Linking Dynamic Systems Theory and Fract PDF

Linking Dynamic Systems theory & Fractal Catalytic Theory with Standard Representation Theory using PE-SE framework
Vimal RLP
3 June 2009
Copyright © 2009 (except quotes used from other authors) by Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal and Vision Research
Institute.
Author’s permission is needed for re-producing and/or quoting any portion except the text quoted from other
authors. For referring, the following content should be included: Vimal, R. L. P. (2009). Classical and Quantum
Physics. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research, 2(4), Available at
http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2009-Vimal-Classical-Quantum-Physics-LVCR-II(iv)-X.pdf. [Updated on April 14,
2010]. Still under development. Comments and suggestions are most welcome and should be emailed to rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in.
Running title: Dynamic Systems theory & Standard Representation Theory
Linking Dynamic Systems theory & Fractal Catalytic Theory with Standard
Representation Theory using PE-SE framework
RAM LAKHAN PANDEY VIMAL

Vision Research Institute, 428 Great Road, Suite 11, Acton, MA 01720 USA;
Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India;
Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer Education Institute, Pendra, Bilaspur, C.G.
495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East of Hanuman Mandir, Betiahata,
Gorakhpur, U.P. 273001 India
rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in; http://www.geocities.com/rlpvimal/
Submitted: ; Revised:
Abstract
In Vimal [J Integr Neurosci 7:49–73, 2008], to address the explanatory gap of materialism, it was
hypothesized that strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons) have material and mental
aspects, which act as the carriers of superimposed fundamental subjective experiences (SEs)/proto-
experiences (PEs). In addition, neural Darwinism and (conjugate) matching process help in
generating and selecting a specific SE in a neural-net. Vimal (2008) proposed that this PE-SE
framework is complementary to all materialistic models and has the capability to integrate such
models. In this article, we integrate three competing models that strive to address structure,
function, and experience: (i) Standard Representational Theory (SRT) and (ii) Dynamic-systems
theory (DST) and (iii) Fractal Catalytic Theory (FCT). The SRT proposes that functions, such as
perception (such as detection and discrimination) and action, are because of the representations of
objects and events in brain, and SE emerges when feed forward stimulus dependent signals interact
with cognition related feedback signals in relevant neural-nets. DST proposes that perception,
action, and SE arise/emerge from some kind of unspecified interaction between the environment and
organism, which is not reducible to the components. The FCT is a non-representational model
linked with DST, which proposes that functions are catalytic processes and SE is a fundamental
entity that emerges as an organism mediates/catalyzes the transitions in its surround/environment.
In this article, we will show that the data related to structure and function can be explained by both
models: some data better by SRT and some better by DST-FCT. Some DST is compatible with and
complementary to some SRT. Moreover, both models use emergence hypothesis (SE component of
consciousness is an emerged entity) to link SE with structure and function. In addition, we argue that
both types of emergence are equivalent because (i) external environment in DST-FCT is equivalent to
external stimulus-signal input to the feed-forward pathway in SRT and (ii) the organism in DST-FCT
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Linking Dynamic Systems theory & Fractal Catalytic Theory with Standard Representation Theory using PE-SE framework Vimal RLP
is equivalent to organism’s feedback signals in SRT. It is argued that SRT and DST are equivalent
because both can explain most of the same data, and hence they can be linked. In addition, FCT could
also be linked with DST and also SRT. When the term emergence is further unpacked in terms of
elemental SEs/PEs, we get the PE-SE framework, from which both SRT and DST-FCT can be
derived, and hence both can be linked.
Keywords: Standard representational theory; dynamic-systems theory, fractal catalytic theory;

quantum physics; classical physics; dual-aspect model; elementary particles; string; fermions;
bosons; proto-experiences; subjective experiences; structure, function, and experience; emergence,
conjugate matching, classical matching process; selection process; explanatory gaps; hard problem;
access and phenomenal awareness; attention; re-entry; memory; wakefulness; threshold; co-
evolution and co-development of mind and brain; chaos theory; self; self-organization.
1. Introduction
Our long history of science suggests that whenever there are two competing models that can explain
the data almost equally well, then these two apparently opposite views might be somehow linked.
One example is well known wave-particle duality in Physics that initially stimulated heated debates
at the turn of 20th century. This was later resolved by integrating and finding the link between them,
namely E = mc2 = hν, where E is the energy, m is the relativistic mass, c is speed of light, h is Planck
constant, and ν is the frequency or reciprocal of wavelength of material entity. It should be noted
that certain data, such as photoelectric effect, could be explained better in particle-framework,
whereas some other data, such as interference effect in slit experiment, can be explained better in
wave-framework. One could argue that the case for ‘Standard Representational Theory (SRT)’ vs.
‘Dynamic-systems theory (DST) & fractal catalytic theory (FCT)’ is analogous to the above the wave
theory vs. particle theory.
Inspired by such an example, in this article, we have attempted to link two competing models (SRT
and DST-FCT) that address structure and function well, but strive to explain the subjective
experiences (SEs) component of consciousness1
Fractal Catalytic Theory (FCT) is a more general theory, which encompasses both DST and SRT (see
below). The integration of FCT with DST is given in (Carpenter, Davia, & Vimal, 2009). The
integration of FCT with SRT is concisely discussed in Section 2.
1 According to (Vimal, 2008b), “Forty such meanings [attributed to the tern consciousness] were identified and
categorized based on function and experience, some overlapping but others apparently mutually exclusive –
and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions of authors’ views about the basis
of consciousness, or opinions about the significance of aspects of its contents. The prospects for reaching any
single, agreed definition of consciousness thus appear remote. However, much confusion could be avoided if
authors were always to specify which aspects of consciousness they refer to when they use the term. An
example is outlined of how this can be done (using the PE-SE framework).”
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2. Standard Representational Theory (SRT) and Dynamic-systems theory&

fractal catalytic theory ((DST-FCT)
2.1. SRT
(Carpenter et al., 2009) elaborated SRT as follows: (i) “When an event occurs in the environment, ambient
energy from the event impinges on the receptors of the organism. A signal is transmitted by the nervous
system to the brain for processing. The theory assumes that the organism forms a representation of the
stimulus, and the experience of an organism is assumed to correlate with these physical processes. […] [SRT
hypothesizes that] the world we perceive is independent of us, an implicit foundation of most neuroscience
and cognitive science theories. They assume that perception occurs as an organism represents the features,
objects, and events of its environment. […] [In SRT, neural activity is] a code or a representation of an
independent environment, [i.e., neural pattern is a representation of the stimuli or external world]. […]
Concepts and thoughts, rather than our dynamic experience, may correspond more closely to the
representations that are proposed to constitute our mental life in the standard paradigm [or SRT]”.
SRT is represented by the work of (A) Type-A materialists (Dennett, 1991; Dretske, 1995; Harman,
1990), (B) Type-B materialists ((Block & Stalnaker, 1999; Hill, 1997; Levin, 2008; Levine, 1983; Loar,
1997; Perry, 2001; Tye, 1995) and perhaps (Baars, 1997; Searle, 2000)), and (C) Type-C materialists
(Churchland, 2003; Crick & Koch, 2003; Edelman, 1993, 2003; Hamker, 2004; Koch, 2004a; Nagel,
1974; Tononi, 2004; Van Gulick, 2001).
The SRT involves four major pathways: (i) the axonal-dendritic pathway for neuro-computation
(Crick & Koch, 1990; Crick & Koch, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Litt, Eliasmith, Kroona, Weinstein, &
Thagarda, 2006; Steriade, McCormick, & Sejnowski, 1993), including neural Darwinism (Edelman,
1993, 2003), (ii) the dendritic-dendritic pathway for quantum-computation (Hameroff & Penrose,
1998), (iii) astro-glia-neuronal pathway for neuronal transmission (Pereira Jr., 2007), and (iv)
pathway with extra-cellular field, volume transmission, and gaseous diffusion (Poznanski, 2002)
and/or information transmission via soliton propagation (Kole, Letzkus, & Stuart, 2007; Penn,
Riquelme, Feller, & Shatz, 1998; Xu, Huang, Takagaki, & Wu, 2007). All four pathways related to
information transmission contribute to structure and function; their percent contribution will depend
on a specific task, which needs further investigation. The SRT models (Crick & Koch, 1998, 2003;
Edelman, 1993, 2003, 2004; Edwards, 2006; Globus, 1998; Jibu, Hagan, Hameroff, Pribram, & Yasue, 1994; Jibu
& Yasue, 1995; Jibu, Yasue, & Hagan, 1997; Koch, 2004b; Searle, 2007; Searle, 2000; Stapp, 1993; Umezawa,
1993) link structure and function very well, but fail to link subjective experiences (SEs) because of the
Levine’s explanatory gap (Chalmers, 1995; Levine, 1983) related to materialism (i.e., SRT and DST).
The SRT proposes that functions, such as perception (such as detection and discrimination) and
action, are because of the representations of objects and events in brain, and SE emerges when feed
forward stimulus dependent signals interact with cognition (attention) related fronto-parietal
feedback signals in relevant neural-nets. However, the term emergence used in SRT needs further
unpacking.
2.2. DST
(Carpenter et al., 2009) elaborated DST as follows: “Dynamic systems theorists ((Kelso, 1995; Port & Van
Gelder, 1995; Thelen, 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994; Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2005) as well as others
(Bateson, 2000; Bohm, 1994; Shanon, 1991; Shaw & Bransford, 1977; Wagman & Miller, 2003; Wheeler, 2005))
have argued that perception and action are emergent phenomena, arising from the interaction of an organism
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and its environment. For example, when we walk on a beach, the compactness and the slope of the sand is
changed as a foot goes down and simultaneously the sand impacts our walking. […] the neural pattern is a
dynamic that is induced by the stimulus; it is not a representation of the world.” One could argue that
perception, action, and SE, in DST, arise/emerge from some kind of unspecified interaction between
the environment and organism, which is not reducible to the components.
2.3. DST-FCT model

The FCT has been integrated with DST in (Carpenter et al., 2009); according to them “we will first
reframe perception from the vantage of the ability of an organism to live in an environment. Such a reframing
is the foundation of a theory of living systems called Autopoiesis (or self-making) by Maturana and Varela
(Maturana & Varela, 1980; Maturana & Varela, 1987). Maturana (Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, & Pitts, 1959)
[…] was dissatisfied with the standard account in terms of an organism encoding and representing an
independent world. […] Its reframing of perception and its break with representational theories of perception
provide a foundation for the current theory [FCT]. […] Davia (Davia, 2006) saw that this reframing of
perception relates to the process of catalysis, and he argued that catalysis can be generalized to levels beyond
the enzyme. The Fractal Catalytic theory proposes each organelle, cell, organ, etc., up to and including the
entire organism maintains its organization by mediating the transitions in its environment in the same way
that an enzyme does. […] The word fractal is typically associated with insight of Mandlebrot (Mandlebrot,
1977) that Nature's geometric structures, such as ferns and trees, are scale invariant. In the present model
[FCT], ‘fractal’ refers to scale-invariant catalytic processes. (Note that proteins and biomacromolecules also
have fractal structures, which may be part of why the fractal formalism is useful in describing the dynamics of
their diffusion and kinetics (Dewey, 1997)).”
According to (Davia, 2006), “The only active chemicals in the environment are the reagents. The catalyst
mediates the reaction between them [the reagents] to produce products and then emerges unchanged to repeat
the process. […] DNA undergoes conformational changes (a characteristic of enzymes) and participates in
many reactions associated with transcription and emerges unchanged.” Similarly, in DST-FCT, one could
argue that organism’s free will or self (catalyst) mediates/catalyzes the interaction between
environmental stimulus related signal and the organism’s cognition related signal (reactants) to
produce SE (product). One could also argue that environmental stimulus (catalyst)
mediates/catalyzes the interaction between environmental stimulus related signal and the
organism’s cognition related signal (reactants) to produce SE (product) and the stimulus (catalyst)
remains unchanged to repeat the process.
To sum up, the DST-FCT is a non-representational model, which proposes that functions are catalytic
processes. A subjective experience (SE) emerges as an organism mediates its surrounding
environment, i.e., as the environment catalyzes the transitions from the reactants to a product.
Reactants are organism and its surrounding environment, the product is a SE, and the catalyst is the
environment (Carpenter et al., 2009; Davia, 2006; Vimal & Davia, 2008). However, the term emergence
used in DST-FCT needs further unpacking, similar to that in SRT.
2.4. Can Fractal Catalysis also be in the Standard Representation Theory?
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Although FCT is compatible 2 more with DST, one could however argue that fractal catalysis could
also be in SRT because of the following examples.
(1) From (Vimal & Davia, 2008), “traveling waves in the brain were observed by (Xu et al., 2007) who
reported that (i) visually evoked primary wave originated in V1 and was ‘compressed’ (via GABBA inhibition)
when propagating to V2, which then reflected and propagated backward into V1, (ii) the
compression/reflection pattern appears to be organized by an internal mechanism associated with visual
processing.”
(2) “(Kole et al., 2007) reported digital to analog transformations in living systems: action potentials are the
primary binary (digital) signal used by neurons for communication within the central nervous system. They
showed that the site of action potential initiation in neurons, the axon initial segment, serves as a critical locus
where these binary signals can be modified in a graded (analog) manner” (Vimal & Davia, 2008).
(3) “In the retina, spontaneous activity takes the form of traveling waves, which are essential for the
organization of retina to lateral geniculate nuclei pre-birth connectivity (Penn et al., 1998)” (Vimal & Davia,
2008).
(4) According to (Davia, 2006), “Calcium waves, which form the basis of many cellular processes are
autocatalytic processes (Sneyd & Sherratt, 1997). The action potential is another example of a self perpetuating
autocatalytic cycle that exhibits soliton like behaviour (Aslanidi & Mornev, 1999). […] In fact, it is suggested
that the entire cell may be understood as an autocatalytic cycle (Weber & Depew, 2001). […] There is a variety
of traveling wave forms in excitable media -- spiral, branching, and circular forms are common. For example,
spiral forms have been observed in calcium waves at the cellular level (Lechleiter, Girard, Peralta, & Clapham,
1991) and in isolated chicken retinas and the brain tissue of rats (Gorelova & Bures, 1983; Koroleva & Bures,
1979). […] The basilar membrane is an excitable medium, and (Von Békésy, 1947; Von Békésy, 1960)
demonstrated that its motion, consequent on a sound stimulus, is a traveling wave (Duke & Julicher, 2003) […]
The basilar membrane is not a passive ‘receiver’ of sound stimuli. Its frequency responses are highly
nonlinear, and its sensitivity is increased by active feedback processes (Rhode & Recio, 2001; Rhode & Robles,
1974). Specialized hair bundles have the effect of altering the dynamic response of the basilar membrane and
thus altering its sensitivity to particular frequencies in real time (Moore, 2003).” (Davia, 2006) elaborated
further that biological processes where nonlinear traveling waves have been observed or theorized
are microscopic processes, such as microtubules (Sataric, Zakula, & Tuszynski, 1992), and
macroscopic processes such as the retina (Gorelova & Bures, 1983) and the brain (Koroleva & Bures,
1979).
(5) One could argue that FCT in SRT could also address the formation/encoding of memory and
recall because one of its essential ingredients is action potential that exhibits soliton like behavior.
(6) (Vimal & Davia, 2008) addressed ‘phenomenal time’ using FCT and SRT based temporal
frequency (TF) tuned mechanisms and suggested that they are complementary to each other because
the former starts from right and the latter from left in the temporal contrast sensitivity function
(sensitivity vs. TF) plot.
2 One could argue that though there are different versions of both DST, but the general notion of emergence
from DST is compatible with FCT; both reject the view that the organism is representing their environment.
DST proposes that perception and action arise from some kind of unspecified interaction between the two that
is irreducible to the components. The fractal aspect of DST is also compatible with FCT. On the other hand,
many of the DS theorists, such as (Thelen, 1993; Thelen & Smith, 1994) and (Kelso, 1995), discuss behavior, not
experience; therefore, further research is needed to investigate if FCT is strongly compatible with DST.
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(7) According to (Edwards, 2006) “For the full action potential this coupling [of electrical and mechanical
forces] leads to the formation of an energy-conserving form of wave called a soliton. … This oscillation must
coexist with, and in a sense listen to, the electrical waves generated by signals coming in at synapses.”
Thus, one could argue that FCT encompasses both DST and SRT.
2.5. Are DST-FCT and SRT equivalent?

The term ‘unspecified interaction between the environment and organism’ in DST (Section 2.2) or
DST-FCT (Section 2.3) needs unpacking. Where would this environment-organism interaction
occur? One could argue that this interaction in DST-FCT is the same as the interaction between
environmental-stimulus-dependent signals in feed forward pathway (for example retina → LGN →
V1 → ’V4/V8/VO’ for color)3 and organism’s frontoparietal cognition (such as attention and
memory) related feedback signals in a neural-net (such as ‘V4/V8/VO’ net for color) in SRT (Vimal,
200x-a). One could further argue that the emergence4 of experience in DST-FCT is the same as the
emergence of experience in SRT. This is because an experience is an experience, does not matter it
happens via DST-FCT or SRT.
Furthermore, the relevant neural signals could be expressed either in terms of solitons as implied by
(Kole et al., 2007; Penn et al., 1998; Xu et al., 2007) in DST-FCT/SRT or by neural-signals via four
other pathways in SRT (Section 2.1). Thus, both ‘DST-FCT’ and SRT are equivalent in analogy to
wave and particle theories are equivalent. The term equivalent is used in the following sense: two
apparently different frameworks are equivalent if they are capable of explaining the same data. The
term link is used in the following sense: when two theories are equivalent then they are linked. In this
sense, SRT and DST-FCT are equivalent and hence linked.
Furthermore, in Vimal and Davia (2008), we suggested, “There are two hypotheses for phenomenal time:
(i) classical psychophysical approach, which leads to temporal frequency tuned mechanisms that are not
sensitive at temporal frequencies equal to or greater than CFF and (ii) quantum approach, where we argue
that the problem of the subjective experience of time (phenomenal time) can be addressed using quantum
coherence – specifically, a solitonic (traveling wave) coherent state similar to a Bose-Einstein condensate. In
our view, both hypotheses are complementary to each other.” First hypothesis is clearly SRT based
temporal frequency tuned mechanisms and second one is DST-FCT based solitonic coherent state
similar to a Bose-Einstein condensate. This also suggests that SRT and DST-FCT are equivalent.
As discussed in Section 2.4, FCT encompasses both DST and SRT; therefore, FCT may be an
underlying micro-mechanism for both DST and SRT, leading to suggestion that DST and SRT are
equivalent.
3The color area ‘V8/V4/VO’ refers to visual area V8 of Tootell-group (Hadjikhani, Liu, Dale, Cavanagh, &
Tootell, 1998; Tootell, Tsao, & Vanduffel, 2003), visual area V4 of Zeki-group (Bartels & Zeki, 2000), and VO of
Wandell-group (Wandell, 1999); they are the same human color area (Tootell et al., 2003). VO is ventral-
occipital cortex.
4 According to (Davia, 2006) “ 'Emergence' is a term used to describe the fact that a complex system gives rise
to dynamics that cannot be predicted from their basic constituents.”
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If the above hypotheses are true then it would be interesting to investigate further how to link SRT
and DST-FCT in analogy to the link between wave and particle theory such as E = mc2 = hν.
2.6. Structure, function, and subjective experience in SRT and DST-FCT
Consider an example related to how subjects experience redness.
In SRT, the structure is red-green opponent channel related ‘V4/V8/VO’ neural-net; function is the
detection and discrimination of long wavelength light from other lights; SE is redness. SE redness
emerges in this neural-net when long wavelength light dependent input feed forward (retina →
LGN → V1 → ‘V4/V8/VO’) signals interact with fronto-parietal attention related feed back signals
in this neural-net.
In DST-FCT, the structure is a subject/organism; function is the detection and discrimination of

environmental red color object from other color objects; SE emerges as a subject mediates its
surrounding environment of red object. In other words, SE redness emerges as the red object
catalyzes the transitions from the reactants to a product; reactants are the subject and its
surrounding environment of red object, the product is SE redness, and the catalyst is the red object.
As a subject moves around the red object, the subject experiences redness.
Both SRT and DST-FCT are materialist frameworks because both assume that SEs emerge from non-
experiential matter, such as brain or brain-environment-interaction. This leads to the famous
explanatory gap of materialism (Chalmers, 1995; Levine, 1983): how SEs can be created from matter
that has no shred of evidence of having SEs. Both SRT and DST-FCT can link structure and function
well; however, both fail in linking SEs with structure and function. To link all three entities
satisfactorily, we need to unpack the term emergence.
2.7. Unpacking of the term emergence using PE-SE framework
One could argue that both types of emergence are equivalent because (i) external environment in
DST-FCT is equivalent to external stimulus-signal input to the feed forward pathway in SRT and (ii)
the organism in DST-FCT is equivalent to organism’s feedback signals in SRT. Once this is accepted,
then we can unpack the term ‘emergence’ using the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c) and its
extensions (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007; MacGregor & Vimal, 2008; Vimal, 200x-a, 200x-b, 200x-c, 2008a;
Vimal & Davia, 2007).
The PE-SE framework is consistent with ‘non-reductive physicalism’ and can be summarized from
(Vimal, 2008c), “Deterministic reductive monism and non-reductive substance dualism are two opposite
views for consciousness, and both have serious problems. An alternative view is needed. For this, we
hypothesize that strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons) have two aspects: (i) elemental proto-
experiences (PEs) as phenomenal aspect, and (ii) mass, charge, and spin as material aspect. Elemental PEs are
hypothesized to be the properties of elementary particles and their interactions, which are composed of
irreducible fundamental subjective experiences (SEs)/PEs that are in superimposed form in elementary
particles and in their interactions. Since SEs/PEs are superimposed, elementary particles are not specific to
any SE/PE; they (and all inert matter) are carriers of SEs/PEs, and hence, appear as non-experiential material
entities. Furthermore, our hypothesis is that matter and associated elemental PEs co-evolved and co-
developed into neural-nets and associated neural-net PEs (neural Darwinism), respectively. The signals
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related to neural PEs interact in a neural-net and neural-net PEs emerges from random process of self-
organization. The neural-net PEs are a set of SEs embedded in the neural-net by a non-computational or non-
algorithmic process. The non-specificity of elementary particles is transformed into the specificity of neural-
nets by neural Darwinism [and the matching and selection process]. The specificity of SEs emerges when
feedforward and feedback signal interacts in the neuropil and are dependent on wakefulness (i.e., activation)
attention, re-entry between neural populations, working memory, stimulus at above threshold, and neural net
PE signals. This PE-SE framework integrates reductive and non-reductive views, complements the existing
models, bridges the explanatory gaps, and minimizes the problem of causation.”
According to (Vimal, 2008d), “The conjugate matching of Globus (Globus, 2006; Globus, 1995a, 1995b;
Globus, 1998; Globus, 2005) and matching and selection mechanism of PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c) can be
integrated. This integration leads to the matching between material aspect (neural activities) of input feed
forward neural activities and that of the feedback cognition related neural-net; this addresses the link between
structure and function. In addition, the integration leads to the matching between the mental aspect (SEs) of
input feed forward signal and that of the feedback cognition related signals; this addresses the experiential
component. The quantum conjugate matching, classical matching, and selection mechanisms lead to
realization of SEs in neural-nets. Thus, all three entities (structure, function, and subjective experience) can be
linked along all four major pathways of information transmission in brain [as described in Section 2.1].”
The term emergence can be unpacked in terms of two hypotheses in the PE-SE framework as detailed
in (Vimal, 200x-b, 200x-c, 2008a). From (Vimal, 200x-a), “The emergence of SE redness can be qualitatively
unpacked as follows (Vimal, 2008c): (i) there exist a ‘virtual reservoir’ (detailed in (Vimal, 2008c)) that stores all
possible fundamental SEs/PEs, (ii) the interaction of long wavelength light-stimulus dependent feed-forward
and feedback signals in the ‘V4/V8/VO’ Red-Green color neural-net creates a specific neural-net state, (iii) this
specific state is assigned to a specific SE, redness, from the virtual reservoir during neural Darwinism (co-
evolution, co-development and sensorimotor co-tuning by the evolutionary process of adaptation and natural
selection), (iv) this specific SE, redness, is embedded as a memory trace of neural-net-PE, and (v) when a
specific redness-related stimulus (such as long wavelength light) is presented to the ‘V4/V8/VO’ Red-Green
color neural-net, the associated specific SE, such as redness, is selected by the matching and selection process
(Vimal, 2008a, 2008d) and experienced by this net. Let us call the steps (i)-(v) hypothesis H1. The generation of
specificity involved in premises (iii)-(v) can be further unpacked using neural Darwinism (Vimal, 2008c). […]
Alternative hypothesis is as follows. According to the principle of emergence, the physical property of salt
(NaCl) emerges from the interaction of its constituents Na+ and Cl- ions because the property of salt is not
present in its constituents (Vimal, 2008a). In analogy to this, a specific SE, such as redness, can emerge in a
neural-net from interaction of its constituent neural-PEs in ‘V4/V8/VO’-color neural-net: call it hypothesis H2.
For example, the reportable SE redness might have emerged during the interaction of two types of signals: (i)
feedforward long wavelength (say 600 nm) stimulus dependent PE-carrying-neural-signal from retina to LGN
to V1 to ‘V4/V8/VO’ color area (call it FF600) and (ii) feedback fronto-parietal attention related re-entrant PE-
carrying-neural-signal (call it FB), i.e., redness related to 600 nm light is SE redness600 = (FF600)∗(FB), in analogy
to NaCl = (Na+)∗(Cl-).”
Thus, the ‘emergence’ can be unpacked in terms of elemental PEs, i.e., SEs/PEs (as in H1) or PE (as
in H2) superposed in string or elementary particles (fermions and bosons), which is common to both
SRT and DST-FCT.
2.8. Critical data for SRT and DST-FCT
2.8.1. Can SRT be rejected by the following data and critiques?
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According to (Carpenter et al., 2009), “[1] Several phenomena challenge the assumption that we are
representing an independent world. [One is the colored shadows demonstration [shadow phenomenon]
(Maturana & Varela, 1987) (pp. 20-22). The demo requires two overlapping sources of light, one of which is a
white light and the other, red. Then place your hand in the beam of red light. The shadow cast by your hand
on the wall is perceived as bluish-green, although if you measured the wavelengths in the shadow there is no
predominance of the wavelengths that are typically called green or blue. This demonstration helps us to stop
assuming that the colors that we experience are determined solely by the features of the light reflected from
objects.] Several theorists have pointed out how the color perception depends on the interaction of the
organism with the stimuli (Maturana & Varela, 1987); for example, birds perceive four dimensions of color,
unlike the human’s three. [2] The assumption that an organism perceives an independent environment also
has been challenged by many dynamic-systems theorists (Kelso, 1995; Port & Van Gelder, 1995; Thelen, 1993;
Thelen & Smith, 1994; Van Orden et al., 2005) as well as others (Bateson, 2000; Bohm, 1994; Shanon, 1991; Shaw
& Bransford, 1977; Wagman & Miller, 2003; Wheeler, 2005). Dynamic systems theorists have argued that
perception and action are emergent phenomena, arising from the interaction of an organism and its
environment. For example, when we walk on a beach, the compactness and the slope of the sand is changed as
a foot goes down and simultaneously the sand impacts our walking. […] [3] [Gestalt psychologist] Shepard
(Shepard, 1984) (p. 433) wrote that "the organism is, at any given moment, tuned to resonate to the incoming
patterns that correspond to the invariants that are significant for it." The perception psychologist Gibson
(Gibson, 1979)(p. 249) speculated: "the perceptual system simply extracts the invariants from the flowing
array; it resonates to the invariant structure or is attuned to it." […] Maturana (Lettvin et al., 1959) had worked
in the early microelectrode research on feature-detector cells in vision (including the famous article, "What the
frog's eye tells the frog's brain"). He was dissatisfied with the standard account in terms of an organism
encoding and representing an independent world. He had the insight that the problem of perception is
identical to the problem of how living systems are organized and how they live and persist in their
environments (Capra, 1996). Maturana argued that the environment is brought forth through the organization
of the organism and its interaction with its surround. For example, a frog, fish and swimmer in the same pond
unfold different experiences. Autopoiesis answered the question, "What is life?" Its answer was that a living
entity is an organizational system that forms a semi-permeable boundary and maintains itself. […] [4] a
minority of researchers have argued that this neural activity is not a code or a representation of an
independent environment (Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela, 1995). […] when reflecting on the significance of
the neural processes of a rabbit in response to an odor, Freeman (Freeman, 1999a) said (p. 151): ...(When
expected stimuli arrive) they elicit the construction by nonlinear dynamics of macroscopic, spatially coherent
oscillatory patterns that cover the entire cortex....The emergent pattern is not a representation of a stimulus,
[…] It is a phase transition that is induced by a stimulus, followed by a construction of a pattern that is shaped
by the synaptic modulation among cortical neurons from prior learning. [...] It is a dynamic action pattern that
creates and carries the meaning of the stimulus for the subject. […] [5] Sensory substitution […] people
practice with devices that translate the output from a camera's scan into a vibro-tactile array that might be
located on the back, tongue or hand of the person. As a person moves his head or body, the vibro-tactile
pattern dynamically changes, giving rise to the experience of a visuo-spatial environment (Lenay, Gapenne,
Hanneton, Marque, & Genouel, 2003). […] Practice with such devices is necessary to structure the user, and
this point is illustrated by research with a visual-auditory substitution system, aptly called vOICeTM. With it,
the left-to-right, top-to-bottom scan of a video input is mapped onto sounds, with pitch indicating elevation
and loudness indicating brightness (Meijer, 1992). [Furthermore, one could argue that the data related to
cochlear implants (Finn, 2003) might not be explained by SRT.] […] Also, other similar phenomena are not
uncommon. For example, an individual who is blind but skilled with a cane perceives the environment at the
tip of the cane. [Rowers feel the water through their oars; skilled riders experience the terrain with their horse.]
Researchers have found that given sufficient practice, well-engineered exploratory equipment becomes
transparent, and perceivers can experience their environment directly (Carello & Turvey, 2000). […] [6] Self-
perception […] When we experience an environment we also experience ourselves, and typically that includes
a sense of our body (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007; Llinás, 2001). […] So even our sense of our own bodies is not
given but arises in a perceptual process. This conclusion is supported by the illusions in body perception
studied by Ramachandran (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). In one illusion, after a brief set-up, many
participants experience a desk that is physically above their hand as replacing or merged with it. In another,
9
participants experience their nose as located two feet in front of their face. The malleability of body perception
is also evident in the successful use of an artificial prosthesis, which requires merging it with the now illusory
sense of body. Moreover, its loss can result in a paradoxical phantom prosthesis (Ramachandran & Blakeslee,
1998). ”
[7] According to (Davia, 2006), “What is the relationship between relatively simple processes, such as
catalyzed chemical reactions, that are consistent with a basic understanding of thermodynamic principles, and
processes that are understood to involve information in the form of codes, symbols or representations [SRT]?
These latter processes [SRT] seem to require levels of organization that are more difficult to reconcile with
thermodynamic considerations. […] It would be more difficult to control the evolution of a traveling wave
associated with the locomotion of a fish, for example, if the brain had to convert from some other ‘format’ to a
non-linear traveling wave. […] This proposal challenges the assumption that neurons communicate with each
other via some, as yet, un-deciphered code. It suggests instead that the significance of a neural event is that it
occurs at a certain place and at a certain time within an overall context of neural events taking place in space
and time. It is the direct correspondence between the relative position and timing of events in the perceptual
field and the brain that is of primary importance. Indeed, there is a direct topological mapping between the
retina and the V1 layer in the visual cortex (Zeki, 1992). What this means is that a triangle in the visual field,
for example, translates to a triangle of neural excitability and/or suppression in the V1 layer. The relative
spatial and temporal relationships implicit in the triangle are preserved in terms of how the medium is
structured. The mapping of spatial and temporal relationships in the visual system may be seen as parallel to
the frequency mapping of sound in the auditory system, as described earlier in reference to the research of
Von Bekesy and others. The basilar membrane responds at the frequency of the stimulus. This response is
translated directly to neural activity. If neural processing involved the use of codes, then this would be
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the brain preserves essential spatio-temporal characteristics of the
perceptual domain. […] For an object or event to become an object of cognition it must embody invariance or
symmetries, what is being called ‘structure,’ in space and/or time (Gibson, 1979). If the potential object or
event of perception embodies structure, then via the senses, that structure translates to excitable areas in the
brain that embody invariance or symmetries in space and/or time. Traveling waves in the brain sustain
themselves by releasing this energy, hence, they constitute a process of catalytic mediation. […]
The world is presented to the senses in discrete, discontinuous events. […] It is false to claim that there is
an object to be represented; the object is only implicit in a discrete set of statistical invariance. Therefore, we
cannot claim that the brain represents an object when the object itself is only implicit in a set of discrete events.
[…]The triangle, as it exists in the world, is a discontinuous set of events in space and time. The neural activity
that corresponds to the observation of the triangle is a phenomenon that relates the invariance of the triangle,
that is, the set of geometric spatial and temporal symmetries that the triangle embodies implicitly, into a single
unified dynamic – a traveling wave or soliton. I suggest that the solitonic triangle is not a representation, but
an ontological [the defining characteristics of the objects and phenomena around us] phenomenon. That is to
say, the act of observation unites the boundary conditions (the invariance in space and time that forms the
implicit triangle) into a continuous, self-sustaining dynamic. The triangle of observation exists and persists
because it is a triangle – this represents an ontological state of structure and energy that is rarely discovered at
the macroscopic level. […]I suggest, then, that cognition does not involve representations; rather the brain
makes explicit the implicit ontology of the objects and phenomena around us. […] cognition is not consequent
upon representation; rather it is to be correlated with ontology - phenomenology equals ontology. So, for
example, when we experience a face, we experience each aspect of the face in a dynamic relationship with the
rest. We don’t ‘see’ individual features (unless we choose to); we experience the dynamic relations (invariance
and symmetries) that were implicit in the many faces that we have seen. With the traditional representational
viewpoint of perception, it has been difficult to correlate the qualitative (or phenomenological) aspect of the
conscious experience with objects of perception quantitatively. However, by correlating the conscious
experience with dynamic and relational properties of nonlinear traveling waves, we are a little closer to
understanding the qualitative nature of consciousness.”
10
[8] According to (Velmans, 2007), “Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension,
while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in
the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of
perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” … enactive models locate conscious
phenomenology in the dynamic interaction of organisms with the external world …The reflexive model
accepts that experiences of the world result from dynamic organism-environment interactions, but argues that
such interactions are preconscious. … in closing the gap between the phenomenal world and what we
normally think of as the physical world, the reflexive model resolves one facet of the hard problem of
consciousness. … enactive models … fail to address the hard problem of consciousness.”
[9] According to (van Gelder & Port, 1995), “[T]he dynamical approach is more than just powerful tools;
like the computational approach, it is a worldview. It is not the brain, inner and encapsulated; rather, it is the
whole system comprised of nervous system, body, and environment. The cognitive system is not a discrete
sequential manipulation of static representational structures; rather, it is a structure of mutually and
simultaneously influencing change. The cognitive system does not interact with other aspects of the world by
passing messages or commands; rather, it continuously coevolves with them […] dynamical and
computational systems are fundamentally different kinds of systems, and hence the dynamical and
computational approaches to cognition are fundamentally different in their deepest foundations […]
dynamical systems can be representational without having their rules of evolution defined over
representations. (pp. 2-4, 10, and 12).”
[10] According to (Bechtel, 1998), “DST does offer new ideas as to the format of representations employed
in cognitive systems. With respect to explanation, I argue that some DST models are better seen as conforming
to the covering-law conception of explanation than to the mechanistic conception of explanation implicit in
most cognitive science research. But even here, I argue, DST models are a valuable complement to more
mechanistic cognitive explanations. […] As Andy Clark (Clark, 1996) argues, drawing on numerous research
projects of DST theorists, much of what we take to be cognitive activity depends upon the way we coordinate
our activities with features of the world. Hence, he suggests that the mind may not be fully contained in the
brain, but "leaks" out into the world. […] one of the functions of representations is to stand in for things
outside the system; once a system has representations, it can operate on them and not need the world (Fodor,
1980). Getting rid of representations thus facilitates reconnecting cognition and the world. […] reliable
covariation is not sufficient to establish something as a representation, as opposed to being a natural sign
(Hatfield, 1990) or index (Dretske, 1988). For one thing, it seems an essential aspect of representation that
misrepresentation is possible. […] In connectionist and neuroscience models one generally does not think of
processes operating on representations, but of states produced within the processing system constituting
representations insofar as they are stand-ins in the causal process. Nonetheless, there is still the need for a
coordination between the format of the representation and the process. Only states appropriate to the process
will count as representations. […] When representations are identified in processes, then it is possible for them
to change dynamically. […] representations in DST systems are radically different in format from some others
used in cognitive science, especially propositional representations. […] DST, like connectionist modeling as
well as much work in neuroscience is concerned with representations that figure in processes. […] One
important contribution of DST is that it focuses on representations that change as the system evolves. […] In
adopting this role, though, it is not challenging the use of representations but is a collaborator in
understanding the format of representations. […] A possible construal of van Gelder and other dynamicist's
opposition to representations is that they are repudiating these higher order representations [concepts that
designate objects in the world or linguistic symbols, figures and diagrams used in reasoning and problem
solving], not the more basic sensory representations on which I have been focusing. […] van Gelder's
suggestion is that the DST approach rejects the assumptions of decomposition and localization characteristic
of mechanistic models. Some DST enthusiasts endorse a holistic perspective that is incompatible with
mechanistic decomposition for the systems they analyze […] it is not possible for scientists to develop a linear
model that is adequate to the phenomenon. At this point scientists start to introduce feedback loops and other
11
non-linearities in the attempt to develop adequate models. Such models, in which numerous components
interact, sometimes in a manner that exhibits homeostasis, we call integrated systems. Such systems are not
sequential and cyclic in van Gelder's sense. […] The distinction roughly is between connectionists who
simply employ feedforward networks, which can be decomposed into sequential processing layers, and those
who employ bi-directional interactions between nodes or recurrent connections. These networks constitute
complex dynamical systems which may best be analyzed using tools from DST. […] connectionist models
employ large numbers of components (units and connections), each engaged in the same type of activity,
whereas non-connectionist DST models usually identify relatively few components which carry out quite
different activities […] In the case of non-connectionist DST theorists, the question is whether their
explanatory pursuits are compatible with the search for mechanistic explanations. In many cases they are not
only compatible, they complement that search. […] Assume that we have a correct DST account of motor
behavior (e.g., as proposed in (Kelso, 1995)), of motor development […] , of perception (Turvey & Carello,
1995), or of decision making […] connectionist [DST] models are models of mechanisms […] Accordingly,
Elman has employed tools such as cluster analysis and principal components analysis [to analyze simple
recurrent networks] […] DST provides additional alternatives to the major models of representational format
considered […] while there is a difference here between DST accounts and other cognitive accounts, this does
not render the two approaches incompatible. Indeed, they are complementary” (bold mine).
The above data [1]-[7] can be explained by DST/FCT as discussed in (Carpenter et al., 2009) and
(Davia, 2006). We attempt to investigate if they can also be explained by SRT as follows:
[1]. The shadow phenomenon (Maturana & Varela, 1987) can be explained by SRT if the light
coming from near surround to far surround is also considered. Experience of color involves center
(object)-surround interaction, in addition to many factors such as adaptation, simultaneous contrast,
assimilation and so on. This is similar to color phenomenon observed in Land’s experiments (Land,
1977, 1986), it is now explained if we consider all lights coming from near to far surround and also
the object’s context in the surround/background (Hubel, 1988). Majority’s view is color emerges in
brain; however, some investigators (Byrne & Hilbert, 2003; Gibson, 1979) argue that color is outside.
Some Birds (such as hummingbird (Herrera et al., 2008)) have tetra-chromatic color vision because
they have four types of cone (Jameson, 2008), whereas normal human color vision is trichromatic;
this can be easily explained by SRT. These are weak examples against SRT, which cannot reject SRT.
[2]. One could argue that the organism-environment system is the fundamental unit of analysis not
only for ecological approach (external stimuli are sufficient for perception without representation)
and transactionalism (“developmental process as the expression of a complex web of endogenous
and exogenous factors”) as suggested by (Wagman & Miller, 2003), but also for SRT because
organism’s neural-nets process signals from environmental stimuli. In other words, when we walk
on a beach, the touch and pressure receptors of feet are activated, which then sends signals
eventually to the foot area in somatosensory area where we have the representation of foot. This
feed-forward signal due to sand-foot system interacts with feedback signals and relevant experience
emerges, consistent with SRT. One could argue that the sand is independent of the foot until our
weight on foot changes the compactness and the slope of the sand, but then ‘dynamic core’
(Edelman, 2003) changes and representation changes, i.e., piecewise independency cannot be
rejected. This does not mean that DST-FCT explanation is rejected. Both SRT and DST-FCT can
explain this data and hence both are equivalent and hence linked.
[3]. Organism’s perceptual system is tuned to resonate to invariant structure. This needs unpacking.
One could argue that SRT can address the phenomena related to (i) both Gestalt and perception
psychologist’s frameworks and (ii) interaction of organism with its surround and autopoiesis, by
12
neural Darwinism and sensorimotor tuning as done in the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c) and
(conjugate) matching/selection processes (Vimal, 2008d).
[4]. Perhaps, the response of neural processes to odor can be explained better by phase transition.
This, however, does not reject SRT because the data can also be explained by SRT because of neural
Darwinism and representation of odor embedded in related neural-net. Freeman’s attractors
(Freeman, 1999b) in DST are equivalent to tuned mechanisms in SRT; both could be dynamically
change during neural Darwinism.
[5[. One could argue that multiple tactile, auditory pattern-stimulations, cochlear implants and so
on can re-organize the activities of relevant neural-nets via neural Darwinism and sensori-motor
tuning, and hence related visuospatial experiences could arise in relevant neural-nets. This can be
tested in fMRI experiments if representations i.e., neural activations change in relevant areas in
brain. Furthermore, a melody is not experienced when a novice first hears notes in a foreign musical
tradition; only after some exposure to such notes that organize coherently in the listener’s
experience via neural Darwinism for co-development and sensori-motor tuning (Vimal, 2008c).
Thus, these data cannot reject SRT.
[6]. Data related to self-perception, illusions in body perception, phantom limbs, and experience
related prosthesis can also be explained by SRT. Phantom-phenomenon can be explained by SRT
using the neural representation of limbs in relevant neural-nets when they were intact.
[7] How do we reconcile SRT with thermodynamic principle? SRT involves chemical/catalytic
reactions as underlying principle that is consistent with thermodynamics; therefore, this argument
cannot reject SRT. Signal transduction or coding is also possible in DST-FCT: For example, one could
argue that information is in coded form in solitons or there is transduction of signal from perception
to action in DST-FCT or during emergence of experience in FCT as an organism mediates its
surrounding environment. Furthermore, the brain can preserves essential spatio-temporal
characteristics of the perceptual domain in SRT in better way because of the coded receptive field
characteristics of neurons. Embodiment in DST is equivalent to representation in SRT. Both can be
further unpacked in terms of the interaction of reentrant neural and electrochemical signals.
[8] (Velmans, 2007)’s externalism, “experiences of the world result from dynamic organism-environment
interactions” is not inconsistent with SRT because one could argue that the term organism is equivalent
to feedback signals in neural-nets and environment is equivalent to stimulus-dependent feed-forward
signals, as discussed before.
[9] (van Gelder & Port, 1995)’s statement “whole system comprised of nervous system, body, and
environment” is consistent with interaction of feed forward environmental stimulus dependent
signals with feedback signals of nervous system in SRT. Since DST is close to holistic perspective,
when DST is unpacked, it is equivalent to SRT.
[10] As (Bechtel, 1998) suggests, DST can be complementary to SRT because low-order sensory
representations can not be rejected by DST, rather it can be dynamically used by DST. In addition, in
some cases DST is compatible with SRT.
Thus, the above data and critiques cannot reject SRT.
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2.8.2. Can DST-FCT be rejected by the following data and critiques?

If an experience is a result of only the organism’s systematic interaction in its surround and nothing
else, then how do we explain endogenously generated experiences such as in phosphenes (Vimal &
Pandey-Vimal, 2007), electrical stimulation, TMS (transcranial magnetic stimulation), and so on?
One could argue that DST-FCT cannot explain it, whereas it can easily be explained by SRT. On the
other hand, if we invoke DST-FCT with conjugate matching of DST related investigator (Globus,
1998; Globus, 2005), then endogenously generated signals can be considered as solitons in feed-
forward input pathway interacting with that in feedback cognition (attention, memory etc) related
signals in a neural-net. This interaction will lead to relevant experiences. Thus, the above criticism
can be addressed using DST-FCT. If the above is true then FCT is a more general theory, which
encompasses both DST and SRT.
One could argue that how DST-FCT can explain memory encoding, storage, and recall. However,
extending DST-FCT to include conjugate matching framework can explain them.
Furthermore, the conjugate matching between input signals from external objects and cognition has
also been proposed for perception and experience. According to (Globus, 1998), “There are two main
alternatives to the classical story. The less popular, due to (Gibson, 1966; Gibson, 1979), is that instead of
copying, the brain picks up abstract information. … The more popular alternative (e.g. (Hubel & Wiesel, 1979))
is that the brain detects a variety of abstract features that can later be bound together. But whether information
pick-up or feature detection cum binding, the brain’s information is abstract, which leads to problems in
explaining the world…Both information pickup and feature detection are too abstract to explain the world. …
My strange-sounding talk of eruption, plenitude, self-tuning and conjugate matching has been an attempt to
meet that need.”
To sum up, the above data and critiques cannot reject DST-FCT when it is extended to include
conjugate matching.
3. Integration/Linking of SRT and DST-FCT

The arguments in Sections 1 and 2 encourage us to integrate and find link between SRT and DST-
FCT as follows:
According to (Carpenter et al., 2009), “For the Fractal Catalytic theory, ‘experience’ is a fundamental
construct, although the theory does not attempt to explain experience or consciousness. […] we persist
because we are information […] consciousness may be fundamental ”. This means that DST-FCT is also
consistent with the ‘non-reductive physicalism’ similar to the SRT-PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c),
where physicalism5 may not the same as materialism (Strawson, 2006). Information could have dual-
aspect (Chalmers, 1995; Vimal, 2008c), and the PE-SE framework is a dual-aspect model. The PE-SE
framework is underlying mechanism for the emergence of SEs in SRT. In other words, SRT and DST-
FCT can be linked via the underlying mechanism for both, the PE-SE framework.
5 In the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c), physicalism = materialism + PE/SE
14
Since DST-FCT considers consciousness as fundamental, and one of the aspects of consciousness is
subjective experience (SE). In both SRT and DST-FCT, SE emerges when organism interacts with its
external environment. The view ‘emergentism’ (Sompolinsky, 2005; Sperry, 1981) when unpacked, it
is ‘non-reductive physicalism’ (Vimal, 2008c), i. e., consciousness is irreducible fundamental
emerged entity. This emergence may appear different from the emergence of subjective experience
in SRT where SE emerges from the interaction of feed-forward stimulus dependent signals with
fronto-parietal feedback signals. One could argue, however, that both types of emergence are
equivalent because external environment is equivalent to external environmental stimulus signal
input to feed-forward pathway and the organism is equivalent to feedback signal. Thus, DST-FCT is
equivalent to SRT, which may be one of reasons that both frameworks are able to explain some of
the same data. This needs further investigation.
One can unpack the qualitative statement in (Carpenter et al., 2009): “experience arises as an organism
mediates (catalyzes) the transitions in its surround”. This can be done using Globus’ conjugate matching
(Globus, 1998; Globus, 2005) between input surround and organism's cognition. In the above
statement, there are two entities: (i) organism and (ii) its surround, which interact with each other.
One could argue that during this interaction, conjugate matching occurs. In addition, the maximum
power transfer theorem in conjugate matching is somewhat analogous to catalysis idea.
In the defense of DST-FCT, according to (Globus, 1995a), “The color of things is on their surfaces, Gibson
[(Gibson, 1966; Gibson, 1979)] insists, not in our minds. … So all the term "experience" properly denotes is our
thrownness in a world of qualities. … What needs explaining is the world of qualities, not qualitative
experiences. What must be accounted for is the redness of that round bulgy object over on the kitchen counter,
forget about theoretical red sensations. … Electromagnetic frequency and object color nicely correlate, but
science doesn't have the right categories to account for world qualities”. Globus’ framework is appears to be
similar to (Byrne & Hilbert, 2003) which argued, “colors are physical properties, specifically, types of
reflectance”.
Furthermore, radical externalism (Honderich, 2006) is also a sort of consistent with DST-FCT:
“His Theory of Radical Externalism, once called 'Consciousness as Existence', gets going with the question,
'What does it seem for you to be conscious of the room you are now in?' Honderich's answer is that it is for the
room in a way to exist, to exist in a specified sense. It is for things to be in space and time outside your head, a
world of perceptual consciousness dependent both on an external sub-world and on you neurally. This
analysis of perceptual consciousness issues in further analyses of reflective and affective consciousness.
Honderich argues that the theory does best at satisfying the criteria, succeeds where both physicalism and
dualism fail.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Honderich).
Similarly, one can defend SRT as well. One could argue that both frameworks (SRT and DST-FCT)
might contribute to relevant functions and SEs depending on various conditions. It would hard to
reject either one.
Th goal appears to be to integrate SRT and DST-FCT, rather than trying to reject either one because
one framework may not address all the data well. Some data appear consistent more with SRT and
some with DST-FCT. We need to point out the strength and weakness of each framework and then
try to integrate and link them. Conjugate matching framework does that, to some extent. About
color, majority’s view is color emerges in brain; however, some think color is outside. I have tried to
integrate them in PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c) and in (Vimal, 2008d) using quantum conjugate
matching and classical matching & selection process in terms of SRT. The same holds true for DST-
FCT.
15
Nagarjuna’s hypothesis of ‘dependent co-origination’: One of the hypotheses of the great eastern
Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna in Sanskrit is “yah Pratitya-Samutpada sunyatam”, which means,
“Whatever is dependently co-arisen, That is explained to be emptiness” translated by Garfield in
(Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995). In my view, an interpretation of Sanskrit terms depends on the
context. Buddha realized that suffering is because of inappropriate interaction, so the principle of
‘Pratitya-Samutpada’ or ‘co-arise’ might have come from this context. In other words, one could
argue for DST using the doctrine of ‘Pratitya-Samutpada’ or ‘co-arise’ in organism-environment
interaction. The argument against representation of independent world in some SRTs is also correct,
but not all SRTs are based on the representation of independent world. This is because the
emergence of experience during the interaction of feed forward signals with feed back signals is the
key concept in most of the current SRTs. My question is where exactly this interaction occurs. I
strongly argue that the organism-environment interaction of DST is precisely the same as the
interaction of feed forward signals (environment) with feed back signals (organism) in most of the
current SRTs, which are Types A-C materialistic views as categorized in (Chalmers, 2003) and
further discussed in (Vimal, 2008c). Thus, the principle ‘Pratitya-Samutpada’ or ‘co-arise’ is
consistent with both DST and SRT; this also leads to the conclusion that DST and SRT are equivalent
and hence they can be linked.
To elaborate further, an extended Nagarjuna’s hypothesis is that the experience of perceiver, the
experience of the perceived, and the relation between them co-arise, which is the key concept of
Mahayana Buddhism that is called co-dependent origination -- the existence of one entails the others.
These three exist in conventional reality, but have no independent essence that enables them to exist
other than co-dependently. This may imply that SRT assumes that there is an independent
environment. In Fractal Catalysis theory, the organism catalyzes the environment (and vice versa) and
catalysis is the experience. Here, conventional terms of organism and environment are used because
of the lack of the appropriate terms. In other words, there is no access to an independent essence of
a perceiver or a perceived object/event, i.e., Nagarjuna’s hypothesis could be considered against
SRT.
However, the concept of ‘co-arise’ is consistent with the hypothesis of co-development and co-
evolution of mind and matter, which is consistent with both SRT and DST-FCT. Nagarjuna
addressed subjective experiences (SEs) of subject, SEs of objects, and their (SEs’) relationship; he
appears to be silent on whether external matter is independent of the material entity such as brain
and its activities. Therefore, the ‘co-arise’ hypothesis is consistent with DST-FCT and SRT because all
involve the emergence of experience from the interaction between external stimuli and organism.
The term ‘organism’ also refers to the neural-nets of its brain. It also seems consistent with mind-
dependent-reality MDR. However, hard-core physicists still believe mind-independent- reality
(MIR). Consider a zombie or photo-detector that does not have SE: are external objects independent
for it? I am not sure that SRT implies that environment is independent, and independent from what:
organism, its activities, its representation, its cognition/perception, its action, or its SEs. What is the
precise definition of the term ‘organism’? How can SRT assume that the SEs organism’s neural-net
produces via emergence are independent of its external or internal environment, whereas SEs are
the products of interaction in SRT, DST, FCT, DST-FCT and SRT-FCT. Representation may depend
on the context (such as surround) and also on internal states of neural-nets; for example, happy and
sad subjects might represent the same stimulus differently. I think, the terms, ‘organism’,
‘environment’, ‘catalyst’, ‘catalysis’, ‘fractal’, and ‘where and how they interact’ need further
unpacking.
The dual-aspect SRT-PE-SE framework may appear distinct from the DST-FCT. However, the
foundation of both is non-reductive physicalism because both posit the subjective experience
16
component of consciousness as an irreducible fundamental mental entity. When the term

‘emergence’ in SRT and DST-FCT is unpacked into elemental SEs/PEs, both are consistent with the
PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e), which is complementary to all existing neuroscience
models. In other words, both SRT and DST-FCT can be derived from the PE-SE framework.
4. Conclusion
1. In the dual-aspect PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c), to address the explanatory gap of
materialism, it was hypothesized that strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons) have
material and mental aspects, which act as the carriers of superimposed fundamental SEs/PEs.
2. The neural Darwinism, quantum conjugate matching, and matching and selection mechanism
facilitate (a) the generation and selection a specific SE in a neural-net, (b) the unpacking of
‘emergence’, and (c) integration of SRT and DST-FCT using PE-SE framework as described in
Sections 2.7, 2.5, and 2.6.
3. The PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e) is complementary to all materialistic models
and has the capability to integrate such models.
4. In this article, we integrated and linked the two competing models (SRT and DST-FCT) that
attempt to address structure, function, and experience.
5. The SRT proposes that ‘functions’, such as perception and action, are because of the
representations of objects and events in brain, and SE emerges when feed-forward stimulus
dependent signals interact with cognition related feedback signals in relevant neural-nets.
6. DST proposes that perception, action, and SE arise/emerge from some kind of unspecified
interaction between the environment and organism, which is not reducible to the components.
7. The FCT is a non-representational model linked with DST, which proposes that functions are
catalytic processes, and SE emerges as an organism mediates/catalyzes the transitions in its
surround/environment.
8. The data related to structure and function can be explained by both models: some data better by
SRT and some better by DST-FCT. However, both models use ‘emergence hypothesis’ (subjective
experience (SE) component of consciousness is an emerged entity) to link SE with structure and
function.
9. One could argue that SRT-emergence and DST-FCT-emergence are equivalent because (i) external
environment in DST-FCT is equivalent to external stimulus-signal input to the feed forward
pathway in SRT and (ii) the organism in DST-FCT is equivalent to organism’s feedback signals in
SRT.
17
10. SRT and DST are equivalent because both can explain most of the same data, and hence they can
be linked.
11. FCT could also be linked to SRT, in addition to linking to DST.
12. When the term ‘emergence’ is further unpacked in terms of elemental SEs/PEs, we get PE-SE
framework, from which both SRT and DST-FCT can be derived, and hence both can be linked.
Acknowledgments
The work was partly supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust, Vision Research Institute
research Fund, and James T. Beran Revocable Trust. Author would like to thank (1) anonymous
reviewers, Manju-Uma C. Pandey-Vimal, Vivekanand Pandey Vimal, Shalini Pandey Vimal, and
Love (Shyam) Pandey Vimal for their critical comments, suggestions, and grammatical corrections,
and (2) Patricia A. Carpenter and Chris J. Davia for introducing me DST and FCT (Carpenter et al.,
2009) and for discussing it further in email correspondences.
Competing interests statement

The author declares that he has no competing financial interests.
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Linking Dynamic Systems theory & Fractal Catalytic Theory with Standard Representation Theory using PE-SE framework

Running title: Dynamic Systems theory & Standard Representation Theory

RAM LAKHAN PANDEY VIMAL

Keywords: Standard representational theory; dynamic-systems theory, fractal catalytic theory;

2. Standard Representational Theory (SRT) and Dynamic-systems theory&

2.3. DST-FCT model

2.4. Can Fractal Catalysis also be in the Standard Representation Theory?

2.5. Are DST-FCT and SRT equivalent?

to dynamics that cannot be predicted from their basic constituents.”

2.6. Structure, function, and subjective experience in SRT and DST-FCT

Consider an example related to how subjects experience redness.

In DST-FCT, the structure is a subject/organism; function is the detection and discrimination of

2.7. Unpacking of the term emergence using PE-SE framework

2.8. Critical data for SRT and DST-FCT

2.8.1. Can SRT be rejected by the following data and critiques?

Thus, the above data and critiques cannot reject SRT.

2.8.2. Can DST-FCT be rejected by the following data and critiques?

3. Integration/Linking of SRT and DST-FCT

5 In the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c), physicalism = materialism + PE/SE

component of consciousness as an irreducible fundamental mental entity. When the term

11. FCT could also be linked to SRT, in addition to linking to DST.

Competing interests statement

University Press, 2002).<http://consc.net/papers/nature.html>; also email correspondence on 11

[Note: Pages 24-50 are for future development.]

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