1NC

Off
 1
Transitioning OPCON destroys deterrence against the North---causes nuclear war
Robert M. Collins 13, 37-year veteran employee of the U.S. Department of the Army and served 31
years in various positions with the U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the
Republic of Korea military, 9/3/13, “STRATEGIC RISK VS. STRATEGIC VISION: OPCON TRANSITION WITHIN
THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE,” http://warontherocks.com/2013/09/strategic-risk-vs-strategic-vision-opcon-
transition-within-the-rok-u-s-alliance/
As these trade dynamics continue to mature, Seoul’s vision of where its national interests will lie beyond the North Korean threat remains an
The North Korean threat has not gone away and
issue of great debate within the ROK. But there is a catch-22 in this debate.
is now a two-edged sword. Not only do North Korean nukes, missiles, cyber attacks and other
asymmetric capabilities present a major risk to Seoul’s security, but, somewhat paradoxically, North Korea’s
instability is a threat also, and not one of small consequence. A collapse of the Kim regime, which would turn the North into a
quagmire of famine, loose nukes, and internal civil war, would demand a commitment from the ROK that would bring
its economy to its knees and considerably weaken its security posture within the region. China’s outsized influence
on both Pyongyang and Seoul’s economic activity, which will continue to grow, only complicates the security calculus of all parties committed to
peace and security in Northeast Asia.

However, the threat goes beyond that. North Korea’s well-documented proliferation of nuclear and missile technology proves that the Kim
regime will sell anything to anyone. The North Korean proliferation threat to the U.S. is now a major factor in Washington’s calculation of
In that the Proliferation Security Initiative has not deterred the Kim regime’s
strategic risk to American national security.
continuing development of weapons of mass destruction, the ROK-U.S. alliance may become more important
to Washington than ever before. Bluntly stated, the U.S. now needs forward deployed capabilities to deter
North Korean use of nuclear-armed missiles with the capability to target the U.S. mainland and
territories.

So how do security interests in Seoul and Washington square with OPCON transition in 2015? How does
America’s sequestration impact U.S. commitment after the transition? Can the ROK really trust that the U.S. can afford its commitment to the
alliance through forward presence? Can the ROK afford a lessened American presence on the Korean Peninsula?
And considering North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, is the U.S. willing to “sacrifice Los Angeles to save Seoul?”

These issues create considerable angst in a nation-state that historically has had to sacrifice some level of security autonomy in order to
maintain stability. At some point, as the North’s nuclear missile program becomes a reality, it will become obvious in the ROK that the U.S. is
OPCON transition in 2015 may be a moment of pride for the citizenry of South Korea,
not willing to incur infinite risk to protect the ROK.
but it will forever change the way the U.S. approaches the region and will shape the potential for
unilateral U.S. military responses when North Korean nuclear missiles are not a potential but a fact. On whom will
Seoul rely at that time? A far-ranging vision is necessary to avoid war with the North.

This all sounds ugly and unrealistic today, but ten years ago it was unimaginable. North-South unification is a distant dream. Does Seoul have a
vision for 2030 and beyond? For starters, who might be its primary security partner, and at what cost in terms of ROK military,
political, and economic autonomy? This is the fundamental question of how to balance future security risks with a
vision for ROK domestic and international leadership. Whoever it is, Seoul must begin to shape that partnership today. If
it is the U.S., OPCON transition in its current conception may not be the best shaping tool. But if it is China,
OPCON transition is the starting point. China is arguably becoming the most economically and diplomatically influential foreign
power on the entire peninsula, in both the North and the South. It is not difficult to see that an expanded economic
influence from China and a decreased military influence from the U.S. could be catastrophic for the
ROK should the North initiate a significant provocation or violate the Demilitarized Zone in a substantive way.
OPCON transition within the ROK-U.S. alliance is much more than a mere change in the military lead in the defense of the ROK. It
means the end of a combined warfighting command that has stood as the bedrock of deterrence for
three and a half decades. The consequences of this fundamental choice for all regional actors , including Pyongyang
and Tokyo, will be unfathomable by today’s limited understanding. At some point, Seoul’s strategic vision must mitigate
strategic risk with an alliance structure not designed by national pride but equipped to meet the evolving security ,
political, and economic needs—and risk tolerance—of the South Korean people .

Korean war goes nuclear, spills over globally

Steven Metz 13, Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor
of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, 3/13/13, “Strategic Horizons: Thinking the
Unthinkable on a Second Korean War,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12786/strategic-
horizons-thinking-the-unthinkable-on-a-second-korean-war

Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security . For years,
the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this
offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press
releases from the official
North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing
to do so, though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous . ¶ In response to North Korea's
Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and
protector, went along. Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the U nited States
and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid
an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He
might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. ¶ No American leader wants another
war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and
sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the
signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation; American
policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American
determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. ¶ Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its
predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push

Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it
could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the

recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to
think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. ¶ The
second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets , or with a
combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks

might include nuclear weapons, but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. ¶ The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized
society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on
adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the
conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla
operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as
would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy
occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. ¶ The
second Korean War would force military
mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately
require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial
base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and
postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the
war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing
effects outside Northeast Asia. ¶ Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would
be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable,
desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective.
¶ China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator
Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the
second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the
world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a
multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. ¶ Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea
allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might
hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. ¶ If the
aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the
result could easily be heightened hostility between the United
States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically
prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial
ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same
time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.
 2
Military presence requires the physical stationing of armed forces
Degang Sun 13, Ph.D. in International Affairs from Shanghai International Studies University, senior
visiting researcher at Middle East Centre of St. Antony's College, University of Oxford and Oxford Centre
for Islamic Studies, associate professor of Political Science and a senior researcher at the Middle East
Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University, “The Strategic Evolution of US Military
Presence in Iraq,”
http://mercury.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/184516/ichaptersection_singledocument/203d394c-
0bcc-4350-8b67-c39f73e87668/en/7.pdf

In this chapter, foreign military

presence refers to an area on land or on sea beyond a sovereign state’s jurisdiction, where a
certain number of armed forces are stationed and which has military activities, organized institutions, and
military facilities.7 It is by nature the geographical and functional extension of a country’s domestic military deployment.

Violation---transitioning OPCON doesn’t reduce U.S. presence---just shifts the

Combined Forces Command into two national commands
Mark E. Manyin 14, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service, 6/24/14, “U.S.-South
Korea Relations,” https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41481.pdf

The United States has agreed to turn over the wartime command of Korean troops to South Korea , but the two
sides will likely postpone this transfer for several years. Under the current command arrangement, which is a legacy of U.S. involvement in the
1950-1953 Korean War, South Korea’s soldiers would be under the command of U.S. forces if there were a war on the peninsula. The plan to
transfer wartime operational control was undertaken to recognize South Korea’s advances in economic and military strength since the Korean
War and is seen by many as important for South Korean sovereignty. In 2007, Secretary Rumsfeld accepted a proposal by President Roh Moo-
hyun to set up separate South Korean and U.S. military commands by April 2012. A
U.S.-ROK operational control agreement
will dismantle the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC), which has been headed by the U.S.
commander in Korea. Separate U.S. and ROK military commands will be established . In accord with the
plan, a new U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be established. Under the Opcon agreement, a bilateral
Military Cooperation Center will be responsible for planning military operations, joint military exercises,
logistics support, and intelligence exchanges, and assisting in the operation of the communication, command, control, and
computer systems.

Vote neg---
a) Limits---they allow any reshuffling of legal arrangements with host countries
which overstretches neg prep and prevents clash on core topic debates
b) Ground---transitioning OPCON while maintaining troop presence is far less
change---eliminates our best arguments
Shelley Su 12, MA Candidate, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2012,
“The OPCON Transfer Debate,” http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Su_YB2011.pdf

In a 2006 Gallup study, conducted while discussions of the OPCON transition were ongoing, 71 percent
of the public was strongly against US forces leaving South Korea . Of course, US forces leaving South Korea
is a much more extreme action than an OPCON transition, but ROK sentiment clearly preferred
retaining a US presence. The strength of this preference is even more telling because the polling was
done during a time when South Korea’s public opinion of the U nited States was at a low point. The Pew Global
Attitudes Project does not specifically show the 2006 percentages for favorable/unfavorable ROK public opinion toward the United States, but
relatively speaking, the favorability ratings from 2002 to 2007 were low (between 46 and 58 percent) compared with 79 percent favorability
ratings more recently in 2010. Even in the early 2000s, with such low favorability, South Koreans wanted US forces in their country. Asked in
2006 if they believed that South Korea could handle its own national defense and security, only 27 percent of respondents said yes, while 66
percent said that a US withdrawal would have a large negative impact on the stability of Northeast Asia.
 3
ROK is building up a blue-water navy now---the plan forces a tradeoff
Doug Bandow 9/2, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Newsflash: the U.S.-South Korea Military
Alliance Isn’t Working,” Sep 2 2015, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/newsflash-us-
south-korea-military-alliance-isnt-working

Indeed, the
South has even surrendered control of its armed forces to the United States. Wartime operational control, or
OPCON, goes to the American military. Decades have gone by, but the South Koreans say they still aren’t ready to
manage their own troops. Some officials candidly admit that they fear taking control might encourage
Washington to bring home its forces. Thus, dependence has become a strategy to ensure a continued
place on America’s defense dole.¶ It’s obvious why Seoul takes this approach. Feigning helplessness can be embarrassing, even humiliating. ROK
officials occasionally resent American meddling in their defense decisions, including in how to respond to Pyongyang’s ubiquitous provocations. Many South
Koreans dislike the inevitable social impact of so many U.S. troops. ¶ Nevertheless, most countries would like to have a superpower pick up a big chunk of their
defense tabs. Seoul
takes the money saved and invests it in export-oriented industries, education and other domestic programs, and
even prestige military assets, such as a blue-water navy designed for use well beyond the Korean

peninsula. South Korea would still be prosperous and influential if it had to cover the full cost of its defense , but it would
face a tougher set of trade-offs—as does the United States.

Blue-water navy buildup is key to cooperation with India on Indian Ocean security
Mingi Hyun 10, research fellow at the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Nov 18 2010, “South
Korea's Blue-water Ambitions,” http://thediplomat.com/2010/11/south-koreas-blue-water-ambitions/?
allpages=yes
The ROKN’s ongoing counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia have been only the most visible sign that the country is stepping up on the international maritime stage. But such

why is South Korea pursuing a blue-water naval strategy? And

missions come at an enormous cost, both in terms of time and resources. So

what does it plan to do with it?¶ The answer to the former question seems, more than anything, to rest in a desire to boost South Korea’s

international status. Despite being a war-torn, relatively poor country in the 1950s, six decades of rapid growth have seen it develop
into one of the world’s wealthiest nations .¶ This rapid economic growth has been heavily dependent on maritime access—about 99 percent of its
international trade has depended on access to the world’s oceans and waterways. Indeed, with diplomatically isolated North Korea as the only country with which it shares a land border,
South Korea has often felt more like an island.¶ But the country’s rapid economic growth relies in large part on developing countries, many of whom continue to be plagued by instability.
Meanwhile, South Korea had no way of defending its overseas interests, meaning that for years the country was reaching its arms around the globe without a shield.¶ With such concerns in
mind, Admiral An Byoung-Tae, then chief of naval operations, asked President Kim Young-Sam in 1995 to prepare for the construction of a blue-water navy. With Kim’s blessing, the ROKN
began expanding and shaping its force structure to accommodate future threats.¶ Almost a decade later, Admiral An wrote an article that made public his vision for what a blue-water navy
could mean. According to An, the ROKN should be capable of extended operations within East Asia and short-term operations in more distant theatres such as the Indian Ocean and the Strait
of Hormuz. He said the navy should also be able to operate as a member of a multinational coalition, which would enable the South Korean government to play a greater role in international
efforts and allow it to better shape the political landscape. Although the ROKN wasn’t envisaged as being as large as Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force or the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN), as noted in World Village at the time, An still wanted the South Korean government to havea louder voice in international affairs.¶ But the development of a more powerful navy isn’t
just in South Korea’s interests—it should be seen as good news for the rest of Asia too. The region is, after all, full of rivalries, internal conflicts and territorial disputes as well as being prone to
natural disasters and the effects of climate change—all potential triggers for unrest and destabilization.¶ The 2004 tsunami underscored the need for organized and capable forces to respond
to events in the region, yet very few Asian navies possess the size and quality necessary to undertake, much less lead, major relief efforts in such an expansive theatre.¶ At present,
responsibility for overseas maritime operations falls largely on the shoulders of Mobile Task Flotilla 7 (jae7 gidongjeondan), an infant version of a planned future power projection-capable fleet
whose floated name has been the Strategic Mobile Fleet (jeollyakgidonghamdae). Established in February, Mobile Task Flotilla 7 is initially composed of the destroyers the ROKN has acquired
since 2002—namely the six 4,500-ton KDX-2 and the two 7,500-ton AEGIS-equipped KDX-3 destroyers—as well as a third KDX-3 to be commissioned over the next couple of years.¶ Both types
of ship are multi-role destroyers whose heavy displacement and large hull size allow for the installation of more sophisticated sensors such as the SPY-1D radar on the KDX-3, and a greater
variety (and quantity) of longer-range ordnances, such as the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) anti-air missile, the Harpoon and Sea Star (Haeseong) anti-surface missiles, and the Red Shark
(Hongsangeo) anti-submarine rocket (ASROC). Equally important, the destroyers’ large hulls give them greater fuel capacity and the ability to operate on the high seas even in the harshest
conditions.¶ Outside Mobile Task Flotilla 7, the ROKN possesses other vessels capable of overseas deployments. Foremost among them is the 18,000-ton ROKS Dokdo, a flat-deck amphibious
assault ship and the largest East Asian naval combat vessel. ROKS Dokdo can accommodate, launch and maintain multiple helicopters and should be capable of doing the same with multiple
unmanned aerial vehicles, enabling the ROKN to deploy a respectable contingent of aircraft in state-to-state and non-state operations.¶ Another benefit of the Dokdo is that it can also
function as a sea base capable of accommodating and transporting marines and providing a flexible, mobile and politically palatable way of facilitating South Korea’s growing participation in
multilateral peace operations. This ensures that any operations near or along a foreign coastline won’t have to temporarily ‘occupy’ a portion of foreign territory and operate out of stationary
land bases, which restricts mobility.¶ But although these large ships can operate anywhere in the world, it’s important to note that the ROKN’s motivations behind a blue-water navy aren’t
entirely ‘outward-looking.’ South Korea’s blue-water aspirations are often represented as being geared solely toward power projection. But there’s more to it than that.¶ For a start, the
flexible deployment of high-end naval assets throughout Korean waters is aimed at allowing South Korea to neutralize nearby threats, including North Korean forces (and, if need be, those of
ally China). In addition, the speedy deployment of major vessels such as destroyers outside Korean waters allows the country to quickly move to defend national and international interests
overseas.¶ The defence potential was underscored by the central role played by the KDX-2 destroyers during ‘Invincible Spirit,’ the largest-ever United States-South Korea naval exercise, which
was held in July in the East Sea. Remaining true to its name, Mobile Task Flotilla 7 moved quickly between various domestic theatres to undertake highly sophisticated operations. Without
these destroyers, the ROKN would have been left to watch the allied naval exercises from the sidelines, playing only a supplementary role using its smaller corvettes and patrol boats. The same
would have been true in the event of an actual war.¶ Since April 2009, the KDX-2 destroyers have been rotating every few months to allow South Korean vessels to operate continuously along
the Somali coast, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean and to conduct successful counter-piracy operations as a member of the multinational Combined Task Force-151 led by the United
States Navy. The ROKS Gang Gam-Chan alone safely escorted a total of 488 commercial ships during its most recent four-month rotation, thwarting all attempted pirate attacks in the process.¶
The destroyers have also participated in numerous bilateral, trilateral and multinational exercises in distant waters with the navies of Japan, Singapore, India, Turkey and various European
countries, including the Pacific Reach submarine rescue exercise and the Cobra Gold multinational amphibious assault exercise.¶ But it’s not just Mobile Task Flotilla 7 that has been seeing
some action. As reported in Defense Daily, the ROKS Hyangrobong, an amphibious vessel, was dispatched to Indonesia during the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, while Gojunbong class
amphibious vessels set sail between 2001 and 2003 as part of the US-led Global War on Terror, transporting military hardware and humanitarian supplies to Guam, Singapore, the Philippines
and Diego Garcia.¶ So what does the future hold for Korean naval power? Over the coming decades, the ROKN’s strategic objectives will most likely look much like today’s efforts to straddle
threats tothe country’s own territory and its overseas concerns. The former should, of course, remain the ROKN’s priority. As such, the number of ROKN vessels available for deployment

recent South Korean media reports indicate there

overseas will depend largely on the stability or otherwise around the Korean Peninsula.¶ That said,

will be further naval procurement, which would give South Korea greater breathing room to deploy a
larger number of vessels throughout Asia.These planned ships reportedly include another batch of KDX-2 destroyers, a new class of 4,500-ton amphibious
assault ships and at least 10 next-generation KDX-2A destroyers. Should these procurement programmes be realized, the ROKN will have well over 20 blue-water vessels sometime during the
2020’s.¶ Yet there’s more to developing an effective navy than just sheer number of vessels—the ROKN will need to devise ways to turn its scattered, ad-hoc overseas initiatives into
something more regimented. The solution for this could lay in the US Navy-led Global Maritime Partnership. Rooted in the ‘1000-ship navy’ concept first introduced in 2005, the Global
Maritime Partnership’s primary objective has been to use the combined capabilities of multinational maritime forces to undertake operations aimed at stabilizing situations across the globe.¶
As the Global Maritime Partnership isn’t a binding agreement, participating navies may change from operation to operation, while some navies may participate only sporadically depending on

through this continuous wave of multinational operations and exercises, the ROKN could find
the geographic location and political conditions. But

ample opportunities for constant and ‘normalized’ overseas participation, while gradually increasing its
contributions. By doing so, it can also develop a greater familiarity and intimacy with Asia’s key naval
actors—Japan, India, Singapore and Australia—which would further enhance the ROKN’s ability to
operate in multinational and multicultural arrangements .¶ The impressive advances the South Korean Navy has made are already giving it some
of the greater recognition it has been seeking. In September, A.K. Antony became the first Indian defence minister to visit South Korea. A major motivation for his visit was undoubtedly

growing concern over a rising China, and India is said to be keen to enhance naval cooperation with South Korea in the
Indian Ocean.¶ Earlier this month, meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Kan Naoto publicly expressed his desire for greater security cooperation between Japan and South Korea,
stating that it is ‘very important’ for regional stability that Japan and South Korea form defence ties alongside the US-Japan alliance. Kan’s statement marked the first time in history that a

But the potential for greater security co-operation with

Japanese prime minister had officially stated his desire for military ties with South Korea.¶

Japan and India rests largely on South Korea’s navy—by far the country’s most able power projection
service. Although the kind of co-operation discussed between South Korea and India and Japan won’t always be explicitly aimed at China, it’s no secret in the region that the PLAN’s
build-up is a key driver behind the unprecedented scale of naval modernization programmes taking place across Asia.¶ The Indian and Japanese overtures then are just part of a bigger picture
that's forming in the Asia-Pacific. But it’s already clear that the ROKN’s blue-water development has given the country at least some of the prestige and influence that Admiral An had

envisaged. Fortunately for a region that faces the unwelcome prospect of a deteriorating security climate, the past 15 years have seen only the beginning
of South Korea's blue-water ambitions.

ROK-India coop is key to manage Chinese perceptions of Indian defense buildups---

economic ties with the ROK allow them to check Chinese aggression in the Indian
Ocean without triggering containment fears
Rajaram Panda 11, Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “India-Republic of
Korea Military Diplomacy : Past and Future Projections,” Vol 5. No 1. January 2011,
http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_5_1_rpanda.pdf

This paper does not suggest that India

and the ROK should form a military alliance. What is argued is that both countries should leverage their
commonalities to expand military exchanges and deepen military cooperation. The bright sign of this aspect of the
relationship is that both have already signed an MoU for the National Defence Development Cooperation. The next logical step is to institutionalise high ranking
military officers’ meetings. Cooperation to address transnational threats such as maritime terrorism and piracy also needs to be strengthened. The Indian
government should seriously consider posting a defence attaché in its embassy in Seoul, instead of allocating dual charge to its attaché posted in Tokyo. India and
the ROK have no conflict of interests. Enhancing
defence and military cooperation can put both countries in a win-win
situation and thereby bolster both nations’ standing in regional and international forums.¶ China might feel
uncomfortable with the strengthening of ROK-India military cooperation but it would be far less uncomfortable with direct India-US military cooperation. As
mentioned earlier, China is already wary of India getting closer to the US after the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. In view of the
growing relations with the US, India might find it prudent to forge similar ties with the ROK, which is a major US ally in North East
Asia. For the US, it would be strategically convenient to encourage the relationship as it will be another means to expand the US sphere of influence within the Asia
Pacific region. Seen from another perspective- as
the ROK-China economic ties are strong, any military engagement
between the ROK and India will not create any misunderstanding in China that it is a US-led strategy to
keep China under check. On the other hand, a strong India-ROK military cooperation that also accrues
economic dividends will be welcome as it would contribute towards deepening economic interdependence in
the Asian region. Also, a multilateral security cooperation framework that takes on board India, the ROK, Japan, the US, Russia,
Australia and China similar to the OSCE may be worth-exploring. It will advance peace and stability in the Asian region. Such cooperative

strategy by a consortium of powers can check (not contain) China’s claims over disputed islands in South China Sea and
its maritime expansionism strategy and thereby halt China’s influence in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

That’s key to Indian Ocean stability---only a middle ground between Indian surrender
and containment prevents destabilizing naval competition
James R. Holmes 8, and Toshi Yoshihara, associate professors of strategy at the U.S. Naval War
College, “CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN,” https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---
Gaming/Indian-Ocean-Regional-Studies-Group/documents/NWCR_Strategic-Triangle-in-
IO_HolmesYoshihara.aspx
As a fi rst step in this endeavor, this article examines a key ingredient in the expected emergence of a “strategic triangle”—the prospects of Indian sea power. While
no one has rigorously defi ned this international-relations metaphor, scholars typically use it to convey a strategic interplay of interests among three nationstates. In
this initial foray, we employ the term fairly loosely, using it to describe a pattern of cooperation and competition among the United States, China, and India. It is our
contention that Indian Ocean stability will hinge largely on how India manages its maritime rise. On the one hand, if
a robust Indian maritime presence were to fail to materialize, New Delhi would essentially be forced to
surrender its interests in regional waters, leaving a strategic vacuum to the United States and China. On the other hand, if
powerful Indian naval forces were one day to be used for exclusionary purposes, the region would almost certainly
become an arena for naval competition. Either undesirable outcome would be shaped in part by how India views its own maritime
prerogatives and by how Washington and Beijing weigh the probabilities of India’s nautical success or failure in the Indian Ocean. ¶ If all three parties

foresee a muscular Indian naval policy, then, a more martial environment in the Indian Ocean will likely
take shape. But if the three powers view India and each other with equanimity, the prospects for
cooperation will brighten considerably. Capturing the perspectives of the three powers on India’s maritime ambitions is thus a critical
analytical starting point.

That causes nuke war---maritime competition is uniquely likely to escalate

Sahil Mathur 14, PhD Scholar in the Indian Institute of Technology, “China, Indian Ocean & the Nuclear
Deterrence: The Destabilizing Effect,” Feb 2014, http://www.ipcs.org/issue-brief/china/china-indian-
ocean-the-nuclear-deterrence-the-destabilizing-effect-245.html

As China continues to grow it needs energy A majority of the oil imported by

steadily, resources to meet the increasing needs of its rising population.

China passes through the Indian Ocean , especially through the Strait of Malacca. Given its geographical proximity and historical linkages, India, the other rising Asian power, has traditionally had an influence over the

China
Region. Hence, believes increasing its own presence in the region as an imperative
, unsurprisingly, ¶ The to preserve its national interests.

situation becomes grim when one realises that all the major countries in the region are nuclear-
further

equipped ¶
. Apart from India, China, and Pakistan actively indulging in nuclear testing, the US too has a naval presence in the Region. What are the implications of Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) vis-a-vis the concerns of India, Pakistan, and the United

¶ The prevailing nuclear environment is far from stable, with four nuclear states that have strategic
States (US)?

interests India is wary of the threat from China.

in the region. While Pakistan is building its nuclear stockpile (allegedly with China’s help) to deter India, The successful India-US nuclear deal has raised the

India is well within range of China’s land-based nuclear-

possibility of an India–US alliance to counter a China–Pakistan alliance in the event of a conflict that could involve nuclear weapons.

capable ballistic missiles, and worried about China’s is effort to establishment of a ‘string of pearls’ – by constructing ports – in its neighbouring countries in an

militarise, and possibly nuclearise the region ¶ . China claims that this strategy is only to provide it with alternative sea lanes and trade routes to decrease its reliance on the Strait of Malacca, a chokepoint; India
doubts it. New Delhi’s launch of the Arihant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in 2009 indicates its desire to nuclearise its navy. India is not as well equipped as China, and Beijing doesn’t view New Delhi as a serious threat. However, the presence of Chinese naval

nuclear power has created an uneasy atmosphere in the Indian Ocean Region.¶ This essay argues that the advancement of efforts to realise Chinese interests has the
potential to destabilise the region , and that both India and China need to take significant measures to maintain the current deterrence. ¶ I¶ The South Asian Nuclear Dynamic¶ The South Asian nuclear dynamic is complex, and
one that is presently facing a diplomatic impasse, with no direct talks or negotiations on nuclear policy. India cites the threat from China, and not Pakistan, as the primary reason for the development of its own nuclear programme. George Fernandes, former Defence Minister, Government
of India, made it explicit in a statement he made following the 1998 Pokhran tests. India held the fear that all of its major cities were within range of Chinese nuclear missiles, and considered this a legitimate justification for its nuclear initiatives. India enthusiastically went ahead with
nuclear weapons testing, arguing that the provision, that only the P5 nations could hold nuclear arsenal, was unfair (Burns, 1998). Naturally, this allegation did not go well with Beijing, that in turn criticised India for making baseless allegations and accused India’s rationale as being ‘totally
unreasonable’.¶ To this day, China refuses to engage in nuclear talks with India as it stands by the UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which calls on India to stop all further nuclear testing, as well as because India is not a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Pant,
2010). As a consequence, China does not apply the concept of ‘No-First-Use’ (NFU) – which is otherwise an essential component of Chinese nuclear doctrine – to India (Cunningham & Medcalf, 2011). Resultantly, India has concerns while dealing with China. ¶ In the midst of this tussle,
Islamabad believed (justifiably so) that India’s nuclear weapons programme was aimed at Pakistan (Rehman, 2012), not China; which it probably was. Given the historical conflict between the two states, and the vulnerability of the major Pakistani power centres owing to geographical
proximity to the Indian border, it is not surprising that the Pakistanis came to such a conclusion. The situation becomes particularly precarious when it comes to the India-Pakistan nuclear dynamic. Although India espouses an NFU policy, Pakistan does not. Instead, Pakistan’s India-centric
nuclear doctrine has a set of four conditions on the basis of which it would proceed with a nuclear attack on its eastern neighbour. These conditions are: large-scale penetration by the Indian Armed Forces into Pakistani territory; large-scale destruction of the Pakistan Armed Forces;
economic strangulation of Pakistan; and the political destabilisation by India (Kumar, 2004). ¶ Hypothetically, India may be faced with a situation where a non-nuclear war could escalate into a nuclear war, in which case India would have to concentrate on its second strike capability. This
is probably the reason why India has an assertive nuclear doctrine, assuring second strike wherever there is capability (Cunningham & Medcalf, 2011). The Sino‐Pakistan nuclear relationship has introduced an interesting twist to the aforementioned nuclear dynamic. Historically, China has
supported Pakistan’s nuclear programme; Beijing has even provided Islamabad with essential material for developing nuclear programme. Although China officially claims that its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan falls within International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) norms, reports
from the US intelligence as well as the surfacing of the A. Q. Khan network have indubitably proved that China has had a major hand in equipping Pakistan with nuclear weapons (China's nuclear exports and assistance to Pakistan, 1999). ¶ Gurmeet Kanwal (2000) even takes the extreme
position of stating that it is China that is intimidating India using Pakistan as the means. While this is unlikely to be the sole reason for Pakistan’s aggressive policy, one cannot let facts go unnoticed. China’s collaboration with Pakistan also highlights its double standards when it comes to
its stance on adherence to the NPT and UNSC Resolution 1172. Though the resolution was directed at both India and Pakistan, China was hesitant to condemn Pakistan, yet eager to condemn India for its nuclear tests in 1998 (China and the nuclear tests in South Asia, 1999). ¶ Arguments
have been made, especially after the success of the India‐US nuclear deal, that the Sino‐Pakistan relationship could be countered by a possible India‐US alliance. In fact, the US desires such an alliance in order to contain the rise of China as a regional hegemon (Brewster, 2009). However,
this balance of (nuclear) power in South Asia is not that easy to achieve. While the Sino‐Pakistan relationship has been called an ‘all‐weather friendship’ (Cunningham, 2011; China‐Pakistan all‐weather friendship scales new heights, 2012), the India‐US relationship is only a ‘fair‐weather
friendship’ (Brewster, 2009). This is because the US realises that it cannot always oppose China, given the larger role Beijing plays in the international system. ¶ A reassessment of the US strategy in the Indian Ocean Region by Geraghty (2012) recommends that Washington abandon New
Delhi as a security partner in the region given ’ndia's extreme strategic independence. In other words, the US cannot rely on India to pursue activities that are in Washington’s national interests. ¶ All these factors contribute to the existing mistrust between the powers of South Asia. As

there is reluctance on the part of all the powers to initiate nuclear dialogue
much as there is an obvious reluctance to initiate a nuclear war, also

with the aim of stability . The reasons for this vary from bilateral disputes such as the India–China border dispute to disproportionate nuclear capabilities, to non‐adherence to international nuclear protocol. Lora Saalman (2012) argues that while

the land‐based nuclear warheads serve as deterrence, the sea becomes the arena for showcasing development in nuclear and missile technology in the case of India and China. Keeping this in mind, the next part of the paper discusses the maritime nuclear situation in the Indian Ocean. ¶

was first used

II A String of Pearls? ¶ The term in trying to describe the elaborate system of ports developed by
by a 2004 Booz‐Allen report

China in the IOR with the alleged aim of a strategic

– from Sittwe in Myanmar, to Gwadar in Pakistan, with ports in Chittagong, Bangladesh, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka –

encirclement of the whole of India . The map in Figure 1 helps in visually imagining a ‘string of pearls’ hugging the Asian coastline that places China in a very advantageous strategic position. Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal (2000) put

forth the idea even before the term came into existence. He argues that China is aiming to contain the rise of India in the Indian Ocean by forming friendly relationships with all of its maritime neighbours, thereby creating a legible threat from sea. ¶ The People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) has made strides in its naval nuclear capabilities, deploying three Jin‐class (Type 094) nuclear‐ powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in active service as of 2007 (Kristensen, 2007). This has made the Chinese nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean an immediate possibility. This
has resulted in New Delhi hot on Beijing’s heels, by undertaking sustained efforts to develop the Indian Navy. While India’s INS Chakra, a nuclear‐ powered attack submarine (SSN) leased from Russia is in active service, the Arihant‐class SSBN, launched in 2009, is currently undergoing sea

developments ¶
trials (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013). Despite Rehman (2012) and Saalman (2012) arguing that the recent Indian forays into naval nuclear capability are merely demonstrations of technology, it is hard to downplay the importance of these .

These pursuits toe the lines of the China’s nuclear doctrine of limited deterrence and India's (Medeiros, 2008)

doctrine of credible minimum deterrence the pessimistic scenario (Kumar, 2004). In the absence of any maritime protocol agreement between the two countries,

could readily turn into an arms race and a security dilemma in the Indian Ocean The Pakistan (Rehman, 2012).

Navy would also be dragged into the picture naval nuclear capabilities built with the intention . The of the countries, originally

of increasing national security, would have the exact opposite effect as a nuclear‐charged IOR would
result in increased insecurity .
 4
OPCON transition causes South Korea to agree to deploy THAAD missile defense
Clint Work 14, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago’s Committee on
International Relations, 7/9/14, “South Korea: Dependence in the Age of OPCON,”
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/south-korea-dependence-in-the-age-of-opcon/?allpages=yes

While OPCON transition gives rise to concerns over the credibility of the U.S. commitment, it also heightens the possibility of
entrapment for Seoul. Which is to say, the necessary steps toward transfer of control could involve the ROK
in U.S.-driven policies that it would rather avoid. This is evident in the case of missile defense. The ROK
is undoubtedly concerned about the DPRK’s missile program and recently stated that its own Korean Air and Missile
Defense system (KAMD) is incapable of independently intercepting the DPRK’s Rodong-class weapons. While it
has various plans to upgrade its low-tier system, Seoul recently stated that it is open to the potential U.S. deployment of a
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to the Korean Peninsula. This could signal Seoul harnessing a U.S.
commitment in order to avoid strategic decoupling or abandonment, but it could also lead to entrapment.

On the one hand, Seoul is open to the THAAD deployment because it offers another layer of defense at no initial cost. Also, the system
could potentially be integrated into KAMD through a later purchase, thus enhancing Seoul’s ability to more
independently deter the threat from Pyongyang. Taking on full operational control would require as much.
At this point, Seoul denies it has plans to purchase such a system . On the other hand, many U.S. officials and defense
analysts view the potential THAAD deployment as another step towards integrating the ROK into the larger US-led ballistic missile defense
(BMD) system. In fact, there has been speculation that Washington is pushing Seoul to join its Missile Defense system as quid pro quo for
delaying OPCON transfer. The U.S. has pressured South Korea to join its regional system for some time, which
the ROK has thus far officially refrained from doing, due mainly to the negative impact it would have on its
increasingly important bilateral relationship with China. Beijing views the U.S.-led regional system as a
counter to its own assets. While deployment of the THAAD battery would be under USFK command and does not officially indicate
Seoul’s entry into the U.S. BMD system, it is certainly perceived as a step in that direction. This likely explains why ROK Defense Minister Kim
Kwan-jin stressed the peninsular-nature of the potential THAAD deployment. Assurances and lack of official integration notwithstanding, the
THAAD system’s X-band radar puts China’s key coastal regions well in its sights. Thus, the ROK could find
its efforts to enhance its defense capabilities entrapping it, almost ineluctably, in a situation where it appears
to be taking the U.S. side in the growing U.S.-China divide.

THAAD deployment in South Korea causes Chinese nuclear buildup---they see it as a

crucial threat to their nuclear deterrent
Teng Jianqun 15, Director of the Department for American Studies and a senior research fellow at the
China Institute for International Studies, PhD in international relations from Peking University, Apr 1
2015, “Why Is China Unhappy with the Deployment of THAAD in the ROK?”
http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2015-04/01/content_7793314.htm

during his visit to South Korea, Assistant Foreign Minister Liu

On March 16, 2015 Jianchao in talks with his counterparts reiterated China’s
concern on the possible deployment of US THAAD in South Korea . 1 Taking into account geopolitics and international relations, why has China taken such a strong

position against this program? What are the US reasons for pursuing this program? Can South Korea accept the US invitation to participate? These questions are now puzzling the countries in this region. ¶ The Missile Defense Project is a “Silver Bullet” in the Hands of the United States ¶
As everybody knows, missile defense from TMD to NMD has long been a dream for the United States. THAAD is an important part of the current missile defense program. Originally standing for “theater high altitude area defense,” today it signifies “terminal high altitude area missile
defense.” The THAAD missile defense program was first proposed in 1987, and instructions to build this capability were transmitted to industry in 1990. After several rounds of failed tests, in June and August 1999, the first successful tests were conducted. ¶ According to its design, it is to
shoot down short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles in their terminal phase by using so called hit-to-kill technology. Renamed from HIGH to TERMINAL, the change in wording shows the main concerns of this program. Technically speaking, the killing part carries no warhead,
which relies on the kinetic energy of the impact to destroy the incoming missile. Such a hit would minimize the risk of exploding conventional warhead ballistic missiles; and nuclear tipped ballistic missiles would not explode upon a kinetic energy hit. Although THAAD was designed to

What worries countries most is the radar systems used by THAAD,

intercept Scuds and similar weapon systems, it also has the capability to intercept ICBMs.¶

which include the X-band active electronically scanned array system —the world’s largest ground/air-transportable system as a forward sensor for ICBM missile defenses.

with the
The United States mentioned that such a radar system is to be used to scan any missile launched by the DPRK in this region and would do no harm to the strategic balance among the three nuclear weapon states, Russia, China, and the United States; however,
surveillance distance of 1300 kilometers, such a ground/sea based radar system, of course, would cover
a large area of China and Russia. ¶ To some
Already these systems are being deployed in Alaska and Japan, and in 2014, China repeatedly criticized the United States for X-band radar deployment in Kyoto.

Chinese scholars, such a system is actually a “ silver bullet” in the hands of the U S . nited tates Their argument is based on several reasons: 1) a
missile defense system is a bullet-to-bullet game, which still needs time to perfect its capacity in many aspects; 2) as a defense system, it could not be efficient in reacting to an attack from any point in a 360 degree defense circle; 3) in the planned deployment, while facing Russian and
Chinese multiple launches at the same time, THAAD only succeeds in a small percentage of cases. On the one hand, Russians and Chinese would not perceive this system as efficient, since it could not provide 100 percent protection; on the other hand, the two countries are showing great
concern over the strategic impact of it. ¶ China Raises Its Voice against the Deployment of a Missile Defense System in Northeast Asia¶ From the late 1980s, experts and officials have paid great attention to the missile defense program of the United States, first TMD and later NMD. If

several experts argued that

one looks at the US missile defense deployment in the Asia-Pacific region, one can find a circular chain already in position along the eastern part of China. In a paper published on February 22, 2010,

Washington has appeared determined to surround China with its anti-missile systems from Alaska to
Taiwan ¶ . According to the US-based Defense News, Taiwan became one of the largest global buyers of the Patriot missile defense system following Japan, the ROK, the UAE, and Germany. Quite a few Chinese military experts have noted that Washington’s proposed weapons

¶ Chinese experts consider the US anti-missile

deal with Taiwan is a key part of US strategic encirclement of China, and that the missiles’ footprints extend from Japan to the ROK and Taiwan.

system in China’s neighborhood to be a replica of its strategy in Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union .

The ring encircling China can also be expanded at any time in other directions. Analysts say that China has been closely monitoring US-India missile defense cooperation since any integration of India into the US global missile defense system would profoundly affect China’s security. ¶

The U S has already succeeded in Japan and Taiwan; so the ROK would become a crucial part of this
nited tates

chain. For at least the past two decades, not only have scholars and experts shown concern over the US missile defense program, but also Chinese officials have raised their voice against it in Northeast Asia, as seen in white papers and speeches. On August 12, 2009,

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told that the missile defense program would
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva by some countries in the Asia-Pacific region

do no good to regional peace and stability , adding that China opposes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. China has joined all related international treaties and mechanisms, put in place a

The practice of seeking

comprehensive system of laws and regulations compatible with the relevant international legal regime, and strictly enforced UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and other non-proliferation resolutions.

absolute strategic advantage should be abandoned. Countries should neither develop missile defense systems that undermine global strategic stability nor deploy weapons in outer space. His

speech gave the world a clear-cut signal that China was not in favor of any kind of missile defense system, which, he explained, would harm the stability in the region.2 ¶ China’s concerns over the US missile defense program have repeatedly been cited in official publications. The white
paper on China National Defense of 2010 said, “International military competition remains fierce. Major powers are stepping up the realignment of their security and military strategies, accelerating military reform, and vigorously developing new and more sophisticated military
technologies. Some powers have worked out strategies for outer space, cyber space and the polar regions, developed means for prompt global strikes, accelerated development of missile defense systems, enhanced cyber operations capabilities to occupy new strategic commanding
heights. Some developing countries maintain the push towards strengthening armed forces, and press on with military modernization. Progress has been made in international arms control, but prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains complex, there is still
much to do to maintain and strengthen the international non-proliferation mechanism.”3¶ China’s senior officials take every opportunity to express their concerns over the US missile defense program. On April 12, 2012, Luo Zhaohui, Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs
with the Foreign Ministry, during an online chat hosted by People’s Daily, noted that after the DPRK announced its intention to launch a satellite, the United States stepped up coordination with Japan and the ROK to prepare to adjust its military deployment in Northeast Asia and the Asia-
Pacific region. He said, “The Chinese government always insists that (countries) should start by maintaining global strategic stability and promoting strategic mutual trust between major powers to handle the issue of missile defense prudently.”4 According to Reuters, a US defense official

Luo
said on March 26, 2014 that the United States was seeking to build a missile defense system in Asia and the Middle East, similar to the one in Europe, to help relevant countries ward off threats from Iran and the DPRK, and prevent possible long-range missile threats against it. ¶

said, “Building a missile defense system in the Asia-Pacific region will have negative effects on global and
regional strategic stability , and go against the security needs of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.” He continued that China over decades had clearly demanded through various channels that the United States fully respect and take care
of the security concerns of relevant parties, including China, act prudently on the issue of missile defense, and solve the problem of missile proliferation through political and diplomatic means. “We also urge relevant countries in the Asia-Pacific region to act prudently in cooperating with
the US on missile defense, and not develop or deploy missile defense systems that exceed the needs of its development.” Luo added that China also “firmly objects to providing assistance in missile defense to Taiwan in any way.”5 ¶ China has taken a very clear-cut position on the
possible deployment of the US THAAD. During a briefing in October 2014, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the move damaged peace and stability in the region. She made the comment after media reports said the US military had delivered X-band radar to the
Kyogamisaki military base in Kyoto. The radar to scan for missile launches from the DPRK was expected to start operation within 2014. She said, “Some countries have pushed forward anti-missile system deployment in the Asia-Pacific region to seek unilateral security, which runs against
regional stability and mutual trust as well as peace and stability in Northeast Asia…This move causes even more concerns, under the backdrop of complex and sensitive regional situation.” She called on relevant countries to proceed from the broader picture of regional peace and stability
and be committed to maintaining regional security through political and diplomatic means. “Relevant countries should not take their own security concerns as excuses for damaging others’ security interests.”6 ¶ By the end of 2014, the discussion over the possible deployment of THAAD
in South Korea again preoccupied the media in China and the ROK. In November 2014, Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong warned that if South Korea allows the United States to deploy the THAAD battery on its soil, it would hurt Seoul-Beijing relations. ¶ Why Is China Not Happy
with the Possible Deployment of THAAD in the ROK?¶ We should discuss this issue from a wider scope since the deployment of THAAD has already gone beyond the boundaries of technological development of missile defense by the United States. It is of geopolitical and strategic
significance for international relations in Northeast Asia. Starting from the early 1990s after the Cold War ended and the United States largely abandoned its Star Wars plan initiated by the Reagan administration, South Korea has been very cautious in responding to invitations from the
United States to participate in missile defense programs. There are many reasons to explain its cautious response: 1) the sensitivity of the program—participation would damage its security environment as North Korea, China, and Russia would make South Korea a target; 2) technology
related to missile defense program has been so uncertain that even the United States has doubted its capacity in dealing with the so-called missile threat from North Korea; and 3) South Korea has its own ambitious KMD plan, which mainly targets the short or medium-range ballistic
missiles from North Korea, while THAAD mainly targets ballistic missiles over 5000 kilometers in range. ¶ In May 2013, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US military had already carried out site studies of potential areas in South Korea where the THAAD battery could be deployed.
The US government could induce Seoul to agree to deepen its anti-missile cooperation with Washington and Tokyo. Despite repeated entreaties by the United States, Seoul has refused out of a desire to avoid antagonizing China and historic mistrust of Japan.7 South Korea says its missile
defenses are aimed at fending off a tactical missile strike from North Korea. The United States argues that having an integrated US-South Korea-Japan system would improve response times in the event of a missile attack by Pyongyang. Admiral James Winnefeld, the vice chairman of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a conference in Washington said that “with the unpredictability of the North Korean regime, we may find ourselves doing more of this sort of thing in the future elsewhere in the region.”8 ¶ Why suddenly has South Korea been reconsidering its reluctance to
participate in the missile defense program of the United States? There are several possible explanations: 1) fast development of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile technologies—especially after the third nuclear test by the DPRK, we have witnessed a growing debate in South Korea on the
possibility of cooperation with the United States on the missile defense program; 2) the public’s increasing nervousness about security—under the threat of the DPRK’s artilleries and missiles, the South Koreans will feel much more comfortable when they can see some kind of missile
defense program on their territory; and 3) the traditional alliance between the United States and South Korea, which needs a new driving force to go forward at this moment. ¶ The deployment of US THAAD has become, at least to some extent, a hot potato in South Korea. On the one
hand, it would provide South Korea new protection in missile defense though it is not strong enough to give a 100 percent guarantee. On the other hand, South Korea again has to take full consideration of the response from relevant countries. China has already repeatedly reiterated its
position on the US missile defense project in Northeast Asia, expressing great concern not only about THAAD but also about the entire missile defense program. Russia now is facing two fronts in fighting against the US missile defense program, both in the Asia-Pacific region and in
Western Europe. The DPRK, as the major target of the US program, will continue to criticize the deployment of any advanced weapons system in this region. These responses from the relevant countries will exert a strong negative impact on the security situation. Park Geun-hye’s
administration should thoroughly study this before any decision is made related to the US missile defense program. ¶ The opposition to the US deployment of a missile defense system in this region should not only be a technical or security matter. Behind the curtain of competition is the
relationship among the United States, China, and South Korea. The pivot or rebalancing strategy by the Obama administration is a double-edged sword for the regional countries. China has recognized the pressure from the United States on its security. South Korea has also recognized the
pressure from the United States. The enhancement of the traditional alliance has already become one of the most important pillars to rebalance other countries. As we all have witnessed recently in the more than two years since President Xi Jinping and President Park Geun-hye took
office, the relationship between China and South Korea has entered a new stage. China has adjusted its policy toward the DPRK and ROK by trying to have a more balanced relationship with the two. Under such circumstances, the Park administration should not be willing to stop such

the possible deployment of the US THAAD system in South

good momentum in cooperation with China.¶ THAAD Has Become a Tough Choice for US Allies¶ In conclusion,

Korea will test relationships among China, South Korea, the United States, or even Russia . It is not simply a military project for the

China has raised its voice against this program. If necessary, China will take
sake of South Korean and US security. Other factors are already involved, and

some solid measures to counter the power of the US missile defense program, including updating and
increasing the number of its conventional and nuclear warheads . South Korea has become the most important area for the United States deploying systems such as
THAAD. South Korea used to be very cautious toward the US proposal, but today has become more flexible to the possibility in consideration of geopolitics, the economy, and the security relationship.

Causes arms racing and accidental nuke war

Alexander Kolbin 12, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Coordinator at the PIR Center,
“China and Nuclear Disarmament,” in Global Nuclear Disarmament: Geopolitical Necessities, google
books [pages not numbered]
In any event, ifChina were to build up its nuclear arsenal, that would have negative effects for the entire
system of regional security in Asia Pacific. Faced with such a scenario, Japan and South Korea might try
to acquire their own nuclear capability. Such a move by China could also trigger a nuclear arms race
between India and Pakistan69 and have a very adverse impact on Russian- Chinese strategic dialogue.
Besides, a rapid increase in the numbers Of Chinese nuclear weapons would disturb the strategic balance

in Asia Pacific, prompting the United States and its allies to speed up their missile defence deployment in the region. ¶ Finally, a sharp increase in
the size Of the Chinese nuclear arsenal would probably mean that Beijing has abandoned its current
defensive posture, including its no-first-use commitment. At the very least. that commitment would become
more of a propaganda tool than a practical strategy. Such an increase could signal a transition to the
"launch under attack" strategy, whereby Beijing would try to reduce to a minimum, the time between
the enemy'S strike and the launch Of its own nuclear missiles. That would require advanced and highly
reliable early warning systems which, according to various sources, China either does not have at all or
is only just beginning to deploy. According to some sources, at present China stores nuclear warheads separately from the missiles. A number of
researchers believe this is because China "lacks reliable technical means for preventing unauthorised use Of nuclear

weapons".
 5
The United States should establish a presidential and senior cabinet-level dialogue
with South Korea, China, and Japan on contingency planning for a North Korean
collapse which seeks to clarify roles and responsibilities for each country. This should
also include encouraging public discussion and debate through foreign policy forums
and professional conferences to inform the policymaking process.
Their author says we only need to clarify roles in dealing with a NK collapse scenario –
doesn’t mention OPCON
Kent Harrington and Bennett Ramberg, 11-1-2014, "The United States and South Korea: Who Does
What if the North Fails?," Washington Quarterly | Elliott School of International Affairs,
http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/united-states-and-south-korea-who-does-what-if-north-fails
Even in the best of all possible worlds—a regime that falls with a minimum of internal violence and external threats—dealing with North
Korea’s demise will present unanticipated challenges including but not limited to its nuclear arsenal. The details of how Washington and Seoul
plan to respond must be kept secret, although the policies that guide their preparations and the underlying assumptions need not. Indeed, if a
decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan teach any lesson about post-conflict burdens, it is the need to identify them, think
through their costs, and ensure that we can and should bear them before declaring them our own. Sixty years after the end of the
Korean War, the U.S. alliance with South Korea stands as a testimony to the durability of the U.S. commitment to its ally. The South Korean
success story is also part of its fruits, a political as well as economic transition that benefited from the U.S. role as a guarantor of stability on the
peninsula and in the region. Like the changing command roles within the alliance, Seoul’s capabilities to lead and underwrite the process of
reunification need clearer recognition. In 2014, as in the past, the United States has a key part in supporting its Korean ally and unique
responsibilities, particularly on nuclear issues, if the North collapses. But the
time has come to clarify historic assumptions as
well as build political understanding and consensus on and off the peninsula about Seoul’s leadership role going forward. Because of
the sensitive as well as classified nature of many of the issues, the task admittedly will not be easy. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia
underscoring the region’s critical importance to U.S. security, however, provides the right umbrella in the Pacific as well as at home. In North
Asia, the current picture of the two leading U.S. allies at loggerheads must be redrawn. Against the backdrop of a failed North Korea, the
implications of that dysfunctional byplay emerge starkly. To move toward substantive trilateral cooperation, a
presidential priority
which assembles senior policymakers to work through how Seoul will lead, what Tokyo can do, and where the
United States will provide its support is the place to begin. Such an effort will have the added benefit of
enabling the allies to put their cooperation on the table with China —the leadership needs to understand
how Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington together will respond to the challenge of a North Korean collapse. Building a
consensus on the U.S. role and the allied division of labor is no less important in the United States. Congressional hearings can address the
issues facing U.S. policy if North Korea collapses (although the partisan dysfunction in Congress raises obvious concerns about leaks from
classified sessions as well as misrepresentations that could jeopardize cooperation with Seoul and others). Classified hearings, however, are not
enough. Administration policymakers should reach out publicly before a crisis drives their decision making. An
initiative to discuss U.S. priorities and South Korea’s leadership role would illuminate the U.S. obligation
and what we expect from our allies. Foreign policy forums abound in the media as well as professional
conferences as venues for that discussion and debate . Given the uncertainties in the North, both Koreans and Americans
need to understand what each partner intends to do as clearly as circumstances allow.
Diplomacy
 Middle Power Link Defense---1NC
The alliance doesn’t undermine South Korean middle power diplomacy, and they’re
not perceived as dependent now
Scott Snyder 15, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of U.S.-Korea policy program at the
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2015, “U.S. Rebalancing Strategy and South Korea’s Middle
Power Diplomacy,” http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/2015030618362920.pdf

At the same time that the United States has unveiled its rebalance to Asia, South Korean foreign policy
strategists have been carefully considering how their country can more effectively use diplomatic,
economic, and military capabilities it has accrued as a result of its own rise to prominence as a G-20 member
and top-tier trading economy. The discussion within South Korean foreign policy circles regarding its future strategy has been
animated primarily by the idea that South Korea is a middle power . Therefore, a deeper understanding and application of
attributes of a middle power to South Korea’s situation will assist South Korean policymakers by providing a constructive blueprint for South
Korea’s foreign policy.

For instance, if
South Korea applies the attributes of a middle power to its own diplomacy, then South Korean
strategists must explore how and whether South Korea’s positioning as a facilitator, manager, and niche
player that can provide intellectual leadership on specialized, well-chosen issues where it has a
comparative advantage. In this way, South Korea is developing and testing the limits of its geographic,
behavioral, and normative capacity to be a middle power actor on the international stage, cognizant of the fact
that its capabilities are constrained by its position at the intersection of interests among great powers
that often bring differing perspectives to the table .

Over the course of the past few years, South Korea has sought to play this role on a variety of international issues,
most notably as a convener of international meetings and steward of the international agenda on global financial stability,
international development policy, nuclear security and safety, and climate change and green growth, among
others.1 In many cases, South Korean effectiveness as a convener of international forums has indirectly benefited
from the context provided by its close relationship with the United States as well as its status not only as
an emerging middle power but also as an U.S. ally.2

Thus far, South Korea’s enhanced capabilities and the U.S.-ROK alliance have had positive, mutually-
reinforcing effects. In principle, South Korean middle power aspirations and a strengthened U.S.-ROK
alliance are not opposed to each other and have the potential to work together as complementary
concepts that generate and take advantage of shared American and Korean foreign policy interests. South Korea’s growing scope
of interests and desire to contribute to the international community have benefited the U.S.-ROK
alliance as South Korea has become a partner in a broader range of functional spheres and the scope of alliance cooperation
has broadened both functionally and geographically . The emergence of a South Korea with capabilities
and attributes of a middle power has enabled the transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance from a
peninsula-focused patron-client security relationship to a comprehensive political and security. The June
2009 U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement reflects this broadened scope, showing the impact of both South Korea’s desires to develop greater
capabilities and have a greater impact internationally and the result of the Obama administration’s desire to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance.3
But an outstanding question is whether strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance might also come at the expense of South Korea’s interests as a
middle power.
 SQ Solves Nuclear Leadership
Squo solves South Korean nuclear leadership---their diplomacy is successful and
they’re not tied to the US---THEIR EV!
Toby Dalton 15, Co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “Nuclear Governance: South Korea’s Efforts to Strengthen Regimes and
Frameworks for the Safe and Secure Use of Nuclear Energy”, Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the
Global Agenda, ed. Snyder, pp. 52-54

Despite the assessment that hosting the NSS had little bearing on several of South Korea’s nuclear priorities,
and setting aside the reputational benefit, was South Korea able to put its stamp on the process and outcomes of the summit itself in ways that
demonstrated a role for middle-power diplomacy? Available evidence, detailed in this section, suggests that the ROK was able to
achieve some modest successes in its diplomacy, to capitalize on the opportunity of hosting the summit , and
to demonstrate that it had standing and legitimacy in a policy area that tends to be dominated by major
powers. That said, South Korea also encountered some challenges and limitations in its ability to set the agenda for the summit and bridge
disparate perspectives.

It is notable that South

Korea mobilized significant internal resources, largely based on human-resource capacity, in order
to implement a successful summit. It placed two seasoned diplomats in charge of the external diplomacy and negotiation of the
summit communiqué, it established a preparatory interagency committee chaired by the prime minister and a standing secretariat led by the
foreign minister, and it mounted a major public diplomacy campaign for participating states and the Korean public.11 It also facilitated
in
parallel to the main summit an expert symposium and nuclear industry summit . As will be discussed further, this
mobilization has had some lasting domestic impact on nuclear policy in Korea. The investment of resources and
careful preparation not only ensured a successful summit; it also guaranteed that South Korea would continue to be viewed as
a leader of the nuclear security enterprise well after the Seoul summit concluded.

In the lead-up to the summit, the

ROK championed several substantive priorities that it sought to place on the
agenda. Several of these priorities were perceived to be contrary to U.S. interests , and some South Korean analysts have
argued that Seoul’s successful efforts to raise them demonstrate effective leadership of the summit process and independence from the United
States.12 In particular, South Korea sought to broaden the discussion of threat beyond fissile materials that can be used in nuclear weapons to
include radioactive sources that are ubiquitous in industrialized countries and whose theft and use by terrorists poses a more likely if less
devastating threat than the potential terrorist use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, in light of the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in
Japan, South Korea supported discussion of a “nuclear safety-security nexus” during the summit. Inclusion of both issues on the agenda
necessarily diluted the narrow focus on fissile material security, which is how the summit process had been initially framed and promoted by
the United States. Without access to official records, it is difficult to assess the extent to which U.S.-ROK tension over these issues was more
perceived than real, as well as how instrumental South Korean diplomacy was in negotiations over the agenda and summit communiqué.
Secondary sources (albeit mainly from the United States, not the ROK) and background interviews, coupled with a nuanced reading of the
communiqués, do yield some tentative findings.

First, South
Korean diplomats did manage to build international consensus on the inclusion of radiological
source security on the agenda, but the evidence suggests this was less a matter of South Korean agenda-setting than deft diplomacy. A
comparison of the Washington and Seoul summit communiqués is instructive in this regard. The 2010 Washington communiqué, closely
reflecting U.S. framing of the issues, mentions radioactive source security in only one instance and asserts that mere acknowledgement, rather
than development and implementation, of steps to promote nuclear security would improve the security of radioactive sources. The
2012
communiqué, in comparison, mentions radioactive source security fifteen times, including in a dedicated
paragraph.13 This is a significant broadening of the agenda beyond Washington’s preferred focus. But
according to secondary source reports, it was Germany, not South Korea, that led the charge on including radioactive source security in the
agenda.14 In this sense, South
Korean diplomats demonstrated adroit diplomacy to manage divergent views
between the founder (the United States) and other states with different priorities . South Korea further
showed creative thinking in announcing a partnership with Vietnam and the IAEA to develop a
radioactive source tracking system that would be piloted by Vietnam. This showed a commitment beyond
diplomacy to exercise of leadership in the region, a role the ROK might usefully expand in the future.
Second, on the inclusion of nuclear safety in the summit agenda, it seems inconceivable that the Seoul summit, which was held in Asia just over
a year after the Fukushima accident, would not have addressed nuclear safety in some way. ROK officials may have sought a more expansive
nuclear safety discussion than the United States was prepared to support, but gaining consensus on even the narrower formulation of the
safety-security nexus was not a foregone conclusion, and several states apparently objected that nuclear safety was properly in the domain of
other institutions and forums.15 Ultimately, South Korean negotiators (with U.S. support) succeeded in scheduling a lunch
during the summit to discuss the issue and in securing consensus of the participating governments on
language in the communiqué, calling on states to design and implement nuclear safety and security measures “in a coherent and
synergistic manner.” This fairly anodyne language indicates a minor diplomatic victory , but one that set the stage for
more progressive thinking. Indeed, at the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, participating states not only
reaffirmed the need for coherent management of both safety and security, but also stipulated that states need to develop a
nuclear security culture focused on the coordination of safety and security and seek continuous improvement in both areas.

Aside from these substantive efforts to shape the agenda to reflect the broader interests of the majority of participating states, South
Korean experts also highlight two procedural successes of Seoul’s summit leadership. The first purported success
was “the transformation from an American -led initiative to a more universal-based normative one,” one
that is more reflective of global concerns and not “excessively dominated by U.S. interests .”16 However, this
assertion seems at odds with the fact that all of the sherpa and sous-sherpa meetings were co-chaired by South Korean and U.S. officials, who
cooperated extensively on the meeting agendas and communiqué drafts.17 Describing the high level of cooperation between the two states on
summit preparation, one U.S. official asserted that “the United States was the hand in the Korean glove.”18 This is not indicative of a process
shorn of U.S. interest.
 Nuclear Leadership Alt Causes
South Korea doesn’t have capacity or commitment for nuclear leadership---crushes
solvency---THEIR EV
Toby Dalton 15, Co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, “Nuclear Governance: South Korea’s Efforts to Strengthen Regimes and
Frameworks for the Safe and Secure Use of Nuclear Energy”, Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the
Global Agenda, ed. Snyder, pp. 56-57

Yet the domestic outcomes also reveal gaps in Seoul’s capacity to lead with credibility . For example, the
recent scandal involving faked safety certificates for parts installed in South Korean nuclear reactors
highlights the need for more attention to cultivating a nuclear safety and security culture in the ROK that
improves practices at home while bolstering its reputation abroad.21 South Korea’s recently established regulatory
organization—the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission—still lacks expertise, which undermines its independence and ability to
lead a process to correct the regulatory deficiencies that contributed to the falsified certificates scandal. ( Lack of effective
government oversight of industry is an endemic problem in South Korea that affects numerous sectors, not just
nuclear; the Sewol ferry disaster in April 2014 occurred largely because of regulatory capture by the shipping industry.) Effective
leadership on nuclear safety and security on the international stage does not require perfection at home; however, it does
require an ability to identify gaps and to address them critically, transparently, and with sustained
commitment.
It is also worth noting here another prerequisite of sustained international leadership: capable diplomacy backed by an interagency support
network at home. As described earlier, South Korea mobilized a major intergovernmental effort to host the summit, but since then both
its diplomatic capacity and interagency process to support global leadership on nuclear safety and
security appear to have withered. The multiple interagency groups formed to support the summit were not
institutionalized, and they dissolved following the summit’s conclusion . Many of the diplomats and technical
specialists who worked on the summit have moved on to other issues, and there has been no dedicated effort to develop
technical or policy expertise within the foreign ministry or other agencies . To be sure, South Korea has talented
nuclear engineers and scientists, as well as capable diplomats, but global leadership also requires policy entrepreneurs and
innovators who understand both policy and technology and who can blend them in creative ways. A return to normal
governmental operations is to be expected after hosting a major meeting, but as one of only three governments to have hosted an NSS (the
United States and the Netherlands complete the leadership troika), South Korea’s ability to sustain leadership is threatened by this diminution
of capacity.

Perhaps more troubling is that the administration of President Park Geun-hye appears to have concluded that the 2012
summit is a legacy of the previous Lee administration, rather than an opportunity for continued
leadership. Instead, Park has pursued her own nuclear initiatives (including one focused on regional nuclear safety) that
appear to have neither international traction nor the type of internal support structure borne by a political
commitment such as the NSS. Without durable political commitments and sustained institutional capacity,
it will be a challenge for South Korea to maintain leadership of any issue, including nuclear safety and security,
on the international stage.
 Rice Production Alt Causes
Vietnamese rice collapse inevitable
The Economist 14, “Against the grain,” 1/18/14, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21594338-
vietnams-farmers-are-growing-crop-no-longer-pays-its-way-against-grain

Party officials trumpet their “rice first” agricultural policies. Yet, more and more, Vietnam’s
rice farmers are being left behind.
Part of the problem is that Vietnamese rice strains tend to be of low or middling quality—a contrast to the premium
varieties grown in Thailand. The costs of fuel, fertilisers and pesticides are rising . And Vietnam’s rice-export sector
is dominated by state-owned firms with links to corrupt officials . Some farmers, especially in the country’s north,
are finding it more profitable to let their land lie fallow.

In An Giang province, at the heart of the Mekong delta, an average family earns just $100 a month from cultivating rice ,
or about a fifth of what coffee-growers earn in Vietnam’s Central Highlands, says Oxfam, an advocacy group. Tran Van Nghia, who farms near
Sam mountain, says young people in his area supplement farm incomes by working as hotel porters or construction workers in Ho Chi Minh City
and other urban centres.

Vietnam’s rice woes are likely to worsen. Myanmar, long ago South-East Asia’s rice basket, is emerging again as an export rival.
The bulk of Vietnam’s crop is sold directly to other governments, but some of its biggest clients, including Indonesia and the Philippines, are
boosting domestic production. Arup Gupta, a commodities trader in Ho Chi Minh City, adds that as a consequence of a crackpot and expensive
campaign in Thailand to subsidise the country’s rice farmers, Vietnam is now being undercut as Thailand unloads
stockpiles at bargain-basement prices.

Scientists also warn that the

Mekong delta, which produces about half of Vietnam’s rice, is showing signs of environmental
stress. The earth dykes that were built to keep seasonal floods from inundating the rice paddies prevent the Mekong river’s
alluvial floodwaters from bringing nutrients to the delta’s soil.

Vo-Tong Xuan, a rice expert who has advised the government on agricultural policies, reckons that many
soils in Vietnam’s rice-
growing regions are now so poor in nutrients that they cannot immediately be put to other uses, such as
cultivating maize. Other problems, he says, include a lack of farmer representation in the powerful Vietnam Food Association, and resistance by
state-owned rice exporters to reforms that would eat into their profits. It does not help that Vietnam’s new constitution, which passed in late
November, calls for state-owned enterprises to keep a central role in the economy.
 Impact D
No resource wars
Tetrais 12—Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratgique (FRS). Past positions
include: Director, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly (1990-1993); European affairs desk officer,
Ministry of Defense (1993-1995); Visiting Fellow, the Rand Corporation (1995-1996); Special Assistant to
the Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense (1996-2001).(Bruno, The Demise of Ares,
csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTertrais.pdf)
The Unconvincing Case for ‘‘New Wars’’ ¶ Is the demise of war reversible? In recent years, the metaphor of a new ‘‘Dark Age’’ or ‘‘Middle Ages’’
has flourished. 57 The rise of political Islam, Western policies in the Middle East, the fast development of emerging countries,
population growth, and climate change have led to fears of ‘‘civilization,’’ ‘‘resource,’’ and ‘‘environmental’’ wars.
We have heard the New Middle Age theme before. In 1973, Italian writer Roberto Vacca famously suggested that mankind was about
to enter an era of famine, nuclear war, and civilizational collapse . U.S. economist Robert Heilbroner made the same
suggestion one year later. And in 1977, the great Australian political scientist Hedley Bull also heralded such an age. 58 But the case for
‘‘new wars’’ remains as flimsy as it was in the 1970s.¶ Admittedly, there is a stronger role of religion in civil conflicts. The
proportion of internal wars with a religious dimension was about 25 percent between 1940 and 1960, but 43 percent in the first years of the
21st century. 59 This may be an effect of the demise of traditional territorial conflict, but as seen above, this has not increased the number or
frequency of wars at the global level. Over the past decade, neither Western governments nor Arab/Muslim countries have fallen into the trap
of the clash of civilizations into which Osama bin Laden wanted to plunge them. And ‘‘ancestral hatreds’’ are a reductionist and unsatisfactory
approach to explaining collective violence. Professor Yahya Sadowski concluded his analysis of post-Cold War crises and wars, The Myth of
Global Chaos, by stating, ‘‘most of the conflicts around the world are
not rooted in thousands of years of history--they are
new and can be concluded as quickly as they started.’’ 60¶ Future resource wars are unlikely. There are
fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought
over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent. 61 The invasion of Kuwait--a nationwide bank robbery--may go
down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow
of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the
two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new
resources.¶ China’s and India’s energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk
of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such
a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts . 62 As prices rise, previously untapped
reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling
blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the
economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become
cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation
for Japan’s decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing
behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.)
63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the
Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.
Loose Nukes
 No Collapse---1NC
Stability high---growth and reform
Chung-in Moon 12/28, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, “North Korea still stable
despite external vulnerabilities,” 12/28/15, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/28/north-korea-
still-stable-despite-external-vulnerabilities/

North Korea seems to have had an internally stable 2015. Its economy is far from faltering and Kim
Jong-un has firmly consolidated his power base. There were no explicit signs of internal challenge. Kim is
both reigning and ruling. But Pyongyang’s provocative behaviour in the international domain could produce severe consequences for
North Korea. Uncertainty remains high.

In late October, Pyongyang announced that it will hold the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in May 2016, 35 years after
the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. At the first Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the late North Korean chairman Kim Jong-il mentioned to then South
Korean president Kim Dae-jung that he would convene a congress, but it was never realised. Kim Jong-un succeeded power without the
congress ever being held. This announcement is therefore a significant move.

Kim Jong-un is likely to use the upcoming party congress as a platform to declare the beginning of a new era
under his leadership. His 2015 New Year speech had already hinted the possibility of redirecting the governing ideology.
Kim Jong-un’s previous New Year speeches made it clear that his rule is founded on two pillars: the ideological lines of his grandfather Kim Il-
sung and father Kim Jong-il. But in 2015, such ideological edifices did not appear. Instead, Kim Jong-un routinely mentioned old rhetoric such as
strengthening monolithic leadership, juche (self-reliance), as well as the importance of songun (military first) politics. The North Korean leader
may well introduce his own brand of ruling ideology at the Seventh Party Congress in 2016.

The decision reveals Kim Jong-un’s growing confidence in economic performance and power
consolidation. North Korea underwent major economic difficulties in 2015 — partly because of international
sanctions and poor harvests, and partly because of falling prices of coal and iron ore that accounted for almost half of its exports.

But Pyongyang’s economic performance has remained rather robust, owing to the flourishing informal
sector. Since 2009, more than 400 jangmadang (informal marketplaces) have been introduced. They have facilitated the
distribution of necessary consumer goods through a quasi-market mechanism. Such informal markets critically
mitigated the negative consequences of severe drought and poor harvest. This was a sharp contrast to the period of
mass starvation of the 1990s, after which the public distribution system collapsed. Equally important is the advent of donju ( money
holders) who are serving as new agents of capital accumulation as well as sources of valuable hard
currency.

The size of the informal sector is now believed to be larger than that of the formal sector. Some
experts even compare the current
North Korean economy to the Chinese economy under Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening up
initiative. As the logic behind a market economy becomes more widespread, the state economy is becoming increasingly
flexible. The state no longer commands and dictates the economy. Citizens themselves have become increasingly
adaptive and entrepreneurial, seeking their own survival through whatever means available. Paradoxically, the adaptive behaviour
of ordinary citizens has weakened the effectiveness of international sanctions.
 SQ Solves Coordination
Lots of coordination now---their author
Richard Fontaine 10, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Managing North
Korea: The Need for Coordination between Washington and Seoul,” Harvard National Security Journal,
2010, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Book-Chapter_Fontaine-Springut_US-ROK.pdf

Apart from diplomatic harmonization, coordinating

plans and policies for contingencies north of the demilitarized
zone represents a core activity of the U.S.-ROK alliance. While diplomats seek to steer the peninsula towards greater
stability, both nations actively prepare — often beyond the headlines — for the possibility of upheaval. Since the Korean
War, ROK Armed Forces and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) have worked to deter and contain North Korean
aggression. Both nations are also well aware of the potentially devastating impact of a DPRK collapse, a contingency that
could destabilize the peninsula and the region if not properly managed. Short of regime collapse, other events — including renewed famine and
nuclear disaster — would demand a coordinated response.
 SQ S ISIS
Retaking Ramadi turns the tide against ISIS
Zalmay Khalilzad 1-1, former director of policy planning in the Department of Defense, was the U.S.
ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations, 1/1/16, “The War Against ISIS After Ramadi,”
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/after-ramadi-iraqs-war-against-isis-14774

These caveats aside, the recent success in Ramadi is significant, and may mark a turning point in the war
against ISIS. After the Iraqi army’s collapse in Mosul, Iraqi security forces—especially its special forces—have largely recovered
in terms of their reorganization, professionalism and willingness to fight. Although the operation took a long time, Iraqi
Special Forces backed by the regular army, U.S. airpower and newly trained Sunni tribal forces performed well against
a talented enemy in a difficult urban environment . Whereas previous successes against ISIS, such as in the Sunni Arab city of
Tikrit, were spearheaded by Iranian-backed Shiite militias, it was the Iraqi security forces that took the lead in pushing ISIS
out of the heart of Ramadi. By all account, the Shiite militias played a minimal role.

Encouraging, too, was the role that recently trained Sunni Arab fighters played in the liberation of Ramadi. The
Sunni Arab role in the fight against ISIS is vital. ISIS’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, had largely been defeated in 2006 and
2007. The growing sectarianism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, however, radicalized sizable elements of the Sunni Arab community. ISIS
emerged in Syrian sanctuaries, expanded into the Sunni parts of Iraq and eventually became a voice for Sunni Arab disenchantment. More
recently in Tikrit, where Shiite militias took over Sunni cities, the short-term success against ISIS led to a wave of sectarian abuses against the
local population. The resulting Sunni Arab alienation gave ISIS a strategic victory amid the tactical defeat.

The liberation
of Ramadi provides the Iraqi government with another opportunity to win over
disenchanted Sunni Arabs and defeat ISIS. Three steps are now necessary:
First, remaining ISIS pockets in Ramadi must be defeated and the city and its suburbs must be cleared. The army and local Sunni forces should
carry out this mission with coalition air and intelligence support. Avoiding collateral damage and abuses of the civilian population to the
absolute extent possible will help ensure that Sunni Arabs rally against ISIS.

Second, the Baghdad government and anti-ISIS Sunnis should move quickly to address the needs of the local population in terms of security,
good governance and services. A sizable reconstruction effort is needed to gain the confidence of the local population. Recent surveys suggest
that severe dissatisfaction with both Iraq’s central government and local politicians among Iraqi Sunnis played a central role in the rise of ISIS.

Third, Iraqi leaders must expedite negotiations on the issue of Sunni self-rule in Anbar and other Sunni areas. Many Sunnis who opposed the
federalization of Iraq when the national constitution was ratified in 2005 now favor the type of autonomy that the Kurds enjoy. The Iraqi
constitution guarantees to provinces the right to pursue self-rule on local issues. Maliki’s decision to violate the constitution and move against
Sunni provinces pursuing the federal option was a major grievance in the Sunni Arab community.

Equally important, the Iraqi government will need to reach agreement on a scheme for power and resource sharing between the central and
local governments. Provincial guard forces should be given responsibility for maintaining local security to the maximum extent possible.

Achieving these objectives will not be easy especially in the current circumstances when oil prices are low and the government faces serious
financial problems. On the positive side, though, Prime Minister Abadi appears more willing than his predecessor to
address legitimate Sunni grievances. Opposition from Shiite hardliners will remain a factor; Abadi’s recent decision to refuse the
U.S. offer to deploy American attack helicopters, for example, was driven in large part by the resistance of Iran-backed militias. Growing
cross-sectarian confidence in the Iraqi government will give Abadi the political capital to resist hardline
Shiite pressure.

Ramadi is an important test case, particularly because of the coming battles for Fallujah and for Mosul, Iraq’s
second largest city. If the coalition and Iraqi government can develop a coordinated strategy
to consolidate victory and make visible progress on political and economic reconstruction , the playbook in
Ramadi could serve as a model for how to move against ISIS in Mosul and in Syria. In fact, Ramadi could
very well become a turning point if progress in the city catalyzes a shift in the Sunni Arab community
away from ISIS and toward the Iraqi government.

The United States has limited influence, but active engagement by Washington could tip the scales ,
transforming a temporary tactical advance in Ramadi into an enduring strategic victory against the forces of
instability and terror in Iraq.
 No China !
No terrorism in China---their arg is Chinese propaganda
Rachel Delia Benaim 14, freelance journalist based in New York, “Should China Fear Islamic
Insurgency?” 5/29/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/should-china-fear-islamic-insurgency/
Yitzhak Shichor, the Michael William Lipson Chair Professor Emeritus at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and one of the “Xinjiang 13” who
are still banned from China, is one of those who is skeptical of the existence of the ETIM. “Most
Uyghurs in Xinjiang aren’t
looking for independence. Even the expat Uyghur community isn’t .” Rather, what they seek is equality and
opportunity. Thus, even the stated mission of what is currently referred to by the Chinese government as ETIM comes into question ¶
Shichor added, “I’m not sure that it exists today , certainly not inside China.” If the ETIM exists at all, he contended, it must be
somewhere on the Internet.¶ The first mention of the ETIM appears to have been in 2000. Its Uyghur leader, Hasan Mahsum, was killed in 2003,
and many claim that since his death, the ETIM has ceased to exist. Despite a number of videos allegedly produced by the group,
according to Gardner Bovingdon, a professor of Central Eurasian Studies at Indiana University and another one of the Xinjiang 13, “it doesn’t
pass the sniff test.”¶ “They’re amateurish and small scale,” Bovingdon stated. Though the people in the videos speak in Uyghur,
“There’s no compelling evidence that they represent a movement that presents substantial military
threats to China.Ӧ There is no question that Islamic radicalism exists in Xinjiang, but its dimensions and impact
remain unclear. China created a correlation between Uyghur violence and religion because the Uyghur are religious. But perhaps that’s
not the motivation at all.¶ Take three of the major alleged Uyghur separatist attacks that have happened in the last few
years: the Urumqi riots in 2009, the Tiananmen Square attack in October 2013, and the Kunming knife attacks in early March this year. The
first two were economic protests turned violent, in which the initial protests didn’t necessarily have radical Islamic elements
but were expressions of mainline frustration with the government. ¶ The knife attack was different. Not only did it lack Islamic
undertones, is didn’t even take place in Xinjiang – Kunming is more than 2,500 miles from Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi. ¶ These three
events were violent and tragic, “but there is no evidence that it was a Uyghur separatist movement, other than
[China’s] word,” Bovingdon contended. He adds that a violent separatist group would normally be expected to be more
active. Drawing an analogy to another frustrated stateless people, he draws a broad comparison with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: “ There
is no comparison between the number of episodes, their scope, and degree of plausibility if you compare these [alleged ETIM
attacks] with the Intifada.”
2NC
CP
 Cyber A/O
Ineffective cyber security decks South Korean cyber diplomacy
David Fidler 15, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Cybersecurity at CFR, “South Korea’s Difficult Path as a
Middle Power in International Cyber Politics,” June 4 2015,
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/06/04/south-koreas-difficult-path-as-a-middle-power-in-international-
cyber-politics/

South Korea is one of the world’s most wired countries, which demonstrates the country’s embrace of cyber technologies. However, this
commitment renders South Korea vulnerable to malicious cyber activities . As has happened in many countries, South
Korea has scaled up its domestic cybersecurity efforts to address cyber threats, including the appointment in 2015 of a
presidential adviser on cybersecurity. Despite increased attention on cyber defense and resilience, South Korea has
not developed approaches that obviously stand out from equivalent efforts by other countries. South Korea
struggles with the same problems as other nations, which means its domestic cybersecurity activities do not necessarily
boost its middle power ambitions.¶ These ambitions also suffer because South Korea faces threats from North
Korea that dominate South Korea’s cybersecurity agenda. Although North Korea is a cyber menace beyond the Korean
peninsula, no other country bears the cyber burden Pyongyang imposes on South Korea. Indeed, in no other country is
cybersecurity so interwoven as part of an existential security threat. This burden damages South Korea’s middle power
aspirations in cyber affairs by highlighting South Korea’s vulnerabilities, forcing Seoul to prioritize North Korean
cyber threats, and undermining the idea South Korea has effective strategies other countries can use .

The plan can’t solve---the problem is that South Koreans are legally required to use
Internet Explorer and ActiveX
Simon Mundy 14, Seoul Bureau Chief for the Financial Times, “South Korea suffers poor cyber security
controls,” June 5 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7ae2b288-e29a-11e3-a829-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3o6AqBkQa

South Koreans internet users have to contend with

are the envy of computer geeks around the world for having the fastest average internet speed on the planet – more than double that of the US. Yet

a cumbersome, dated security system that is undermining internet blamed for hindering ecommerce and innovation – and also, paradoxically,

security.¶ By law, anyone using online banking in South Korea must use ActiveX a “digital certificate” issued by a bank. This process requires an plug-in,

an outdated technology incompatible with browsers except

developed by Microsoft that is broadly ignored by web developers outside South Korea and is internet Microsoft’s

Internet Explorer ¶
unfashionable . Thus, South Korea holds another world record. It is the only country where Internet Explorer accounts for more than half the browser market. Research site StatCounter says 76 per cent of South Koreans use the Microsoft

browser instead of faster, more reliable browsers developed by the likes of Google and Mozilla. ¶ This has created a self-perpetuating cycle where many South Korean web developers focus only on building sites compatible with Internet Explorer. Users of other browsers find that many
South Korean websites – including the local sites of foreign groups such as Standard Chartered and Citibank – do not function properly. ¶ Reliance on Internet Explorer was a source of alarm in April, when the US government advised citizens to avoid using the browser, after it was

discovered that a programme flaw could allow hackers to steal personal data. ¶ Microsoft fixed that problem but even it advises users to shun the ActiveX technology, where possible. ¶ Microsoft admits on its website that
ActiveX controls can “pose a security risk” and says: “It’s best to avoid using them if the website will work without them. They can stop your computer from functioning correctly, collect your browsing habits and

South Korean internet experts say the

personal information without your knowledge.” It adds: “Also, ‘good’ ActiveX controls might contain unintended code that allows ‘bad’ websites to use them.” ¶

vulnerability of ActiveX is one of the main reasons for the high rate of hacking and data leaks in South
Korea ¶ Internet users have to download so many plug-ins
. that malicious ones can easily slip when web surfing,

through ¶
. A high-profile incident last year saw systems brought down at several broadcasters and financial institutions in an attack attributed by the government to North Korean agents. Media reports said the hackers had exploited ActiveX, although investigators said this

¶ “Because of ActiveX, Korea has become a number one place for hackers,” says Lee
could not be proven. a Min-wha,

professor at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology . “South Korean internet users are
trained to click ‘yes’ to everything.” ¶ ¶ The system was initially an object of pride for the South Korean government, which saw it as proof of the country’s move towards the technological cutting edge. In 1998, the

authorities deemed the available online payment systems too insecure. The new SSL protocol had not been authorised for export from the US. As other countries waited for SSL, South Korea developed its own system, SEED, which can be used only with ActiveX plug-ins. ¶ For years,
regulators and card operators resisted calls to change the system, deterred by fears of the disruption that a new model would cause, and of security risks that could be caused if it were implemented badly. ¶ This year, the government is at last promising change, with public frustration
having reached new highs.¶ A survey, by the Federation of Korean Industries, a lobby group, found that 84 per cent of respondents wanted a new system. The burdensome old one is blamed for holding back the development of ecommerce. ¶ It has also protected local personal
computer makers Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics against Apple, whose Mac computers account for just 1.7 per cent of the South Korean PC market, compared with 8.9 per cent globally, according to StatCounter. ¶ President Park Geun-hye intervened when she heard of the

frustration of Chinese fans of a South Korean soap opera, who could not buy associated merchandise because of the security controls. As a result, digital certificates will not be required for online transactions from June. ¶ No plans exist to
change the system for online banking. any change Moreover, to the ecommerce payment systems needs support from South Korean
card companies. This may not be forthcoming , warns Lee Dong-hwan, information officer of Paygate, an alternative payment system that has been shunned by card operators despite interest from online
retailers.

Air-gap solves
Weimann 4 – Gabriel Weimann is a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace and
professor of communication at the University of Haifa, Israel. December 2004, "Cyberterrorism: How
Real is the Threat?"
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/15033/1/Cyberterrorism How Real Is the
Threat.pdf?1

Many computer security experts do not believe that it is possible to use the Internet to inflict death on
a large scale. Some pointed out that the resilience of computer systems to attack is the result of significant
investments of time, money, and expertise. As Green describes, nuclear weapons systems are protected by
“air-gapping”: they are not connected to the Internet or to any open computer network and thus
they cannot be accessed by intruders, terrorists, or hackers. Thus, for example, the Defense Department
protects sensitive systems by isolating them from the Internet and even from the Pentagon’s own
internal network. The CIA’s classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI’s entire computer system. The 9/11 events and the subsequent
growing awareness of cyberterror highlighted other potential targets for such attacks. In 2002, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) described “the absolute havoc
and devastation that would result if cyberterrorists suddenly shut down our air traffic control system, with thousands of planes in mid-flight.” However, argues
Green, “cybersecurity experts give some of their highest marks to the Federal Aviation Authority, which reasonably separates its administrative and air traffic
control systems and strictly air-gaps the latter.”
THAAD
 Turns Middle Power
Turns middle power---crushes South Korean neutrality
Jin Kai 15, research fellow at the Center for International Studies (CIS) at Yonsei University in South
Korea, Ph.D. in International Relations from the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Yonsei
University, South Korea, “The Other Reasons China Wants to Block THAAD Deployment,” Apr 18 2015,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/the-other-reasons-china-wants-to-block-thaad-deployment/

But beyond that, THAAD

deployment, which has yet to be finally confirmed, could pose two less obvious but serious
diplomatic challenges for China.¶ First, THAAD could conceivably check both China and South Korea in the
East Asian power game. The hidden message from the United States could be that the Beijing-Seoul
honeymoon will always have to give way to traditional security ties between Seoul and Washington.
That means Seoul’s diplomacy with Beijing will be constrained every time U.S. politicians decide to invoke South
Korean security concerns regarding the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. Merely the discussions between Seoul and Washington
regarding THAAD — forget about the actual deployment — will be a very uncomfortable wedge driven into China’s
painstakingly-built good neighbors policy with South Korea . No wonder some Chinese believe that the United States is actually
alienating both China and South Korea with talk of THAAD deployment. China may be confident in South Korea’s economic reliance, but an
“unfriendly” decision to deploy THAAD will be regarded in China not only as a humiliation, but as a stab
in the back.
 Link Turn
No issue linkage now
Richard Weitz 14, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Affairs at Hudson
Institute, “For U.S. and South Korea, Missile Defense Looms as Next Big Challenge,” 10/28/14,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14290/for-u-s-and-south-korea-missile-defense-looms-as-
next-big-challenge

Han Min-koo and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel finally agreed
After years of tense talks on the issue between the two countries, visiting South Korean Defense Minister

that conditions were not ripe for near-term transfer of wartime operational control to South Korea.
They did not set a new date for the transfer, but instead cited the need for an improvement of the security environment on the
Korean Peninsula and a strengthening of the South’s “critical” military capabilities before it could take place. ¶ Hagel said that the
postponement would “ensure that when the transfer does occur, Korean forces have the necessary defensive capabilities to address an intensifying North Korean threat.” These critical

capabilities include enhancing South Korea’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance ( C4ISR) capabilities;
acquiring precision-guided munitions and their associated delivery systems; and improving South Korea’s capabilities for
maneuver and network-centered warfare. These capabilities will prove useful for conducting operations both in Korea and for extra-peninsular missions. ¶ Both sides
endorsed the U.S. Army’s new practice of rotating U.S. combat forces from outside the region to various U.S. allies and partners in the region. This “Pacific Pathways” concept involves visiting
Army units conducting on-site exercises to increase readiness and strengthen partnerships. While useful in countries that seek to keep their security ties with the United States modest, such
arrangements provide nowhere near the visibility and regional impact of the permanent U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan.¶ Recently heightened animosity between Seoul and
Tokyo, however, has thwarted U.S. efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spokes pattern for U.S. alliances in Asia toward a more balanced multilateral structure. Last week in
Washington, the ministers did agree to share information on North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs with Japan through the trilateral dialogue process they started earlier this year.
However, this modest exchange hardly outweighs the territorial and historical strains between both countries.¶ The South Korean and U.S. ministers made no evident change in their positions
regarding North Korea, despite complaints that their firm stance was contributing to North Korean intransigence on restarting the Six-Party Talks to end the North’s nuclear program. They said
that they were “open to dialogue with North Korea” but that there was no point in engaging in talk for talk’s sake—Pyongyang must first commit to end its nuclear weapons program and take
concrete measures to demonstrate that it would act on that commitment. In Kerry’s words, “North Korea must demonstrate that it is serious about denuclearization, and we need to be certain
that it is prepared to live up to its international obligations and abide by international norms of behavior.” ¶ Foreign Minister Yun gave vent to what are undoubtedly shared frustrations
regarding North Korea, noting that Pyongyang was at times aggressive, but also striving for dialogue with Washington and Seoul. Yun argued that unification of the two Koreas would provide
the most effective and secure means of eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons. Yet, North Korean leaders have evinced little interest in developing concrete plans for unification or
eliminating their nuclear weapons. ¶ For this reason, the two sides stressed their intent to keep their forces ready and strong. Hagel said that the United States would not make major
reductions in the number and kind of forces stationed in South Korea. Repeating a deterrence formula that has been called into question in recent years by the U.S. failure to enforce its
military red lines against Syria, as well as its inability to defend Ukraine, Hagel “emphasize[d] that the United States remains committed to using all our military capabilities, both on and off the
Korean peninsula, including conventional strike missile defense and our nuclear umbrella, to ensure that our extended deterrence is credible and effective.”¶ To better deal with North Korea’s
missile threats, the two sides endorsed the “Concepts and Principles of the Alliance Comprehensive Counter-Missile Operations,” a joint mechanism to “detect, defend, disrupt and destroy”

the two parties have yet to engage in discussions let alone decide on South Korea’s
missiles. Nonetheless, Hagel said that

purchasing THAAD missile defense systems, which are more advanced than anything the United States or South Korea now has on the Peninsula.
Russia and increasingly China oppose such deployments as potential threats to their own nuclear deterrent as
well as likely to provoke further North Korean missile tests.

No THAAD now---South Korea isn’t willing to deal with the consequences

Erik Slavin 12/11, Navy and Asia writer for Stars and Stripes, “South Korea unlikely to gain US missile
defense system, for now,” 12/11/15, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/south-korea-unlikely-to-
gain-us-missile-defense-system-for-now-1.383306

Placement of a U.S. mobile missile defense system in South Korea remains unlikely in the near term despite
continued concern about North Korea’s nuclear program, analysts and government officials say. ¶ ¶ Top U.S. military officials want
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, ready to deploy in the Asia-Pacific region on a permanent basis —
and its bases in South Korea are ideally where they need to be to counter a possible North Korean offensive. ¶ Last year, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Robert Work said the
Pentagon had conducted site surveys for THAAD within South Korea . However, what
makes sense from amilitary tactical standpoint doesn’t always correspond with how leaders view the strategic
and diplomatic consequences.¶ When rumors spread in March of a deal to deploy THAAD to South Korea in an emergency, China
decried the possibility as a threat to its security, with Russia voicing opposition as well.¶ That left South Korea
uncomfortably positioned in a dispute pitting China and Russia on one side and the U nited States and Japan on
the other, said Kim Hyun-wook, a professor at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy in Seoul.¶ The result was that despite
discussions between President Barack Obama and South Korean President Park Geun-hye earlier this year, along with high-level ministerial
talks between both nations, neither
side has confirmed ever having had formal talks about THAAD.¶ Seoul’s caution
in regard to THAAD also comes from concern over harming its recently stabilized relations with Pyongyang, Kim
said.¶ The Koreas have technically remained at war since 1953, so everything is relative when it comes to measuring stability. But recent cross-
border family reunions and a series of official talks that began in November — the most recent took place Friday at a North Korean border
town, according to The Associated Press — aren’t something the South wants to jeopardize, Kim said. ¶ “The situation is now considerably
better than it was last spring,” Kim said. “It would be making a fool of ourselves to [deploy THAAD].”

OPCON transfer means the U.S. can successfully push THAAD---causes massive great-
power tension and turns the case
The Hankyoreh 13, South Korean newspaper, 10/2/13, “[Editorial] Missile defense and the possibly
delayed OPCON transfer,” http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/605492.html

US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel emphasized the need for South Korean missile defense before the
transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON).

Hagel held a press conference aboard the plane while flying to Korea to participate in the 45th yearly
US-ROK security deliberations. When asked by a reporter what capacity the South Korean military
would need to make an OPCON transfer possible, Hegel said that missile defense would be “a huge
part of this.”

This is the first time that a high-ranking American official has clearly stated the country’s plans to link
negotiations about Korean participation in missile defense with the issue of the OPCON transfer.

In contrast, Hagel took a step back on the question of delaying the OPCON transfer, which Park’s
government has been calling for. “I don’t believe we’ll be in a position to make any final decisions,”
Hagel said.

In Korea, there are loud calls for delaying the OPCON handover, while public opinion in the US tends to
oppose putting the transfer off yet again. It can be inferred that Hegel’s remarks are calculated to take
advantage of this disagreement in a bid to achieve American strategic interests to the greatest possible
extent.

It is very likely that this trend will have repercussions not only on participation in American missile
defense but also on the next-generation fighter project that will have to restart from scratch and the 9th
Special Measures Agreement (SMA) for sharing the cost of supporting US forces in Korea.

Indeed, some analysts suggest that that US hopes for Korea to field a stealth fighter capable of
countering China and Russia played a part in the ultimate rejection of the Boeing F-15SE, the final
candidate in government efforts to acquire a next-generation fighter.

If negotiations about the OPCON transfer go as the US hopes they do, they could lead to the worst
possible scenario for Korean national security. In this case, Korea would provoke China and Russia
without even gaining the sovereignty that OPCON would represent. This would mean that Korea would
find itself on the front lines in a major power conflict pitting the US and Japan against China and Russia.

Needless to say, this would make it impossible for Park to carry out her policy goals of maintaining an
alliance with the US while working with China and bringing about change in North Korea.
 A2 THAAD Inevitable (Jee 15)
This card is normative not predictive---it says that South Korea should accept the
THAAD but is actually pursuing a policy of strategic ambiguity to avoid having to
choose between the US and China---only the plan tips the balance
David Eunpyoung Jee 15, Korea Foundation Associate Researcher of the Asia-Pacific Security Program
at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as a military officer at the operation
center of Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army Missile Command 4-7-2015
http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/solving-the-thaad-puzzle-in-korea/

Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea General Curtis Scaparrotti, the highest U.S. military official in the country, recommended Seoul deploy THAAD to protect
itself from the threat of North Korean missiles. But during a meeting between Chinese Defense Chief Chang Wanquan and South Korean Minister of National
Defense Han Min-Koo, China publicly expressed its concerns over America’s proposal to deploy the air defense system. Mindful of Chinese concerns, Seoul’s

official stance is the “three nos,” meaning no decision has been made; there was no consultation with
the United States, and no request from Washington.¶ Americans want Koreans to say yes to THAAD; the Chinese want Koreans to say
no. Meanwhile, Seoul is hesitant to provide an official stance. Amid the THAAD debate, there are three questions to be answered; why
Beijing is concerned, why Seoul is staying quiet, and what the three stakeholder countries should do. ¶ Why is China concerned? ¶ Why is Beijing concerned about
extended American air defense capability in Northeast Asia? China believes that THAAD will not only operate to protect the Korean Peninsula from North Korean
missiles, but will also monitor Chinese air activity off the east coast of the Chinese continent and shoot down Chinese missiles as required. However, it is unlikely
that China would launch missiles to strike U.S. assets in the Pacific. Both Washington and Beijing are aware of the catastrophic consequences of a clash between the
two superpowers. China should not be concerned about America’s ‘shield’ as long as Chinese missiles will not strike U.S. assets. THAAD is not aimed at China, but
directed at North Korea.¶ Why is Seoul staying quiet?¶ Seoul
maintains its strategic ambiguity in order not to be forced to
choose between its economic and security interests. Currently, the South Korean economy is heavily
dependent on Beijing, China is both its largest exporter and importer (China, including Hong Kong, accounts for 31 percent of exports and 16 percent of
imports). At the same time, South Korea is well aware of the national security benefits of a U.S. military presence in the country. Even though South Korea boasts
one of the most powerful armies in Asia, it still heavily relies on U.S. ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities and is likely to rely further on
U.S. air defense capabilities if THAAD is deployed. Since
both economic interests and security interests are important,
Seoul is reluctant to accept the U.S. proposal (which could cause estrangement in the South Korea-China relationship) but equally
hesitant to reject the air defense system.¶ What should the three countries do?¶ First, Beijing must understand that the deployment of
THAAD is ultimately beneficial for China. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s regular press conference on April 9, 2013 shows that China wants the deterrence
of armed conflict, stability, and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing is well aware of the tragic consequences of conflict should North Korea miscalculate and
inflict damage on its rival to the south.¶ If South Korea remains exposed to North Korean missile threats and is eventually attacked, the safety of more than one
million Chinese living in South Korea will be at risk. Besides possible Chinese casualties, the turmoil of the South Korean economy will directly impact Chinese
interests. When the U.S.-South Korea alliance strikes back, they may decide to put an end to Kim Jong-un regime, meaning millions of North Korean refugees will
rush to the border with China seeking food, water, and survival. The consequences of North Korean missile use on the Korean Peninsula will not be contained within
the peninsula; it will directly threaten Chinese interests as well.¶ The American ‘shield’ to protect its ally state could also protect Chinese interests from North
Korean missiles. In addition, as the country with the most influence on North Korea, China must play a more active role in inducing North Korea to change its
coercive strategy. To guarantee survival of the regime, the North Korean leadership sticks to brinkmanship and a coercive strategy involving nuclear programs,
military provocations, threatening rhetoric, and cyberattacks against its southern rival and United States. China should convince its neighbor that there are other
options than this coercive strategy, which has kept North Korea isolated from the outside world and economically depressed. It is time for China to show its
neighbor the right way to build a “strong and prosperous nation.” ¶ ***AFF
CARD BEGINS HERE***¶ Second, Seoul has to send a
clear message to Beijing that deploying THAAD is an inevitable option in pursuit of national security because the country is
still vulnerable to North Korean missile threats. Despite efforts of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense to protect the country by building two key air
defense components — Kill-Chain and KAMD (Korea Air and Missile Defense system) — the country will remain exposed to missile threats until 2024, when the air
defense system is expected to be operational. Plus, a key component of KAMD, the PAC-2 (Patriot Advanced Capability) system, is not a reliable provider of air
defense. Due to a limited number of sensors and shooters, it is impossible to detect and destroy hundreds of North Korean mobile missile launchers. However,
Seoul cannot let its sky remain exposed to threats until 2024.¶ THAAD could provide bridging capability with its
100 percent success rate, as shown by U.S. Missile Defense Agency tests. It will be a reliable shield against North Korean missile threats until the air defense systems
are complete in 2024. Plus, more than half of the Korean public supports deployment of THAAD for national security. Deployment of THAAD is an inevitable option
to defend South Korean national security. Seoul must emphasize that interests of a neighboring country cannot outweigh ROK national security concerns, including
the need to protect civilian lives and property.
 A2 SK/THAAD Not Key
South Korean THAAD is key---it’s China’s primary focus because it would allow easy
detection of decoys, which threatens their deterrent---causes expansion of their
arsenal and nuke war
Wu Riqiang 9/25, associate professor at the School of International Studies at Renmin University of
China, where his research focuses on missile defense, strategic stability, and Sino-US crisis escalation,
visiting fellow at Dartmouth College's Dickey Center for International Understanding, PhD in Political
Science from Tsinghua University, Sept 25 2015, “Stabilizing China-U.S. Nuclear Dynamics,”
http://xivisit.nbr.org/2015/09/25/stabilizing-china-u-s-nuclear-dynamics/

Similarly, the expansion of U.S. theater missile defense in East Asia, specifically the
potential deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, has been the focus of the missile defense debate between China and

the United States. It is THAAD radar (TPY-2), rather than the interceptors, that concerns China. Besides serving as the fire control
radar of the THAAD system, this radar could also be deployed in forward-based mode, tracking Chinese strategic

missiles during the boost phase of flight and the deployment process of decoys and actual warheads.
Therefore, the system could easily discriminate real warheads from decoys, as decoys are much lighter
and the releasing of decoys causes smaller velocity changes of the offensive missile. If deployed, THAAD
radar would pose a major threat to Chinese strategic missiles.¶ Another challenge faced by China in this
domain is responding to and managing the risks of escalation from conventional weapons use to
nuclear use in the event of a conflict with another nuclear power. For example, China and the United States might engage in a conventional conflict over
Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the East China Sea, all of which would carry serious escalatory risks. Such conflicts could lead to different forms of nuclear
escalation. First, in a conventional conflict, the United States might deliberately attack Chinese nuclear weapons with conventional munitions to neutralize China’s
nuclear deterrent gradually and challenge China’s “no first use” policy. Second, the United States might use low-yield and high-accuracy nuclear weapons to attack
China in order to signal resolve and blackmail the country. Finally, even if neither side desires a nuclear conflict, because of the difficulties in discriminating between
Chinese conventional and nuclear assets, the United States might inadvertently attack nuclear weapons. Such attacks would likely be interpreted by China as
disarming strikes and put high pressure on China to respond.¶ Recommendations for China and the United States in the Nuclear Domain ¶ To maintain strategic
stability, China and the United States should reach a common understanding on strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. For example, the United States could
limit its missile defense—enough to counter North Korea’s unsophisticated missiles without threatening China’s more advanced strategic missiles. In return, China
could agree to refrain from expanding its nuclear arsenal. If the United States is sincere in its declaration that homeland missile defense is not directed at China, this
solution is in Washington’s interest. China
has maintained a small nuclear arsenal for several decades, and the only
reason it would have to increase its stockpile of weapons is to compensate for its nuclear deterrence
capability being undermined by improved U.S. missile defenses . So this solution is also in Beijing’s interest.
 2NC Indo-Pak Impact
Kolbin says that Chinese nuclear buildup triggers an Indian buildup and Indo-Pak arms
race---that goes nuclear
Tom Hundley 12, Senior Editor at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, journalist with nearly two
decades’ experience as a foreign correspondent covering more than 60 countries, master’s degree in
international relations from the University of Pennsylvania, “Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” Sep 5
2012, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-
cold-war

Yet, though the danger of a loose Pakistani nuke certainly deserves scrupulous attention, it may not be the severest nuclear threat emanating from South Asia, as I
came to realize after interviewing more than a dozen experts in Pakistan, India, and the United States this summer. Since the 9/11 attacks, preventing the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into the hands of the world's

most dangerous actors -- whether al Qaeda terrorists or Iranian mullahs -- has understandably been America's stated priority. Yet the gravest danger -- not only for the region, but for the United States itself -- may be the
South Asian incarnation of a Cold War phenomenon: a nuclear arms race.¶ Pakistan, with an estimated 90 to 120 warheads, is now believed to be churning out more plutonium than any other country on
the planet -- thanks to two Chinese-built reactors that are now online, a third that is undergoing trials, and a fourth that is scheduled to become operational by 2016. It has already passed India in total number of warheads and is
on course to overtake Britain as the world's No. 5 nuclear power. Pakistan could end up in third place, behind Russia and the United States, within a decade. ¶ This April, Pakistan tested a short-range ballistic missile, the Hatf IX, a
so-called "shoot and scoot" battlefield nuclear weapon aimed at deterring an invasion by India's conventional forces. This development carries two disturbing implications. First, Pakistan now has the know-how to build nuclear
warheads compact enough to fit on the tip of a small missile or inside a suitcase (handy for terrorists). Second, Pakistan has adopted a war-fighting doctrine that does not preclude nuking its own territory in the event of an Indian
incursion -- a dubious first in the annals of deterrence theory. ¶ India, meanwhile, has just tested its first long-range ballistic missile, the Agni-V, with a range of 3,100 miles. In April, the Indian Navy added a new Russian-made
nuclear-powered submarine to its fleet and is now building its own nuclear subs. One has already been launched and will enter service next year, and India is determined to add submarine-launched ballistic missiles to its arsenal.
This puts India on the verge of joining the elite nuclear "triad" club -- states with the ability to survive a first strike by an adversary and deliver a retaliatory strike by land, sea, or air. ¶ India has also said that it has successfully tested
an anti-ballistic missile shield that could be deployed "in a short time" to protect New Delhi and Mumbai. The downside of this defensive measure -- putting aside the question of effectiveness -- is that it invites an adversary to build
many more warheads in the hope that a few will be able to slip through the shield. ¶ India claims that it is not really engaged in an arms race -- or that, if it is, its opponent is not Pakistan, but China, a nuclear-armed superpower
and economic rival with which it shares a disputed border. The Agni-V was dubbed the "China-killer" in some overheated Indian headlines. China's nuclear ambitions are geared toward deterring the United States and Russia, but it
obligingly stirs the pot in South Asia by providing Pakistan with plutonium reactors -- in flagrant violation of its obligations as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. ¶ Meanwhile, through a 2008 deal negotiated by George W.
Bush's administration, the United States has given India access to nuclear fuel on the international market. In the past, India had been barred from such trade because the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not consider its
nuclear weapons program legitimate, and its limited supplies of domestic uranium forced it to choose between powering its reactors and building more nuclear weapons. "Power production was the priority; now they can have
both," explained Toby Dalton, deputy director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ¶ With both sides armed to the teeth, it is easy to exaggerate the fears and much harder to pinpoint
where the real dangers lie. For the United States, the nightmare scenario is that some of Pakistan's warheads or its fissile material falls into the hands of the Taliban or al Qaeda -- or, worse, that the whole country falls into the
hands of the Taliban. For example, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer now at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, has warned of the "lethal proximity between terrorists, extremists, and
nuclear weapons insiders" in Pakistan. This is a reality, but on the whole, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal appears to be reasonably secure against internal threats, according to those who know the country best. ¶ To outsiders, Pakistan
appears to be permanently teetering on the brink of collapse. The fact that large swaths of the country are literally beyond the control of the central government is not reassuring. But a weak state does not mean a weak society,
and powerful internal dynamics based largely on kinship and tribe make it highly unlikely that Pakistan would ever fall under the control of an outfit like the Taliban. During the country's intermittent bouts of democracy, its civilian
leaders have been consistently incompetent and corrupt, but even in the worst of times, the military has maintained a high standard of professionalism. And there is nothing that matters more to the Pakistani military than keeping
the nuclear arsenal -- its crown jewels -- out of the hands of India, the United States, and homegrown extremists. ¶ "Pakistan struggled to acquire these weapons against the wishes of the world. Our nuclear capability comes as a
result of great sacrifice. It is our most precious and powerful weapon -- for our defense, our security, and our political prestige," Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told me. "We keep them safe." ¶ Pakistan's
nuclear security is in the responsibility of the Strategic Plans Division, which appears to function pretty much as a separate branch of the military. It has its own training facility and an elaborate set of controls and screening
procedures to keep track of all warheads and fissile material and to monitor any blips in the behavior patterns of its personnel. The 15 or so sites where weapons are stored are the mostly heavily guarded in the country. Even if
some group managed to steal or commandeer a weapon, it is highly unlikely the group would be able to use it. The greater danger is the theft of fissile material, which could be used to make a crude bomb. "With 70 to 80 kilos of
highly enriched uranium, it would be fairly easy to make one in the basement of a building in the city of your choice," said Pervez Hoodbhoy, a distinguished nuclear physicist at Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University. At the moment,
Pakistan has a stockpile of about 2.75 tons -- or some 30 bombs' worth -- of highly enriched uranium. It does not tell Americans where it is stored. ¶ "All nuclear countries are conscious of the risks, nuclear weapons states especially
so," said Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, who speaks with the been-there-done-that authority of a man who has served as both chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and head of the ISI, its controversial spy agency. "Of course
there are concerns. Some are genuine, but much of what you read in the U.S. media is irrational and reflective of paranoia. Rising radicalism in Pakistan? Yes, this is true, and the military is very conscious of this." ¶ Perhaps the
most credible endorsement of Pakistan's nuclear security regime comes from its most steadfast enemy. The consensus among India's top generals and defense experts is that Pakistan's nukes are pretty secure. "No one can be 100
percent secure, but I think they are more than 99 percent secure," said Shashindra Tyagi, a former chief of staff of the Indian Air Force. "They keep a very close watch on personnel. All of the steps that could be taken have been
taken. This business of the Taliban taking over -- it can't be ruled out, but I think it's unlikely. The Pakistani military understands the threats they face better than anyone, and they are smart enough to take care it." ¶ Yogesh Joshi,
an analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, agrees: "Different states have different perceptions of risk. The U.S. has contingency plans [to secure Pakistan's nukes] because its nightmare scenario is that
Pakistan's weapons fall into terrorist hands. The view from India over the years is that Pakistan, probably more than any other nuclear weapons state, has taken measures to secure its weapons. At the political level here, there's a

The greater concern -- not only for India and Pakistan, but for the United States and
lot of confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure."¶

everyone else -- may be the direct competition between the two South Asian states . True, in terms of numbers and destructive capacity,
the arms buildup in South Asia does not come close to what was going on during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union built enough

bombs to destroy the planet many times over. India and Pakistan have enough to destroy it only once,
perhaps twice.¶ But in many ways, the arms race in South Asia is more dangerous . The United States and the Soviet Union were rival

superpowers jockeying for influence and advantage on the global stage, but these were also two countries that had never gone to war with each other, that had a vast physical

and psychological separation between them, that generally steered clear of direct provocations, and that eventually had
mechanisms in place (like the famous hotline between Moscow and Washington) to make sure little misunderstandings didn't grow into
monstrous miscalculations.¶ By contrast, the India-Pakistan rivalry comes with all the venom and
vindictiveness of a messy divorce, which, of course, it is. The two countries have officially fought three wars against each other since their breakup in
1947 and have had numerous skirmishes and close calls since then. They have a festering territorial dispute in Kashmir . The 1999 Kargil conflict, waged a year after
both countries went overtly nuclear, may have come closer to the nuclear brink than even the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. At the height of the showdown, there was credible intelligence that both sides were readying their nuclear
arsenals for deployment.¶ Pakistan lost all three of these wars. Its very large army is still only half the size of India's, whose military budget is more than seven times larger than Pakistan's. Pakistan's generals are well aware that in
any all-out conventional confrontation with India, they're toast. The guiding ideology of Pakistan's Army -- from the generals on down to their drivers -- is that India represents a permanent existential threat. This is why Pakistan

clings to its nukes and attempts to maintain at least the illusion of what its generals call "bilateral balance." ¶ This conventional asymmetry increases the danger of
the nuclear arms race -- it feeds India's hubris and Pakistan's sense of failure. Here are two countries headed in opposite directions. India's $1.7 trillion economy is eight times the size of Pakistan's and
has grown at an enviable 8.2 percent annually over the last three years, compared to just 3.3 percent for Pakistan. India is in the forefront of the digital revolution, and while the country's leaders were embarrassed by this
summer's massive two-day blackout, Pakistan's broken-down infrastructure struggles to provide citizens with more than a few hours of electricity each day. India, the world's largest democracy, is on the cusp of becoming a global
power; Pakistan, with its on-and-off military dictatorships (off at the moment), ranks 13th on Foreign Policy's most recent Failed States Index. ¶ More significant than these statistics is the mindset behind them. India is brimming
with confidence. Pakistan is hobbled by fear, paranoia, and a deep sense of inferiority. India's major cities, New Delhi and Mumbai, are modernizing global metropolises. Checking into the Marriott in Pakistan's capital is like
checking into a maximum-security prison -- high walls topped with razor wire, armed guards in watchtowers. Islamabad today looks and feels like a city under siege where there could be a coup at any moment. Soldiers and
checkpoints are everywhere. It felt this way the first time I visited, in 1985. ¶ This economic and cultural lopsidedness is strikingly reflected in the countries' nuclear competition. ¶ In perhaps no other major power is the military
quite so submissive to civilian authority as it is in India. "The civilian side lords it over the military in a manner that often borders on humiliation -- and there is no pushback from the military," said Ashley Tellis, an India expert with
the Carnegie Endowment. The reasons for this are rooted in India's long struggle for independence against a colonial master that filled the ranks of its police and army with natives. "The military was seen as a force that served a
colonial occupier," said Tellis. With the Indian officer corps' fondness for whiskey, mustaches, and other Briticisms, "the nationalist leadership looked at them as aliens" and took extreme measures to make sure there would be no
coups.¶ From a nuclear standpoint, the result of this dynamic is a command-and-control system that is firmly in the hands of the civilian political leadership, a clearly stated "no first use" policy, and a view that nukes are political
weapons -- a way to project global power and prestige -- not viable war-fighting tools. ¶ In theory, Pakistan's nuclear trigger is also in civilian hands. A body called the National Command Authority, headed by the prime minister, is

Pakistan has never formally stated its nuclear doctrine,

supposed to be the ultimate decider of whether to initiate a nuclear attack. In reality, however, it is the military that controls the process from top to bottom.

preferring to keep the Indians guessing as to when and where it might use nukes. But now it appears to be contemplating the idea of actually using tactical

nuclear weapons in a confrontation with India.¶ The problem with this delicate state of affairs is not simply the two countries' history of war, but Pakistan's tactic of hiding behind its
nuclear shield while allowing terrorist groups to launch proxy attacks against India. The 2001 attack on India's Parliament building and the 2008 Mumbai attack are the most egregious examples. Both were carried out by Lashkar-e-
Taiba militants based in Pakistan with well-established links to the ISI and were far more provocative than anything the Americans or Russians dished out to each other during the four decades of the Cold War. (More than 160
people were killed in the attack that held India's largest city hostage for 60 hours.) Terrorism is the classic underdog tactic, but Pakistan is certainly the world's first nuclear-armed underdog to successfully apply the tactic against a
nuclear rival. ¶ India has been struggling to respond. "For 15 years this country is bleeding from attack after attack, and there is nothing we can do," said Raja Mohan of the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi think tank.
"The attacks correlate directly to Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons. From the moment they got nukes, they saw it as an opportunity they could exploit. And India has no instruments to punish Pakistan or change its
behavior."¶ There are encouraging signs that Pakistan may be rethinking this tactic, realizing that over the long run the Taliban and others of its ilk pose a far greater danger to Pakistan than to India. The relentless succession of
suicide bombings and attacks on police and military bases and a costly war to wrest control of the Swat Valley from the Taliban seem to have finally convinced Pakistan's military that, in the words of one general, "the threat today
is internal, and if it is not pushed back and neutralized, it will continue to expand its influence and we will have an Afghanistan situation inside our own country." But even if the ISI is sincere about ending its relationship with jihadi
proxies, India's military planners are still searching for an appropriate weapon with which to punish Pakistan in the event of "another Mumbai." ¶ The problem for India is that even though it holds a huge advantage in conventional
forces, its mobilization process is ponderously slow. This shortcoming was humiliatingly exposed after the 2001 attack on the Parliament building, when it took the Indian Army about three weeks to deploy for a retaliatory strike --
enough time for the United States to step in and cool tempers on both sides. A potential nuclear crisis had been averted, but in 2004, India, still smarting from its inability to retaliate, announced a new war-fighting doctrine dubbed
"Cold Start," which called for the capability to conduct a series of cross-border lightning strikes within 72 hours. The idea was not to hold territory or threaten the existence of the Pakistani state, but to use overwhelming firepower
to deliver a punishing blow that would fall short of provoking a nuclear response. ¶ Pakistan's reaction -- or overreaction -- was to double down on developing its short-range battlefield nuclear weapon, the Hatf IX. Any incursion
from India would be met with a nuclear response even if it meant Pakistan had to nuke its own territory. "What one fears is that with the testing of these short-range nuclear missiles -- five in the last couple of months -- this seems
to indicate a seriousness about using theater nuclear weapons," said Hoodbhoy, the physicist. ¶ While strategists on both sides debate whether the Hatf IX, with a range of 60 kilometers and a mobile multibarrel launch system,
would be enough to stop an advancing column of Indian tanks -- Hoodbhoy argues that "smaller, sub-kiloton-size weapons are not really effective militarily" -- they do agree that it would take more than one missile to do the job,
instantly escalating the crisis beyond anyone's control. ¶ The last nuclear weapon state to seriously consider the use of battlefield nuclear weapons was the United States during the first decades of the Cold War, when NATO was
faced with the overwhelming superiority of Soviet conventional forces. But by the early 1970s, U.S. strategists no longer believed these weapons had any military utility, and by 1991 most had been withdrawn from European
territory. ¶ Pakistan, however, seems to have embraced this discarded strategy and is now, in effect, challenging India to a game of nuclear chicken -- which seems to have made India tread carefully. Tellingly, in 2008, when Lashkar
terrorists attacked Mumbai, Cold Start was not implemented. These days, Indian officials seem to be backing away from the idea. "There is no Cold Start doctrine. No such thing. It was an off-the-cuff remark from a former chief of
staff. I have been defense minister of the country. I should know," veteran Indian politician Jaswant Singh assured me. In a WikiLeaked classified document dated Feb. 16, 2010, Tim Roemer, then U.S. ambassador to India,
described Cold Start as "a mixture of myth and reality" that, if implemented, "would likely encounter very mixed results." ¶ Pakistani military planners, however, continue to be obsessed with the idea of Cold Start. It comes up in
every conversation about security, and it is the driving force behind the country's program to develop tactical battlefield nukes. For now, the focus is on missile delivery systems, but according to Maria Sultan, director of the South
Asian Strategic Stability Institute, an Islamabad think tank, there is growing interest in using nukes in other ways -- such as to create an electromagnetic pulse that would fry the enemy's electronics. "In short, we will look for full-
spectrum response options," she said.¶ The arms race could make a loose nuke more likely. After all, Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear arsenal is safe and secure rest heavily on the argument that its warheads and their delivery
systems have been uncoupled and stored separately in heavily guarded facilities. It would be very difficult for a group of mutinous officers to assemble the necessary protocols for a launch and well nigh impossible for a band of
terrorists to do so. But that calculus changes with the deployment of mobile battlefield weapons. The weapons themselves, no longer stored in heavily guarded bunkers, would be far more exposed. ¶ Nevertheless,

military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalc ulation,
miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with
the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if
they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against
Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." ¶ Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to

understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only
move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and

events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people
could die almost immediately. ¶ What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers

University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be
upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence
could starve.

It also causes Pakistani collapse---causes lashout and nuclear escalation

Pervez Hoodbhoy 12, Professor of Physics and Mathematics at Forman Christian College University in
Lahore, PhD in Nuclear Physics from MIT, member of the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Terrorism of
the World Federation of Scientists, and Zia Mian, director of Princeton’s Project on Peace and Security in
South Asia, at the Program on Science and Global Security, Co-Editor of Science & Global Security, Ph.D.
in physics from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, “Speculations on the Future of Nuclear South
Asia,” in Confronting the Bomb, http://eacpe.org/content/uploads/2014/01/8.-Future-of-Nuclear-South-
Asia-pdf.pdf

It is as likely, however, that the Pakistan army’s narrow interests will keep it committed to the struggle against
India, regardless of cost and consequence. In a replay of the U.S.–Soviet race, Pakistan could break its back
trying to keep up with India. The South Asian region would fester as the two countries wrestle for advantage in every forum. Left unchecked, it
would result in the economic, political and social collapse of Pakistan, which would unleash chaos. Under
such circumstances, it is possible to imagine that the jihadis may capture a nuclear weapon . A fearful India and United States
would intervene, raising concerns in China. The prospect of great power conflict would loom.¶ The nightmare
scenario is that Pakistan’s generals, faced with collapse, decide to threaten nuclear war. As the Cuban Missile
Crisis showed fifty years ago, in the midst of crisis, there is fear, miscalculation, errors of judgment, flaws in

command and control, and simple bad luck, and any of them could trigger a nuclear war. The subcontinent’s
cities would become radioactive ruins. Tens of millions would die. The pall of smoke would darken the world and become a global calamity.
Loose Nukes
 No Collapse
Economic growth solves
Chung-in Moon 15, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, “Kim Jong-un secure as North
Korean economy picks up,” 1/27/15, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/01/27/kim-jong-un-secure-
as-north-korean-economy-picks-up/

The longevity of Kim Jong-un’s regime in North Korea has been subject to widespread speculation by
outside observers. Several factors led some to predict an early downfall for the regime: young and immature
leadership, a potential factional struggle, a stagnant economy and a hostile external environment. But this prediction has not yet
been realised. The Kim Jong-un regime is alive and well. It has been surviving, if not thriving, with stable
political leadership and a gradual economic recovery.

The purge and execution of Kim Jong-un’s uncle, Jang Sung-thaek, then the second in charge, sent shockwaves through the
world in 2013. Some pundits saw it as a prelude to a new power struggle that would foster the coming collapse of Kim’s
regime. But since then, the opposite seems to have occurred. Kim Jong-un is in firm control of the Workers’ Party
of Korea (WPK), the military, and the state . With Jang’s removal, he is not only reigning, but also ruling the daily operation
of the North Korean system. Consolidation of power through new personal and institutional arrangements has further strengthened
his grip over national governance.

Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il, ruled the country rather arbitrarily with his own personal charisma, emphasising Songun (military-first
politics) ideology — while downplaying the party-centred governance system. In contrast, Kim Jong-un has completely restored the primacy of
the WPK over the military and the state. This move has been evidenced by the take-over of the military by civilian party officials: first by Choe
Ryong-hae and later by Hwang Pyong-so, appointed as head of the General Political Bureau of People’s Army that oversees the entire military.
Kim has also created a troika system composed of his loyalists that assists his rule. The troika includes party secretary Choe Ryong-hae, Vice
Marshal Hwang Pyong-so, and Prime Minister Pak Pong-ju. Choe manages the WPK, Hwang is in charge of the military and Pak runs the cabinet.
North Korea under Kim Jong-un’s leadership is likely to be stable for the time being, because, at least so far, there
are no opposition blocs. Political rivals or popular dissenting groups have not yet emerged.

The North Korean economy has also performed better since Kim Jong-un’s inauguration. According to the Bank of
Korea (the central bank of South Korea), North Korea’s growth rate recorded 0.8 per cent in 2011, 1.3 per cent in 2012, and 1.1 per cent in
2013. Given its chronic negative growth rates before 2011, such
records are quite impressive. And outsiders who travelled to
North Korea have commonly acknowledged that the overall living conditions of its people, including food and other consumer
goods, have significantly improved. This can be attributed partly to an increase in exports of coal, minerals, and
fishery products to China; growth in foreign earnings through manpower exports to China, Russia, and the Middle East; and a
relatively good harvest over the past three years .

Equally crucial are economic reform measures. On 28 June 2012, Pyongyang introduced an incentive driven new economic
management system known as the ‘June 28 measure’. The measure stipulates that those who produce more are entitled to have more. For
example, a collective farm is now subdivided into several farm households each of which is composed of three or four families. Those farm
households retain about 30 per cent of the crops they harvest, while 70 per cent goes to the government. The produce that is retained by farm
households can now be traded in 380 farmers’ markets throughout the country. This represents a substantial change. (In the past,
the government took the entire harvest and rationed portions to farmers through a public distribution system). A similar incentive
system is now being applied to state firms. In this way, a more competitive market system is slowly being
adopted.

Kim also instructed the cabinet to exercise unified leadership in economic management , and, at the same time,
banned intervention by the party and the military — which was a major source of policy discord and confusion. In addition, the North Korean
government has designated 19 special economic development zones in addition to five state-level special economic
zones (such as Rajin-Sonbong and Kaesung). Such institutional reforms have played a positive role in boosting the
nation’s otherwise stagnant economy.

Reforms solve---they’re incrementally improving the economy

Andrei Lankov 12/16, Associate Professor, Social Science Department, Kookmin University, “Slow
progress for North Korea’s cautious reforms,” 12/16/15,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/12/16/slow-progress-for-north-koreas-cautious-reforms/
What does the future hold for North Korea? Sometime ago, I had the relatively rare opportunity to have a free chat with a North Korean
merchant. A woman in her forties, the wife of a mid-ranking official, is running an import business dealing in consumption goods. But, unlike the
majority of people with the same background, she also has a keen interest in elite politics. When talking about the most desirable future for her
country, she said: ‘we do not need reform and opening up like China, all we need is reform’.¶ It seems that the Supreme
Leader, Marshall Kim Jong-un, shares this idea. Since 2012 North Korea has undergone cautious and slow reforms,
without opening the country. The North Korean government is slowly changing how it manages the economy ,
shifting control away from the state to the market, but it is still maintaining (and, indeed, strengthening) its political control.¶
These trends began soon after the ascension of Kim Jong-un. 2015 has not been marked by any significant change in this regard. ¶ The
agricultural reforms initiated by the so-called ‘June 28th Instructions’ of 2012 have continued to yield very positive
results. This is in spite of all the uncertainty and lack of uniformity surrounding these reforms as well as a severe drought.
While the reforms vary from place to place, all the reform models have one thing in common: farmers no longer work for fixed
rations but for a certain share of the harvest. This share is often said to be 30 per cent. The first estimates of
agricultural output are quite optimistic — the harvest is likely to be only slightly lower than the record-breaking
2014 harvest.¶ News from industry is less encouraging. In 2014, the North Korean government passed a decision, the so-called ‘ May 30th
Measures’, about the universal switch to an independent accounting system. In practice, this meant that North Korea’s state-owned industrial
enterprises were given the right to choose suppliers for their inputs, sell their produce at market prices, hire and fire personnel at will and pay
employees what they considered to be a realistic wage. But, for reasons unknown, the reforms were cancelled in early 2015. Despite this,
some factories are still allowed to work according to the new model . The vast majority of these
enterprises make money from exports to China and are quite profitable.¶ On the political front, economic changes
have not been accompanied by liberalisation. This is understandable since it would be politically risky for the regime to be too permissive. Being
a divided country with a far richer southern neighbour, the government would struggle to survive with similar levels of openness found in China
today — Kim Jong-un seems to understand this situation well.¶ So, the year 2015 has been marked by further attempts to reverse the
spontaneous political changes that have occurred in the last 20 years. Most policies have sought to counteract the government’s biggest worry:
the continued flow of information from overseas into North Korea.¶ There has been a further increase in Sino–North Korean border security.
Border crossings are now remarkably risky, unless one is willing to pay an increasingly steep bribe to guards. ¶ There have also been campaigns
against Chinese mobile phones that allow a small number of North Koreans — largely traders, smugglers and border-crossing brokers — to
communicate with China and the outside world almost freely. Now, such mobile phones are considered to be spying equipment. People found
in possession of them face the threat of five to seven years’ imprisonment. Attempts have also been made to crack down on the spread of
foreign videos, with renewed inspections of homes.¶ At the same time, the world media was busy reporting the untimely deaths of top officials.
The most notable was the death of defence minister Hyon Yong-chol in early May (allegedly by an anti-aircraft gun). Then in late September,
Choe Ryong-hae, who until early 2015 was seen as North Korea’s second-in-command, disappeared. He has reportedly been sent to work at a
farm as punishment for mismanagement. While reports remain unconfirmed, there is little doubt that Kim Jong-un continues to purge the elite
and those that were once close to him are especially vulnerable. ¶ These high-levelpurges have attracted much attention, but
there does not seem to have been any corresponding increase in repression targeting the average
person. So far Kim Jong-un’s wrath has been reserved for army generals and party dignitaries, not the common folk — most of whom
probably do not feel much affinity for the elite. In this sense, oft-repeated reports of Kim Jong-un’s ‘reign by terror’ are
exaggerations.¶ The year 2015 has been another year of stuttering reform without openness. Though, on balance, this seems
to have been rather good news for the average North Korean.

Kim is succeeding in eliminating opponents and solidifying his control

Dr. Alexandre Y. Mansourov 14, Adjunct Professor of Korean Studies, U.S.-Korea Institute, School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, “Washington DC Forum: A Score Card: The
First Three Years of Kim Jong Un’s Rule,” Dec 17 2014, https://www.upf.org/peace-and-
security/washington-dc-forum/6250-washington-dc-forum-a-score-card-the-first-three-years-of-kim-
jong-un-s-rule

Let me start by giving you my bottom line up front. The regime is stable, the system is resilient , and,
believe it or not, the North Korean economy is better today than it was three years ago. The North Korean people have a better life

today than they did three years ago when Kim Jong Il died .¶ There is no question in my mind that we have to deal with

one-man rule in North Korea, it is the rule of Kim Jong Un. He is the decider, the modernizer, the commander-in-chief, and the architect-in-
chief. He is the person who makes the decisions in North Korea. There is no second-in-command. Anyone who tried to assert him- or herself as a

second-in-command was cut down in size and eliminated time and again. I regard all senior officials
around Kim Jong Un as basically the pawns of the supreme leader .¶ There is no collective leadership in North Korea, and no matter what
other people may tell you, the people around him can only give him advice. Hence, we have the system of collective advice, but not collective leadership.¶ Kim Jong Un was

able to solidify and consolidate the “unified guidance system” where all reports are directed to him. He
maintains control over the country through the key institutions — the party, the military and the security
services. Over the past three years, we observed a visible shift from the "Military-First" (Songun) policy, as practiced by his father Kim Jong Il, to the so-called Pyongjin Line, i.e., the
strategic course on parallel construction of the economy and nuclear weapons.¶ We still have to deal with essentially the family-based regime and take into account the first family politics. We
saw how ruthless Kim Jong Un could be. He eliminated people perceived as mounting a political challenge to him, those who sought to muscle away the power he had inherited from his father.
Jang Song Thaek, his powerful uncle who was married to the only daughter of Kim Il Sung, and was in the shadow of Kim Jong Il for almost 40 years. He did everything to amass his power,
including setting up his own private cabinet, his own party within the party, his own security force, and his own reporting line (guidance system) that was meant to enable him to run the
country on his own. But, Jang failed to consolidate his power, and, in the end, Kim Jong Un took him out.¶ Let me make my position clear. Most people say, “What a horrible human being Kim
Jong Un is! He took out his own uncle. How could he do that?!” In my opinion, Jang’s purge was an act of courage on Kim’s part. Why? Because Jang Song Thaek was a horrible man. His hands
were drenched in blood. He was in charge of the North Korean gulag. As the director of the Administrative Department of the WPK Central Committee, he supervised the Ministry of State
Security, the Ministry of People’s Security, and other principal organizations within the North Korean repressive apparatus. He was the person who signed all execution orders and all the
torture orders. He was the North Korean analogue of Stalin’s henchman, Lavrenti Beria, who was chief of the secret police apparatus and administered the Soviet Gulag. Everybody in North
Korea knew Jang Song Thaek was a frightening human being. With his removal, North Korean citizens no longer have to live in the fear of arbitrary executions and prosecutions.¶ In the past

Kim Jong Un step-by-step dismantled the guardianship system created by Kim Jong Il to ease his
three years,

son’s way to power: he removed Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho, Jang Song Thaek, and others. He has solidified his position as the supreme
leader by surrounding himself with the people he trusts, including party secretary Choe Ryong-hae and his younger sister Kim Yo Jong, who
was recently appointed as vice director of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee’s Propaganda and Agitation Department.
 No Uighur Terror
ETIM/Uighurs cant carry out attacks—no leadership or capacity
Arabinda Archarya 13 and Lynne Chua, East Asia Country Assessment: China,
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTTA-January13.pdf

While the discontent and perceived marginalization of the Uighur leading to acts of violence in Xinjiang could not be disputed, the
capability of organized entities such as the ETIM/TIP is rather limited in China as they have minimum
influence and access to the mainland. With ETIM‘s top leadership almost completely decimated, the
group‘s ability to carry out attacks has come under severe stress. The ETIM‘s founder, Hasan Mahsum, was
killed in 2003 by the Pakistan military. His successor, Abdul Haq was killed in February 2010 by a United States (US) drone
strike in Afghanistan. It is estimated that the ETIM has less than one hundred members . It also operates mainly
outside of China– mainly in Pakistan. Groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and even Al Qaeda support the cause of ETIM. But
these groups have priorities and problems of their own apart from the Xinjiang issue.
Nuclear Safety
 Disease A/O
Intervening actors solve
Zakaria 9—Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and
Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, “The Capitalist Manifesto: Greed Is Good,” 13 June 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/201935)

Note—Laurie Garrett=science and health writer, winner of the Pulitzer, Polk, and Peabody Prize

It certainly looks like another example of crying wolf. After bracing ourselves for a global pandemic, we've suffered something more
like the usual seasonal influenza. Three weeks ago the World Health Organization declared a health emergency, warning countries to "prepare for a pandemic"
and said that the only question was the extent of worldwide damage. Senior officials prophesied that millions could be infected by the

disease. But as of last week, the WHO had confirmed only 4,800 cases of swine flu, with 61 people having died of it. Obviously, these

low numbers are a pleasant surprise, but it does make one wonder, what did we get wrong? Why did the predictions of a pandemic turn out to

be so exaggerated? Some people blame an overheated media, but it would have been difficult to ignore major international health organizations and governments when
they were warning of catastrophe. I think there is a broader mistake in the way we look at the world. Once we see a problem, we can describe it

in great detail, extrapolating all its possible consequences. But we can rarely anticipate the human response to that crisis. Take

swine flu. The virus had crucial characteristics that led researchers to worry that it could spread far
and fast. They described—and the media reported—what would happen if it went unchecked. But it did not go unchecked. In fact, swine flu
was met by an extremely vigorous response at its epicenter, Mexico. The Mexican government
reacted quickly and massively, quarantining the infected population, testing others, providing medication to those who needed it. The noted expert
on this subject, Laurie Garrett, says, "We should all stand up and scream, 'Gracias, Mexico!' because the Mexican people and the Mexican
government have sacrificed on a level that I'm not sure as Americans we would be prepared to do in the exact same circumstances. They shut down their schools. They shut down

businesses, restaurants, churches, sporting events.They basically paralyzed their own economy. They've suffered billions of dollars in financial losses still being tallied up, and thereby
really brought transmission to a halt." Every time one of these viruses is detected , writers and officials
bring up the Spanish influenza epidemic of 1918 in which millions of people died. Indeed, during the last pandemic scare, in 2005, President George W.
Bush claimed that he had been reading a history of the Spanish flu to help him understand how to respond. But the world we live in today looks

nothing like 1918. Public health-care systems are far better and more widespread than anything that existed during the First World War.
Even Mexico, a developing country, has a first-rate public-health system —far better than anything Britain or France had in the
early 20th century.

No disease extinction---empirics and isolated populations

Nick Beckstead 14, Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute, citing Peter Doherty,
recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize for Medicine, PhD in Immunology from the University of Edinburgh,
Michael F. Tamer Chair of Biomedical Research at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital, “How much
could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?” in Futures, published online 18 Nov 2014,
Science Direct

While there is little published work on human extinction risk

That leaves pandemics and cobalt bombs, which will get a longer discussion.

from pandemics, it seems that it would be extremely challenging for any pandemic—whether natural or
manmade—to leave the people in a specially constructed refuge as the sole survivors. In his introductory book on pandemics

(Doherty, 2013, p. 197) argues:¶ “No pandemic is likely to wipe out the human species. Even without the

protection provided by modern science, we survived smallpox, TB, and the plagues of recorded history.
Way back when human numbers were very small, infections may have been responsible for some of the

genetic bottlenecks inferred from evolutionary analysis, but there is no formal proof of this.Ӧ Though some authors have
vividly described worst-case scenarios for engineered pandemics (e.g. Rees, 2003 and Posner, 2004; and Myhrvold, 2013), it would take a
special effort to infect people in highly isolated locations, especially the 100+ “largely uncontacted”
peoples who prefer to be left alone. This is not to say it would be impossible. A madman intent on annihilating all human life could use cropduster-style delivery
systems, flying over isolated peoples and infecting them. Or perhaps a pandemic could be engineered to be delivered through animal or environmental vectors that would reach all of these
people.
 Rice A/C
Climate change makes collapse inevitable
Parameswaran Ponnudurai 13, Vice President of Programming at Radio Free Asia, “Climate Change
Conjures Up 'Alarming' Scenarios in Southeast Asia,” 7/2/13,
http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/east-asia-beat/climate-change-07022013165938.html

Imagine these scenarios: The rice bowl of Vietnam cracking. Popular diving spots in the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Indonesia lying idle with no tourists. Nearly half of Bangkok inundated with water.¶ Well, they could become a reality in 20 to 30
years—no thanks to the adverse effects of climate change in Southeast Asia exacerbated by forest fires
particularly in Indonesia which recently blanketed the region with deadly smoky haze. ¶ Scientists warn in a new World Bank report of
major impacts on the region if the temperature rises by up to 2 degrees Celsius—warming which they say may be reached
in two to three decades—fueled by the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. ¶ The warming climate will push up the sea
level in the region and cause an increase in heat extremes, a higher intensity of tropical cyclones, and ocean
acidification stemming from excess carbon dioxide in the air, according to the latest edition of the bank's "Turn Down the Heat" report.¶
The scientific report predicts a drop in agricultural production and widespread food shortages, rapidly
diminishing fish catch, increasing water- and vector-borne diseases, and diarrheal illnesses, impacting mostly the urban poor, who constitute
large proportions of city populations in the region.¶ The climate change effects will also dampen the region's tourism industry, a top money-
spinner, as coral reefs in pristine waters that lure divers and help fish breed are rapidly destroyed. ¶ 'Alarming scenario'¶ The World Bank issued
its first "Turn Down the Heat" report last year, likening it to a wake-up call to climate change. It concluded that the world would warm by 4
degrees Celsius by the end of this century if no concerted action is taken. ¶ In the new report, scientists say that if the temperature rises by just
2 degrees Celsius, warming may be reached in 20 to 30 years. ¶ It gives a more detailed look at how the
ongoing negative impacts of
climate change could create devastating conditions especially for those vulnerable , predicting what the bank's
chief Jim Yong Kim calls an "alarming scenario for the days and years ahead." ¶ "The displacement of impacted rural and coastal communities
resulting from the loss of livelihood into urban areas could lead to ever higher numbers of people in informal settlements being exposed to
multiple climate impacts, including heat waves, flooding, and disease," the report said. ¶ "Basically, you'll have a range of impacts on countries
but the incidence on that will fall disproportionately on poor people, because fisheries and agriculture [are the key areas to
be affected]," John Roome, the bank's director for sustainable development in the East Asia Pacific Region, told RFA.¶ He said that while
there is greater awareness by governments to combat climate change, efforts needed to be accelerated by putting in place early warning,
monitoring and evaluation systems, and allocating special budgets to mitigate the crisis. ¶ "The alarming part is that a 4-degree world [where the
temperatures are 4 degrees warmer] is not going to be a very pleasant place to live in for all the reasons that are set out in the report but there
are things that can be done if countries act soon to stem the temperature rise so that [the rise] doesn’t reach 4 degrees," Roome said. ¶ Mekong
Delta crop production drop ¶ The new report, based on analysis using advanced computer simulations to paint the clearest picture of
vulnerabilities, says that as early as 2040, Southeast
Asia's major rice-growing region—the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam—
will see crop production drop by about 12 percent due to an estimated sea-level rise of 30 cm (nearly 1 foot).¶ The Mekong
Delta, popularly known as the “rice bowl” of Vietnam and home to some 17 million people, makes up half of Vietnam’s total agricultural
production and contributes significantly to the country’s rice exports.¶ "Any
shortfall in rice production in this area because
of climate change would not only affect the economy and food security of Vietnam but would also have repercussions for
the international rice market," the report said.
1NR
Nuclear Safety
 HR Cred Defense
HR cred doesn’t solve war
Moravcsik 2 (Andrew, Professor of Government – Harvard University, Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent
Engagement, Ed. Patrick and Forman, p. 365)

There is little evidence that Rwandan, Serbian, or Iraqi leaders would have been more
humane if the United States had submitted to more multilateral human rights commitments. The
human rights movement has firmly embedded itself in public opinion and NGO networks, in the United
States as well as elsewhere, despite the dubious legal status of international norms in the United States. In sum, the
consequences of U.S. nonadherence to global norms, while signaling a weakening in theory,
is probably of little import in practice.

Nations won’t enforce human rights even with foreign support

Goodman 4 and Jinks, 2004 [Ryan and Derek, Assistant Professor of Foreign, International, and
Comparative Law, Harvard Law School and Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law, Duke Law
Journal, December, 54 Duke L.J. 621, Lexis]

Before we proceed with our analysis, it is important to note the special characteristics of human rights regimes that bracket our
discussion and that make the investigation of socialization processes especially productive in this arena. Most international
regimes seek to facilitate cooperation or coordination among states. 11 The global promotion of human rights, however, is
importantly different from both types of regimes. 12 For several reasons, the prevalence of human rights violations is not
reducible to a simple collective action problem. First, states have substantial capacity to promote and protect human rights
within their territory without coordinating their efforts with  [*629]  other states. Without question, states retain some
substantial measure of effective autonomy in this area. Second, many
states have little clear interest in
promoting and protecting human rights abroad. Although "bad actors" impose externalities on other states in
extreme cases (for example, when poor human rights conditions trigger massive refugee flows), these externalities arise only
sporadically and typically affect only a few (bordering) states. Third, many states have no interest in promoting and protecting
human rights domestically. Some states
are simply willing to violate human rights when it is
convenient to do so, and they have no interest in accepting structural commitments that may
alter their current decision processes. Indeed, one of the central regime design problems in human rights law is how best to
influence "bad actors" to make fundamental changes. The question whether international law can promote human rights norms
may be recast, in an important sense, as how human rights regimes can best harness the mechanisms of social influence. The
task of designing effective human rights regimes is further complicated by several structural characteristics of international
society that undercut the potential effectiveness of some strategies. Consider two. First, international
human rights
norms are not self-enforcing. 13 This point issues from the fact that human rights regimes do
not address coordination problems and that states have no clear, direct interest in securing
human rights protection in other states. Second, good faith participants in such regimes are
generally unwilling or unable to shoulder the enforcement costs necessary to coerce
recalcitrant states to comply with human rights norms. This "enforcement deficit" -
exacerbated by high enforcement costs and negligible direct returns - is a political reality of
the current international order.
Deterrence
 2NC vs. MSU Joint Command
OPCON transfer causes North Korea to perceive a short-term opportunity to strike---
the aff argument that transfer bolsters ROK independence is the reason the North
would provoke them
Daniel S. Hurlbut 13, Colonel, U.S. Army; U.S. Army War College Fellow, April 2013, “The Role of the
U.S. Army in Air Sea Battle,” www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA592966

Complicating matters further on the Korean peninsula is the transfer of operational command in 2015
to South Korea. In accordance with the joint agreement, the South Koreans will assume operational
command of all South Korean military forces in both peace and wartime in 2015. The transfer of
command is an indication of increased South Korean military operational capability.

The transfer of command may also be viewed by the North Koreans as an opportunity to act
provocatively. They may view it as a lessening of capability (e.g. the US is moved to a more enabling
role) and North Korea may decide to act aggressively to test South Korean capability, demonstrate
their own power, or to negate the powerful psychological effects an independent South Korean military
will have on the minds of Koreans north of the demilitarized zone.5

Framing issue---the plan transfers OPCON suddenly and unilaterally, and does it over South Korean
protests---those factors swamp their defense and mean none of it applies

Leslie Forgach 10, research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute, 3/5/10, “US-ROK OPCON
Transfer Should Wait,” http://www.defensestudies.org/cds/us-rok-opcon-transfer-should-wait/

So uth Ko rea has sounded the alarm again over the plan to disband the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces
Command and transfer of wartime op erational con trol of ROK forces to South Korea by 2012. Defense Minister Kim Tae-
young came out for the second time last week and said: “I hope that the U.S.-led defense scheme will remain further, given the North Korean
nuclear and missile threat.” While he was careful to appeal to the core U.S. security concerns on the peninsula (nuclear and missile threats),
what should really make both countries think twice about a premature transfer is the mounting instability
within No rth Ko rea and the asymmetric land-based threat the country poses .

The timing of the transfer couldn’t be worse, as North Korea ramps up for 2012, the year that marks the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung (the
country’s founding father and “Great Leader”), as well as the year Pyongyang projected it would become a “strong and powerful nation” — a
projection the regime could seek to manifest in shows of force. Growing domestic instability, as seen in unprecedented public protests and a
hike in hunger-related deaths, along with a looming succession crisis, will also make the next three years a particularly
bad time to experiment with a hasty reconfiguration of South Korea’s command and control ,
potentially putting allied contingency operations at stake. Three years is also not enough time for the
South Koreans to fill the existing gaps in their defense capabilities (in terms of missile defense,
command and control systems, critical logistical capabilities , etc.), especially with a shrinking defense budget.

The United States’ initial rationale for the transfer is also increasingly being called into question (see here and here). And the decision to
go ahead with the transfer despite South Korea’s protests , and despite the increasing instability across
the DMZ, only further reveals that our view of the North Korean threat is dangerously myopic. We tend to
solely focus on the nuclear threat and not the asymmetric challenges that the country presents, such as
Pyongyang’s long range artillery deployed along the DMZ or their surprisingly formidable special operations
forces — the largest in the world, at (reportedly) one million strong. The damage North Korea could do on the ground is unimaginable, as

they like to remind us. The maintenance of a unified command — one time-tested over 30-plus years — is an assurance
that the allies will be ready on the ground if conflict arises.

In the long run, OPCON transition may indeed prove to be a step worth taking — while maintaining close
coordination between U.S. and ROK forces, of course. There’s no doubt, for instance, that having ROK forces at the helm during
any sort of military confrontation would further legitimize the South Korean government’s post-conflict role on the peninsula. But

transition now only makes sense if So uth Ko rea is ready, which their senior leaders are plainly
telling us is not the case .

Maintaining U.S. OPCON’s vital to deter nuclear conflict with the North---the U.S. is distracted by
other crises which makes reinforcing deterrence through other means after the plan ineffective---
means the link beats their defense

Victor Cha 14, senior adviser and Korea Chair at CSIS and professor of government and director for Asian
Studies at Georgetown University, 2014, “Keeping Focus on Korea,” in 2015 Global Forecast, eds. Cohen
& Gable, http://csis.org/files/publication/141110_Cohen_GlobalForecast2015_Web.pdf

It is hard to tell what the bigger concern on the Korean peninsula will be over the next year: more nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile tests by the North, or potential political discontinuities inside the Pyongyang
regime . Neither is a good outcome.

The first scenario would highlight the fact that over 20 years after the first nuclear agreement with North Korea in October 1994 (the Agreed
Framework), and 10 years after the second nuclear agreement in September 2005 (the Six-Party Joint Statement), the problem has become
exponentially worse in 2015. North
Korea, under Kim Jong-un’s byongjin strategy appears to be aiming to develop the full
spectrum of nuclear capabilities, from plutonium and uranium-based weapons to potential battlefield use. The Obama
administration might try to make one last push for a denuclearization deal like the September 2005 agreement, but success would be highly
unlikely.

The second scenario is no better. The machinations of North

Korean leadership dynamics raise concerns about regime
stability. It is not clear if the young leader is calling the shots or if there are power struggles among elites
in the party and military over a shrinking pie . Even if internal power struggles are not the problem, Kim’s health may be.
Westerners who have met the young leader in person at diplomatic functions in Pyongyang have observed that he is grossly obese, much more
so than official pictures depict; that he is a chain smoker; that he drinks heavily; and that his face looks unusually unhealthy for a 29- or 30-year-
old. There is a history of heart disease in the family (Kim’s father and grandfather both died of massive heart attacks), as well as purported
kidney and liver problems. The chances that he can rule for decades like his predecessors are slim.

The challenge for the United States will be how to maintain focus on this problem when the White House
will be preoccupied with Ebola in West Africa, Russia and Ukraine, and the war against ISIS. A crisis with the North
(in the form of a fourth nuclear test or provocations against South Korea) will certainly grab attention, but the reaction will be to seek a
temporary solution that provides compensation to Pyongyang in return for de-escalation—a familiar outcome that has contributed directly to
the growth of the North’s nuclear program over the past 25 years. On the other hand, if the North does not invoke a crisis it will mean little
attention from Washington, allowing the North’s nuclear program to develop unimpeded.

The best antidote to this catch-22 is to continue robust defense cooperation with South Korea . This
means enhancing missile defense, including the introduction of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to the peninsula;
delay of the transfer of wartime operational control ( OPCON ) from the United States to South Korea; and a rigorous
regimen of military exercises to reinforce deterrence. Washington and Seoul might consider improved
defense cooperation in areas like drone technology, which could be useful against North Korea. Regional security also requires better
defense cooperation and information sharing between South Korea and Japan. As reluctant as the South Koreans may be to work with their
neighbor, enhanced U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral alliance cooperation is the best answer to North Korea’s threats and possible regime instability.
 AT: Transfer Turns Deterrence
The best, most comprehensive read of Kim Jong-Un concludes deterrence is working
now and risk of escalation is limited---also predictive
Ken E. Gause 15, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies Program of the Center for Strategic
Studies, CNA Corporation, August 2015, “North Korea’s Provocation and Escalation Calculus: Dealing
with the Kim Jong-un Regime,” https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2015-U-011060.pdf

Any discussion of deterrence should be tied to considerations of escalation. In the case of North Korea,
these discussions should also be tied to the Supreme Leader’s drivers and boundaries . Carrying out random
strategic messaging without understanding how those messages will resonate with Kim Jong-un is only a selfsatisfying act of wishful thinking. In
the end, North Korea’s calculus is tied largely to the personality and predilections of an individual. It is his fears and aspirations that need to be
manipulated to deter, dissuade, or, if all else fails, mitigate.

Under Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s brinksmanship strategy used a framework with three stages: Provocation, Marking the Position, and
Maintenance and Recognition. On the international level, this strategy was tied to missile and nuclear tests. Within the inter-Korea context, it
was linked to naval (and later cyber) provocations. In both of these arenas, Kim Jong-il’s planning revolved around securing these three stages,
ultimately achieving international recognition of the North Korean point of view. His tolerance for escalation was informed by decades of
observation of South Korean and U.S. responses. De-escalation off-ramps were part of each provocational engagement.

An early assessment of Kim Jong-un portrayed him as a leader who was growing in self-confidence and
would likely see provocations as a policy tool. This assessment also portrayed Kim as someone who was bolstered
by the outcome of the 2013 crisis and , therefore, less willing to forgo confrontation , confident that his will would
win out in the end. Not endowed with his father’s deep knowledge of escalation dynamics on the peninsula, this assessment
continued, Kim Jong-un was more prone to miscalculation. His growing self-assurance would deter his advisers from
providing advice that contradicted his worldview. The events of the last couple of years suggest that this assessment
may not be entirely correct. It is most likely applicable to intercrisis periods, as opposed to the period leading up to a provocation. In
other words, during periods of increasing tension on the peninsula, Kim Jong-un may be willing to push
strategies that appear bold and aggressive. But during this period, his decisionmaking is still informed
by advisers and calibrated depending on external stimuli . After a provocation occurs and the escalatory ladder is engaged
(if the 2013 crisis is any indication) his decision-making changes. Decisions are heavily weighted toward the implications for his own position
and legitimacy within the wider leadership. His self-perceived ability to de-escalate (and risk showing weakness) is diminished. How far he is
willing to move up the escalatory ladder is unknown.

If this model of a leader (and by extension, a regime) going through a power consolidation is placed in the context of decision-making on future
provocations, certain
assumptions can be made that comport with how North Korea has acted since Kim
Jong-un took over. It is a regime that will engage in non-violent demonstrations where escalation can be
managed. On one hand, even in the face of warnings from the United States, South Korea, and China, North Korea conducted two missile
tests in 2012 and a nuclear test in 2013. Such demonstrations feed the requirements for Kim’s power consolidation process. But, on the other
hand, as international pressure has grown and the Sino-North Korean relationship has become more
strained, Pyongyang has not engaged in another demonstration —although it has apparently engaged in a high profile
(yet covert) cyber-attack. According to some sources, the economic pressures on the regime (especially from China) may not have
deterred other tests, but may have slowed the pace of testing. If true, it suggests that Kim Jong-un, while eager to move
forward with these programs, has been influenced by external pressure and has likely listened to those within the
regime who caution against moving too quickly .

Despite its aggressive rhetoric, which has reached a new level of animosity under Kim Jong-un, the regime has not yet
engaged in violent provocation. Even during the Foal Eagle/Key Resolve exercises in 2013, 2014, and 2015 when
the regime could have justified aggressive actions as a way of bolstering its own deterrent and responding to the aggressive actions of the
United States and South Korea, it chose to confine its actions to rhetorical fusillades and Scud launches into the Sea of
Japan. It made no attacks on South Korean territory or ships at sea. This suggests that the cost somehow
outweighed the benefits that could have been gained from undertaking such actions. According to some reports, the pressure
from China and the threats of retaliation from the Blue House and the South Korean Joint Staff, including decapitation
strikes, may have figured into the North Korean calculus . The U.S. decision to forgo the testing of the Minuteman missile in 2013,
as well as the U.S.-South Korean decision to downplay the 2014 and 2015 exercises, may have also provided needed off-ramps and a more
deliberative decision-making process to occur inside Pyongyang. Contrary
to the portrait of an impetuous leader who
makes emotional decisions and lashes out at perceived threats , to date, Kim Jong-un has proven to be a
pragmatic decision-maker—someone who may be able to be deterred at the upper end of the escalation
scale.
 AT: No Impact (Jackson)
The North Korean nuclear threat’s set to massively expand in the short term---throw
out old defense
Joel Wit 15, Visiting Scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS and a Senior Research Fellow at
Columbia University Weatherhead Institute for East Asian Studies, 4/22/15, “North Korea's Unstoppable
Nuclear-Weapons Program,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-koreas-unstoppable-nuclear-
weapons-program-12686?page=show
In the past month, a disagreement has broken out into the open between the United States and its ally, the Republic of Korea, over the
seriousness of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program. This dispute, centering on whether Pyongyang can mount nuclear
weapons on ballistic missiles—the United States says yes, and South Korea says no—reflects first and foremost the two sides jockeying for
position over whether Seoul should introduce an advanced U.S. missile-defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
While THAAD is intended to deal with the threat from Pyongyang, Beijing opposes its deployment, given concerns that the system is really
aimed at its own missile forces. But the dispute also reflects a bigger problem—namely, South Korea’s unwillingness to come to grips with the
reality that the nuclear-weapons threat from the North is poised for significant expansion.

That expansion will benefit from accomplishments achieved between 2009 and 2014, banner years for
Pyongyang’s nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Aside from the obvious manifestations—two tests of nuclear
devices and three of long-range rockets—North Korea has conducted a host of other activities intended to lay the foundation for the future
growth of its nuclear deterrent. For example, in 2011, Pyongyang unveiled a new modern plant able to produce highly
enriched uranium that can be used to expand its nuclear-weapons stockpile. More recently, that plant has doubled in size,
possibly meaning it can produce twice as much of this material. On the missile front, aside from modernizing its main
launch facility to test larger rockets, the North is also gearing up to eventually deploy a road-mobile intercontinental
ballistic missile able to reach the west coast of the U nited States.
What do these developments mean for North Korea’s nuclear future? We have been looking at this prospect at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and have concluded that the threat is going to grow, perhaps quite
dramatically, by 2020. Of course, predicting the future of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is difficult, given inherent
uncertainties in prognosticating about the most secret programs in an already secretive country. But there is also more evidence
about these programs today than at any time in the past, in part because of the availability of commercial satellite and on-
the-ground photography able to spot new developments, but also because as these programs move towards fielding
operational weapons through visible activities , such as testing, it is easier to observe their progress.
Given these uncertainties, any prudent analysis has to construct different scenarios ranging from a “worst case” outcome for the North Koreans
—little or no growth—to a “worst case” outcome for its neighbors and the international community—a great deal of growth—with a middle
scenario that essentially reflects their current program and where it is heading. We did that working with David Albright, a well-known nuclear
nonproliferation expert and head of the Institute for Science and International Studies, starting with a baseline of ten to sixteen nuclear
weapons in Pyongyang’s stockpile, based on our understanding of how much fissile material the North had produced by the end of 2014. And
the projections were not just for numbers of bombs, but also looked at Pyongyang’s ability to build smaller, lighter weapons (allowing the North
to place them on top of missiles) with greater yields (that would cause more damage). (See Graph)

The outcome is sobering. Whichever scenario takes place, the North Korean nuclear threat will grow at an
alarming rate, although just how alarming remains unclear. Even in a worst-case scenario for the North Koreans—
they do not conduct any more nuclear tests , their ability to produce nuclear material for more bombs remains limited and their
efforts to acquire foreign technology are unsuccessful— Pyongyang’s stockpile grows 100 percent, from ten to twenty weapons.
In the worst-case scenario for the rest of us, North Korea steps up its yearly nuclear-test program,
operates plants at full capacity to produce bomb-making material and is successful in acquiring foreign
technology. The result is a stockpile numbering one hundred nuclear weapons by 2020, as well as
significant progress in miniaturizing warheads to place on missiles and in increasing the explosive yields
of those weapons. In
the third, most likely “mid-range estimate”—based on Pyongyang continuing its
infrequent nuclear tests, a more reasonable rate of fissile-material production and limited success in
foreign cooperation—North Korea could still produce fifty nuclear weapons.

Impact defense is wrong---risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis is significantly higher

than it appears in relative peacetime
Anthony H. Cordesman 13, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS; and Ashley Hess, MA in
international relations from Seoul National University, June 2013, “The Evolving Military Balance in the
Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Volume II,”
http://csis.org/files/publication/130513_KMB_volume2.pdf

The tensions between the Koreas - and the potential involvement of the People's Republic of China
(China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) at both the political and military
levels — create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These range from posturing and
threats - "wars of intimidation" — to major conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula to
intervention by outside power like the US and China to the extreme of nuclear conflict.

There are powerful deterrents to such conflicts. The Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) has
emerged as major economic power, and one that is important to the economies of the US, Japan, and
China — as well as to the world. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is
one of the world's most heavily militarized states, but is still a relatively small military power by US and
Chinese standards. It remains vulnerable to US aid, missile power, and precision strike capability, and
runs a serious risk of being isolated if it provokes or escalates a conflict without Chinese support.

The fact remains, however, that no one can dismiss the risk of a serious clash or war. This is particularly
true if one considers the number of times that war has resulted from unpredictable incidents and
patterns of escalation. The historical reality is that the likelihood of less-probable forms of war actually
occurring has been consistently higher than what seemed in peacetime to be the most probable
contingencies and the patterns of escalation that seemed most likely from the viewpoint of a "rational
bargainer."
 AT: End Strength
Overall U.S. posture in Asia and with South Korea specifically is highly credible---crises
elsewhere don’t thump the link---only our ev distinguishes fact from spin
Janine Davidson 15, Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, CFR, 7/20/15, “Greatest Hits: How Serious Is the
Rebalance? U.S. Military Record Tells (Part of) the Story,”
http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/07/20/greatest-hits-how-serious-is-the-rebalance-u-s-military-
record-tells-part-of-the-story/
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s travels to Japan and South Korea last week—designed no doubt to highlight the continued U.S. commitment
to the region—instead resurfaced concerns that the rebalance to Asia is no longer a priority for Washington. Skepticsworry that world
events from Russian aggression in Ukraine, to the continued conflagrations across the Middle East, and negotiations
with Iran will continue to challenge Washington’s ability to deploy what Carter referred to as the “next phase of our rebalance.”
Debates over the defense budget back in Washington further stoke worries that the military side of the rebalance
will remain more talk that action. While there may be other valid concerns about the rebalance (Is it focused sufficiently on Southeast
Asia?Overly provocative toward China? Likely to be derailed entirely without the TPP?), concerns that the United States has not
prioritized the rebalance do not stand up to the facts. A survey of actual U.S. military activity in the
region helps differentiate facts from opinion.

That Secretary Carter visited Tokyo and Seoul so soon after stepping into the job reflects the priority the Pentagon
places on the region. Between them, these two countries host over80,000 U.S. military personnel and the majority of forward deployed
assets in the Western Pacific (note: there are 65,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe and roughly 35,000 currently deployed to the Middle East).
In Tokyo, Secretary Carter’s visit was timed to coincide with the final revisions to the U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation Guidelines, a bilateral priority given the dramatic regional geopolitical shifts since the guidelines were last revised
in the late 1990s. His discussions with counterparts in Seoul did tiptoe around the U.S. proposed introduction of a Terminal High-
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea, but highlighted the solidarity of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Beyond these recent steps, the Pentagon’s plans and movements have made Asia-Pacific a top priority since the earliest
days of the rebalance. The Department of Defense is on track to position 60 percent of U.S. Air Force and Navy forces in the region by 2020 with
55 percent of the Navy’s 289 ships, including 60 percent of its submarine fleet, already based across Asia.

Marines are shifting from being primarily in Okinawa to having a presence in mainland Japan, Australia, Guam, and Hawaii. In Australia, a
country now caught between closer security ties with Washington and economic connections to China, the U.S.-Australia Force Posture
Agreement ensures both that 2,500 Marines rotate annually through Darwin for the next twenty-five years and that U.S. military and
intelligence representation at Australian facilities continues. As the U.S. Army withdraws troops from Afghanistan, it is re-focusing the efforts of
more than 80,000 soldiers in Hawaii, Alaska, and Japan in support of its Pacific Pathwaysmultilateral training and exercising initiatives in Asia
and is sustaining its robust presence on the Korean peninsula.

Beyond such rebalancing of U.S. forces within the region, is the effort to ensure the newest cutting-edge technology finds its way into service in
Asia before use elsewhere. The Pacific has seen the main deployment of the Zumwalt-class destroyer and the latest Virginia-class submarine,
the principle basing for the advanced F-22 and (soon) the F-35, the introduction of the advanced P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, increased rotation
of U.S. Air Force and Navy airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), and the replacement of theUSS George Washington with the more
capable Ronald Reagan.

In Japan, two additional Aegis ballistic missile defense-capable ships, joint high-speed vessels, and a second TPY-2 missile defense radar are
being deployed. Additional submarines willrotate regularly to Guam as part of a new, higher volume presence. And in Singapore, a regular
rotation of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) enhances the strong U.S.-Singapore security relationship.

Drawing from the Army’s foreign area officer program, the Navy inaugurated a similar initiative, ensuring that culturally astute officers can
spend their careers in the Asia-Pacific. Military personnel will have the opportunity to link up multiple deployments in Asia, accumulating
regional expertise and building lasting relationships with their counterparts in other nations. By the time these officers reach senior-level
command positions, they should have a wealth of cultural and substantive experience—often to include regional language skills—that position
them for success in their positions and in cooperation with Asian military leaders.
These moves provide opportunity for deeper, more meaningful military-to-military cooperation and
substantive agreements with U.S. allies across the Asia-Pacific . In addition to the U.S.-Australia Framework Partnership
Agreement, Washington also inked the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines, authorizing access by U.S.
forces to predetermined locations across the islands.

Meanwhile, multilateral military exercises across Asia continue at a steady clip, ranging from the biannual Rim of the
Pacific (RIMPAC), which included over 22 U.S. allies and partners, including China last year, to the annual Cobra Gold exercise (the largest in the
region), Southeast Asian Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training (CARAT), Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT), and Operation
Malabar, a bilateral U.S.-Indian exercise whose status was upgraded earlier this year.

There is a tendency in Washington circles to draw sweeping policy judgments (“The rebalance is fundamentally flawed!
“The rebalance is dead!”) with few facts to back them up. Yet, even as crises in other regions vie for
Washington’s attention and debates over the U.S. defense budget continue, a review of the actual U.S. military
posture and activity in the Asia-Pacific, shows the strategy inaugurated by President Obama in 2011 remains—at least
where the military is concerned— pretty much on course.
 OPCON---Causes Troop Withdrawal
OPCON transition crushes Congressional support for the overall troop presence

Christopher Robert Escamilla 10, MA, National Security Studies, American Public University System,
2010, “THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE TRANSITON OF THE LEAD OF THE COMBINED DEFENSE FOR THE KOREAN
PENINSULA,” http://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-library/masters-theses/Escamilla_8-2010.pdf

Bechtol argues that the loss of unity of command and political aspects of the ROK-U.S. Alliance must be
considered prior to the conduct of OPCON transition . “The loss of a unified command (which exists
today) is likely to curtail the high degree of coordination that exists between ROK and U.S. forces today.”
Bechtol believes this will likely result in higher casualties. The current ROK-U.S. Alliance command
relationship is seamless and extends from two separate national command authorities in Washington,
D.C. and Seoul. In wartime, designated ROK forces chop to the commander CFC who then answers to
both the U.S. and South Korean national command authorities and carries out their strategic direction in
the execution of a bilateral unified command, CFC. Post OPCON transition, CFC will disestablish and ROK
forces will no longer fall under a bilateral command. Two separate warfighting commands, KORCOM for
the U.S. and Korea Joint Forces Command (KJFC) for the ROK. Bechtol argues unity of command will no
longer exist with forces fighting on the Korean Peninsula answering to two separate national command
authorities. 53, 54

Bechtol states politically that the change in wartime OPCON can lead to the misperceptions about the
ability of the ROK military to independently conduct a war with North Korea. Additionally, this could
result in a loss of congressional and U.S. domestic support for the continued presence of U.S. forces
in Korea. A reduction of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula would not bode well for either South
Korean or regional security. Bechtol concludes that by the U.S. allowing the ROK government the
opportunity to increase its military capabilities and improve its forces through delaying the
implementation of OPCON transfer the ROK-U.S. alliance will be reinforced in maintaining “the security
of the Korean Peninsula and the stability of Northeast Asia as a whole .” 56, 57
 OPCON---ROK Readiness
The ROK military’s not ready to regain OPCON---they lack necessary C4ISR and there’s domestic
opposition to modernization

Bruce Klingner 14, Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Heritage Foundation, 8/7/14, “The U.S. and
South Korea Should Focus on Improving Alliance Capabilities Rather Than the OPCON Transition,”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/the-us-and-south-korea-should-focus-on-
improving-alliance-capabilities-rather-than-the-opcon-transition

The transfer of full operational control of South Korean forces to Seoul during both armistice and wartime has
also been delayed over concerns about Seoul’s ability to adequately exercise command and control of
its forces and to coordinate wartime actions with U.S. and international forces . The decision to postpone the
OPCON transition would alleviate some of the near-term pressure on Seoul, but the Park Geun-hye administration needs to clearly articulate
plans to redress shortages in the country’s defense capabilities.

General Scaparrotti testified that, although

Seoul continues to expand defense spending —this year’s defense budget
represents a 4 percent increase over 2013—“it
still has not been able to meet the ambitious defense spending
objectives of its current long-range defense plan , prompting a re-evaluation and re-prioritization of defense acquisition
priorities and future force posture.”[20]

The South Korean military still lacks the necessary C4ISR systems and capabilities to overcome stovepiped
command structures and to enable interoperability across services. U.S. officials privately comment that at present
the South Korean military is not capable of truly joint operations.

Seoul had previously committed itself to Defense Reform Plan (DRP) 12-30,[21] a wide-ranging military modernization
strategy to compensate for demographically driven large reductions in manpower by upgrading to a
smaller, high-technology defense force. Seoul would procure improved command and control systems and more capable
weapons.[22]

Yet South Korea did not implement the JCS-centric command structure included in DRP 12-30. The ROK
National Assembly refused to pass the required laws because of considerable domestic opposition,
especially from retired generals. The organizational revision would have enabled a more flexible and joint military
force. By augmenting real-time joint battlefield management capabilities and indigenous target warning and acquisition skills, Seoul could
exercise more effective joint command.
 OPCON---ROK Restraint
OPCON transfer causes the ROK to escalate against NK provocations---the U.S. lead
role is highly restraining
Daniel Pinkston 14, North East Asia Deputy Project Director with the International Crisis Group in
Seoul, 6/18/14, “U.S.-ROK Alliance Management: OPCON Transition and ISR,”
http://blog.crisisgroup.org/asia/2014/06/18/u-s-rok-alliance-management-opcon-transition-and-isr/

Seoul has been outspoken in its desire to retaliate sternly against any future North Korean
provocations. This sentiment was borne out of what some ROK political and defence officials viewed as
an overly restrained response both to the sinking of the Ch’ŏnan and the shelling of Yŏnp’yŏng Island in
2010. With this in mind, the development of ROK weapons capabilities in addition to the possibility of
OPCON transfer opens up broader issues related to future deterrence and crisis stability within the
context of U.S.-ROK alliance dynamics.

Credible threats to strike back with greater force may strengthen deterrence by signalling to Pyongyang
that future provocations would be too costly. However, if deterrence fails and the ROK delivers
retaliatory strikes that are more extensive and robust than in the past, the danger of rapid escalation is
real since Pyongyang could perceive the response to be the first wave of much larger military operations
or the beginning of a full-scale war. In other words, if the U.S. were to relinquish wartime OPCON, the
threat of counter-strikes against provocations such as the Ch’ŏnan sinking is more credible because the
ROK military would perhaps feel less restrained in seeking to settle some scores with the North. With
Seoul in the driver’s seat the barriers to escalation could be reduced since Seoul appears to be less
concerned about escalation and stability than Washington. As long as an American general is in
command of the Combined Forces Command (CFC), stability will be viewed as more important than
revenge against the [North] Korean People’s Army (KPA).