TITLE 13-CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
suppose and understand that the person against whom they were uttered was
Section 1-Definition, forms and punishment of the crime
1. Art. 353 – Definition of libel
2. Art. 354 – Requirement for publicity
3. Art. 355 – Libel by means of writings or similar means (provides penalty
for libel)
4. Art. 356 – Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication
for compensation
5. Art. 357 – Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of
official proceedings
6. Art. 358 - Slander
Art 353 – Definition of Libel
“Libel” is a defamation committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, paiting or theatrical or cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar meanrs. On the other hand, “oral defamation” is
called slander.
Note: seditious libel is punished in Art 142 (Inciting to sedition) since in this
article, it punishes all kids of attack against honor and reputation
Purpose of Article 353
Enjoyment of a private reputation is as much as a constitutional right as
the possession of life, liberty or property.
Elements of Defamation
1. That there must be an imputation of a A) crime, or of a B) vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or C) any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance.
2. That the imputation must be made publicly.
3. That it must be malicious.
4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or
one who is dead.
5. That the imputation must tend to cause the A) dishonor, B) discredit or
C) contempt of the person defamed. [ D) to blacken the memory of one
who is dead ]
TEST OF DEFAMATORY CHARACTER OF THE WORDS USED
A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to
guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his honesty, virtue
or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule.
Notes:
1. The meaning of the writer is IMMATERIAL; whatever he/she may
have intended should not be considered. What is considered is: the meaning
of that the words in fact conveyed on the minds of persons of reasonable
understanding, discretion and candor, taking into consideration the
surrounding circumstances which were known to the hearer or reader.
2. Imputation of criminal intention is not libelous
3. Expression of opinion (one which is based on actual fact) is NOT
libelous IF the communication is made in the performance of a “legal,
moral or social duty.”
Art 354 – Requirement for Publicity
“Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it to be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. Private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty.
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.”
Presumption of malice is rebutted, if it is shown by the accused that:
(a) the defamatory imputation is true, in case the law allows proof of the
truth of the imputation
(b) it is published with good intention
(c) there is justifiable motive for making it
PAR. 1 , ART. 354
Two kinds of privileged communications (wherein malice is not presumed)
1) Absolute
• it is not actionable even if its author acted in bad faith
• i.e. statements made by members of Congress in the
discharge of their functions as such, official communications
 made by public officers in the performance of their duties, etc.
(even those in judicial proceedings by lawyers
themselves Malit vs. People)
2) Conditional or Qualified
• Would not be actionable unless author was in bad faith
• If malice is shown, it CAN BE ACTIONABLE
Art 356 – Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such
publication for a compensation
Acts punished:
1. By threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents,
spouse, child, or other members of his family.
2. By offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation,
or money consideration

Purpose for the Doctrine of Privileged Communication Blackmail defined:

The right of the individual to enjoy immunity from publication of - any unlawful extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure
untruthful charges derogatory to his character is not absolute and must at
times yield to the superior necessity of subjecting to investigation the In what felonies is blackmail possible?
conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. 1. Light threats (Art. 283)
2. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a
compensation (Art. 356)

PAR. 2 , ART. 354 Art 357 – Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the
Fair and true report of official proceedings
In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be
course of official proceedings
considered privileged, the following conditions must exist:
------------------------- Constitutes the so-called “Gag Law”------------------------------
a) that it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official
proceedings which are NOT of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or
Elements
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a
1. Offender is a reporter, editor, or manager of a newspaper daily or
public officer in the exercise of his functions
magazine.
b) it is made in good faith
2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another.
c) it is without any comments or remarks
3. That such facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person
Art 355 – Libel by means of writings or similar means
note: elements 2 and 3 must concur OR ELSE there is no violation
A libel may be committed by means of:
©Cases
1. Writing 6. Phonograph Malit vs. People 114 SCRA 348: May 31, 1982- Petitioner Malit was counsel
2. Printing 7. Painting of a certain Ruth Fernandez in an administrative case filed against her by a
3. Lithography 8. Theatrical exhibition Dr. Macaspac. On cross examination by Malit stated “I doubt how did you
4. Engraving 9. Cinematographic exhibition become a doctor” because Dr. Macaspac would not understand the word
5. Radio 10. Or any similar means “made.” Hence, Dr. Macaspac filed a complaint for slander (but an information
for UNJUST VEXATION was filed).
note: defamation through amplifier (speaker system) is not libel, but oral SC SAID:
defamation. Oral defamation in a television program is libel since it falls  Well settled rule that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted
under “or any similar means” from liability from libel or slander cases for words otherwise
defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings,
PENALTY is given in this article (PC in its min and med periods) provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case.
DOCTRINE: Utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative
proceedings belong to the class of communications that are absolutely
privileged.
Mercado vs. CFI 116 SCRA 93 August 25, 1982- A telegram (by Rafael
Mercado) addressed to a superior officer (Sec. David Consunji; Dep. Of
Public Works and Communications) asked to investigate private respondent
Virginia Mercado’s assets since the letter alleged that she has enriched
herself thru corrupt practices (since her husband was jobless and she had
assets which her salary could not possibly afford).
SC SAID:
• United States vs. Bustos – a qualified privilege maybe “lost by proof
of malice”; qualified privilege - > complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official
when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty
in the matter.
• Case at bar: what casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his
tenacity with which he had pursued a course of conduct on its face
would seem to indicated that a doubt could reasonably be entertained
(even if Virginia had proven to be innocent of the “charges” against
her)
DOCTRINE: Qualified privileges can be lost by proof of malice; letters to a
board or superior officer are only qualified privileges
Agbayani vs. Sayo 89 SCRA 699 April 30, 1979- Mahinan filed a complaint
of libel against his subordinates in GSIS (Agbayani et al) for making
documents that allegedly depicted him as “an incorrigible managerial misfit,
despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler,
chronic falsifier and an unreformed convict”
SC:
• Mahinan cannot file his case in CFI of Nueva Viscaya since he was
stationed in Isabela where the alleged libel was committed.
•
DOCTRINE: Actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be
filed in the courts within the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published (regardless of where it was written) or where the
offended parties actually reside at the time of the commission of the offense.
Newsweek vs. IAC 142 SCRA 171 May 30, 1986- Private respondents,
incorporated associations of sugarcane planters, filed a libel suit against
Newsweek for its article which portrayed Negros Occidental as a place
dominated by sugarcane planters who exploited workers and brutalized them
with impunity.
SC:
1. Complainants have no cause of action for it made no allegation that
anything contained in the article referred to specifically to any one of them. In
order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable.
2. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons is not actionable
UNLESS the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for
victim to be identifiable.
Lacsa vs. IAC 161 SCRA 427 May 23, 1988- Lacsa was a CPA and a
member of the Board of Directors of the Phil. Columbian Association;
complainant is Ponciano Marquez (President of Board). Lacsa had access to
the records of its members and he discovered that Marquez was a mere
associate member of the association. Hence, he questioned Marquez’s
qualifications and wrote a letter to the Board (and even to Marquez; which
was later published and circulated to the members) “branded” Marquez as a
DE FACTO president.
SC:
1. Test of libelous meaning is NOT the analysis of a sentence into
component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but
the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary
reader.
2. Even if the letter is a privileged communication, it lost its character
as such when the matter was published in the newsletter and circulated
among the members.
3. No good faith since it was his irresponsible act of letter writing to
expose his alleged discovery of what he perceived to be an anomaly without
the verification which ordinary prudence demands.
Soriano vs. IAC 167 SCRA 222 November 9, 1988- Chairman of the COA
Francis Tantuico filed a libel suit against Soriano for imputing that he
tampered election returns in the 84 elections. Soriano (editor) and 6 others
were employees of THE GUARDIAN (newspaper) which published an article
alleging such.
SC:
1. “Multiple publication” rule – each and every publication of the same
libel constitutes a distinct offense
2. The editor/business manager of a daily newspaper or magazine
shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author himself.
3. As the respondent held office in QC and that the offending newspaper
is published in QC, the case should be filed in a QC court.
Bulletin Publishing Corp. vs. Noel 167 SCRA 255 November 9, 1988- 21
alleged relatives of the late Amir Mindalano (in behalf of him and their clan)
filed a complaint (LIBEL) against petitioner for the article by Jamil Flores
which appeared in an issue of the Philippine Panorama.
SC: 1. The identification of Amir Mindalano is thus merely illustrative or
incidental to the course of the development of the theme of the article.
Language of the article appeals simply declaratory or expository in character,
matter-of-fact and unemotional in tone and tenor. No derogatory or derisive
implications.
Santos vs. CA 203 SCRA 110 October 21, 1991- Santos, as a columnist of
then Manila Daily Bulletin wrote in his weekly column a quoted statement from
an unverified complaint filed w/ the SEC (by Rosario Sandejas charging CMS
Stock Brokerage Inc. particularly priv resp). He was then charged of libel as
well as other employees of the newspaper.
SC:
1. Malice is presumed in every defamatory imputation but does not arise
if the communication is privileged under Art. 354.
2. The published article is privileged, being a fair and true report of a
judicial proceeding, without comments or remarks, and therefore not
punishable since it was a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a
quasi-judicial body.
Sazon vs. CA 255 SCRA 692 March 29, 1996- Sazon was the editor of the
monthly newsletter of the Parang Bagong Lipunan Community Association
Inc. (association of home owners). The association held an election for the
members of its board and among those who ran is complainant. Pet lost,
complainant lost. Unable to accept defeat, he wrote to the Estate
Management Office protesting the election of the petitioner; wrote to the other
home owners asking them not to recognize petitioner’s status. Afterwards,
numerous leaflets were spread ridiculing Sazon. In response, Sazon started
writing and circulating newsletters referring to complainant (hence complaint)
SC:
1. It is not the question of what the offender meant but what the words
used by him meant/conveyed.
2. When the imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of the defendant (for there is a presumption of malice Art
354).
3. Newsletter WAS NOT PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION since the
readers (homeowners) were not vested with the power of supervision over the
private complainant or the authority to investigate the charges made against
the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be
classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among
thepublic.
4. Any attack upon the private character of the public officer on matters
which are not related to the discharge of their official functions MAY
constitute libel.
Vasquez vs. CA Sept. 15, 1999 September 15, 1999- Vasquez is a resident
of the Tondo Foreshore Area. After going to the National House Authority to
follow up on their complaint against their Barangay captain (herein
complainant OLDMEDO), he was interviewed by newspaper reporters. In the
article released by Ang Tinig ng Masa, he stated that Olmedo was corrupt and
the source of their problems regarding the land disputes. Hence, Olmedo filed
a complaint for libel.
SC:
1. Vasquez cannot claim to have been the source of only a few
statements in the article and point to the other parties as the source of the
rest since he admitted that he was correctly identified as the
spokesperson of the families during the interview.
2. Under Art. 361, if the defamatory statement is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and
truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an
acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends.
Case at bar: he did prove that what he said was INDEED true.
DOCTRINE: Even if the defamatory statement is FALSE, no liability can
attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice.
Art 358 – Slander
What is slander?
Slander is oral defamation
Two Kinds of oral defamation
1. Simple slander
2. Grave slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature
Factors that determine the gravity of oral defamation
1. The expressions used.
2. The personal relations of the accused and the offended party.
3. The circumstances surrounding the case.
Note: slander need not be heard by the offended party.
©Cases
Reyes vs. People 27 SCRA 686 March 28, 1969 – Petitioner Rosauro Reyes
was a former civilian employee at the Navy Exchange at Sangley Point whose
services were terminated by Agustin Hallare and Frank Nolan. A month after,
he led a group of about 20-30 persons in a demonstration in front of the Naval
Station. They carried placards saying “Agustin, mamatay ka na!” “Frank do
not be a common funk” etc. The rallyists followed Hallare to his house
wherein Reyes shouted “Agustin Putang Ina mo. Mawala ka na. Lumabas ka,
papatayin kita!” He was charged with grave threats and grave oral
defamation.
SC:
1. The conviction for grave threats is sustained despite the deletion of the
world “orally” (describing the word “threaten”) since the 3 elements of a
threat existed. The demonstration led by the accused also created in the
mind of the complainant the belief that the accused will make good on his
threat
2. The charge of oral defamation cannot be sustained since the utterance of
“Putang ina mo” is commonly employed not for slander but to express
anger or displeasure. In the case, it should be viewed as parts of the
threat voiced by the accused.
DOCTRINE: Libelous/slanderous remarks that are attendant to threats maybe
considered as mere preparatory remarks culminating in the threat and
therefore are absorbed in the crime of threats and cannot be the basis for
another charge for slander
People vs. Pelayo, 64 OG 1991, September 20, 1966 – Appellant Pantaleon
V. Pelayo Jr. was the councilor of Davao city and hurled accusations against
Governor Alejandro Almendras of receiving protection money from Chinese
gambling operators. Appellant stated such allegations twice: once in the office
of Atty. Clapano within hearing distance of 3 people and in a privileged
speech he delivered in a regular session of the City council. Appellant offers
the defense of privileged communication and self-defense
S.C.
1. The contention of privileged communication is inconsistent with the
contention of self-defense. Self-defense would have required some publicity
which is anathema to the contention of uttering it in a privileged
communication with Atty. Clapano. Also, he uttered such statements in a
privileged speech and was heard by 3 people in the Clapano conversation
2. The offense does not constitute intriguing against honor since the
information came from a definite source, the Chinese gambler and it was
passed by the accused for the purpose of committing dishonor to the
complainant. The elements of intriguing against honor are 1.) Unidentified
source 2.) The accused passes it on without subscribing to the truth
thereof
3. Self-defense cannot apply since his statements were made independent
of the previous allegations the governor supposedly made against him
DOCTRINE: Self-defense maybe invoked in slander but it must have the
following requirements: 1.) defendant should not go beyond explaining his
side to minimize the damage of the slanderous remarks made against him 2.)
defendant can only counter with slanderous/scurrilous remarks if they are
necessary for his explanation or defense
People vs. Prieto, 71 OG 3251, June 2, 1975 – The accused Florentino
Prieto uttered defamatory statements against the complainant Esterlita
Vicente on at least 2 occasions. The accused told his mother-in-law’s kumare
that “he dated Esterlita and would not marry her since they already enjoy the
pleasure of dating”. The accused also told Sinda Linda Plaza that Esterlita
was “badly damaged and that he would just make use of her and to have
pleasure with her in the kitchen”. Sinda Linda Plaza then conveyed the same
to the complainant Erlinda.
S.C.
1. The accused blanket denial which is not based on an iota of evidence falls
2. The accused defense that he did not utter such statements to the victim’s
friends or community cannot prevail over the doctrine.
DOCTRINE: The requirement of “being uttered in public” is satisfied when
delivered in a manner that makes it possible for the public to know it, even if
actually only one person happens to learn of it.
People vs. Mendoza, 74 OG 5607 – The accused, Cristina Mendoza (a
school teacher) was seen by the complainant, Victoria Jamelo (also a school
teacher) and several witnesses uttering the following statements in the
direction of the provincial road from her house: “You Victoria, when you were
single many had sex with you because your are confident you will not bear a
child. Your vagina is odorous. You have leucorrhea. Your husband is a
homosexual, uncircumcised and henpecked (HARSH!!!)” The accused claims
that it was the complainant who uttered such statements and not her.
S.C.
1. The witness for the prosecution were more credible. They were all
volunteers and not ill-motives were proven by the defense on their credibility
2. Defense also posits the defense that it has not been established as to
“who hurled the first stone” but the prosecution witnesses were able to
establish that it was indeed the accused who started it. However, even if the
complainant was the one who started it, the accused would not be justified in
slandering the former
DOCTRINE (more on self-defense)
- The complainant may be justified to hit back with another slander only
if his reply is made in good faith, without malice and is not necessarily
defamatory of his assailant.
- Retaliation or vindictiveness cannot be the basis of self-defense
Victorio vs. CA, 111 SCRA 609, May 31, 1989 – Petitioners were heard by a
policeman uttering defamatory statements which contained the allegation that
the complainant, Atty. Ruiz, was “suwapang and an estapador”. Both were
charged with Serious Oral Defamation. The older petioner died and the
younger petitioner appealed that he should only be charged for slight oral
defamation
S.C.
1. Oral defamation or slander has been defined as speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood
2. To determine whether an offense is serious or slight, the doctrine of
ancient respectability which determines if remarks are serious or slight
depending on their sense and grammatical meaning, while also considering
the special circumstances, antecedents and relationship of the offended and
offending parties.
3. Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer touching on his
profession are libelous per se.
People vs. Judge Orcullo, 111 SCRA 609, January 30, 1982 – The accused
Venida Peralta uttered the ff slanderous words against Lydia Flores: “A
hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis has penetrated your vagina.”
within the hearing distance of several people. The accused filed a motion to
quash on the grounds that the crime alleged cannot be prosecuted de oficio
because the crime being imputed by the accused is that of adultery against
Lydia is therefore a private crime and must be brought by a complaint filed by
the complainant (according to par. 5, Art. 360 RPC). Respondent judge
quashes the charge on such grounds
S.C.
1. The Sol-Gen’s comment is correct that the crime being imputed is not
adultery but prostitution because of the usage of hostess which has taken a
notiorius connotation and since the charge does not allege that the victim is
married and should thus be presumed single.
2. In people vs. Hong Din Chu, an imputation that a married woman is a
prostitute not only proclaims her as an adulterer, which is a private offense,
but also as one who has committed a crime against public moral, prostitution
and can therefore be prosecuted de oficio.
3. It must be noted that only when the derogatory remarks clearly and
categorically reflect the elements of adultery would the complaint for
libel/slander by the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution.
Art 359 – Slander by Deed
What is Slander by Deed?
It is a crime against honor which is committed by performing any act which
casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person.
Elements
1. Offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor
2. Such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons
3. Such act casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon the offended party
2 Kinds of Slander by Deed
1. Simple slander by deed
2. Grave slander by deed, of a serious nature
The Gravity of the slander by deed is determined by:
a. the social standing of the offended party
b. the circumstances under which the act was committed.
c. the occasion, etc.
Difference between Slander by Deed and Acts of Lasciviousness
People vs. Valencia – kissing and touching a girl’s breast in public is
slander by deed when it is committed with the intent to dishonor the girl and
if committed without lewd designs (labo. How can that not have lewd
designs?)
©Cases
People vs. Motita, 59 OG 3020, April 30, 1966 – Accused was seen in the
public market holding a mirror between the legs of the complainant Mrs.
Pilar N. Letada and thus allowing people to see a reflection of her private
part. Sol-Gen agrees that what was committed was slander by deed but
disagrees on the gravity of the deed and says that it is not serious
S.C.
1. The crime committed could be unjust vexation or slander by deed.
However, though irritation or annoyance exists in both crimes, slander by
deed is committed when such annoyance is attended with publicity, dishonor
or contempt. If the annoyance was attended by those circumstances
mentioned in rape, the crime would be acts of lasciviousness. The facts of
the case show that the act committed was slander by deed.
2. We disagree with the Sol-Gen regarding his comment on the gravity of
the slander by deed. In considering the seriousness of the act, we are
moved by considerations of public policy and morals, namely, the
degeneration of the respect accorded to Filipinas.
Section 2 – General Provisions
Art 369 – Persons responsible
Who are the persons responsible for libel?
 a. The publisher, exhibitor, cause of the publication or exhibit
b. Author or editor of the book or pamphlet
c. Editor or business manager of a newspaper or serial publication
d. owner of the printing plant which consents to the publication of the
libelous article and all other person who in any way participate or
have connection with its publishing.
Who conducts the preliminary investigation?
The city or provincial fiscal or the city court where the actions are instituted
shall conduct such investigation and not a judge who is neither a judge of the
municipal, city or capital court where the action is instituted.
Venue of criminal and civil proceedings
- Both can be filed simultaneously or separately filed in the CFI of the
province or city:
a. where the libelous articles are printed and first published
b. Or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense.
c. A public officer must sue in the court of the locality where he holds
office
* this was meant to prevent “Out of town” libel suits which require the
offender undergo the hardship of attending a case out of town.
Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Court
The court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed
shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts
Art 361 – Proof of Truth
When is proof of truth admissible
1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of
whether the offended party is a private individual or a public officer
2. When the offended party is a government employee even if the act or
omission is imputed does not constitute a crime but is related to the
discharge of his official duties
When proof of truth leads to an acquittal of the defendant (DEFENSES)
1. When the matter charged is proven to be true
2. It was published with good motives
3. It was published for justifiable ends.
Art. 362 – Libelous Remarks
What does this article cover?
- Libelous remarks or comments connected with privileged matters
under Art. 354, if made with malice, will not exempt the author, editor,
managing editor or the newspaper thereof
CHAPTER 2 INCRIMINATORY MACHINATIONS
Art. 363 – Incriminating innocent person
Any person who, by any act not constituting perjury, shall directly
incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime shall
be punished by arresto mayor.
Elements
a. that the offender performs an act
b. that by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an
innocent person the commission of a crime
c. said act does not constitute perjury
Example
- Planting evidence or the like which do not constitute false prosecutions
but tend directly to cause false prosecutions
©Cases
People vs. Alagao, 16 SCRA 879, April 30, 1966 – The said accused, being
members of the Mnila Polic Department, were charged with the complex
crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest. The allegedly
unlawfully arrested complainant, Marcial Apolonio y Santos, and planted on
his person a marked P1.00 bill in order to impute to him the crime of bribery.
The accused filed a motion to quash said information on the grounds that said
crime does not exist.
S.C.
1. A perusal of the charge shows that it is a complex crime in the sense that
the unlawful arrest was used as a means to commit the crime of incriminatory
machinations. The accused had to detain the complainant through the
unlawful arrest first before they proceeded with the planting.
2. Sol-Gen points out that the unlawful arrest was a necessary act in order for
the planting of the evidence to have been committed. The trial courts finding
that the planting happened long after the unlawful arrest was not proven by
evidence and even assuming that it was, it still doesn’t disprove the necessity
of the unlawful arrest in committing the evidence planting
Art. 364 – Intriguing Against Honor
How committed?
 It is committed by making any intrigue which for its principal purpose is to
blemish the honor or reputation of another person
Intriguing against Honor distinguished from Incriminatory Machinations
- Incriminatory machinations impute the commission of a crime to an innocent
person whereas intriguing against honor only blemishes the honor of the
person
Intriguing against Honor distinguished from Defamation
- Defamation is committed in a public and malicious manner whereas
intriguing against honor consists of some tricky and secret plot
- Gossiping is not intriguing against honor since it is done by
availing of directly spoken words
- People vs. Pelayo requirement for Intriguing against honor:
a. source of the derogatory information cannot be determined
b. the accused passes it on without subscribing to the truth of
the remarks
RA 4200 – The Anti-Wiretapping Law
How committed?
a. tap any wire or cable without authorization from all parties to the
private communication
b. using a device or arrangement to secretly overhear, intercept and
record such communication
c. using a device called a Dictaphone or dictagraph or walkie-talkie or
tape recorder
d. knowingly possess any form of record of such private communication
secured by any manner prohibited by this law
e. replay, communicate or furnish transcripts of said recordings
f. willfully or knowingly aid, permit or cause to be done any of the
prohibited acts
Disclaimer on presentation as evidence
Provided that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof,
shall not be covered by this prohibition
Sec. 3 – commission of lawful authority of said prohibited acts
- said acts shall not be punishable or unlawful if committed by a peace officer
upon authorization by a written order of a court to execute such acts in cases
involving
a. treason, rebellion, sedition and any conspiracy thereof
b. espionage
c. provoking to war and disloyalty
d. piracy and mutiny in the high seas
e. kidnapping
Requirements of written order
a. reasonable grounds that the crimes have been committed or
about to be committed (provided that in crimes of rebellion,
sedition and treason, prior proof that said acts have been
committed are adduced)
b. the evidence procured form the wiretapping are essential to the
conviction of the persons
c. there are no other means of readily procuring such evidence
Content of Written Order
a. the identity of the person to be tapped and the teleraph line or
telephone number involved and its location
b. the identity of the peace officer who overhears
c. the offenses committed or are sought to be prevented
d. the period of authorization (which shall not exceed 60 days from
date of issuance
* all recordings made shall, within 48 hours of the expiration of the
period set, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or
package. Said contents will not be used as evidence unless ordered
by the court
Admissibility of Evidence procured through the prohibited Acts
- they shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
©Cases
Ganaa vs IAC, 145 SCRA 112, October 16, 1986 – Complainant Atty. Pintor
called up Lenoanrdo Laconico to discuss the withdrawal of the charge of
direct assault against latter. Laconico requested the appellant, Atty. Ganaan,
to listen in on the conversation, by using the phone extension, between
Pintor and Laconico wherein Pintor offered to drop the charges if Laconico
paid him P8,000. Gaanan executed an affidavit attesting that he heard the
complainant extort/ commit robbery against Laconico. Complainant then files
a complaint against Ganaan for violating the Anti-wiretapping law.
S.C.
DOCTRINE:. A telephone extension is not considered as subsumed
under the phrase “any other device or arrangement” since a telephone
extension is not deliberately installed for the purpose of overhearing,
intercepting or recording spoken words.
1. Statutory construction will nor permit telephone extensions to be included
in the enumeration of prohibited devices in the law
2. The records of the congressional hearings show that they were concerned
more with penalizing the act of recording rather than just listening to phone
conversations
3. The act of mere listening can only be prosecuted if committed strictly with
the use of the enumerated devices or others of a similar nature
4. “Crossed-lines” phenomenon will prevent inadvertent listeners to report
crimes for fear of being prosecuted under RA 4200 if we sustain such
prosecution of the accused at hand

Ramirez vs. Ca, 248 SCRA 590, Septembet 28, 1995 – In a civil case for
damages, the accused presented a verbatim transcript of the event wherein
the private respondent vexed, insulted, humiliated her in a hostile and furious
mood”. The conversation contained such statements as “wala kang utak”,
“Putang ina mo”, “Bastos ka”. The private respondent, Ester Garcia, then filed
a criminal case saying that the accused violated RA 4200 since she allegedly
taped their conversation.
S.C.
1. The provision also prohibits the unauthorized taping of a conversation
committed by one of the parties to the conversation. The accused is not
exempt merely by being a party to the conversation
2. The provision makes no distinction between private communication and
private conversation. Both terms were used interchangeably in the
congressional debates.
3. “To secretly record would be unsporting and is not aligned with the notion of
fair play”