consti part 10: free exercise clause
as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY of MANILA
FACTS:
o the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit
religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through
its Philippines agency established in November
of 1898
o the defendant appellee is a municipal
corporation with powers that are to be
excercised in conformity with the provisions of
R.A No. 409, known as the revised charter of the
city of manila
o the plaintiffs agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and gospel porionms thereof
throughout the Philippines
o the acting city treasurer nformed plaintiff that it
was conducting business of general
merchandise, without providing itself with the
necessary mayors permit and municipal license,
in violation of various ordinances, and asked the
plaintiff to secure within 3 days, the
corresponding license and fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953 in the
sum of Php 5,821
o plaintiff paid the sum and acquired the license
fees but at the same time filed a complaint to the
courts
o plaintiff was able to show that they were exempt
from real estate taxes; and that it was never
required to pay any municipal licence or atx fee
before the war, nor does the American bible
society in the U.S pay license fee or sales tax for
the sale of the bible.
o however a witness for the appellees was able to
prove that the American bibler society in fact
does profit from the sale of the Bible.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila,
Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are
constitutional and valid?.YES!!!
(2) whether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or
unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of
distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the
Philippines by a religious corporation like the American
Bible Society? Sayang pero YES invalid!
HELD:
*The only essential difference that We find
between these two provisions that may have any bearing
on the case at bar, is that while subsection (m-2)
prescribes that the combined total tax of any dealer or
manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections
(m-1) and (m- 2), whether dealing in one or all of the
articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500
per annum, the corresponding section 18, subsection (o)
of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any limitation
consti 2 all stars
dealer has to pay per annum. Hence, and in accordance
with the weight of the authorities above referred to that
maintain that "all rights and liabilities which have
accrued under the original statute are preserved and
may be enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the
repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without
interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of
the City of Manila are still in force and effect.
*The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on
the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of
the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar
the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant
for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature.
*The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious
information. Any restraint of such right can only be
justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on
the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent". (Tañada and Fernando on the Constitution of
the Philippines, Vol. I, 4th ed., p. 297). In the case at bar
the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant
for its distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature.
*(Citing Murdoch vs. Pennsylvania) It is one
thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a
preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from
him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax
imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax,
payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these
constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of
a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance.
Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form
of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all
'those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious
beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would thus
be denied the needy. . . .
*It may be true that in the case at bar the price
asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost
of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that
the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so
it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.
*Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff Society. But
as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as
amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated
before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of
the plaintiff.
Reversed and Remanded
GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION
(1959)
Montemayor J
FACTS:
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony
compulsory for schools. The implementing rules
(Department Order 8)says that the anthem must be
played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone
must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while
the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to
recite the patriotic pledge (panatang makabayan).
Petitioners children attending the Buenavista
Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute
the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did
not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's
Witnesses. They followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not
make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above, or that is in earth
beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They
consider the flag to be an image in this context. Because
of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.
Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their
children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to
remain silent and stand at attention. SecEd denied
petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned
and issued.
ISSUE:
WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional
HELD:
Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-
discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional
RATIONALE:
consti 2 all stars
The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it's
exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the
former must yield.
What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain that
it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol of
Republic of the Philippines. It is not a religious symbol.
Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. The
determination whether a ceremony is religious or not is
left to the courts not to any religious group.
Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand during
flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag during boy
scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing
of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged
to be completely secular. It does not even pledge
allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is
also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak
of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend
the country.
There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of
the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted
under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the
salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public
education. Take it or leave it.
Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were members
of Methodist Episcopal Church who believed that war
and preparations for war are gainst God's wishes. They
did not take required military service training which was
requirement to graduate. Court said that they were not
being drafted to attend university. University did not
violate due process when it required the mil service.
Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs
Witness children were expelled from school for refusing
to salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupils
in flag ceremony did not infringe due process. West
Virginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnette:
reversed the former decision at a divided court.
This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special
circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the
students although attendance in schools is mandatory
turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories.
Fortunately, the law requiring compulsory enrollment
here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and
exemptions that there is no crisis if the children didn't
attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to
attend school.
Whenever a man enjoys the benefits of society and
community life he becomes a member and must give up
some of his rights for the general welfare just like
everybody else. The practice of religion is subject to
reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the
state.
Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: Sarah
Prince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the
Child Labor law because her hiece distributed religious
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control of
parent/guardian. The right of practice religion freelydoes
not include liberty to expose child to ill health. This case
was decided after Barnette, supra.
SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flag
salute. It was Merely enforcing a non-discriminatory
regulation applicable to members of all religions. State
carried out duty to supervise educational institutions
and teach civic duty.
Petitioners do not question the right of the school to
conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the
attempt to compel them. The trouble of exempting the
petioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and
demoralize the greater student population.
There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an
understanding that anti-war religious believers will not
be made to fight but help war effort in other non-combat
ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the
courts.
DISPOSITION:
decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary
injunction dissolved. No costs.
ERBALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
March 1, 1993
Ponente: Griño-Aquino, J:
FACTS:
All the petitioners in these two cases are school
children who are members of Jehovah’s Witnesses who
were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by R.A. No. 1265 (July 11, 1955) and by DECS
Department Order No. 8 (July 21, 1955) which makes
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not school children who are
members of a religious sect known as Jehovah’s
Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and
private) for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs,
to take part in the flag ceremony.
RATIO:
It has been held previously in the case of
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a
system of complete separation between church and
state, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance and therefore saluting it is not a religious
ceremony. The requirement of the flag ceremony, which
seeks to develop reverence for the flag and love of
consti 2 all stars
country, etc., is a non-discriminatory school regulation
applicable to students and teachers regardless of their
religion.
While the necessity to develop such respect for
the flag and respect for the country still persists until
today, there is recognition that religious freedom is a
fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights
(Fernando separate opinion in German vs. Barangan)
Two-fold aspect of religious profession:
 Freedom to believe – absolute as long as
confined to the realm of thought
 Freedom to act on one’s belief – subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts affecting the public welfare
Petitioners contend that while they did not
participate in the flag ceremony, they did not engage in
any disruptive behavior that would offend those who
choose to participate but rather they just quietly stood at
attention during the flag ceremony to show respect to
their countrymen. Therefore, in the absence of a grave
and present danger which is the sole justification for
a prior restraint on the exercise of religious
freedom, according to Teehankee in his dissent in
German vs. Barangan, there is no warrant to justify
their expulsion.
What petitioners seek is only exemption from the
flag ceremony and therefore the virtues (e.g. patriotism,
respect for human rights, love of country, etc.) they are
supposed to imbibe from their participation in the flag
ceremony, they can get in their study of the
Constitution, the democaratic way of life and form of
government, the history and culture of the Philippines,
the life of our heroes, etc.
To force a small religious group through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to
love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities
which are precisely the values the court in Gerona feared
will be lost by exempting some members of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses to participate in the flag ceremonies.
 let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to
the country… is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable
end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs.
Nebraska)
 expulsion of the members will violated their right as
citizens under the Constitution to receive free education
which is the duty of the State to protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education and to make
such education applicable to all.
 in closing, the court hopes that it will not take
another foreign invasion of our country for our
countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag
as what happened during WWII.
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
NEWDOW vs. U.S. CONGRESS
FACTS:
1. Newdow is an atheist whose daughter attends
public elementary school in the Elk Grove
Unified School District ("EGUSD") in California.
In accordance with state law and a school
district rule, EGUSD teachers begin each school
day by leading their students in a recitation of
the Pledge of Allegiance ("the Pledge").
2. The California Education Code requires that
public schools begin each school day with
"appropriate patriotic exercises" and that "the
giving of the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of
the United States of America shall satisfy" this
requirement.
3. To implement the California statute, the school
district that Newdow's daughter attends has
promulgated a policy that states, in pertinent
part: "Each elementary school class recite the
pledge of allegiance to the flag once each day."
(students are led by teachers)
4. Newdow does not allege that his daughter's
teacher or school district requires his daughter
to participate in reciting the Pledge. Rather, he
claims that his daughter is injured when she is
compelled to "watch and listen as her state
employed teacher in her state-run school leads
her classmates in a ritual proclaiming that there
is a God, and that ours is 'one nation under
God.'
5. He challenges the constitutionality of the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance to the
Flag. Newdow argues that the addition of these
words by a 1954 federal statute to the previous
version of the Pledge of Allegiance (which made
no reference to God) and the daily recitation in
the classroom of the Pledge of Allegiance, with
the added words included, by his daughter's
public school teacher are violations of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
ISSUES:
WON the added phrase “under God” constitutes a
violation of the U.S. Consti?
HELD:
Yes. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent
with our holding. Plaintiff to recover costs on his appeal.
RATIO: Court used three tests to determine the validity
of the added words.
Lemon test
- To survive the "Lemon test," the government
conduct in question (1) must have a secular
purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
consti 2 all stars
and (3) must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.
- Historically, the primary purpose of the 1954 Act
was to advance religion, in conflict with the first
prong of the Lemon test. The federal defendants
"do not dispute that the words 'under God' were
intended" "to recognize a Supreme Being," at a
time when the government was publicly
inveighing against atheistic communism.
o the federal defendants argue that the
Pledge must be considered as a whole
when assessing whether it has a secular
purpose. They claim that the Pledge has
the secular purpose of "solemnizing
public occasions, expressing confidence
in the future, and encouraging the
recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society."
o Court said: As was the case with the
amendment to the Alabama statute in
Wallace, the legislative history of the
1954 Act reveals that the Act's sole
purpose was to advance religion, in
order to differentiate the United States
from nations under communist rule.
"The First Amendment requires that a
statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to
advance religion."
- Defendants: The phrase 'under God' recognizes
only the guidance of God in our national affairs.
Court: This alleged distinction is irrelevant for
constitutional purposes. The Act's affirmation of
"a belief in the sovereignty of God" and its
recognition of "the guidance of God" are
endorsements by the government of religious
beliefs. The Establishment Clause is not limited
to "religion as an institution"; this is clear from
cases such as Santa Fe, where the Court struck
down student-initiated and student-led prayer at
high school football games.. The Establishment
Clause guards not only against the
establishment of "religion as an institution," but
also against the endorsement of religious
ideology by the government. Because the Act
fails the purpose prong of Lemon, we need not
examine the other prongs.
- Similarly, the school district policy also fails the
Lemon test. Although it survives the first prong
of Lemon because, as even Newdow concedes,
the school district had the secular purpose of
fostering patriotism in enacting the policy, the
policy fails the second prong. The second Lemon
prong asks whether the challenged government
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as
an endorsement, and by the non-adherents as a
disapproval, of their individual religious
choices." *fn11 Ball, 473 U.S. at 390. Given the
age and impressionability of schoolchildren, as
discussed above, particularly within the
confined environment of the classroom, the
policy is highly likely to convey an impermissible
4
consti part 10: free exercise clause
message of endorsement to some and
disapproval to others of their beliefs regarding
the existence of a monotheistic God. Therefore
the policy fails the effects prong of Lemon, and
fails the Lemon test
Justice O’ Connor’s “endorsement test”
- In the context of the Pledge, the statement that
the United States is a nation "under God" is an
endorsement of religion. It is a profession of a
religious belief, namely, a belief in monotheism. .
To recite the Pledge is not to describe the United
States; instead, it is to swear allegiance to the
values for which the flag stands: unity,
indivisibility, liberty, justice, and -- since 1954 --
monotheism. The text of the official Pledge,
codified in federal law, impermissibly takes a
position with respect to the purely religious
question of the existence and identity of God.
- Furthermore, the school district's practice of
teacher-led recitation of the Pledge aims to
inculcate in students a respect for the ideals set
forth in the Pledge, and thus amounts to state
endorsement of these ideals. Although students
cannot be forced to participate in recitation of
the Pledge, the school district is nonetheless
conveying a message of state endorsement of a
religious belief when it requires public school
teachers to recite, and lead the recitation of, the
current form of the Pledge.
“Coercion test”
- on the principle that "at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise, or otherwise to act in a
way which establishes a state religion or
religious faith, or tends to do so."
- Although the defendants argue that the religious
content of "one nation under God" is minimal, to
an atheist or a believer in certain non-Judeo-
Christian religions or philosophies, it may
reasonably appear to be an attempt to enforce a
"religious orthodoxy" of monotheism, and is
therefore impermissible. The coercive effect of
this policy is particularly pronounced in the
school setting given the age and
impressionability of schoolchildren, and their
understanding that they are required to adhere
to the norms set by their school, their teacher
and their fellow students.
(Reversed and Remanded)
ANUCENSION vs. NLU
FACTS:
In a Collective Bargaining Agreement between Hacienda
Luisita and the United Luisita Workers’ Union in 1962,
the parties stipulated that, except for those who were
members of Inglesia ni Cristo at the time of the
consti 2 all stars
agreement, all employees would be required to join the
Union and must stay in the Union to be able to retain
employment in the Hacienda.
In 1963 and 1964, 150 members of the Inglesia ni Cristo
sought resignation from the Union pursuant to a circular
given by Inglesia in 1959 prohibiting any of their
members from joining any outside association or
organization. Members of Inglesia were told that they
would not lose their jobs pursuant to RA 3350, that says
that members of religious sects that prohibit affiliation
may not be laid off simply on grounds of their non-
affiliation with any worker’s union.
Later this number went down to 115 due to 2 of them
having already been deceased and 27 not having been in
the Union to begin with. The Union then infomed the
Hacienda that the 115 members have resigned and
demanded for their immediate lay-off due to the
stipulations of the CBA. The Union even proceeded to go
on strike until the 115 workers were laid off.
Respondent Union assailed the constitutionality of RA
3350 and the Court on Industrial Relations struck down
the statute. Petitioners here have appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1) WON the Court of Industrial Relations had
jurisdiction.
2) WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
1) No it did not. The Court of Agricultural
Relations had jurisdiction.
2) No, RA 3350 is not unconstitutional.
RATIO:
1) Petitioners claim that the Court of
Agricultural Relations should have had
jurisdiction as the Hacienda is of an
agricultural nature, not an industrial one.
Here the Court says that the agricultural
nature of the Hacienda is unquestionable.
As such it is clear that the Court of
Agricultural Relations should have had
jurisdiction.
2) The constitutionality of RA 3350 was
attacked the Union and struck down by the
Court of Industrial Relations on the
following grounds:
A) it abridges the freedom of workers to
form associations
B) it impairs the obligation of contracts
C) it discriminates in favor of the
religious sect Inglesia ni Cristo in
violation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting legislation for
the support of any religious sect
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
D) it denies equal protection
A) On the first claim, the Court said
that both the Consti and RA 875
(the original Industrial Peace Act,
later amended by RA 3350)
recognized freedom of association.
RA 875 provides for the forming,
joining or assisting of labor
organizations for the purpose of
collective bargaining. The court also
said that this right to join also
includes the right not to join or to
abstain from joining any union. The
court explains, however, the idea of
a closed shop, wherein an
agreement of this nature binds
employees to the union bargained
with. “Hence, the right of said
employee not to join the labor union
is curtailed and withdrawn”.
However, RA 3350 included the
exception with regards to religious
sects that prohibit affiliation. Here,
the members are not being
prohibited as they may still join,
neither are they being coerced to
join. Therefore, there is no
curtailment of the freedom of
association.
B) With regards to impairing the
obligation of contracts, the Court
said that legislation impairing the
obligation of contracts can be
sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the
people, and when the means
adopted to secure that end are
reasonable. Here the purpose is to
insure freedom of religion, prevent
discrimination, and protect the
members of those religious sects.
Also stated by the Court is that the
free exercise of religious profession
or belief is superior to contract
rights.
C) The Court cited Aglipay v. Ruiz
where they stated that the
government should not be precluded
from pursuing valid objectives
secular in character even if the
incidental result would be favorable
to a religion or sect. The purpose of
RA 3350 is secular, worldly, and
temporal, not spiritual or religious
or holy and eternal. It was intended
to serve the secular purpose of
advancing the constitutional right to
the free exercise of religion.
D) The Court here discussed on equal
protection, not being a guaranty of
equality. It allows classification.
consti 2 all stars
Here we see that the classification is
based on real and important
differences, as religious beliefs are
not mere beliefs or ideas, bit are
motives of certain rules of human
conduct. Such classification is
therefore valid.
IGLESIA ni CRISTO vs. CA
1996
Ponente: Puno
FACTS:
1. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) has a television program
entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” aired on 2 TV
channels. The program presents and propagates
petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times in comparative studies
with other religions.
2. Sometime in 1992, INC submitted to the BRMPT
(Board) the VTR tapes of its TV program Series
Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board
classified the series as “X” or not for public
viewing on the ground that they “offend and
constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law.”
3. Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action
against the Board. First, it appealed to the
Office of the President the classification of its TV
Series No. 128. It succeeded in its appeal and
the Office of the Pres. reversed the decision of
the Board. Second, petitioner filed a civil case
against the Board with the RTC Quezon City.
4. INC alleged that the Board acted w/o
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
requiring INC to submit the VTR tapes of its
program and x-rating them. The Board invoked
its power under P.D. 1986 in relation to Art. 201
of the RPC. The RTC ordered the Board to grant
the INC the permit for all the series of the “Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo” program.
5. The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after
its motion for reconsideration was denied. The
CA reversed the trial court’s decision. It ruled
that: (1) the respondent board has jurisdiction
and power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not
act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three
series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” on the ground
that the materials constitute an attack against
another religion. It also found the series
“indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs.”
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
ISSUES:
1. WoN the Board has the power to review
petitioner’s TV program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo,”
2. Assuming it has the power, whether or not
the Board gravely abused its discretion
when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and
121, for the reason that they constitute an
attack against other religions and that they
are indecent, contrary to law and good
customs.
DECISION:
The Decision of the CA sustaining the jurisdiction of
the Board to review the TV program entitled “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo,” is AFFIRMED.
Its decision sustaining the action of the Board x-
rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and
121 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RATIO:
Issue 1.
• The law gives the Board the power to screen, review
and examine all “television programs.” the Board
has the power to “approve, delete x x x and/or
prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x The law
also directs the Board to apply “contemporary
Filipino cultural values as standard” to determine
those which are objectionable for being “immoral,
indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs,
injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the
Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous
tendency to encourage the commission of violence or
of a wrong or crime.”
• The SC rejects INC’s postulate that its religious
program is per se beyond review by the respondent
Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
and ears of children.
• The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long
as the belief is confined within the realm of thought.
The second is subject to regulation where the
belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare. Where the individual
externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that
affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State (Isagani
Cruz)
• (Cruz) It is error to think that the mere
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invocation of religious freedom will stalemate
the State and render it impotent in protecting
the general welfare. The inherent police power
can be exercised to prevent religious practices
inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious
conviction and not merely for the purpose of
evading the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
Issue No. 2
• The evidence shows that the Board x-rated
petitioners TV series for “attacking” other religions,
especially the Catholic church. An examination of
the evidence will show that the so-called “attacks”
are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the CA as they were
not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the CA as indecent, contrary to law
and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from
public viewing under Section 3(c) of PD 1986. This
ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise
of religion.
• The respondent Board may disagree with the
criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State
to favor any religion by protecting it against an
attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and
beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace
among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits
the State from leaning towards any religion
• The Board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner
INC simply because it attacks other religions, even if
said religion happens to be the most numerous
church in our country. The bedrock of freedom of
religion is freedom of thought and it is best served
by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas.
When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of
ideas demands that speech should be met by more
speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the
heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of
truth.
• The respondents cannot also rely on the ground
“attacks against another religion” in x-rating the
religious program of petitioner. Section 3 of PD 1986
will reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify
an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner’s
television program. The ground “attack against
another religion” was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules.iThis rule is void for it
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
runs smack against the doctrine that administrative
rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and
spirit of the law they seek to enforce. Moreover,
Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code
should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It
cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of
speech.
• Respondents failed to apply the clear and present
danger rule. The records show that the decision of
the Board is completely bereft of findings of facts
to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes
constitute impermissible attacks against another
religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type
of harm the tapes will bring about especially the
gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious
speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears
but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.
• It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the
clear and present danger test to the case at bar
because the issue involves the content of speech
and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its
impact cannot be measured, and the causal
connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended cannot be established. The contention
overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves
videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their
speech content is known and not an X quantity.
Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board,
with its expertise, can determine whether its sulphur
will bring about the substantive evil feared by the
law. vs. TELERON
PAMIL
MCDANIEL vs. PATY
(April 19, 1978)
Ponente: CJ Burger
FACTS:
McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in
Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for delegate to
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the constitutional convention. An opposing candidate,
appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued in the Chancery Court
for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was isqualified
from serving as a delegate by a Tennessee statutory
provision establishing the qualifications of constitutional
convention delegates to be the same as those for
membership in the State House of Representatives, thus
invoking a Tennessee constitutional provision barring
ministers of the Gospel, or priests of any denomination
whatever."
That court held that the statutory provision violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. and for a judgment
striking his name from the ballot. Chancellor Franks of
the Chancery Court held that 4 of ch. 848 violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution and declared McDaniel eligible for the office
of delegate. Accordingly, McDaniel's name remained on
the ballot and in the ensuing election he was elected by
a vote almost equal to that of three opposing candidates.
After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the
disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon
"religious belief" and restricted "religious action . . .
[only] in the lawmaking process of government - where
religious action is absolutely prohibited by the
establishment clause . . . ."The state interests in
preventing the establishment of religion and in avoiding
the divisiveness and tendency to channel political
activity along religious lines, resulting from clergy
participation in political affairs, were deemed by that
court sufficiently weighty to justify the disqualification,
notwithstanding the guarantee of the Free Exercise
Clause.
ISSUE/HELD:
W/O Not a Tennessee statute barring Ministers of the
Gospel, or priests of any denomination whatever from
serving as delegates to the State's limited constitutional
convention deprived appellant of the right to the free
exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.
YES
RATIO:
The disqualification of ministers from legislative office
was a practice carried from England by seven of the
original States; later six new States similarly excluded
clergymen from some political offices. The purpose of the
several States in providing for disqualification was
primarily to assure the success of a new political
experiment, the separation of church and state. Prior to
1776, most of the 13 Colonies had some form of an
established, or government-sponsored, church. In light
of this history and a widespread awareness during that
period of undue and often dominant clerical influence in
public and political affairs here, in England, and on the
Continent, it is not surprising that strong views were
held by some that one way to assure disestablishment
was to keep clergymen out of public office. As the value
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
of the disestablishment experiment was perceived, 11 of
the 13 States disqualifying the clergy from some types of
public office gradually abandoned that limitation. The
essence of this aspect of our national history is that in
all but a few States the selection or rejection of
clergymen for public office soon came to be viewed as
something safely left to the good sense and desires of the
people.
The right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably
encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform
other similar religious functions. Tennessee also
acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to
seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the
state constitutional convention. Yet under the clergy-
disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both
rights simultaneously because the State has conditioned
the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. The
Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily, not at
religious belief, but at the status, acts, and conduct of
the clergy. Therefore, the Free Exercise Clause's absolute
prohibition against infringements on the "freedom to
believe" is inapposite here.
The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee
restriction on ministers is that if elected to public office
they will necessarily exercise their powers and influence
to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the
interests of another, thus pitting one against the others,
contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its
command of neutrality. However widely that view may
have been held in the 18th century by many, including
enlightened statesmen of that day, the American
experience provides no persuasive support for the fear
that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-
establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of
civil office than their unordained counterparts.
The challenged provision violates appellant's First
Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion
because it conditions his right to the free exercise of his
religion on the surrender of his right to seek office.
Though justification is asserted under the Establishment
Clause for the statutory restriction on the ground that if
elected to public office members of the clergy will
necessarily promote the interests of one sect or thwart
those of another contrary to the anti-establishment
principle of neutrality, Tennessee has failed to
demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy
participation in the political process have not lost
whatever validity they may once have enjoyed.
GERMAN vs. BARANGAN
(March 27, 1985)
Ponente: J. Escolin
FACTS:
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On Oct 2, 1984, petitioners composed of about 50
businessmen, students and office employees and who
were members of the August Twenty-One Movement
(ATOM), converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the
purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which
adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same
street. Wearing yellow t-shirts, they marched down said
street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-
government invectives. Along the way, however, they
were barred by respondent Major lsabelo Lariosa, upon
orders of his superior and co-respondent Gen. Santiago
Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground
that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang
security area. When their efforts to enter the church
became apparently futile, they opted to stay outside,
kneeling on the sidewalk in front of the barricades and
prayed the Holy Rosary. Afterwards, they sang Bayan ko
with clenched fists of protest against the violation of
their rights and thereafter dispersed peacefully. Because
of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major
Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter
the church in the future would likewise be prevented,
petitioners took this present recourse.
ISSUE  HELD:
1. WON petitioners’ constitutionally protected freedom
to exercise religion (Sec 8, Art IV of the 1973 Consti)
was violated  NO
2. WON petitioners’ freedom of locomotion was violated
(Sec 5, Art IV of the 1973 Consti)  NO
RATIO:
1.
Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel
Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At
the hearing of this petition, respondents assured
petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted,
and will never restrict, any person or persons from
entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain,
however, that petitioners' intention was not really to
perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct
an anti-government demonstration at a place close
to the very residence and offices of the President of
the Republic. Respondents further lament petitioners'
attempt to disguise their true motive with a ritual as
sacred and solemn as the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.
Undoubtedly, the yellow t-shirts worn by some of the
marchers, their raised clenched fists, and chants of anti-
government slogans strongly tend to substantiate
respondents allegation.
These allegations cannot but cast serious doubts on the
sincerity and good faith of petitioners in invoking the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religious worship
and of locomotion. While it is beyond debate that every
citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to
religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all
fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in
good faith. As Art 19 of the Civil Code admonishes:
"Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties… observe honesty and
good faith."
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
Even assuming that petitioners' claim to the free exercise
of religion is genuine and valid, still respondents
reaction to the October 2, 1984 mass action may not be
characterized as violative of the freedom of religious
worship. Since 1972, when mobs of demonstrators
crashed through the Malacañang gates and scaled its
perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel
Street and the streets approaching it have been
restricted. While travel to and from the affected
thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited,
passers-by have been subjected to courteous,
unobtrusive security checks. The reasonableness of this
restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it is
considered that the same is designed to protect the lives
of the President and his family, as well as other
government officials, diplomats and foreign guests
transacting business with Malacañang. The restriction is
also intended to secure the several executive offices
within the Malacañang grounds from possible external
attacks and disturbances. These offices include
communications facilities that link the central
government to all places in the land. Unquestionably,
the restriction imposed is necessary to maintain the
smooth functioning of the executive branch of the
government, which petitioners' mass action would
certainly disrupt.
Cantwell v Connecticut: The constitutional inhibition on
legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere to such religious organization or form of worship
as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion. Thus the amendment
embraces two concepts –freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things,
the second cannot be.
In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or
restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their
religion, but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action. This
curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this
Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education, thus:
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So
is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in
most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of
belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said
religious belief clashes with the established
institutions of society and with the law, then the
former must yield and give way to the latter. The
government steps in and either restrains said
exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.
consti 2 all stars
2.
Suffice it to say that the restriction imposed on the use
of J.P. Laurel Street, the wisdom and reasonableness of
which have already been discussed, is allowed under the
fundamental law, the same having been established in
the interest of national security.
Petition dismissed.
Teehankee, dissenting:
I vote to grant the petition on the ground that the right
of free worship and movement is a preferred right that
enjoys precedence and primacy and is not subject to
prior restraint except where there exists the clear and
present danger of a substantive evil sought to be
prevented. There was and is manifestly no such danger
in this case.
1. The right to freely exercise one's religion is guaranteed
in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. Freedom of worship,
alongside freedom of expression and speech and
peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed
that on the judiciary—even more so than on the other
departments—rests the grave and delicate responsibility
of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred
rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of
course, dispense with what has been so felicitously
termed by Justice Holmes 'as the sovereign prerogative
of judgment.' Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of
such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and
primacy."
2. In the free exercise of such preferred rights, there is to
be no prior restraint although there may be subsequent
punishment of any illegal acts committed during the
exercise of such basic rights. The sole justification for a
prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of these basic
rights is the existence of a grave and present danger
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
any other legitimate public interest, that the State
has a right (and duty) to prevent.
3. The burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would justify prior restraint and
bar a group of persons from entering the church of their
choice for prayer and worship lies on the military or
police officials who would so physically restrain them.
Indeed, there is no precedent in this time and age where
churchgoers whose right of free exercise of their religion
is recognized have been physically prevented from
entering their church on grounds of national security.
On the other hand, it does not lie within the competence
or authority of such officials to demand of churchgoers
that they show and establish their "sincerity and good
faith… in invoking the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of religious worship and of locomotion" as a pre-
condition, as seems to be the thrust of the majority
decision.
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consti part 10: free exercise clause
Respondents themselves in the Solicitor General's
comment admit that "true, there were only about 80
persons in petitioners' group on October 2 and this
number could hardly pose the danger feared," but
expressed the fear that petitioners' ranks could within
hours reach hundreds if not thousands and "peaceful
dispersal becomes impossible as in recent
demonstrations and rallies." Respondents were in full
control and there is no question as to the capability
of the security forces to ward off and stop any
untoward move. They had placed an advance
checkpoint as far back as the Sta. Mesa Rotonda and
could stop the flow of people in the church if they
deemed it unmanageable. There definitely was no clear
and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or
the security of Malacañang.
CANTWELL vs. CONNECTICUT
COMMONWEALTH vs. TWITCHELL
(1993)
WILKINS, J.
FACTS:
David and Ginger Twitchell appeal from their convictions
of involuntary manslaughter death of their 2 1/2 year
old son Robyn. Robyn died of the consequences of
peritonitis caused by the perforation of his bowel which
had been obstructed as a result of an anomaly known as
Meckel's diverticulum. There was evidence that the
condition could be corrected by surgery with a high
success rate.
The defendants are practicing Christian Scientists [CS]
who grew up in CS families. They believe in healing by
spiritual treatment. During Robyn's five-day illness they
retained Nathan Talbot. As a result of that consultation,
David Twitchell read a church publication concerning
the legal rights and obligations of CS in Mass. That
publication quoted a portion of General Laws Sec. 1, as
then amended, which accepted remedial treatment by
spiritual means alone as satisfying any parental
obligation not to neglect a child or to provide a child with
physical care.
HELD:
• Parents have a duty to seek medical attention for a
child in Robyn's circumstances, the violation of
which, if their conduct was wanton or reckless,
could support a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter and that the spiritual treatment
provision [STP] did not bar a prosecution for
manslaughter. However, special circumstances in
this case would justify a finding that the Twitchells
reasonably believed that they could rely on spiritual
treatment without fear of criminal prosecution. But
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since this defense has not been presented to the
jury, the judgement must be reversed and
remanded.
ISSUES:
WON the law generally imposes a parental duty to
provide medical services to a child. - YES
• The duty to provide sufficient support for a child is
legally enforceable in a civil proceeding against a
parent. A breach of that duty is a misdemeanor.
Where necessary to protect a child's well-being, the
Commonwealth may intervene, over the parents'
objections, to assure that needed services are
provided. Parental duty of care has been recognized
in the common law of homicide in this
Commonwealth. There is also a common law duty to
provide medical services for a child, the breach of
which can be the basis, in the appropriate
circumstances, for the conviction of a parent for
involuntary manslaughter.
WON the STP bars any involuntary manslaughter charge
against a parent who relies on spiritual treatment, and
who does not seek medical attention for his or her child
(even if the parent's failure to seek such care would
otherwise be wanton or reckless conduct). - NO
• STP provides no complete protection to a parent
against a charge of involuntary manslaughter that is
based on the parent's wanton or reckless failure to
provide medical services to a child. Sec.1 concerns
child support and care in a chapter that deals with
the Commonwealth's interest that persons within its
territory should not be killed by the wanton and
reckless conduct of others. It is unlikely that the
Legislature placed the STP in Sec. 1 to provide a
defense to common law homicide. The act that added
the STP was entitled "An Act defining the term
'proper physical care' under the law relative to care
of children by a parent." The amendment's concern
seems focused on the subject matter of sec.1 and
certainly not directed toward changing the common
law of homicide.
• Sec.1 reads:
"xxxx any parent of a minor child xxxxx who
willfully fails to provide necessary and proper
physical, educational or moral care and guidance
xxxxx or who fails to provide proper attention for
said child, shall be punished xxxx.
A child shall not be deemed to be neglected or
lack proper physical care for the sole reason that
he is being provided remedial treatment by
spiritual means alone in accordance with the
tenets and practice of a recognized church or
religious denomination by a duly accredited
practitioner thereof."
• A predecessor of sec. 1, enacted in 1882,
provided that "whoever unreasonably
neglects to provide for the support of his
minor child shall be punished by fine or by
imprisonment." Statute was rewritten in
1909 to impose a duty of physical care of
children on parents. In 1954, sec. 1 was
amended to state that "any parent of a
11
consti part 10: free exercise clause

minor child who wilfully fails to provide
necessary and proper physical, educational
or moral care and guidance shall be
punished." The STP was added in 1971.
• Section 1 was rewritten removing from sec. 1
any reference to willful failure to provide
necessary and proper physical care and
limited any violation to matters of failure to
support. Nevertheless, the STP was
retained. Because of the 1986 amendment,
the STP of sec. 1 has an application outside
of sec. 1 that it did not have before.
• The STP refers to neglect and willful failure to
provide proper physical care as bases for
punishment. These concepts do not underlie
involuntary manslaughter. Wanton or reckless
conduct is not a form of negligence. Wanton or
reckless conduct does not involve a willful intention
to cause the resulting harm. Involuntary
manslaughter does not require willfulness. Thus,
the STP in sec. 1 does not apply to involuntary
manslaughter.
• There is special merit to such a rule if
religious beliefs are involved and if the
defendant was attempting to comply with
the law while adhering to his religious
beliefs and practices.
CASE REMANDED because some ‘Questions of
Fact’ need be answered:
o Whether a person would reasonably conclude
that the Attorney General had ruled that sec. 1
provided protection against a manslaughter
charge.
o Whether the defendants reasonably relied on the
church's publication and on the advice of the
Committee on Publication.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR

WON the failure to extend the protection of the STP to

them would be a denial of due process because they
lacked "fair warning" because they were officially misled
by an opinion of the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth. - YES
• Atty Gen, who is statutorily empowered to give his
opinion upon questions of law, gave an opinion
which answers a general question "whether parents
who fail to provide medical services to children on
the basis of religious beliefs will be subject to
prosecution for such failure." An average person
might read the Atty Gen’s comments as being a
negative answer. It is true that the answer comes to
focus on negligent failures of parents, and we know
that wanton or reckless failures are different.
• Atty Gen: “The Massachusetts child abuse reporting
law does not specifically address itself to the
relationship between the religious beliefs of the
parent and failure to provide medical care. Sec. 1 is
a criminal statute and it expressly precludes
imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent
for failure to provide medical care because of
religious beliefs. However, the intent of Chap 119 is
to require that children of such parents be provided
services whenever the need arises. Under Chapter
119, children may receive services notwithstanding
the inability to prosecute the parents.”
• Although the Twitchells read a CS publication called
"Legal Rights and Obligations of CS in Mass" which
relied on the above opinion. That opinion was
arguably misleading because of what it did not say
concerning criminal liability for manslaughter
• Although it has long been held that "ignorance of the
law is no defense", there is justification for treating
as a defense the belief that conduct is not a violation
of law when a defendant has reasonably relied on an
official statement in an official interpretation of the
public official who is charged with the responsibility
for the interpretation or enforcement of the law. (
aka "entrapment by estoppel." )
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