G.R. No. 178835. February 13, 2009. NACHURA, J.
paragraph 75 of which provides that: (75) Full-time teachers
MAGIS YOUNG ACHIEVERS' LEARNING CENTER vs. MANALO
Facts:
 On April 18, 2002, respondent Adelaida P. Manalo was hired
as a teacher and acting principal of petitioner Magis Young
Achievers’ Learning Center with a monthly salary of
₱15,000.00. Respondent wrote a letter of resignation
addressed to Violeta T. Cariño due to personal and family
reasons. Respondent received a letter of termination from
petitioner, stating that the position of PRINCIPAL will be
abolished next school year. Therefore, the petitioners regret to
inform the respondent that the former can no longer renew the
latter’s contract, which will expire on March 31, 2003.
 On April 4, 2003, respondent instituted against petitioner a
Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of 13th month
pay, with a prayer for reinstatement, award of full backwages
and moral and exemplary damages, claiming that her
termination violated the provisions of her employment contract,
and that the alleged abolition of the position of Principal was
not among the grounds for termination by an employer under
Article 282 of the Labor Code. She further asserted that
petitioner infringed Article 283 of the Labor Code, as the
required 30-day notice to DOLE and to her as the employee,
and the payment of her separation pay were not complied
with. She also claimed that she was terminated from service
for the alleged expiration of her employment, but that her
contract did not provide for a fixed term or period. She likewise
prayed for the payment of her 13th month pay under PD No.
851.
 Petitioner, in its position paper, countered that respondent was
legally terminated because the one-year probationary period,
from April 1, 2002 to March 3, 2003, had already lapsed and
she failed to meet the criteria set by the school pursuant to the
Manual of Regulation for Private Schools, adopted by the then
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
who have rendered three years of satisfactory service shall be
considered permanent.
 LA: LA rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal, including the other claims of respondent, for lack of
merit, except that it ordered the payment of her 13th month
pay in the amount of ₱3,750.00. It found out that complainant
was not dismissed, much less, illegally. On the contrary, she
resigned. It is hard for the LA to imagine complainant would
accede to sign a resignation letter as a precondition to her
hiring considering her educational background. Thus, in the
absence of any circumstance tending to show she was
probably coerced her resignation must be upheld.
 NLRC: On appeal, on October 28, 2005, the (NLRC) reversed
the Arbiter’s judgment. Petitioner was ordered to reinstate
respondent as a teacher, who shall be credited with one-year
service of probationary employment, and to pay her the
amounts of ₱3,750.00 and ₱325,000.00 representing her 13th
month pay and backwages, respectively. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was denied in the NLRC’s Resolution
dated January 31, 2006.
 CA: Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
The CA, in its Decision dated January 31, 2007, affirmed the
NLRC decision and dismissed the petition.
Issues:
I. W/N THE RESIGNATION OF RESPONDENT MANALO DID NOT
BECOME EFFECTIVE DUE TO ALLEGED LACK OF ACCEPTANCE.
II. W/N RESPONDENT MANALO IS A PERMANENT EMPLOYEE;
III. W/N THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT DID NOT STIPULATE A PERIOD.
Ruling:
I. Yes. The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the
resignation of the respondent is not valid, not only because there was
no express acceptance thereof by the employer, but because there is
a cloud of doubt as to the voluntariness of respondent’s resignation.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a
situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be
sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and that he has no
other choice but to dissociate himself from employment. Voluntary
resignation is made with the intention of relinquishing an office,
accompanied by the act of abandonment. It is the acceptance of an
employee’s resignation that renders it operative. Furthermore, well-
entrenched is the rule that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of
a complaint for illegal dismissal. To be valid, the resignation must be
unconditional, with the intent to operate as such; there must be a clear
intention to relinquish the position. In this case, respondent actively
pursued her illegal dismissal case against petitioner, such that she
cannot be said to have voluntarily resigned from her job.
II. No. There should be no question that the employment of the
respondent, as teacher, in petitioner school on April 18, 2002 is
probationary in character, consistent with standard practice in private
schools. In light of our disquisition above, the Court cannot subscribe
to the proposition that the respondent has acquired regular or
permanent tenure as teacher. She had rendered service as such only
from April 18, 2002 until March 31, 2003. She has not completed the
requisite three-year period of probationary employment, as provided
in the Manual. She cannot, by right, claim permanent status.
There should also be no doubt that respondent’s appointment as
Acting Principal is merely temporary, or one that is good until another
appointment is made to take its place. An "acting" appointment is
essentially a temporary appointment, revocable at will. The
undisturbed unanimity of cases shows that one who holds a
temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment
can be terminated any time at the pleasure of the appointing power
without need to show that it is for cause. Further, in La Salette of
Santiago v. NLRC, we acknowledged the customary arrangement in
private schools to rotate administrative positions, e.g., Dean or
Principal, among employees, without the employee so appointed
attaining security of tenure with respect to these positions.
III. No. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure during
the term of their probationary employment such that they may only be
terminated for cause as provided for by law, or if at the end of the
probationary period, the employee failed to meet the reasonable
standards set by the employer at the time of the employee’s
engagement. Undeniably, respondent was hired as a probationary
teacher and, as such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show by
competent evidence that she did not meet the standards set by the
school. This requirement, petitioner failed to discharge. To note, the
termination of respondent was effected by that letter stating that she
was being relieved from employment because the school authorities
allegedly decided, as a cost-cutting measure, that the position of
"Principal" was to be abolished. Nowhere in that letter was respondent
informed that her performance as a school teacher was less than
satisfactory.
Thus, in light of Espiritu Santo Parochial School v. NLRC case
that, in the absence of an express period of probation for private
school teachers, the three-year probationary period provided by the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools must apply likewise to the
case of respondent. In other words, absent any concrete and
competent proof that her performance as a teacher was unsatisfactory
from her hiring on April 18, 2002 up to March 31, 2003, respondent is
entitled to continue her three-year period of probationary period, such
that from March 31, 2003, her probationary employment is deemed
renewed for the following two school years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated January 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 29, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.