Nationalism as the Framework

for Dalit Self-realization

Gopal Guru
Professor of Social and Political Theory
Jawaharlal Nehru University

The consolidation of nationalist aspirations drives the formation of

national identity in most colonial and postcolonial cases. This process involves
a multifaceted struggle for self-definition in the presence of socially dominant
actors and an effort at self-realization among socially dominated sections of
society. Socially dominant actors shape the formation of a new nation. Follow-
ing independence, for instance, Indians had an opportunity to redefine their 239
sociocultural identity, which had become destabilized and saturated due to the
impact of colonialism. Nationalism, for the traditional social elite, denoted the
recovery of lost social prominence. Hence, the historical purpose of such an elite
found its expression in the nationalist struggle, articulated primarily against the
colonial configuration of power. On the other side of the spectrum, those who
are socially suppressed throughout history are driven by the normative need to
achieve self-realization: they are no longer a suppressed, silenced lot, but rather
an active and assertive subject of history. To put it differently, social groups such
as Dalits, who have been historically cast out of the framework of the public
sphere and forced to remain passive objects of history, view nationalism as an
opportunity to achieve self-realization as active subjects.
Such groups thus require a nationalist space to foreground this self-realiza-

Gopal Guru is Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Centre of Political Studies at Jawaharlal
Nehru University. Previously he was Professor at Delhi University and held the Mahatma Gandhi Profes-
sorial Chair at Pune University. He has also worked as a member of the Equal Opportunity Commission
within the Government of India. He is editor and author of Humiliation: Claims and Context (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2009) and has written numerous articles on Dalits, women, social movements,
and Indian political philosophy.

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 Gopal Guru
tion. Self-realization can also be defined in terms of the Dalit desire to matter, to
have equal dignity in the different forms and spheres of nationalist articulation.
Therefore, as the history of the freedom movement shows, the Dalit struggle for
self-realization fundamentally runs against both colonial and local configura-
tions of power. Specifically, British colonialism as a problematic configuration of
power involved three dynamics: collaboration, competition, and confrontation.
As has been argued by scholars such as Anil Seal, a section of Indian society
collaborated with the colonial power but also competed among themselves for
access to the opportunity structure controlled by the colonial state.1
The other, rather mainstream force making nationalist claims for inde-
pendence sought to interrogate and confront the colonial state. From the Dalit
As the history of the freedom movement point of view, the logic of the
local configuration of power
shows, the Dalit struggle for self-realiza- built up around the caste-
tion fundamentally runs against both co- based hierarchical ideology of
purity-pollution reproduced
lonial and local configurations of power. the socioeconomic domination
by the social elite. This logic was no different than the logic of the colonial con-
figuration of power that undergirded sociopolitical domination by the British
240 colonialist. The ideology of purity-pollution renders some castes ritually pure
and some ritually impure, such as Dalits. In practice, therefore, the abolition
of colonialism did not mean the restoration of formal political freedom to all,
but the restoration of political power only to traditionally privileged social
elites. Dalits, led by Ambedkar, suspected that national identity resulting from
the anti-colonial struggle would still be incomplete in the sense that it would
continue to perpetuate the angularity of caste. As mentioned above, India’s
caste system is considered to be a closed social arrangement that determines
membership strictly based on birth. However, those who are acutely aware of
a loss of past glory, and whose fondest hope is to regain it, are bound to take
the lead in the nationalist struggle against colonial power. The nationalist elites
belonging mostly to the upper layer of India’s caste system, then, naturally make
political freedom the organizing principle of their national identity. Needless
to say, such a nationalism seeks to portray other parallel assertions against local
configurations—the Bahujan led by Jotirao Phule from Maharashtra and the
Dalit assertion led by Bhimrao Ambedkar—as secondary concerns at best and
anti-national at worst.
At their best, Indian nationalists, led by the Congress Party, did not show
the same political urgency in combating the social evils arising from India’s

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 Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization
caste system. This was evident from the opposition of Congress to social issues
such as caste.2 In its worst form, the intensification of the struggle against the
local configuration of power was seen by most nationalists as a divisive issue
that fragmented nationalist solidarity.3 The formation of national identity thus
remains an incomplete project. In part, this stems from the reality that nationalist
forces have avoided social questions rooted in the local configuration of power
emerging from the caste system.4 The rather skewed nature of the nationalist
struggle, in turn, has led to the emergence of autonomous, but small, voices of
downtrodden groups such as the ex-untouchable Dalits.
Although these small voices of history imagined the nation differently,
their vision was subordinate to that of Congress-led nationalists. The leaders
of lower-caste movements initially expected nationalists—Hindu nationalists
included—to launch a decisive struggle against the caste system, historically
configured in local power structures. These expectations came from social think-
ers like Phule and later Ambedkar, who invested moral intellectual resources in
their constructive project to reason with Congress-led nationalists, so that the
latter could at least accommodate Dalit and Bahujan aspirations to be considered
human in the nationalist imagination. The term Bahujan (a social majority and
not just a demographic preponderance over other groups) has a genealogy that
241
goes back to Buddha in the fifth century BC, and that reemerges again in early
twentieth century Maharashtra.5 However, conceptual efforts made particularly
by Ambedkar to assign a broader universal dimension to nationalism failed to
elicit a sympathetic response from most nationalists. On the contrary, some
started using nationalism as a moral compass with greater force and vehemence
to attack Ambedkar as a desh drohi (anti-national or traitor).6 Interestingly,
however, among the entire lot of so-called nationalists it was Mahatma Gandhi
who candidly acknowledged the sterling quality of Ambedkar’s nationalism.
Gandhi said to Ambedkar, “I know you are a patriot of sterling worth.”7 This
was not merely a rhetorical concession by Gandhi, but rather one example of
his repeated efforts to understand the question of untouchability, if not caste,
which he rightly located in the local configuration of power.

Ambedkar Assigns Deeper Meaning to the Idea of Droha

Ambedkar sought to counter the allegation of his being a desh drohi, which he
thought unfair on moral grounds. Ambedkar argued, for instance in his 1930
speech delivered at Nagpur, that Dalits had been equally critical of colonial rule
that would not prioritize the emancipation of Indians in general, and Dalits

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 Gopal Guru
in particular. The question of defining the characteristics of national identity
provided Ambedkar with a much larger philosophical scope to produce deeper
philosophical understanding, and in fact a metaphysical understanding, of
the word droha (sedition). His understanding is metaphysical in that it seeks
to transcend the meaning of droha from its political grounding and take it to
a metaphysical level that is concerned with the formation of the idea of self.
Ambedkar, like Gandhi and RabindranathTagore, is elevating the conception of
self far beyond the constitutive context of nation. Since this allegation of droha
had a negative impact on the Dalit moral self, Ambedkar decided to unearth
a deeper understanding of the term droha by shifting focus from its ordinary
use as a condemnation to the metaphysical revelation missing from nationalist
polemics. The definition of droha thus extended beyond the physical concep-
tion of a nation and included an enlarged, but harmful, meaning that seeks to
adversely affect the universal vision of human beings with intrinsic value. Thus,
when Ambedkar spoke of manav droha (moral crimes against humanity), he was
referring to the universal conception of a dignified human being.8 In Ambedkar’s
conception, a human being is an ontological essence that is inherently present
in all sentient beings.
In polemics, it is easy to drop one word in favor of another, and polemicists
242 do so with the intention of achieving quick victory over their opponents. This
does not demand that they trace the theoretical or philosophical genealogy of
words. Thus, as the semantic angle of nationalist struggles in India shows, there
were some “nationalists” who used different terms, such as desh drohi, swaraj
drohi (traitor to self-rule), and “stooges of imperialism,” with the sole intention
of morally discrediting leaders such as Phule and Ambedkar, who questioned
their supposedly pure construction of national identity.9 Although the form of
these words is different, their meaning is functionally the same: leaders from
different lower castes. It is in this sense that these words belong to the same
logical class, as they produce the same morally devastating consequences for
those who seek to question the canonical meaning of nationalism. Moreover,
in the logic of political nationalism, desh droha (sedition or treason against the
state) as polemical language also seeks to discipline those who make fresh intel-
lectual attempts to enlarge the meaning of nationalism so as to include the idea
of social freedom or the resolution of caste issues. Hence, the word desh droha,
which is communicated through polemical language rather than in persuasive
vocabulary, remains merely performative rather than morally transformative.
It does not sufficiently motivate the recalcitrant social self to undergo internal
moral transformation. Ironically, those who practice casteism against the Dalits,

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 Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization
and by virtue of this practice become manav drohis (traitor to humankind), feel
authorized to call others desh drohi. To put it differently, a particular conception
of political nationalism does not consider a person as desh drohi even if he or
she is guilty of constructing internal fault lines on the basis of caste or of raising
actual walls of separation, as with the practice of untouchability.10 However, with
the polemical language of desh droha, one may succeed in silencing those who
propose parallel ideas of India, but can achieve only temporary victories at the
cost of preventing a much deeper understanding of the desh droha—necessar-
ily denying the experience of nationalism a moral or ethical depth. Ambedkar
realized that the logic of political nationalism was constraining because it
was sensitive enough to implant an ethical relationship that involved mutual
recognition of other castes’ dignity. Although political nationalism promotes
patriotism, which demands collective fidelity to a nation, it does not promote
ethical individuality or moral independence. The survival of untouchability as
an internal fault line is the result of the depletion of moral and ethical resources.
In Ambedkar’s metaphysics, the practice of untouchability by nature leads to
manav droha. It is droha that is committed by an individual who lacks the ethi-
cal and moral independence necessary for self-realization.
Some of the upper castes, who take pride in possessing inherited assets, need
243
to realize that their particular conception of inherited merit motivates them to
commit droha on another manav (human being)—specifically members of the
untouchable caste. Further, the language of political nationalism, which prompts
them to employ morally disciplinary language such as desh droha, acts as a cover
under which they can create social stigma. Some members of the touchable
castes, who seem to enjoy the lifelong advantages of being so-called authentic
nationalists, can do so only by pushing untouchables into a state of internal
exile on an almost permanent basis. Ambedkar referred to this segregated space
of untouchables as Bahishkrut Bharat (quarantined India). Ambedkar suggests
to the touchable Hindus that they should use nationalism as an opportunity
to realize that they cannot accept human degradation. They should, in other
words, avoid sustaining their national pride through the social ruination of
untouchables. Gandhi sent the same message to members of touchable castes
by using similar language.11
Political nationalism thus limits the humanitarianism inherent in its
egalitarian essence through its reliance on the negative language of desh droha.
Put differently, political nationalism is exclusionary in that it obviates the
need to reform the colonial power and seeks to stamp out as adversarial those
who have conceptions of power that run parallel to the dominant notion of

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political freedom. On the other hand, inclusive nationalism—as imagined by
Ambedkar—does not humiliate people on grounds such as citizenship, which
supplies the major criterion for defining political nationalism. In other words,
its adversary is manav droha, and political nationalism gets defined in terms of
desh droha, a phrase with negative connotations. Although Ambedkar chooses
to retain the word droha, he seeks to expand its meaning beyond the concep-
tual bounds of political nationalism. In Ambedkar’s definition, the word droha
acquired a much deeper and more deleterious meaning as a description of the
ethical and moral state of human beings. As he once declared, “the practice of
untouchability against a vast number of humanity is an act of sedition against
humanity.”12 Manav droha was a much more morally objectionable crime to
Ambedkar than desh droha was.
In his works, Ambedkar sought to narrativize the nature of manav droha.
He saw manav droha as so grave that even the portrayal of Dalits as wounded,
classified, or profiled citizens of India would not be adequate to describe the
intensity and magnitude of their situation. In fact, in Ambedkar’s experiential
reading manav droha was a moral crime committed by touchable castes against
other human beings who had been treated as untouchable or unapproachable.13
Manav droha sought to freeze untouchables into stigmatized forms of social life:
244 the caste system reduced them to lives in which they continue to experience the
worst kind of social ostracism today. It involves two morally offensive adjectives:
bahishkrut (quarantined) and tiraskrut (repulsive). Ambedkar uses the term Ba-
hishkrut Bharat, or quarantined India, to explain the morally corrosive impact
of manav droha. This impact is reflected in the quarantined Dalit colonies all
over villages, and even within Indian cities. The touchable castes treat Dalit
colonies as ethically dead spaces. Ambedkar’s parallel nationalist imagination
of Prabuddha Bharat (Enlightened India) could be realized only through the
radical transformation of Bahishkrut Bharat.
In this regard, it is also necessary to mention that Ambedkar did not seem
to be using the concept of bahishkrut in order to produce a spectacular impact
on the social sensibility of civil society in India. In other words, he did not use
Bahiskrut Bharat as a spectacle of tragedy to generate sympathy among touchable
castes. Such vocabulary has to be seen as a cultural resource for enriching the
moral content of this identity. Ambedkar sought to define Bahishkrut Bharat in
contrast to what could be seen as a neat, pure, sacred, and canonized nationalist
identity. The attempts made by Ambedkar to raise the caste question within
the larger issue of Indian nationalism did appear to be cynical, at least to some
nationalists. Ambedkar’s constant efforts to raise the caste question even after

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 Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization
India’s independence may have annoyed impatient nationalists, who ignored that
Ambedkar had legitimate reasons for doing so. The irony was that Ambedkar
attempted to understand nationalism in terms of its capacity to create moral
conditions within which there could be equality of human value across castes—
upholding the idea of “one man, one value” (intrinsic value) instead of just “one
man, one vote,” which defined value solely in terms of political capital.14 In this
regard, both Gandhi and Ambedkar held human value higher than any other
value. Gandhi, in fact, shared with Ambedkar the same expansive meaning of
nationalism, noting: “I am patriotic because I am human and humane.”15 He
did not see any tension between patriotism and humanism. Ambedkar shared
the same meaning through his embracing of Buddhism in 1956. Both Ambedkar
and Gandhi comprehensively rejected national identity as the unilateral result
of self-authorization based on an inherited past. Gandhi, however, added a dif-
ferent and perhaps religious dimension to humanism: seva (service), care, and
compassion are constitutive elements of his conception of humanism.
The right-wing politics of self-authorization over national identity be-
trays the Gandhian and Ambedkarian readings of nationalism. Gandhi and
Ambedkar’s commitment to human values had its basis in the practice of ethical
individuality and moral independence, but such a basis could be subverted by
245
deploying the force of self-authorization that seeks to colonize the independent
thinking that should form the basis of a vibrant and inclusive nationalism.

The Politics of Self-authorized Indian National Identity

Self-authorization seeks to determine both the essence and symbolic form of the
national identity that has been at work since the emergence of nationalist imagi-
nation in India. During the struggle for freedom, it was Congress-led national-
ists who took the lead not only in imagining India, but also in exercising their
authority over the question of who had a share in the emergent Indian identity.
They granted themselves the moral authority to introduce an internal classifica-
tion to national identity, thus dividing people into true nationalists and sham
nationalists, or first- and second-class citizens. In modern day India, attempts
at self-authorization that seek to establish an exclusive claim over nationalism
are being made even more vociferously by Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) forces.
Hindu nationalists are those for whom either the colonial West or other regional
influences are inconsequential to Hinduism. Hindu nationalists would claim
that all Hindus are the same in terms of allegiance to Hindu religious texts; this
idea of sameness produces the other (minority person).16 This claim, in turn,

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 Gopal Guru
demands fidelity not from the true self, but from others who lack this truth.
The assumption upon which self-authorization is based necessarily involves
the prejudice that others can never have an independent hold on the truth of
nation. Hence, such a category must subtract some truth from those who have
established monopoly over nation as truth.
Claims to national identity emerge from the self-authorization of being
truthful to the nation, while others’ allegiance is considered suspect. Self-autho-
rization does not look at nationalism as an opportunistic space that would enable
others to express their genuine allegiance to the nation. Self-authorized claims
on national identity do not accept the idea that everyone’s—including “true
nationalists”—allegiance to nationalism is on trial and not given. Commitment
to nationalism is a matter of trial, particularly in the context of the complex form
of pluralism, upon which self-authorization runs against the grain of a plural-
ist reading of nationalism. For example, in this regard, Bhikhu Parekh’s work
on the plural imagination of India is particularly noteworthy.17 Some scholars
find a plurality of meaning within Indian national identity.18 Following from
their readings, one can argue that the concept of the Indian nation has to be
understood as an adjective rather than as a proper noun. In its syntactic sense,
perceiving the nation as an adjective allows for the modification of our value
246 judgment on nationalism. Hence, a pluralist reading of nationalism necessarily
undermines the claim of self-authorization that treats Indian nationalism as its
exclusive cultural property.
As an adjective, nation represents the As an adjective, nation
site where different views of the nation represents the site where dif-
ferent views of the nation con-
contest and negotiate with each other. test and negotiate with each
Nation, then, is neither historically de- other. Nation, then, is neither
termined nor culturally essentialized. historically determined nor
culturally essentialized. And
yet, in the Indian context, there have been constant attempts to mold the na-
tion’s multiculturalism into a monolithic culture. Self-authorization eliminates
the need to assign intellectual backup, if not respectability, to nationalism.
Nationalism need not rely any more on the persuasiveness and cogency of its
arguments, and still less on the willingness of its members to accept them. One
could experience this lack of reason at the anti–Jawaharlal Nehru University
(JNU) protests recently held in and outside Delhi. On 9 February 2016, in
one of the cultural programs on the JNU campus, some people were shown
shouting out anti-India slogans on TV footage. According to Ambedkar’s vision,

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 Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization
the absolutist conception of nation suggested in this footage is bankrupt not
only intellectually but also ethically.19 It does not deal with the concrete social
relationships between human beings. Instead, its focus is an abstract image of
the nation. It does not center on the moral need for self-reflection or interroga-
tion, or on the depletion of ethical or moral resources. This depletion is closely
related to the social production of manav droha among touchables in India—a
development Ambedkar would argue is weakening India’s national identity.

Dalits Require National Identity for Self-realization

I argue that Dalits in India do not require nationalism as a means to compensate

for their cultural deprivation. On the contrary, they require national identity for
twin purposes. First, it comes to them as a moral need for their self-realization.
The self-realization of Dalits essentially involves not only that they matter in
terms of enriching the normative content of national identity, but also that their
perspective is distinct from other viewpoints in that its primary focus is on the
normative content of national identity. Secondly, it comes to Dalits out of an
epistemic need to connect nationalism with theory. To put it differently, the
Dalit predicament of social oppression offers better intellectual opportunities
247
and epistemic grounds on which connections between political theory and na-
tionalism can be made. In fact, Dalit self-realization necessarily emerges in the
realm of theory that is informed by practice within the nation-state. However,
to acquire this epistemic ability, they need to escape the trap present in claims
made by some self-authorized nationalists over Indian nationalism. These claims
can be understood in terms of exercising legislative power to decide who can
certify the claims to nationalism. Dalits, for their self-realization as decent hu-
man beings, need a different theoretical understanding of nationalism. Dalits’
understanding of nationalism is based on the ethics of social action promoting
the idea of living together. In other words, this understanding does not define
nationalism in terms of an amoral imperative that makes allegiance to nation a
matter of rule. However, enabling and arriving at this understanding is not an
easy cultural process, since Dalit leaders have been using the symbolic language of
a nationalism reliant on self-authorized claims. For example, some Dalit activists
use symbols such as the slogan “Bharat Mata ki jai” (“Hail to Mother India”).
However, those who argue that, for the Dalit, the idea of nation as an
opportunity sphere does not make sense will be surprised to know that some
Dalit leaders have now symbolically incorporated the Indian nation into their
pedagogical practices.20 Nagpur, for example, every October on the Dhamma

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 Gopal Guru
Chakra Pravartan Din (the day on which Ambedkar, along with several hundred
thousand untouchables, embraced neo-Buddhism), such leaders recite the na-
tional anthem after they offer Buddha vandana (Buddhist prayer). To further this
allegiance to India, they also say “Bharat Mata ki jai” after they finish saying Jai
Bhim (saluting Ambedkar).21 The Dalit turn toward nationalism is also indica-
tive of a readiness, at least temporarily, to revise their response to nationalism
and pursue nationalism as the project that involves a collective conception of
good. Nowadays, one can come across Dalit leaders publically vocalizing their
identification with national symbols such as the national flag and singing the
national anthem even in a Buddha viahara (monastery). In this context of grow-
ing neo-nationalism among Dalit leaders, which goes against the grain of some
Dalit scholars, it would be premature to construct a post-nationalist position
for the Dalits. Inclusion within the nation is still possible, but Dalits cannot
imagine an Indian nation without factoring in the paradox that it has failed to
substantially improve their material or moral quality of life.
As mentioned previously, Dalits require a nation for self-realization. Their
relation to the Indian nation is neither spiritual nor abstract, but experiential.
They seek to associate with nationalism through Buddhism, based on everyday
initiatives in ethical practices. However, this association with the nation must
248 not be seen in terms of the territorial origin of Buddhism. It should instead
be viewed primarily, in terms of Buddhism, as a moral principle that assigns
dynamism to an otherwise normative concept of national identity. Buddhism as
an ethical practice would radically alter the social relationship that is otherwise
based on an unequal distribution of moral goods, such as respect, dignity, and
reciprocal recognition, that is internal to Ambedkar’s Buddhism. This forms the
core principle of self-realization for those who are the source of manav droha
and those who are on the receiving end of accusations of desh droha.
This principle of rotation of power would guard against the dominance
of any group of elites within society. In a participatory democracy, which is
integral to Ambedkar’s Buddhism, it is ethically desirable for aspirants to reach
ruling power while also accepting that they can be ruled in turn by those at the
bottom of society. This democratic dynamism is embodied in the Ashok Chakra,
a Buddhist symbol which is embossed on the national flag of India. As a power-
ful cultural symbol, the chakra provides an opportunity for nationalism to save
itself from falling into a paradox.
This nationalist paradox is as follows: whatever nationalism promises as
the precondition of its emergence is not fulfilled even after its emergence. For
example, Indian nationalism promised the rotation principle, which has been

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 Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization
duly codified into the Indian Constitution. The rotation principle refers to the
principle of providing opportunities for people to achieve vertical mobility
across various spheres. Radical rotation is aimed at enabling the lower castes,
such as Dalits, to acquire generic identity so that they can appear in different
spheres of recognition without a preordained tag of ascribed description such as
“Dalit.” Once they had achieved
For Dalits, nationalism makes sense
generic identity, history would
stop following them. This means only in terms of its aspirations to
no one would refer to Dalits as find concrete expression in the
ex-untouchables and they would
be able to take up positions in progressive performance of their state.
multiple modern, clean occupations by rotation depending on choice and
qualification. Thus, a person from an upper caste could be a leather worker,
and the leather worker could be a labor commissioner. Nationalism, through
its articulating agency—the state—also promises to annihilate inhuman prac-
tices such as scavenging. An obnoxious aspect of manav droha, namely moral
offense, is inflicted by those who are responsible for perpetuating scavenging.
Scavenging, in the context of India, involves one human being—always from
the untouchable caste—who manually cleans the excrement of another person.
The Indian Constitution includes provisions that suggest the removal of the 249
practice of untouchability from public life. For Dalits, nationalism makes sense
only in terms of its aspirations to find concrete expression in the progressive
performance of their state. This performance, in turn, lies in the state’s capacity
to transform conditions that would create new opportunities for those caught
up in historical frameworks of human degradation.
Nationalism as the framework for self-realization should also lead Dalits
to think about their collective predicament in the life of India, as opposed to
what they are able to achieve individually. It is, of course, arguable that the state
makes it possible these days for a few Dalits to occasionally make individual
progress, which is often celebrated as a spectacular achievement. Nevertheless,
the majority of Dalits continue to exist at, or even beyond, the margins of the
nation.22 They exist at the margins of the Planning Commission’s considerations
and its budgetary provisions. In fact, Dalits have to fight even to acquire a little
space at the margin of Union budgets. In a democratic overflow of resources,
they are the fringe beneficiaries of the leakages of democracy, which works mostly
through trickle-down mechanisms. The state, therefore, can only become truly
nationalist for Dalits on the condition that it takes a social justice agenda seri-
ously and implements it honestly. The state must take extraordinary care to not

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allow members of civil society to construct the image of Dalits as scavengers.
This predicament establishes an unhealthy overlap between form and object,
in my view suggesting that “Dalit is dirt and dirt is Dalit.” This association of
dirt with Dalit and vice versa has been structurally sustained in the sense of the
continued proximity of Dalit colonies to garbage depots, both in villages and in
cities. There are Dalit activists who, in their debate with the Indian state as well
as with the casteist civil society,
The state, therefore, becomes nation- are making this point quite
alist for Dalits only on the condition poignantly, contending that
that it takes a social justice agenda manual scavenging is indeed a
source of moral embarrassment
seriously and implements it honestly. for the Indian state.23 The state
does respond to such questions (see the Swachh Bharat, Clean India, campaign
in India), but the response is not adequate.
What Dalits in India want from their nation-state is the promotion of
development in Indian cities in such a way as to eliminate both inhuman labor
practices and the resultant residential segregation that is at the root of manav
droha. However, it has not been possible for the state to create the structures of
opportunity that would eliminate these spheres of segregation. The state does
250 create some spheres of opportunity, for example by giving jobs to Dalits through
affirmative provisions. But this sphere of opportunity fails to overlap with others.
A Dalit reservation (or affirmative action) beneficiary has the capacity to buy
a house in a society that would elevate his or her self-esteem, but not in areas
considered to be attractive residential locations, implying that he or she carries
the baggage of his caste wherever he or she goes.24
As has been argued time and again by supporters of the market, rational
transactions (at least theoretically) promise to undermine, if not eliminate, ir-
rational elements like caste and religion, followed by demographic minorities.
But even against this theoretical assumption, caste continues to rear its head,
even in an urban context.25 The image of urban India is tainted by the influence
of caste on the material and cultural life of Indian cities, not to mention the
market’s failure to follow its own principle of rationality.
No nation, India included, aspires to showcase its identity through
negative reference points. Its greatest desire is to express its national identity
through affirmative events. In order for the nation-state to showcase its identity
positively it needs to prioritize certain eminent spheres, such as the military,
culture, sports, and material growth; these can collectively be referred to as the
nation’s performative sphere. Hence, the expression of national pride acquires

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 Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization
an individual dimension. Put simply, national identity finds its articulation
through the individualization of national pride. Thus, athletes, military heroes,
and successful industrialists make valuable individual contributions that can be
seen as enhancing national pride. Thus, any athlete, military hero, or successful
industrialist’s individual victory or failure becomes associated with national pride
or insult, depending on their performance. It is in this sense that nationalism
is performative in character. Only some individuals are structurally privileged
to become sources of national pride, while others—Dalits for instance—are
structurally excluded from the performance of nationalism.
Of late, some have argued that Dalits, along with Adivasis, are the mul-
nivasis (original inhabitants) of India.26 Such an approach assumes an exclusive
ontological claim on the Indian nation. Following Ambedkar, it could then be
suggested to supporters of such claims that this exclusive approach does not
fit into the Dalit theory of nationalism as the framework for self-realization.
Dalits should thus shift focus away from the ontological association of human
beings with territory to human beings with intrinsic value, acknowledging
equality, respect, and the worth of every sentient human being’s existence. This
worth, constituted through inter-subjective understanding, should form the
basis of any national identity. It is in this sense that the discourse on national
251
identity in general, and the Dalit response to the question of Indian identity in
particular, should go beyond the ontology of belonging to a territorial nation
and should identify oneself with others through a moral route of empathy. In
other words, it is the ethics of empathizing with those caught in an embattled
existence that should provide the basis for national identity. Dalits must take
the lead in giving a new human dimension to the idea of India, as it is the
precondition for their self-realization as worthy human beings. National-
ism as the framework of self-realization necessarily contains the need for a
reconfiguration of power structures that would promote the radical rotation
of opportunity structures, thus making the social base of nationalism more
inclusive and egalitarian. Self-realization of Dalits would also mean that once
the radical rotation achieves its full dynamism, this would then not only create
W
confidence among Dalits, but also restore a sense of self-worth among them. A

Notes
1. Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the later 19th Century
(Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 114–9.
2. Susan Bayly, “Hindu Modernizers and the Public arena, Indigenous critique of caste in Colonial
India,” in Swami Vivekananda and the modernization of Hinduism, ed. William Radice (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 96–97.

Fall/Winter 2016 • volume xxiii, issue i

 Gopal Guru
3. Ibid.
4. B.R. Ambedkar, “Annihilation of Caste, Vol. 1,” in Writings and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar, ed.
Vasant Moon (Mumbai: Government of Maharashtra, 1990), 50. For a recent endorsement of Ambed-
kar’s observation, which argues that caste and religion are two internal narratives of the idea of India, see:
Ashutosh Varshney, “Modi’s Idea of India-2,” Indian Express, February 6, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/
article/opinion/columns/modis-idea-of-india-2.
5. Vithalramji Shinde, a social thinker from nineteenth century Maharashtra, has used this term.
6. Vasant Moon, ed., Writings and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar Vol. 18 (Mumbai: Government of
Maharashtra, 1989), 50.
7. Dhananjay Keer, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Life and Mission (Mumbai: Popular Publication, 1954),
166.
8. Hari Narake, ed., Writing and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar Vol. 19 (Mumbai: Government of
Maharashtra, 2005), 395.
9. Moon, Writings and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar Vol. 18.
10. R. Ilangovan, “ Dalits Separated by Wall at Colony,” The Hindu, July 20, 2011, http://www.thehindu.
com/news/national/tamil-nadu/dalits-separated-by-wall-at-colony/article2266854.ece.
11. Mahatma Gandhi, “ Duty of Hindu Navjivan” (speech given at Ahmadabad, November 1921).
12. Narake, Writing and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar Vol. 19, 392
13. Ibid., 242.
14. Moon, Writing and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar Vol.18 (Mumbai: Government of Maharashtra,
2002), 246.
15. Mahatma Gandhi, “Nationalism and humanism” (speech given at Ahmedabad, Gujarat, March
16, 1921).
16. For more details, see: David Ludden, ed., Making India Hindu: Religion, Community and the Politics
of Democracy in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006).
17. Bhikhu Parekh, Re-imagining India (Delhi: Institute of Social Sciences, 2005).
252 18. Ashutosh Varshney, “Contested Meanings: India’s National Identity, Hindu Nationalism, and the
Politics of Anxiety,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (1993): 227–61.
19. Vasant Moon, ed., Writing and Speeches of Babasaheb Ambedkar Vol. 8 (Mumbai: Government of
Maharashtra, 1990), 351.
20. Hugo Gorringe, “The Caste of the Nation: Untouchability and Citizenship in South India,” Con-
tribution to Indian Sociology 42, no. 1 (2008) 123–49.
21. One could observe this on every October 14 at Deeksha Bhumi (site of Buddhist conversion) at
Nagpur in Maharashtra. This is also practiced in local level Buddhist rituals followed in some of the vil-
lages in Akola District of Maharashtra.
22. Jan Breman, The Labouring Poor in India: Patterns of Exploitation, Subordination, and Exclusion
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 132–205.
23. Bhim Yatra was the nation-wide social campaign led by Bezwada Wilson against the practice of
manual scavenging in India. This campaign culminated on April 14, 2016 at the national capital of Delhi.
24. This is the experience shared with me by Mr. Harkishan Santoshi, retired Labor Commissioner.
Santoshi, in his conversation with me, said that information about his caste would travel faster than his
transfer papers wherever he was transferred.
25. Gopal Guru, “Rejection of Rejection,” in Humiliation: Claims and Context, ed. Gopal Guru (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 234.
26. The term, mulnivasi (indigenous), is associated with the claim made by some lower caste people
for the last two decades that they are the sons of soil or the original inhabitants of India. By implication,
they suggest that the Aryans have come from outside.

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