations picture.
(4) You only engage potential targets that you PID as EF. Any potential target that
cannot be PID as EF, FF (incl allies and partners) must be assumed neutral or
civilian until EF PID can be established.
(5) ROE and CDE permit engagement.
(6) Backstop is free of FF, neutrals and civilians.
Airspace management
328. Terminology.
Term Definition
Airspace The air environment from ground level to infinity over the AO.
A combination of airspace organisation planning procedures, the resulting control structure

Airspace control
and coordinating functions to minimise risks and allow for efficient and flexible use of
(ASC)
airspace by all involved elements of the joint air, land and sea operation.
Airspace The integration and utilisation of airspace by indirect surface-to-surface weapons, air-to-
management (ASM) surface weapons, surface-to-air weapons and air platforms within the AO.
An airspace manager will be appointed within the CP BM Cell. Fires, AD, Avn and ISR all
Airspace manager
have responsibilities within ASM and will be coordinated by the airspace manager.
Figure 22.31. Airspace management terminology
329. Airspace authorities. The JTFC has ultimate responsibility for ASM. The JFC may
designate a joint force air component commander (JFACC), an ACA and an area AD
commander (AADC). The responsibilities of the JFACC, ACA and AADC are interrelated
and are normally assigned to one individual which often simplifies the coordination
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required to develop and execute fully integrated joint air operations. It is important
to note that the land formation does not own airspace above its AO and coordination
between the land formation and ACA is vital in the prosecution of any use of airspace.
The coordination will be executed through the LCC BM Cell. JFACC, ACA and AADC will
promulgate their intent through the documents shown in Figure 22.32.
Reference Description
The JAOP is the JFACC’s plan for integrating and coordinating joint air operations that
Joint air operations
include task forces, message format and ROE. It translates the JFACC tasking from the JFC
plan (JAOP)
into an air strategy and establishes the JFACC’s objectives.
The daily AOD is promulgated by the CAOC, is similar to a FRAGO and gives planners the
Air operations
priority of effort, operational constraints, and any other specific guidance governing the
directive (AOD)
planning and execution of air and space operations during an ATO period.
The ACP is developed by the ACA, in conjunction with other components, to detail the
Airspace control broad policies and procedures for ASC within the JOA. This is the overarching document
plan (ACP) that contains all airspace details. The ACP will embody the ‘standing’ airspace control order
(ACO) which will include all ACMs that may be required in the AOR.
The ACO is developed after component Comds consolidate, deconflict, and forward their
Airspace control airspace requests to the ACA for further consolidation with other theatre-wide inputs. The
order (ACO) ACO implements specific ACMs for specific time periods. The ACO activates and deactivates
procedural control measures and updates positive control procedures.
This implements JOA wide defensive counter-air (DCA) priorities, authorities, procedures
and tasks. DCA execute the AADP to protect assets, friendly forces and civilian population
Area AD plan
centres in accordance with JFC guidance. The integration of AD in the ACP is critical and the
(AADP)
AADP needs to be written with detailed engagement procedures that are consistent with the
ACP and operations in the combat zone.
Air tasking order The ATO is the mission assignment for all aircraft missions during that specific ATO period.
(ATO) Detailed information can be found in the Air Cell SOI 103 Annex J.
Numerous airspace procedures and airspace usages are promulgated through SPINS. They
Special instructions
may also include ROE and combat identification criteria for AD along with any additional
(SPINS)
guidance, directives and information that AD operators may require.
Figure 22.32. Airspace management references
330. Airspace complexity. The airspace environment is becoming more complex

incorporating the altitudes and ranges of new weapons systems, including UAS.
The commander must not only contend with their own airspace users, but also with
commercial flights, contract aircraft and other government agency aircraft. An integrated
ASC system is required to enable mission accomplishment and minimise risk.
331. Delegation of ASC. The ACA is responsible for theatre-wide ASC but, dependent
on assets and infrastructure within theatre, can struggle to provide real-time or near-
real-time control of this increasingly complex and crowded airspace. The solution is to
delegate ASC authority within a designated portion of battlespace to the land formation,
such as within a high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). This delegation moves
decision making down to the lowest practical level, leading to rapid decision making at
the tactical level. It is critical that the land formation has the capability to effectively plan
and execute ASM within their designated area.
332. Common reference system. A common area reference system is an operational-level

means to ‘digitise’ the operational environment and provide a two-dimensional construct
from which three-dimensional airspace control means (ACMs) can be constructed. The
ACP should define the theatre-specific area reference system in use, as well as procedures
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for definition and activation of airspace dimensions. The ACP must draw the reference
system from the force instruction document issued by JTFHQ.
a. Area reference system considerations. BM provides the authority between

Global area reference system (GARS) and common geographic reference system
(CGRS), both of which use common terms (keypads/quadrants) despite both having
different meaning in each system. The ACP should define the theatre-specific area
reference system in use, as well as procedures for definition and activation of airspace
dimensions. The type of system used is less important than ensuring all components
use the same reference system and procedures.
b. Global area reference system (GARS). GARS is an area reference system based on
lines of longitude and latitude to provide an integrated common frame of reference for
joint force situational awareness to facilitate air-to-ground coordination, deconfliction,
integration, and synchronisation. This area reference system provides a common
language between the components and simplifies communications. It is important to
note that GARS is primarily designed as a management tool and is not to be used as
FSCMs or ACMs.
GARS construct (see BM doctrine)

Divides the surface of the earth into 30-nm x 30-nm Each cell is 30min x 30min 1:100,000 charts = 30min x 30min
Cell to quadrant to keypad yields 5min x 5min cell;
cells. AH
takes advantage of existing charts
Each cell id’d by 5-character designator. First 3 AG 006

Each cell is sub-divided into
designate long band. 4th/5th characters designate lat. AG
four 15min x 15min quadrants 1 2
AF 1:50,000 charts = 15min x 15min
Each 30-min cell is divided into four 15-nm by 15-nm 3 4
quadrants. Each quadrant is identified by a six- AE
006AG3
character designation. A quadrant can be further
AD
sub-divided into nine 1 2 3
The graphical representation of a 15-nm quadrant 5min x 5min keypad ‘keys’
with numbered 5-nm by 5-nm areas resembles a AC
4 5 6
telephone keypad. AB
7 8 9
Each 5-nm by 5-nm area, or keypad “key,” is
AA 006AG39
identified by a seven-character designation. Current 1:50,000 chart has
001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009
symbology ‘+’ to denote 5x5 ‘keys’
Complements physical reference, e.g. “Cleared to Origin Point
engage targets east side of river in cell 006AG3”. South Pole / 180 E/W
GARS Construct (see BM doctrine)

• Divides the surface of the earth into 30nm x 30nm cells.
c. Common geographic reference system • Each cell (CGRS). Similarly,
id’d by 5-character designator. CGRS
First 3 designate divides
long band. two-
4th / 5th characters designate lat.
• Each 30’ cell is divided into four 15nm by 15nm quadrants. Each quadrant is identified by a six-character designation.
dimensional space into ‘cells’ which are•• The
then subdivided into 9 x keypad, each cell of
graphical representation of a 15nm quadrant with numbered 5nm by 5nm areas resembles a telephone keypad.
Each 5nm by 5nm area, or keypad “key,” is identified by a seven-character designation.
• Compliments physical reference e.g. “Cleared to engage targets east side of river in cell 006AG3”.
which in turn is subdivided again into four quadrants.
CGRS 10 The CGRS

lat/long fro
operation.
Pre-dates GARS. 9
9B
Cell
varies acco
Divides terrain into ‘cells’ coincident with ½ degree 8
Keypad The grid is
1 2 3
lat/long. 7
following
4 5 6
Each cell divided into 9 x keypads and quadrants (NW, CELL: 30 m
6
SE, SW, NE). 7 8 9 KEYPAD: 1
5
Like GARS, not FSCM/ACM or manoeuvre control Quadrant QUADRAN
NW NE
measures. 4
CGRS
SW SE • Pre-dat
May be combined with physical reference, e.g. 3
• Divides
“Cleared to engage targets east side of river in keypad degree l
2 9B9SW • Each ce
9B9SW”. quadran
1 • Like GA
control
A B C D E F G H I J
• May be
“Cleare
Keypad
Contents
333. Methods of control. These follow from the identification of the common reference
system. The methods of ASC vary across the range of military activities. They range from
procedural control of all air assets in an ASC area to positive control of all such assets
– under-pinned and determined by the level of SA. They are not mutually exclusive as
Figure 22.33 demonstrates.
Increasing situational awareness

Procedural Dynamic procedural Active deconfliction Positive
Procedural control
• Volumes of airspace allocated procedurally to force elements.

• Activates the airspace by defined volume and time through standard ACMs.
• Advantages – simple, less susceptible to disruption, suited to independent actions.
• Disadvantages – inflexible, less responsive to dynamic situations, ill-suited to complex airspace.
Dynamic procedural control, e.g. GMLRS ‘goalpost’
• Allows BM to react to unexpected and maintain synchronised and integrated activity.
• Requires pre-established architecture of control measures (as with procedural control).
• These can be activated or deactivated as necessary.
• Bde/BG’s TCPs undertake dynamic procedural control within their AORs and TAORs.
• Advantages – agility.
• Disadvantages – reliant on effective SA, holds risk through misapplication of activated ACMs.
Active deconfliction
• Increases tempo from dynamic procedural control, but requires increased SA.
• Advantages – less need for pre-planned deconfliction, highly flexible to dynamic situations.
• Disadvantages – enhanced SA through JADOCS or JAPPLE93 to ensure separation of assets.
Positive control
• Relies on radars, cooperative identification systems,94 digital data links to id, track and direct assets.
• Positive control measures must include provision for transition to procedural if positive control systems
are downgraded or unavailable.
• Advantages – allows commanders to control activities in real time, mitigate risks and exploit
opportunities.
• Disadvantages/conditions – ability to positively identify airspace users, constant maintenance of comms
with assets.
Figure 22.33. Increasing SA - methods of control
334. Recognised air picture (RAP). To aid SA and AD, a RAP can be fed into the land
formation CP using digital datalinks. This provides the CP with a picture detailing what
aircraft are over the formation battlespace at any time – dependent on available sensors.
The RAP is currently provided into the land formation CP through the deployment of
a JAPPLE attachment. JAPPLE is set to become land environment air picture provision
(LEAPP) which, with organic G-AMB (Giraffe) Radar, is capable of producing a local air
picture. This, along with visibility of ACMs, improves SA, Figure 22.34 refers.
93 Joint air picture provision for land environment (JAPPLE).

94 Identity friend or foe (IFF), blue force tracker etc.
Contents
335. Airspace control means (ACM). The ACO activates and deactivates procedural
control measures and updates positive control procedures to provide a two-dimensional
construct from which three-dimensional airspace control means (ACMs) can be
constructed. The ACO implements ACM for specific time periods. Types of ACM are
depicted in Figure 22.34 and described in Figure 22.35.
Increasing Situational Awareness
1.
3.
X 5. ?
International border
FSCL
6.
X
2. 4.
XX
Figure 22.34. Airspace control means schematic
Key ACM Description
An advisory measure established to increase the awareness of conflicts

Coordination level (CL) between slow and fast-moving a/c at low level (FW & RW). Determines a
1
Procedural ACM height above ground level below which fast a/c normally will not fly and
above which slow a/c will not normally fly.
Standard use army aircraft Established to route RW a/c in the forward area in direct support of
2 flight routes (SAAFR) ground operations. Do not require approval of ACA.
Procedural ACM
Restricted operating zone Established to reserve airspace for specific activities in which the
(ROZ) operations of one or more airspace users is restricted. Offers short-term
3 volume of airspace, usually smaller than HIDACZ, reserved for a single
Procedural ACM but can be activity, e.g. UAS, fires, landing sites. May be permanently established
dynamic but not activated until operation begins, or criteria met.
High-density airspace control Is airspace designated in the ACP or ACO to a ground Comd. Offers
zone (HIDACZ) short-term volume of airspace within which a unit Comd can exercise
4 complete freedom of action, e.g. for AH raids, CAS, air manoeuvre or
Procedural ACM but can be
dynamic deception operations.
Allows BM to react to the unexpected. Based on procedural measures

Pre-planned GMLRS ‘wall’ but presupposes that these measures can be quickly activated/
5
Procedural control deactivated. ‘Walls’ can be routinely established after sufficient planning
time (1 to 24hrs) to calculate the GMLRS trajectory to fly below.
Dynamic response (<1hr) a simple solid ‘wall’ is established, increases

6 Immediate GMRLS ‘wall’ GMLRS freedom of action but constrains use of air. Requires low latency
SSA to implement such short notice ACM.
Figure 22.35. Airspace control means descriptions

Contents
Weapons engagement zones (WEZ). Airspace of defined dimensions where the responsibility for
engagement rests with a particular weapon system. WEZs are subdivided as follows:
• Fighter engagement zones (FEZ). Airspace of defined dimensions where the responsibility for
engagement rests with AD fighter aircraft.
• High altitude missile engagement zones (HIMEZ). Airspace of defined dimensions where
responsibility for engagement rests with the operators of high altitude SAMs.
• Joint engagement zones (JEZ). Airspace of specific dimensions where friendly SAMs and fighters
are employed simultaneously.
• Low altitude missile engagement zones (LOMEZ). Airspace of defined dimensions where the
responsibility for engagement rests with operators of low to medium altitude SAMs.
• Short-range AD engagement zones (SHORADEZ). Airspace of defined dimensions where
the responsibility for engagement rests with the operators of short-range AD weapons. May be
established in a LOMEZ/HIMEZ.
336. Joint fires integration methods. Time and space are two methods of deconfliction.
Airspace can be further divided into lateral and vertical (altitude). Offset deconfliction
combines both.
a. Time deconfliction. Time deconfliction requires detailed coordination and may be

required when aircrew fly near indirect fire trajectories or ordnance effects. The timing
of surface fires must be coordinated with aircraft routing.
Increasing Situational Awareness
minus 2 through minus 1 and plus 1 through plus 2’
X
?
International Border
FSCL
en aircrew / X
e same / XX
en IDF
hen a/c Artillery position 1408.57
gt engaged
or surface
X
?
FSCL
cific a/c
X
XX
TTT).
1410.00
any real
gration. X
?
FSCL
XX
Artillery position 1411.03
b. Spatial deconfliction. The separation of activities in space offers far more

opportunities to integrate assets. Spatial deconfliction can be used to attack multiple
adjacent targets simultaneously or, with detailed planning, the engagement of the
same target. To achieve this, the aerial platforms’ flight paths or battle positions must
be deconflicted with weapon trajectories and effects. This method requires that the
air vehicle is offset from weapon trajectories and operating at safe distance from the
point of impact.
Contents
Altitude deconfliction
• Used to keep a/c safe from trajectories of • A/C given altitude restrictions
munitions and fragmentation from indirect fire • A/C kept +/- of wpn trajectory + pressure
when used with CAS against same/separate tgts variation buffer
fliction
a/c safe from
unitions & Stay above height
om indirect 1,000ft safety buffer
with CAS Maximum vertex height
eparate tgts.
ude
1,000ft safety buffer
f wpn Stay below height

sure variation
fliction
c safe from
unitions & Stay above height
om indirect 1,000ft safety Airspace
buffer coordination area (ACA)
ith CAS Maximum vertex height
parate tgts.
de
1,000ft safety buffer
tion
wpn Lateral separation
‘Staybelow
Stay west of height
grid line 62’
fliction
ure variation • Requires id/promulgation of geo features (road,
s sufficiently
c safe from • Used when tgts sufficiently separate from a/c river etc.) or BM tool (kill box, FSCM, ACM). A/C
cnitions
flight paths,
& Stay above height
omnt of wpn
indirect flight paths, battle posns, point of wpn release.
1,000ft safetyAirspace
buffer
given
coordination areaaltitude restrictions.
(ACA) Artillery
ith CAS position
Maximum vertex height • A/C ordered to stay on one side of the line.
parate tgts. of
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de
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on river etc.) ‘Stay west of grid line 62’ 1,000ft safety buffer
Box, FSCM,
sufficiently
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nflight
urealtitude
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nt of wpn Artillery
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Unprotected flight
oomulgation
stay on oneof Protected flight
Airspace coordination area (ACA)
Grid
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ox, FSCM,
n altitude
on ‘Stay west of grid line 62’
Unprotected flight
stay on one
sufficiently Protected flight
Grid
flight paths, line 62
ion wpn
nt of Artillery
Worst case line position
ical / lateral GT right
omulgation of
nd,inside wpn
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30 or 500 mile
separation from
stances.
on
ox, FSCM, Offset separation line GT Fixed wing
terally
cal / lateral
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Worst case line
GT right
inside
pns wpn
trajectory • Possible
Combines vertical/lateral separation when
30 or 500 mile
separation from
• Allows a/c to operate below the max vertex
Unprotected flight
ances.
stay on one attack line GT Fixed wingflight
afe altitude.
erally inside wpn safe/splinter distances.
cones
no-fly area height but clear
Protected
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operate below
pns trajectory • Possible
A/C remains laterally separate from wpns
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• Must be offset by 30o from gun target line.
attack
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perate trajectory but above min safe

30 or 500 mile altitude.
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o
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/ lateral
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ances. line GT Fixed wing
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Offset from weapon effects in target area
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fe altitude. cones
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eight but 30 or 500 mile
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Worst case line
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Offset from surface to surface trajectory Offset from weapon effects in target area
Contents
Risk management and ASC planning

337. Risk. Risk is a key consideration of ASC. The JTFC’s acceptable level of risk for all airspace
users (including fires) should be delineated in the ACP. There is a continuum of control
which assesses methods of control against efficiency, resources required and risk.
Uncontrolled airspace exerts a minor drain on resources but carries major risk. This is
incrementally mitigated by ACMs through procedural control but consequently increases
the level of control and resources required. Full positive control provides the best
mitigation for risk (ideally the entire ASC area is under positive control) but provides the
greatest drain on resources.
Airspace continuum of control
• System efficiency
+ • Resources, cost
• Risk
- Increasing situational awareness +

Uncontrolled Procedural controlled Dynamic procedural control Active deconfliction Positive control
• Procedures • Comms • Some surveillance • Full surveillance
• Common ref • Controller • Comms • Comms
• Procedures • Controller • Controller
• Common ref • Procedures • Procedures
• Common ref • Common ref
Figure 22.36. Risk and ASC
338. JTFC guidance. The JTFC will identify unacceptable risks and must establish the baseline
risk criteria for airspace users through the ACP. The criteria should be specific enough
to minimise uncertainty and enable components to make decisions in support of JTFC
criteria.
339. Commander’s guidance. Within formation/unit controlled airspace (such as a HIDACZ),

staff involved in BM must examine each potential conflict and advise the commander on
risk management. The following is an example of a method of examining risk and issuing
guidance, Figure 22.37 refers:
Contents
Risk to Risk from Acceptable risk When to accept increased risk
Any military None. Civil aviation forbidden entry to HIDACZ. No

Civil aviation None
system organic joint fires beyond the limits of HIDACZ.
1. Immediate fires in support of troops in contact.

AND
Manned air
Either 2,000ft vertical 2. Comd approval.
(fixed wing)/
Indirect fires deconfliction (inc PVB) or
Avn (rotary WITH
1nm lateral deconfliction
wing)
3. Aircraft warning to ensure friendly fire is not
inadvertently viewed as hostile.
Manned air 1. Immediate air support to troops in contact. AND

Either 1nm lateral
(fixed wing)/ 2. Manned aircraft pilot accepts responsibility for
RPAS or 1,000ft vertical
Avn (rotary separation. AND
deconfliction.
wing) 3. Comd approval.
Below CL fly on VFR.

Manned Avn Manned Avn RW pilot accepts
None – no RW above CL.
(rotary wing) (rotary wing) responsibility for
separation.
1. FW cleared below CL by HIDACZ controller who

has deconflicted airspace users and indirect fires.
OR
Manned Avn Manned air CL maintains buffer 2. FW immediate air support to troops in contact.
(rotary wing) (fixed wing) between FW and RW. AND
3. FW aircraft pilot accepts responsibility for
separation. AND
4. Comd approval.
Either 1nm lateral

UAS UAS or 500ft vertical Comd or above for component asset.
deconfliction.
Note: Numerical values and approval authorities are notional and are provided for illustration; actual values and approval
authorities should be identified based on the operational environment.
Figure 22.37. Commander’s guidance
340. ASC planning. Considering these risk management factors alongside the following
considerations will aid the unit BM cell in determining what method (or combination of
methods – procedural, dynamic procedural etc.) of ASC is required over the unit AOO:95
a. Identification of all likely airspace users within AO.
b. Common theatre-wide area reference system.
c. Theatre-wide and unit comms architecture.
d. Comms procedures/data networks/C2 Internet tactical chat facility.
e. JFAC positive control asset availability (1ACC or AWACS) and area of coverage
provided.
f. Means of receiving the RAP into the unit CP.
95 Wider airspace control considerations such as host nation ATC liaison will be coordinated by the ACA with guidance
provided in the ACP.
Contents
g. Integration and location of organic sensors (LEAPP and blue force tracker).
h. Organic and air component UAS planning.
i. Identify the complex airspace areas which may require a higher level of control and
integration due to airspace/fires density (this may require dynamic procedural control
or positive control).
j. Organic control capability – number of and capability of TACPs. Does the unit need
augmenting to be able to undertake the required level of control? The RAF Air Support
Operations Centre (ASOC) is established to provide support to land CPs (at highest
tactical level) and can be further broken down into air support elements to support
subordinate land CPs in coordinating and directing air support.
341. Kill boxes. A kill box is a three-dimensional NATO FSCM used to facilitate the
expeditious air-to-surface attack of targets. These can be augmented by, or integrated
with surface-to-surface indirect fires but are not normally allowed to pass through an
open kill box. Kill boxes provide the airspace in which to manoeuvre and may contain
within them ROZs and HIDACZs within which the effects are conducted. They are usually
defined using an area reference system, such as CGRS.
a. There are two types of kill box:
(1) Blue kill box. Permits air-to-surface fires without further coordination with the
establishing CP.
(2) Purple kill box. Permits the integration of surface-to-surface indirect fires with
air-to-surface fires without further coordination with the establishing CP.
b. Each type of kill box has four stages of life:
(1) Established (stage). Describes a kill box that is in effect, either planned by the
joint target cycle or immediate during execution.
(2) Open (stage). Describes a portion or portions of a kill box that are open to fires
without further coordination or deconfliction. An established kill box is open until
closed or cancelled. Two terms apply to open kill boxes:
(i) Active. An established kill box that has ac flying in the space defined by the
box or the effects of air of other fires within its bounds.
(ii) Cold. An established kill box that is not active. All portions of the kill box are
open to fires unless identified as closed.
(3) Closed (stage). Describes a portion or portions of an established kill box in

which fires or effects of fires are not allowed without further coordination.
(4) Cancelled (stage). The kill box is no longer in effect.
c. ACM definition:
(1) Air route (AR). A bi-directional route established to route aircraft through AD
in the rear area. They will be utilised by non-operational and operational support
traffic.
(2) Base defence zone (BDZ). A zone established around airbases to enhance the
effectiveness of local ground-based defence systems.
Contents
(3) Coordination level (CL). An advisory measure established to increase aircrew

awareness of conflicts between slow and fast-moving traffic at low level. Slow-
moving traffic will operate below the CL and fast-moving above it. Any air activity
taking place below the CL is to be coordinated through the unit air staff.
(4) High-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ). Airspace of defined dimensions

which there is a concentrated employment of numerous, and varied weapons and
airspace users. HIDACZ is requested by land force commander who then controls
all air activity within it.
(5) Restricted operating zone (ROZ). Established to reserve airspace for specific
activities in which the operations of one or more airspace users is restricted (e.g.
air-to-air refuelling, landing/drop zones etc.).
(6) Safe lane (SL). A SL is a bi-directional lane which connects an airbase, landing
site and/or BDZ to adjacent routes/corridors.
(7) Special corridor (SC). Established to accommodate the special routing

requirements for specific missions.
(8) Slow aviation asset flight route (SAAFR). An SAAFR is used to route
helicopter traffic in the forward area in DS of ground operations. They will be
established below the CL, and their dimensions shall be dictated by mission
requirements.
(9) Temporary minimum risk route (TMRR).
(10) Time slots. A temporary route used to route fixed wing aircraft between transit
routes of the rear boundary of the forward area and their operations in DS of
ground operations.
(11) Time slots. A time slot is a period of time during which certain activities are
governed by specific regulations. This is to restrain certain airspace users to allow
others a greater degree of freedom or operations.
(12) Transit route (TR). A temporary bi-directional corridor of defined dimensions

established in the forward area to minimise the risk to friendly aircraft from
friendly AD or surface forces.
(13) Traverse level (TL). A vertical displacement above level AD systems, expressed
as a height and altitude, at which aircraft can cross an area. It is used to improve
the effectiveness of AD systems by providing an extra friendly discriminator.
(14) Weapons free zone (WFZ). An AD zone established around key assets or
facilities which merit special protection based AD assets.
d. Air control means request form (ACMREQ). Pre-planned requests for airspace
are to be made via an ACMREQ. Immediate requests should include the following
minimum information:
(1) ACM type and usage requested.
(2) Location of centre point in lat/long (DDMMSS). (If the area is a square start with
the top left corner (TL) and work round in a clockwise fashion inserting TR (top
right), BR (bottom right) and BL (bottom left) before each point.)
Contents
(3) Width (if applicable).
(4) Radius (if applicable).
(5) Turn direction (right, left, centre – if applicable).
(6) Min-max altitude (AGL or AMSL).
(7) Timings (Z).
(8) Controlling C/S.
(9) Freq (pri/sec).
(10) Expected associated C/S (if known).
(11) ACM activation and control.
e. Activation. ACMs, such as a ROZ, established and ‘active’ over IDF assets, should
remain dormant (‘cold’) until IDF is required (‘hot’). If IDF is suspended for a significant
period of time the ACM should be turned ‘cold’, and when all activity is complete the
ACM is to be deactivated (‘closed’). The control authority (CA) is to deactivate the ROZ
at the earliest opportunity to allow other users to access that airspace.
f. Control. The CA is to monitor the ACM’s controlling frequency at all times when ‘hot’
and, should make every effort to do so when ‘cold’.
g. Airspace coordination.
(1) Direct fires. The responsibility for the deconfliction of direct fires rests with the
commander responsible for the weapon system being fired and does not have to
be deconflicted by the unit staff involved in BM.
(2) Indirect fires (IDF). Deconfliction of dynamic IDF 60mm and above rests with
unit CP G3/COps, for pre-planned IDF. A ROZ should be requested that includes
the max vertex height (AMSL) of the weapon being used, the ROZ controlling c/s
and controlling frequency.
(3) Guided multiple launch rocket system (GMLRS). When firing GMLRS
deconfliction with other battlespace users must occur. A series of GOALPOST/
HOTWALLS or SECTORS can be established and held dormant on the ACO
to enable rapid activation and deconfliction. If time is short a HOTWALL is
preferable once coordination is achieved with all airspace users in the vicinity.
(4) FW and RW coordination. Theatre air C2 agencies or host-nation air traffic

control are responsible for the coordination and deconfliction or airspace outside
of active ACMs. The theatre air C2 agencies will hand over aircraft to the CA,
who is responsible for the deconfliction of all air users within the ACM.
(5) Unmanned aerial systems (UASs). Airspace is becoming increasingly congested

with the use of UASs and remotely piloted aircraft.
(6) Mini UASs (MUASs). MUASs often fly at, or below the CL and consequently
conflict with aviation assets. A ROZ must be established for MUAS use and will
be based on the maximum height band of the MUAS (normally no higher than
2,000ft AGL).
Contents
(7) Tactical UAS (TUAS) and strategic/operational UASs (SUASs). TUASs and
SUAVs generally operate above the CL. TUAS and SUAS are often able to be
positively controlled. That said if required the aircraft can be assigned operating
areas in which procedural control is applied.
(12) As with all air users, UASs are not permitted to enter active ACMs without the
permission of the CA.
342. Air-land integration. The coordination of an air operation is conducted through

the combined air operations centre (CAOC), sitting within the air component; this is a
theatre-level organisation. The air component and the CAOC plans, refines and executes
all air operations in its assigned areas in support of the Joint Force Commander. Its orders
are delivered in the form of an air tasking order (ATO) and airspace control order (ACO).
Air command and control is delegated to subordinate units such as control and reporting
centres (CRCs), air support operating centres (ASOCs), and airborne warning and control
system aircraft.
343. Liaison. Liaison is established by the air component within the Joint Task Force
Headquarters and at various levels within the land component. Liaison includes:
a. Air support operations centre (ASOC). Located across corps, division and brigade,
the ASOC is the primary C2 agency responsible for the execution of all air support
allocated to the land component (CAS, ISR, air interdiction), as well as the processing
of immediate requests submitted by ground manoeuvre forces. When the CAOC has
granted the ASOC the authority over missions assigned to it on the ATO, the ASOC
can directly task on-call missions, or divert scheduled missions to satisfy approved
immediate requests. The ASOC may also distribute air staff officers (ASOs) to augment
the embedded division ASOs in their plan and refine role (an SO1 Air is positioned in
the division JFC, while SO2s are placed in plans and ops cells). In addition, the ASOC
will task its subordinate TACPs within its assigned area of control.
b. Brigade level. ASOs are distributed to brigade level where they provide subject
matter expertise and coordinate directly with the brigade JFC to integrate and
synchronise air operations in support of land forces. The ASOC may also provide a
dynamic procedural controller (DPC) to assist the brigade TACP with the execution of
air operations.
c. Battlegroup level. At battlegroup level, the main air representative is the TACP. The
primary task of the TACP is to support the FAC during the terminal control of CAS.
Battlespace spectrum management (BSM)

344. Battlespace spectrum management (BSM). Efficient and effective control of the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) provides an operational advantage to the commander
and enables optimal spectrum use through deconfliction, protection, exploitation
and denial within the AOO. BSM requires engagement and liaison with key spectrum
stakeholders within the deployed force and beyond. The following are all users of the
EMS and must be consulted to establish their requirements prior to segments of the EMS
being allocated.
a. CIS.
b. ISR (including downlink and control frequencies).

Contents
c. EW (including electronic attack, surveillance and defence).
d. FP ECM.
e. SIGINT and ELINT.
f. G3 (lethal and non-lethal effects on the EMS).
g. OGDs, NGOs and IOs.
h. Media operations.
i. Other components.
(1) The Joint Force Headquarters BSM cell will coordinate all bids and will liaise with
the host-nation authority to deconflict with civil spectrum requirements and
allocate (and potentially, pay for) frequencies.
(2) BSM is be particularly challenging on the modern battlefield and will become
increasingly so as more and more users require greater access to bandwidth.
CPs must consider methods for achieving their aim when parts of the EMS are
unavailable.
EMCON
345. All the communication and information systems on which applications depend rely on
the electromagnetic spectrum. While the electromagnetic environment is the principal
information enabler, it could also be our Achilles heel. The enemy can gain a great deal
of information by simply identifying the location and type of transmission that our force
elements radiate. As part of a range of measures to conceal our ORBAT and intentions,
it is necessary to control electronic radiation in an environment that is increasingly
congested and contested. These measures are collectively known as emission control
(EMCON) measures. This should be seen within a wider protect and countersurveillance
control measures framework as well as a broader operational context. UK EMCON policies
are being reviewed as a critical element of protection, but which must also provide
commanders with sufficient freedoms and flexibility to C2 their formations/units.
346. EMCON measures can be found in the SOHB Section 2.6.1 - Countersurveillance control
measures (CSCM)/emission control measures (EMCON).
347. Further detail will follow in AFM Protection.96
96 For publication NB 2018.

Contents
CHAPTER 23
Assess
Assessment during execution Contents

348. Assess considers the unfolding situation against that • Assessment during execution
which was planned for and allows adjustments to be • Monitor
made to mitigate or exploit the identified change. The • Recognising variances
situation may change for a wide variety of reasons. • Evaluate
A3E and environmental activity will all have an impact • Measurement
and cause an under or over delivery of the plan. At • Determining progress
the lower tactical levels and during simple operations, • Gathering evidence
the commander may be able to conduct the assess
function with limited support. During more complex
operations, the commander will rely more heavily on the staff to monitor and evaluate the
situation to assist their decision making. The commander and staff assess current progress,
the probable outcome of the mission and likely impact on future operations as per Figure
23.1.
COMMAND
CONTROL
Monitor Evaluate
Update reconnaissance
and surveillance tasking Execution
Criteria of success
Apply
Progress
Situational Yes combat

CCIR awareness
No
power
Adjustment
Modifies information
requirements
Changes
Chan
ges
Creates new reality

start process again
CCIR commander’s critical informantion requirement
Figure 23.1. Functions of execution

Contents
Monitor
349. Monitoring. The operations centre staff will concentrate on the execution and
monitoring of operations. Plans staff are responsible for the analysis of any changes
identified. To do so, the plans staff must be briefed by the operations centre on any
perceived changes. This must take place away from the operations centre so as not to
hinder the on-going execution. Information such as imagery, specialist mapping, R2 and
other information received in the operations centre may be used by the staff to brief
those involved in planning. The commander could be included during analysis.
Recognising variances
350. Variances are the differences between the actual situation at a given point
during an operation and the forecast of the situation at that time. CIS can
display relevant information in the COP that highlights the existence of variances. In
such instances, the staff will use objective and subjective criteria to assess the COP,
to determine the existence of a variance, its significance and how it will affect the
plan. If necessary, the staff will update its estimates and will recommend COAs to the
commander. The commander will direct any necessary subsequent action to exploit
opportunities, or counter threats to the mission. If the assessment reveals no substantial
variance, the commander may direct minimal corrective action to ensure that operational
progress conforms to the plan. There are two forms of variance:
a. The first is an unexpected threat to mission accomplishment, or to the force. When

a threat is recognised, the commander must adjust the plan to counter the enemy
advantage and restore the initiative.
b. The second form of variance is the presence of an unexpected opportunity that will
enable the more effective accomplishment of the mission, or will lead to unexpected
success against the enemy. When recognised, the commander should alter the plan to
exploit the opportunity, if such an amendment can be made without compromising the
plan, or incurring unacceptable risk. The philosophy of mission command empowers
the commander to exploit opportunity, or seize the initiative within their higher
commander’s intent. In assessing variances, assessment must identify opportunities and
threats quickly in order to react effectively.
351. Changes within an operation. During an operation the commander and staff
continually ask ‘has the situation changed and how might it affect me?’ To identify
whether the situation has changed from that which was expected, the operations staff
must have a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent, any established success
criteria and a vision of how the commander sees the operation unfolding. A good way of
achieving the latter is for key operations staff to attend a ROC drill (covered in Chapter
19). The constant provision of information to the operations centre will enable the
operations staff to analyse the progress of an operation and identify when a situation has
changed or will potentially change and affect the plan. Staff should look for indicators of
variances that affect their areas of expertise; examples of change indicators are shown in
Figure 23.2.
Contents
Types Indicators
Answer to a CCIR
Change in mission
Change in organisation of unit
Change in command of unit
Change in capabilities of subordinate unit
Command
Impending changes in key military command
Receipt of a FRAGO or WNGO from higher CP
Effective enemy information efforts on civilians
Loss of contact with a CP or Comd
Jamming or interference
Identification of enemy main effort

Identification of enemy reserves or counter-attack
Indications of unexpected enemy action or preparation
Increase in enemy solicitation of civilians for intelligence operations
Identification of an IR
Insertion of manned surveillance teams
Disruption of education systems
Intelligence
Unexplained disappearance of key members of intelligence community
Use of enemy electronic attack
Identification of high-value targets
Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) launch
Answer to a PIR
Enemy Air or Avn (incl UAS) use
Identification of threats from within the population
Success or failure in breaching or gap crossing operations

Capture of significant numbers of enemy CPERS, enemy CP, logistic elements or
artillery units
Manoeuvre
Establishment of road blocks along major traffic routes
Success or failure of a subunit task
Modification of an airspace control measure (ACM)
Receipt of an air tasking order (ATO)

Battle damage assessment (BDA) results
Unplanned repositioning of artillery units
Identification of high-payoff targets
Fires
Execution of planned fires
Modification of a fire support coordination measure (FSCM)
Effective enemy counterfire
Climate changes or natural disasters impacting on the population, agriculture, or
industry
Interference with freedom of the press or news media
Indicators of illicit economic activity
Increased unemployment within the population
Interference with freedom of religious worship
Loss of civilian communications nodes
Negative effects of fires on civilians
Destruction of any place of worship by friendly fire
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Signing or implementation of peace treaty or other key political arrangement

Change in role of host-nation military force
Upcoming local election
Changes in key civilian leadership
Capacity building
Unexplained displacement of neighbourhoods within a given sector
Numbers of dislocated civilians sufficient to affect friendly operations
Damage to civilian infrastructure affecting friendly mobility
Loss of one or more critical transportation systems
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) report or other indicators of enemy

CBRN use
Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive device (IED) use
Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against civilians or friendly forces
Increased criminal activity in a given sector
Protection Increase in organised protests or riots
Identification of threats to communications or computer systems
Reports of enemy targeting critical host-nation infrastructure
Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities
Escalation of force incidents
Loss of border security
Significant loss of capability in any class of supply

Opening or closing of civilian businesses within a given area
Identification of significant incidences of disease and non-battle injury (DNBI)
casualties
Closing of major financial institutions
Mass casualties (MASCAL)
Receipt of significant resupply
Disruption of one or more essential civil services (water or electricity etc.)
Enemy contact on a supply route
Sustainment Answer to a FFIR
Mass detainees
Degradations to essential civilian infrastructure by threat actions
Civilian MASCAL event beyond capability of host-nation resources
Identification of significant shortage in any class of supply
Outbreak of epidemic or famine within the civilian population
Medical evacuation launch
Dislocated civilian event beyond capability of host-nation resources
Disruption of key logistics lines of communication
Changes in availability of host-nation support
Figure 23.2. Examples of change indicators
Evaluate
352. Evaluating. Beyond the immediate operation, the progress of an enduring operation
or campaign also needs to be monitored and evaluated. Although this longer-term
assessment is more usually conducted at the operational level, it does have application
at the tactical level too, particularly during an enduring campaign - COIN for example.
Assessment, a G5 Plans-led activity, is ‘the evaluation of progress, based on levels of
subjective and objective measurement to inform decision making’. Fundamentally,
assessment is a form of estimate which reviews the situation and allows a commander
to make judgements on the progress of operations and supports their subsequent
decisions. As with any estimate, the staff’s key role is to gather and analyse data to
provide evidence against which they can base recommendations for ‘what next?’ to the
commander. Units and formations may also be directed to make assessments in order to
inform their superior’s decision making.
Contents
353. Planning. As each required effect is identified in the planning process, the means by
which its progress is measured should be determined. Assessments need to be developed
using a comprehensive and enduring method that can be adjusted to meet a dynamic
campaign. This must not be a separate process to normal planning.
354. Focus on outcomes. All assessment should focus on outcomes (e.g. the quality of the
policemen trained and their ability across DLODs to conduct their role), rather than on
inputs (e.g. the amount of training the policemen have had).
355. Integrated approach. Some assessments will need to draw on (and feed) CJIIM actors’
judgements and measurements to give a broader and more balanced picture.
356. Principles of assessment. Assessment requires a structured and robust approach that
must be consistent and enduring. The four principles of assessment are:
a. Objective-led. The assessment should be derived from the objectives of the
operation otherwise it is likely to be irrelevant.
b. Useable. Assessment is not an end in itself. The data and analysis that it produces
must enable decision making.
c. Achievable. Assessment must be designed such that it can be delivered despite the
challenges of the operational environment.
d. Valid. Assessments must ensure that the data and analysis is valid and verifiable.
Measurement
357. Measurement should provide indications of change and effect. Measurements
should be considered across the physical and cognitive dimensions. While the physical is
often easier and quicker to measure, the cognitive dimension will often provide insights
of greater importance.
a. Qualities of a good measure. Measures should be able to measure progress and

relapse, and must be defined. A firm definition of the measure will improve the
consistency and continuity of the data thus improving analysis, e.g. low may be
defined as three IDF attacks a day, medium as five, high as seven and very high as ten.
In turn ‘IDF attack’ also needs to be defined - is it one round or is it 20? In addition,
measures must be:
(1) Mapped to a desired objective or effect.
(2) Meaningful.
(3) Measurable.
(4) Culturally and locally relevant.
(5) Sensitive to change.
In addition, measures should, if possible, be:
• Time and geographically bounded.

• Comprehensive.
• Cost and time efficient.
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b. Quantitative measures. Quantitative measures have the advantage that they are
easier to compare over time. It is possible to use visualisation and statistical methods
to examine them.
c. Qualitative measures. The qualitative approach allows a subjective assessment. For

example, a few large-scale attacks causing many casualties could outweigh a large
number of less destructive attacks. Such an approach also enables assessment to be
made with incomplete data or where it is difficult to obtain numerical data.
d. Qualitative/quantitative mix. Unsurprisingly, the best assessments use qualitative

and quantitative approaches.
Determining progress
358. Scales. Measures are usually scaled for clarity, e.g. low, medium, high, very high or
unlikely, possible, likely, highly likely. Scales should have an even number of scores
to prevent the tendency to choose the middle ground. For example, if assessing the
capability of an indigenous army unit, a scale might be:
a. Unable to operate as a unit.
b. Capable of low-level operations (up to platoon strength).
c. Able to conduct operations unassisted.
d. Capability across all DLODs.
359. Textual explanation. It is useful to record why a particular judgement was made. For
example, using the scale above, if a unit was judged as being a ‘three’, the reasons why
that selection was made might be ‘the unit successfully planned, executed and recovered
from four minor combat operations at company level in the last month with only limited
support from mentors’. This audit trail explaining the context helps ensure consistency
over time and as different SMEs contribute to the assessment.
360. Criteria and thresholds. If the effects assessment process is to work consistently and
efficiently there must be tightly defined criteria and threshold values for measures.
For example, a measure for attacks on coalition forces could be either a subjective
assessment, from low to very high, or an objective metric, defined by a number of
particular types of attack in Figure 23.3.
Subjective Criteria and thresholds
Red Very high No of IDF attacks/week >10
Amber High No of IDF attacks/week 6-10
Yellow Medium No of IDF attacks/week 2-5
Green Low No of IDF attacks/week <2
Figure 23.3. Assessment criteria
361. At the division and brigade level this activity is owned by G5 Plans, while at battlegroup
level the ops officer will take the lead. Identification of thresholds, developed in
conjunction with subject matter experts (SME) and supported by data, leads to a more
meaningful assessment. Thresholds should be reviewed periodically as they may change
as the operation develops, while noting that a change in thresholds will change the
assessment and the presentation of any results.
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362. Thresholds should be chosen so that the increments between thresholds are indicative of
similar levels of improvement or regression across MOE.
363. It is important to consider the number of thresholds for each MOE and their characteristics:
a. More thresholds mean greater granularity.
b. Different numbers of threshold values for different measures make comparison

difficult.
c. Thresholds may be status, rather than numerically related. For example: red – the road
is closed; amber - the road has been closed for more than 15 of the last 30 days but is
now open; yellow - the road has been closed for less than 15 of the last 30 days and is
now open; green - the road is open.
364. Baseline. Baselines are ‘criteria to which assessments of progress are referred to for
correlation’. Baselines represent an understanding of expected norms. Ideally they should
be based on pre-conflict levels.
365. Success criteria. Success criteria consist of statements, supported by quantifiable

objectives, which define success.
366. Analysis and reporting. When a set of measures and thresholds have been agreed and
data collection starts there is a tendency for the process to drive the output. Time must
be left for the actual analysis - examining the data, identifying critical points, trends and
relationships, and then offering recommendations, “what is this telling me?” and “so
what?” Measures may be combined or weighted to portray the relative importance of
measurements, but should be used with caution as doing so may skew perceptions.
367. Trend analysis. Measures will tend to fluctuate over time and so changes from one
reporting period to the next may not be significant. Trend analysis looks at the movement
of measures over a longer period of time and can identify seasonal variations, data
anomalies, and systematic errors and indicate true progress or regression.
368. Forecasting. As the operation progresses and the assessment matures, it should be
possible for the staff conducting evaluation to be able to forecast what will happen, given
the same activity, based on what has passed, and what might happen. Forecasting is an
important part of creating COAs to offer as options to the commander.
369. Presentation. Measures and the insights drawn from their analysis may be presented
in verbal form or written or tabulated. For ease of assimilation, some form of graphical
representation is usual. One of the most common methods is the traffic light system, as
shown at Figure 23.4. The inclusion of trend arrows to depict movement in the value of
the measurement is also useful.
Baseline Threshold 1 Threshold 2 Success criteria
Figure 23.4. Baselines, thresholds and success criteria

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Gathering evidence
370. There are a wide range of sources from which evidence can be gathered. They
will vary significantly depending on what is to be measured but the wider the range of
sources, the more accurate the evidence is likely to be. Sources include:
a. G2 intelligence reporting.
b. Battle damage assessment (BDA).
c. G3 Reporting.
d. Human factors research. Human factors research has developed as a primary means
of measuring psychological effect. It is provided through a range of complementary
techniques, the most common of which are:
(1) Opinion polling. Opinion polling provides an objective measurement of

perceptions. Once analysed it is a highly effective means of quantifying any shifts
in attitude. It must be conducted against an understanding of local perceptions
and expectations, and therefore establishing a baseline is particularly important.
Particular care must be exercised when framing questions and the method of
survey will also be key as different methods may generate different results. If the
poll is conducted by friendly forces for example, the perception of security will be
different to that if the poll was conducted via the Internet because of the physical
presence of the pollster. Political sensitivities as well as potential expectations of
material gain may also affect the responses to questions.
(2) Interviewing. More in-depth interviews can also contribute to assessments.
e. Secondary sources. Information already in the public domain can also be analysed.
Although it is often uncertain to what extent the media reflects or shapes public
attitudes, media output analysis may provide a simple method of gauging public
opinion.
f. Observation. Perhaps the simplest of all techniques is through observation. The

observer will bring their own perspective and bias to the measurement, but the
explanation of context which a human observer can bring can be extremely useful.
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CHAPTER 24
Decide
Command situational awareness Contents

371. Situational awareness and understanding. • Command situational
Situational awareness (SA) is gained by the awareness
collection, processing (analysis, fusion and • Identifying COAs
interpretation) and dissemination of data. Data • Decision briefs
arrives in the operations centre in two forms; that • Commander’s analysis
which is fed directly into the operations centre for • Commander’s decision
processing (e.g. an ISR feed), and that which is making
processed outside the operations centre (e.g. R2 from
subordinates). Both types of feed require processing
within the CP, cognisant of the CP and commander’s information requirements, and are
packaged for dissemination such that the information improves SA. An effective CP must
be able to filter information so that only that which is useful reaches the recipient. SA,
once analysed, provides comprehension, insight and understanding. Commanders will
use their intuition, experience and judgement to decide when they understand enough to
make a decision.
Identifying COAs
372. The operations centre will inform the plans staff of any identified changes.
Once briefed the plans staff will conduct an estimate. The planning timeline will depend
on when a decision is required. Pre-formatted templates can reduce staff effort. The
estimate will identify one of four possible COAs:
a. CONPLAN selection. An existing CONPLAN is selected. It may require adjustment

and is then issued as a fragmentary order.
b. Minor change. A minor change to the existing plan requiring existing OSW to be
amended and reissued as a fragmentary order (e.g. a boundary change).
c. Major change. A major change to the plan requiring new OSW to be created and
issued as an operation order or a fragmentary order (e.g. a subordinate mission
change).
d. Plan invalid. If the plan is invalid, the plans staff will need to begin planning again
and issue a new operation order (e.g. new orders from the higher CP).
Contents
Figure 24.1 displays a number of options that plans staff may wish to consider.
Tactical function COA consideration
Move communications nodes.

Move CPs.
Command Loss of C2 nodes capability.
Adjust themes and messages to support the new decision.
Revise recommended protected targets.
Modify PIR and other IRs

Update NAIs and TAIs
Update the intelligence estimate
Intelligence
Update the enemy situation template
Modify the ICP
Confirm or deny enemy MD/ML COA
Assign new objectives

Assign new tasks to subunits
Adjust BM
Use of obscurants
Manoeuvre Modify ACM
Make boundary changes
Emplace obstacles
Clear obstacles
Establish and enforce movement priority
Deliver fires against targets or target sets

Modify the HPTL and the attack guidance matrix
Fires Modify radar zones
Modify the priority of fires
Modify FSCM
Information activities Modify information priorities for employing information as combat power
Adjust measures for minimising civilian interference with operations

Recommend modifications of stability tasks, including employment of civil affairs
Capacity building operations and other units, to perform civil affairs operations tasks
Inform host-nation (HN) authorities
Coordinate HN SF to secure routes
Move AD weapons systems

Establish decontamination sites
Conduct CBRN recce
Establish movement corridors on critical lines of communications
Protection
Change AD weapons control status
Enhance survivability through engineer support
Revise and update personnel recovery coordination
Reassign or reposition reserve force elements
Prioritise MEDEVAC assets

Reposition logistic assets
Position and prioritise detainee assets
Sustainment
Reposition and prioritise engineer assets
Modify priorities
Modify distribution
Figure 24.1. COA considerations

Contents
Decision briefs
373. Any unexpected changes or approaching DPs must be briefed to the commander in a
timely manner. COAs resulting from the plans staff estimate will form an essential part
of this brief. The staff will present information and provide options to the commander,
from which the commander can direct additional analysis or makes a decision. Decision
briefs must be short, succinct and relevant. The format for a decision brief can be found at
Chapter 22, paragraph 36.
Commander’s analysis
374. Using their experience, education, judgement and intuition, and for planned decisions
the conclusions of the estimate, the commander will compare the results achieved against
their Intent. Recognition that there is variance between the actual situation and that which
was envisaged will drive further decision making and often lead to the development or
modification of the plan. Once the commander has been briefed on the situation and
conducted their own analysis, they can decide to:
a. Take no action.
b. Give operations staff more specific direction on areas to monitor more closely in
anticipation of a change.
c. Direct the plans staff to analyse the emerging situation and conduct an estimate to
recommend COAs.
d. Direct the plans staff to issue new orders or personally deliver orders.
Command decision making

375. Decision making. Having analysed of the impact of an identified change the
commander will make a COA decision based on the options available. The commander
should not hesitate to modify the plan or discard it altogether if it is necessary to
accomplish the mission (and save the force) or to achieve greater success. Commanders
at all levels must consider whether the benefits of modifications outweigh the costs of
disrupting the current plan, particularly its synchronisation.
a. Execution decisions. If the progress of the operation is meeting expectations, what

needs to be done next according to the plan?
b. Adjustment decisions. What must be done to exploit opportunity or restore mission

accomplishment?
376. The difference between execution and adjustment decisions lies in whether the plan
anticipates the situation requiring a decision. In execution decisions, the variances in
measurement of effect (MOE) and measurement of progress (MOP) are within limits for
planned actions such as coordination of manoeuvre or the initiating of a CONPLAN. For
adjustment decisions, the variances are greater than expected in the MOEs and MOPs. The
actions resulting from these decision types are shown in Figure 24.2.
Contents
Type of decision Situation Action
Execute planned actions

Minor variances from the plan. Comd or responsible staff member decides which
Plan working well. Variances planned actions best meet situation and directs or
Execution
in MOE and MOP are within confirms their execution. Staff completes follow-up
acceptable limits. actions. Decision may simply be permissive; FRAGO not
normally issued.
Execute CONPLAN
Comd or staff reviews CONPLAN (branch or sequel) if
Anticipated situation linked to
prepared; Comd receives assessments and recommenda-
established decision point.
Execution tions for modifications to plan and issues guidance or
Variances within limits for decision for further actions. Participation by Comd and
CONPLAN initiation. refinement of CONPLAN determined by situation and
time available. Staff completes follow-up actions. FRAGO
issued if modifications to CONPLAN are complex.
Unanticipated situation-friendly
success
Comd recognises threats or opportunities and determines
Significant unanticipated positive time available for decision making. Selects estimate
variances are to the friendly method. If no time for full estimate, outlines decision
forces’ advantage for mission on single COA for staff to refine or directs actions by
accomplishment. subordinates to counter threats or exploit opportunities
Adjustment Or and exercise initiative in accordance with higher Comd’s
Unanticipated situation -enemy intent. Normally will not attempt to restore plan. Verbal
threat WNGO or FRAGO issued to subordinate Comds. Staff
resynchronise the operation, modify MOE and MOP, and
Significant, unanticipated commence operations assessment in accordance with
negative variances are not to the new decisions.
friendly forces’ advantage for
mission accomplishment.
Figure 24.2. Summary of decision/action relationships during execution

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CHAPTER 25
Direct
Commander’s direction Contents

377. Direct. After the commander’s decision the staff • Commander’s direction
must distribute any new orders and associated OSW
as soon as possible. The challenge lies in making
sure that subordinates and operations centre staff are able to conduct the new actions
without disrupting those elements of the existing plan and battle activities which remain
extant. In a fast-moving operation, the potential for confusion is great. Plans staff must
consider carefully how best to disseminate the new orders. It will rarely be possible to
reconvene an O Group, for example. Rehearsals of CONPLANs during ROC drills in the
Prepare phase will aid subordinates’ understanding.
378. The authority of changed products is provided by a covering fragmentary order.

Verbal instructions must be recorded in the operations centre log. Version control is
essential and subordinates must be in no doubt which version of OSW products are to be
used.
379. The operations staff must also be briefed on the new orders and products as
quickly as possible. Given the dynamic nature of an operation, the operations staff
must anticipate the impact of the changes to existing activity. The new orders may lead
to a subsequent change in situation and the cycle will start afresh.
380. Assessment process summary. The process for evaluating progress within the
operation and longer-term assessment is essentially the same. In both, the commander
and staff set criteria against which to evaluate progress and then analyse and measure
events to judge whether the operation is progressing as expected or otherwise. If it is
not, the staff offer solutions to the commander based on their analysis, the commander
applies their judgement and a decision is reached. Within the operation, this process is
likely to be swift and based on the analysis conducted in the original estimate. Longer-
term assessment informs judgements made over a period of time and is most suited to
campaigns.
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CHAPTER 26
Staff process
Rules of engagement Contents

381. Rules of engagement (ROE). ROE are directives • Rules of engagement
issued by a competent military authority which • Consequence management
specify the circumstances and limitations under • IM/IX
which forces undertaking any military action will • Data command
operate. They are a means by which political control • The lessons process
is exercised over the use of force and ensure that
action taken by UK Armed Forces is legal. ROE
encompass political direction together with operational and legal provisions for using
force to inform commanders of constraints imposed, or freedoms permitted. The
issued instructions may be referred to either as an ROE profile or an ROE authorisation
(ROEAUTH). The absence of a particular authorising rule from an ROE profile denotes
prohibition. The reference publication for all UK ROE is JSP 398.
382. For coalition operations UK forces may operate under non-UK ROE. Where there
is a conflict between mission ROE and UK ROE the most restrictive interpretation is to be
applied. The UK inherent right to self-defence however, will always apply.
383. ROE implementation. An ROE profile containing serials from either NATO or UK
government sources will be issued. The issue of the ROE profile does not bring the
ROE profile into force: it becomes effective on receipt of a ROE implementation
signal (ROEIMPL). It is possible for more than one profile to be issued but only one
implemented depending on the situation. In this case the other profiles remain dormant.
All operational planning must remain within the constraints imposed by the extant ROE.
If action is proposed which exceeds the constraints then a change to the ROE must be
requested. Ownership of ROE issues remains with G3/COps.
384. ROE profile. An ROE profile will usually be provided for each operation as part of CDS
operational directive. However a specific ROE profile may not be necessary for operations
where the use of force is not authorised, other than the inherent rights to self-defence.
The profile comprises political policy indicator (PPI) and rules. The PPI and supporting
amplification gives command’s political direction on how the ROE should be applied,
including if new circumstances evolve and swift direction from higher authorities is
unavailable. For example, X-RAY - De-escalation, YANKEE - Status Quo, ZULU - Risk
of escalation is acceptable. ROE profiles where offensive effects are permitted will be
complemented by an operation-specific targeting directive to regulate full-spectrum
targeting activity.
385. Self-defence. UK law permits the use of reasonable and proportionate force in order
to defend yourself or others when you honestly believe that you are being attacked,
including anticipatory use of force in the face of a perceived imminent threat. This is
an inherent right which UK forces will operate under on all operations and includes the
right to use lethal force where it is reasonable and proportionate to the threat and there
Contents
is no other way to neutralise it. Lethal force should always be the last resort and cannot
be used in defence of property unless there is an associated imminent threat to human
life. Where the ability to use force in defence of mission critical equipment or locations
may be required then this must be specifically authorised through the ROE profile. UK
forces will always operate in accordance with the guidance contained in Card A (JSP 398
UK ROE) but should be aware that other nations will operate under their own nation
interpretations which may be more or less restrictive. The application of ROE and self-
defence to a tactical example is shown in Figure 26.1.
ROE 421/423 ROE 421/423
Showing Showing
hostile intent hostile intent
PID ENEMY PID ENEMY

Moving into Moving into
position to position to cover
attack withdrawal
INDIVIDUAL
ATTACK
INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP
PID PID ENEMY PID
NO OR GROUP RE-POSITIONING NO
ENEMY RETREATING ENEMY
PID ABOUT TO TO CONTINUE PID
(Target FOR GOOD (Target set)
ATTACK ATTACK
set)
PID ENEMY
PID ENEMY
Setting up
Setting up
weapons to
weapons to
cover
attack
withdrawal
Committing Imminent threat Committing

hostile act to life hostile act
ROE ROE SELF-DEFENCE ROE ROE

429 422/424 Inherent right, don’t need 422/424 429
authorisation
Duty to minimise harm to civilians
Figure 26.1. Application of ROE and self-defence in a tactical example
386. Application of ROE. Adherence to ROE does not in itself guarantee the lawfulness of
any action; it remains the commander’s legal responsibility to ensure that only the degree
of force which is lawful in the circumstances is used. It follows that all commanders and
personnel under their command are to be conversant with, trained in, and understand,
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and ROE. Ultimately, individual Service personnel are
responsible, under applicable domestic and international law, for their acts and omissions.
a. National operations (joint and single-Service). In authorising a UK national

operation, ministers will authorise an ROE profile drawn from the rules contained
within JSP 398. Such a profile will apply to all UK Armed Forces assigned to that
particular operation. This joint approach will enable commanders at all levels to
understand the rules applicable to all operating environments within the same
operational theatre.
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b. Coalition and multinational operations. Multinational operations create additional

complexity for UK Armed Forces personnel. Other partner nations may have differing
interpretations of what constitutes the legal basis for the use of force or apply a
different interpretation of international obligations. Where coalition ROE are put in
place, they must be applied unless the UK equivalent is more restrictive. Multinational
ROE, TDs, and tactical directions must be considered, as far as possible, in addition to
their UK equivalents. In these circumstances, the MOD will, where possible, seek to
harmonise any differing rules and to clearly explain any remaining points of difference.
Examples of such differences may include:
(1) National domestic positions on the use of force in self-defence. Some nations may
have more permissive domestic laws, whereas others may have a more restrictive
law of self-defence. Furthermore, some nations’ forces may also not be able to
use lethal force to defend others unless authorised by national ROE or may be
able to use lethal force in defence of property in routine circumstances.
(2) The permissibility of a given ROE (resulting from the interpretation of the legal
basis of the operation or the interpretation of specific ROE).
(3) National differences on the adoption and release of particular ROE.
(4) An example of the differences between UK and US interpretations in an operation

is depicted in Figure 26.2.
ATTACK ATTACK HOSTILE HOSTILE

IMMINENT ACT INTENT PURSUIT OFFENSIVE
OCCURRING
Issue: Note: US understanding of ”attack imminent” includes hostile act and intent
Note: UK understanding of offensive force includes hostile act, hostile intent and pursuit
Enemy Positioning to engage e.g. laying IED e.g. carrying IED Enemy PID enemy forces based on
engaging FF fleeing prior intelligence
Offensive force
Defensive force = no imminent threat
= actual attack, imminent threat, hostile intent, pursuit Act iaw ROE/TD/orders
USA:
Self-defence PURSUIT 429
Defensive force
= actual attack or imminent threat Offensive force
(immediate manifest and overwhelming) = no imminent threat
No authorisation required Act iaw ROE/TD/orders
UK: Self-defence 422/424 421/423 PURSUIT 429
Figure 26.2. UK and US interpretations of use of force example

Contents
c. Embedded or exchange officers and loan officers. UK Armed Forces personnel

deployed on operations with another nation’s forces or international organisations
may fall outside the normal C2 arrangements for UK Armed Forces. Though under the
C2 of other nations and coalition organisations as embedded or exchange staff they
are still bound by, and are individually responsible for compliance with, the law of
England and Wales and the UK’s interpretation of international law. They must abide
by the UK interpretation of self-defence and may only take part in the use of offensive
force which complies with the principles of LOAC, and which is directed against
target sets as authorised by the UK. For military personnel of other countries on loan
or exchange with the UK, where possible the UK ROE profile should be released to
providing nations so they can be assured that the ROE are drawn up in accordance
with international law. Until ministerial approval is provided for loan and exchange
officers to operate under the specific UK ROE profile, they may not be allowed to
deploy with UK Armed Forces.
d. Geographical area. In any theatre of operation, UK forces will generally operate

under the same ROE profile. If the operational theatre contains more than one joint
operations area (JOA), it may be necessary to issue multiple ROE profiles to reflect
differing missions, tasks or environmental conditions. Similarly, within the same JOA, it
is possible for different profiles to exist.
e. Non-operational deployments. UK Armed Forces may undertake non-operational

deployments overseas where UK personnel may be at risk (e.g. exercises in areas at
risk from terrorist attack). In such cases, and in the absence of a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) or status of forces agreement or arrangement (SOFA), MOD
would require liaison with the host nation prior to deployment to secure agreement on
a number of issues (e.g. carriage of arms). In such circumstances an arming directive
would usually be issued by CJO or the FLC, to regulate the carriage of personal
weapons. An arming directive may be issued by a deployed commander in support of
the ROEAUTH or as a separate document, such as a mission directive, based on the
CDS directive which permits arms to be carried.
387. Delegated authority. ROE provide delegated authority to sanction action under the
rules to specified commanders (typically, chief of joint operations (CJO), single-Service
chiefs, SJC(UK), Com JFC or a joint task force commander). Unless restricted in the ROE
profile, those commanders may further delegate authority to their subordinates to meet
the operational need for flexibility and tempo; the purpose being to ensure that the
decision can be made at an appropriate level of command to enable effective balancing
of the potential operational impact against the wider military and political implications
and risks associated with the activity.
388. Targeting - political and legal considerations. At every stage in the targeting
process, commanders and targeting staff must consistently apply LOAC, ensure that their
actions are lawful and operate within their superior commander’s intent and objectives.
In passing orders, subordinate commanders at any level must always act within the ROE
received, although they are not bound to use the full extent of the permissions granted.
Commanders and targeting staff must understand the linkage between the legal basis,
the ROE Profile and the TD as well as the principles of LOAC, as shown in Figure 26.3.
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CD directive
ROE TD
(JSP 398) (JSP 900)
WHAT
What you are permitted
Legal basis WHO & to do to the target:
WHY & WHERE
LOAC/IHL WHEN Casualty threshold
WHERE Who are
(JSP 383) Under which Weapon considerations
Campaign plan legitimate
circumstances a
Comd’s intent targets and
Political target may be
Mission where can
constraints attacked
Military necessity HOW
they be
How you are
attacked
permitted to
engage the target
Generally
LOAC/PM/CDE
Someone acting Specifically
with hostile intent Named target
Figure 26.3. Linkage of legal basis, ROE and TD
389. Targeting directive (TD). The TD for an operation will usually be issued concurrently
with the ROE profile as an annex to the mission directive. It will identify the target set
(the UK approved list of military objectives) and authorise the planning and conduct of
targeting operations involving the delivery of primarily physical effects by UK assets,
or those coalition assets utilising UK sovereign territory. The TD will also specify
the circumstances when potential targets should be subjected to a formal collateral
damage estimate (CDE) process before being approved for attack and will detail the
corresponding level of delegated authority for clearing potential targets
390. ROE request (ROEREQ). Any requests for changes to the profile should be submitted
up the operational chain of command by means of an ROE request (ROEREQ) set out in
JSP 398. If the requested change is granted a ROE authorisation signal (ROEAUTH) will
be issued down to divisional CP and then disseminated by means of a fragmentary order
across the command, as shown in Figure 26.4.
391. ROEREQ staffing. Every ROEREQ should follow the format given by higher and be
sent by highest priority signal. LEGADs will draft the ROEREQ, to do so they require all
information concerning to the justification for the change and the penalty if not granted.
Changes may be requested which are mission specific (i.e. for one engagement or task)
or enduring (i.e. for the rest of the operation).
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Event Action
Identify need to change ROE. Inform Unit G3/COps of request and penalty.
G3/COps issues to relevant parties. Including LEGAD, media, POLAD, G3, G5 and CIMIC.
ROEREQ drafted by LEGAD, after input by staff ROEREQ to include justification for change and military penalty
branches, if considered likely to be authorised. if refused. Strong justification and penalty required.
ROEREQ signed off by COS. ROEREQ sent by signal to higher CP.
ROEAUTH received from higher CP. ROEAUTH distributed to all units by FRAGO.
Figure 26.4. ROEREQ sequence
392. ROE release authority matrix (ROERAM). The ROERAM is a tool extracted from the
ROE profile and targeting directive and may be attached as an appendix to the ROE
Annex of an operation order. It lists all the approved numbered ROE serials and identifies
the level of approval authority for each. It is particularly useful where a commander
decides to restrict release authority for certain types of engagement or equipment to
a higher level than the targeting directive based on their judgement of the situation.
For example, approval for engagement of hostile intent/hostile act could be restricted
to company commander level or authority to deploy riot control equipment could be
restricted to battlegroup commanders.
393. Warning shots. Warning shots are the use of potentially lethal force without lethal
intent to warn individuals that their conduct is considered hostile and risks attack (and
can include ordnance delivered by indirect, air or aviation assets). The UK considers that
warning shots can be used in self-defence as a final escalation of force measure short of
direct lethal engagement. Using warning shots in self-defence requires the same honest
belief as required for lethal force that an imminent threat exists. Warning shots will
usually be employed where they are likely to have the required effect of neutralising the
threat with a lower risk of causing CD. For example, where a firing point is identified but
it is not possible to adequately assess the risk of CD. Where specifically authorised under
the ROE warning shots may additionally be employed to assist with forcing compliance or
to warn individuals whose conduct is considered hostile but does not pose an imminent
threat that they risk attack. There are serious risks associated with firing warning shots
as they have the potential to cause unintentional death or injury (to the target or other
parties). They may also lead an innocent person or friendly forces operating in the general
area to believe that they are under fire. The risks associated with the use of warning shots
must be properly understood and factored in to any decision to use them.
394. Collateral damage (CD) and collateral damage estimate (CDE). UK forces have a
duty under UK and international law to use only the minimum force necessary to achieve
the required effect. When conducting offensive strikes commanders must take all feasible
precautions to ensure that attacks are limited to military objectives, that the chosen
methods and means minimise CD and that any expected CD is not excessive in light of
the direct and concrete military advantage anticipated from the attack as a whole. When
acting in self-defence UK forces may use no more force than is absolutely necessary to
neutralise the threat. Using minimum necessary force does not mean that a commander
must escalate through all available weapon systems until the effect is achieved but
rather that, with the advice of their targeting experts, the most appropriate weapon
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to target match is employed. For example, a sniper and a 2000lb bomb may be able to
achieve the same effect against the target but one carries a much greater risk of causing
potentially disproportionate CD. When acting in self-defence if the 2000lb bomb is the
only effective option available to neutralise the threat then its use may be necessary, but
for a discretionary offensive engagement it may be disproportionate. Any use of lethal
force against a legitimate military objective may mean that significant damage to civilian
property and civilian deaths are unavoidable. The CDE is a formal tool used by targeteers
to inform the commander’s decision-making process by identifying the likely level of
damage and civilian deaths or injuries which will result from any strike. The methodology
and level of approval authority for a given level of CDE will be identified in the targeting
directive. The nature of an operation and the overarching political intent may lead to
additional restrictions (such as zero CD) being imposed when using offensive force.
All engagements under self-defence will be guided by Card A (see below) and are not
subject to these additional restrictions.
Consequence management (CM)

395. Overview. CM is activity undertaken to exploit or mitigate against a situation which
has occurred in order to preserve or improve the planned outcome. While operational
risk management (ORM) will identify risks in the planning phase, CM is concerned
with managing the positive and negative consequences of a force’s actions during
execution. It is a form of contingency planning and occurs most frequently to mitigate
against negative, unintended effects on A3E. These can appear in multiple forms, most
commonly collateral damage (CD), including civilian casualties, damage to property,
including dwelling and crops and damage to infrastructure. While the generic risk may
have been identified in the estimate, CM generally occurs once the detail of the event
is understood. The origins of the incident will usually be in friendly action and the
management of the consequences usually aims to mitigate the impact on reputation
and legitimacy, though there may be circumstances which allow exploitation of an
opportunity to enhance reputation and legitimacy. It is more usual for CM to be applied
during less intense and more enduring operations.
396. Aims. The aims of CM are:
a. Mitigate against/plan to exploit events through anticipation.
b. Manage the negative impact of events.
c. Exploit the positive impact of events.
d. Control the flow of information relating to an event
e. Learn from the event to encourage or prevent recurrence
Although CM is executed reactively, it can be prepared for in advance.
397. Stages. The four stages of CM are:
a. Preparation. Potential 1st, 2nd and 3rd-order effects are identified throughout the
operations process. These effects are formally explored as part of risk management.
These effects are then dealt with using the 5Ts. Not all of the risk will have been
identified in the planning process, nor will all of the identified risk have been planned
for. A generic CM plan or planning cycle may be prepared.
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b. Identification. During execution of operations, the impact of activity is reviewed

and evaluated. Established CONPLANs may then be enacted or a commander may
judge that the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a new plan. I&W identified
to support CONPLANs may be triggered, or an action or event may be observed or
reported which the commander judges requires management.
c. Response. Once the plan has been created, it is then executed.
d. Review. The final stage seeks to ensure that the plan is delivering that for which it
was intended; identify lessons and; disseminate solutions.
398. CM checklist. A checklist for CM activities is shown below:
a. Mitigate (pre-event).
(1) Can the activity be conducted differently - are the potential consequences worth
the reward? Reduce the impact/likelihood of the risk occurring
(2) Different weapon/FEs/resources.
(3) Different action to achieve the effect (consider non-lethal options).
(4) Increase SA prior to execution improving the chances of making the right
decision.
(i) Will we be able to conduct post activity assessment to establish what has
actually occurred?
(ii) Can we pre-message to shape the environment in our favour?
(iii) Can we pre-position assets to ensure swift post-activity mitigation?
b. Understand (post-event).
(1) Establish the facts.
(2) Record the evidence (witnesses, still and FMV, recordings of radio nets etc.).
c. Warn and inform.
(1) Up.
(2) Sideways.
(3) Down.
(4) Externally.
d. Investigate.
(1) In depth analysis of the event.
e. Follow-up.
(1) Tracking of atmospherics, casualties, reactions

(2) Post-incident mitigation (compensation, assistance)
(3) Exploit any successes
(4) Capture, analyse and promulgate lessons and solutions

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399. The CM board. Once an event occurs which requires CM a mini estimate should be
conducted drawing together the relevant staff from the CP to create a plan for dealing
with the incident. This will frequently take the form of a Board, usually part of a
formation’s SOIs. A suggested format is at Figure 26.5.
Ser Phase Task Responsible
ONE
1 Wkpr log/witnesses G3
2 FIR/2IR Adjt/CM staff officer
3 FMV/ISR evidence ISR

Situation review
4 Cultural impact and acceptability STABAD
5 G2 threat assessment G2
6 Balance of culpability COS
TWO
7 Opportunities G5
8 Identify desired outcomes Risk mitigation
9 Liability acceptance
THREE
10 KLE Info activities branch
11 Messaging/media
12 Info Ops
13 CIMIC
COA development
14 Ground troop action G3/5
15 Compensation G8
16 Local dialogue Info activities branch
17 Do nothing? COS
FOUR
18 Summary of perceived consequences Scribe
19 Conclusion and D&G Written record of decisions
20 D&G CO/COS
FIVE
21 Orders G5
22 Aftermath Information up, down, sideward CM staff/G3/G5
23 DTG of next review COS
Figure 26.5. CM board agenda
400. Recording. Particularly with events from which there is a negative impact, staff
should record all associated information and decisions meticulously. There will often be
significant attention from higher CPs and the incident may require investigation sometime
after the event occurred.
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401. Considerations. Key considerations to ensure effective CM:
a. Keep CM staff and any operational planning team (OPT) support to CM small to reduce
internally generated staff friction and confusion.
b. Leverage existing ‘influence’ elements via information activities.
c. Recognise need to engage ‘influence’ stakeholders/key communicators within coalition

forces and leverage their existing lines of influence into host-nation government, host-
nation security forces and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
d. Process for positive ‘influence’ exploitation of operations is very similar to process of

CM.
e. Provide support for imagery declassification where necessary.
402. Inputs and outputs. The table below illustrates the inputs to and outputs from CP CM
staff in managing adverse consequences.
Storyboards
Formation reports REL coalition forces
(5W, storyboards, REL HN govt
POR through COP) UNCLAS
Enemy IO Key communicator

CM staff/OPT
threat warnings briefs
Force CP
HN govt
HN sy forces
IO sensitive
NGO/UN
CONPLANS
Info release
Media monitoring Force CP media
PSYOPS
HN govt media info centre
Media officers
Plans
Crisis action planning
Investigations
Fact-finding and reporting
Follow-on release
of information
Confirming outcomes
and pivoting to a
positive news story
403. CM drill – crisis event. A CM ‘crisis event’ will be executed as follows:
a. Inform/advise – against notification criteria of the CM.
b. Establish OPT – lead CM staff.

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c. CP informs chain of command of crisis event or notifies of an CM CCIR:
(1) CIVCAS events (particularly if caused, or allegedly caused by CP).
(2) Collateral damage (CD) events or incidents (these are subdivided into ‘significant
CD’ and ‘minor CD’).
(3) ‘Spectacular’ or significant ‘complex’ attack or enemy successes.
(4) Insider threat events or attacks (so-called ‘green on blue’).
(5) Fratricide events (so-called blue-on-blue’ or ‘blue-on-green’).
(6) Mass-casualty (MASCAL) event within our AO.
(7) Events committed by force which are likely to offend cultural or religious beliefs.
(8) Announcements or news stories which may be perceived negatively by the

population of the host nation.
(9) Communication of isolated personnel (ISOP) events.
(10) Force caused road traffic accidents (RTA) or road traffic incidents (RTI).
(11) Civil disorder or unrest targeted towards UK/TCN/host nation.
(12) Actions of neighbouring forces that may be perceived negatively by the civilian
population or host nation within the AO.
(13) Political events (e.g. host-nation official being found in collusion with enemy).
(14) Local national with political connections detained/killed.
d. CM plan developed by CM staff with minimum requirement of 5Ws/FIR provided to

CM staff before return to base.
e. Whenever possible conduct on site mitigation.
f. On site Imagery sourced by CM cell.
g. Media staff commences media monitoring.
h. G2 coordinates post-operation monitoring of enemy/insurgent IO networks/reflections.
i. Media release coordinated by CM cell (as for deliberate operation). Units to inform
LN of the situation (facts only); media – lines to take (key facts within the first hour;
additional messages focus on positive host-nation security forces’ reaction, host-nation
security forces saving lives; CF mentoring sp to host-nation security forces’ showing
dividends.
j. Storyboards released and key communicators briefed.
k. Further tactical mitigation conducted by host-nation security forces/deployed units.
l. CM storyboard developed and CM strategy confirmed – fly away team dispatched

for fact-finding and mitigation if necessary. (Note – liaison requirement with AO
commander and need to secure the area.)
m. Follow-on engagement with host-nation security forces/host-nation government/

media/NGOs.
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n. POR written, approved by commander and sent to higher CP.
o. OPT stood down.
404. Templates. The following templates should be utilised in CM activity:
a. First impression report (FIR). The FIR is to be used to record 5W and immediate
action in response to a major incident requiring follow up CM activity. It must always
be completed in response to any potential/alleged/confirmed CIVCAS incident.
Event no: Ref no:
Component Unit Partner unit
DTG DTG of the report
Report approved by:
DTG of the event

When
Grid
Where
Outline of what took place/any fire received/any shots fired/reason for opening fire: self-
What defence or ROE? (If ROE which rule)
Assistance requested/recommendations for action by others

Actions taken by the unit after event
What’s next Future action planned by the unit
KLE planned: Yes/No; if no explain
Investigation planned: Yes/No/To be decided; ( if yes, by whom)
Direct reaction of local population

Additional
Any host-nation sy forces reporting received
information
Any MEDIA presence at the scene
Confirmed Unconfirmed
Casualty estimate
K(IA) W(IA) K(IA) W(IA)
(if known)
Figure 26.6. First impression report
b. Shooting incident review. For potential or confirmed CIVCAS incidents where there
are no ground to report the matter to Service police (SP), a shooting incident review
(SIR) must be completed. SIRs are legal documents and will be requested from the unit
involved by the higher CP LEGAD.
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Ref No:
Date (of SIR):
SHOOTING INCIDENT REVIEW (SIR)

[UNIT]
Detail
OFFICER COMPLETING ISR:
No: Name: Rank: Appt:
DTG OF SHOOTING INCIDENT(S): LOCATION OF INCIDENT(S):
BRITFOR UNIT/SUBUNIT INVOLVED:
UK Personnel Involved: See Flap Sheet at Annex B
Number Rank Name Posn Fired: Yes/No
BACKGROUND TO INCIDENT: Set the scene preceding the incident, including the J2 picture if relevant; don’t give a
summary of the event itself.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF INCIDENT: Describe the event in detail, particularly what happened just before the serviceman
opened fire and, having consulted him, exactly why he decided to open fire.
CONFIRMED/SUSPECTED DEATHS INJURIES (FF/EF/CIVILIAN): Names if known and details of the casualties and any
additional, relevant information.
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE/CASEVAC PROVIDED:
OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS:
SERVICE POLICE INVESTIGATION PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF SIR?:

If yes, DTG of referral to Service Police.
COMD’S RECOMMENDED COA:
i.e. Whether an SIB investigation in recommended. This will be the case if these are real grounds to suspect the
commission of an offence. If in doubt, consult Fmn LEGAD.
Reason
Name: Signature: Date:
On completion by the unit, this form should be sent to the land component CP LEGAD together with enclosures.
PROVOST ADVICE TO LCC:

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LEGAL ADVICE TO LCC:
DECISION OF LCC:
ENCLOSURES:
The following should be included, where applicable:

Sketch plan of scene depicting key players and event
Post
Flap sheet
Fire planning information
Patrol reports
Ops Cen log
Radio log
Watchkeeper’s log
SITREPS
NOTICAS signals and medical reports
List of witnesses (including civilians if known) and addresses
Material pertinent to weapon and ammo used
Weapon and ammo issue logs
Armourer’s report
Witness statements are not compulsory but should be produced if they will help describe the event, and the firer’s
mindset, accurately. As a minimum, all key witnesses should be thoroughly debriefed in order to provide an accurate,
informed description of events in the SIR.
Figure 26.7. Shooting incident review
Information management/information exploitation (IM/IX)

405. Army information vision. Collaborative exploitation of timely, accurate and trusted
information to the right place at the right time in a form that protects OPSEC and enables
better, more accurate decisions to be made.
406. Staff role. The staff’s role is to support the commander and the subordinate units and
organisations. The basis of the staff’s role lies in generating, moving and packaging
information such that it can be exploited by commanders and subordinates to make the
right decision
407. Definitions.
a. Information management (IM). IM is a set of integrated management processes

and services that enable and support the capability for collectors, producers and users
to store, locate, retrieve and transform information, allowing it to become the right
information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy the demands of the
commander or organisation.
b. Information exploitation (IX). The sharing and use of information to support

situation awareness, planning and decision making and the coordination of desired
effects.
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c. Information assurance (IA). IA is defined as the confidence that the information

within the Defence community is maintained reliably, accurately, securely and
is available when required. IA protects and defends information by ensuring its
availability, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. IA is vital for ensuring that a high
degree of confidence is maintained. This includes the provision of protection for and
the restoration of CIS.
408. The basis of decision making. The chance of making the right decision is increased
with the fidelity and accuracy of the information on which that decision will be based.
Information must be accurate, unambiguous, concise, clear, consistent and timely.
The origins (provenance) and status (such as historic or current, draft or final) of the
information must be known and it should be in a form which is accessible and usable and
stored and passed in a way that ensures it is protected. This requirement forms the basis
of information management (IM).
409. Roles and responsibilities. IM is every individual’s personal responsibility however

there are some specific roles that provide governance, control and guidance to IM and IX
within every CP, unit or organisation. The following roles are mandated across the Army:
Ser Role Div/Bde CP appointment BG appointment
1 Senior information officer COS 2IC
2 Unit information manager SO2 IM/IX RSO
3 Battle information manager SO3 G3/COps BG battle captain
4 Cell information managers Cell IC 1 x officer/WO
Figure 26.8. IM staff
a. The senior information officer (SIO). The SIO (normally the COS in a CP) is the
individual within an organisation or unit holding the critical leadership position
impacting directly on the efficiency and effectiveness of the staff. The SIO establishes
and governs local policy, and drives the information culture within the unit/
organisation. The SIO is accountable for the quality and provenance of the information
produced.
b. The information manager (IMgr). The IMgr advises and supports the SIO and is
responsible for ensuring that information is being captured, stored, distributed, used,
retained, and eventually disposed of, in accordance with legislation, MOD policy and
guidance as well as local instructions. The IMgr will be supported by the iHub, and will
oversee its operation in support of the organisation. Typical responsibilities include:
(1) Drafting the IM directive and related OSW.
(2) Drafting and maintaining IM SOIs.
(3) Conducting the daily OIM battle rhythm.
(4) Providing IM and IX advice to staff.
(5) Ensuring the archiving of key information such as the operational record.
(6) Ensuring the CP is compliant with the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act.
(7) Directing and tasking the digitisation support team.
(8) Communicating Information requirements to the G6 staff.

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c. iHub. The iHub is the focus for all iAdmin within a CP, and underpins effective IM.
The iHub’s task is to ensure the effective receipt, storage, distribution, archiving
and disposal of information in the CP. The iHub should be staffed with information
professionals:
(1) Information support officer (ISO). The ISO is head of the iHub. The ISO
will advise the SIO and IMgr on information related matters, and execute their
policies. The ISO may also be responsible for the maintenance of the registered
files and other records in support of the IMgr. The ISO may be supported by a
number of iHub information support administrators (ISA).
(2) Information support administrator (ISA). ISA work within the iHub. ISA are
responsible to the ISO for iAdmin activities.
410. The information cycle. The information cycle at Figure 26.9 illustrates the staff
processes during the lifetime of information. Each step in the process must be
understood by the staff and is explained separately below. The IM plan gives CPs specific
detail on how the information cycle will be managed.
Disposal Identify
Record needs Aquire or
Archive create
Delete
Exploit
Collaborative working
Visualisation Organise
Planning tools IM plan File naming
Metadata
Ways of working
Communicate
Web announcements
Email/chat Give access
Hyperlinks Permissions
Record management
Intranet/AKX
Figure 26.9. The information cycle
a. Identify needs. Once tasked, the staff must know what information is required to
develop the output. This should be directed by the tasking officer but may also form
part of a staff estimate. All staff officers should have an understanding of:
(1) Information exchange requirements (IER). IER describe what information is

required to be passed and where. They provide the requirement from which the
CIS branch establish the most appropriate method of transmission and receipt. In
some cases where networks cannot be established information may need to be
transferred on electronic media physically by person, vehicle or helicopter. The IX
staff in a CP should lead this work helped by each staff branch and should form
part of the IMIX estimate.
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b. Acquire information. Once information needs have been determined, the

relevant sources of that information need to be identified. The collection plan and
management of it can then be created. Information in both paper and electronic
format is received in the following ways:
(1) ‘Pushed’ from higher formation, e.g. orders or directives.
(2) ‘Pulled’ from other/higher/subordinate formations, e.g. RFIs or R2.
(3) RFI.
(i) Within each unit/organisation an RFI management process must be

established and managed (often by the ISO). All outgoing and incoming,
non-intelligence related RFIs and their answers should be processed centrally.
(ii) Intelligence RFIs will be managed by G2 in most cases and local procedures
will dictate how and who is responsible.
(4) Information requirements (IRs). CCIRs will be identified by the commander

during the estimate to support their decision making. Units and branches will be
tasked with informing the IRs.
(5) Reports and returns. Units supply routine information to the CP as part
of a battle rhythm. In most cases G3 are responsible for the collection and
dissemination of all R2.
(6) Information capture. All official correspondence, paper or electronic, received

or disseminated by a unit is to be captured by the staff via the iHub in accordance
with local procedures and ways of working.
(7) Principles. Requests for information (RFIs) are specific, time sensitive, ad hoc
requirements for information or products submitted to higher authority CPs to
support an on-going crisis or operation. RFI are generated to answer questions
that cannot be answered via assets organic to the formation, when info does not
exist within internal databases or when an RFI cannot be answered by resident
SME.
(8) Initialisation. On the delivery of OSW the iHub will publish an RFI tracker to
all the unit’s subordinate units. Units will subscribe to the tracker and will then
submit all RFIs to unit through this tracker. It will be managed by the iHub with
each individual cell in a unit CP responsible for answering questions directed at
their staff area. In turn the unit iHub WO will subscribe to the division RFI tracker.
A new tracker will be produced for each OSW.
(9) Submitting RFIs. It is inevitable that during the planning phase cells within
the battlegroup and unit CPs will require answers to questions that have arisen
during the receipt of orders. Prior to submitting RFIs, cells are to exhaust their
own resources and sources of information following which they are to check
the current list of RFIs and only then should an RFI be submitted. RFIs are to
be submitted using the RFI tracker as this is the singular version of the truth
and priority one RFIs may be lost among the CP tempo. Voice and free text are
reversionary means and are to be recorded by the IMWO.
(i) ID. To include the abbreviation of the unit, the OSW/mission number and the
serial (e.g. 1PWRR 01-001).
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(ii) TYPE. As per requirement.
(iii) QUESTION. Succinct question(s) prefixed with PRIORITY level. (e.g. (line 1) –
priority 1, (line 2) question).
(iv) ANSWER. To be answered by relevant SME.
(v) ELEMENT RESPONSIBLE. This should be directed to the relevant SME’s role
(e.g. G5) by the originator. The RFI manager will redirect if appropriate.
(vi) REQUIRED BY. As per the PRIORITY level.
(vii) PENDING/ANSWERED. The originator is to leave this blank. When the

RFI manager receives the question it will change from ‘blank’ to ‘pending’
(showing the unit that their higher are working on the question). Once
answered it will change from ‘pending’ to ‘answered’ (showing the unit that
the RFI has been completed).
c. Prioritising RFIs. The priority of the RFI needs to be stated in the RFI question column
at the start of the message. All RFIs are to be prioritised as follows:
(1) PRIORITY1: From commander.
(2) PRIORITY2: From COS.
(3) PRIORITY3: From staff or SME.
d. RFI tracker. To ensure that all RFIs are tracked and collated correctly all RFIs will be
input onto the RFI tracker on ComBAT and managed by IMWO. As information is
returned to the RFI manager the database will be updated and delivered electronically,
by hand or in respect of priority 1 RFI, also by voice. Individuals within CP requiring
access to the tracker are to subscribe to the published document. Thereby, allowing
the SME to answer the RFI directly. This includes the IMs. The IMWO will subscribe to
the higher CPs tracker.
e. Archiving and ORK. Once a mission has ended, or the RFI is no longer in use, a back-
up copy is to be produced and stored in the relevant back-up location. In addition, a
copy is to be moved to the relevant folder in the ORK.
f. Processing an RFI. On receipt of an RFI, the iHub will check current records and
previous RFIs for applicable responses. If no record is found, the iHub staff will check
the RFI format and prioritisation before seeking comment from the appropriate
member of the staff. If required, the RFI will be referred to the higher CP.
g. Organise - information administration (iAdmin). “iAdmin is the structuring

and handling of information, in adherence with the organisation’s conventions and
standards, to enable it to be stored, archived, located and retrieved efficiently while
ensuring its integrity.” iAdmin procedures are vital for setting the conditions for the
rapid exploitation of information by the staff. It is overseen by the iMgr and the iHub.
Eighty per cent of good IM is founded on iAdmin.
(1) Legal. The overarching aspects pertaining to legislation and security of

information are available on the CIO information portal, and specifically IM
Protocol 037 information legislation.
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(2) Information hub (iHub). The iHub is the central information node of any CP.
In some locations there may be satellite iHubs at the branch level. They not only
organise information but also track mission-critical information in, through and
out of the CP and conduct IMPEX (import/export) of information between the
various security domains.
(3) Storing information. Information must be stored in the right place, correctly
labelled, so that it can be found and used again. The staff needs to be familiar
with file structures, drives and databases, the methods of labelling information
and be able to work collaboratively. The IMgr should give direction on where
different types of information should be stored. Further guidance on storing
information is contained in IM Protocol 009, storing and filing information.
(4) It is important to have a consistent approach to folder structures at all

levels. One of the IMgr’s tasks will be to ensure that after any operation clear
instructions are given on what is to be done with the stored files pertaining to
the completed operation. The idea is that whole elements of the file structure can
be treated as one. The CP can dispose of all the information on closed operations,
opening a fresh, unpopulated folder structure at the start of each new one. An
example folder structure is shown at Figure 26.10.
Figure 26.10. Bowman file structure
(5) Labelling. It is critical to label information as fully as possible whenever it is

created or amended. Doing so improves the chances of it being found and
exploited. Labelling consists of two key elements:
(i) File naming. As well as getting the format right, it is important to make the
title meaningful. Staff should note that some partner organisations/nations
mandate different file naming formats. Local procedure should be confirmed
and applied. Further details on the UK MOD file naming format, including
authorised exceptions, are in IM Protocol 007.
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UK FILE NAMING CONVENTION

FORMAT
• Document and Record names must consist of three elements, separated by hyphens (-):
• Date-Title-Protective Marking
• Only the following characters are normally allowed:
• A-Z, a-z, 0-9, hyphen, round brackets, space, underscore.
• Where an application is unable to handle round brackets or spaces satisfactorily, use underscores instead.
• The three elements, consisting of mandatory (listed in BOLD UPPERCASE) and optional parts are described in the
paragraphs below.
• Date - This must show when the version of the document was created or amended. It consists of:
• DATE (in the format YYYYMMDD);
• An UNDERSCORE - this is only required if a time is included;
• TIME (in the format HHMMZ, where Z is the appropriate Time Zone).
• Title - consists of the following parts, separated by single spaces:
• DESCRIPTION - this should be meaningful but concise;
• DOCUMENT STATUS - this should be included where the status of the document is important or
requires clarification. Examples include `Draft’, Ùnder Review’, `Final’ and `Published’;
• VERSION (in the format “vx_y” where x represents the major version identifier, and y the minor one
- see Version Numbering, over) if required;
• ORIGINATING UNIT or ROLE, if required;
• FILE REFERENCE, if required.
PROTECTIVE MARKING (for further guidance refer to JSP 440 Part 3, Chapter 4)
• PROTECTIVE MARKING ABBREVIATION (‘O’, ‘OS’, ‘S’, ‘TS’), where;
• No protective marking – OFFICIAL – see fig 3.12.2 for further details
• OS = OFFICAL SENSITIVE
• OS_Commercial or OS_COMRCL
• OS_LOCSEN
• S = SECRET (see Fig 3.12.2)
• TS = TOP SECRET (see Fig 3.12.2)
• SPECIAL MARKING (eg Caveat, descriptor, privacy marking), if applicable
• HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS Some documents include handling instructions. If this is the case this needs to be reflected
in the e-mail title e.g. [subject] - Handling_Instruction:_Limited_Circulation-OS
• Limited circulation replaces the old LIMDIS. If transmitting limited circulation material all relevant e-mails (in and out)
should be kept for a minimum of 4 weeks - in case a leak enquiry is launched.
• Examples
• A short name complying with the standard would be:
• 20100913-Camp_Bastion_Air_Conditioned_Kennels
• 20100913-Camp_Bastion_Personal_Data-OS
• 20100911_1135A-FOI_and_T45_Contracts_Draft_V2-OS
• Anything OS must not be sent over the Internet or to external e-mail
• File extensions (the suffix at the end of a filename, such as .doc and .xls) do not form part of the name. They should
be appended to it as normal, and should not be modified from the system default.
VERSION NUMBERING
• In order to track the status of a document the following system should be used:
• The major identifier is the number of the version promulgated (or, for drafts, to be promulgated);
• The minor identifier is numeric for live versions and alphabetic for draft versions. (To avoid confusion with 0, O is
eliminated from the alphabetic sequence. Z is followed by AA, AZ by BA, etc.)
• Examples
• The first draft of a document is v1_A, and subsequent drafts are v1_B, v1_C.
• The first live document is always v1_0.
• Minor amendments for live are v1_1, v1_2, v1_3.
• Drafts of the next major release are v2_A, v2_B, v2_C.
Figure 26.11. File naming convention

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(ii) Metadata. Metadata means ‘data about data’. Although it can be applied
to information held in many formats (the notes people write on the label of
a CD case, for example), it is generally used to help the management and
retrieval of electronically held documents and files. Further guidance on MOD
metadata is contained in JSP 717.
h. Give access. Once information has been correctly organised and maintained, staff can
then gain access relatively easily. The iHub is responsible for setting user permissions
for the information storage architecture.
i. Communicate. Once organised and stored, information needs to be communicated to

other staff in such a fashion that it can easily and quickly be utilised. This can be done
in a number of different ways such as adding an announcement to SharePoint, email,
using hyperlink(s) to a specific recipient(s) or utilising the iHub to distribute that which
is deemed critical or having a large distribution. Another method of communicating
information is the setting up of alerts and subscriptions (where available). Alerts and
subscriptions benefit staff who wish to automatically be informed when information
is amended or added to a specific area where they have an interest (website or team
sites). Further guidance on alerts and subscriptions is contained in IM Protocol 021.
j. Exploitation. Information exploitation is the staff’s usage and reuse of information

that has been gathered from across the information environment in order to provide
situational awareness or inform decisions.
(1) Collaborative working. Collaborative working requires an iterative exchange

of information which progressively adds value and deepens understanding. Staff
work in a virtual, not necessarily physical, location to produce a common output.
Collaborative working increases tempo and efficiency.
(2) Information superiority. Information superiority is the capability to collect,

process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information, while exploiting
or denying an adversary’s ability to do so. Two key elements which will assist in
achieving information superiority are:
(i) Search. Efficient labelling, logical storage and forensic weeding of out of
date information, coupled with good search tools will improve staff ability to
retrieve the right information. Further guidance on search is contained in IM
Protocol 024.
(ii) Fusing and presenting information. Staff should consider how

information should be fused, packaged and presented depending on the
length of preparation time and the prior knowledge of the person to whom
it will be passed.
k. Information disposal. Information disposal is the process by which official

documents are destroyed, retained or transferred for recording. Some information
must be kept, irrespective of security classification or special handling caveats, for
future use by operational analysis and for legal purposes should the need arise.
Further guidance on information disposal is contained in IM Protocol 031.
411. Information assurance. Information assurance is staff operations that protect

and defend information commensurate with the threat by ensuring its availability,
confidentiality, integrity and authentication. Information assurance is vital to ensuring
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that a high degree of confidence is maintained in the information used. Information

assurance also includes the provision for the restoration and protection of information
communication systems.
a. Protecting hardware:
(1) Terminal security. Terminals should be located in an environment which

is protected both physically and in the electromagnetic spectrum to a level
commensurate with their classification.
(2) Access. Login passwords should meet local security standards, should not be
shared, should be unique for each login and should not be written down where it
may be accessed by unauthorised personnel.
(3) Data transfer media. Unauthorised media (iPods, personal USB sticks etc.)
must not be connected with computer systems. Data which must be transferred
between systems physically must be done so through the iHub where it must be
virus checked and to ensure that the classification of the data does not exceed
that of the hardware.
(4) Software. Unauthorised software must not be used on official systems.
b. Protecting the data/information. Data and information may be passed

electronically, physically or verbally. Staff must ensure that whatever method of
transmission is used matches the classification of the information transmitted. The
most common mistakes are inappropriately classified telephone systems, including
mobile phones, inappropriately protected mail systems, the use of the Internet and the
insecure disposal of data.
c. Classification. UK classifications are shown at Figure 26.12. When working in an

alliance or coalition, staff must check the meaning of classifications as they may differ
from UK definitions.
412. Operational record keeping. The aim of the operational record (OR) is to produce as
comprehensive a record as practicable of combat and other operations. The information
captured will inform future improvements in Army training, doctrine, equipment and
organisation. It also assists with a wide range of Ministry of Defence activity from the
validation of war pension claims, protection of units and commanders against litigation to
the compilation of official histories. The intention of the OR is to provide the structured
archiving and storage, of all important documents and information produced as part of
the normal routine staff process during operations.
413. At the formation level the COS is responsible for the OR. At unit level the OR
is the responsibility of the second in command. To be of genuine value the contents
must be accurate, honest and objective. Authors must avoid the temptation to exclude
unpalatable facts. The OR is to consist of:
a. AF C2118.
b. Completed cover (AF C2119) signed by the commander.
c. Annexes, compulsory and additional (listed on AF C2119).
d. Current instructions for the compilation of the OR are contained in formation SOPs.
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GSC Security Marking DOs, DON’Ts and MAYs Handling on

The list below shows all the allowable DII
Information (whether security markings for documents. (temporary rules
written or not) can Documents may also have handling pending updates
instructions. to DII)
three ways.
OFFICIAL No Security Marking DO – remember that unmarked information - Can be stored - Under GSC, there
Government - Any information that doesn’t meet the may still be sensitive and give it the protection in open MOSS is no such thing
information that does test for OFFICIAL SENSITIVE. you think it merits. And respect any handling teamsites. as UNCLASSIFIED
not meet the tests for Over 80% of MOD OFFICIAL material is instructions which have been added. information. It’s all
SECRET or TOP SECRET expected not to be marked, including DON’T assume that it can be freely shared - Save on OFFICIAL.
is automatically material that is sensitive to a degree, within and outside MOD just because it isn’t MOSS and - Documents without
but not enough to justify OFFICIAL marked. Think: Is it sensitive? Does it need Meridio as: NOT a security marking or
SENSITIVE. protecting? Against what? How? PROTECTIVELY handling instruction
In MOD there are three - Some other Departments will mark Provided you do this, you MAY: MARKED. may still be sensitive
Marking Options for such information OFFICIAL.
• Share it with people inside and outside MOD. and need protection.
what appears at the
top of an OFFICIAL • Email it to third parties over the internet or
discuss it on any phone.
- If you fail to take
reasonable care of
document. information, it will not
• Remove it from MOD premises. be a defence simply to
• Dispose of it with normal waste. argue it was unmarked.
• Work on it on personal computers (subject to
certain rules).
Marked: DO – give it appropriate protection and comply Can be stored - OFFICIAL SENSITIVE
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE with the handling rules. But always think in open MOSS information is similar
Information which in the wrong hands whether it may need stronger protection. teamsites. to the old RESTRICTED,
For example, DON’T – circulate it internally to
work or reputation of Defence or the more people than really need to see it. Save on MOSS
government more widely. Useful test – If you follow the appropriate rules you MAY: and Meridio as: - In particular, it is
of MOD at the national level? • Share it with people inside and outside MOD
on secure systems.
RESTRICTED. permitted, subject to
certain strict rules, to
• Discuss it on any phone, but not within

earshot of unauthorised persons.
email it over the internet
and work on it on
personal computers.
• Remove it from MOD premises, provided
you take care to ensure it is not seen by
unauthorised persons.
• Subject to certain strict conditions, email it
over the internet and work on it on personal
computers.
Marked: As for OFFICIAL SENSITIVE, but there are tight Must be stored As for OFFICIAL
OFFICIAL SENSITIVE restrictions on emailing sensitive personal in locked MOSS SENSITIVE
Plus one or more of the following information over the internet and working on it teamsites.
permitted ‘descriptors’ COMMERCIAL on personal computers.
(or CMRCL), LOCSEN, PERSONAL Save on MOSS
and Meridio as:
RESTRICTED.
SECRET Transitional Marking: As previously
CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL. for material CONFIDENTIAL becomes
May be used until further notice to a marking.
mark less sensitive SECRET information CONFIDENTIAL. - The technical
if it potentially needs to be shared with
other Departments or internationally. remains SECRET.
SECRET As previously As previously As previously
TOP SECRET TOP SECRET As previously As previously As previously
Version 18-03-2014
Figure 26.12. UK protective marking definitions

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Data command
414. Operational chat rooms (OCR). Chat services (also known as instant messaging)
are used extensively in operational theatres to provide a rapid means of exchanging
tactical information and assisting in developing and maintaining shared situational
awareness between multiple levels of command. In particular, OCRs enable rapid and
accurate transfer of information into other applications. Consequently chat services
are increasingly the tool of choice for watchkeepers and staff engaged in complex
operations. However, commanders should refrain from using them. There is no
replacement for commanding by voice using CIS. Chat services such as B-CHAT and
JCHAT are used in conjunction with traditional voice command nets and with command
and control applications (C2PC, JADOCS).
415. Overview of CHAT software. At a basic level chat applications provide a means of
online typed communication between two or more users within a shared communications
facility. Modern chat applications can also provide a number of other facilities to users,
e.g. file exchange, white-boarding, remote desktop access, and video conferencing
or Adobe Connect. Operation of the BCiP 5.6 OCR is covered by the ComBAT User
Handbook (UHB).
416. System configuration. The numbers of OCRs active should be the minimum necessary
and they should not be allowed to proliferate without control. A suggested default list is
as follows:
Ser Organisation Ser Organisation Notes
1 G1 8 Fmn Recce
Additional OCRs
2 G2 9 ADSR may be required,
dependent on the
3 G3 Ops 10 Joint Fires situation. These
4 CSS 11 ENGR may include convoy
control and CPERS
5 G5 12 TUAV Ops handling for
example.
6 G6 13 LEGAL
7 ISR
Figure 26.13. Suggested operational chat rooms
417. Usernames. Usernames are to follow the format UNIT-POST. The user name is to be
created in a uniform manner with military unit identifications (MUID) across all systems
(ComBAT/LAN and OCR). A printed label is to be placed prominently on each terminal. A
silent user should be suffixed with SILENT. The word call sign or C/S can also be used to
refer to a username. Examples of usernames are below:
a. CP3UKXX-COS (SILENT) - the user name for COS of CP 3 (UK) Div who is a silent user.
b. CP3UKXX-G3_WKPR - the username for the G3 wkpr for CP 3 (UK) Div.
418. Silent user. A silent user is one who is logged into an OCR but only to monitor the
exchanges that take place or to be able to easily review past exchanges. A silent user
does not normally take part in any conversations or exchanges within the room, nor will
they be expected to monitor the room constantly while they are logged on. All members
of the common group will have silent user rights.
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419. OCR traffic. Suitable and unsuitable message traffic are listed below:
a. OCR should be used for:
(1) Short SITREPS and INCREPS.
(2) Updates to tactical situation.
(3) Real-time coordination of fires and manoeuvre forces.
b. OCR should not be used for:
(1) Distribution of routine R2.
(2) Distribution of formal orders and the distribution of OSW.
(3) Operator chatter.
420. Time stamping and referencing messages. All messages sent by a user within an OCR
should be time-stamped (this should happen automatically). Reference by a user to a
message sent earlier generally uses the timestamp and the originator’s username. Other
methods of unambiguously referring to earlier messages may be used.
421. Text procedures. Text procedures (TP) are the rules and conventions to be followed
when entering text into an OCR. TP is analogous to voice procedure used on combat net
radio. Figure 26.14 outlines the abbreviations to be used.
Ser Text Meaning Notes
30 millimetre calibre ammunition Ammunition fired from air and Avn, e.g.
1 30MM
A10 and Apache.
‘ACKNOWLEDGE’ The originator When sent without reference to a particular

requires positive acknowledgement of user or users, all users are to acknowledge
2 ACK the message sent from the addressees. message.
One or more users may be directed to
acknowledge.
3 AD 40-42 Sea King formation call signs (Adonis).
4 AH Attack helicopter.
5 AL03 Flying programme (flypro) version.
6 APX Approximately.
Abbreviation for OUT. Used to mark the OUT TO YOU may be used to indicate
7 AR end of a reply not requiring any further change of user to whom a message is being
acknowledgement. directed.
8 ATT At this time.
9 BDA Battle damage assessment.
10 C/S Call sign.
11 CANCEL MY (DTG) Reference my message at (DTG), cancel.
12 CAS Close air support.
13 CBA Closed before air. TIC closed before air arrived on scene.
14 CD Collateral damage.
15 CFA Close for air.
16 CIVCAS Civilian casualties.

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17 CLP Combat logistic patrol.
18 CPD Compound.
19 COY Company.
Command wire improvised explosive

20 CWIED
device.
Predator/Reaper formation call sign

21 CY
(Cody).
22 E East.
23 EAMR Emergency air movement request. Emergency air mission report.
24 EF enemy forces.
25 EYES ON Tracking.
26 FAM Fighting age male.
27 FF Friendly forces.
28 FLYPRO UPDATE Update to the flying program.
29 FOA Follow on air.
30 FP Firing point.
31 FRT Freight.
32 FST Fire support team.
33 G2W Good 2 way. Good communications with ground call sign.
34 GD Grid.
Hermes 450 formation call sign (Green

35 GE
Eyes).
36 GR Grid reference.
37 GT Good test.
38 HLS Helicopter landing site.
39 HRF High readiness force.
40 HWY Highway.
41 IASR Immediate air support request.
42 IDF Indirect fire.
43 INS Insurgents.
44 INT Intelligence.
45 IRT Incident response team.
46 ISO In support of. Used in SITREP or medical missions.
47 IVO In vicinity of.
48 JTAC Joint tactical air controller.
49 K1A HELLFIRE. Fragmentation missile.
50 K1N HELLFIRE. Blast missile.
51 KIA Killed in action.

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LEAVING ROOM The user will leave the room immediately

52
NOW/AT DTG or at the DTG stated.
MINCOM lifted. This may be directed to one or more specific

53 LIFT MINCOM
users.
54 LN Local national.
55 LOC/LOCN Location.
56 MAM Military age male.
57 MAOT Mobile air operations team.
Message for forwarding on to a who is

58 MF
not a user of the room
MHG / MHH AH request number. Used to identify the number assigned to the
59
(NUMBER) AH request.
Only essential traffic is to be sent on this Normally MINCOM is imposed or lifted by

60 MINCOM
means. the moderator. See serial 6 above.
61 MM(SW)12-09A-Z Med mission identification. Used to identify the medical mission.
62 MOL11-13 Merlin formation call signs (Molten).
MOVING TO ROOM I am moving to room roomname.

63
roomname
64 N North.
65 O/H Overhead. Apache is overhead.
66 PAX Passenger. To abbreviate people.
67 PID Positively identified.
68 PL Platoon.
69 PL2 Please.
70 POI Point of injury.
71 POO Point of origin.
72 PRI REQ Priority banner. Requesting AH or close air support (fast air).
73 PROPOSED PLAN Proposed plan for and EAMR or IASR.
Play time (time on task - fuel load

74 PT
dependent).
75 PTL Patrol.
76 QRF Quick reaction force.
77 R Your message is understood.
78 R/S 20 Ready state 20mins. From shout to time of lift is 20mins.
79 R/S 60 Ready state 60mins. From shout to time of lift is 60mins.
80 RD Road.
81 REF MY (DTG) Refer to my message sent at (DTG). Other references may be used if appropriate.
82 RGR Roger.
83 RIP Relief in place.
84 ROE Rules of engagement.

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85 ROLEX Delay to aircraft.
ROOM CLOSING This room will close at (DTG).

86
AT DTG
87 ROZ Restriction operating zone.
88 RTB Return to base.
89 RTE Route.
90 RV Rendezvous.
91 RW44-46 Lynx ATC call signs (Rockwood).
92 S South.
93 SAF Small arms fire.
94 SAFIRE Surface-to-air fire.
Abbreviation for STAND BY indicating a

95 sb requirement to wait for information or
action to follow.
96 SECT Section.
97 SH Support helicopter.
98 T Test.
99 TACP Tactical air control party.
Figure 26.14. OCR abbreviations
422. The issue of orders and tasking of forces via OCR. The use of OCR to issue
immediate orders or direction to subordinate CP and units is perfectly valid, and has the
advantage of providing an auditable record of the orders issue. However OCR should
not be used in place of the normal issue and distribution channels for warning orders,
operation orders, fragmentary orders and other OSW.
423. Classification. An OCR and the text contained within the rooms used takes on the level
of security classification of the network on which it is hosted. Text extracts taken from
OCR logs will retain the classification of the original system, but can be declassified in the
normal way. All users of an OCR must be appropriately cleared for the network.
424. OCR moderation. Use of OCR will follow the policies laid down in the MOD acceptable
use policy for email. Abuse includes using the room for unauthorised purposes, exchange
of inappropriate material, security breaches and violations of OCR net discipline.
a. Moderation is the process to ensure that the room is being used in a disciplined and
professional manner and in accordance with its function. All OCRs are to be moderated
and have a moderator. A moderator equates to the control or “0” C/S on a voice net.
Normally the moderator will be the main user in the CP that owns the OCR and is
responsible for the correct operation of the room. The moderator must be active and
monitoring the OCR while it is open.
b. All OCR will be monitored. Data will be saved at the end of each shift for operational
record keeping (ORK) purposes by the iHub staff.
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425. Display of OCR. In certain circumstances it may be possible and desirable for open OCR
to be displayed or projected to a large screen to enable a wider number of staff to view
the exchange of information in the OCR. However consideration will need to be taken
over the classification of the information being displayed.
426. Back-up of OCR. The iHub staff is to ensure that all chat text is copied to document
format and filed in the LAN folder structure at the end of each shift.
427. OCR record keeping. The various chat software applications in use have the ability to
generate logs of all traffic sent over a particular time period. This information must be
incorporated into the ORK (Army Form C2119). Individual OCR logs should be included
as appendices to the watchkeeper log annex and the log files labelled with the OCR
name and period covered. Both a soft and a hard copy should be retained. (The hard
copy should also be printed off on a daily basis and included with the relevant paper
watchkeeper log. These logs should be included within the paper Annex A to the
operational record). The CP that owns the OCR is primarily responsible for the operational
recording of OCR log files. Copies of these log files should be sent where possible to
subordinate user CP for incorporation within their own operational records. Examples of
the file names to be used for OCR logs are shown below:
a. Format. YYYYMMDD-OR_An-OCR_LOG-OCR_name-period_covered-unit-
classification.
b. Examples. 20170221-OR-C1-OCR_LOG-CP3XX_G3_OPS-01-21FEB17-CP3UKXX-S.
The lessons process

428. Introduction. Learning lessons is a non-discretionary activity; the key purpose of the
lessons process is to improve current operational performance and to contribute to force
development (the transformation of the Army to meet future threats). It also serves to
save lives on operations and in training. Operations are demanding and evolve against
a mutating threat and the Army needs to have a flexible and robust mechanism that
identifies both good practice and lessons which can be addressed quickly and robustly.
A successful lessons process requires an agile mind, willingness and determination to be
self-critical, openness to debate and an adaptive, flexible framework that allows change.
The requirement is to cement a learning culture in the Army’s psyche and, crucially, gain
buy-in and support from the chain of command.
429. Background. The Chilcot Inquiry highlighted the need for a more strategic approach
(not day-to-day) and a culture of constant and consistent learning, including the ability to
learn from history. This requires leaders to entertain alternative viewpoints, champion the
importance of critical thinking, problem identification, and actively listen. It also requires
that the organisation’s members must be willing to critically appraise and constructively
challenge the status quo, to accept and learn from mistakes. In overall terms, a more
strategic approach should: place greater emphasis on the role of informed, evidence-
based analysis, critical thinking and challenge in decision making and risk management;
using a systems thinking/approach (seeing an organisation as a system of bounded
objects rather than a linear process) and subsequently sharing of that which has been
learned.97
97 The Report of The Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary, PS MOD blog: Learning from Chilcot https://civilservice.blog.
gov.uk/2016/09/08/learning-from-chilcot/ and Transforming Defence forum: http://pppaintranet.chris.r.mil.uk/blogs/
transformingdefence/
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430. What is a lesson? In simple terms, a lesson is an experience, example, or observation

that imparts beneficial new knowledge or wisdom and can be analysed to produce
recommendations and/or actions. A lesson may be identified from a one-off incident
or as the result of trends observed over a prolonged period of time. The method for
recording lessons, observations or good practice is the same.
a. Lesson identified (LI). A lesson identified is an observation that has been analysed
in context and identified as an issue where a change(s) for beneficial effect is needed
and that/those recommendation(s) has/have been accepted. Lessons identified are
sometimes known just as ‘lessons’.
b. Observation. An observation is a statement based on something one has seen,

heard, or noticed that is believed to impart beneficial new knowledge or wisdom. It is
something that can be analysed to produce recommendations.
c. Good practice. A good practice is an observation that has been analysed and
accepted as an effective and useful way of doing something. A good practice does not
necessitate change throughout the organisation, but provides a recognised, beneficial
and immediately useable option for operating, completing a task or carrying out an
action.
431. The LDOLP (land domain operational lessons process). The LDOLP is one of the
Army’s directed lesson processes, the purpose of which is to describe how the Army will
drive the learning of lessons from and for operations. The purpose of the LDOLP is to
enable UK land forces to learn and adapt rapidly from operational experience, in order to
improve performance on operations, contribute to performance and risk management,
and inform force development. The process identifies good practice, highlights shortfalls,
initiates and tracks to conclusion action to make improvements across all lines of
development and disseminates results. The system relies on thorough reporting from
the theatre of operations and broader ‘capture’, e.g. from defence academia, rigorous
analysis, effective prioritisation, faultless tracking and acceptance of responsibility by
those with the authority to make adjustments. In general, the LDOLP follows the NATO
lessons learned process against four stages: capture, analyse, resolve and (in addition)
exploit. After a lesson has been resolved, activity must take place to assure that the
lesson identified (LI), either good practice or lesson, has been learned. The LDOLP is
shown diagrammatically at Figure 26.15
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LDOLP in detail
ASSURANCE
Newsletters
LI LL
IDR
QPRR
POR CAPTURE ANALYSE RESOLVE EXPLOIT Thematic
Lesson identified
Observe and Root cause Action plan + Action body
Lesson learned
studies
VTC document Report
Publish Evidence for
MXS MJP DLIMS LDLWG Share
DLODs
NMR Study
Inital analysis Lessons Manage Authorise Roadshows
ODCR Observations action closure Good practice
LAs Good practice
POIs TTPs
AKX
Theatre visits ALSFG
PREPARE, PROJECT, OPERATE, PROTECT, SUSTAIN, COMMAND, INFORM, RECOVER
Figure 26.15. The land domain operational lessons process
432. Activity. The LDOLP is bounded by direction and force generation/preparation activity
on one side and governance and assurance activity on the other. In outline, the capture
of observations and their initial analysis is conducted by deployed force elements – IAs
and collective – leading to a mission exploitation symposium (MXS), the sum of which
is then subject to further analysis via an OpLT-led military judgement panel (MJP). LI
are resolved by the appropriate action body and along with good practice potentially
exploited, managed by the OpLT. Follow-on revalidation of selected lessons previously
determined as having been learned is undertaken by way of assurance. The flowchart
as shown represents the most comprehensive and deliberate approach (see paragraph
436 for abbrivations). However, the basic process needs to be executed at speed if the
operational imperative dictates. The abiding principle is that lessons should be resolved
at the lowest practical level, with the chain of command judging where the results need
to be shared more broadly or elevated. A more detailed description of the LDOLP at Field
Army (FdArmy) level can be found in the LDOLP FdArmy Standing Order (FASO), Annex B,
which all operational lessons responsible staff are to understand in detail.
433. Lessons sources. Lessons may be derived from operations, but also from training,
exercises, experimentation, accidents, incidents and Service inquiries. Our allies, the other
Services and indigenous forces are also important sources of lessons, as are historical
research and academia. The production of post-operational, exercise and training
reports are mandated, but equally incidents must be reported to the Accident Incident
Notification Centre (AINC) which may then direct the Land Accident Investigation Team
(LAIT) to produce a report with recommendations. The key UK methods for identifying
lessons are:
a. Mission exploitation (MX). An important part of learning operational lessons is

mission exploitation (MX). MX combines a number of events and reports to provide
a consolidated grouping of lessons from the operational deployment of a specific
formation or brigade. The key stages and events are:
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(1) Mission-specific training review. This is a review at the end of MST for each
deploying formation, run by Field Army Training Branch.
(2) Initial deployment report (IDR). Each deploying formation is mandated to

provide an IDR within six weeks of TOA on operations.
(3) The post-operational report (POR). Each formation is to produce a POR, to be

with PJHQ and Field Army Lessons by the date of TOA to their successors at the
end of their tour, or departure from theatre. PORs are also raised following single
operational events.
(4) The formation-led, lessons team-facilitated, mission exploitation

symposium (MXS). The MXS is an event during which a number of syndicate
discussions and more detailed deep dives are held, aiming to extract maximum
operational experience from the commanders, staff and soldiers of the returning
formation and units.
(5) Interviews. The lessons team will conduct post-operational interviews of all
commanders at OF-4 and upwards, and key OF-3 commanders and staff such as
formations’ COS.
434. Training exploitation symposium (TXS) and post-exercise reports (PXR).

Formations and units undergoing training are mandated to provide Field Army Training
Branch with their PXRs upon exercise completion. Parent formation headquarters are
strongly encouraged to hold periodic TXS to exploit the full value of training across
and beyond the formation. Field Army Training Branch also periodically conducts TXS,
normally following a training or pan-DLoD theme such as return to contingency.
435. Learning accounts. Any unit experiencing an incident should raise a learning account
(an example is in Annex B of the FASO), which seeks to explain the incident to a wider
audience and propose ways to mitigate the risk of its reoccurrence. The LA describes the
context for the incident and critically provides recommendations to both the in-theatre
CP and the rest of the land domain as appropriate. This allows measures to be taken
to reduce the chance of, or effect of, reoccurrence. The LA should provide an honest
assessment of the reasons for the incident. The authors may not wish to apportion blame
to named individuals, but they should certainly not hide the truth - other soldiers’ lives
may depend on the information that is provided in the LA.
436. Near misses. Any unit experiencing a near miss should raise a near miss report. A near
miss is defined as event or situation that could have resulted in an accident, serious injury
or other direct negative impact to UK forces or others, but did not, either by chance,
circumstance or through timely intervention. Possible examples include, but are not
limited to, potential friendly fire incidents, weapon misfires and equipment failures.
As with a learning account, a near miss report describes the context of the near miss,
identifies issues and offers recommendations to both the in-theatre CP and the rest of
the land domain. This allows trends to be identified and measures to be taken to reduce
the risk of recurrence.
437. Other areas. As well as the formal LAs, PORs, IDRs and PXRs, other reporting may assist
in the identification of lessons.
438. Lessons from others. There is much to be learned from the experience of partner
nations and allies, captured by UK-deployed force elements, e.g. IAs in multinational
headquarters, as well by the OpLT from partner nations’ lessons teams. The lessons
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evidence base can be strengthened by the contribution made from deeper historical
analysis drawing on previous military operations, via the OpLT’s own historical analysis
cell and the Army’s Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR).
439. Lesson cycle. The LDOLP utilises a three-lesson ‘loop’ methodology. The three loops are
closely linked, but help to identify the speed in which a lesson should be addressed. They
are illustrated at Figure 26.16, with example end/ways/means for operational lessons
annotated. Agility is required and will dictate which loop is most appropriate to expedite
lesson resolution. Lessons are prioritised with a timeline for resolution determined and
progress toward it reported.
LDOLP lesson loops
Time Short lesson loop Land domain operational lesson process

(in theatre) (UK driven)
Event
Immediate Days-weeks Future force

Save life Follow-on force Institutional change
Figure 26.16. Lessons loops
440. The learning loops. Referred to as the ‘learning loops’ in academia, not to be
confused with lessons loops discussed in paragraph 429. Academic study of various
business models and companies has identified ‘triple loop’ learning as the best means
of reinforcing lessons learning; and the principle is being applied within Defence for
organisational learning. This will be expanded upon in the AOLP/ALP. The LDOLP
undertakes all three learning, as well as lessons, loops:
a. Single loop learning (following the model). Single loop learning (reacting) is
based on reacting to an event, action, unintended consequence or deviation from a
plan that requires either reinforcement of good practice or changes in behaviour, drills
or TTPs to address a deficit in performance.
b. Double loop learning (changing the model). Double loop learning (understanding
and improving effectiveness) questions underlying assumptions behind actions and
behaviour. It examines the reason why single loop changes were required, identifying
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root causes and whether more systemic changes to an approach, plan or capability are
required to improve effectiveness. This loop asks the questions ‘are we doing the right
things, could we be doing things differently and/or doing different things’? Lessons of
this nature generally require an element of elevation or greater resource, support, or
authority.
c. Triple loop learning (learning about learning). Triple loop learning (transforming)
is operating at a higher level; it develops the organisation’s ability to learn from
its learning, answering the question ‘what have we institutionally done well, what
can we do better, and what we can learn from that’? Triple loop learning may
therefore suggest changes in our thinking, our operating philosophy, principles and
environment, as well as to learning processes and training. This is true continuous
improvement.
441. Responsibilities. Formation headquarters are responsible for the learning, sharing and
elevation of lessons within their commands. 3 (ARRC), 2 and 1* headquarters operational
lessons facing staff within formation headquarters are contained within Annex E of the
FASO. Their duties should include oversight of the lessons process within the formation
for lessons that are within its authority and resource to resolve, drafting of related
reports and returns and to act as the formation DLIMS gatekeeper. Headquarters tasked
as 2* coordinating authorities for specified operations are responsible for support to
LDOLP activity against the ARO, currently as shown in the table below:
Op/Cts type Coord HQ Remarks
UK Ops SJC(UK)
PJOBs and overseas garrisons JCOS
HQ 1 Div, HQ 3 Div, HQ FTC, HQ PJHQ/HQ ARRC

Ops
JHC, 16 Bde
Contingency and readiness HQ Fd Army Includes interoperability activity.
Defence Engagement HQ 1 Div
442. Lessons capture during the operational process. Lessons can be identified
throughout the operations process. They are identified either proactively (during the
planning phase) or reflectively in the preparation or execution phases, for which time
should be provided to pause and reflect/review the organisation’s progress. Lessons
capture can be conducted either as a group function (such as a debrief or after-action
review) or through individual action or interviews. Examples of where lessons can be
identified during the operation process are:
a. Planning. Proactively hunt out lessons from previous experience in a particular

area. This could be from history or current operations (including from others such
as out coalition allies) in order that they can be included during an estimate or later
preparation activity. Post-operation reports (PORs) and initial deployment reports
(IDRs) can be found on the Army Knowledge eXchange (AKX). The Defence Lessons
Identified Management System (DLIMS) is a database of lessons identified from
incidents occurring at home or abroad. All operations have their own nuances
however it is still worth seeking out lessons from similar operations to inform the
planning stages of a new operation.
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b. Preparation. Communicate those lessons identified during the planning phase in

order to inform individual and group preparation, study periods or briefings. These
lessons should also be used in the design of mission-specific training. In addition
to this a method of capturing lessons learned need to be established as part of the
preparation phase. This could be something as simple as a spread sheet. Examples are
given below.
c. Execution. During execution, lessons are identified reflectively, either as part of a

scheduled event or as a reaction to an unscheduled one.
d. Scheduled. Lessons can be identified and captured at various pre-determined pause

or scheduled events during and after a task, phase or campaign. These could come
from after-action reviews, debriefs or as part of a specific exploitation event. For
example, initial deployment reports and post-operation reports require units and
headquarters to report lessons identified as part of their format.
e. Reactive. Following a particular unplanned event or incident lessons should be

identified and communicated as quickly as possible. They can be reported as part
of a written after-action review, learning account or specific report. A single page
storyboard should be produced as part of this.
443. Drafting lessons. Care must be taken in drafting lessons. A lesson has to clearly
describe the issue and the impact that issue had. A poor lesson may be wordy,
generalising and include clichés or stating the obvious. A poorly worded lesson will also
make it difficult to resolve. An example of a good lesson is in Annex A.
444. Learning lessons. A lesson is only learned once the organisation changes something, or
decides not to, it is not enough to simply identify the lesson alone. However, thorough
analysis is still required to avoid a knee-jerk reaction to incidents.
445. Summary. Learning lessons is whole-Army business and a lesson is not actually learned
until something has changed - or a conscious decision is made not to make a change. An
agile and adaptive culture must be adopted, one that is comfortable in open self-criticism
and with a positive attitude to transforming land forces to meet new challenges in
uncertain and resource-challenged times. Learning from what is both good and bad is an
essential characteristic and every level of command has a part to play. For further detailed
information on the land domain operational lessons process see the LDOLP FASO.
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Glossary of lessons process abbreviations

AAR after-action review
AF adaptive forces
AKX Army Knowledge eXchange
ALSFG Army Lessons and Safety Fusion Group
CTWG Counter-Threat Working Group
DLIMS Defence Lessons Identified Management System
DLoD defence line of development
IDR initial deployment report
LDLWG Land Domain Lessons Working Group
LI lesson identified (commonly referred to as a ‘lesson’)
MJP military judgement panel
MTMC Mission Training and Mobilisation Centre
MX mission exploitation
MXS mission exploitation symposium
OPTAG Operational Training and Advisory Group
OpLT Operational Lessons Team
PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters
POI post-operational interview
POR post-operational report
PTR/PXR post-training/exercise report
SJC(UK) Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom)
LDOLP: lessons capture

446. This tabular reporting format can be submitted on its own, as Annex C to an initial
deployment report (IDR)/post-operational report (POR), or an annex to a learning account.
Before submission, reporting staff are to apply protective marking. Below is an example of
a good lesson.
447. Drafting. Care is required in drafting potential lessons. Critically, the articulation
must clearly indicate what is to change, although how the change is to be made is
not necessary at the capture stage, as that falls within the lesson owner’s (SPA) and
supporting action body’s (SAMs) role. Only raise observations you cannot resolve or
should be shared as good practice. If worded poorly, the lesson will be difficult to resolve
and subsequently learn. Use plain English and facts. Additional guidance on completing
the report is below:
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Column title Guidance
This serial must be unique - i.e. do not assign any serial twice; nor use serial numbering from
Serial
subordinate reports.
Date Date on which the issue is entered into the spread sheet by the initiator; not the date of occurrence.
Unit and appointment of the person raising the issue; needed in order to allow follow-up and
Author
clarification, where necessary.
G/J 1-9 Indicate here which staff section the issue should sit under.
Official, Official-Sensitive, Secret or Top Secret. Always stay as low as possible, preferably
Protective Official. Reports can contain lessons and good practice at several protective marking levels,
marking provided that the report is treated as being in the highest PM level selected. When processed by the
OpLT, lessons will be separated out by protective marking for recording on the appropriate DLIMS.
A simple, concise title of the issue, e.g. ‘Heat injuries’. This field defines/sums up the main issue or
Title of issue problem to which the observation is related. Try to limit each observation to a single problem or
issue. Revisit this once you have completed the ‘recommendation’.
This is the problem. A short factual description of what happened compared (better or worse) with
what was supposed to happen. This statement can be positive (i.e. something that worked better
Observation than expected) or negative (i.e. something happened that should not have or something did not
(what) happen that should have). Limit the observation description to a single problem or issue, e.g. that
people died is not a single problem or issue; it is the consequence of a number of single problems
or issues that should each be written up in the ODCR format.
The discussion consists of four parts and therefore should have four (or more) paragraphs:
Expected situation. Details regarding the ‘expected’ situation and evidence for why it was expected
for the situation to turn out that way, e.g. standard procedures, plans, contractual/informal
agreements, historical precedence.
Observed situation. Details regarding the ‘observed’ situation with presentation of evidence that
the situation was as reported, e.g. eye witness accounts, storyboards, patrol report, etc.
Discussion The impact that the problem had. When something worked better or worse than expected, what
(why) were the consequences?
The cause(s) of the problem. Why was there a difference between the ‘observed’ and ‘expected’
situations? be careful: Don’t explain why the consequences in part 3 occurred, but why the single
problem or issue presented in the observation description occurred.
Use ‘5 times why’, ‘starbursting’ or the ‘6Ws’ analysis technique: Who, What, When, Where, Why
and How. See NATO Lessons Learned Staff Officer Handbook for advice specific to lessons or the
chapter on red teaming for advice on analysis techniques.
The conclusion should identify the root cause of the lesson to be learned.
The conclusion is a statement, which is the logical consequence of the discussion presented and
it should provide a concise summary of the lesson that can be learned from the observation. The
Conclusion conclusion will identify the root cause of the observation. A conclusion should always make sense if
(root cause) you precede it with the word ‘therefore’. Do not simply restate any paragraph from the observation
or discussion in different language, e.g. there were not enough personnel. If the observation is
there were not enough personnel. Use ‘COA comparison’ analyse to identify and compare likely
solutions or mixtures of solutions.
This section should include a suggested solution and who (which department/organisation) could
address the issue.
The recommendation should provide the explicit action(s) to be taken to solve the problem,
Recommendation identifying exactly what needs to be changed and how this should be done. Make a statement of
(solution and how to repeat your success or how to correct the problem and who should make the correction:
action body) the action body. This may require new or modified publications, procedures, procurement of new
equipment, change of the force structure, revision of command relationships, improved training,
etc. Do not simply restate any paragraph from the observation or discussion in different language,
e.g. recommend more personnel, if the observation is that there were not enough personnel.
Routine/significant/critical. Author to indicate the impact which, in their judgement, the issue is
Impact
having upon operational effectiveness.
Recommended Author to select the level, HQ or unit that probably ‘owns’ the issue - i.e. has authority and
owner resources to fix it. This can be left blank if the author is unsure of who the owner should be.
Status For use only by lessons staff. Identifies progress of lessons.

Contents
LESSONS INPUT FORMAT (insert Exercise, Operation, etc. name here)
Insert unit/formation here
Observation Recommendation
G/J Discussion (why did it Conclusion (root Recommended
Ser Date Author Title (what (solution and Impact
1-9 happen) cause) owner (who)
happened?) action body)
12- SO3 J5 J3/J5 Non-lethal Gate guard Expected situation: That If a non-lethal Each location PJHQ and Field Significant
Mar- force personnel have a rifle would be sufficient capability was available should hold a Army Trg Branch.
17 capability been confronted deterrent. these situations could small number of
gap with situations Observed situation: FP be dealt with and hickory sticks, or
where drunk has been confronted with de-escalated quickly similar, to allow a
or aggressive situations which have without the need to stand-off, non-
individuals have required intervention resort to excessive lethal response to
behaved in a (e.g. witnessing violence shows of force. Guard acts of aggression
threatening between civilians or personnel require or violence. Non-
manner towards aggressive behaviour a quiet, non-lethal lethal weapon
them or have towards gate guards). escalation measure to deployed and
engaged in Escalation to the threat keep individuals, small trained with during
acts of violence of lethal force has not crowds and stone- PDT.
against other been necessary. Any shot throwers posing a
civilians. threat at arm’s length.

fired (whether baton gun,
1 warning shot or a shot
to kill) would likely cause NOTE: Non-lethal
mass panic with the POC weapon systems are
camp. common across other
The impact: Without troop-contributing
a non-lethal capability countries (TCCs),
guard personnel are force protection units
forced to escalate their (FPUs) and contracted
posture to a higher level security.
than preferred to protect
themselves or intervene to
protect others.
The causes: No non-lethal
capability for personnel
on guard duty.
Contents
Doctrine aide memoire

BATTLE PROCEDURE
Concurrent activity Anticipation Thorough knowledge of the Efficient drills
grouping system
COMMAND
5 principles of command: Roles of the staff to the commander:
1. Unity of command 4. Integration of Support
2. Continuity of command Advise

command 5. Mission command Caution
3. Chain of command
Functions of command: Model:
Functions of Leadership
command
Decision Control
making
Elements of
command
support
Command posts
CI Provision of an HQ
S; P s
rocesses & procedur e
States of command:
OPCON
Authority FULLCOM OPCOM TACOM TACON (7)
(2)
Task organise the assigned element (1) X X
Assign missions to the assigned element (3) X X X (4)
Assign tasks to the assigned element for the

X X X X (5)
purpose of which it has been assigned.
OPCOM OPCOM OPCON TACOM TACON

OPCON OPCON TACOM TACON
May further delegate command authority (6) TACOM TACOM TACON
TACON TACON
Coordinate movement, local defence, and

X X X X X
force protection.
Planning and coordination X X X X X
Administrative and logistic responsibility X
FULLCOM full command OPCON operational control TACON tactical control

OPCOM operational command TACOM tactical command
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DOCTRINE HIERARCHY
NATO Joint Land

Higher-level philosophy and principles
AJP-01
Allied Joint Doctrine
AJPs JDP 0-01

British Defence Doctrine
JDPs ADP
Hybrid Thematic Land Operations
Army Leadership The Staff Standard

Environmental
Supporting AJPs Doctrine for the Army
Functional
AJP-5
Lower-level practices and procedures
Allied tactical AFMs

publications
Thematic
Environmental
Functional
Handbooks, Procedures,
Aides Memoire
Special to Arm Doctrine
ESTIMATES
3 processes:
Operational-level planning process (Reference: AJP-5/COPD)
Tactical estimate (TE, previously 6 Step)
Combat estimate (CE, previously 7 Questions)
Tactical estimate (TE): Combat estimate (CE):

Step 1 - Understand the situation Q0 - Baseline preparation and understanding.
Step 2 - Identify and analyse the problem Q1 - What is the situation and how does it affect me?
Step 2A - Mission analysis Q2 - What have I been told to do and why?
Step 2B - Evaluate objects and factors Q3 - What effects do I need to achieve and what
Step 2C - Comd’s analysis and guidance direction must I give in order to develop a plan?
Step 3 - Formulate and consider COAs Q4 - Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?
Step 4 - Develop and validate COAs Q5 - What resources do I need to accomplish each
action/effect?
Step 5 - COA evaluation
Q6 - When and where do the actions/effects take
Step 6 - Comd’s decision and development of the place in relation to each other?
plan
Q7 - What control measures do I need to impose?
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FIGHTING POWER
Components: Model:
Conceptual
Context component
Relative Understanding of
Conceptual component:
Competitive how to operate
thought processes
Environment Flexibility to adapt
Moral component: the Actors
ability to get people
Physical
to fight component
Manpower
Physical component: the Moral
Equipment component
means to fight Training and Morale
collective
performance Leadership
Sustainability Ethical
foundations
Resources
FRAMEWORKS
Tactical:
Fix
Find: locate, identify, assess
Fix: deny enemy their goals, distract him, deprive them Strike
freedom of movement to gain own freedom of action
Strike: manoeuvre, attack to destroy enemy; direct action
Exploit
Exploit: retain initiative; reinforce success, capitalise on Fix
enemies’ weaknesses Find
Operational:
Shaping Decisive to
Shaping to create or
achievement of
Decisive preserve conditions for decisive
the mission
action
Sustaining
Sustaining to enable the force to survive, move and fight
Geographic:
Deep operations: long range, protracted timescale, against enemy not in close battle
Close operations: short-range, immediate timescale, conducted by main body of a formation, often in direct contact
with enemy
Rear operations: establish and maintains FF to generate freedom of action for deep and close operations
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INTEGRATED ACTION
Integrated action is the application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to change and maintain
the understanding and behaviour of audiences to achieve a successful outcome.
Actions Effects Outcomes

(taken by the force) (perceived by audiences, actors, (audiences, actors, adversaries
adversaries & enemies’ behaviour) & enemies’ behaviour)
Ultimate
Land Information Intermediate
manoeuvre activity Physical Unintended
Perceptions Audience, actor,
capability
adversary, &
enemy
behaviour
Capacity Will &
Joint fires cohesion
building
Understanding
INTEROPERABILITY
Model: Levels:
Integrated – merge seamlessly
Compatible – interact in same
geographical battlespace
Deconflicted – coexist, but not
interact
JOINT ACTION
Information activities (IA) Outreach
Fires Manoeuvre
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LAND COMPONENT COMMAND AND THE LEVELS OF CONFLICT
Alliance
Strategic plans
Strategic Strategic end-state
Strategic on employment
Military strategy
General direction and guidance
Military strategic Limitations on employment
Operational
Land component
Campa gic)
ign end-state (based on strate
command
Cam ons
paign erati
objectives and plan and major op
Tactical
Battles, engagements, activities
LEADERSHIP
Army leadership code:
Lead by example Apply reward and Encourage confidence Strive for team goals
Encourage thinking discipline in the team
Apply reward and Demand high Recognise individual

discipline performance strengths and
weaknesses
Skills and qualities of a leader:
Leadership Decision making Initiative Building relationships

Understanding Vision and intellect Judgment Ability to communicate
10 diseases of leadership:
Lack of moral courage The quest for the 100% solution

Failure to recognise that opposition can be loyal Equating the quality of the advice with the rank of the
Consent and evade person providing it
There is a need to know and you don’t need to know I’m too busy to win
Don’t bother me with the facts I’ve already made up I can do your job too
my mind Big man, cold shadow
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MANOEUVRIST APPROACH
The manoeuvrist approach is the Army’s fighting doctrine for the tactical level. It determines the way we fight
enemies across the different types of operation, and because fighting can have extremely significant consequences,
it is set in the broader context of the audience and integrated action. It is an indirect approach which emphasises
effects on the will of the enemy. It blends lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve objectives which shape the enemy’s
understanding, undermine their will and break their cohesion. It aims to apply strength against vulnerabilities.
Joint action
Information Info activities
Influence
Intelligence Fires
perceptions
(people and ground) Outreach
Understanding effects, Manoeuvre
Outcomes and success
Enhancements
Surprise
Pre-emption Simplicity
Seize and Dislocation Flexibilty
Understand Break adversaries’
hold the Disruption Tempo
the situation cohesion and will
initiative Shock action Momentum
Destruction Simultaneity
Exploitation Air power
Fundamentals
An attitude of mind, Shape
practical knowledge, Protect own and Secure
a philosophy of population’s Hold
(mission) command cohesion and will Develop
10 commandments of manoeuvre warfare:
Focus on the enemy not the ground Use reserves to reinforce success
Act more quickly than the enemy can react Be unpredictable
Always designate the main effort Support movement by fire
Avoid enemy strength – attack weakness Command from where main effort can be achieved
Exploit tactical opportunities Act boldly and decisively
Manoeuvrist effects:
Undermine will: Paint a picture of defeat in enemy Disrupt: Confuse enemy C2

mind Pre-empt: Seize initiative
Shatter cohesion: Prevent enemy fighting together Shape understanding: Every action should part of an
Dislocate: Deny enemy strength information operation
Integration of air into manoeuvrist approach:
Shape Attack Protect Exploit
MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS
Peace support
Humanitarian
assistance
Stabilisation and
reconstruction
Capacity building
Evacuation - non-
combatant evacuation
operations or
evacuation operations
Military aid to the civil
authority (MACA)
[UK operations]
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MISSION COMMAND
Guiding principle: Application of mission command:
The absolute responsibility to act to achieve the Commanders ensure that their subordinates
superior commander’s intent understand the intent, their own contributions and the
5 principles: context within which they are to act
1. Unity of effort Commanders exercise minimum control over their

subordinates, consistent with the context and nature
2. Freedom of action of the mission and the experience and ability of
3. Trust subordinates, while retaining responsibility for their
actions
4. Mutual understanding
Subordinates are told the outcome that they are
5. Timely and effective decision making contributing to, the effect that they are to realise and
why
Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry
out their missions
Subordinates decide for themselves how best to
achieve their superior’s intent
Subordinates must communicate their plan to the
comd to ensure situational awareness. (Note: in AFM
Command, but not in ADP Land Operations.)
OPERATIONS PROCESS
P
s
As
es
RE
N
ses
Ass
PA
PLA
s
RE
Commander
EXECUTE
A ssess
Contents
OPERATIONS THEMES, TYPES OF OPERATION AND TACTICAL ACTIVITIES
Operations themes
Types of operation
Warfighting
Combat stability Tactical activities

Security Counter-irregular Offensive activities Defensive activities
activity (counter- Attack Defence
insurgency,
Peace Raid Delay
counterterrorism,
support counter-criminality) Ambush
Military contribution to Exploitation

Defence peace support Pursuit Enabling activities
Engagement Military contribution to Breakout Reconnaissance
humanitarian aid Feint Security
Military contribution Demonstration Advance to contact

to stabilisation and Reconnaissance in force Meeting engaement
reconstruction
Link-up
Military support to Stability activities
capacity building Withdrawal
Security and control
Non-combatant Retirement
Support to security sector
evacuation operation reform Relief of troops in
Extraction combat and encircled
Support to initial forces
Military aid to the civil restoration of essential
services March
authority
Support to interim Obstacle breaching
governance tasks and crossing
ORGANISATION OF FORCES
Combined arms force – combination of capabilities, with sufficient interoperability; sum of parts is greater than
the whole
Task organisation – process to form combined arms forces; increases flexibility
Battlegroup – Combined arms force, commanded by combat unit HQ, comprising armr, recce, Inf or Avn units
Taskforce – combined arms force created for a specific purpose, commanded by any HQ
Hierarchy: Functional: Force type: Specialist capabilities:

Corps Combat Heavy ISR forces
Division Combat support Medium Air manoeuvre
Brigade Combat service support Light Amphibious
Unit Capacity building
Subunit
PRINCIPLE OF FOUR
1. Reconnaissance/fixing force 3. Echelon force
2. Striking/manoeuvre force 4. Uncommitted reserve force
Contents
PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. Primacy of political purpose 7. Provide security for the population
2. Unity of effort 8. Neutralise adversaries
3. Understand the context 9. Gain and maintain popular support
4. Foster host-nation governance and capacity 10. Anticipate, learn and adapt, operate in
5. Prepare for the long term accordance with the law
6. Provide security for the population 11. Counter-irregular activity
PRINCIPLES OF TRAINING
1. Is a function of command 6. Training methods must be continuously
2. Is a continuous and progressive process reviewed for effectiveness
3. Must be challenging and interesting 7. Must reflect operational doctrine
4. Must be realistic 8. Must be permissive of error
5. Must have an aim and objectives 9. Must be appropriately safe

10. Must be exploited
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
1. Selection and maintenance of aim 6. Concentration of force
2. Maintenance of morale 7. Economy of effort
3. Offensive action 8. Flexibility
4. Security 9. Cooperation
5. Surprise 10. Sustainability
RISK
Risk management:
Risk analysis Risk management
Identify
Assess
• Risks
(activities and events)
Plan
• Likelihood
• Impacts
• Owners/those at risk
Manage
• Terminate
• Treat
• Tolerate
• Transfer
• Take • Responsibility
• Indicators & warnings
• Reassessment
Contents
Risk tolerance:
Untreatable within
Untreatable Exposure means: transfer or
terminate (elevate)
Risk can be treated by

specific action. The
Requires treatment Capacity residual risk should
then be broadly
acceptable
Broadly tolerable Tolerance
Risk impact graph (RIG):

High
RISK
Risk impact graph (RIG) Risk to mission
Risk to force
IMPACT:
HIGH. Will have a major effect
IMPACT
Post mitigation (with tail)

on the operation. Will likely
result in significant casualties.
May result in major disruption
MEDIUM. Will have a ACTION (5Ts):
noticeable effect on the TOLERATE. Accept the risk
operation. May result in
significant loss. Will cause a TREAT. Take effective action to
degree of disruption reduce the risk
LOW. The consequences and Low LIKELIHOOD

TRANSFER. Let someone else
losses will not be severe. take the risk (e.g. by passing
Negligible effect on action the responsibility for the risk to
LIKELIHOOD: a superior)
HIGH. Very likely to happen TERMINATE. Agree that the
MEDIUM. Likely to happen infrequently risk is too high and do not
and difficult to predict proceed with the activity
LOW. Most unlikely to happen TAKE. Integrate into COA
development.
Action
Ser Risk Impact Owner Mitigation measure
(5Ts)
1
3
Contents
STABLE STATE MODEL

Security
Economic development
Legitimate governance
TACTICAL PRINCIPLES
Offence: Defence:
1. Seek surprise 1. Depth in order to prevent penetration or its effects
2. Maintain security 2. All-round defence in order to anticipate threat from
3. Seize key terrain or targets vital to influencing any direction
perceptions 3. Mutual support in order to increase strength and
4. Achieve superiority of Fires and other effects flexibility of defence
5. Exploit manoeuvre 4. Maintain a reserve
6. Concentrate effects of force or threat of force 5. Offensive action in order to seize or regain initiative
7. Plan to exploit success 6. Concealment and deception in order to deny adversary

advantage of understand
8. Keep it simple
9. Maintain a reserve
Delay: Patrolling:
1. Keep it simple 1. Mutual support
2. Exploit manoeuvre 2. All-round defence
3. Conduct offensive action 3. Depth
4. Deceive the enemy 4. Deception
5. Maintain freedom of action 5. Communication
Ground reconnaissance: Obstacle crossing:

1. Command led 1. Seek surprise
2. Robust communications 2. Maintain security
3. Freedom of action 3. Maintain momentum
4. Layering assets 4. Retain balance
5. Keep it simple
6. Deceive the enemy
7. Maintain control
Withdrawal:
1. Maintain flexibility 3. Keep it simple 5. Maintain security

2. Conduct offensive action 4. Maintain control
Contents
TARGETING CYCLE
Joint
Manoeuvre fires Understand:
Campaign plan, national direction,
targeting directive (TD), cultural awareness,
IPE, human terrain analysis, OA, commander’s targeting priorities,
Capacity Information synchronisation of integrated actions
building activities
DECIDE
Target lists, target packs,
target audience analysis
ASSESS COORDINATE DETECT
BDA, MOE, OA,

campaign effectiveness, Execute collection plan:
recommendations to maximise effectiveness of
commander scarce resources
DELIVER:
achieve effects
TARGETING:
• Mechanism to coordinate fires and IA Effect target:
• Command led • ROE
• Synchronised - intent and ISR cycles • PID
• Underpins legal use of force • PoL
• Necessity • CDE
• Humanity • TEA
• Distinction • BDA
• Proportionality
TACTICAL FUNCTIONS
1. Command
2. Intelligence
3. Manoeuvre Activity to set
the operation’s • Command
4. Fires • Intelligence
direction
5. Information activities (IA)
6. Capacity building
7. Protection Activity directed
8. Sustainment at those relevant • Manoeuvre
to the outcome • Fires
of the operation • Information activities
(the audience) • Capacity building
Activity to
enable the • Protection
operation • Sustainment
Contents
UNDERSTANDING
The basics – how data, information and knowledge contribute to understanding Types:
Individual
Collective
Common
Understanding Characteristics:
Contextural
Judgement
Information Perishable
requirements
Knowledge Imperfect
Competitive
Principles:
Cognition
Self-awareness
Internal External
Education Information Regulated Critical analysis
Experience Unregulated Creative thinking
Continuity
Processing
Collaboration
Data Fusion
VALUES AND STANDARDS

Values: Standards:
1. Loyalty 1. Appropriate behaviour
2. Integrity 2. Lawful
3. Courage 3. Totally professional
4. Discipline
5. Respect for others
6. Selfless commitment
Contents

Contents
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Waterloo Lines,
Imber Road, Warminster,
Wiltshire, BA12 0DJ
Civ 01985 84 8764

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Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB)

Handling instructions and conditions of release

Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | i

It must be read, understood and practised by all. I commend it to you.

Head of Warfare Development

ii | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018

Doctrine aide memoire.

Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | iii

Staff functional responsibilities 1-3

CHAPTER 2 - Tactical estimate (TE) 2-1

CHAPTER 3 - Combat estimate (CE) 3-1

Q0. Baseline preparation and understanding 3-18

iv | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018

Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action or effect? 3-58

CHAPTER 4 - Supporting planning activity 4-1

Combat service support (CSS) - support to planning activity 4-1

CHAPTER 5 - Risk 5-1

CHAPTER 6 - Deception 6-1

CHAPTER 7 - Tactical-level fires and targeting 7-1

Tactical fireplan 7-1

Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | v

Annex - Target lists and effects guidance 7A-1

CHAPTER 9 - Deployable scientific support (DSS) 9-1

When to use OA and SCIAD support 9-1

CHAPTER 10 - Wargaming 10-1

CHAPTER 11 - Red teaming 11-1

What is red teaming? 11-1

CHAPTER 12 - Operational staff work (OSW) 12-1

vi | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018

• Synch matrix: 12-10

CHAPTER 13 - Orders groups 13-1

Part 2 - Prepare P2-1

ISR activity execution 14-6

CHAPTER 15 - Refinement of the plan 15-1

CHAPTER 16 - Subordinate’s backbrief 16-1

Subordinate’s backbrief 16-1

CHAPTER 17 - Coordination and liaison 17-1

Coordination and liaison 17-1

CHAPTER 18 - TASKORG and integration 18-1

Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | vii

Command and control (C2) relationships 18-3

CHAPTER 19 - Rehearsals 19-1

CHAPTER 20 - CP pre-execution checks 20-1

Conditions checks 20-1

PART 3 - Execute P3-1

The role of the commander 21-1

CHAPTER 22 - Control 22-1

viii | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018

CHAPTER 23 - Assess 23-1

Assessment during execution 23-1

CHAPTER 24 - Decide 24-1

Command situational awareness 24-1

CHAPTER 25 - Direct 25-1

Commander’s direction 25-1

CHAPTER 26 - Staff process 26-1

Rules of engagement 26-1

Doctrine aide memoire 27-1

Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | P1-1

1-1 | Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018

1. Command post role. The role of a command post

Planning and Execution Handbook (PEHB) - 2018 | 1-2

ISR Gp Joint fires cell (JFC) 77 Bde

Member of the commander’s personal staff

Planning and control of CSS within the formation

The XO’s function is primarily one of command support

Is the deputy to the DCOS in barracks

Within Div, the main responsibility is to act as the battle manager

Direct and coordinate all activity in the ISR cell

Cover all generalist CSS issues within the formation/unit (Log, ES

Responsible for monitoring the status of all medical activity

Detailed planning, delivery and management of CIS to the HQ,

SO1 G7 Doctrine management

Resources and finance

Civil affairs operations including policy, legal and media

Bde CP move every 12hrs

Recce - nothing requirements of CIS, protection (to incl concealment/

Step 2C. Commander’s analysis Anchor synch matrix with