TORTS AND DAMAGES  Fault consists in the execution of a positive
act but the act was done contrary to the
1. WHAT IS TORT?
In common law, tort is an unlawful violation of
private right, not created by contract, and which gives
rise to an action for damages. It is an act or omission
producing an injury to another, without any previous
existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission
may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident.
(Robles vs. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220, 5 C.A.R.213).
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 
2. KINDS OF TORT
 A direct invasion of some legal right of the
individual
 Infraction of some public duty by which
special damage accrues to the individual
 The violation of some private obligation
which like damage accrues to the individual
3. SOURCES OF OBLIGATION
 Law
 Contract
 Quasi contract
 Delict
 Quasi-delict
4. REQUISITES OF QUASI-DELICT (DNC)
a. Damage to plaintiff
b. Negligence, by act or omission, of which
defendant, or some person for whose act he
must respond, was guilty
c. Connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and damage; fault
COVERAGE OF NEGLIGENCE
covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional
and voluntary or negligent.
5. DAMAGE vs. DAMAGES
 Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from injury
 Damages refers to the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered
6. FAULT vs. NEGLIGENCE
 Fault is that condition where a person acts in
a way or manner contrary to what normally
should have been done
normal way of doing it and ultimately
causing damage or injury to another
 Negligence consists in the omission to do acts
required under the attendant circumstances
resulting to damage or injury to another
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of
the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and
of the place. When negligence shows bad faith,
the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2, shall apply.
 
If the law or contract does not state the
diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
7. CAN THE HOSPITAL BE HELD LIABLE FOR
THE FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PHYSICIAN IN THE TREATMENT OR
OPERATION OF PATIENTS?
For purposes of apportioning responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and
their attending and visiting physicians.
Moreover, the hospital’s liability is also
anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppels and the doctrine of
corporate negligence which have gained acceptance
in the determination of a hospital’s liability for
negligent acts of health professionals.
8. LIABILITY OF EXPERTS AND
PROFESSIONALS
9. CAN THERE BE MALPRACTICE IN LAW?
 Yes. While lawyers are not required to exercise
the extra-ordinarily diligence of a common
carrier, they must exercise diligence not lesser
than the diligence of a good father of a family in
the handling of cases which they accepted from
clients.
 Adrimisim v. Javier- Respondent lawyer, in
failing to immediately secure a bail bond, clearly
neglected to exercise ordinary diligence or that
reasonable degree of care and skill required by
the circumstances
 Negligence, to be “excusable,” must be one
which ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against
 RPC, Art. 209: A lawyer commits the crime
called “betrayal of trust” if he would maliciously
breach

10. ARTICLE 2177
11. ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS OF
NEGLIGENCE
12. DEFENSE OF EMPLOYER UNDER ART. 2180
“EMPLOYERS SHALL BE LIABLE FOR THE
DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR EMPLOYEES AND
HOUSEHOLD HELPERS ACTING WITHIN THE
SCOPE OF THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS, EVEN
THOUGH THE FORMER ARE NOT ENGAGED IN
ANY BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY.”
CASE: Construction Development Corp. of the PH vs.
Estrella, GR 147791
Facts:
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter,
Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a BLTB
bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached
their destination because their bus was rammed from
behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South
Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their
seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them.
They regained consciousness only when rescuers created
a hole in the bus and extricated their legs from under the
seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical Center
where the doctors diagnosed their injuries.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages
against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and
Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 13. They alleged that Payunan, Jr. and
Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB
buses, respectively, were negligent and did not obey
traffic laws and that BLTB and CDCP did not exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employees. RTC ruled in favor
of the complainants. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not BLTB and its driver Wilfredo
Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damges
sustained by the respondents? NO.
(2) Whether or not Employers are liable for the
action for the actions of their employees? YES.
(1) In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for
a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and
several" obligation, the relationship between the active
and the passive subjects is so close that each of them
must comply with or demand the fulfillment of the
whole obligation.
It was clearly stated in the lower court’s decision that
petitioner and its driver Payunan, Jr., are jointly and
solidarily liable for moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 to respondent Fletcher and P25,000.00 to
respondent Estrella.20 Moreover, there could be no
double recovery because the award in paragraph 2 is for
moral damages while the award in paragraph 1 is for
actual damages and attorney's fees.
(2) Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Employer is liable for the
acts of its employees; An action based on quasi-delict
may be instituted against the employer for an
employee’s act or omission—the liability for the
negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee.—The case
filed by respondents against petitioner is an action
for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that
the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one
is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-
delict may be instituted against the employer for an
employee’s act or omission. The liability for the
negligent conduct of the subordinate
is direct and primary, but is subject to the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Payunan, Jr.
13. CAN THE COURT ORDER THE PAYMENT OF
CIVIL DAMAGES IN THE SAME CASE EVEN
IF THE ACCUSED WAS ACQUITTED DUE TO
LACK OR ABSENCE OF REASONABLE
DOUBT?
CASE: Yadao vs. People, GR No. 150917
Facts:
Petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime
of homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one
Deogracias Gundran, in an Information. He was found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC. CA
affirmed. In the case at bar, was the prosecution able to
prove the two components of the corpus delicti?
The SC thinks not.
Though it was established that petitioner Yadao slapped
the victim, and as a result of which the latter fell down
and struck his head on the edge of a table, the
prosecution nonetheless failed to show the nexus
between the injury sustained by the victim and his death.
It failed to discharge the burden to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the death of the victim resulted
from the use of violent and criminal means by petitioner
Yadao. The fact that the victim herein was wounded is
not conclusive that death resulted therefrom. To make an
offender liable for the death of the victim, it must be
proven that the death is the natural consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted. If the physical injury is not
the proximate cause of death of the victim, then the
offender cannot be held liable for such death. Thus, SC
did not find Yadao guilty of the crime Homicide.
Issue: Whether or not the Court may order Yadao to pay
Civil damages despite him being acquitted of the
Criminal Action? YES.
Same; Same; Damages; Settled in jurisprudence is the
principle that a court may acquit an accused on
reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil
damages in the same case.—The heirs of the victim,
however, have not completely lost their case. Settled in
jurisprudence is the principle that a court may acquit an
accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of
civil damages in the same case. In this case, though
petitioner Yadao is acquitted, nonetheless, his liability
for damages is not considered extinguished since the
judgment of acquittal is not based on a pronouncement
that the facts from which civil claims might arise did not
exist. Accordingly, this Court awards P50,000.00 as
civil damages to the heirs of the victim.
14. EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED ON
HIS CIVIL LIABILITY
CASE: Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
(BLTN) vs. CA and Gregorio Hinagpis GR No. L-
33138-39
Facts:
This is a case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
filed against BLTB Co. and his driver for the vehicular
accident which resulted to death and damage to
properties.
On the morning of February 18, 1963, Andres I. Ilagan
drove the passenger bus owned by BLTB Co. along
Manila South Super Highway on its way to Lemery,
Batangas while Ricardo de los Reyes with his Chevrolet
car left Calamba, Laguna with Eduardo de los Reyes,
Jean Elizondo, Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema, and Ursula
Bayan, and bound for Manila. In the ensuing event, both
vehicles collided with each other. The tragic accident
occurred when the bus driven by Ilagan overtook a big
cargo truck. The bus took the left or the lane on which
the car driven by de los Reyes was traveling. The latter
being in the best position to see the fast approaching bus
tried to swerve to the right to avoid the bus but was too
late and hit in the left front side up to the driver's door.
Both de los Reyes and Elizondo were rushed to the Phil.
General Hospital but were pronounced dead upon arrival
at the hospital while the rest of the fatalities were
brought to Manila Rail Road Hospital for treatment.
Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against Ilagan
for reckless imprudence and the injured parties sought
for payment of their hospital bills and other expenses
from the petitioners but the latter refuse, thus, two civil
cases were filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
for recovery of damages. The lower court decided in
favor of the plaintiffs and award damages. The
respondents not contented, appeal the decision to the
Court of Appeals but was denied, thus this appeal by
certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not BLTB Co. and Andres I. Ilagan
are liable for damages for the injury inflicted to
the plaintiffs. YES.
(2) Whether or not the doctrinal rule on Corpus vs
Paje is applicable to the case. NO.
Ruling:
Yes, BLTB Co. and Andres I. Ilagan are liable for
damages and the case of Corpus vs Paje is not applicable
to the case.
Under the law, "Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relations between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
Further, the "Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees xxx acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry."
In this case, undisputable facts were established by both
the trial and appellate courts on the reckless and
imprudent acts by the driver of the bus.
Though BLTB Co and his driver-co-appellants, Ilagan
asserted that they had exercise extraordinary diligence of
a good father and the accident was fortuitous in
character, and that the accident was due to the
negligence of Ricardo de los Reyes were presumptive
and unproven by the appellants.
Further, appellants reliance on the case of Corpus vs
Paje that "the criminal action against petitioner Ilagan
must first be resolved by respondent Court of Appeals
and, until final resolution thereon, it is premature to
proceed in the two civil cases” was came too late
because it was never raised in the lower and appellate
courts and the facts were dissimilar to the case, thus, not
controlling said the Supreme Court.
In fact, the liability of appellants was not predicated on
criminal negligence but rather on being a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana is an independent source of obligation
between two persons not so formerly bound by any
juridical tie, thus the awards for damages against
appellants were proper and just. Accordingly, the lower
court and court of appeals decision is affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
Same; Same; A separate civil action based on quasi
delict may be filed independently of and notwithstanding
the pendency of, the criminal action against the offender
because responsibility for fault or negligence based
on quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code.—Nor is this all. It is to misread the opinion of
Justice Capistrano in Paje if it is made to yield a
significance that would under the circumstance of this
case reduce to a barren form of words the jural concept
of a quasidelict as an independent source of obligation.
The law is anything but that. The Civil Code speaks
unequivocally to the contrary. Article 2176 provides:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.” x x x What is more, there is this new
provision in Article 2177: “Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.” This Court in appropriate
cases has given force and effectivity to the mandates
thus so clearly expressed.
CASE: Azucena vs. Potenciano, GR No. L-14028

Facts:
An action for damages which was allegedly sustained, as
a result of a collision between Azucena's scooter and a
bus of appellee Laguna Trans. Co, then driven by its co-
appellee Severino Potenciano. Negligence is imputed to
the driver, and to the company itself with respect to the
choice and supervision of its employees. The allegations
send to make out a case of quasi-delict, or culpa
aquiliana, under Arts 2176 & 2180, CC.
Complaint was filed. Defendants answered, with a
counterclaim also for damages. They filed a
supplemental pleading with a prayer for dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that in the criminal action
against Severino Potenciano for serious physical injuries
with damage to property through reckless imprudence,
involving the same accident which gave rise to the civil
action, the accused was acquitted in CFI Laguna. Since
the acquittal of the accused was based on a finding that
he did not act recklessly or negligently the judgment in
the criminal case is a bar to the civil action. Reliance is
placed squarely on Rule 107, which provides, inter alia,
that when a criminal action is instituted the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged is impliedly instituted with it, and that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact front
which the civil might arise did not exist.
Issue: Which law should govern: Rule 107, a general
rule, or specific provisions of Articles 31, 33 and 2177,
of the New Civil Code? Art. 33, NCC.
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff can not recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Order appealed from set aside and the case is remanded to the Court
of origin. Costs against defendants
Appellees contend that the civil action referred to in
Article 33 of the Civil Code is that which arises ex
delicto, or from the commission of the offense involving
defamation, fraud or physical injuries, and consequently,
pursuant to Rule 107, section 1 (a), the right to file it
must be expressly reserved in the criminal action if it is
to prosper at all.
The contention is erroneous. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
vs. Gamboa. It presupposes that there must first be a
conviction for the crime, for without conviction there
can be no offense to speak of from which civil liability
could arise. Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the
recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the
purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason why
only a preponderance of evidence and not proof beyond
reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient.
Actions; Civil action for recovery of damages based on
quasidelict; Acquittal in criminal action not a bar to
civil action.—A civil action to recover damages on the
theory of quasi-delict may proceed although the
defendant therein was acquitted in the criminal case,
because, according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil
Code, the civil action is entirely independent of the
criminal case. To subordinate the civil action
contemplated in said articles to the result of the criminal
prosecution would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in
Article 31 that such action "may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result
of the latter."
Same; Same; Same; Civil action under Article 88, new
Civil Code, unrelated to criminal aspect of the case.—
Article 33 of the Civil Code contemplates a civil action
for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to
the purely criminal aspect of the case. This is the reason
why only a preponderance of evidence and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt is deemed sufficient.
15. As a geneal rule, THE JUDGMENT OF
ACQUITTAL DOES NOT NECESSARILY
EXTINGUISH THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
ACCUSED, EXCEPT:
a) In the case of BERMUDEZ VS. JUDGE
MELENCIO-HERRERA;
b) In the case of ALBORNOZ VS. ALBORNOZ;
c) SAPIERA VS. CA;
d) When the judgment expressly declares that the
liability is only civil in nature;
e) Where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;
and
f) Where the civil action has prescribed.
CASE: Bermudez, Sr. vs. Judge Melencio-Herrera, GR
No. L-32055
Facts:
A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and
owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a
jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of
plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy
sustained injuries which caused his death. As a
result, Criminal Case No. 92944 for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Domingo Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed on
July 27, 1969 in the said criminal case “A
Reservation to File Separate Civil Action.”
On July 28, 1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed
a civil case for damages against Domingo
Pontino y Tacorda and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan.
Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action
“on the assumption that defendant Pontino’s
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969
constituted aquasi-delict,” the trial court stated
that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the
accident as a “crime” by reserving in the
criminal case their right to file a separate civil
action. That being so, the trial court decided to
order the dismissal of the complaint against
defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to
suspend the hearing of the case against
Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case
for Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence is
finally terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the present action is
based on quasi-delict under the Civil Code and
therefore could proceed independently of the
criminal case for homicide thru reckless
imprudence?
Ruling:
Quasi-Delict; Actions; Damages; Injured party or his
heirs has the choice between an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasidelict under
Articles 2176-2194 of the Civil Code.—ln cases of
negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of
the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold
the employer solidarily liable for the negligence act of
his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that appellants
reserved their right in the criminal case to file an
independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.—In the
case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action
for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal cases to
file an independent civil action did not preclude them
from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
CASE: Albornoz vs. Albornoz, GR No. L-7081
Facts:
The present appeal refers to two claims presented by
Elias Racela against the estate of the deceased Perpetua
Vda. de Soriano and which were dismissed by the trial
court. The first claim is based on a supposed sale of one
hectare of land for P1,000 executed by the decedent on
July 18, 1933 in favor of the claimant. The second is
based on another supposed sale of another part of the
defendant's land for P1,000 also, in favor of the
claimant, made on September 23, 1933. The supposed
sales appear in two deeds marked Exhibits "A" and "B".
After the supposed sales were made, the decedent sold
the same parcels of land in 1934 to one Soriano
Ballesteros, who succeeded in registering the deed of
sale in his favor. Claimant attempted to register the
deeds executed in his favor but the decedent opposed
registration. So claimant brought a criminal action
against the decedent for estafa (Criminal Case No. 6406
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte). The court
acquitted the decedent of the charge.
After the presentation of the plaintiff in the court below,
the Judge, upon motion of counsel for the defendant,
dismissed the action.
Claimant-appellant argues that the judgment of acquittal
in the criminal action was based on reasonable doubt and
therefore it cannot amount to a judicial declaration "that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist."
Issue: Whether or not when a criminal action decides
that the claimant’s claim did not exist also bars civil
action? YES.
ACTION; ClVIL LlABILITY WHEN BARRED BY
JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL ACTION.—Where the
judgment in a criminal action contains an express
declaration that the basis of claimant’s action did not
exist, the latter’s action for civil liability is barred under
section 1(d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court.
The theory upon which the present claim of Elias Racela
is based that the deceased sold the parcels of land to
Elias Racela and the latter paid the deceased the price
therefor or P2,000. The above-quoted portions of the
decision clearly indicate that no actual sale was made
and that the deeds Exhibits "A" and "B" were executed
for another purpose and were, therefore, simulated sales.
The judgment in the criminal action, therefore, contains
an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action
for P2,000, or the sales of said parcels of land to the
claimant and the receipt by the decedent therefor for
P2,000, did not exist. Claimant's action is barred under
section 1 (d), Rule 107, which provide:
(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. . .
In view of the above conclusion, it is unnecessary to
consider the claim of the claimant-appellant that he had
submitted sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's
liability. The judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the claimant.
CASE: Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128927
Facts:
On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store
owner, purchased from Monrico Mart certain grocery
items and paid for them with checks issued by one
Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the
back by Sapiera. When presented for payment the checks
were dishonored because the drawers account was
already closed. Private respondent Ramon Sua informed
de Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both
failed to pay the value of the checks. Consequently, four
charges of estafa were filed against petitioner with the
RTC of Dagupan City. After trial, the court a quo
acquitted petitioner of all the charges of estafa but did
not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for
the checks she indorsed to private respondent. In a 22. CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSIDER IN
petition for mandamus filed by private respondent, the DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE
Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding petitioner  TIME
liable for the value of the checks.  PLACE
 GRAVITY OF HARM TO BE AVOIDED
Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable  SOCIAL VALUE OF UTILITY OF ACTIVITY
when she was acquitted in the criminal charges against
her? YES.

Section 2, par. (b), of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, specifically provides: Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages
only when it includes a declaration that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus,
the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where
the court expressly declares that the liability of the
accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c)
where the civil liability is not derived from or based on
the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.

The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did

not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to
insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration
from the court that the fact from which the civil action
might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa
may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts
established by the evidence so warrant. The accused
should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the
checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.

The rationale behind the award of civil indemnity

despite a judgment of acquittal when evidence is
sufficient to sustain the award was explained by the
Code Commission in connection with Art. 29 of the
Civil Code

Actions; Damages; Criminal Procedure; The civil

liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b) where the
court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature; and, (c) where
the civil liability is not derived from or based on the
criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.—The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the
accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt; (b) where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in
nature; and, (c) where the civil liability is not derived
from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is
acquitted.

16. ARTICLE 2177

17. CIVIL LIABILITY WHEN EXTINGUISHED BU
DEATH OF ACCUSED
18. ARTICLE 2178
19. STANDARD CONDUCT/REQUIRED DEGREE
OF DILIGENCE
20. ARTICLE 2179
21. WHAT IS PROXIMATE CAUSE