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The gralieg of th jhet must be the same a4 that of the Nighert grade we ocunttt conttcd in The sppvpsate sogrliog slip mast be ased when ever sceiry) l 98 A CONFIDENTIA = 7 Lt i. iS ¥CONFIDENTIAL Frot Dati Mr 0'YefT1 Maite Tox PS/Mr Renton B72 ce: Mr Edwards Legal Advisers Defence Dept MERCENARIES PROBLEM 1, After four years work the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Mercenaries has produced a single ‘consolidated negotiating basis’ of an ‘international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of Mercenaries', We need to review UK policy before the next phase of the Committee's work. RECOMMENDATION 2, I recommend; (a) that Ministers confirm that we should continue with our existing policy of working constructively within the Ad Hoc Committee for the best possible draft convention, on the normal understanding that we are not committed to becoming a party to any convention that may emerge; (b) if Ministers agree to this, that I should write at official level to the Home Departments directly concerned so informing them and inviting officials to attend a meeting in January to produce a detailed UK negotiating position on the existing consolidated text. I submi draft, The results of this meeting would be reported to Ministers for endorsement. a 3. Legal Advisers concur. BACKGROUND 4, During the last Labour administration mercenary activities by British nationals in Angola prompted the establishment of the Diplock Commission to consider the need for legislation against the recruitment of UK citizens as mercenaries. The Diplock Report (1976) concluded that the activities of individual /British CONFIDENTIAL,Gs CONFIDENTIAL British mercenaries could cause severe embarrassment in Britain's relations overseas, but recommended that the offence should be recruiting of mercenaries. The Labour Government set in hand legislation broadly along the lines recommended by Diplock. But the new Conservative Government in June 1979 decided to put the Proposed legislation on ice. 5. In parallel, following an initiative in 1979 by the Nigerians and other Africans, the 1980 UN General Assembly set up an Ad Hoc Committee to draft an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of Mercenaries, Ministers agreed that we should support the UNGA resolution and join the Committee. 6. Following the first (preliminary) session of the Ad Hoc Committee, FCO Ministers were consulted on the guidelines for our delegation at further sessions, I subsequently wrote to fficials in a number of home departments (my letter to Mr Varney Une oxl2 St 30 December 1981) setting out FCO Ministers’ views. These (ave were: (a) that we should stand firm against suggestions that ‘Mercenarism' is a crime in international law or that States bear international responsibility for their nationals who become mercenaries; (b) that we should go along with the idea of prohibiting recruitment of mercenarie (c) that our delegation should point out the objections to the taking of jurisdiction over enlistment by a State's nationals overseas; (d) that it would be reasonable for the convention to ban advertising for recruits; (e) that we would resist any restrictions on the scope of the convention by type of foreign conflict or type of foreign force (i e National Liberation Movements) ; (£) that we should resist any suggestion that a State should prevent the departure of its nationals from its territory on the suspicion that they intended to enlist overseas; (g) that we should insist on a definition of ‘mercenary which would exclude loan service personnel, contract personnel, Gurkhas, or other cases of legitimate services with the regular armed forces of a foreign state I also noted that FCO Ministors thought it highly unlikely that the present Governmont would over wish to promote legislation on Mercenaries or that there would be adequate support for such a move amongst their supporters in Parliament, CONFIDENTIAL (7. SinceCONFIDENTIAL 7. | Since then there have been three further sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee. The 1982 and 1983 sessions made very limited progress. But the 1984 session (from 30 July to 24 August) did succeed in consolidating the four competing draft conventions previously under discussion into one single working text. Though full of alternative wording (demonstrating that many of the basic problems remain unresolved) the text provides a consolidated basis for further work. 8, The next meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee will be in the summer of 1985, But in early February 1985 there will be a meeting of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on Public International Law which provides us with the best opportunity to consult our European partners on this type of subject. Now that we are entering a new phase with a single basic text we need to review our present approach and coordinate detailed UK views within Whitehall, ARGUMENT I think that our existing approach, to work constructively hout commitment to the end product, remains valid. Relations with the many Commonwealth countries who are concerned about mercenaries alone require it, . Alternative approaches are unattractive. Withdrawal from the Committee would not stop its work. Nor would our absence from the drafting process reduce any eventual pressure on us to sign a convention, Working deliberately to stall the Committee's proceedings would probably soon become apparent, It could only sour relations with other Committee members. We should also bear in mind that it is not uncommon for the UK to take part in negotiations on an international instrument which we subsequently decide not to sign or ratify. 9 in the Ad Hoc Committee but witl Ne el NC R Williams CONFIDENTIAL