Manila Memorial Park v DSWD, GR 175356

FACTS:

RA 7432 was passed into law (amended by RA 9257), granting senior citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments.

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the DSWD issued its own Rules and
Regulations.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners are not questioning the 20% discount granted to senior citizens but are only assailing the
constitutionality of the tax deduction scheme prescribed under RA 9257 and the implementing rules and
regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF.

Petitioners posit that the tax deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."

Respondents maintain that the tax deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise of the State’s police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legally mandated 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power or eminent
domain.

RULING:

Yes.The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power.

It may not always be easy to determine whether a challenged governmental act is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain. The judicious approach, therefore, is to look at the nature and effects of the challenged
governmental act and decide on the basis thereof.

The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be
gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing
basic commodities. It serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent their lives on contributing to the
development and progress of the nation.

In turn, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price control or rate
of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power measures.

The subject regulation differs there from in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments from
adjusting the level of prices of their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a
given establishment but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution
of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory
measures which affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject
regulation is a police power measure.
Fernando vs. St. Scholastica. G.R. 161107

Facts:

Respondent SSC is the owner of four parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are
SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the
retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some
thirty years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.

The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and
Walls in the Municipality of

Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217[5] and 200[6] were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5,
respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:

Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:

Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one meter in height. Fences in excess of one meter shall be of an
open fence type, at least 80% see-thru

Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five meter parking area allowance located
between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial establishments and
educational and religious institutions.

Issues:

Whether or not Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling:

No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.”

Two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: Under the
rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the public and not for
the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and “un-
neighborliness” due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and
oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid.
Tano v. Socrates, G.R. 110249

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment
of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching
, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did
not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing
that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the
use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo

Facts: 

Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against the property of the Respondent, that the
lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized housing project.
Respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power
to expropriate their properties. Hence, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the Petitioner has a lawful
right to expropriate the properties of the Respondents. Petitioner, filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss
complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered
impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries
can not afford. The Motion was denied on the ground that the Partial Judgment had already become final and
executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the case. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied, thus filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
which summarily dismissed the petition. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner can withdraw the expropriation proceedings after the determination of the Power of
Eminent Domain

Held:

No, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10, 1999, which declared that it has a
lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became
final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court. A final and executory decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are
not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes

Fact:  The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling
land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, The defendants filed
their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or Reconsideration,
manifestation adopting the answer.

In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of

public use, that there is no specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking
of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such power,
the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land
reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform
program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance
that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National
Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the
properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued
separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises
and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

 Issue: Whether the actions to expropriate properties are constitutionally infirm in

the taking of private property for the promotion of tourism?

 Held: No, petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is
appropriately accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation.
The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, Presidential Decree No. 564: 2. Acquisition of
Private Lands, Power of Eminent Domain. — To acquire by purchase, by
negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without
the tourist zones for any of the following reasons: (a) consolidation of lands for
tourist zone development purposes, (b) prevention of land speculation in areas
declared as tourist zones, (c) acquisition of right of way to the zones, (d)
protection of water shed areas and natural assets with tourism value, and (e) for
any other purpose expressly authorized under this Decree and accordingly, to
exercise the power of eminent domain under its own name, which shall proceed
in the manner prescribed by law and/or the Rules of Court on condemnation
proceedings. The Authority may use any mode of payment which it may deem
expedient and acceptable to the land owners: Provided, That in case bonds are
used as payment, the conditions and restrictions set forth in Chapter III, Section
8 to 13 inclusively, of this Decree shall apply.

Manosca v. Court of Appeals

Fact: Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,

Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492)
square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution
No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was
approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports At the same time,
respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit
it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by
petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional
market and assessed values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take
over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of the
Constitution.  Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the
implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. On 15 February
1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion
seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion
to dismiss.6 Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,7 another order was issued
by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the motion for reconsideration
and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners’
motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the reconsideration of the 20th
February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991
order. Petitioners then lodged a petition with the Court of Appeals which the
appellate court dismissed for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the
reconsideration of the decision was denied subsequently by appellate court.
Issue: Whether  the expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally,
that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to
the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.

 Held: No, Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for
taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, “public use” is
one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to
actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of
use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a “public advantage”
or “public benefit” accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. The idea that
“public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has long been
discarded.

Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA

Fact: Respondent initiated before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings

on three (3) parcels of land in Rosario, Cavite. More than ten (10) years later, the
said trial court upheld the right of respondent to expropriate the land of the
petitioner. Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner contending
that said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippines Vinyl
Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. Hence the petition.

Issue: Whether the said expropriation is for public purpose.

Held: Yes, the “public use” requirement for a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing
conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been
summarized as the court has ruled that the taking to be valid must be for public
use. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. The term “public use” has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public
benefit or advantage. the Court has also held that what ultimately emerged is a
concept of public use which is just as abroad as “public welfare.”
JIL v Municipality of Pasig

Fact: The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street,
a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid,
Pasig. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the
1,791-square meter property of Cuancos. On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate
the fund therefor, filed a expropriation of the property under R.A. No. 7160, 
deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property, filed motion to
issued a writ of possession which was granted by the RTC, constructed therein a
cemented road with a width of three meters. In their answer, the Cuancos
claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had sold the said property to
JILCSFI. When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to
intervene as defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August
26, 1994.10

In its answer, JILCSFI averred, that the Respondent ’s exercise of eminent

domain was only for a particular class. JILCSFI also averred that it has been
denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was constructed
in the middle portion and that the Respondent was not the real party-in-interest.
The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the Respondent for
moral damages and attorney’s fees. On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an
Order in favor of the Respondents. Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the
CA. the CA affirmed the order of the RTC

Issue: whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19
of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the
property prior to the filing of the complaint;

Held: No, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made
a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an
access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its
compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of
the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of
the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. Even if the letter was, indeed, received
by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific
portion of the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one of
the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the project
and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
Filstream International v CA

Fact: On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against the occupants of the abovementioned
parcels of land owned b the petitioner on the grounds of termination of the lease
contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on
September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and
pay back rentals to petitioner. Respondent appealed to reverse the decision to
the RTC and CA but the coarts affirmed the decision of the lover court.

Thereafter, no further action was taken by the private respondents, as a result of

which the decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory.

 Thereafter, no further action was taken by the private respondents, as a result of

which the decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory.

 Issue: Whether the city of Manila comply with the conditions of the existing laws
when it expropriated petitioner Filstreams properties?

Held: No, City of Manila did not complied with Sec. 9 and Sec. 10 of R.A.
7279. Petitioners Filstreams properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved
futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstreams right to due process
which must accordingly be rectified.

Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in

exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the
right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use
always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However
we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the
exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process
extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard,
vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

 
Mun. of Meycayauan vs. IAC

Fact:   In 1975, private respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising

Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land which will to enable the
storage of the respondent’s heavy equipment and various finished products such
as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors,
bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete
pipes, and parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution
manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent’s parcel of land. On 1976,
the Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan
disapprove the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity
for the Municipality to expropriate the respondent’s property for use as a public
road. The respondent, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for
the approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 1983,
however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano
D. Daez, passed Resolution for the purpose of expropriating anew the
respondent’s land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid
resolution and filed with the RTC a special civil action for expropriation. Upon
deposit of the amount of value of the land, the RTC issued a writ of possession in
favor of the petitioner. In 1984, the RTC issued an order the taking of the
property and ascertain the just compensation for the property. The respondent
went to the IAC on petition for review. In 1985, the IAC affirmed the RTC’s
decision. However, it was subsquently reversed after the court found no genuine
necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several
other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the
proposed public road.

Issue: WHether the expropriation of the Respondents Lot is of Public Necessity?

Held: No, the Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public
character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public
good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the
courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity therefor.
here is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of’ Meycauayan to expropriate
the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation for
use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available
road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and
lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the
Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment
after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to
condemn the same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and
would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of
Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully
and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at
lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business
therein. Or, the municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot
also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic)
of traffic because as observed by the Committee

De Knecht vs. Bautista

Fact:   The petitioner alleges that than ten (10) years ago, the government
through the Department of Public Workmen’s and Communication (now MPH)
prepared a to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Blvd; that the
proposed extension, an adjunct of building program, the Manila — Cavite Coastal
Read Project, would pass through Cuneta Ave. up to Roxas Blvd that this route
would be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSA but later
decided to make the proposed extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan
Streets which petitioner being one of them residents, that President Marcos
referred the matter to the Human Settlements Commission (HSC) for
investigation and recommendation which recommended the original plan;
notwithstanding the said recommendation, the MPH insisted on implementing the
revised plan; In February 1979, the government filed in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge, a complaint for
expropriation against the petitioner. respondent judge issued a writ of possession
dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take and enter
upon the possession of the properties sought be condemned. The petitioner
contends that “Respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the order to take over and enter upon the
possession of the properties sought to be expropriated-petitioner having raised a
constitutional question which respondent court must resolve before it can issue
an order to take or enter upon the possession of properties sought to be
expropriated. The petitioner assails the choice of the revised Streets route on the
following grounds:

 
Issue: Whether the expropriator can choose any property it wanted?

 Held: No, The choice of property to be expropriated cannot be without rhyme or

reason. The condemnor may not choose any property it wants. Where the
legislature has delegated a power of eminent do-main, the question of the
necessity for taking a particular fine for the intended improvement rests in the
discretion of the grantee power subject however to review by the courts in case
of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. The choice of property must be
examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process
determination as to whether or not the proposed location was proper in terms of
the public interests.

Republic vs. De Knecht

Fact: The Petitioner On February 20, 1979 filed in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners of
the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets among them is the
respondent and some fifteen other defendant who filed a motion to dismiss
alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the
Philippines, prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of
the properties, filed an ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court
of a restraining order to restrain the Petitioner from proceeding with the taking of
immediate possession and control of the property sought to be condemned. In
June, 1979 the Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of
the property to be expropriated which the lower court granted and created a
Committee of three to determine the just compensation for the lands involved in
the proceedings. Respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, and directed against the order of the lower court dated June 14, 1979
praying that the Petitioner be commanded to desist from further proceeding in the
expropriation action and from implementing said order where the court granted in
favor of the respondent.Adrian Avilado Antazo

On August 8, 1981 defendants Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde and
others moved to dismiss the expropriation action in compliance with the
dispositive portion of the aforesaid decision of this Court which had become final
and in order to avoid further damage to same defendants who were denied
possession of their properties. On September 2, 1983, the Republic filed a
motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg.
340 expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court
in an order of September 2, 1983 dismissed the case by reason of the enactment
of the said law. The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of
the lower court dated December 18, 1986.

Respondent appealed from said order to the Court of Appeals wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on December 28, 1988 in favor of the
respondents and setting aside the decision of the CA.

Issue: whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final

judgment of this Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for
expropriation.

 Held: Yes, While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the
subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that
the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the
payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws.
Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by
voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court
action or by legislation.

De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi

Fact: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,

Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The Respondent City of Pasig, notified
petitioner of its intention to expropriate a portion of her property to be used for the
“sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance enacted by the then Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig. Again respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time
the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the Municipal Government
to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her
property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is
neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community.” respondent reiterated in a letter that the purpose of
the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational
facilities to its poor residents.” Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court
a complaint for expropriation and prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; The petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion on the
ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property. The motion
for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the trial court which prompted
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari who
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied.

 Issue: Where the expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small
community notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short
distance away, is considered to be for public use?

 Held: No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity.
the court held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow,
the taking of the land. That “necessity within the rule that the particular property
to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to
the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” That respondent City of
Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property.

Eslaban v. De Onorio

Fact: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-Asa,

Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The Respondent City of Pasig, notified
petitioner of its intention to expropriate a portion of her property to be used for the
“sports development and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance enacted by the then Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig. Again respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time
the purpose was allegedly “in line with the program of the Municipal Government
to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”
petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her
property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is
neither sufficient nor suitable to “provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community.” respondent reiterated in a letter that the purpose of
the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide sports and recreational
facilities to its poor residents.” Subsequently, respondent filed with the trial court
a complaint for expropriation and prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; The petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the motion on the
ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property. The motion
for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied by the trial court which prompted
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari who
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was also denied.

Issue: Where the expropriation of private property for the benefit of a small
community notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short
distance away, is considered to be for public use?

 Held: No. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be limited to such necessity.
the court held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is
a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover,
the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow,
the taking of the land. That “necessity within the rule that the particular property
to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to
the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party
and the property owner consistent with such benefit.” That respondent City of
Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property.

EPZA vs. Dulay

Fact: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation
No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the
City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669
square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone
by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area,
however, was public land which includes, four (4) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned by the private respondent. The
petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent
in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding
the sale of the property. The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu for
expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the
private respondent for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing
Zone. The respondent judge issued a writ of possession, order of condemnation
and order to appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s Report on the grounds that P.D. No.
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the
ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just

compensation in P.D. No. 1533 which states “Section 1. In determining just
compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain
proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by
the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or
determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever
value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government office to acquire the property.” valid and constitutional?

Held: No, the method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends
to render the Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to
it for final determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to
appoint commissioners under the Rules of Court. The determination of “just
compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the
court’s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the
“just-ness” of the decreed compensation.

Ansaldo vs. Tantuico

Fact:   The lots belong to the petitioners are covered by title in their names.
These lots were taken from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of
Public Work Transportation and Communication and made part of what used to
be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro
Manila. This, to repeat, without demur on the part of the owners. Said owners
made no move whatever until twenty-six years later. They wrote to ask for
compensation for their land on January 22, 1973. Their claim was referred to the
Secretary of Justice who in due course rendered an opinion dated February 22,
1973, that just compensation should be paid in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 76. The Decree provided that the basis for the payment of just
compensation of property taken for public use should be the current and fair
market value thereof as declared by the owner or administrator, or such market
value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. The Secretary of
Justice thus advised that the corresponding expropriation suit be forthwith
instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to the Ansaldos.

Pursuant to this opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the

Provincial Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the
Ansaldos’ property in accordance with PD 76. 6 The new valuation was made,
after which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos’
claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that payment be made on
the basis of the “current and fair market value, . . . and not on the fair market
value at the time of taking.

The Commission on Audit, however, declined to adopt the recommendation. In a

decision handed down on September 26, 1973, the Acting Chairman ruled that
“the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be determined as
of the time of the taking of the subject lots, 8 i.e. 1947. The ruling was reiterated
by the Commission on September 8, 1978, and again on January 25, 1979 when
it denied the Ansaldos’ motion for reconsideration.9 It is these rulings of the
Commission on Audit that the Ansaldos have appealed to this Court.
Issue: Whether the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimants is to be
determined as of the time of the taking of the subject land?

Held: Yes which is in 1947. there is a “taking” when the owner is actually
deprived or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or
a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the
ordinary use thereof. There is a “taking” in this sense when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a more permanent
duration, for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a
manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
For ownership, after all, “is nothing without the inherent rights of possession,
control and enjoyment. Where the owner is deprived of the ordinary and
beneficial use of his property or of its value by its being diverted to public use,
there is taking within the Constitutional sense. Under these norms, there was
undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldos’ property when the Government obtained
possession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare for public use.
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos’ property must be ascertained as of the
year 1947, when it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the
expropriation suit, which, by the way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that
the real measure of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall
earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected, conformably with other
principles laid down by case law

NAPOCOR v. Tiangco

Facts:

Herein respondents are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Sampaloc,

Tanay, Rizal and registered in their names. petitioner NPC requires the
respondents’ aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San
Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse. NPC’s Segregation Plan for the
purpose shows that the desired right-of-way will cut through the respondents’
land. After repeated unsuccessful negotiations with the respondents, NPC filed
with the RTC a complaint for expropriation against them which the RTC issued
Condemnation Order, granting NPC the right to take possession of the area
sought to be expropriated. Which RTC subsequently ordered directing NPC to
pay and deposit with the Rizal Provincial Treasurer an amount representing the
temporary provisional value of the area subject of the expropriation prior to the
possession. The RTC rendered judgment expropriating in favor of [NPC] a parcel
of land covering a total area and ordered the amount of P40,594.07 as just
compensation for the 19,423 square meters of land affected by the
expropriations; and the amount of P324,750.00 as reasonable compensation for
the improvements on the land expropriated. The respondents moved for
reconsideration, presenting for the first time a document entitled “BIR Circular of
Appraisal,” which shows that for the year 1985, 1992, 1994 that the lands valued
at ₱30.00, ₱80.00, ₱100.00 per square meter respectively. NPC and the
respondents went on appeal to the CA whereat the separate appeals who
modified the decision of the RTC that the compensation awarded for the 19,423
square meters of land affected is increased to ₱116,538.00, and the reasonable
compensation for the improvements thereon is likewise increased to
P325,025.00.

Issue: Whether the Just Compensation Is it to be based on the 1984 or the 1993
valuation?

Held: Neither of the two determinations made by the the CA and RTC is therefore
correct. A new one must be arrived at, taking into consideration the foregoing
pronouncements.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. In this case, this simply means the property’s
fair market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, or “that sum of money
which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.”
The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

In the determination of such value, the court is not limited to the assessed value
of the property or to the schedule of market values determined by the provincial
or city appraisal committee; these values consist but one factor in the judicial
valuation of the property. The nature and character of the land at the time of its
taking is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation
should be given to the landowner All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered.