POLICE POWER
Calalang v Williams
Doctrine: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the
law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some
fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make,
its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful
legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making
power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and
determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 1
43 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)
Ichong v Hernandez
Doctrine: It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in
scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep.
As it derives its existence fromtheveryexistenceof the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or denied in its scope;
itissaidtobe co- extensive with self-protection and survival, and
as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental
processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable
Limitations of Police Power
a) Due Process
"SECTION 1 .(1 ) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, no shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws."(Article III, Phil.
Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of
individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited
to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their
application, without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality.
The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made,there must be a reasonable basis
for said distinction.
b) Equal Protection Clause
"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which
forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a
class than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classifcation in the exercise
of police power."(2Am.Jur.468-469.)
Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court
Doctrine: We find that the challenged measure is an invalid
exerciseofthepolice power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished.The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Lozano v Martinez
Doctrine: The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public
nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the
statute. It is sufficient that a reasonable nexus exists between
means and end. Considering the factual and legal antecedents
that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to
understand
the public concern which prompted its enactment.
DECS v San Diego
Doctrine: The proper exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The
subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the
ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession
is not inhiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed
by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to
be doctors. While every person is entitled to aspire to be a
doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is
involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's
ambition.
MMDA v Garin
Doctrine: In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-
Air Village Association, Inc., We categorically stated that
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police
power,
let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA
which claimed that it had the authority to open a subdivision
street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with
police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
From this premise, the MMDA argued that there was no need
for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune
Street to the public.Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act
No. 7924 creating the MMDA,we concluded that the MMDA
is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed
with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro
Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. Thus,in the absence of an
ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the
street was invalid.
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is
a developmental authority created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national
governmental agencies, people's organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector, which may public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
enforce, but not enact, ordinances. property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Standing Doctrine: Nonetheless, the general rules on standing

admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine,
White Lights Corporation v City of Manila
taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the
Doctrine: That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.
wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party
for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure.
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
appropriate. In Powers v.Ohio, the United States Supreme
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
Court wrote that:
interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on

and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are

evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the satisfied:

purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More (1) the litigant must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the giving himorhera "sufficiently concrete interest" in the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its outcome of the issue in dispute;
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
(2) The litigant must have a close relation to the third party;
and (3) there must exist some hindrance to the third party's
ability to protect his or her own interests.
The test of a valid ordinance
Following substantive requirements:
(1 ) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4)must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6)must not be unreasonable
Ermita-Malate Hotel v Mayor of Manila
Doctrine: The challenged ordinance then 'proposes to check
the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these
establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill
up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
open to public view at all times, and by introducing several
other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy
that characterizes the registration of transients and guests.'
Moreover, the increase in the license fees was intended to
discourage establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal' and at the same time, to increase `the
income of the city government.'
City of Manila v Laguio
Doctrine: The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails
to address the core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance
may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it
can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a
thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that
occurs inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of
liberty and
privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of
democracy.
Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or
limit the petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the
discretion vested in them. It provides
definition of the establishments covered by it and it fails to set
forth the conditions when the establishments come within its
ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications
whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be
tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement
could be secured.
City Government of Quezon City v Ericta
Doctrine: "It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that
police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the
promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking
or
confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in
no
order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and
order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium
and firearms.
"It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 61 1 8,
Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright conficscation. It deprives a person of his private
property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation."
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Doctrine: There are traditional distinctions between the police
power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. The cases before us present no knotty complication Doctrine: For this reason, when the conditions so demand as
insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe primacy of police power because property rights, though
retention limits for land owners,there is an exercise of the sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.
police power for the regulation of private property in
Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly
accordance with
as they reach the point in their lives when the vigor of their
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it
youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands
much because of choice, they become needing of support from
they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
the society for whom they presumably spent their productive
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
days and for whose betterment they exhausted their energy,
which
know-how and experience to make our days better to live. In
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking
the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is an
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land.
equally important State responsibility. Thus, the State is
What is required is the surrender of the title to and the
obliged to give full support to the improvement of the total
physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights
well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the
accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This
mainstream of society.
is definitely an exercise not of the police power but
of the power of eminent domain. It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress
enacted R.A.Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws mandating a 20%
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation vs DSWD
discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens
and PWDs. It is also in further exercise of this power that the
legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax
deduction, rather than tax credit,by covered establishments.
On the Grounds of taking without just compensation.
To begin with, the issue of just compensation and no relevance
in the instant case as it had already been made clear in Carlos
Super drug that the power being exercised by the State in the
imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power.
Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, just
compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is
precisely because there is no taking involved, but only an
imposition of burden.
As to the 20% discount affecting their income.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation
affecting the ability of private establishments to price their
products and services relative to a and
special class of individuals, senior citizens for which the
Constitution affords preferential concern. In turn, this affects
the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private
establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other
words, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence,
the profitability of a private establishment. However, it does
not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in
the operation or conduct of the business of private
establishments, for the use or benefit of the public,or senior
citizens for that
matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services
relative to,and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that
such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens.
Measures to the point of interfering with personal liberties or
property rights in order to advance common good. To warrant
such interference, two requisites must concur:
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class,require the interference of the State;
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the and the amount of products or income/gross sales that such
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not private establishments may derive from, senior citizens.
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words,the proper exercise of the police power requires

the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. EMINENT DOMAIN
Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v Secretary of DSWD Manosca v Court of Appeals

Doctrine: As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a Doctrine: Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and

regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For

price their products and services relative to a special class of condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers

individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to

preferential concern. In turn, this affects the amount of actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public

products or income/gross sales that a private establishment can to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought

derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by

regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profatability one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or

of a private establishment. However, it does not purport to "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.

appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772,

or conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use 773.

or benefit of the public,or senior citizens for that matter, but Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise
merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, of the right to take private property in virtue of eminent
domain, means a use concerning the whole community as
distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every
member of society need not be equally interested in such use,
or be personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to
satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.  case led by an agency authorized to do so.
Sumulong v Guerrero
Doctrines:
On Just Compensation
In said case of ExportProcessing ZoneAuthority, this Court
pointed out that:
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time
of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations
made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is
illusory. The overwhelming mass of landowners accept
unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared
by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not
even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of
expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a
On Due Process
The constitutionality of this procedure has also been ruled
upon in the Export Processing ZoneAuthoritycase, viz:
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice
and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat
or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually
viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con
have been presented, and after all factors and considerations
essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously
evaluated.
On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling
in the Ignacio case is reiterated, thus:
[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by
the Court in expropriation proceedings, the following requisites
must be met:
(1)There must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient
inform and in substance;
(2)A provisional determination of just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial
court on the basis of judicial (notlegislative or executive)
discretion; and
(3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be
complied with. (p. 1 4)
This Court holds that "socialized housing" denied in Pres.
Decree No.1224, as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1 259 and 1
31 3, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation.
However, as previously held by this Court, the provisions of
such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in
the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant
to the corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing
immediate taking without notice and hearing are violative of
due process. Cd
People v Fajardo
Doctrine: But while property may be regulated in the interest
of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit
structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs.
Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use
of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
That the mayor can refuse a permit solely in case that the
proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or
occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in
fact, the refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit
to the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed
building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by
preventing its being seen from the public highway. Even thus
interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in
that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to
use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without
just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as
conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents
Republic v PLDT
Doctrine: The court a quo has apparently overlooked that while
the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract
with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of
eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and
services to allow interservice connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case private
property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If
under Section 6, Article XIII,of the Constitution, the State
may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to
publi cownership upon payment of just compensation, there is
no reason why the State may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor.
City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila
Doctrines:
When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private
property and an objection is made thereto by the owner, the
courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make
inquiry, and to hear proof upon an-issue properly presented,
concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the
appropriation is, in fact, for some public use.
The right of expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal
corporation and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in
this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property. The land to
be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the
expropriation must be public. If the court. upon trial, finds that
neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails,
the right to expropriate does not exist.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be
of a public character.The ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of
the land.
RIGHTS OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO
EMINENT DOMAIN
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain
must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a
particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon
municipal corporations and other entities within the State,
general authoritytoexercise the right of eminent domain cannot
be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of
municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying
the authority.
The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is
admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether
or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right
in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the courts have the right
to inquire into.
Municipality of Paranaque v V.M. Realty Corp
Doctrine: The Supreme Court held that the petition is not
meritorious.The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government which may delegate
the exercise thereof to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities.
A local government unit may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed
through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
H C A local government unit, like the Municipality of Parañaque,
cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through
a mere resolution of its law making body.
The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an
ordinance or a law for the purpose. A municipal ordinance is
different from are solution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion
of a law making body on a specific matter. The fact that there
is no cause of action is evident from the face of the complaint
for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to
lack of cause of action.
On the Grounds on Eminent Domain Barred by Res
Judicata
On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar
subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same
property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise
are complied with.
Iron Steel Authority v Court of Appeals
Doctrine: While the power of eminent domain is, in
principle, vested primarily in the legislative department of the
government, this Court believes and so holds that no new
legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon
being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the
expropriation proceedings. For the legislative authority, a long
time ago, enacted a continuing or standing delegation of
authority to the President of the Philippines to exercise, or
cause the exercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf
of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. In the
present case, the President, exercising the power duly
delegated under both the 1917 and 1987 Revised
Administrative Codes ineffect made a determination that it was
necessary and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent
domain in behalf of the Government of the Republic and
accordingly directed the Solicitor General to proceed with the
suit.
Philippine Press Institute v COMELEC
Doctrine: To compel print media companies to donate
"Comelec space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half Page), amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or
purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of
such compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from
6 March 1 995 (or 21 March 1 995) until 1 2 May 1 995? or
everyday or once a week? or has often as Comelec may direct
during the same period? The extent of the taking or deprivation
is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis
temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory "donation," measured by the
advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers
whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial
indeed. LexLib
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first
be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use.
Thethreshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property
for public use need to be examined here:
(1) One is the necessity for the taking;
(2) Another is the legal authority to effect the taking.
The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by
respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their
normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the
unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buyprint space lies
at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, thatComelec has been granted the power of
imminent domain either by the Constitution or by the
legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that
power and the enforcement and administration of election laws
by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
TELEBAP Inc. v COMELEC
Doctrine: Petitioners' argument is without merit, all
broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is
licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress
in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires."
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.
They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them.
Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service.
Finally, it is argued that the power to supervise or regulate
given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the
Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the first
place, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or
regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, 31 among other
things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or
permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is
the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads.
In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is
different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy
for petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the object
of the power were the same.
In the second place, the prohibition in §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
is only half of the regulatory provision in the statute. The other
half is the mandate to the COMELEC to procure print space
and air time for allocation to candidates. As we said in Osmeña
v. COMELEC:
The term political "ad ban" when used to describe
§11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as
§11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and
air time to political candidates, it mandates the
COMELEC to procure and itself allocate to the
candidates space and time in the media. There is no
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the
time and manner of advertising.
Export Processing Zone Authority v Dulay
Doctrine: The determination of "just compensation" in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation,no statute, decree, or executive order
can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court's Andings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the
decreed compensation.
"Another consideration why the Court is empowered to
appoint commissioners to assess the just compensation
of these properties under eminent domain proceedings,
is the well-entrenched ruling that 'the owner of property
expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating
authority the fair and full value of the lot, as of the time
when possession thereof was actually taken by the
province, plus consequential damages—
includingattorney's fees — from which the
consequential benefits, if any should be deducted,with
interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the
owner from and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol
Subdivision,Inc.v.Province of Negros Occidental, 7
SCRA 60).
Limiting the determination of just compensation on the
value declared by the owner or
administrator or as determined by the Assessor,
whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of
the landowner's right of due process to enable it to prove
its claim to just compensation, as mandated by the
Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 1 23). The tax
declaration under the Real Property Tax Code is,
undoubtedly, for purposes of taxation."
Republic v Bank of the Philippine Islands
Doctrine: No actual taking of the building is necessary
to grant consequential damages.Consequential damages
are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from
animpairment or decrease in value. The rules one
xpropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the award
of consequential damages.
Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:
. . . The commissioners shall assess the consequential
damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use or public
purpose of the property taken, the operation of its
franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the
business of the corporation or person taking the
property.
But in no case shall the consequential benefits assessed
exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the
owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so
taken.
In B.H. Berkenkotter&Co. v. CourtofAppeals, 52 we court nor was It affected by the construction of the
held that: To determine just compensation, the trial Zapote-Alabang Flyover, We find the ruling of Republic
court should first ascertain the market value of the of the Philippines through the DPWH vs. CA and
property, to which should be added the consequential Rosario R. Reyes appropriate to apply in this case,
damages after deducting therefrom the consequential towit:
benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the Petitioner contends that no consequential damages may
consequential benefits exceed the consequential be awarded as the remaining lot was not "actually taken
damages, these items should be disregarded altogether "by the DPWH, and to award consequential damages for
as the basic value of the the lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount to
property should be paid in every case. unjust enrichment on the part of the latter.

Republic v Vda. De Castellvi

We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of
Doctrine: Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number
Appeals:
of circumstances must be present
Lastly, as to the argument of plaintiff-appellant that the
in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent
award of additional just compensation for the building
domain.
of defendant-appellee is erroneous and without legal
basis because the building was never taken by the (1) First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
government This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by
in the expropriation proceeding conducted by the trial virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the
AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi. case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi
(2) Second, the entrance into private property must be property as lessee.
for more than a momentary
period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of
(4) Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use
but a moment's duration" The word "momentary" when
or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property
affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of
should be construed to mean "a limited
the
period" — not indefinite or permanent.
property being devoted to public use is present because
By express provision of the lease the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return
the premises insubstantially the
(5) Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use
same condition as at the time the property was first
must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the
the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may
instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property
be inferred from the construction of permanent
and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust
improvements.
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of
(3) Third, the entry into the property should be under the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was
warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as
the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to
year,and by the provision in the lease contract whereby
the Republic undertook tore turn the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the
property, because the Republic was bound to pay,
and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly
rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for
eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Castellvi's
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. We find merit in the contention
of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking"
of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely:
(1 ) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor
must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and
(2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner
was ousted from the property and deprived of its
beneficial use,were not present when the Republic
entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
Secretary of DPWH v Tecson
Doctrine: When a property is taken by the government
forpublicuse, jurisprudence clearly provides for the
remedies available to a landowner. The owner may
recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is
not, the aggrieved owner may demand payment of just
compensation for the land taken. For failure of
respondents to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed
to have waived and are estopped from assailing the
power of the government to expropriate or the public
use
for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and
appellate courts found that respondents are entitled to
compensation. The only issue left for determination is
the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Government act and later instituted actions for recovery
of possession with damages. The Court thus determined
the landowners' right to the payment of
compensation and, more importantly, the amount of just
compensation.TheCourt has uniformly ruled that just
compensation is the value ofthe property at the time
of taking that is controlling for purposes of
compensation.
The reason for the rule has been clearly explained in
Republic v. Lara, et al.,and
repeatedly held by the Court in recent cases, thus:
"[T]he value of the property should be fixed as of the
date when it was taken and not the date of the filing of
the proceedings. "For where property is taken ahead of
the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enhanced by the public purpose for
which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have
been a natural increase in the value of the property from
the time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due
just
to general economic conditions.
Note: For said illegal taking, respondents
are entitled to adequate compensation in the form of
actual or compensatory damages which in this case
should be the legal interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the value of the land at the time of taking in
1940 until full payment.This is based on the principle
that interest runs as a matter of law and follows from the
right of the land owner to be placed in as good position
as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.
National Power v Ibrahim
Doctrines:
On Tunnels ground for just compensation expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to
accept its offer claiming that the taking of the
YES. In the past, the Court has held that if the
property for the purpose of the eminent domain should
government takes property without expropriation and
be reckoned as of the date when it started to occupy the
devotes the property to public use, after many years, the
property and that the value of the property should be
property owner may demand payment of just
computed as of the date of the taking despite
compensation in the event restoration of possession is
the increase in the meantime in the value of the
neither convenient nor feasible. This is in accordance
property."
with the principle that persons
shall not be deprived of their property except by In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it
competent authority and for public use constructedthetunnelsasthe date of valuation would be
and always upon payment of just compensation. grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under
warrantor color of legal authority or with intent to
On the value of the property
expropriate the same. In fact, it did not bother to

"If We decree that the fair market value of the land be notify the owners and wrongly assumed it had the right

determinedas of 1 978, then We would be sanctioning a to dig those tunnels under their property. Secondly, the

deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason "improvements" introduced by petitioner, namely, the

other than for eminent domain would occupy tunnels,innoway contributed to an increase in the value

another's property and when later pressed for payment, of the land.

First negotiatefor a low price and then conveniently

Republic vs Rural Bank of Kabacan
Doctrine: Theconstitutional limitation of "just were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and
compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the improvements thereon, the trial court selected
the market value of the property, broadly defined as the another batch of disinterested members to carry out the
price fixed by the seller in open task of determining the value of the land and the
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action improvements.
and competition; or the fair value
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve
of the property; as between one who receives and one
the expenditure of public funds. In this kind of
who desires to sell it, fixed at the
proceeding, we require trial courts to be more
time of the actual taking by the government.
circumspect in their evaluation of the just compensation
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated property.
the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1 997 Rules of Civil Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on
Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked the Rural Bank of Kabacan's mere declaration of non-
to ownership and non-participation in the expropriation
determine the just compensation for the expropriated proceeding to validate defendants-intervenors' claim of
properties. The first set of committee members made an entitlement to
ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the that payment.
expropriation. They also determined the exact areas
Amigable v Cuenca
affected,as well as the kinds and the number of
improvements on the properties. When the members
Doctrine: In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First
Instance of Cebu, involving a claim for payment of the
value of a portion of land used for the widening of the
Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr.
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the
government takes away property from a private land
owner for public use without going through the legal
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
National Power Corporation v Posada
Doctrine: Just compensation as required by the
Constitution is different from the provisional value
required by Republic Act No. 8974. In Capitol Steel
Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority:
Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in
an expropriation case . . . is entitled to a writ of
possession as a matter of right and it becomes
the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue
the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the
court neither exercises its discretion or judgment
in determining the amount of the provisional value of
the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has
fixed the amount under Section 4 of R.A. 8974. H
SAcaE
To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a
prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession
differs from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property. While the provisional value is
based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just
compensation is based on the prevailing fair market
value of the property. As the appellate court explained:
The first refers to the preliminary or provisional
determination of the value of the property. It serves a
double purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully
expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if the
proceedings are dismissed. It
not a final determination of just compensation and may
not necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing fair
market value of the property. Of course, it may be a
factor to be considered in the determination of just
compensation.
between one who desires to purchase and one who
is desires to sell;the current price; the general or ordinary
price for which property may be sold in that locality.
Power of Taxation
Lutz v Araneta

Doctrine:

Just compensation, on the other hand, is the final

determination of the fair market value of the property. It
has been described as "the just and complete equivalent
of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated
has to suffer by reason of the expropriation." Market
values, has also been described in a variety of ways as ARTICLE III – BILL OF RIGHTS
the "price fixed by the buyer and seller in the open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade Sec 1 – No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and
and competition; the price and value of the article property without the due process and law nor shall be
established asshown by sale, public or private, in the denied of equal protection clause.
ordinary way of business; the fair value of the property
Philippine Communication Satellite Corp v Alcuaz
Topic: Quasi-Judicial general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to
the validity of administrative action where the
Doctrine:
administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,

The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. administrative, or legislative functions; but where a
public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-
Ruled that:
judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate
 'If the nature of the administrative agency is essentially rather than general and prospective, the person whose
legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are rights or property may be affected by the action is
not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action entitled to notice and hearing. 
which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or
Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Baguio v Jadewell
property are not involved, is not determined according
to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct
Topic: Quasi-Legislative
application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is
said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Doctrine:
Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from
In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian
statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an
Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA – be it first or
administrative proceeding depends on the character of
second act of rescission – was clearly in the exercise of
the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far
its legislative or administrative functions and was not an
as generalization is possible in view of the great variety
exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The
of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a
Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. The preamble of the MOA
lends support to this view. Evidently, the foremost
reason why the agreement was entered into by the
parties was to provide order, given Baguio City’s
parking problems in identified areas, as well as to
generate income.
The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as
its intention to rescind the MOA; because it deems to no
longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are
clearly an exercise of its legislative or administrative
function. However, it is another matter as to whether the
City of Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds
as basis for the exercise of its right to rescind.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v Anti-
Terrorism Council
Topic: Facial Challenge
Doctrine:
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is
legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims
of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it
has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act
is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." 
As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in
all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others."
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his
concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases
is justified by the aim to avert the "chilling effect" on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear
an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful
conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and
penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful,
so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Note: In overbreadth analysis; challenges are permitted
to raise the rights of third parties;
Disini v Secretary of Justice
Topic: Overbreadth // Cyber Crime
Doctrine:
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from
overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech
and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect
on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental
purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may
not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its
subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on
these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism,8 the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others,
in this case their computer data, electronic document, or
electronic data message. Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy
other people’s computer systems and private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course
an inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect9 or the
fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of
citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries
of what is proper. But to prevent the State from
legislating criminal laws because they instill such kind
of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and
penalizing socially harmful conduct. Here, the chilling
effect that results in paralysis is an illusion since Section
4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil that it seeks to punish
and creates no tendency to intimidate the free exercise
of one’s constitutional rights.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of
the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice
Antonio T. Carpio explained in his dissent in
Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,65 "we must
view these statements of the Court on the inapplicability
of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal
statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctrines
are used to mount ‘facial’ challenges to penal statutes The rationale for this exception is to counter the
not involving free speech." "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes from
statutes violating free speech. A person who does not
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a
know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an
violation of his constitutional right can raise any
overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
constitutional ground – absence of due process, lack of
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth,
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into
or vagueness. Here, one can challenge the
silence
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. It prohibits one from assailing the Ang Tibay v Court of Industrial Relations
constitutionality of the statute based solely on the
Topic: New Trial (Unfair Labor) // Quasi-Judicial
violation of the rights of third persons not before the
court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against Doctrine:
third-party standing.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
instance mount a "facial" challenge to the 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of
constitutionality of a statute even if he claims no Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
violation of his own rights under the assailed statute promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
where it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not
or vagueness of the statute.
narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order
or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or
agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light
of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been
especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated
by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry
into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable
cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character.
GSIS v Court of Appeals
Topic: Admin Decision // Hepa
Doctrine:
Ang Tibay declared:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
[citations omitted] The statute provides that "the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling," The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The purpose of the Office
admission of matter which would be deemed of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary
incompetent in judicial proceedings would not investigation, after conducting its own factfinding
invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in an information, and not to make a final adjudication of
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify the rights and obligations of the parties under the law,
orders without a basis in evidence having rational which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay.
probative force.  The investigating officer investigates, determines
probable cause, and prosecutes the criminal case after
Estrada v Ombudsman
filing the corresponding information.

Topic:
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make

Doctrine:
The GSIS clarification affirms the non applicability of
the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations
in criminal cases: The investigating officer, which is the
role that the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the
investigation and prosecution of government personnel,
sure that the courts are not clogged with weak cases that
will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person from
the travails of a needless prosecution. 26 The
Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the
control and supervision of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder,
investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the
respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously, investigation level because none of these will satisfy
this procedure cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. 
amplified in GSIS. However, there is nothing
unconstitutional with this procedure because this is
merely an Executive function, a part of the law
enforcement process leading to trial in court where the
requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, will apply. This has been the procedure under the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. To now rule that
Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, should apply to
preliminary investigations will mean that all past and
present preliminary investigations are in gross violation
of constitutional due process.

It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between the

constitutionally guaranteed rights of an accused and the
right to a preliminary investigation. To treat them the
same will lead toabsurd and disastrous consequences.

All pending criminal cases in all courts throughout the

country will have to be remanded to the preliminary