Service Specialists, Inc. v. The Sheriff of Manila, et. al.

GR 74586

Doctrines
 A petition for relief in the same court that rendered the judgment and in the same cause,
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
 The judge who rendered the judgment is not a party in a petition for relief from said
judgment.
 When filing a petition for relief, in order to stay execution, it was necessary for private
respondent to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction in accordance with Section 5 of
Rule 38
 While a judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an
order granting such relief which is interlocutory, the party may not assail the judgment on
the merits.

Facts
 Service Specialists, Inc. filed with the RTC of Manila an action for replevin and damages
against private respondent Roy Diaz.
 After Diaz filed his answer, a pre-trial conference was set. The counsels of both parties
were duly notified.
 Both Diaz and his counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial conference. Diaz was declared
in default.
 Petitioner Service Specialists, Inc. presented its evidence ex-parte. The trial court ruled in
favor of petitioner.
 On December 10, 1985, the decision became final and the RTC granted the motion for
execution filed by Service Specialists, Inc.
 On December 24, 1985, Diaz filed a petition for relief from judgment.
 Service Specialists, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the petition for relief on the grounds
that the petition was filed out of time; that it failed to indicate a good and substantial
defense; that it failed to show the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and
that it was not filed in the same court and in the same cause as required by Rule 38.
 Diaz filed an opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. However, on March 21, 1986, the
Trial Court dismissed the petition for relief based on lack of jurisdiction.
 On April 2, 1986, Diaz filed a notice of appeal.
 On April 9, 1986, a writ of execution was issued pursuant to the order of execution issued
prior.
 Respondent deputy sheriff issued a notice of levy and sale of the properties of private
respondent levied on, but on the date of the auction sale, refused to proceed because of
the protest of private respondent based on his appeal from the order dismissing his
petition for relief.
 Service Specialists, Inc. filed a petition for mandamus.
 Diaz then filed a petition for relief with a different case, including the judge of the
original case as respondent.

Ratio
 W/N Diaz complied with the requisites for filing a Petition for Relief
NO. Section 2 of Rule 38 requires that respondent file a petition for relief in the same court that
rendered the judgment and in the same cause, praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be
set aside. This is because of the fact that when a court takes cognizance of a case, it acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts. To file a petition for relief in another court would be
depriving the original court of jurisdiction which it had already acquired over the case and would
have the effect of transferring that case to another court of the same category at the instance of
the losing party. In this case, Diaz filed his petition for relief also with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, but he did not file it in the same case; he filed it in another case, No. 8534098. Branch
XII of the lower court to which Civil Case No. 85-34098 was assigned could not take cognizance
of the petition for relief, because it was not the same branch of the court which rendered the
judgment from which relief was sought.

W/N the judge of the court which issued the questioned judgment or order should be included as
defendant in the petition for relief
NO. The judge who rendered the judgment is not a party in a petition for relief from said
judgment. A petition for relief from judgment is not like a petition for certiorari wherein the
judge is made a party respondent because he is alleged to have acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In a petition for relief from judgment, the
petitioner claims that due to extrinsic fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he has
been unjustly deprived of a hearing or has been prevented from taking an appeal.

W/N the final and executory judgment rendered against Diaz could no longer be executed in
view of his petition for relief
NO. In order to stay execution, it was necessary for private respondent to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction in accordance with Section 5 of Rule 38. The necessity of securing a writ
of preliminary injunction to suspend or stay the execution of the judgment sought to be set aside
under Rule 38, stems from the fact that such judgment had already become final and executory.

W/N a judgment denying relief under Rule 38 allows the party to also assail a judgment on the
merits
NO. Diaz invoked Section 2 of Rule 41 which states that “A judgment denying relief under Rule
38 is subject to appeal, and in the course thereof, a party may also assail the judgment on the
merits, upon the ground that it is not supported by the evidence or it is contrary to law.” While a
judgment or order denying relief under Rule 38 is final and appealable, unlike an order granting
such relief which is interlocutory, the party may not assail the judgment on the merits. This
cannot be done because the judgment had already become final and executory.

The purpose of the rule is to enable the appellate court to determine not only the existence of any
of the grounds relied upon, but also and primarily the merit of the petitioner's cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. If the appellate court finds that one of the grounds exists and that the
petitioner has a good cause of action or defense, it will reverse the denial or dismissal, set aside
the judgment in the main case and remand the case to the lower court for a new trial in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 38. On the other hand, if the petition for relief is against an
order disallowing an appeal for having been filed out of time and the petition is denied or
dismissed, in the appeal from the denial or dismissal the appellate court must also be apprised of
the merit of the case of the party who assails such denial or dismissal. If the appellate court finds
a justifiable ground and a meritorious case, it will reverse the denial or dismissal and allow the
appeal from the decision in the main case

W/N a petition for relief is proper in this case

NO. The main ground of the petition for relief is that no notice of the scheduled pre-trial
conference was sent to private respondent himself and such notice was sent only to the counsels
who were furthermore commissioned to secure the presence of the parties they represented.
Private respondent claimed that this is not the notice of pre-trial contemplated by law. This is not
the case because previous jurisprudence has stated that notice of pre-trial can be served upon
counsel of the parties. As such, none of the grounds with regard to a petition for relief can be
cited in this case.

Fallo
WHEREFORE, respondents Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff of Manila are directed to proceed with
the sale at public auction of the properties of private respondent which had been levied upon on
execution. Costs against private respondent.

Agan v. Heirs of Spouses Nueva

G.R. No. 155018

Doctrine
Mistake, to constitute a ground for petition for relief, refers to a mistake of fact, not of law.

Facts
 Diosdada Nueva, with marital consent, sold under a pacto de retro, a parcel of land
situated in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, to petitioner Philadelphia Agan for Php
21,000.00.
 The parties agreed that the Nuevas were granted the right to repurchase the property sold,
within six (6) months from and after the date of the document for the same consideration
of P21,000.00.
 Petitioners failed to repurchase the property within the stipulated six-month period.
 Upon the death of Diosdada Nueva, the property was extrajudicially partitioned where
her husbamd Andres sold his interest in the land in question to his daughter Ann and son
Lou.
 Philadelphia Agan filed a petition for consolidation of ownership against the Nuevas with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Cagayan de Oro City.
 In their answer, the Nuevas alleged that the pacto de retro sale was actually an equitable
mortgage, the consideration for the sale being only P21,000.00 as against its Fair Market
Value of P81,320.00.
 The judgment consolidating ownership over the disputed property in favor of
Philadelphia Agan, was rendered by the trial court. However, the second paragraph of the
 dispositive portion gave the vendors a period of thirty days from receipt of the decision
within which to redeem the property.
 Agan refused to accept the amount of P52,080.00 as redemption price, so the Nuevas
were constrained to consign the amount with the court.
 Agan filed a petition for relief from the decision. She argued that she did not find it
necessary to file an appeal from the said decision considering that the grant of the third-
day period to redeem the property is a mere surplusage and hence, unenforceable and
illegal in view of the court's order consolidating ownership of the property in her favor.
She prayed for the court to delete the said portion of the decision.
 The trial court issued an order deleting the aforementioned provision.
 The Nuevas filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.
 The Nuevas then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA contending that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for relief.
 The CA reversed the order of the RTC and rendered judgment in favour of the Nuevas,
stating that a petition relief is not available when a party had another adequate remedy
available to him which was either a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse
decision, and furthermore, he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence from filing such motion or taking an appeal

Ratio
W/N the circumstances of this case constitute a proper subject of a petition for relief from the
judgment of the court

NO. Petitioner contended that a mistake prevented her from ling an appeal. She believed that an
appeal was unnecessary because the inclusion of the second paragraph in the RTC Order was
mere surplusage. However, the erroneous opinion of a party concerning the incorrectness of the
judicial decision of the court cannot constitute a ground for a petition for relief. If a party
complains of a decision as being void, then the proper remedy is to appeal said judgment. The
relief provided for under Rule 38 of the Rules is of equitable character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. The rule is that relief
will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure;
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
procedure by counsel.

Relief from judgment or order is premised on equity. It is granted only in exceptional cases. It is
an act of grace. It is not regarded with favor. For relief to be granted, the petitioner must show
that the judgment or final order was entered, or the proceeding thereafter against him was taken,
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The mistake contemplated by Rule 38
of the Rules of Court, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, pertains generally to one of fact,
not of law. It does not apply to a judicial error which the court in question might have committed
in the trial referred to. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal. Had petitioner
sincerely believed that the second paragraph was merely surplusage, she would have moved to
rectify the error immediately.

The law presumes good faith and, in the absence of a contrary finding by the RTC in its
Decision, respondents are entitled to the right to redeem the property pursuant to the third
paragraph of Article 1606 of the New Civil Code.

Fallo
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of merit.

Fukuzumi v. Sanritsu Great International Corporation et. al.

GR 140630

Doctrine
A party is not entitled to relief if he was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Such relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to
be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his
own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure

Facts
 The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents Sanritsu Great International
Corporation et. al., ordering petitioner Yusuke Fukuzumi to pay the respondents sums of
money.
 Fukuzumi received a copy of the decision on February 9, 1999 and on February 23, 1999,
filed his motion for reconsideration of the decision.
 On April 27, 1999, the trial court issued an Order denying his motion. He received a copy
of the order on May 5, 1999.
 Instead of perfecting his appeal on May 6, 1999, he filed his notice of appeal only on
May 7, 1999, or one day beyond the reglementary period therefor.
 The court issued an Order on June 2, 1999 denying the defendant’s notice of appeal.
 Fukuzumi filed a petition for relief averring that his counsel suffered from high blood
pressure which impelled him to rest for three days and hindered him from filing the
notice of appeal. He appended a verified Medical Certificate as proof.
 The trial court issued an Order denying the Fukuzumi’s petition on the ground that
Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was not applicable.

Ratio

W/N a party can file for a petition for relief when the loss of the remedy of the law is due to his
own negligence

NO. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure. Otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of
procedure by counsel.

The petitioner’s failure to file his notice of appeal within the period therefor is far from
excusable. It shows negligence. The medical certificate issued to his counsel shows that he was
examined by Dr. Lakambini Cruz-Crespo on May 6, 1999 and was advised to rest for three days
from May 6, 1999 or until May 8, 1999. However, his counsel was well enough to file the notice
of appeal on May 7, 1999 when he was supposed to be resting. The petitioner even failed to
allege in his notice of appeal that the same was filed one day late because his counsel was
suffering from high blood pressure. Said allegation is a mere afterthought to cover up his and his
own counsel’s collective negligence. It is settled that clients are bound by the mistakes,
negligence and omission of their counsel.

While delay in the filing of a notice of appeal does not justify the dismissal of the appeal,
however, the Fukuzumi has not shown any exceptional circumstances justifying a reversal of the
assailed order of the trial court and the reinstatement of his appeal. The right to appeal is not a
natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only
in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

Fallo

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Redena v. CA
GR 146611

Doctrine
A party prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final order of a court by reason of
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in the same
case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given due course. As such, a petition for relief
cannot be filed in the CA.

Facts
 Petitioner Tancredo filed an action for partition against his half-brother, respondent
Leocadio. They are both sons of one Maximo Redena.
 Their father left several pieces of realty: a residential lot at M. Calim Street, Famy,
Laguna; a riceland at Poroza, Famy, Laguna; and another parcel of land at Maate, also in
Famy, Laguna.
 The trial court, based on the evidence presented, allowed the partition of only the
property actually pertaining to the estate of the parties' deceased father and co-owned by
them, namely, the parcel of land at Maate.
  On December 11, 1997, Tancredo filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal. The
court gave due course to the notice and directed the elevation of the records of the case to
the CA where petitioner's appeal was docketed.
 On September 28, 1998, the CA issued a resolution directing petitioner, as appellant, to
file his appellant's brief, thus effectively giving Tancredo an extension.
 On March 9, 1999, there being no appellant's brief fied within the extended period, the
CA issued a resolution considering the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the
same.
 Eight months after the CA issued the resolution, Tancredo filed a motion for
reconsideration. The CA denied the same.
 Then, on December 28, 1999, in the same case, Tancredo filed a petition for relief,
praying that his appeal be reinstated. The CA also denied the same, stating that a petition
for relief is not among the remedies available in the Court of Appeals.

Ratio
W/N a petition for relief can be availed of in the CA
NO. Under Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party prevented from taking an appeal
from a judgment or final order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, may file in the same court and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his
appeal be given due course. This presupposes that no appeal was taken because of any of the
aforestated reasons which prevented him from appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief
cannot be availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction.

In this case, the record shows that petitioner in fact led a Notice of Appeal with the trial court,
which it granted and ordered the elevation of the records to the CA. In turn, the CA, in its
resolution, required the petitioner to file his appellant's brief. Petitioner failed to comply. As
such, a petition for relief is not applicable.

W/N a petition for relief is the proper remedy in this case

NO. Tancredo was not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to
be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was due to his
own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure. Tancredo failed to point out any circumstance
which might lead the Court to conclude that his station in life had in any way placed his half-
brother in a more advantageous position. As such, it is evident petitioner failed to show diligence
in pursuing his cause. His condition as a farmer does not excuse or exempt him from being
vigilant on his right. He cannot lay the blame solely on his former lawyer. While, exceptionally,
a client may be excused from the failure of his counsel, the circumstances obtaining in this case
were not convincing enough to merit exception.

Furthermore, the Court's power to liberally construe and even to suspend the rules, presupposes
the existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the strict application of technical rules must
concede. The facts borne out by the records pertaining to petitioner's purported undivided share
in the property at Famy, Laguna, and the property in Poroza clearly showed that these two
properties had been subject of an agreement whereby petitioner recognized respondent's rights to
said properties. This fact binds this Court, there being nothing on record with the trial court as to
the herein alleged fraud.

Fallo

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed resolutions of the CA are
AFFIRMED

Gold Line Transit, Inc. v. Luisa Ramos

GR 144813

Doctrine
The party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with the two (2)
reglementary periods- first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of
the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and secondly, within a fixed period of six
(6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these
periods is required.

Facts
 Respondent Luisa Ramos, seeking indemnification for the death of her daughter due to a
collision between a passenger jeep and a bus owned by Gold Line Transit and driven by
an Eduardo Lumontad, prayed that the aforementioned parties be held liable for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages.
 Goldline denied liability, stating that it was due to the negligence and recklessness of the
jeepney driver, Julius Jereza. It further stated that the bus is insured against accidents.
 On the day of the pre-trial, Goldline and counsel failed to appear. Goldline was declared
in default.
 The trial court ruled based on evidence presented by Ramos and held that Goldline was
indeed liable for damages.
 On November 1998, Goldline’s counsel Atty. Mijares was filed a copy of the decision.
 The decision became final and executory because Goldline failed to appeal from the
same.
 Goldline filed a Petition for Relief with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel alleging among
others that answering defendant was furnished with a copy of the questioned decision
only in March 1999; that defendant's counsel had a misunderstanding with the owner of
the building where he had his office regarding the payment of rents, that counsel was
forced to transfer to a new office; that he omitted to inform the court of his change of
address, and that the notices, order of default, and trial court decision were not received
by him.
 The trial court denied the petition for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
 Goldline went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari questioning the denial
of the relief, but the appellate court dismissed the same, stating that the finding that Atty.
Mijares received a copy of the decision has remained uncontroverted.
  Goldline then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, stating that since it only
learned of the decision on 30 March 1999, its petition for relief was filed within the
period provided.

Ratio

W/N the rules on reglementary periods in the filing for petitions for review should be
relaxed

NO. The party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with the two (2)
reglementary periods- first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of
the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and secondly, within a fixed period of six
(6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these
periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the
part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle
that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put at
last an end to litigation. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a condition or
contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of
grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and final chance, and failure to
avail of such chance within the grace period set by statute or the Rules of Court is fatal.

The records disclose that Atty. Mijares III was furnished with a copy of the decision of the trial
court by registered mail on 20 November 1998. The Petition for Relief was filed on April 8,
1999. Although the petition was filed within six (6) months, it was not within sixty (60) days, but
only after 139 days, from the time petitioner learned of the judgment. The absence of one of the
two (2) mentioned periods, which are concurring elements, precludes petitioner from availing of
the remedy of relief from judgment.

W/N Atty Mijares received the decision on November 1998

YES. The return card bears the signature of Atty. Mijares III, unequivocally showing receipt of
the assailed decision on 20 November 1998. An attorney's denial certainly cannot prevail over
the contrary statement of postal officials based on official records. For one thing, postal officials
enjoy the presumption, without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, to have regularly
performed their social duty and that they have acted in good faith. All things are presumed to
have been done correctly and with due formality until the contrary is proved.

W/N a petition for relief is the proper remedy in this case

NO. Even assuming that counsel did not really receive a copy of the trial court's decision, this
circumstance would not in any way improve petitioner's situation. It bears stressing that the
remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on any of the grounds mentioned in the
rules, namely, fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. Negligence, to be "excusable,"
must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.

In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded against is not
the lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The question is not
whether petitioner succeeded in defending its rights and interests, but simply, whether it had the
opportunity to present its side of the controversy. As petitioner retained the services of counsel of
its choice, it should, as far as this suit is concerned, bear the consequences of its choice of a
faulty option. Its plea that it was deprived of due process echoes on hollow ground and certainly
cannot elicit approval nor sympathy.

Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 30 June 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals and
its 12 September 2000 Resolution denying reconsideration are AFFIRMED, thus sustaining in
effect the Orders of the trial court dated 8 April 1999 and 24 August 1999, which granted the
issuance of a writ of execution and denied petitioner Gold Line Transit, Inc.'s petition for relief
from judgment. Costs against petitioner.