Luis Lim, administrator, v. Isabel Garcia, widow of Hilario Lim (1907) 1.
1. WON Matea’s non-intervention in action for partition is proof that she
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Zamboanga
FACTS:
 1903: Hilario Lim died intestate leaving a widow and 9 children.
 RTC: Inventory prepared by the administrator showed entire estate of the
deceased to be conjugal property except
1) H&Lot in Zamboanga
2) Sum of P10,000.00
3) P700 sum paid for a certain lot but was later sold
4) Not included in the inventory were 3 parcels of land presumed to be part of
widow’s paraphernal/ separate estate.
 Administrator and children contend that none of the said property should be
treated as conjugal because Hilario Lim brought to the marriage property more
than double the amount of the intestate estate while defendant widow brought
nothing at the time of the marriage or thereafter. (ouch!)
ISSUE: WON the above claim is tenable
HELD: Judgment affirmed.
RATIO: No, unless evidence will be provided to establish otherwise. Art 1407 CC
holds:
All the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership
property (bienes gananciales – repeat after me...) unless and until it is proven
that it is a part of the separate estate of the H or W.
Matea E. Rodriguez, plaintiff & appellant, vs.
Susana, Escolastico & Procesa De La Cruz, defendants & appellees
Appeal from judgment of CFI Albay [Sept. 28, 1907]
FACTS:
 Aug. 21, 1905: Rodriguez filed complaint to recover certain pieces of lands from
defendants. She alleged that:
1. She owned lands & enjoyed furits of same from May 1882 – Feb. 1905.
2. She acquired them from her deceased dad, Alejo Rodriguez, during her 1 st
marriage.
3. Hilarion dela Cruz, dad of defendants, is her 2 nd husband & this suit is w/his
consent.
4. Hilarion had no interest/rt in said property.
5. Feb. 20, 1905 – defendants commenced suit to against Hilarion for
partition of lands. Matea was not made a party in the action.
6. March 29, 1905 – CFI decided in favor of defendants, decreeing their
ownership & possession of lands.
 Defendants: special denial w/special defense: March 29, 1905 CFI judgment.
 CFI decided in favor of defendants, complaint dismissed. CFI claims that
evidence show that lands were acquired by Hilarion during his married life
w/first wife, Andrea de Leon & not inheritance of Matea from her dad.
ISSUES & RATIO:
has no interest in lands in question.
NO. The fact that she was not made party to such action means that the court
decision did not prejudice her interest in any way. Defendants admit that Matea
was not made a party & there’s no proof either that she had knowledge of such
action. Legal basis: Code of Procedure in Civil Actions Sec. 277 states
that proceedings in a cause against one person can’t affect the rights of
another.
2. WON Hilarion is the rightful owner of the land simply because he had
been administering lands throughout his marriage with Matea.
Hilarion indeed administered Matea’s property upon marriage. CC doesn’t
prohibit such. CC doesn’t say either that such property becomes his simply
because he had administered the same for a long time. Legal bases: CC Art.
1382 states that wife shall retain ownership of her property w/c she brings to
the marriage relation (perhaps by virtue of the CPG being the legal regime
then). CC Art 1384 states that wife will manage her property unless she
assigns the same to her husband thru a public document but again, this does
not mean that such becomes the property of her husband. Defendants did not
make such claim. They only claimed that lands were acquired during Hilarion’s
1st marriage.
3. WON Hilarion acquired lands during his marriage to Andrea de Leon.
No. Evidence show that lands were acquired by Matea from her father by
inheritance during her 1st marriage.
HOLDING: CFI decision reversed. Remanded for CFI to enter judgment that Matea
is owner & entitled to possession of lands.
ROSETE v. PROVINCIAL SHERIFF
96 Phil 560 (1954)
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Zambales, CFI
Facts:
Epifanio Fularon was convicted of murder and was sentenced to indemnify the
victim’s heirs in the amount of P2K.
To satisfy said indemnity, a writ of execution was issued and the sheriff levied upon
4 parcels of land belonging to the conjugal partnership of Epifanio and Fularon
Rosete.
These were sold at public auction for P1,385 (balance: P739.34)
A year after, Gliceria redeemed 2 of the 4 parcels of land sold at the public auction
for P879, after the sheriff executed in her favor the corresponding deed of
repurchase.
Then an alias execution was issued to satisfy the remaining balance and the sheriff
again levied upon the two parcels of land which Gliceria had redeemed. He set a
date for the sale but before said date, Gliceria filed a case for injunction to restrain
the sheriff from carrying out the sale—a case which did not prosper.
As such, the sheriff was able to carry out the sale as originally scheduled and the
property was sold.
The plaintiff amended her complaint praying that the sale of the sheriff be declared
null and void which the court upheld, hence this appeal.
Note: The original issue they laid out was whether the sale made by the sheriff of
the 2 parcels of land which were redeemed by Gliceria in the exercise of her right of
redemption is valid it appearing that they formed part of the four parcels of land
belonging to the conjugal partnership which were originally sold to satisfy the same
judgment of indemnity awarded in the criminal case. The trial court had declared it
null and void on the basis of a precedent—Lichauco v. Olegario. But because the
Court expressed doubt as to the applicability of the Lichauco case, another issue
which for purposes of this case is sufficient to decide the controversy was turned to,
that is:
Issue: Since it appears that plaintiff redeemed the two parcels of land in question
with money obtained by her from her father, has the property become paraphernal
and as such is beyond the reach of further execution?
Held: Yes. Decision appealed to modified; Sale by sheriff, null and void; Deed of
repurchase revived and maintained.
The issue is answerable by yes for two reasons:
a. Gliceria redeemed the property, not in behalf of her husband, but as
successor in interest in the whole or part of the property, it being then
conjugal. Successor in interest includes one who succeeds to the interest of
the debtor by operation of law or the wife as regards her husband’s
homestead by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband passes
to her
b. A property is deemed to belong exclusively to the wife (1) when acquired by
her by-right of redemption, and (2) with money belonging exclusively to her
(Art. 1396, old Civil Code)
The interest which a wife has in conjugal property is known as “inchoate right of
dower” or “contingent interest”. By virtue of this inchoate right, a wife has a right of
redemption of a homestead as successor in interest of her husband. The cases
Hepfner v. Urton, Taylor v. Taylor and Malone v. Nelson, provided that the wife’s
inchoate right of dower was a sufficient interest for the right of the wife to redeem
to base on.
The property in question has therefore become the exclusive property of the
plaintiff. She has acquired it by right of redemption as successor in interest of her
husband. It ceased to be the property of the judgment debtor (the husband). It can
no longer therefore be the subject of execution under a judgment exclusively
affecting the personal liability of the latter.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. vs. Register of Deeds of Manila [May 5, 1934]
Appeal from a judgement of the COFI of Manila
Facts:
 October 26, 1933 – Dominga Angeles was married to Manuel Sandoval who
resides in Palawan.
 Dominga lives separately from her husband. She executed an instrument
entitled “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” in favour of People Bank and
Trust Co, whereby she conveyed in trust he paraphernal property consisting of
3 parcels of land together with 2 buildings thereon. These lands would be
subdivided into small lots and would subsequently be sold either by cash or
instalments; that the trustee would redeem the mortgage constituted on said
property with funds derived from rents or sale thereof; that the trustee would
grant a loan of P10,000 with which to redeem the mortgage in question; and
that the said trustee would collect the rents to be derived from the property
while the lots remained unsold.
 Instrument was presented to the register of deeds but it was denied. The COFI
sustained the action of the register of deeds and denied the registration applied
for. The basis for the denial by the trial court was that the trustee was
authorized to collect the fruits of the paraphernal property while the lots
remained unsold or unalienated to other persons. Article 1385 and 1401 (3) of
the Civil Code provides that such fruits are conjugal partnership property, the
management of which corresponds to the husband, in accordance with article
1412 of the said Code, and the husband did not intervene nor give his consent.
Issue: WON Dominga Angeles can enter into an agreement and declaration of trust
without marital consent and therefore the instrument is valid and susceptible of
registration.
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 In a deed of trust the grantor neither parts with nor conveys the rents of her
paraphernal property in favour of the trustee but merely authorizes it to collect
them during the time the lots remain unsold. This authority is only a mere act
of administration which article 1384 expressly vests upon the grantor.
 Art. 1384 – the wife shall have the management of the paraphernal property
unless she has delivered the same to her husband before a notary, for the
purpose of conferring its management upon him. In such cases it shall be the
the duty of the husband to execute a mortgage for the value of any personalty
which may be so delivered to him or otherwise secure it in a manner prescribed
with respect to dowry property.
 If the grantor is the legal administratrix of the property then she has the right
to collect the fruits thereof and she may delegate such power to other persons.
If this would be denied then it would be tantamount to converting her from an
administratrix to a mere collector of rents.
 The wife manages her paraphernal property that was not delivered to the
husband under the formalities prescribed by law, while such fruits remain
unliquidated, on the ground that they answer for the necessary and
indispensable expenses incurred in the administration and preservation of the
property. Not till then does the husband acquire the right to claim them for the
conjugal partnership to which he is the sole administrator. The husband cannot
claim the fruits in question for their conjugal partnership until a liquidation
thereof has been made by her.
 Failure to comply with the requisites of article 1387 does not render the
contract null and void but merely voidable and the right of action belongs to the
husband or his heirs. Even if the instrument is defective it is susceptible of
registration,
 Prior cases: November 8, 1898 – management of the paraphernal property
conferred upon the wife by article 1384 of the Civil Code carries with it the
power to enter into contracts regarding the same, subject only to the limitation
contained in article 1387.
 October 16, 1918 – wife does not need marital consent; management should
not be understood as limited by law merely to gathering fruits and collecting
rents and interests thereon and delivering them to the husband, for that would
be tantamount to converting the wife from an administratrix into a mere
collector of rents of the paraphernal property.
  1928 ruling – wife may legally perform every act not intended to alienate,
mortgage or otherwise encumber her paraphernal property, she being
authorized to execute contracts arising from the administration of an estate,
and consequently to obtain loans, without marital consent, for benefit of such
property.
 Logical interpretation that can be given to article 1384 in connection with article
1387 is that which grants the wife complete freedom in the management of her
paraphernal property and renders marital consent as unnecessary except for
acts expressly states in art. 1387, 995 and 1053.
 Lack of marital consent does not render the act null and void but merely
voidable at the instance of the husband or of his heirs, on the ground that the
legal prohibition in question was not established in favour of third persons but
with a different end or purpose, that is in favour of the husband whom the law
wants to protect from possible damage to the conjugal partnership of which he
is the head.
Friends, I tried looking for the articles for the case but when I checked the civil code (cd
version provided by FLOP) it would not make sense. 1387 and 1384 does not deal with
paraphernal properties of the wife. CC art 1384 talks about rescission and damages and
1387 deals with contracts wherein the debtor alienates property by gratuitous title. Sorry
talaga but I can’t find the codal for this case. 
Trustee – bank
Trustor – Dominga Angeles
I think that when she entrusted her properties to the bank she has already an existing
mortgage and that Peoples bank granted her a loan to pay for that mortgage. What the
bank would get in return is that they would collect the proceeds from the rent until such
time that the properties would be sold.
Why is it considered voidable if it was stated that the wife can manage her property if it
was not delivered to the husband?
In my opinion it is voidable even if the it was mentioned that the wife can manage the
property because the conjugal property has the rights to the fruits of the paraphernal
property… Before FC conjugal partnership of gains and therefore the conjugal property
has the rights to the fruits of the separate property of the spouses after the expenses
incurred have been deducted. The husband has the right to manage the conjugal
property and as such he would be affected if the paraphernal property of the wife would
be sold or if the supposedly remaining share (fruits-expenses) would not be given to the
joint property of the spouses. The act is valid but it is voidable and only the husband and
his heir can assail it because they are the only party that are adversely affected.
Sps Virgilio & Michelle Castro v. Romeo Miat (2003)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS:
 Sps Moises & Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land during their marriage in
the ff locations:
1) Parañaque: 132 sq. m. – w/c Moises wanted to be his alone
2) Paco, Mla: 70 sq. m., bought on installment basis – w/c was for their 2 sons,
Romeo & Alexander
 The agreement re the partition of the Paco property was manifested in the ff
events:
a) even before death of Concordia
b) reiterated at her deathbed
c) after Moises’s return from Dubai, UAE, again reiterated in front of the Miat
extended family members and attested to by formal document (Sinumpaang
Salaysay)
d) letters of Moises to sons
 Dec 1984: Moises paid the balance of the Paco property in full from Fraval
Realty, Inc. but secured the title in his name as a widower. Romeo asserted his
right and demanded for the owner’s duplicate of the Paco property w/c was
given to him.
 April 1988: After Romeo along w/ Alexander & his wife lived in the property, the
couple decided to leave the house and agreed to sell Alexander’s share to
Romeo. Romeo gave him partial payment of P6,000.00.
 Feb 1988: Romeo learned from his godmother that the latter placed a
downpayment of P30K for the Paco property in favor of her son Virgilio.
 Dec 1988: Romeo & Virgilio Castro went to MTC to discuss status of the Paco
property. It was later sold to him by virtue of a Deed of Sale for P95K.
 Romeo filed an action to nullify such sale and to compel Moises & ro Alexander
to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco property to him
upon his payment of the balance of the agreed price.
 RTC declared sale of Moises-Virgilio as valid. CA ruled in favor of Romeo and
nullified deed of sale.
ISSUES:
1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital
2) WON there was a valid oral partitions of that land
3) WON sps Castro were buyers in good faith
HELD: CA decision affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
RATIO:
1) Clearly conjugal. Paco property acquired by onerous title during the marriage
out of the common fund. Art 153 of the New CC:
The ff are conjugal partnership property:
a. Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense
of the common fund, ….
2) YES! See manifestations cited above.
No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to
be valid Moreover, the partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a
public document. The requirement in Art 1358 CC is only for convenience; non-
compliance w/ which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of the
parties as among themselves. (Pada-Kilario v. CA)
3) No, as manifested in the fact that they brought Moises to the Judge in MTC to find
out if Romeo had a right over the property. Virgilio even admitted that he knew
Romeo was in possession of the title & Romeo then insisted that he is the owner
of the property.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair price for
it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person’s claim or
interest in it. He must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession of the real property. W/o such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
regarded as buyer in good faith. (Republic v. De Guzman)