SUGGESTED ANSWERS

to the

2019 BAR EXAMINATIONS IN

CIVIL LAW

PART 1

A.1.

In January 2018, Mrs. A, a married woman on her sixth (6  ( 6 ) month of pregnancy, was
crossing a street when she was suddenly hit by a car being recklessly driven by Mr. X. As a
result,
result, Mrs. A sustained
sustained serious injuries and further,
further, suffered an unintention
unintentionalal abortion.
abortion. Mrs. A
was hospitalized for two (2) months, during which she incurred P400.000.00 in medical fees. Her 
expenses were all duly substantiated by official receipts. During the two (2)-month period of her 
confinement, she was unable to report for work and earn any salary, which was established at the
rate of P50,000.00 per month. Mrs. A then filed a civil case for damages against Mr. X.

(a) Based on the case filed by

b y Mrs. A. what is the source of Mr. X's obligation to her as a
result of his acts? Explain. (2 %)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Mr. X's obligation arose from a quasi-delict, one of the five sources of obligations (Art.
1157, Civil Code).
Code) . The Code also provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done and such
fault or negligence, is called a quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code).  Here, Mr. X, in
recklessly driving a car, hit Mrs. A, thereby causing serious injuries and unintentional
abortion to the latter.

(b) May Mrs. A claim actual damages from Mr. X? If so, how much can Mrs. A claim?
Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Mrs. A can claim actual damages amounting to P500,000. Article 2199 of the Civil
Code provides that except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to actual or
compensatory damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
The medical fees totaling P400,000 were duly substantiated by official receipts, Article 2200
of the Civil Code also provides that indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain.
The rate of her salary was established at P50,000 per month; thus, her inability to report
for work and earn salary for two months entitled her to a total of P100,000. Mrs. A,
therefore, can claim her expenses for medical fees and two months' worth of salary the total
of which is P500.000.

(c) May Mrs. A claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWERS:
ANSWER S:

No, Mrs. A cannot claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Birth determines
persona
personality
lity.. The Court has held that an action
action for pecuniary
pecuniary damages
damages on account
account of 
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, and if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs (Geluz v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961).

ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNA TIVE ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages

damages on behalf of her unborn baby. Under Art. Il Sec. 12 of 
the 1987 Constitution, the State is obliged to protect equally the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. This provision should be applied in favor of the unborn
child, and therefore modifies the Geluz v. Court of Appeals ruling.

ANOTHER ALTERNATI
A LTERNATIVE
VE ANSWER:
ANSWE R:

Yes, Mrs. A can claim damages on behalf of her unborn baby. The Court has held that
a conceived child, although yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Art. 40 of the New Civil Code,
which includes being a recipient of donations under Art. 742 of the New Civil Code, as well
as support. A claim for damages in favor of the unborn child should also prosper
 [Quimiguing
 [Quimiguing v. leao, G .R.
.R. No. 26795. July 31, 1970].
 (d) What must Mrs. A prove if she wants to recover moral damages from Mr. X? (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Mrs. A must prove that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety,
anxiety, besmir
besmirched
ched repu
reputati
tation,
on, wounded
wounded feefeeling
lings,
s, moral
moral shock,
shock, social
social humiliat
humiliation,
ion, or
similar injury. She must also prove that Mr. X's reckless driving produced the physical
injury in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, without which she would not have suffered the same, that is the reckless
driving is the proximate cause of the injury, Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-
deliets causing physical injuries (Article 2219 of the Civil Code).

ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNA TIVE ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Mrs. A must prove the following: (1) that she suffered physical injuries; (2) that Mr.X
committed a culpable act or omission; (3) that the wrongful act or omission of Mr. X is the
proximate cause of the damages she sustained; and (4) that X's act or omission is either a
criminal offense resulting to physical injuries or a quasi-delict causing physical injuries
( Mendoza
 Mendoza v. Gomez , G.R. No. 160110. June 18, 2014).

(e) Assuming that Mrs. A is awarded actual and moral damages by the trial court, may
she also claim interest if the final and executory judgment award remains unpaid by Mr.
X? If so, when should the interest be reckoned and what is the rate of interest? Explain.
(3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, Mrs. A may also claim interest. The interest should be 6% per annum from the
finality of judgment until its satisfaction. The Court held in  Nacur w . Gallery Frames
Frames (G. R.
No. 189871, August 13, 2013), interpreting BSP MB Circular No. 799, that when the
 judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of 
legal shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be the equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
 A.2.

Hand W were married in 1990. 11, being a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), was deployed to a rebel-infested area in 1992. Since then, W has not heard from her 
husband, H.

One day, the AFP informed W that H had been declared missing since 1995. in consequence.
W diligently pursued all available means to ascertain her husband's whereabouts, but to no avail.

Firmly believing that H had already died, W filed a claim before the AFP in 2008 for the
death benefits of the missing serviceman. However, the AFP, despite being cognizant of II's
status, would not act on the claim, contending that H could not be presumed dead unless a
 judicial declaration to this effect is issued by the proper court.

In what instance/s is a judicial declaration of presumptive death necessary? In this case, is the
contention of the AFP correct? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGESTE D ANSWER:
ANSWE R:

Judi
Judicia
ciall decla
declara
ratio
tion
n of pre
presum
sumpti
ptive
ve death
death is neces
necessar
sary
y only
only for the
the pu
purp
rpose
ose of 
contracting a subsequent marriage. Article 41 of the Family Code provides that for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage contracted by a person who had a well-
founded belief that his/her prior spouse who had been absent for four consecutive years
was
was alrea
already
dy dead
dead,, the spous
spousee pre
presen
sentt must
must insti
institu
tute
te a summ
summar
aryy proce
proceed
eding
ing for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

The contention of the AFP is incorrect.

The Court has declared that the AFP can decide claims of death benefits of a missing
soldie
soldierr witho
without
ut requi
requirin
ring
g the
the claim
claiman
antt to first
first produ
producece a court
court dec
decla
lara
ratio
tion
n of thethe
presumptive death of such soldier and the claimant need only present any "evidence" which
shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number of years and / and  / or
or under
the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. Article 391 of 
the Civil Code provides that a person in the armed forces who has taken part in war and
has been missing for four years shall be presumed dead for all purposes. Here, W informed
the AFP that her husband had been declared missing since 1995, 23 years before the filing
of her claim in 2018. There is, thus, no need for a judicial declaration
declaration of presumptive death
before the AFP can act on the claim of W |Tadeo-Matias
|Tadeo-Matias y: Republic, G.R. No. 230751, April
25, 2018).
 A.3.

Mr. Reyes is legally married to Mrs. Reyes. During the subsistence of their marriage, Mr.
Reyes
Reyes cohabit
cohabited
ed with
with anothe
anotherr woman,
woman, Ms. Cruz. Out of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz's Cruz's illici
illicitt
relationship, a child named C was born. In C's birth certificate. "Cruz" appears as the child's
surname, although Mr. Reyes expressly acknowledged Cas his child.

In 2018. Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz ended their relationship. Mr. Reyes thereafter lodged a
 petition in court for parental custody and change
chan ge or correction of C's surname in the child's birth
certificate from "Cruz" to "Reyes," At that time, C was only ten (10) years old.

(a) Should Mr. Reyes be granted custody of C? Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, Mr. Reyes should not be granted custody because C is an illegitimate child, who
shall be under the parental authority of his mother (Article 176, Family Code).

The Family Code provides that children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate (Article 165). In this case, C was conceived and born out of the illicit
relationship of Mr. Reyes and Ms. Cruz who are not married; thus, C is an illegitimate child
of Mr. Reyes. The Court has held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not eustody of the child.
The Court has further declared that since the law explicitly confers to the mother sole
parental authority over an illegitimate child, it follows that only if she defaults can the
father assume custody and authority over the minor and that only the most compelling of 
reasons, such as the mother's unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
(  Briones y
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else ( Briones
 Miguel, G .R.
.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004). There is no showing that Ms. Cruz, C's mother
was unfit to exercise sole parental authority over C; therefore, she cannot be deprived of C's
custody.

(b) Can Mr. Reyes validly compel the change or correction of C's surname from "Cruz" to
"Reyes"? Explain. (2.5%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, Mr. Reyes cannot compel the change of surname from "Cruz" to "Reyes". The
Court has held that Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. The Court further declared
that it is not the father or the mother who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their
their illegi
illegitim
timate
ate child
childre
ren;
n; hen
hence
ce,, Mr.
Mr. Reyes
Reyes canno
cannott valid
validly
ly comp
compel
el the chang
changee or
( Grande - Antonio, G .R.
correction of C's surname (Grande .R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014).
 If they are still minors, however, the decision to use the father's surname may be
exerc
exercise
ised
d for the
them
m by thetheir
ir mothe
motherr pupursu
rsuant
ant to the
the latter
latter's
's paren
parental
tal autho
authorit
rity
y over
over
illegitimate
illegitimate children. In this case, the father cannot compel the mother to register the child
under his surname.

A.4.

F. a Filipina, married J. a Japanese, in the Philippines. After three (3) years, they had a
falling out and thus, separated. Soon after, F initiated a divorce petition in Japan which was not
opposed by because under Japanese law, a grant of divorce will capacitate him to remarry. F's
divorce petition was then granted by the Japanese court with finality.
May the legal effects of the divorce decree be recognized in the Philippines, and
consequently, capacitate F to remarry here? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, the legal effects of the divorce deeree may be recognized in the Philippines, and
consequently, capacitate F to remarry.

of Republic v. Manalo
In the case of Republic Manalo [ G.R.
G.R. No. 221029,
221029, April 24, 2018], the Court held that
under Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to
remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Here, F
initiated a divorce petition in Japan and obtained a favorable judgment which capacitated
her Japanese husband to remarry. Applying Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
in  Republic v.
as interpreted in Republic v. Manalo,
Manalo, the legal effects of the divorce obtained by F may be
recognized in the Philippines which may capacitate F to remarry here.

 [Note: The legal effects of the divorce obtained

obtained by F may be recognized
recognized in the Philippines;
Philippines;
howev
however, it may not capacitate her to remarry as a matter of enforcement of said divorce.
 Recognition
 Recognition is different
different from enforcement
enforcement,, the latter being
being subject
subject to defenses].
defenses].

A.5.

X and Y were in a live-in relationship for the longest time, and were already blessed with a
child, Z. They finally decided to get married on March 15, 2020, When X's parents found about
the news, they were thrilled and thus, donated in favor of Z, the family heirloom, particularly, a
gold ring valued at P250,000.00 which X and Y orally accepted on behalf of their minor child.
One day, X and Y got into a serious quarrel, which resulted in them setting aside their marriage
 plans.
 (a) Is the donation to Z valid? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, it is a void donation. This is an ordinary donation inter vivos

vivo s , not a donation proper 
donation  proper 
nuptias. The Civil Code provides that if the value of the personal property donated exceeds
five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing; otherwise,
the donation shall be void. A piece of jewelry like the family heirloom here which is a gold
ring, valued at P250,000.00, is a personal property. Here, the acceptance was made orally;
therefore, the donation is void (Article 748).

(b) Assuming that the donation to Z is valid, may X's parents revoke the
donation on the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through?
Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, because it is an ordinary donation, not a donation  propter nuptias. The ground that
the marriage did not push through may only be raised to revoke donations by reason of 
marriage which is defined by Article 126 of the Family Code, as those which are made
before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses ( Art.
Art. 83, FC). Here, the donation was not made in favor of one or both of the future
spouses, but in favor of their child. X's parents, therefore, cannot revoke the donation on
the ground that the marriage of X with Y did not push through.

A.6.

 Name at least two (2) exclusions from the following

following property regimes as
enumerated under the Family Code:

(a) Absolute community of property (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

(Any 2 of the 3 may be considered):

(1) Property
Property acquired during
during the marriage by gratuitous
gratuitous title by either spouse,
spouse, and the
fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property
Property for personal and exclusive
exclusive use of either spouse.
spouse. However,
 jewelry shall
shall form part
part of the community
community property;
property;

(3) Property
Property acquired before
before the marriage by either
either spouse who has legitimate
legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of
such property. (Article 92 of the Family Code)
 (b) Conjugal partnership of gains (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

(Any 2 of the 4 may be considered):

(1) Property which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;

(2) Property which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous

title:
(3) Property which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with
property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
 (4) Property which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
(Article 109 of the Family Code)

A.7.

Believing that he owned a certain parcel of land and completely unaware of any defect in his
title thereto, Mr. A started to build a house thereon. When Mr. P. the real owner of the land
learned of 'Mr. A's actions, Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises. However.
Mr. A refused to leave, and instead, asserted that as a builder in good faith. Mr. P is obliged to
sell the land to him.

(a) is the claim of Mr. A correct? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, Mr. A is not correct. Mr. A who was completely unaware of any defect in his title, is
a builder in good faith. Mr. P who prompted Mr. A's possession also acted in good faith.
Article 448 appiies in this case, which provides that only the owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, has the right to appropriate as his
own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity for necessary expenses
and useful expenses where applicable, OR to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent; however, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building
or trees. The law grants said rights to the owner of the land. The builder in good faith, Mr.
A in this case, cannot compel Mr. P, the owner of the land, to choose which right to exercise,
for the option belongs to the owner alone.

ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNA TIVE ANSWER:
ANSWER :
No, Mr. A is incorrect. He is a builder in bad faith. When Mr. A started building his
house, he was completely unaware of any defect in his title and therefore, was, at the outset,
a builder in good faith but when Mr. P immediately demanded Mr. A to leave the premises
before he completed the house, which Mr. A refused to do and he continued building since
he persisted in the belief that his title had no fatal defect, he became a builder in bad faith.
Mr. P, the real owner, who immediately asked him to leave the premises, acted in good faith.
He has by law the option of acquiring the house without paying for it (Art. 499, Civil Code).

(b) Assuming that Mr. P all the while, know but did not object to Mr. Als construction of the
house on his property, may Mr. A compel Mr. P to purchase the said improvement due to Mr. P's
 bad faith? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, Mr. A may compel Mr. P to purchase the improvements, Article 454 of the Civil
Code provides that when the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower
proceeded in good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall apply. Article 453 of the same
Code provides that it is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. Article
447 provides that the owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another,
plantings, constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and,
if the landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any
event, with a right to be indemnified for damages. The landowner, having known and
without opposing the construction made by Mr. A is deemed to have acted in bad faith:
Article 447, therefore, applies and Mr. P shall pay the value of the improvement; i.e., the
value of the materials, plus damages.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Since Mr. A is a builder in bad faith for continuing to build despite being asked to leave the
 premises, and Mr. P also acted
a cted in bad faith for not objecting to Mr. A's construction of his house
on his property, they shall be treated to have both acted in good faith (Article 453 of the Civil
Code). The bad faith of Mr. A is neutralized by the bad faith of Mr. P; thus, Article 448 of the
Civil Code shall apply. The two options still belong to Mr. P, not Mr. A.

A.8.

Mr. E leased a piece of

o f land from Mr. F to be used for his sawmill business for a period of
ten (10) years. Consequently, Mr. E placed heavy machineries there on to be used for his
aforementioned business, with the intention of removing them after the expiration of the lease
 period.

Are Mr. E's heavy machineries considered real p roperties under the Civil Code? Explain.
(3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, they are movables. Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes
immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner thereof in a land or building which is also
owned by him, for an industry or works which may be carried on in a tenement and which
tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or works, but not when so placed by a
tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner, for instance, if the lease contained a stipulation that any
useful improvement which the lessee introduces on the leased property shall pertain to the
lessor at the termination of the lease. Here, the heavy machineries were placed by Mr. E on
a piece of land leased from Mr. F with the intention of removing them after the expiration
of the lease period. Being movable in nature, said machineries were not deemed
immobilized (Davao Saw Mill Co. Inc. v. Castillo, G .R.
G .R. No. L-40411, August 7, 1935).

A.9.

Ms. U is a usufructuary of a piece of land owned by Mr. L. During the existence of the
usufruct, Ms. U introduced various useful improvements on the land. Upon termination of the
usuf
usufru
ruct
ct,, Mr.
Mr. L requ
reques
este
ted
d Ms.
Ms. U to remo
removeve the
the said
said impr
improv
ovem
emen
ents
ts,, but Ms.
Ms. U refu
refuse
sed,
d,
demanding instead that Mr. L reimburse her the value of the same.

(a) What is a usufruct? (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

A usufr
usufruct
uct give
givess a right
right to enjoy
enjoy the
the prope
propert
rty
y of anot
another
her with
with the obligat
obligation
ion of 
preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides (Article 562, Civil Code).

The Court has further declared that a usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply
allowi
allowing
ng one
one to enjoy
enjoy anothe
another's
r's proper
property
ty.. It is also
also def
define
ined
d as the right
right to enj
enjoy
oy the
the
property of another temporarily, including both the  jus utendi and the jus
temporarily, including the  jus fruendi,
fruendi, (plus,
the  jus possidendi)
impliedly, the jus possidendi) with the owner retaining the  jus disponendi
disponendi or the power to
alienate the same ( Moralidad v. v. Sps. Pernes,
Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006).

(b) Is Ms. U's demand proper? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, the demand is not proper. The Civil Code provides that the usufructuary may make
on the property held in usufruct any useful improvements, or expenses for mere pleasure,
which he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall
have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements
should it be possible to do so without injury to the property (Article 579, Civil Code).

Ms. U, thus, has no right to be indemnified for any improvements which she might
have made on the land held in usufruct. She may only remove them should it be possible to
do so without injury to the property.
 A.10.

Villag
Villagee H and Villag
Villagee L are adjoin
adjoining
ing reside
residenti
ntial
al villag
villages
es in a mounta
mountaino
inous
us porti
portion
on of 
Antipolo City, Rizal, with Village L being lower in elevation than Village 11. In an effort to
 beautify Village H. its developer,
dev eloper, X, Inc., constructed a clubhouse which included an Olympic-
sized swimming pool and an artificial lagoon on a portion of land overlooking Village L.

During the monsoon season, the continuous heavy rains caused Village II's swimming pool
and artif
artifici
icial
al lagoon
lagoon to overfl
overflow,
ow, result
resulting
ing into
into a massiv
massivee spillo
spillover
ver that
that damage
damaged d variou
variouss
 properties in Village L. Aggrieved, the homeowners
ho meowners of Village L filed a complaint for damages
against X, Inc. In defense, X, Inc. contended that pursuant to the Civil Code, Village L, as the
lower estate, was obliged to receive the waters descending from Village H. the higher estate.
Hence, it cannot be held liable for damages.

Is X. Inc.'s position tenable? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWERS:
ANSWER S:
No, X Inc.'s position is not tenable. The Water Code provides that lower estates are
only obliged to receive waters which naturally and without intervention of man descend
from higher estates (Art. 50, Water Code of the Philippines). The Code also provides that
the owner of the higher estate cannot make works which will increase the natural flow.
Therefore, Village L, as the lower estate, was only obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without intervention of man descend from higher estates and not those which
are due to the massive spillover from constructions made by X, Inc. (Article 537 of the Civil
Code).

X, Inc, therefore, is liable for damages.

-END OF PART I -
 PART II

B.11.

Mr. R is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Cebu City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1234 issued in 1955. Since his acquisition of the lot. Mr. R and his
family had been in continuous, open, and peaceful possession thereof. Mr. R died in 1980,
resulting in the land being transferred in the names of his heirs, i.e.,
i.e., A, B. and C, who became
registered owners thereof as per TCT No. 5678. During the entire time, said land had never been
encumbered or disposed, and that its possession always remained with them.

Sometime in 1999. A, B, and C wanted to build a concrete fence around the parcel of land,
 but they were opposed by Mrs. X, who started claiming ownership over the same property on the
strength
strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
purportedly entered into by her with Mr. R during the time
that he was still alive, Aggrieved, A, B, and C intend to file a complaint for quieting of title
against Mrs. X.

(a) What are the substantive requisites for the action to prosper? Do they obtain in this case?
Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

For an action to quiet title to prosper, the following requisites must obtain in the case:

(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title

to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and

(2) the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding

claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.

The requisites for an action to quiet the title obtain in this case, since A, B, and Care
the registered owners of the parcel of land, having inherited the same from their father Mr.
R, and the Deed of Absolute Sale, which cast a cloud on their title may be shown to be
invalid or inoperative (Heirs of Delfin v. Heirs of Bacud, G .R.
.R. No. 187633, April 4, 2016).
 (b) Within what period should A, B, and C file the complaint for quieting of title? Explain,
(2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :
The action for quieting of title does not prescribe, because the plaintiffs are in
land  [Heirs of Uheras
possession of the land [Heirs Uheras v. CFI, October 30, 1978).
(c) Assuming
Assuming that Band C are residing
residing abroad, may A. without
without the knowledge of Band ,
file the complaint for quieting of title on behalf of all the heirs? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER:
ANSWER :
Yes, A may file the complaint, provided that he files the same for the co-ownership.
Anyone of the co-owners may bring such an action in ejectment (Article 87 of the Civil
Code), even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all, assuming A wins the case. Parenthetically, if A
loses in the action to quiet title, it will if not affect B and C, because the Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The Court further held that if the action is for the
benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims the possession for himself and not for the
co-ownership, the action will not prosper (Celino v. Heirs of Alejo, G .R.
.R. No. 1618117, July
30, 2004).

B.12.

D, an Overseas Filipino Worker, was on his h is way home to the Philippines after working for so
many years in the Middle East. He had saved P100,000.00 in his local savings account which he
intended to use to start up a business in his home country. On his flight home, tragedy struck as a
suicide bomber blew up the plane. All the passengers, including D, died. He left behind his
widowed mother M; his common-law wife, W, who is the mother of his twin sons, T and S; and
his brother, B. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives, and no other properties except the
money in his savings account.

Who are the heirs entitled to inherit from D and how much should each receive? Explain.
(5%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

D's heirs entitled to inherit from him are:

M (his mother) - P50,000 and T and S (his twin sons) - P25,000 each.

D died intestate and his heirs are the mother (legitimate ascendant) and his twin
sons (illegitimate). The mother gets one-half of his estate and his two illegitimate sons get
the other half (Article 991).
 W, the common-law wife" is not an heir ab intestato because she is not a legal spouse.
She is merely a partner in a non-marital union.

B.13.

M. single, named his sister N in his will, as a devisce over a certain parcel of land that he
owned, with the obligation of preserving the land and transferring it, upon N's death, to her 
illegitimate daughter O. who was then only a year old.
Is the condition imposed on N to preserve the land and to transmit it upon her death to a valid
va lid
case of fideicommissary substitution? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, this is a valid case of fideicommissary substitution. Article 863 of the Civil Code
provides that a fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted. First, there is
the absolute obligation imposed upon the fiduciary N to preserve and to transmit to the
fideicommissary the part of the inheritance. Second, O, the fideicommissary, as the
fiduciary's illegitimate daughter is one degree from the fiduciary. Furthermore, O's
illegitimate status is of no moment, because Art. 863, referring to the "heir" does not
distinguish between legitimate from illegitimate relationships.

B.14.

Prior to his death, H, married to W. with children X. Y. and Z, executed a holographic will
entirely written, dated, and signed by him. In his will, H instituted W, X, and Y as bis heirs, and
consequently, made testamentary dispositions in their favor. H. however, expressly disinherited Z
on the ground that the latter once filed a civil case against him in order to collect a particular sum
of money he previously owed Z

(a) Was the disinheritance of Z proper? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, it is not a proper ground to disinherit. Article 916 of the Civil Code provides that
disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. Article 919 of the same Code provides that the following shall be sufficient causes
for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate. That Z
once
once filed
filed a civil
civil case
case agains
againstt him
him in order
order to colle
collect
ct a parti
particu
cular
lar sum
sum of money
money he
previously owed is not one of the grounds for a valid disinheritance.
 (b) Assuming that the disinheritance of Z was improper, how will it a ffect the institution
of heirs and testamentary dispositions made in II's will? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Article 918 of the Civil Code provides that disinheritance for a cause which is not one
of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice
the person disinherited; but the devises and legacies and other testamentary dispositions
shall be valid to such extent as will not impair the legitime.

B.15.

Mr. P offered to sell his Manila Polo Club shares to Ms. Q for P2.500,000.00. Ms. Q accepted
on the condition that their agreement will not take effect until after one (1) year. Mr. P then
acceded and both of them shook hands, Excited about the prospect of acquiring Mr. P's shares,
Ms. Q approached the former and offered to pay him an earnest money equivalent to 1% of the
 purchase price, which Mr. P accepted. After one (1) year, Ms. Q approached Mr. P seeking the
enforcement of their agreement for Mr. P to sell his shares to her. Mr. P refused to honor their 
agreement, claiming that the same was covered by the Statute of Frauds because it was not
reduced into writing and hence, unenforceable.

Is the position of Mr. P correct? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, the position of P is incorrect. The Statute of Frauds only applies to purely executory
contracts; partial performance removes the contract from the ambit of the Statute of
Frauds and not to partially or completely executed contracts. Article 1482 of the Civil Code
provides that whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be considered as
part of the price and as proof of the perfection of the contract. The payment of earnest
money, such as in this case, is tantamount to partial execution of the contract which
precludes the application of the Statute of Frauds. The contract has been partially
performed and a benefit was already accepted when the seller accepted earnest money from
the buyer (Article 1403 (2)(d); A veria v . Averia, G.R. No. 14187 
14187 7. 2004; Mactan-
7. August 13, 2004; Mactan-
Cebu International Aiport Authority v. Tudtud, (2 008).
 B.16.

C Corp. entered into a contract

co ntract with D, Inc. for the construction of the latter's production
warehouse. In consideration thereof, D, Inc. was obliged to pay C Corp. the amount of
P50,000,000.00 within a period of one (1) month from the time of the project's completion. To
secure the payment of the said sum, D, Inc. entered into a surety agreement with S Company:

After more than a month from the completion date of the project, C Corp. remained unpaid.
Claiming that it was suffering from serious financial reverses, D, Inc. asked C Corp. for an
extension
extension of three (3) months to pay the P50,000,000.00
P50,000,000.00 it still owed, to which C Corp. agreed.
Howe
However
ver,, afte
afterr more
more than
than thre
threee (3)
(3) mont
months
hs,, D, Inc.
Inc. stil
stilll refu
refuse
sed
d to pay.
pay. Henc
Hence,
e, C Corp
Corp,,
 proceeded to collect the above sum from the surety. S Company,

F or its part, S Company refused the claim and raised the defense that the extension of time
granted by C Corp. to D. Inc. without its consent released it from liability

(a) Will the defense of s Company against the claim hold water? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGESTE D ANSWER:
ANSWE R:
Yes, the defense holds. The Court has held that the provisions of the Civil Code on
Guarantee, other than the benefit of excussion, are applicable and available to the surety.
One of the provisions of the Civil Code on Guarantee is Art. 2079 which provides that an
extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor
extinguishes the guaranty. Here, the parties entered into a surety agreement; thus, the
[ Autocorp
extension granted without the consent of S Company extinguished the suretyship [ Autocorp
Group vs. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, G .R.
G .R. No. 166662, June 27, 2008; 556 SCRA
250].

(b) Assuming that S Company instead refused the c laim on the ground that Corp. has yet
to exhaust D, Inc.'s property to satisfy the claim before proceeding against it, will this
defense prosper? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the defense will not prosper. Art. 2047 provides that if a person binds himself 
solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this
Book shall be observed and in such case the contract is called a suretyship. Under Article
2059, the excussion shall not take place if he (the guarantor) has bound himself solidarily
with the debtor, S Company, therefore, cannot refuse the claim on the ground that C Corp.
has yet to exhaust D, Inc.'s property to satisfy the claim before proceeding against it.
 B.17.

In 2015, O, the original registered owner of a 300-square meter property covered by

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1234. appointed F as its caretaker. A year after, while
was abroad, F surreptitiously broke open O's sure and stole the duplicate copy of the said OCT. F
then forged a Deed of Absolute Sale and made it appear that O sold the property to him.
Consequently. F was able to have OCT No. 0-1234 cancelled and in lieu thereof a new title.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4321. was issued in his naine

A few months after, F offered the property for sale to X After conducting the required due
diligence to verify the title of F. and finding no occupant in the property during ocular inspection,
X signed the contract of sale, and thereupon, fully paid the purchase price. A few days later, X
was able to obtain TCT No. T 5678 under his name.

When O discovered T's fraudulent acts upon his return in 2017. O immediately filed a
complaint for reconveyance against F and X, principally pointing out that F merely forged his
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly made in F's favor and thus, F could not have
validly transferred the title thereof to X. Consequently, he sought the return of the subject
 property to him.

(a) Will the prayer of O for the return of the subject property prosper? Explain. (3%)

 SUGGESTED
 SU GGESTED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No, the prayer of O will not prosper, because X purchased the land from an apparent
owner in good faith and for value. Section 53 of P.D. 1529 provides that in all cases of 
registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent
o f Heirs of Abalon v. Andal 
holder for value of a certificate of title. The Court in the case o f
( G.R.
G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014), defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before
receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.

(b) Assuming that could no longer recover the subject property in view of X's registration
thereof in his name, may a claim against the Assurance Fund pursuant to the provisions of
the Property Registration Decree be instituted? Explain. (3%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, a claim against the Assurance Fund may be instituted. Section 95 of P.D. 1529
provides that a person who, without negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence of the bringing of the land
under the operation of the Torrens system arising after original registration of land,
through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission, mistake or misdescription in any
certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by the
provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded under the provision of any law
from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein, may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages to be
paid out of the Assurance Fund.

ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNA TIVE ANSWER:
ANSWER :

The property is already registered under the name of X, an innocent purchaser for
registration of the innocent purchaser for value's title is a condition sine qua
value. The registration
non in order to properly claim against the Assurance Fund. This is because it is only after
the registration
registration of the innocent purchaser
purchaser for value's title and not the usurper's
usurper's title which
constitutes a breach of trust) can it be said that the claimant effectively sustains loss or
damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein  Manuel v. RD for Legazpi 
Cit y,
y, G.R. No. 224678, July 3, 2018].

B.18.

In light of a new business venture, Mr. A entered into a lease contract with Mr. B involving
one of the latter's warehouses. One day, Mr. B, who was then encountering financial difficulties,
approached Mr. A and sought for a loan, which Mr. A readily granted to him. In order to secure
the loan obligation, Mr. B mortgaged the leased warehouse in favor of Mr. A. In addition, Mr. B
executed a promissory note in favor of A, wherein prior demand was waived by him.

When Mr. B defaulted on his loan obligation. Mr. A simply stopped paying rentals due to
Mr. B on the ground that legal compensation had already set in up to the concurrent amount.
Furthermore, since there was still a balance due on the promissory note, Mr. A foreclosed the
real estate mortgage over Mr. B's property. without any prior demand furnished to Mr. B.

Aggrieved, Mr. B opposed the foreclosure due to the lack of prior demand, contending that
the waiver of prior demand was stipulated in the promissory note and not in the mortgage
instrument. Mr. B likewise argued that when Mr. A invoked legal compensation between the
unpaid rentals and the loan arrearages, it amounted to a novation that resulted in the
extinguishment of the loan contract between them. As such, the real estate mortgage, being a
mere accessory contract to the principal loan, was necessarily extinguished.

(a) May Mr. A validly claim legal compensation? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes, Mr. A may validly claim legal compensation. The Civil Code provides that when
all the req
requisi
uisites
tes mention
mentioned
ed in Article
Article 1279 are pre
present
sent,, compen
compensati
sation
on takes
takes effe
effect
ct by
operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the
creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation (Article 1290, Civil Code).
 All requisites obtain in this case. For compensation to be proper, it is necessary:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same
time a principal creditor of the other:

(2)
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable,
they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;

(3) That the two debts be due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable:

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by
1279 , Civil
third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor (Article 1279 ,
Code).

(b) May Mr. A validly foreclose on the real estate mortgage even without prior demand to
Mr. B? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Yes,
Yes, Mr.
Mr. A may
may valid
validly
ly forec
foreclos
losee the mortga
mortgage.
ge. The Court
Court hashas decl
declare
ared
d that
that a
provi
provisio
sion
n on waiv
waiver
er of notic
noticee or dema
demandnd is legal
legal and
and valid
valid.. Altho
Although
ugh the Civil
Civil Code
Code
provides that one incurs in delay or is in default from the time the obligor demands the
fulfillment
fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee (Article 1169), the law expressly provides that
demand is not necessary under certain circumstances, and one of these circumstances is
when the parties expressly waive demand. Since Mr. B waived the requirement of prior
demand in the promissory note, he was considered in delay or in default when he failed to
pay the loan obligation [S ps.
 ps.  Agner, v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G .R.
.R. No. 182963,
2013; BPI v. CA, 523 Phil. 548 (2006)].
June 3, 2013;

(c) Is Mr. B's claim of novation correct? Explain, (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGES TED ANSWER :

No, Mr. B's claim is incorrect. A novation is express when the new obligation declares
in unequivocal terms that the old obligation is extinguished and it is implied when the new
obligation is incompatible with the old one on every point. The test of incompatibility is
whether the two obligations can stand together, each one with its own independent
existence. Here there is neither express nor implied novation (A rco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc.
v. Lim, G .R.
.R. No. 206806, June 25, 2014).
 ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNA TIVE ANSWER:
ANSWER :

No Mr. B's claim is incorrect, because there was no new contract entered into between
Mr. A and Mr. B. When there is neither a valid new contract nor a clear agreement
between the parties to a new contract, there is no novation. Without the new contract, the
old contract is not extinguished by novation ( Country Bankers Insurance Corp. v. Lugman,
G .R.
.R. No. 165487, July 13, 2011). Besides, legal compensation is another mode of
extinguishment of the obligation different from novation. Here, what took place is partial
legal compensation; hence, Mr. Bis still in default as to the unpaid loan arrearages.

B.19.

Mr. A entered into a lease contract covering one of his commercial buildings with XYZ
Company, a partnership composed of X, Y. and Z, as lessee, for use as an office space. Upon
failure to receive the rental payments when they fell due, Mr. A immediately sought payment of 
the same from X. Y, and Z, asserting that the individual partners are solidarily liable together 
with the partnership for its debts.

X, Y, and Z disagreed with Mr. A's contention, arguing further that in any event, rentals
should not be paid up until Mr. A makes the necessary arrangements for the repair of the
defective electrical wirings in the office that caused power outages and hence, made it difficult, if 
not impossible, for them to conduct their usual business operations.

Rule on the parties' respective arguments. (5%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Mr. A's contention that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the
partnership for partnership debts is untenable. Article 1768 of the Code provides that the
partner
partnership
ship has a juridica
juridicall per
persona
sonality
lity separate
separate and distinct
distinct from that of each of the
partner
partners.
s. Article
Article 1816 of the Civil
Civil Code further
further provide
providess that all partner
partners,
s, includin
including
g
industrial ones, shall be liable pro rata with all their property and after all the partnership
assets have been exhausted, for the contracts which may be entered into in the name and
for the account of the partnership, under its signature and by a person authori  z ed ed to act
for the partnership,

The contention of X, Y, Z that the rentals should not be paid up until Mr. A. makes the
necessary arrangements for the repair of the defective electrical wirings in the office that
caused power outages is correct. Article 1658 of the Civil Code provides that the lessee may
suspend the payment of the rent in case the lessor fails to make the necessary repairs or to
maintain the lessee in peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the property leased. Repair of 
defective electrical wirings are necessary repairs.
ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNA TIVE ANSWER:
ANSWER :

Mr. A's contention that the individual partners are solidarily liable together with the
partnership for partnership debts is untenable. X, Y, Z are not the real parties in interest
against whom a claim for payment of the unpaid lease rentals may be made. According to
of  Saludo, Jr.
the Court in the case of Saludo, Jr. v. Philippine
Philippine National Bank
Bank ( G.R.
G.R. No. 193138, August 20,
2018], the general rule under Article 1816 of the Civil Code is that partnership assets are
primarily liable for the contracts entered into in the name of the partnership and by a
person authorized to act on its behalf. All partners - in this case, X, Y, and Z - are only
liable pro rata with all their property after all the partnership assets have been exhausted.
This is because it is the partnership, an entity possessing of a juridical
juridical personality separate
from its partners, that entered into the contract of lease. Said partnership
partnership has concomitant
concomitant
rights and obligations with respect to the transactions it enters into for which the partners
may not be made liable:

B.20.

Distinguish the following:

(a) Contract of sale and contract to sell (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGESTE D ANSWER
A NSWER 1:

A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional ( Art.

Art. 1458 (2), Civil Code). A contract
to sell is a kind of conditional sale.

In an absolute sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold. In both contracts to sell and contracts of conditional

sale,
sale, title
title to the property
property remain
remainss with the seller
seller despite
despite delivery.
delivery. Both
Both contrac
contracts
ts are
subject to the positive suspensive condition of the buyer's full payment of the purchase
price or the fulfillment of the condition.

SUGGESTED ANSWER 2 :

In an absolute sale, title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the
thing sold.

In a contract of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the property
upon full payment of the purchase price. This transfer of title is "by operation of law
without any further act having to be performed by the seller."
 In a contract to sell, transfer of title to the prospective buyer is not automatic. "The
prospective seller (must) convey title to the property [through a deed of conditional sale
(Olivare
(Olivarezz Realty
Realty Corpora
Corporation
tion And Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez
Olivarez V. Benjamin
Benjamin Castillo,
Castillo, G .R.
G .R. No.
196251, July 9, 2014).

(b) Interruption and tolling of prescription of actions (2%)

SUGGESTED
SUGGEST ED ANSWER:
ANSWER :

The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that
the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand [ Overseas Bank of 
 Manila v. Geraldez,
Geraldez, 94 SCRA 937 (1979)]

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the "prescription of actions is interrupted "
inter
inter alia,
alia, "when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor." This
simpl
simplyy mean
meanss that
that the peri
period
od of presc
prescri
ripti
ption,
on, when
when inter
interrup
rupted
ted by such
such a writt
written
en
acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might have already
elap
elapse
sed
d from
from the
the accr
accrua
uall of the
the caus
causee of acti
action
on is ther
thereb
eby
y nega
negate
ted
d and
and rend
render
ered
ed
ineffica
inefficaciou
cious.
s. The effect
effect of the interru
interruptio
ptionn spoken
spoken of in Article
Article 1155
1155 is to ren
renew
ew the
interruption . [Philippine
obligation, to make prescription run again from the date of the interruption . [Philippine
 National Railwa
Railway's
y's vs . National Labor
Labor Relations
Relations Commission,
Commission, 177
1 77 SCRA 740 (1989)]

In Overseas Bank of Manila v. Geraldez ,

Geraldez , the Supreme Court ruled that tolling merely
suspends the period that has already elapsed.

- END OF PART II -