THE GEOPOLITICS OF OIL EXPLORATION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR

PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOMALIA

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the

Degree of Master of ………………………… of …………… University

2018
 DECLARATION

This proposal is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other
University

………………………….. …………………
Signature Date

(REG. NO.)

This proposal has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

………………………….. ……………….

Signature Date

Dr. ……….
University of….

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 DEDICATION

This research project is dedicated to …

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my gratitude to …

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 Table of Contents
DECLARATION......................................................................................................................ii
DEDICATION........................................................................................................................iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT......................................................................................................iv
Abbreviations and Acronyms..............................................................................................viii
Table of Figures.......................................................................................................................ix
Abstract.....................................................................................................................................x
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY.....................................................1
1.1 Background to the Study......................................................................................................1
1.1.1 Somalia’s Oil Geology and Exploration...........................................................................4
1.1.2 Understanding Somalia’s Oil Stratigraphy.......................................................................4
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....................................................................................................6
1.3 Objectives of the Study........................................................................................................7
1.4 Research Questions..............................................................................................................8
1.5 Significance of the Study.....................................................................................................8
1.6 The Delimitation of the Study..............................................................................................9
1.7 Limitations of the Study.....................................................................................................10
1.8 Chapter Outline..................................................................................................................10
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW.....................................................................12
2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................12
2.2 Background of Resource-Related Conflicts in Africa.......................................................12
2.2.1 Theorizing the Prevalence of Oil-Related Conflicts.......................................................13
2.2.2 Cases of Oil-Related Conflicts in Africa........................................................................16
2.3 Actors in Oil Related Conflicts..........................................................................................28
2.4 The Oil Politics in Somalia................................................................................................30
2.5 Theoretical Framework......................................................................................................35
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....................................................38
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................38
3.2 Research Design.................................................................................................................38
3.3 Data Collection Instruments...............................................................................................38
3.4 Data Collection Procedures................................................................................................39
3.5 Reliability and Validity......................................................................................................40

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3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation..........................................................................................40
3.7 Ethical Considerations.......................................................................................................41
CHAPTER FOUR: OIL POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE..........................42
4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................42
4.2 Demographic Overview of Somalia...................................................................................42
4.3 Somalia’s History and Colonial Legacies..........................................................................43
4.4 The Evolution of Conflict in Somalia................................................................................44
4.5 Clan Politics and Conflicts.................................................................................................46
4.6 Al-Shabaab: Evolution of a Social Movement (2005-2018)..............................................49
4.7 The Dynamics of Oil..........................................................................................................54
4.8 The Emerging Oil Conflict in Somalia..............................................................................56
4.9 Analysis of the Oil Politics in Somalia..............................................................................58
4.9.1 Mechanisms and Manifestations of Resource Curse......................................................58
4.9.2 Will the discovery of Oil Trigger Conflict?....................................................................59
4.9.3 Existence of Rebel Groups and External Actors.............................................................62
4.9.4 Ethnic Fractionalization in Somalia................................................................................64
4.9.5 Political Grievance..........................................................................................................66
4.9.6 Somalia’s External Actors...............................................................................................72
4.9.7 Overlapping Concession Agreements.............................................................................73
4.10 Summary..........................................................................................................................74
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..............................75
5.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................75
5.2 Summary............................................................................................................................75
5.3 Conclusions........................................................................................................................76
5.4 Recommendations..............................................................................................................78
References...............................................................................................................................81

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 Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

AMISOM African Mission in Somalia

APF African Peace Facility

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

ESU Exploration Security Unit

EU European Union

HOA Horn of Africa

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

GIA Galmudug Interim Administration

GRS Galmudug Regional State

MNC Multinational Corporation

NACOSTI National Commission for Science and Technology

ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front

OPU Oil Protection Unit

SNM Somali National Movement

SNRS Somali National Regional State

SPM Somali Patriotic Movement

SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front

TFG Transitional Federal Government

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UN United Nations

USA United States of America

USC United Somali Congress

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 Table of Figures

Figure 2.1: Resource-Related Conflict in Africa, 1197-2014).................................................16

Figure 2.2: Pictorial view of Somalia’s oil blocks in Nogal and Darhoor...............................31
Figure 2.3: Somalia’s oil basins in Nogal and Darhoor...........................................................32
Figure 2.4: Somaliland and Puntland.......................................................................................34
Figure 4.1: Oil Exploration in the Ogaden Region..................................................................57

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 Abstract

The research examines the geopolitics of oil exploration and the prospects for peace and
stability in Somalia. It focuses on the conditions surrounding the exploration and exploitation
of oil in Somalia and argues that, the operating environment is littered with several negative
trajectories that might jeopardize the process and plunge the country into deeper instability.
This study proceeds from the fact that Somalia is in the process of oil prospecting and the
potential oil find will have the potential of ushering the country into the league of countries
having this precious energy resource. Limited studies on the potential for peace and stability
in this situation have inspired this study as a way of filling the research gap and offering
informed opinions on how best to manage this resource to ensure peace and stability is
engendered. As a result, this study adopted the following objectives; to establish the
background and historical evolution of the conflict in Somalia; to examine the role of the
various actors in the conflict in Somalia; to analyze the oil politics in Somalia and it effect on
peace and stability, and to recommend plausible measures to ensure that oil exploration and
exploitation contributes to Somalia’s peace and stability. This study is a significant
endeavour that not only enriches the scholarly debate on how Somalia’s peace and stability
can benefit from the exploitation of the oil resource. It also provides informed views and
opinions to policy makers on just how the issue can be best handled. The study adopted the
resource curse model as its guide, in order to understand whether Somalia is likely to prove
or disprove the hypothesis that a resource endowment most likely creates conditions of
conflict and general socio-economic and political ruin. After reviewing existing literature on
the subject area, this study established that there is a gap in the literature on how Somalia as a
country can realize peace and stability. The study chose a qualitative research design to guide
its data gathering and analysis. This design was picked owing to its major advantage of
enabling the researcher to access an array of information and enabling for a comprehensive
examination of this contemporary issue. Based on this analysis, the paper predicts that
conflict is highly likely in the case of Somalia unless sustained mitigating measures on a
multilevel approach are undertaken. where oil is not necessarily the cause, it must be
understood as an intensifying factor on the already existing institutional weaknesses and
possible conflict dynamics. The study eventually concludes with several policy
considerations, among them the temporary halt in oil exploration to allow for harmonized
legal frame working, sustained efforts to address the root causes of the conflict and an
address of the governance and legitimacy issues facing the country.

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 CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background to the Study

The prevalence of conflicts on the African continent has often come with debilitating

consequences to the populace. The rabidity of these conflicts has often resulted in wanton

loss of lives, the displacement of many more-within and across state boundaries, as well as

the destruction of the economies and polities of these countries (Le Billon, 2012). Whereas

the root causes of these conflicts are multidimensional-from socio-economic to political

sticking points, most of these conflicts have been known to be driven by the quest for control

of fossil fuels. Auty’s (2004) thesis on ‘The Resource Curse’ has heavily been employed to

explain why such resources are never a portent of development but rather a foreboding of

doom and gloom for a country. He argued that such endowments are actually magnets of

economic ruin and catalysts of conflict and instability due to the stirring up of combinations

of ‘grievances’ and ‘greed’ which are hard to resolve in such an environment of high

expectations.

To say that it is only in Africa that violent conflicts have been fought over the control of

resources- and more so oil- is an understatement. The current international system is

increasingly becoming energy-dependent, with global production processes requiring

constant supplies of energy sources. As such, fossil fuels have become a focal point in the

quest by countries for energy and geopolitics has now been dominated by powerful countries

and Multinational Companies (MNCs) scrambling for spheres of influence to profit from the

control of these resources (Klare, 2004). Oil is a major source of income for governments and

profits to corporations who produce and distribute it. By the singular fact that oil is a vital

commodity in this globalized world, any disruptions in supply or pricing often have

1
devastating consequences to the world economy and that is why the major powers often adopt

foreign policies that seek to dominate this oil sector.

The dependence on oil, coupled with the increasing demand for it, has contrasted with the

inability to meet demand (or albeit at the right price). The result has been interruptions in

production flows and pricing, with and the measures taken by states either to access or

dominate it have been interpreted as belligerence by communities within the resource area or

states, thus providing a valid reason for war (Klare, 2004). This has caused the main areas of

production and transit routes to turn into areas of tension and conflict. Ultimately, the

frequency and intensity of these conflicts has depended on the environment in which

decisions and political strategies are made, and the relationship between demand and supply

and on the geography of the production and distribution of oil - the main oil sources and

reserves span regions that cross more than one country or are located in areas of high

political, social and military instability (Auty, 2004).

The larger Middle East, the South China Sea (Vietnam, China, Japan, Philippines), Iraq and

Iran (especially the Persian Gulf), Russia, Ukraine, and Venezuela have emerged as the major

conflict hotspots in the last three decades and this situation is likely to be replicated into the

future. The Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988, the Sudanese civil war of 1983-2005 and the Gulf

war of 1990-1991 had heavy oil-resource undertones (Patey, 2014). In this geopolitical quest

for the oil resource, peace and stability has become at times a mirage as most often these

conflicts have become intricately enmeshed in the distinct local socio-economic and political

histories of conflict. Whereas the intensifier has been the quest for determining who controls

and distributes the benefits of this oil; the context of these inter-state and intra-state conflicts

has been the rivalries (at communal and inter-state level). In these contexts, is also the age-

old conflicts on land, religious and ideological differences as well as ethnic divisions over the

control of grazing lands and political power. In most of these conflicts, the discovery of oil

2
has signified boom times ahead, as previously there was no other major resource that could

be used to engineer economic development.

Conflicts in the Niger Delta, over the Bakassi Peninsula (between Nigeria and Cameroon)

also indicate the perceived benefits with which oil exploration and mining will ultimately

bring to an otherwise poverty-impoverished region. The inter-state conflict between Tanzania

and Malawi over their boundary in Lake Tanganyika has taken a new dimension with oil

exploration discovering the potential oil and natural gas deposits on the sea bed of the lake.

Likewise, the Horn of the Africa (HOA) region has also witnessed one of the devastating

wars over the control of oil. The unmanageable differences between Sudan and its southern

portion eventually led to the split of Sudan- one of the largest countries in Africa by

geographical area. This conflict is now being fought over the territorial reach of both Sudan

and South Sudan as the region in contest has been proven, after exploration, of having sizable

quantities of oil (Grawert, 2010).

Further south of the Horn, Somalia is the centre of global attention following the discovery of

potential oil fields. Estimates suggest that Somali’s offshore oil and gas fields could contain

110 billion barrels-more than Kuwait’s fields, potentially making the area the fifth largest

global producer. Further onshore finds have put it at loggerheads with her South-western

Neighbour-Kenya (Walls and Kibble 2014). The news of this recent discoveries has been

greeted with a lot of optimism, that the amount of wealth associated with such resources has

the potential to catalyse development and transform the country into an economic hub based

on its strategic position in the region (Reuters, 2012, 2013). Another hydrocarbon analysis by

the World Bank and United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in 1992, ranked

Somalia second only to Sudan as the top prospective producer. Drawing from the country’s

history, concerns have been raised regarding its readiness to allow for commercial oil

production. However, Somalia has also been the theatre of a damaging civil war, with

3
decades of clannism and clan rivalries rendering this country ungovernable for the most part

after the deposition of Siad Barre in 1991.

1.1.1 Somalia’s Oil Geology and Exploration

Somalia’s history of oil exploration is not new in the discourse of Africa’s rich natural

resource economies. Evidence suggests that Somalia’s history of oil exploration dates back

several decades in the colonial period (Balthasar, 2014). Italian and British geologists

pioneering work led to the identification of potential oil reserves in Somalia. Subsequent

exploratory activity by an Italian company Agip (now Eni) and a US –based Sinclair oil

Corporation begun to study Somalia’s oil geology in the 1950s (Balthasar, 2014).

In the late 1980s, another phase of hydrocarbon exploration began spearheaded by five major

international oil corporations; ConocoPhillips, Shell (Pectin), Eni, Amoco, Total and Texaco

(Bamberger and Skovsted, 2016). Yet with the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991

and the ensuing war, these companies –together with other actors such as BP and Chevron-

declared force majeure and put their operations on hold. Ultimately, hopes for embarking on

oil production in Somalia were buried when the US-led and UN-approved humanitarian

intervention ‘Restore Hope’ in 1992/93 failed to bring political stability to the country.

1.1.2 Understanding Somalia’s Oil Stratigraphy

The territory of Somalia is located at the edge of the Africa’s continent and it is part of the

Somali Peninsula, the region commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa. Somalia has the

largest coast line in Africa which extends to 1,000km long the red sea and 1,900km along the

Indian Ocean. The total surface area of Somalia is approximately 637,650 km2 (Africa Union,

Working Report, 2014). Seismic analysis of Somalia’s geology indicates that there at least

eight petroleum basins in Somalia that hold potential prospects ready for exploration and

development (Idale News Online, 2013).  These include; Daban basin, Migiurtinia Basin,

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Mudugh Basin, Mogadishu Basin (Ex Coriolei Basin), Chismaio and Lamu Basin, El-Wak

Mandera Basin and Ogaden Basin. Some of these sedimentary basins have deposit

thicknesses more than five Kilometres and contain good source rocks, reservoir rocks, seals

and traps necessary for oil and gas to deposit (Idale News Online, 2013).

Based on this analysis, the Federal Republic of Somalia is determined to join the race of

commercial oil production in Africa. Specifically, in 2012, the Federal Republic of Somalia

(FGs) signed an agreement for the exploration of potential offshore and onshore oil fields

with Soma and Gas Explorations (Obi, 2012). Further, in 2014, the Federal Ministry of

Minerals and Water Resources signed an agreement for the exploration of potential offshore

and onshore oil fields with Shell Gas exploration. Additionally, it’s well known there is

renewed interest for Somalia’s oil geology and the country has witnessed a host of activities

as numerous actors rush to secure concessions with the government of Somalia (Obi, 2012).

The attractiveness of Somalia’s oil endowments is basically based on the promising large

profits (Walls and Kibble 2014). For the first time in many years, it is clear that the fragile

state, of the Horn has a unique opportunity to transform the lives of its people and

consequently lay the foundation stones for a better and prosperous country for its future

generations. Additionally, if well invested this wealth can go a long way to having positive

spill overs in the region. However, beneath this optimism there are concerns that ought to be

addressed if Somalia is to realize the full benefits of its newly discovered wealth. Against this

backdrop, this paper examines the conditions surrounding the exploration and exploitation of

oil in Somalia and argues that, the operational environment is littered with negative

trajectories that might jeopardize the process as well as derail its prospects for peace and

stability. It is on the basis of this information that this research sought to understand just how

the discovery of oil in Somalia would be a blessing as projected or will it be a curse as it is

the case with other oil rich countries in Africa and whether the exploration and exploitation

5
of oil in Somalia exacerbate conflict. Furthermore, just how has the involvement of

international actors impacted the prospects for peace and stability in the country.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The discovery of oil in Somalia has revealed enormous potential for political and social

development of the country. For the first time in many years, it is projected that these

discoveries have the potential to dramatically increase government revenues, a substantial

blessing to the people of Somalia, if the revenues are invested well in reconstructing the

dilapidated infrastructure, promoting development and investing in human capital. Somalia is

therefore at an epoch-changing time, where it can rebuild its economic history through the

exploitation of this vital resource while at the same time ensuring that the structural causes of

this conflict can be addressed. Peace and stability can be engendered through the

redistribution of the benefits of this oil.

Existing researches on Somalia have explored the political economy of conflict on Somalia

(Kaldor, 2006; Menkhaus, 2003 and Mbugua, 2013). Furthermore, growing literature has

documented the role played by international actors in fuelling and/or resolving the conflict in

Somalia. There are further expositions on the impact of the Al Shabaab on the conflict and

the prospects for peace. However, there is inadequate literature on the potential for peace and

stability in the discovery, exploration and exploitation of the oil finds in Somalia. What

Somalia ought to do right to avoid falling into the trap of oil being a resource curse? This

question has not been fully covered in literature and therefore, the existing literature on

‘Resource wars’ and ‘resource curse’ do not mention the Somali context.

Petterson’s (2011) and Abdi’s (2015) researches on the intractability of conflict in Somalia,

examine the causes, drivers and dynamics of the war. Whereas Petterson’s study is a valuable

addition to the existing body of literature, it acknowledges in its study there is need for

further research on other influencers of peace and stability in Somalia. Though she does not

6
mention oil as one such determinant, this study will seek to fill this gap in literature by

examining the geopolitics of oil exploration and how they will affect peace and stability in

Somalia. Abdi (2015) actually recommends a further study on the impact of the entry of the

various international and local actors on the various aspects of life in Somalia. The study

proceeded to investigate how the discovery and consequently the actual exploration will

affect the fragile security environment within and between the various autonomous or semi-

autonomous political entities, clans, armed groups, and international oil companies.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study was to examine the conditions surrounding the exploration

and exploitation of oil in Somalia. This study sought to achieve the following objectives;

1. To establish the background and historical evolution of the conflict in Somalia,

2. To examine the role of the various actors in the Somalia conflict,

3. To analyze the oil politics in Somalia and it effect on peace and stability,

4. Recommend plausible measures to ensure that oil exploration and exploitation contributes

to Somalia’s peace and stability.

1.4 Research Questions

These following research questions guided the study;

1. What is the contextual background and evolution of the conflict in Somalia?

2. What role has the various actors played in the Somalia conflict?

3. To what extent has the oil politics affected peace and stability in Somalia?

4. Which measures can be taken to ensure that oil exploration and exploitation in Somalia’s

does threaten peace and stability?

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1.5 Significance of the Study

The study sought to fill the gap in existing literature on the prospects for peace and stability

especially after the exploration and discovery of significant oil finds in Somalia. The limited

studies on the geopolitics of oil and the resultant impact on peace and stability made this

study worthwhile and distinct. This is because this study was to build on the knowledge about

the underlying factors in this conflict to introduce the dimension of the oil politics occasioned

by the exploration of oil. This study argued that such a discovery added a new dimension to

the yet-to-be resolved entrenched differences among the various actors. The paper draws on

the literature of the natural resource curse which has been used to widely explain the reasons

for the continued conflicts among the natural resource rich economies in the developing

countries. The “Resource Curse” has been a topic of study for decades and is now a well-

established term in both academic literature and the public domain. Building on the findings

of Balthasar (2014), Reitano & Shaw (2013), Walls & Kibble (2012), and Anderson &

Browne (2011) we argue that the mere belief in the existence of oil and the related ongoing

oil exploration trigger a number of the negative trajectories associated with the resource curse

such as corruption and violent conflict.

This study also sought to make a contribution to the contemporary debate on oil exploration

as a source of insecurity in the Horn of Africa region. The findings inform the debate and

form a basis for further research. It also provides information relating to threats and

challenges of oil exploration activities on national security in the Horn of Africa, particularly

in Somalia. Additionally, the finding of the study will be a critical assert to policy makers that

enhances their ability to make informed policies based on research on the impact of oil

exploration and eventual extraction on national security and how to make it less of a security

challenge in the Horn of Africa, and in Somalia to be specific.

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1.6 The Delimitation of the Study

The geographical delimitation of this study was in the Horn of Africa country of Somalia as a

state entity existing by virtue of the imperial legacy. Whereas the country has experienced

breakaways in the form of Puntland in north eastern Somalia and Somaliland in north western

Somalia (see Figure 2.4), this study will focus on the dynamics of conflict as have affected

the whole country, as well as how local and international actors made this conflict intractable.

This study focused on the period between 1991 and 2017. This periodization was based on a

time when the country degenerated into deep-seated conflict, with the latent phase of post-

independent Somalia gradually turning into violence, after the overthrow of Siad Barre. This

was a period when clannism, regional actors (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya) and international

actors entered the country either to take sides in the conflict or to attempt to resolve the

conflict. As this conflict raged, the key issues were brought to the fore; issues which will be

examined. Subsequently, this study sought to domicile the issue of oil and its exploration-as a

dimension in this conflict in Somalia as well as a potential facilitator of peace and stability in

the country.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

This study foresaw various challenges that might have handicapped the research. First of all,

the scanty literature on the subject area was a probable obstacle to the conduct of an extensive

research. The researcher overcame this by consulting wider sources of information; by not

being limited to books and journal articles but also researches conducted on the area.

Furthermore, the researcher sourced for and obtained seminar papers and relevant policy

documents.

Logistical and time constraints were also projected to pose a challenge to this research. The

logistical challenges emanated from the data gathering and analysis, since some of them were

restricted in access either due to their sensitivity or because of the requirements for

9
subscription or purchase. The researcher overcame this by pooling financial resources to

facilitate access to these informative sources. Moreover, the researcher networked with

various sources who facilitated access to vital information on the subject area.

1.8 Chapter Outline

This research is divided into five chapters with each chapter covering a specific topic area as

follows;

Chapter one is the introduction, providing a background to the study. It grounds this study

within the global context-as an issue requiring concerted policy and practical attention as well

as a research problem that demands scholarly study to fill the gap in literature. This chapter

further lists the objectives of the study, the significance of the study and the limitation and

delimitation of the study.

Chapter two is a review of the existing literature, to provide a synthesis of what has been

written on the subject area. This chapter critiques this literature while at the same time laying

bare the gaps in literature that this study intended to fill. A relevant theoretical framework

used to guide the scholarly approach to this study is also provided in this chapter.

Chapter three on the other hand provides the methodology that guided the various processes

in data gathering and analysis. It is an illustration as to the objectivity and the scientific rigour

employed in carrying out this research. It has sections on the research design, the data

gathering and analysis processes, validity and reliability as well as ethical considerations.

Chapter four is an analysis of the data gathered with informed inferences made based on the

data gathered. Chapter five is the concluding chapter of this study, containing a summary of

the study as well as conclusions based on the observations made in the previous chapter.

Recommendations are also made on the way forward to ensure that peace and stability is

engendered by a purposive approach in addressing the oil resource being explored and in

Somalia.

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 CHAPTER TWO:

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a critical review of the existing literature on the topic area under study.

It informs this study as to the extent of research on the geopolitics of oil and its enabling

factor to peace and stability. The chapter identifies the thematic areas canvassed in the studies

carried out while critiquing their extent in addressing the gap in literature that is the concern

of this study. Lead scholars and their views are presented as a way of ensuring that this

research is well founded in the scholarly body of knowledge. Subsequently a guiding

theoretical framework is discussed to provide a thematic guide to this study.

2.2 Background of Resource-Related Conflicts in Africa

Oil is a major commodity that drives global production processes. As a collective goods

problem, the extraction, mining and sale of this precious commodity is always laden with

conflict igniters. As such, the African continent, has been found to have immense deposits of

oil. And this has come with a myriad of problems, as these countries grapple with how best to

tap the perceived benefits of having this resource. However, resource-based conflicts have

sapped the energies of these countries, to the point that the possession of this resource has

now made such conflicts to assume intractable dimensions. Existing studies on oil-related

conflicts in Africa have sought to address different dimensions of the conflicts. Stokes and

Raphael (2010) observe that Africa’s unique oil type1 has actually predisposed it to a

scramble for this commodity.

Africa is emerging as a continent with a significant amount of oil, particularly in the Gulf of

Guinea. With the world economy seeking new reserves of oil energy besides those in the

Middle East, Russia and the Americas, Africa is increasingly becoming the centre of focus,
1
This type of oil has been highly regarded for its environment-friendliness and the low cost of refining. - “sweet” (low in
impurities) and “light” (easily convertible to gasoline).

11
partly because of lesser oil nationalism as witnessed in these other regions. As of 2007,

Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon were

producing an estimated 5,120 million barrels per day. The Gulf of Guinea alone produces 7.1

per cent of total world production of oil (Obeng-Odoom, 2012).

With Africa’s rich endowment in oil and other resources, several studies have highlighted the

prevalence of conflict in such countries; whether inter-state or intra-state. Watson (2010)

enumerates Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville as the documented cases of

conflict.

2.2.1 Theorizing the Prevalence of Oil-Related Conflicts

In theorizing why, oil has become a conflict trap in Africa, many studies on the subject

proceed from Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) study which posited that the combination

between greed and grievance predispose an oil-rich country to slide into conflict due to

unmanaged expectations and unaddressed wants. Collier and Hoeffler’s advance this

argument by observing that the exploitation of these circumstances by internal (militias) and

external actors (diaspora, MNCs and governments) polarize the positions and cause tensions

on oil resource management to become a full-blown civil conflict.

Of all natural resources, oil has been found to have the highest risk of civil conflict (Collier

and Hoeffler, 2005; Fearon and Laiton 2005). According to Collier and Hoeffler, 23 percent

of countries dependent on oil exports have experienced civil war in any 5-year period, a

figure that dwarfs the 0.55 percent for countries without natural resources (Collier and

Hoeffler, 2002). The study clearly, illustrates that despite its potential, the discovery of oil

wealth is not a cure for underdevelopment.

Maphosa (2011) observes that from the empirical studies carried out in Africa, “countries

whose wealth is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities such as oil are

highly prone to civil violence”. He further observes that there are linkages in such conflicts

12
between those with no interest in nation building (but bent on profiteering) and those who

seek the control of the state and its resources and eventually seek to maximize the

opportunities that come with such control. While this study does not undertake detailed

examination of oil-related conflicts, it identifies the linkages and the drivers of natural

resource conflicts as well as useful recommendations on how to address such conflicts. For

instance, his recommendations on improving resource governance, involvement of the civil

society and local communities, investments in other sectors of the economy and facilitating

community-based peace building initiatives provide areas of exploration in this proposed

study. Scholarly, discourse and resources on the relationship between resources endowment

and armed conflicts gained currency in the late 1990s when empirical and theoretical

literature arose indicating a statistical correlation between a country’s natural resource

endowment and the occurrence of violent civil war (Maphosa, 2012). Since then, several

models have emerged to attempt to explain the factors that affect the risk of conflicts (Ferras

and Bannet, 2005).

Akinyemi (2007) observes that, the fact that there have been several domestic conflicts on the

African continent associated with the competition over natural resources, has given credence

to the popular notion of “resource curse” on resource rich economies. According to

Akinyemi, the assumption is basically that, the mere existence of a valuable and highly

sought after natural resource can trigger and perpetuate conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2012)

adds that the abundance of natural resources does not automatically lead to development and

wealth.

13
 Figure 2.1: Resource-Related Conflict in Africa, 1997-2014

Source: The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), 2018

14
In the figure above, a plausible link is being revealed as to the prevalence of conflict in

resource- rich countries. Influential literature done by Le Billon, 2003; Fearon and Laitin,

2003; investigates the relationship between oil abundance and civil conflict. These studies

generally allude to a positive relationship between resource abundance and incidence of

conflict. When focusing on country-specific cases and using resource discoveries for study,

the results portray a significantly varied result: Lei and Michaels (2014), for instance posit

that that giant oil discoveries increase the incidence of internal armed conflicts within 4-8

years of discovery. Bazzi and Blattman (2014), instead, do not find a significant association

between changes in oil wealth and the probability of conflict. This study will augment these

existing researches, by examining the Somalia case, which is yet to attract considerable

scholarly attention.

Auty (2004) is regarded as the authority in explaining just how a resource blessing actually

turns to be a source of conflict and underdevelopment. According to him, such a resource

may be a conflict driver either when they are concentrated in one area (point resource) or

scattered over wider region (diffuse resource). The fact that not the exploitation of such a

resource is dominated by an exclusive expatriate (highly skilled few) causes latent tension as

to the wider implication of such an activity.

2.2.2 Cases of Oil-Related Conflicts in Africa

Alao’s study (2007) on Sudan is reveals a country split into 450 diverse ethnic group that

have created a myriad of social, religious and cultural identities. With these politicized and

ideologized identities, Sudan has, according to Alao, the second highest number of explicitly

resource-related conflict. He identifies the actors in the oil politics of Sudan and South Sudan

as being oil multinational Talisman which was the first to commence commercial exploitation

in September 1999 when it acquired 25 percent stake in the Great Nile Petroleum Operating

Company (GNPOC) when it bought out cash-starved Arakis Energy (Alao, 2007). It

15
shrewdly calculated that U.S. economic sanctions against Sudan would ensure there was little

competition from the big American oil companies. Talisman’s other partners in the GNPOC

are Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) with 40 percent; Malaysia’s state-owned

oil companies, Petronas, with 30 percent; and the Sudan’s state-owned oil company with 5

percent. This arrangement saw “the Chinese and the Sudanese supply manpower; the

Malaysians supply the Muslim credential necessary to do business with radical Islamic

regime and Talisman supplies the oil-field expertise” (Ejahi, 2000). Despite the war, oil

continues to substantially contribute to the national economy.

Accordingly, the study by the Enough Project (2013) reveals the vagaries of conflict between

Sudan and South Sudan brought about by conflict. This study reveals that approximately 5%

of violent conflicts in South Sudan since 2011 have been explicitly resource-related-

occurring almost exclusively in the oil-rich Unity state and the Abyei region. The vast

majority of this type of conflict seen in South Sudan comprises of battles, primarily between

government forces and rebel groups. Abyei is responsible for about a quarter of Sudan’s total

crude oil output (Enough Project, 2013). In addition to battles and violence against civilians,

directly-resource-related conflict also takes the form of riots and protests in Africa.

Cascao (2013) analyses the matrix of water, land and oil conflicts in the Horn of Africa. She

traces the genesis of oil exploration in South Sudan by companies such as Chevron and how

eventually the discovery of oil became the fuel for the conflict that developed other

undertones; from land, identity, culture, religion and political power. She is extensive in her

study, exposing the different angles in this conflict. It is a useful study that informs this

proposed research as to areas of focus.

Similarly, Purcell (2014) analyzes the myths of oil riches prevailing in this region. Purcell

further examines the regional conflicts linked to these oil myths in this HOA region. There

have been numerous myths held by HOA nations on matters oil with the most prevalent one

16
being the abundance of oil. Purcell observes how the amplification of this myth in the media

and government circles has added a new dimension-the capture of this resource by

geopolitical interests that eventually create conflict situations. The analysis by Purcell

provides useful information on the beliefs and perceptions held by communities in which oil

exploration has been undertaken. It lays bare the “entitlement” that these communities have

of this vital commodity, which is perceived as the panacea to their years of nomadic lifestyle

and attendant conflict. From this analysis, this study deduces the sources of conflict, while at

the same time shedding light on the probable courses of action to ameliorate this situation. It

is insightful as it brings the qualitative research attributes in its presentation of the opinions

and belief systems prevalent in the issues of oil.

South Sudan emerged as the newest member of sovereign nations in 2011 with a lot of hope

and promise owing to the potential for development hinged on the numerous resources in this

country. Expectations turned to resignation as the country cataclysmically descended into a

costly civil war. The studies written on this country portray the oil resource curse as a major

factor driving the conflict. The Sentry (2018), a report initiative if the Enough Project and

Not on our Watch (NOOW) chronicles the actors and interests in this conflict. For instance,

this report identifies the linkages between control of the oil sector and the funding to the

government and rebels. This report is invaluable in its exposition on how not to manage a

country’s resources. It however fails to research on the structural causes of conflict to

establish whether oil was the major factor. Its focus on how oil is fuelling the conflict,

however useful as a study, does not lay bare the history of the socio-economic history of the

conflict. This proposed study will pick valuable insights on how oil plays a role in fuelling

conflict. It will however seek to move away from being superficial in examining the

Somalian case.

17
Grawert (2010) carried out a more comprehensive study on the oil-related conflict in Sudan

and South Sudan than The Sentry report. In it, Grawert examines the role played by good

governance and effective management of resources as a predisposition towards sustainable

peace. Besides examining the structure of the conflict, he further examines how such

conflicts have been managed through the negotiation of peace agreements that include wealth

sharing. He cites The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area and The

Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile States as

examples. This study learns that the discovery and subsequent exploration of oil usually

elevates the expectations of communities. This was clearly canvassed in Grawert (2010) and

Purcell’s (2014) studies. That the moment the local population, previously with no hope of

development is aware of such a resource, such a community/communities stir up expectations

that always end up to become grievances and thus latent conflict unless demands for land

compensation, employment, environmental security and local development are met.

These studies by Grawert and Purcell further lay the foundation for this study to advance this

line of research; previously intermittent, less violent and resolvable conflicts have become

complex conflicts when oil discovery and exploration comes into the picture. This proposed

study will seek to explore these areas in its examination of the Somali case.

Sharamo and Mwanzia (2011) complement studies undertaken by Grawert (2012) and Purcell

(2014). Their study is however more historical, examining the conflict from right after

independence and the onset of the First Civil War between 199-1972. From the studies by

Ross (2004) and Patey (20014) it is revealed that oil politics contributed to the outbreak of

the conflict in South Sudan, and later, it became an essential strategic resource to fight for.

Patey (2014:34) actually points out how the discovery of oil altered the relationship between

the South and the North; the Sudanese president sought control of the oil to the extent that the

pipeline was now to be constructed via Port Sudan, a key town in the North. The studies by

18
Patey (2014) and Ross (2004) provides insights on the legitimization of oil fields, foreign oil

companies as targets in this struggle for the control of resources. There are however

inadequate accounts of the conflict at the very initial stage. There is still no clear guide on

initiatives undertaken to resolve this conflict. it can however be observed that at the time of

their writing, the conflict dynamics were yet to be fully come to light. This proposed study

therefore seeks to comprehensively address these gaps in literature by contextualizing oil

exploration and the conflict matrix therein.

Alao’s (2007) study documents Nigeria’s rise to be a major oil-producing nation in the world.

This resource endowment has brought with it the most complex oil-related politics in the

African continent. Similar studies undertaken by Butt (2003) and Abiodun (2007) reveal a

country that was previously dependent on its agricultural exports, particularly cocoa, palm

oil, and groundnuts, with the discovery of oil becoming an economic and political game

changer. These studies are rich in historiographical material on Nigeria’s oil politics and the

resultant conflict. They are however limited by the period of their study, with new

dimensions in the oil politics emerging, especially in the Somalian context- a situation that

obliged this study.

Kishi (2018) provides an analysis of oil-related conflicts in Nigeria, revealing the extent to

which the oil resource has contributed to heightening ethnic, regional and religious tensions

in the country. Statistics provided by Kishi show that about 5% of violent conflicts in Nigeria

since 1997 have been explicitly resource based with oil workers being kidnapped or taken

hostage and civilians being killed, and many more displaced. From Kishi’s study, valuable

information relevant to this study was provided. For instance, it is clear that failure to

effectively manage this oil resource has culminated into corruption, bad governance,

unemployment, insecurity, and a total indifference to poverty alleviation. Collectively, all

these issues have become key drivers of conflict that underlie much of the anger and

19
resentment in Nigeria. This study will sustain Kishi’s approach to examining how the failure

to manage the oil politics often leads to conflict and instability

The exemplification oil related conflict is presented by Kadafa, (2012) who presents the

causes, actors and issues in the conflict over oil in Nigeria. It complements previous studies

by Kishi (2018) and Alao (2007) though its analysis is rich in content on the conflict between

the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the military regime of the

late General Sani Abacha deployed a military task force on Ogoni land to keep the peace. The

consequences of this military response led to the hanging of the MOSOPs President, Saro-

Wiwa along with eight other compatriots on trumped up charges in November 1995 in an

attempt to violently suppress the growing Ogoni resentment at their mistreatment. From this

study by Kadafa (2012) it is established that the Nigerian government’s failure to address real

issues of grievances particularly by failing to deliver fair access to oil profits coupled with

inability to build a better livelihood for its people and not only for the local communities but

also the wider population, is what has brought about the growing conflict. The clash between

the government and the local people has also been observed in Sudan, where the oil fields of

the south have been coveted by both Khartoum and her southern region. Oil conflicts is

Sudan is extremely complex. (Gonzalez 2010).

Peterson’s (2012) study on Nigeria examines the resource curse, with a particular focus on

how this supposed resource has created a petro-state that has exacerbated corruption and

conflict. This is a study that provides an economic analysis of oil resource management to

obviate the oil resource curse. In it, this study is informed of the effects of mismanagement of

the oil resource and how best to circumvent such a situation. The study is however limited in

its usefulness as it does not adequately address the structure of conflict in this economy.

Neither does it examine how the country degenerated into this situation of oil being a

20
resource curse. Furthermore, its relevance is in doubt as most of its secondary data is not

contemporary, thus failing the test of addressing a topical issue.

Babatunde (2012) provides a more comprehensive study than Peterson’s (2012). The former

provides an examination of the nature and magnitude of the cost of the perennial oil-related

conflicts in the Niger Delta. Babatunde (2012) delves into the conflict in this part of Nigeria,

richly providing statistics and insights into the origin of this conflict. For instance, it is

hypothesized that the struggle by the local communities in securing increased local

participation in the oil business and adequate access to the oil revenues and the failure to

address these concerns has actually given rise to ethnic militias. These militias have taken it

upon themselves the responsibility of challenging the established oil companies- a situation

that is causing local conflict dynamics to assume an international dimension. Babatunde

reports that 40% of Nigeria’s oil has been lost to these militant saboteurs, in the process

denying Nigeria valuable foreign exchange while creating a long-lasting environmental

disaster. When this study will be examining the Somalian case, it will be aware of the role

played by local communities, oil companies, the government in ensuring effective use of the

oil resource and the management of the attendant conflict system. This study will further

examine the initial point of contact between these actors in the conflict, something that

Babatunde (2012) and Peterson (2012) have not done in their studies.

Watson (2010) concurs with Babatunde’s observation by adding that the Niger Delta has

effectively been militarized with the Nigerian government actually getting AFRICOM’s help,

just as the rebels shore up their resources from the oil loot. In the case of Cameroon, armed

groups working from Nigeria have carried out attacks in Bakassi, Douala, Limbe and Kribi in

a region rich in oil (Gauthier and Zeufack, 2011). The research by Gauthier and Zeufack

(2011) details the oil sector and the political economy of managing this resource. While this

report elaborates on the aftermath of the oil discovery and the activities that have led to the

21
mismanagement of the resource, it fails to explore the structure of the oil-related conflict in

the country. This study will, endeavour to explore this conflict angle at the root stage of oil

exploration as is the case in Somalia.

While most existing literature that examine the “Resource Curse” have tended to acquiesce

with the thesis put forward by Auty (1993) that the blessing of nature’s endowments in actual

fact tends to be a curse, Obeng-Odoom (2012) proceeds from a different approach in his

study. This study is a departure from the general trend of malaise brought about by oil. To

Obeng-Odoom (2012) Ghana offers vital lessons to other African countries in how best to

manage the oil resource and avoid the pitfalls that come with the possession of this resource.

With oil having been discovered in 2007, Ghana has managed to institute systematic

processes that have ensured the effective management of the oil resource. Obeng-Odoom’s

(2012) study provides a different perspective on the prevalent narrative of oil being a

resource, with the country’s working governance structures and effective planning and

implementation of policies ensuring that all stakeholders are involved in decision- making.

This study will seek to establish whether this situation can be replicated in the case of

Somalia.

Patey (2012) carries out a related study on Liberia notes that the discovery of an estimated

3,200 million barrels of oil in the Gulf of Guinea where Liberia Sierra Leone and Guinea

share a boundary has transformed the region into a “Wild West” with companies and

governments rushing to seal oil exploration deals. Pailey’s study supports Obeng-Odoom’s

study as he provides a narrative that if oil exploration, mining and distribution of benefits is

undertaken well, then the resource curse can actually be avoided.

Sogge (2017) studies the Angolan case by examining to what extent the preponderance of oil

explains Angola’s troubled politics and non-inclusive politics. In this probe on the so-called

resource curse, Sogge examines the impact of this resource on economic growth and

22
development, on conflict and on the provision of basic public goods and human development.

Furthermore, Sogge (2017) focuses his attention on the impact of this oil resource on

governance. In his conclusion, it is clear that rent-seeking, corruption, violence and neglect of

public needs were present long before oil rents came on stream. Nor were those miscreations

conceived wholly within Angola (2017;257). Rather, a country’s experience with oil has to

take into account the multiplicity of actors and issues; both local and international. This study

augments the studies done in the various countries, though Sogge (2017) is comprehensive in

this historical analysis of the Angolan case. This proposed study will seek to establish

whether in actual case Somalia is headed the Angolan way or it can actually mitigate the

situation and be on the rid of the conflict scenario as Obeng-Odoom’s (2012) prescribes.

Molemele (2015) takes a different approach to conflict studies by examining the factors that

have prolonged civil conflicts in Africa. She identifies the legacy of colonialism, the

geopolitics of the Cold War and the ethnicization of civil conflict. She argues that Africa’s

endowment with huge deposits of natural resources has caused the continent to be attractive

to business. Consequently, the scramble for oil has attracted foreign interests and such

external interests have made the local conflicts intractable. From Molemele’s (2015) study, it

is revealed that MNCs actually benefit from (as subsequently prolong) the chaos and the lack

of accountability and as such, may have no interest in stopping conflict. This is quite

informative to the current study since it seeks to establish whether Somalia is on the path

towards overcoming this context.

Molemele (2015) singles out Angola for focus. She traces the root causes of the conflict and

identifies the Cold War factor as the catalyst to this conflict. Whereas there may be no Cold

War factor in the Somali case, this proposed study will perhaps pursue the angle of big power

rivalry in the rush for control of energy resources. Chinese, Turkish, and Western presence

23
will be examined in this context to understand their role in the conflict and conflict resolution

process.

Gonzalez (2010) observes that despite her oil and diamond wealth, she still ranks as one of

the poorest countries in Africa. The study provides an insight into the failings of the different

peace accords that were designed to resolve the civil war, though failing as a result of the

weaknesses on issues of inclusivity, political governance and the sharing of the national

wealth. The 1975 Alvor Agreement and the Bicesse Accords are a study on how to avoid

such pitfalls and ensure that conflict addresses all the dimensions of the conflict

comprehensively. Angola is the largest oil-producing country in southern Africa where oil

was discovered in the country in 1955, mainly in the Kwanza valley (Alao, 2007). Expansion

in oil production came in the late 1960s, when further discoveries were made in the coastal

reserve of Cabinda a region with an approximate area of 2,800 square miles and an estimated

population of 600,000 (Alao, 2007). There is a topographical characteristic that underscores

the politics of oil in Cabinda as the region is divided from the rest of the nation by a sixty-

kilometre-wide strip.

This, as will be noted in more detail later, remains a vital issue in the politics of resource

ownership in the republic. Cabinda area accounts for almost “60% of Angolan oil production,

projected at approximately 900,000 barrels a day.” (J.G Porto, 2003). Further discoveries in

the area led to oil becoming Angola’s principal export by 1973, with the annual range of its

income from oil wavering between US$1.8 and $3.0 billion. (Global Witness not dated).

According to sources, Oil installations remained unaffected for most of the war period, and

the country’s largest oil field in the north coast region of Cabinda remained under the control

of the MPLA government. However, in October 1992, following the resumption of war after

the 1991 truce, oilfields b5ecame primary military targets (Alao, 2007).

24
Brittani (2012) and Mouawad (2014) conducted researches that portrayed the negative

impacts of mismanaging the oil reserve. In these complementary studies, the two scholars

highlight key factors in this quest for control of the oil resource: from the Cold War politics

and the attendant ideological differences to the domestic ethnic and political differences. De

Beer and Gamba (2013) add that MPLA‟s “protracted authoritarian governance” had

excluded particular regions of ethnic groups from power and the benefits of resource

exploitation-a situation that gave the two rebel parties opportunity to peruse military options

and therefore prolong the war.

Chad is another country that has discovered considerable reserves of oil. Attendant conflict in

the country have attracted studies on the relationship between the oil resource and conflict.

Yorbana (2017) provides a summary report on the same. He presents the various arguments

on whether this resource is a blessing or a curse. This study mirrors the one carried out by

Purcell (2014). It is a unique study as it provides qualitative accounts of people’s perspectives

of their entitlements on the presence of oil. In one such notable account, Yorbana (2017;69)

quotes a peasant as having expressed the belief that by their land having been endowed with

oil, God purposed that they actually enjoy it and the widespread myth in Chad and Nigeria is

that oil is actually a legacy of wealth that has been handed over from ancestors to their

descendants. From such accounts, it can be deduced that the exploration and mining of oil

wealth can never be removed from the cultures and beliefs of the people. This study echoes

the best practice undertaken in Ghana and Liberia to ensure that local communities actually

benefit from the resource. This study argues that for Somalia to manage the conflict around

the exploration and mining of oil, there has to be structures of engaging all the actors in this

issue, more so, the communities living in those areas.

A more comprehensive study undertaken on the oil-related conflict in Chad is provided by

Humpreys (2005) who observes that the discovery of oil reserves led to the incidence of

25
violent coup d’états as military elements who sought exclusive access to the benefits accruing

from the mining of this resource. It is clear that there were no clear institutional structures in

place to manage expectations and ensure proper utilization of this resource. He lays possible

scenarios of the disintegration of the state as a result of mismanagement of the oil resource;

First, he points to the “state capture” by the military industrial complex who use the state

machinery not for public good but for exploitation. According to Humpreys (2005), such a

situation leads to neglect of national security (territorial boundaries, internal insurgencies).

Secondly, certain parts of the country, feeling marginalized find no place for their benefit and

establish secession. Thirdly, other economic sectors suffer due to mismanagement, corruption

and poor governance.

Ali and Harvie (2013) present Libya’s experience with oil. They emphasize the importance of

oil to Libya’s economy as a major source of revenue, contributing 91% revenue for most of

the new millennium. Ali and Harvie observe that at one time Libya was the world’s fourth

largest crude oil producer (2013; 275). And Libya’s thriving human security indicators, for a

long time pointed to the oil revenue. The failure to address the conflict dimension is

complemented by Chipaike’s (2012) study which puts forward the argument that the

geopolitics of oil led to the eruption of the conflict in 2011. The study presents a history of

Libya’s experience with oil and her conflict with the West. It is an illustration of how oil can

be a magnet to various conflict dimensions, which will be examined in this study.

In summary, the existing literature on oil-related conflicts in Africa have singled out the

Niger Delta and Sudan-South Sudan conflicts for study. Valuable insights have been obtained

on the causes, the structure of these conflicts as well as their socio-economic and political

impacts on the countries affected. These studies have also hinged their studies on the

“Resource Curse” debate, either proving and contesting its application to the African context.

These studies however fail to address the critical issue of managing conflict at the initial oil

26
exploration stage, and such expositions are further missing in the Somalia context, a situation

that motivates this study to embark on this study.

2.3 Actors in Oil Related Conflicts

ACLED (2017) provides a comprehensive statistical expose of the continental conflict trends

in Africa. In this study, the analysis identifies the various actors in conflict; ranging from the

insurgent groups, the government and its military (34%), political militias which

contributed30% of all organized armed conflict in Africa. There is also the categorization of

rebels as the other most active agent in conflict. In this last classification, it is identified to be

most active, causing substantial losses of human lives. This ACLED study provides a

valuable insight into conflict trends. It singles out Somalia for attention. This study obtained

valuable information on the recent conflict trends, with the Al Shabaab identified as a major

actor contributing to the 48% spike in fatalities in 2016 alone. The study however does not

list the issues and interests of the various actors, a gap that this study sought to fill.

A more comprehensive study on the actors in conflict is undertaken by Abdi (2015) who case

studies the various domestic and international actors in the Somali conflict. The study

explores the reasons for entry into the conflict in Somalia by various state actors as well as a

host of local actors, multilateral state and non-state actors. Abdi (2015) significantly

identifies oil and gas investors as the latest entrants to Somalia. This is a significant

development, observes Abdi, as it is altering the dimension of the conflict as oil has now

become a resource worth fighting over and even self-governing areas are now establishing

themselves as major political players. This study sought to deepen the understanding of these

actors to the conflict especially in relation to the discovery of oil in Somalia-something that

Abdi’s study did not attend to conclusively.

Balthasar (2014) identifies the EU and the USA for study due to their diverse approaches to

security in their pursuit of their geopolitical security interests. He singles out the African

27
Peace Facility(APF) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as areas of

cooperation in the Horn of Africa (for the EU) with the USA opting for unilateral actions in

support of the Somali government. Balthasar’s (2014) builds on the classical work done by

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Sambanis and Herge (2006) who did a classical research on

the various actors. The actors’ nomenclature is however richly displayed in a study by the

World Bank (2005) titled “Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics”. Hansen (2016) also

undertakes a comprehensive study on the various actors, dwelling on the clannism in

Somalia. These studies equipped this study with the literature on the various actors. However,

there was inadequate information provided on oil-related actors and their role in ensuring

peace and stability. It was with this in mind that this study was premised.

2.4 The Oil Politics in Somalia

Ahali and Ackah (2014) examine the demographic and oil history of Somalia- with the latter

tracing the exploration of oil during British colonialism. After decades of inactivity, renewed

activity revealed considerable amounts of oil. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below reveal the oil finds in

Noogal and Darhoor.

28
Figure 2.2: Pictorial view of Somalia’s oil blocks in Nogal and Darhoor

Source: Ahali and Ackah (2014), page 3

29
 Figure 2.3: Somalia’s oil basins in Nogal and Darhoor

Source: Ahali and Ackah (2014), page 3

The figure above provides an insight on the conflicts of irredentism and the obstacles faced

by Somalia to realizing lasting peace. As Ahali and Ackah (2014) explain, Somalia’s state

institutions are weak, as a result of decades of destruction and neglect. From this study, it is

further revealed that the democratic checks and balances characteristic of a stable political

system are non-existent- a situation that predisposes the country to the vagaries of spoil

politics. This study provides an insightful view of the structure of the state and state of

governance. This study will seek to advance on this framework laid by Ahali and Ackah

(2014) in examining the result of this weak political base as the driver of the oil-related

conflict in this country. it can be inferred that corruption, and failure of politicians to manage

the oil and gas sector, conflict dimensions in Somalia will likely be reshaped.

30
Musau (2013) provides an account of clan mobilization and clannism and how such control

over weak political institutions is a threat to Somalia’s peace and stability. This study reveals

the extent with which clannism as a political ideology has taken hostage political

organization in Somalia. He notes that clans dictate power, resource distribution, recruitment

to clan and political identities as well as recruitment and loyalty of the Somali forces. It is

also learnt from Musau’s study that there is an absence of a robust civil society in Somalia- A

situation that precludes purposive state building in Somalia due to the strong clan ties that

predate state formation in Somalia. Musau’s elucidation of the power sharing between the

ruling class Hawiye clan and the Darod clan epitomize the stranglehold of the clans on

political power. The study however fails to address the politics of oil and how they are

enmeshed in clannism.

Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) map the oil exploration and conflict matrix in Somalia and

Ethiopia. They outline the legal and political status of the different political entities existing

in the larger Somalia. Besides examining the potential onset of the Dutch Disease at the

projected economic windfalls from oil revenues, Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) lay out a

scenario of unequal distribution of oil revenues since the political structures are dominated by

political centralization in clans where decision making is exclusive and secretive. The

desegregation of the Somalia state, accounted for in this study by Bamberger and Skovsted

(2016) is further indicative of the politics of control of resources, and in reference to figures

2.2 and 2.3 above, the Somalia state’s splinter political entities have established themselves in

this region.

31
 Figure 2.4: Somaliland and Puntland

Source: Bamberger and Skovsted (2016), Page 13

In such an unfolding scenario, the Federal Government of Somalia has had to seek local and

international alliances to enable it to prevent dominance of the oil sector by the dominant

clans in Puntland and Somaliland. Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) provide an educative

account of this situation, and their topical study provides rich up-to-date accounts of the

political and economic situation in Somalia. For instance, these scholars mention the

Galmudug Regional State (GRS) as one of the political entities playing a role in the oil

politics of South Central Somalia. In this account, Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) analyze

how the FGS has sought an ally in the GRS. The several oil companies in Greater Somalia

have also had to deal with competing legal jurisdictions that are contestable at every stage of

operation. These conflicts are not only a feature of Somaliland and Puntland but also in

32
Central and Ogaden regions of Somalia. Another conflict front with Kenya was opened on

the offshore oil blocks.

Hagmann (2014) advances the oil politics in the Ogaden region by observing that the Ogaden

National Liberation Front (ONLF) has found renewed legitimacy in the struggle for the

liberation of their region from Chinese and Ethiopian exploration. Hagmann (2014) identifies

numerous players in the oil politics of Somalia; from Chinese, British and French oil

companies to the Ethiopian, Turkish and Russian interests and the local inter-clan rivalries.

2015 World Bank Report supports these studies by Hagmann (2014) and Bamberger and

Skovsted (2016). This WB report observes that the oil politics of Somalia is layered with

multiple levels of government and that lack of consensus on control has elevated the risk of

this resource fuelling an extensive conflict in Somalia.

Balthasar (2014) confirms the analyses by Bamberger and Skovsted (2016). He proceeds to

examine the preparedness of Somalia from this oil windfall and concludes that the economic

and political structures are basic, unable to handle the emerging complexity of managing the

oil economy. He predicts that such oil exploration is bound to foster tensions. He cites a case

in Puntland where ten people lost their lives after local militias took up armed to eject

geologists from undertaking oil exploration in Puntland as the Warsangeli clan nullified the

contracts entered into by Puntland and the geologists.

The extent of the clan politics domination of oil politics is outlined in Ali’s (2016) study on

the Somali clan system and how it is a key ingredient to political stability in Somalia. Ali

traces the history of clan politics and just as Ahali and Ackah (2014) had done extensively

provides the rivalries between the two major clans of Darod and Hawiye and the numerous

sub-clans forming these two solid ordering units. He also introduces the dimension of

overarching American interests in it geo-strategic engagement with the FGS, a situation that

pits one clan against another in the quest for dominance. Ali’s study, though useful in its

33
explanation on clannism and clan politics, it fails to tie oil politics to this conflict system and

thus does not address the causal factors and remedies to the potential conflict arising from the

oil-related conflict. It will be the duty of this study to examine salient features of oil politics

and how they predispose Somalia towards conflict. There will be an examination of ways in

which this country can steer itself towards managing this conflict.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

Academic discourse about the origins of conflict particularly, though not exclusively,

domestic conflict, has been informed mainly by two theoretical approaches. The first

approach associates conflict and violence with the nature and behaviour of human beings.

According to this view, war (read conflict) results from selfishness, from misdirected

aggressive impulses of human beings (Waltz, 1968). Again, other causes are considered as

secondary and therefore have to be interpreted only in the light of these causes (Waltz, 1968).

Distinct theoretical frameworks have emerged to explain the occurrence of contemporary

conflicts. This study proceeds from the theorizing on the resource curse also referred to as

the paradox of plenty gets its name from the binary way in which it affects an economy. The

Resource curse concept was introduced by Richard Auty in his book Sustaining Growth in

Mineral economies (Auty, 1993). According to him, the Resource Curse refers to the

phenomenon of worse economic performance in resource abundant countries comparing to

resource poor countries (Balthasar, 2014).

Millan (2013), and Brook 2016), advanced this theory by observing that the problem is seen

more in less developed countries with relatively concentrated and undiversified industrial

sectors. They continue stating that in such countries, once a natural resource is discovered,

available investment capital tends to gravitate to this industry. The new industry becomes a

source of economic growth and relative economic prosperity, as jobs and disposable income

that were previously absent become available. As a result, according to this theory, the nation

34
becomes overly dependent on the price of commodities, and overall gross domestic product

becomes extremely volatile. Additionally, government corruption often results when proper

resource rights and an income distribution framework are not established in the society,

resulting in unfair regulation of the industry.

This theory has been advanced further by Balthasar (2014) and Bamberger and Skovsted

(2016b) who state that abundant natural resources including oil and diamond have posed as a

security challenge to many states in Africa since such resources are being explored and

exploited in contexts which are conflict-prone. Naturally, abundant non-renewable resources

are expected to boost a nation’s socio-economic growth. However, from the oil reserves of

the Middle East to the diamond mines of West Africa, it has been revealed that populations in

countries with a wealth of natural resources have not benefitted much, furthermore many

citizens have experienced worse outcomes owing to corrupt governance and conflict (Le

Billon and El Khatib, 2004).

The resource curse framework is therefore applicable to this study as it helps in establishing

potential impacts of oil exploration and exploitation in Somalia given the pre-existing conflict

situation. Guided by the framework, vulnerability, risk and opportunity are the three

dimensions around which the study presents its argument. A country’s over-reliance on

unearned natural resources may cause the economy to underperform and political institutions

to weaken, thus making the country more vulnerable to experiencing conflict (Le Billon,

2012). Risk is conceptualized as contexts in which some resource industries like oil are more

susceptible to conflict and insecurity due to their direct links to the access and control of

wealth. This study analyzed the Somali conflict situation as a new war predominantly fuelled

by issues domestic. As Kaldor (2006) observes, inter-state wars were waged between state

armies, with goals often of a geopolitical nature and victory/success was in capture of

territory. War aims were financed via taxation and mobilizing the general population. In this

35
new generation of new wars, the control of resources and territory as well as the mobilization

of identities has become the mode of prosecuting war. This study established this in the case

of Somalia. In this case, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) state, greed and grievance becomes a

justification for seeking to control or controlling such a resource. Peace and stability therefore

becomes a challenge of managing equity and justice in redistribution of benefits of this

resource besides addressing the other age-old root causes of the conflict.

Conceptual framework
The framework conceptualized the three variables: that is, the independent variable,
dependent variable and the intervening variables.
Oil exploration activities represents the study’s independent variable. The exploration
activities include downstream, midstream and upstream oil exploration activities. Upstream
activities are those relating to exploration of oil, determination of viability and extraction.
Mid-stream activities relate transportation and storage of oil while downstream are oil
activities that relates refinery and marketing of oil.
Dependent variables of this study included social activities, economic activities and the
emerging security management. Variations in these dependent variables is conceptualized to
be affected by oil exploration activities in South Lokichar basin. Depending on how oil
exploration activities are managed, the dependent variables could either be adversely affected
or be positively impacted.
The interactions of the independent variable and the dependent variables was affected by the
intervening variables that included government policies relating to land and minerals, and
corruption. This determined if the independent variable negatively impacted on the dependent
variables or otherwise.

36
 The conceptual framework showing the relationship of variables indicated in the Figure

Social Security

Cultural sites and practices

Family roles setup

Politics

Environmental pollution and health

risks

Human rights abuse and exploitation

Economic Security

Effects of Security Grazing lands

implication Oil Traditional economic activities

Exploration Employment opportunities

Activities in Infrastructure development

Somalia Emerging Security Management Issues

Government Policies Community Participation

Security management strategies

and Business
Role of civil societies
Practices
Natural resource management
policies
Corruption
Tender allocation

Indigenised ownership

Exploitation of indigenous people

Independent variable Intervening variables Dependent variable
Adequacy of security personnel
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework
Oil discovery as factor of
insecurity
above.

37
 CHAPTER THREE:

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This section contains the scientific research framework employed in the conduct of this
research. The research design, sampling procedures and procedures to ensure the quality of
data collected will be examined in this section.

3.2 Research Design

The study adopted a cross-sectional survey research design. This research design was best
suited to studies aimed at finding out the prevalence of a phenomenon, situation, problem,
attitude or issue by taking a cross-section of the population (Kumar, 2014). Kumar (2014)
further notes that cross-sectional survey research design is useful in obtaining the overall
picture as it stands at the time of the study. The design was chosen because the study seeks to
make an assessment of the security effects of oil exploration on the socio-economic activities
of Somalia residents, as at the time the study was conducted. Furthermore, Cross-sectional
research design are comparatively cheaper to undertake and easy to analyse since it involves
one contact with the study population. However, follow - up studies required to track changes
over time.

3.3 Target Population

The target population for this study were residents of Somalia and Employees of oil
companies. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2009) the target population answers most
critical characteristics of the population. The target population of the study was 10,000
residents. The respondents were selected because they live, work in Somalia and are expected
to be affected by impacts of oil exploration.

3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

According to Kothari and Garg (2014) sampling is the procedure by which some elements of
a population are selected as representative of the entire population. Sampling enables a
researcher to draw conclusions about the entire population. As samples size of 384
respondents was selected using Yamane formula on sample size:

38
Where n = is the sample size
N = the target population (10,000)
e = precision level (0.05)
Therefore:
n=(10000)/1+(10000*0.0025)
= 384
Key Informants

Ser Informant Number Remarks

1 Oil Expatriates 6 Purposive sampled

2 Chiefs 6 Purposive sampled

3 Security Officers 4 Purposive sampled

Total 12

The Key informants were purposively sampled. Kumar (2014:189) indicates that purposive
sampling is used reliant on the researcher’s judgement as to who can provide the best
information to achieve the objectives of the study. From table above, key informants comprised
of 6 oil expatriate employees, 6 administrators/chiefs, and 4 security officers was purposively
sampled.

3.5 Unit of analysis

The units of analysis for this study was the resident of Somalia; comprising of both the
indigenous and non-indigenous individuals who reside and/or work in oil refining companies
and are affected by oil exploration activities.

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

3.6.1 Sources of Data

The research was utilized both primary and secondary data. The secondary data was obtained
from textbooks related to the study, journals, presented conferences papers and government
reports as well as the internet. The primary data on the other hand was obtained from the
respondents using interview schedules and focused group discussions.
39
3.6.2 Questionnaires

Tools and instruments that will be used to collect primary data included questioners and

interview guides. Questionnaires will be used to collect primary data. Questionnaires will

contain both open ended and close ended questions, open ended questions will be used to

gather information on opinions of the respondents i.e.to measure the objective responses

while close ended will be used to help in ensuring standardization and compatibility of

information i.e. to measure subjective responses, questionnaires will be administered using

drop and pick method.

3.6.3 Interview Guide

According to Kothari (2009) interview schedule is the most appropriate for investigations that
are thorough. Interview schedule enable the researcher to get in-depth details and required
data by asking probing questions. An interview schedule made it possible to obtain
information necessary to meet exact goals of the study (Orodho, 2009). The interview
schedules consisted of both open and closed ended questions and was used to collect data
from indigenous residents and the Key informants. Open ended items were used to collect
qualitative data while closed ended was used to collect quantitative data

3.6.4 Focus Group Discussion

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) consisting of 8 respondents was drawn from the
Community elders. Participants in FGDs was purposively recruited to capture differences in
residents’ perspectives about Oil exploration activities and its implications on their social and
economic activities. According to Sekaran (2013), FGDs allow a researcher to get deeper
insight into a situation or phenomenon. FGDs yielded qualitative data given that the questions
were open ended. FGDs captured what the respondents said in a given context. The
researcher also captured on how the community participates for instance their attitudes,
perceptions, opinions and experiences in relation to oil exploration.

40
3.8 Validity and Reliability

3.8.1 Validity of Instruments

Validity measures whether the individual results of an instrument are meaningful and allows

the researcher to draw sound conclusions from the sample population being studied. Content

validity was realized through proper “inspection” and “sieving” of the information. Various

themes, as guided by the objectives of the study, was adopted, providing the benchmarks for

which to admit or reject information.

3.8.2 Reliability of Instruments

Reliability checks confirm whether the results of an instrument are stable and consistent, and

it’s the extent to which a given measuring instrument produces the same effect each time it is

used. This study achieved reliability through the assembly and coding of information

gathered to ensure that only credible information was used. Moreover, the researcher was

keen to identify and document the opinions of respondents and authorities in the field of

study without any biases and subjectivity.

3.9 Data Analysis

The study was used the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to analyze

the data obtained. This software was necessary due to the multiple questionnaires that was

available for the analysis, moreover, it was appropriate for the analysis of quantitative data.

The software also generated accurately the findings using graphs and pie charts. The data

collected was analyzed and presented using descriptive statistics. Schacher (2002), has stated

that descriptive studies be analyzed using descriptive statistics. Content analysis was used to

analyze qualitative data. Correlations, the statistical technique was adopted to show whether

and how strongly pairs of variables are related, was used to ascertain such relationships.

41
3.10 Ethical Issues

Before starting data collection, the researcher got the introductory letter from the University.

The research permit was obtained from the targeted university; the management was asked

for permission. The researcher sought permission from the research body. He had the

responsibility of protecting people’s rights, privacy, and sensitivity. There was a need to

ensure that there is confidentiality by keeping their anonymity and secrecy secure. The

participants were informed about the study topic and study objectives; this is one way of

promoting integrity. At this point, data confidentiality from the participants was maintained.

The participants were informed that the study is carried out for academic purposes only.

There was a moral responsibility of the data obtained; in this case, there was no information

misuse. In case the researcher wants to use the information for other purposes, the

participants will be asked. In case of any clarification, it was done before filling the

questionnaires. The researcher did not carry out that the study that will physical or

psychological hurt the participants. According to Anderson and Steneck (2011) defined

plagiarism as using another person’s work without their knowledge, or claiming credit for

something that was done by another person. In this paper, all journal and articles were cited

using the standard APA Referencing System.

42
 CHAPTER FOUR:

OIL POLITICS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the basis for the subsequent analysis of the prospects of peace in

Somalia after the discovery of oil. As such, it provides a situational overview of the conflict

in Somalia; the genesis of the conflict and its dynamics since its flare up more than three

decades ago. Eventually, the study takes an analytical approach in dissecting the possibilities

of peace at this time that Somalia is seeking to exploit its oil resource.

4.2 Demographic Overview of Somalia

Somalia constitutes the part of Eastern Africa commonly called the Horn of Africa. The

country spans approximately 640,000km2, with its borders and coastline measuring 2,340km

in length. (Woulhuter, 2014) It borders Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the

Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean and Guardafui Channel to the east, and Kenya to

the southwest. (Woulhuter, 2014). Based on United Nations estimates Somalia has a

population of 15.1 million (Worldometers, 2018), with a 51-year life expectancy and the

infant mortality rate at 108 out of 1000 live births (World Bank, 2012).

The Somali people are relatively homogenous in language and faith (Sunni), despite the

presence of small minority groups who are not ethnically Somali. According to Lewis (2005),

Somali–speaking people form one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, spreading

throughout the Horn of Africa, from the Awash Valley, through the Ethiopian Ogaden, and

also found in northern Kenya as far as the Tana River Lineage fortifies the society and people

are grouped according to clans and sub clans. The main clan families in Somalia according to

tradition include Darood, Digil-Rahanweyn, Dir and Hawiye. Under these four there are

many sub clans and sub-sub clans. The people of Somalia are mostly pastoralists with a

considerable number also practicing farming and fishing (Lewis 2005). There are no official

43
records of population figures in Somalia and it is estimated that the population is 10 million

Somalis (WB, 2012). The incessant conflict has distorted settlement patterns,

4.3 Somalia’s History and Colonial Legacies

The Somali people’s origin is unclear, however according to an important mythology the

Somalis are said to originate from the Arabian Peninsula, possibly even from a group of

Islamic missionaries sent by the Prophet around AD 615 (Moller, 2009). For many centuries

there have been substantial relations with the Arabian Peninsula for example through

migration, missionary work and trade (Moller 2009).

Following the efforts of the Islamic missionaries the Somalis embraced Islam, although they

failed to adopt the Arabian Peninsula’s predominant fundamentalist version of Islam,

Wahhabism. Instead the Somali people chose to stick with Sufism, their version of Islam

represented predominantly by brotherhoods such as the Ahmadiya, Qadiriya and Salihiya

(Moller 2009). Like many other states in Africa, the state of Somalia came about as a result

of the late 19th century colonisation of Africa by Europeans (Dersso, 2009). Even though the

area that came to form part of the Somalia state was for centuries already occupied by the

Somali people, the region only came to be known as the present-day state of Somalia due to

European colonial rule (Bayne, 2001). The late 19th century scramble for Africa saw

European colonial powers dividing up the nation of Somalia amongst themselves (Moller,

2009). The northern region (present day Somaliland) was controlled by Britain, where ethnic

Somalis inhabited much of the northern parts (Moller, 2009). Present day Djibouti came

under the rule of France, while in 1905 Italian powers took over vast territories adjacent to

the eastern coast which eventually came to form most of the present-day Somalia (Bayne

2001). Aside from the colonial powers, however, the kingdom of Abyssinia - which spanned

current Ethiopia - also extended into territories that were mostly populated by Somali people.

44
Such territories form most of the recent region in Ethiopia formerly called Ogadeen (Moller

2009).

4.4 The Evolution of Conflict in Somalia

Somalia achieved her independence on 1st July 1960 and it was the 1960 Independence

constitution that merged the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland (Appiah,

2003). The constitution advocated for a centralized Somali state even though federalism was

aspired which included the creation of eight administrative regions. During the first regime

which was a multi-party era (1960-1969), there was the set-up of administrative regions even

though power remained at the center.

The militarization of the state was initiated and perfected during the Siad Barre regime just as

the Cold War politics was sucking it into this East-West rivalry. Due to her geological

positioning, Somalia had attracted the attention of the Soviet Union and the USA. After the

coup d’état in 1969, the Somali state became increasingly militarized and centralized even

though there were occasional federalist structures under his then ideology of scientific

socialism (Appiah, 2003). According to Bradley (1994), the Siad Barre’s regime played a key

role in hyper–militarization of Somalia since its inception. Said Barre, was particularly, adept

of using the tensions of the Cold War and superpower interests to solicit a vast array of arms

for his government. According to Bradbury (1994) the Soviet Union and the US also played

a major in arming the country. Largely, the arsenals of weapons driving the current conflict in

modern Somalia are to some extent leftovers of the Cold War arms.

As observed this phenomenon is a major subject of concern for the security and stability of

countries in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, foreign military, financial and technical

assistance to the countries involved is another key contributor of conflicts. This predatory

state that was increasingly centralizing was in sharp contrast to the traditional kinship system

that was egalitarian and based on clannism and the authority of the elders.

45
The 1977-78 Ogaden war was the first of three major armed conflicts waged between 1977

and 1991. These conflicts devastated the Somali nation, causing considerable losses of lives,

destroying the national fabric and ensuring that weapons of war were now readily available to

rebel movements with state claims or secessionist ambitions. This fragmentation and violence

ensured that a violent takeover of power was inevitable as it happened in 1991. These

negative experiences under a unitary state would lead to the self-declared republic of

Somaliland in 1991 bringing the utility of a decentralized governance structure that also

incorporated traditional norms (Zoppi,2018).

The fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991 had serious implications on the Somali

institutions. By the time Siad Barre seized power in a military coup in 1969, the country had

been into a period of nine years with visible structural weaknesses. The military government

destroyed even the rudimentary structures of a functioning state such as the legislator,

judiciary and the civil service. Therefore, it has been said that the collapse of the Somali state

was not just a chance but a process which had been triggered since independence.

This resort to violence was began by the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF),

established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf from the mainly Majerten clan movement. Its

uprising against government repression in the northeast of the country and was met with

harsh repression. The Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 1982 on its part drew its

support from the Isaaq clan in an insurgency that lasted over five years in Burco and

Hargeisa. The government responded with a ferocious assault on the Isaaq clan, killing some

50,000 people and forcing 650,000 to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti (World Bank, 2005).

Rebellion was also from the USC (United Somali Congress) - Hawiye clan, and the SPM-

(Somali Patriotic Movement) Ogaden clan.

The country become fragmented in terms of clan lineage and patronage and the resulting

drought due to introduce another twist on the causes of conflict. The absence of political

46
formations capable of channeling the anger of the Somalis to change the divisive legacy of

Said Barre caused conflict. The overthrow of the Barre regime precipitated calamitous events

in the country with clan-based militias morphing into formidable rival units seeking to

control the state. Wanton plunder of government and private resources became widespread,

with agricultural communities the worst affected (World Bank, 2005). The clan-cleansing and

famine led to a dire situation in the early and mid-1990s with the international community

slow to respond. A limited response in the form of the United Nations Operation in Somalia

(UNOSOM) failed to sustain the gains built by a ceasefire agreement brokered between Ali

Mahdi Mohamed and General Farah Aideed. This intervention was opposed largely due to its

perceived interference and favouritism and its lack of legitimacy led to the infamous “Black

Hawk Down” catastrophe where a US helicopter was shot down and scores of US military

men were murdered.

4.5 Clan Politics and Conflicts

Bradbury (1994), opines that, the clan structure is a fundamental political unit essential for

individual and group survival, particularly during conflict times. Bradbury in his study

observes that, until the colonial period, the Somali “nation” did not have a single political

unit. Any forms of political identity were based on clan affiliations (Bradbury 1994). Prior to

colonialism, the Somali society had a social order which was underpinned by the Xeer, a set

of rules and norms which drew on the Islamic religious values to govern political and

economic life (Lewis, 2005). After the Xeer, the next important structure was the clan system

in pre-colonial times during which, every Somali had to be a subject to a chief in a

hierarchical order of subject, tribe, chief and colonial structures (Lewis, 2005). The effect of

colonialism was thus to upset the Somali society from a previously decentralized structures

(Loebser & Solomon, 2014).

47
For the British indirect approach, this did not influence the Somali social structures but in

contrast, the Italian style of administration interfered with the social structures by creating

undefined hierarchical and bureaucratic structures. The resultant was a Somali elite that in

part embraced commercialism and departed from previous Xeer structures. This would then

explain why these legacies of colonialism began to create tensions following the merging of

British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland (Loebser & Solomon, 2014).

The history of conflicts in Somalia is long and it predates the colonial period. The modern-

day conflicts have however, been driven by a plethora of issues and they remain mostly intra-

Somalia in character (Lewis 2005). In the recent past, the conflicts in Somalia has assumed a

different dimension spilling over to neighboring countries. Additionally, the Pan -Somalia

ideology has become entrenched within the country and the regional states. As observed in

literature the Pan-Somali ideology is said to have no regard for international law or for the

regulation and recognition of the colonial borders. The conflict is further compounded by the

Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, with Somalia becoming the incentive for a proxy war between the

two countries.

Following the outbreak of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the Siad Barre regime in

the early 1990s, Somalia reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, consisting of

solidifying their leadership based on clan, religious and customary laws. The Somali people

have been divided since the colonial times into five major parts: Djibouti, Northern Frontier

District (NFD), Ogaden, British and Italian colonies. Only two of those territories united and

formed the independent Somali Republic in 1960. The British colonial separation of the

Somali people has since become a source of conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia

(Bamberger and Skovsted, 2016).

As mentioned earlier clannism is the most powerful unit of political organization. In 1969,

General Mohammed Siad Barre, a member of the Marehan sub–clan of Darod, seized power

48
in a military coup and renamed the country the Somalia Democratic Republic, based on

Scientific Socialism (Lewis 2005). During his reign, he signed numerous policies that

outlawed clans and their structures, but concentrated political power in his Marehan sub–clan,

his maternal Ogaden sub–clan and the Dolbahante sub–clan of his principal son-in-law

(Lewis 2005). According to Lewis, all these sub-clans belong to the Darod clan and this

explains the reasons for their dominance in Somali’s body of politics.

Other than setting the stage for futile clan conflicts, the initial stage of Siad Barre rule has

been described as a period characterized by a concentration of problems such as local

development and the consolidation of the regimes authority (Lewis 2005). However,

persistent political exclusion of other clans and crackdown on the religious establishment

became a major source of conflict between the regime and those excluded from the

mainstream politics, economics and social spheres of the country (Lewis 2005).

The clan structure in Somalia further complicates oil resource extraction in that, while there

are tensions on how to govern oil resources in both the federal government and the

autonomous regions (Somaliland, Puntland, Khaatumo state (disputed), clan dynamics come

to play. Somaliland and which defected in 1991 is largely dominated by the Isaaq clan which

includes the Dir and the Darod clan families. It performs statehood functions but lacks

international recognition. In Puntland, a regional state created in 1998, is administered by the

members of the Darood/Harti clan collective. This clan collective comprises the Majerten,

Dhulbahante, and Warsangeli among other clans. Power is shared proportionally relative to

clan strength (Hoehne, 2014).

With other political institutions in Somalia collapsing, the clan structure has proved to be the

referent point of allegiance. The largest and dominant clans have been the Hawiye and the

Darod clans with the other clans coalescing around these two for a share of state power such

as the Dir, Rahanweyn, Isaaq and the Digil (Musau, 2013). Strong bonds and alliances bind

49
people into these clan structure. These clans have established monopolies in their regions

with fierce wars of control being fought among the various clans and sub-clans. Clannism has

emerged as a political ideology has taken hostage political organization in Somalia. Musau

(2013) notes that clans dictate power, resource distribution, recruitment to clan and political

identities as well as recruitment and loyalty of the Somali forces.

Clan and regional conflicts over oil resources can be deciphered from contestations around

the oil reserves in the Nugaal valley in the Sool region as a case in point. The oil reserves

have been disputed between Somaliland and Puntland (Hoehne, 2014). This additionally

would complicate how international oil prospecting interests do not only negotiate with

autonomous regions but also how they engage with the federal government.

4.6 Al-Shabaab: Evolution of a Social Movement (2005-2018)

The prolonged lawlessness, has however, attracted a host of issues that have had negative

effects on its sovereignty. Specifically, a chunk of Somalia is still under the control of al-

Shabaab, and jihadi militants allied to international terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda.

According to sources, al-Shabaab activities over the past 10 years have increased in intensity

causing serious consequences on human life and economic advancement of the country.

Religion has for a long time been a significant cause of conflict in Somalia. They rally the use

of the ever contended sharia law. Islam has been responsible for a number of suicide bombs

which are seen as a form of religious act.

While there is no consensus in scholarship on the exact dates for the rise of the al-Shabaab

movement in Somalia, the more widely held view is that the group emerged in 2005. Its

eventual rise post 2007 is largely attributed to the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia

in late 2006 following the takeover of Mogadishu by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)

which briefly governed Mogadishu and other territories in South Central Somalia. The group

50
emerged as a loose social movement made up of ex-militias and NGO participants in Somalia

(Mueller, 2018).

The rise of the Islamic Courts Union (2006) is however traceable to the broader discourse of

state collapse in Somalia in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime.

The rise of the Islamic Courts generally was the need to regulate the state following the

failures of the Somali state and the international community to provide a semblance of law

and order in the country. Post the state collapse, the need to control predatory militias as well

as addressing inter-clan disputes necessitated the presence of these courts.

In 2000 a joint council was set up complete with a militia that would apprehend criminal.

Eventually, this led to the rise of the Supreme Court of the Islamic Courts Union in 2004

which simply became known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UCI) led by among others

Sheikh Shariff Ahmed (Mueller, 2018). While its genesis is traced to the period around 2005,

its eventual rise has been attributed to the December 2006 intervention by Ethiopia. This

intervention and the subsequent occupation by Ethiopian forces over a two-year period gave

immense credibility to the Al-Shabaab. This social movement emerged with a national

rhetoric that it was defending the Somali nation from foreign intrusion (the Ethiopians) with

whom they had have fraught relations since the 1970s.

Secondly, the movement adopted a religious framing to enable recruitment into their ranks

which would in part be to defend their Muslim country (Mueller, 2018). By relying on a

religious frame, the Al- Shabaab was successful in framing her Ethiopian neighbors’ as

Christian invaders on their Muslim lands’.

This subsequent mounting would enable them the legitimacy to launch an intervention

against their Ethiopian ‘invaders’ which would help to grow the ensuing insurgency. This

foreign intervention helped then in their framing as the single most-important actor to defend

their Somali nation from ‘foreign intervention’. Kenya’s intervention in Somalia in 2011

51
would bear the same fate (Mueller, 2018). The Somali-Ethiopia relations have been fraught

with tensions since the 1970s. In the 1970s, the tensions between the two neighbors had

centered on the Ogaden region of Ethiopia that is inhabited by ethnic Somalis and which is

disputed between the two. In the 1990s, the Islamist organization Somali Islamist group Al-

Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and which had become popular in the disputed Ogadeni region

arose.

Over the 1990s and the subsequent entry into of the Global War on Terror post 9/11, this

group, Ethiopian officials began to get concerned with remnants of the AIAI and their

possible linkages with radical Islamist organizations. At the height of the invasion, it was

feared to that members of the AIAI had infiltrated the UIC. These fears were also shared by

the United States with concerns that no efforts would be spared to ensure that a post-

collapsed Somalia did not turn into a haven for terrorist organizations (Mueller, 2018).

Ethiopia would also partly intervene in order to support the then weak transitional federal

government (TFG). The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) would be set up in

2007 to safeguard strategic locations in Mogadishu for the TFG (Hoehne, 2014).

Progressively, a series of drought induced famine also contributed to the rise of insurgency.

There were factional rifts as the insurgency spread (Mueller, 2018).

Al-Shabaab (meaning youth in Arabic), according to sources, is a social movement that is

often termed as a Sunni-Salafi organization. It relies on the variant of Islam that is. The broad

claim of Wahhabist teachings is to develop a so called ‘righteous state’ Wahhabism drawing

on Prophet Muhamed teachings (PBUH) and which are anchored on an Islamic theology

(Mueller, 2018; Loebser & Solomon, 2014). While the movement has relied on an ideology

that aspires towards an ‘Islamic caliphate’ it is much more than this. It has often deployed a

national rhetoric to build on its support base with claims of foreign invasion on their land

(Mueller, 2018).

52
This social movement owing to different circumstances has also evolved in its tactics. At its

early formation (2006-2007) it had capacity to administer territory. In other times it has

operated as a military outfit. Post the 2011 period, the group has had to change tact owing to

loss of territory and principally through the intervention of Kenya and AMISOM troops. In

this respect the group has resulted to the use of asymmetrical guerilla warfare style.

Increasingly the group has also adopted suicide attacks.

Over time and while moving beyond selective targeting of individuals such as the police, the

military, including journalists and institutions such as educational facilities, one of the most

notable trend of the group has been to target non- Muslims. Owing to the group’s

transnational reach in the region, the Westgate attack in Kenya in September 2013 had this

semblance (Mueller, 2013). Post 2010, the movement also began to have a transnational

reach with targets outside of Somalia. This marked a new strategic direction for the

movement with a focus on ‘oppositional forces.’ They would demonstrate this with the July

2010 Kampala bombings during the World Cup season in retaliation of Ugandan troops

presence there (Mueller, 2018).

Following Kenya’s intervention in October 2011 under the Operation Linda Nchi (Operation

Protect the Country), there would be a rise on attacks on Kenyan territory. This Kenyan

intervention was billed as a security intervention to counter Al-Shabaab insurgency in the

north and coastal part of the country. While security reasons were billed as the singular

intervention, other strategic interests such as the securing of infrastructural projects were

additional explanations. It was notable that Kenya’s foreign policy had largely been non-

interventionist since 1963. But through the Operation Linda Nchi operation in 2011, Kenya

took on a military intervention in Somalia. This intervention would then create a safe zone in

Jubaland. This safe zone would then create a buffer zone between Al-Shabaab controlled

territory and Kenya. In the long run, this military intervention would create a safe space for

53
relocation of Somali refugees in Kenya (Mueller, 2018; Loebser & Solomon, 2014; Anderson

& McKnight, 2014).

Nevertheless, this intervention would be used by the al-Shabaab to be a similar trope of

‘foreign invasion’ and as such the so called ‘enemy’ would be confronted at home. This was

most notable with the Westgate attack in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 which claimed

over 60 lives. In April 2015, the Garissa University College in Kenya attack would be

attributed to the same social movement. Increasingly too, the movement has also notably

since 2009 been recruiting part of its membership from Kenya. Notwithstanding the internal

leadership rifts in the organization pitting Robow and Hassan Awey against the Godane

faction. The Godane faction would announce in 2012 an alliance with the Al-Qaeda. This rift

in part had been occasioned by Al-Shabaab alliance with Al-Qaeda movement. Other source

of contention in the movement and mainly directed at the Godane faction and claimed by

Awey was the indiscriminate targeting of civilians.

There had also been unease within the regional commanders on the supposed alliance to Al-

Qaeda. The contention among the membership then was that the organization in announcing

an alliance with the Al-Qaeda could have been perceived to be a puppet under a foreign

organization (Mueller, 2018). In the post 2010 period and under Godane’s leadership, the

organization had the presence of foreign fighters who brought different capabilities to the

organization. These included suicide bombing, bombs making, and assassinations. He

however remained wary of these foreign ‘experts ‘even as he consolidated his powers within

the movement. Some of these foreign experts came from Kenya, Sudan, Pakistan among

other places. Recruitment in the Kenyan coast has targeted both marginalized and privileged

individuals who are often brainwashed through religious ideologies (Mueller, 2018; Hansen,

2016; Amble & Hitchens, 2014; Ndzovu, 2017).

54
4.7 The Dynamics of Oil

As pointed out in the literature review, the endowment of natural resources to a country has

more often been linked to the addition of another dimension armed conflicts (Collier and

Hoeffler 2004). In the Somali context, the discovery of this resource came at a time when the

country is yet to find a resolution to its conflict. Before the discovery of oil was a game

changer: scarce resources such as water pasture, arable land has meant that the little available

provide the reason for violent appropriation. The 3,300km of largely unprotected coastline

has also provided another porous border for the entry of contraband- of which weaponry has

been the key driver of war. In this context, the splinter of the country into various

autonomous entities and a further fractionalization has seen miniature governments

controlling sections of the country. It is within this context that western commercial oil

exploration companies have operated from, with rival self-governing units claiming to

authorize such activities and assuming exclusive right over the oil finds (Bamberger and

Skovsted 2016).

In the literature review, Fearon and Laitin (2003) noted that a dependence on oil exports in

one way or another increases the likelihood of civil war onset by 10 percent with Ross (2001,

2004a, 2004b and 2005), regarding oil as one of the most robust predictors of armed

conflicts. This finding is reinforced by several other studies using data and measurements of

oil wealth (Niemeyer 2007, Dube and Vargas 2007, Persson 2008).

While oil exploration is historically traced to 1948, a number of major oil companies signed

concession agreements with the Siad Barre regime in the 1980s though the ensuing conflict in

the late 1980s and early 90s prevented any progress in exploration. Since then, the scramble

for oil has seen Somaliland and Puntland award oil exploration licences to overlapping

territories within their control. This situation is exacerbated by Somalia’s 2012 Constitution

which allowed for autonomous regions within Somalia to contract oil companies to carry out

55
oil exploration. As Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) observe these oil companies (among

them Norwegian DNO and Canadian Africa Oil) became part of the conflict in Somalia by

playing into the politics of regional and ethnic dominance, thus contributing to the divisions

in the country. As a result, the FGS is potentially being denied of its oil revenues and a vital

resource for the development of the country. It is evident that oil finds due from the oil

exploration are fragmenting the country along distinct rivalries that have played a major part

in the conflict matrix of Somalia. Arguably, a new front in the conflict is being opened, with

a new issue in the conflict being added. The moment Somalia will discover the extent of her

oil resources, there will be significant socio-economic and political realignments whose effect

on peace and stability are under study in this research.

4.8 The Emerging Oil Conflict in Somalia

Somaliland and Puntland have emerged as potential conflict spots due to the substantial oil

exploration activities in these regions. The two autonomous regions have potential oil finds

(see Figure 2.3). Contextually, both regions are dominated by the Dhulbahante and

Warsangeli sub clans of the Darod clan. Border disputes over the territorial reach of Puntland,

Somaliland and the greater Somalia have been accentuated by the entry of oil exploration

companies that operate in these disputed area-risking attacks from the armed ethnic militias

(Hoehne, 2015). The entry of these companies has attracted the attention of home

governments who have sought security guarantees on behalf of these Companies. For

example, ConocoPhillips, one such company has secured the influence of the US government

to ensure the TFG enables the company to reap the benefits of the oil concession.

Bamberger and Skovsted (2016) identify another dimension in this emerging oil conflict; the

aspirations for international recognition have meant that Somaliland has assumed a radical

war posture regarding the control of resources within her reach and the subsequent

partnerships with governments and companies. Special police units created have been

56
mandated not only to safeguard the security and property of oil prospecting companies but

also to safeguard the territorial integrity of these competing autonomous units and the TFG.

This privatization of security has further ingrained the already toxic violent psyche of the

nation. In the GRS, competing onshore and offshore finds have pitted this self-governing

region with the TFG. Further conflict areas are onshore with Kenya and in the Ogaden

region.

In the Ogaden region, the intricate conflict with Ethiopia might open a new war front due to

the fact that the oil exploration companies are raising the tensions over the irredentist claims

of the Ogaden.

57
 Figure 4.1: Oil Exploration in the Ogaden Region

Source: Bamberger and Skovsted (2016; 21)

The ONLF has come out to rightfully claim this resource as Ogadeni and for all Ogaden (Le

Billon, 2012). This exploration is happening at the same time as Ethiopia is also undertaking

oil exploration activities in the Ethiopian Ogaden region and has regarded any transboundary

activity by the ONLF and Al Shabaab as a declaration of war (Bamberger and Skovsted,

2016). The potential of regionalization of this conflict is real as security needs and oil claims

58
have increased armaments within this region and because of the value of oil to the

communities and countries, it has become a winner-takes-all when one group manages to

control regions with this reserve.

4.9 Analysis of the Oil Politics in Somalia

4.9.1 Mechanisms and Manifestations of Resource Curse

In a study focusing on the mechanism between natural resources and conflicts, Humphry

(2005), discusses the following principle mechanisms. The nature of the state (weak or failed)

has commonly been cited as a key mechanism for explaining the link between natural

resources and armed conflicts (Humphry, 2005). In a series of papers on the role of resources

in conflict, Ross (2004a, 2004b, 2006) proposes that state weakness makes conflict more

likely by reducing states’ ability to resolve societal conflicts. His arguments draw on the

work of scholars who argue that oil wealth in Middle-Eastern states have sustained weak state

apparatuses with little capability of resolving social conflicts (Ross 2004a).

Di John (2007) also observed that in these states, elites maintain power through corruption

and patron-client relationships, rather than through an establishment of a social contract

based on deliverance of public goods financed through taxation (Di John 2007). Fearon and

Laitin (2003), therefore, note that, oil states are less likely to have strong institutions and

bureaucracies since they are less likely to rely on them for revenue as non-oil dependent

states.

The lack of legitimacy and political, administrative and military capacity makes them more

vulnerable to insurgency and rebellion. Additionally, with limited bureaucratic capacity and

presence in tax collection, the state’s ability to stay informed of what happens at the

grassroots level remains limited, making planning and execution of insurgency and rebellion

easier (Di John 2007).

59
It is furthermore argued that as states become more independent of its citizens, predatory

behaviour amongst those in power becomes less costly and more likely, and reduces the need

for leaders to make long-run political bargains with interest groups (Di John 2007:967).

Taxation and revenues are therefore unpredictable, and when resource rents collapse and

disappear, as they eventually do due to their non-renewable nature and fickle value, elites

might find themselves in a financial situation dependent on arbitrary confiscation in order to

maintain power (Di John, 2007). The mismanagement of wealth combined with historical

circumstances might create long lasting grievances, making especially secessionist conflict

more likely (Di John 2007). Weak state institutions have also been linked to slow economic

growth and low-income levels, factors that have been shown to increase the likelihood of

conflict (Lujala 2010).

4.9.2 Will the discovery of Oil Trigger Conflict?

Based on research and experiences from other oil rich economies, the advent of oil is likely to

incite home grown pressure which might weaken all gains made by the government of

establish permanent amity and stability. As seen from the case of Puntland, oil production can

become a fuel that generate local insecurity. Possible areas of conflict may arise from,

awarding of contracts to international companies and signing of over lapping concessions. A

recent example is demonstrated in the case of Mahmud ‘Adde’ Muse 2005, where he signed

an agreement with business officials from the United Arab Emirates and changed some

clauses in the constitution to win some interest.

Additionally, the discovery oil in itself has attracted a host of activities as international oil

companies set in to begin a prolonged period of excavation. This influx of activities has led to

increased securitization of the area. The presence of these companies has resulted in the

formation of an Exploration Security Unit (ESU) – a special branch of the Puntland Security

Forces whose sole purpose is to provide security for the security companies. The increased

60
creation and deployment of private security companies might result to a backlash with

existing agencies especially the AMISOM forces working on the stabilization of the country.

A situation like this will not only fragment the country’s security apparatus, further, but it

also reduces it and makes it extremely difficult for the federal government to establish

monopoly of its security.

Sambanis and Herge (2006) find oil to be linked with armed conflict but points out that their

analysis can only be held true in relation to smaller types of armed conflicts, and therefore

questions the robustness of the link between conflict and oil. In their defence, Sambanis and

Herge (2006) add that, their position is based on a number of unsatisfactory proxy variables.

Buhaug (2006) in this case adds that the size of conflict moderates the effect of oil on

conflict. Other scholars who question the link between oil and conflict altogether include,

Smith, 2004, Conrad 2009, Di John 2007, Alexeev and Watts 2007, Murshed and Tadjoeddin

2007, Basedau and Lay 2009, Dube and Vargas 2007, Obi 2010).

After reviewing numerous studies, it is clear that there seems to be no direct link between

resource and armed conflicts. However, scholars particularly pay attention to the mechanism

supposedly connecting natural resources to armed conflict (Smith 2004:242-43, Ross 2004a;

2004b, Humphreys 2005). With the wrong conditions present, the discovery of oil most likely

provides the catalyst to conflict. In the case of Somalia, its history is laden with incessant

conflict, to the point of state and nation collapse. The issues in the conflict have been largely

control of the state though resource control has been also in the mix. Therefore, when a

precious commodity such as oil is potentially available in large parts of the country controlled

by armed groups with external connections and interventions, the conflict is likely to reignite.

The task that ahead for the government of Somalia is to ensure that all clans of the country

benefit from the proceeds of the oil. As read from literature, unequable distribution of the

profits could catalyse rifts and political tensions at sub-national levels. To avoid this scenario

61
from occurring, the federal state needs to build a formidable structure that will gain grounds.

It should be noted that several literatures on resource curse has laid emphasis on the need for

good governance with emphasis on capacity building and anti-corruption mechanisms.

One of the longstanding issues characteristic of Somali history is conflicts over border lines

and territorial independence. As a matter of fact, it should be noted that Somalia has the

longest coastline of about 3025km on the mainland of Africa. Some of the recently

discovered oil basins spread across the coastline by-passing contested boarders. A recent UN

report highlights a brewing row between Kenya and Somalia over a maritime boarder which

may trigger conflict. According to the report, the issue between Kenya and Somalia is not a

historical dispute, but a territorial argument that came after the discovery of oil and gas along

the shared border (UNMG, 2014). Consequently, research has shown that most of the

regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa, are largely ecological.

An assessment conducted by analysts also pointed that the relationship between Mogadishu

and Puntland could deteriorate further if oil prospects prove successful (African Confidential,

2013). Likewise, there is also tension with Somaliland. The dispute between Hargeisa and

Mogadishu over the control of Somali airspace is a classic example which has the probability

to escalate if oil findings in Somaliland is deemed commercially viable. Additionally, current

debates regarding the imagined nature of Somali state have strongly been influenced by

demands to consolidate the territories of Somali into a federal state which has consequently

been disputed since the Said Barre’s era.

4.9.3 Existence of Rebel Groups and External Actors

According to Collier and colleagues (2009), the most defining feature of an armed conflict is

the presence and interest or rebel group capable of large – violence. Virtually, all

governments maintain armies (Collier et al. 2009). The defining aspect of armed conflicts as

observed by Collier and colleagues (2009) is the presence of an opposing force. For such a

62
group to react however, there must be a reason for convergence. However, there seems to be

no consensus in literature why rebel groups cause violence and why they engage with

government through violent means. But based on the literature of motivators of violence

Collier and Colleagues (2009), have identified three main motivators namely; Economic

greed, political grievances and -military and financial feasibility. In the case of Somalia, a

multiplicity of rebel movements and insurgents

Conflict is not a new phenomenon and applying concepts and information acquired by

historians should therefore be beneficial (Dixon’s, 2009). Historical characteristics of a state

play an important role in explaining the causes and drivers of conflicts (Dixon’s 2009). In

spite of this, there have been some researchers who have included historical factors in the

study of armed conflict. Some have, for example, attempted to look at the effect of colonial

heritage (Collier et al. 2009, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Lujala 2010), but no robust effect has

been found.

The two variables that have demonstrated to be the most robust is a previous history of

conflict and “peace years” (Dixon 2009). Collier et al. (2009) incorporate these jointly into

the concept of a “conflict trap”. The variables jointly provide controls for fixed effects that

might have occurred before the initial war, which are likely to make the country prone to

future wars, and legacy effects of previous wars, which are expected to fade with time. From

the findings it is evident that the failure to manage this resource may negatively affect the

economy of Somalia. Influx of unearned resources from oil exploitation may cause the

‘Dutch disease’ to occur, resulting in its trade-based sector, particularly the export of

livestock products, to be less competitive. Literature on resource curse indicates that huge

reserves of national resources such as oil and gas have great potential to improve the

wellbeing of a country (United Nations Development Program, 2006). Contrary to this

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belief, most countries gifted with such resources have recorded abysmal programs in items of

economic growth and poverty levels.

This indicates that in spite of its significant potential, oil wealth is not a cure for development

and armed conflict. For instance, while countries such as Botswana, Indonesia and Norway

have profited enormously from oil, others like Venezuela, Nigeria and Ghana have registered

negative growth results (Humphreys, 2007). In view of the resource curse framework

discussed in chapter two, we have seen that states endowed with a natural resource in

abundance experience worse economic development trajectories than states without such

resources. Evidence demonstrates that there is a negative correlation between natural

resources and economic growth with respect to states which accrue a large portion of their

revenue from rents, as opposed to taxes from citizens (Auty, 2004; Humphreys, Sachs and

Stiglitz, 2007; Beland and Tiagi, 2009).

Furthermore, it can be argued that mismanagement of the rents, rather than the rents

themselves, is the underlying problem with natural resource abundance. To this effect it can

be said that the resource curse is not an inevitability, rather it is a phenomenon where human

agency can play a significant role in catalysing or correcting its impacts (Humphreys et al.,

2010; Roll and Sperling, 2011). Therefore, not only does political agency play a role in

explaining the paradox of plenty, it can also resolve it. Nevertheless, doubt still remains as to

whether the political elite in Somalia are capable of sufficiently managing these challenges to

avoid such adverse economic impacts.

It has also been noted that a country’s political landscape can be negatively affected by the

resource curse. First, natural resource abundance grants political elites increased autonomy

from their citizens, thereby making them less accountable. Second, due to the influx of

unearned resources, leaders have access to increased amounts of capital to beef up security

mainly used to enforce their authoritarian rule.

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4.9.4 Ethnic Fractionalization in Somalia

Studies have shown the potential of ethno linguistic fractionalization to substantially increase

the likelihood of conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002), for example, observe that ethno

linguistic fractionalization to have been underestimated in economic studies of conflict.

While some studies have confirmed this, many others have found no such indication.

However, it has been established that conflict is likely in more ethnically diverse societies

(Aron and Patrick, 2013).

Bodea and Elbadawi (2007) find ethnic, religious, and language fractionalization (social

fractionalization) to significantly increase the likelihood of civil war. According to their

results, a diverse country is three times more likely to experience conflict than a homogenous

country. Smith (2004) also finds ethnic diversity to increase the likelihood of civil war and

notes that diverging results may be due to how one measures conflict.

In Philip’s (2010) and Gonzalez’ (2010) preposition on the types of resource war is the

abundant resource war whereby a wealth of resources can result in less democracy, poor

economic growth, and greedy behaviour by competing elites. Accordingly, dominant

resources and its control by the state leaders will lead to little hope for those outside state

patronage to improve the quality of their lives or gain a decent standard of living. This

analysis mirrors the precarious situation in Somalia. Additionally, violence might become the

most appropriate method of maintaining control for the governing body, which should create

and sustain profitable patterns of resource exploitation and wealth distribution. Subsequently,

this study opines that this resource war or the threat of it, might become an intrinsic part of

the political economy of resource exploitation in Somalia and there is need for remedial

measures of addressing the conflict.

Among the more robust demographic findings in the conflict literature is population. De

Soysa (2002) finds population and population density to be related to conflict onset, as do

65
Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 2009). Population in this context is used to refer to a group of

individuals of the same species occupying a defined geographic space (Collier and Hoeffler

2004, 2009). Populations may be relatively small and closed, as on an island or they may be

more diffuse and without a clear boundary between them and a neighbouring population of

the same species (De Soysa, 2002). In the case of Somalia, the population is sparse, relative

to land mass, though the fact that these regions are well patrolled by marauding armed groups

ensures that there is a potential for conflict. Control of these areas inhabited is difficult for a

weak government, let alone patrolling over 5,000km of land and sea borders. According to

Smith (2004), population density always serves as a control measure of the size of a country,

whereas larger countries in terms of population are expected to be more prone to conflict and

protest than smaller ones (Smith 2004). De Soysa and Wagner (2003) furthermore point out

that the effect of population is dependent on how conflict is measured. Somalia’s peace and

stability therefore rests on the ability of a legitimate government managing to establish

control across the country.

Several physical geographic features have been proposed as predictors of conflict.

Researchers have examined the amount of forest area, total length of borders, number of

bordering countries, total amount of land area, length of riverbeds, and more (Dixon 2009).

Physical geographical features are either man-made or naturally-created features of the Earth.

According to Dixon (2009) natural geographical features consist of landforms and

ecosystems such as: terrain types, physical factors of the environment.

However, research has shown that, the theoretical foundation for the link between

mountainous terrain and conflict is not well developed, mostly due to it being treated as a

control variable, rather than an explanatory variable, in most studies of conflict. Therefore,

where it has been included it has been hypothesized that mountainous terrain can provide

rebels with a safe haven outside the reach of the state’s reach (Smith 2004, Djankov and

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Reynal-Querol 2007). It is uncertain if this is in fact the case, but since it has been shown to

be somewhat consistent across studies, it seems beneficial to maintain the awareness of the

potential for it.

4.9.5 Political Grievance

According to Hanlon and Yanacopulos (2006), there is no consensus regarding the effect of

loot seeking on rebel recruitment. However, numerous case studies have often highlighted

rebel movements only appear in quest for economic rewards. Hanlon and Yanacopulos

(2006) give reference to the case of FARC in Colombia and FMLN in El Salvador where

membership conditions were gruelling and looting often prohibited (Hanlon and Yanacopulos

2006).

However, there are several types of arguments as to how natural resources are connected to

grievances (Humphreys 2005). However, all of them revolve around the issue of

dissatisfaction with their distribution and extraction. The compelling arguments as to why

political grievances could link natural resources to armed conflict onset, testing the grievance

mechanism is difficult as they are intangible, and therefore cannot be tested directly

(Humphreys 2005). According to Humphry, grievances are also linked to dissatisfaction with

the state, and separating between a weak-state mechanism and the grievance mechanisms is

therefore difficult.

The issues addressed in this section illustrate how the current oil exploration and potential

future exploitation affect the conflict dynamics of the country in the context of the prevailing

challenges such as contested statehoods and borderlines, overlapping authorities, and recent

conflict characterized by famine, war, civil war, clan conflict, foreign military interventions,

piracy, and terrorism. While there is yet to be consensus on the potential figures on oil

reserves in Somalia, there is a possibility that Somalia could be sitting on huge oil reserves.

The history of oil exploration dates back the colonial era when Italian and British geologists

67
discovered oil seeps in the country’s north (Reitano & Shaw,2013). In the 1990s the World

Bank launched several initiatives to investigate the potential of oil and gas in Somalia.

It was on the basis of such initiatives that the Siad Barre regime sold oil concessions in the

Northern region of the country before the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. The collapse

of the state in 1991 led to the halting of initiatives to explore her rich natural resources such

as iron ore, bauxite and most notably oil.

In the literature, there exists five areas where oil is being explored in Somalia. These include

the Nugaal Block which is on the border of Puntland and Somaliland and which has had

disputes within the two regional governments. There is the Naroor block to be found in

Puntland. Other areas include the Berbera PSA in Somaliland, and offshore blocks on the

border with Kenya and Samhah in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the Lamu basin remains

contested between Kenya and Somalia (Reitana & Shaw, 2013).

The oil exploration in Somalia also occurs in an environment marked by weak governance

regimes and a presence of other security threats in the country that have ranged from piracy

to terrorism. Given Al-Shabaab presence in the country, they could disrupt the extractives

industry (Balthasar, 2014).

It is notable to mention however that the regions where oil prospects are ongoing (Puntland

and Somali Land) are relatively stable in terms of governance (Walls & Kibbles, 2012). Inter-

clan’s agreements would need to be carefully navigated to ensure stability in oil exploration.

The tendency therefore to situate the discovery of oil amidst a broader fragile space should

thus not be generalized. In Somali and owing in part to minimal state presence, the oil

extraction field has seen the privatization and militarization of these spaces for energy

security. This has seen the presence of private security firms performing state like functions

that even extend beyond the extractives areas (Walls & Kibbles,2012).

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A major contention across the extractive industry and which goes beyond the present case

study is that of transparency and accountability in oil contracts and revenue sharing. The lack

of accountability in contexts such as Nigeria is a case in point. In the Somali context, there

are claims that the republic’s national oil law crafted in 2007 was the work of Canadian

lawyers with additional support from Kuwaiti. The contention being that this law vastly

underestimated the oil reserves in the country while allocating meagre oil royalties. This turn

of circumstances additionally speaking to gaps in negotiation (Wall & Kibbles, 2012).

It is pertinent to observe that both Puntland and Somaliland have separate oil prospecting

agreements bringing into question the role of the central government in Mogadishu. While

the 2007 petroleum law gives the autonomous regions the right to engage in oil explorations,

including the requirement that signed deals be approved by Somali national parliament.

Additionally, it calls for half of all oil inputs in each autonomous region revert to the

central/federal government (Reitana & Shaw, 2013).

In spite of this law, the Somaliland government continued to sign bilateral deals for oil

explorations in territories that continued to be disputed. Given that autonomous regions have

been signing contracts with oil exploration firms without the involvement of the federal

government in the past, a complication arises. How are contractual obligations and property

rights to be navigated in a context of oil exploration? (Balthasar, 2014).

Complicating the oil exploration question is a new trigger that was initiated by a Somali

cabinet resolution in June 2012 that claimed a 200 nautical mile inside Kenya’s territory and

which is currently the subject of litigation pitting Kenya and Somalia at the International

Court of Justice.

This ongoing case lodged by Somali to the court seeks for a delimitation of maritime

boundaries on the Indian Ocean Coast and which are claimed by Kenya (ICJ,2017). Kenya in

part and filling an admissibility challenge to the International Court of Justice would argue

69
that it had in fact signed an agreement with the Somali transitional federal government of

Somalia in 2009 which supported Kenya’ claim on that territory.

The area under dispute between Kenya and Somalia is about 64 thousand square kilometers.

This dispute would be escalated by the federal government of Somalia decision to refer the

matter to the International Court of Justice. The initial source of dispute on part of Kenya’s

shoreline was underlined by claims that Kenya had already sold off 6 oil and gas fields close

to her border with Somalia on the Coastal shore to international firms.

Kenya’s oil interests are additionally considered to have been part of the motivation to launch

attacks on the Al-Shabaab in October of 2011. There is no outright possibility that this

dispute would trigger a military conflict between Kenya and Somalia. In any case, the two

countries are bound together in neutralizing the security threats posed by the Al-Shabaab

(Bamberger & Skovsted, 2016). It is however the security interests that continue to be

adduced on Kenya’s intervention in Somalia in 2011 (Githigaro, 2015; Anderson &

McKnight, 2014). Arbitration for the case would seem to be more sound option (Reitana and

Shaw,2013; Ahali & Achak, 2015).

Underlying the dynamics of oil production is the fear of ‘resource curse’ or the ‘Dutch

disease, a phenomenon that has affected former less endowed economies with sudden wealth

from oil rent. Economists have argued that natural resources rent injected into an economy

has the potential to impact an economy negatively (Le Billon, 2005; 2012). In ordinary

circumstances however, natural resources should propel a country to positive economic

development.

The discovery of oil and other minerals has however been a bringer of calamitous times for

countries in Africa, a situation that could potentially mirror and anticipate the course of

Somalia’s oil resources. Academic debates centered on the resource curse framework have

posited that this has been the case owing to the general levels of poor governance and culture

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of impunity. There is evidence that the Persian Gulf regions and the diamond mines in the

region have experienced a similar fate. They have suffered in the past from exploitative

commercial relations, poor governance and war. Drawing from Kenya and the recent

discovery of oil in Somalia County, there is already speculation that the oil resources could

also turn into a curse if governance issues are not addressed. In the Kenyan case, there have

been claims of lack of transparency around the question of oil extraction and which could

potentially turn it into a resource curse (Le Billon, 2005; Johannes et al. 2015).

The underlying view is that unearned resources from natural resources rent lead to an over-

valuation of currencies which leads to the rise of real exchange rates. The wider implication

of this, is that salaries rise, the cost of production appreciates with a negative drop in the

competitive sectors of the economy. Somalia’s economy has largely been dominated by

agriculture and livestock production. This additionally is complicated too by potential price

volatility of primary commodities such as oil which would impact negatively on an economy

sustained by natural resource rents.

Related to the ‘Dutch disease’ framework, Somalia’s weak governance structures with

various characteristics as a fragile/weak state then raises the question of how these resources

would be managed (Ahali & Achak, 2015). In averting a resource course for Somalia, good

governance would help unlock herself from the ‘Dutch Disease’.

While commendable steps are ongoing in the governance sector in Somalia, the stability of

the country would matter for the extraction of her natural resource rent (Ahali & Achak,

2015). In contextualizing the resource curse, the natural resource ‘rent’ in places

characterized by weak governance, affects the political landscape.

The state is captured by the ruling elite who siphon off the proceeds of natural resources and

as such they cease being accountable to the citizenry. The net effect of this is the rise of

71
authoritarianism in a state. The authoritarianism would in this context be made possible by

the strengthening of the security apparatus made possible by the presence of oil capital.

When this is tied to the prevalence of corruption in Somalia, navigating the resource curse

through sound governance would further assist to wade off social divisions that would

emanate from the lack of transparency. These are all potential risks that stare at Somalia’s

leadership as they navigate how they will prudently manage their abundance of oil resources

(Ahali & Achak, 2015).

4.9.6 Somalia’s External Actors

Right from its political history Somalia has been a centre of activity attracting interest from

regional and international actors. Analysts have shown that in the early part of the 1990s, the

link between the international humanitarian intercession and the interest of Western oil

companies, and today’s international military engagement is often assumed to be compelled

by the pursuit for oil exploration in Somalia (Gibbs, 2000; Assl, 2012). A fact to substantiate

this assertion is shown in one of the six steps set out by the United States prior to recognizing

the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). The legitimacy of the Union of Islamic Courts

was, for instance enhanced with the support of HOA and American support. According to the

Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, (2013), the rule set out that the Somali government

recognizes the rights of US oil companies following the collapse of Said Barre’s government

is a testament to the role of external actors in contributing to the peace and stability of

Somalia.

Considering Somalia’s weak state institutions, as well as its de facto lack of sufficient checks

and balances and its nascent democratic structures, the wealth that the oil sector promises to

accrue is likely to have adverse effects on politics. Rampant corruption in the country will

impede the transparent and fair management of the oil assets, thereby fostering social

divisions which is among the key conflict drivers in Somalia (Ross, 2012). External actors,

72
despite their vested interests in Somalia can play a role in establishing the conditions for

peace. AMISOM’s activities bespeak of this contribution, though long-lasting actions ought

to originate from the Somali nation.

4.9.7 Overlapping Concession Agreements

Conflict is further made highly probable due to disputed property rights resulting from oil

production companies signing conflicting contracts with heads of different political bodies in

Somalia (Balthasar, 2014). In such a scenario, there is a high likelihood that oil enterprises

will increasingly endeavour to hold the political leaders to account so as to ensure the

protection and enforcement of their contract rights, consequently putting fragile social

relations under even more strain. Petro Quest Africa for instance in February 2013 made an

agreement for a block with the local administration of Galmudug (a state in the south of

Puntland). According to Manson (2013) Petro Quest’s contract conflicted with Shell’s claim

of an offshore block and this led to Shell writing a letter to the federal government in April

2013 demanding the protection of their exclusive rights to the block, increasing the likelihood

of a violent ‘solution’.

Somalia’s legal situation, however, does not offer any solution to the concession rights issues.

To begin with, Somalia’s oil law passed in 2008 is vague and leaves much room for differing

interpretations, albeit being regarded as one of the most progressive legislations in the

country. Furthermore, important questions about which political actors are allowed to be

signatories to oil production deals to begin with remain unclear. Conflicting jurisdictions and

legal frameworks engender legal and political as well as armed struggles, with the security of

expatriates providing for concern. Ransom money paid to pirates during the heydays of

piracy in the Indian Ocean may return further inland. Moreover, international oil enterprises

become direct actors in the Somalia conflict crisis by putting additional strain on the already

tense relations between all the different actors in the Somali conflict crisis, that is, regional

73
administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, the federal government of Somalia and local

clans.

Oil concession agreements can even, prior to exploitation, lead to disputes and controversies

both between the different political entities in the region and with international oil companies.

Since 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia has entered into several concession

agreements with oil companies and their respective governments. Several violent

manifestations of these tensions have been registered as well. For instance, in 2014, a DNO

exploration team was ambushed in Sool by a clan militia, forcing DNO to flee to Hargeisa

without any fatalities (Hovland, 2014, all Africa, 2014). Further back in 2006, Range

Resources’ oil exploration undertakings in Puntland exacerbated clan tensions between

Warsangeli and the local Puntland administration (Majerten). Puntland’s security forces,

which, in collaboration with Majerten leaders, were allegedly instructed to safeguard Range

Resources’ equipment, killed over thirty people triggering the Warsangeli to form a new

militia. The militia later went on to swear allegiance to Al Shabaab and even defended an Al

Shabaab territory in 2014 (Gridneff, 2014).

4.10 Summary

This chapter examined the oil evolution of the conflict in Somalia and how the discovery of

oil has altered the peace prospects. In this sub-section, it was established that the country’s

conflict grew for most of the authoritarian years of Siad Barre’s regime and that the interplay

of external and domestic actors combined to set Somali along a path of state collapse and

dysfunctionalism as a sovereign entity. The entry of oil as a factor only accentuates the

situation since long lasting peace is still a mirage. With the root causes of conflict yet to be

addressed, the actors to the conflict are likely to find another issue to be prosecuted in the

conflict unless mitigating measures are addressed. Concerted efforts are therefore needed to

tackle the root causes of the conflict and to ensure equitable gain from the oil resource.

74
 CHAPTER FIVE:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This concluding chapter provides a review of what has been studied as well as the final

inferences and plausible lines of action to ensure that peace and stability is realized in

Somalia.

5.2 Summary

The focus of this study was on the Somalian case where the country has found peace and

stability elusive for most of its post-independence life. The disintegration of the country has

been systematic and catastrophic, with government collapse in the 1990s ushering in decades

of virulent clannism and secessionism that has split the country into fractions controlled by

armed groups. Whereas the TFG, aided by the AU and AMISOM as well as other

international backers have sought to ensure it re-establishes control over Somalia, conflict

dynamics still point to a conflict yet to be resolved since the Al Shabaab and other groups are,

together with the autonomous units, causing division in the country. With oil a new factor in

this conflict, this study sought to analyze how this country will convert this resource into a

blessing and not a curse.

Chapter One presented the structure of the study, providing a background of the issues, the

statement of the problem as well as the objectives. The study adopted these objectives; To

establish the background and historical evolution of the conflict in Somalia, to examine the

role of the various actors in the conflict in Somalia, to analyze the oil politics in Somalia and

it effect on peace and stability and recommend plausible measures to ensure that oil

exploration and exploitation contributes to Somalia’s peace and stability. The main argument

of this chapter was that there is need for a scholarly study on the prospects of peace in

Somalia, especially at a time when it is on the verge of obtaining windfalls from the oil

75
resource. Whereas many studies have pronounced themselves on the discovery of a precious

non-renewable resource as a resource curse, the same has not been comprehensively

undertaken in Somalia’s case.

A subsequent literature review in Chapter two presented a critique of the existing literature

and grounded this study in the gap in literature as identified. The resource curse model was

adopted to guide this study while the methodology that guided this study was laid out in

chapter three. The analysis of the conflict system is laid out in chapter four, with an extensive

examination of the various actors in the conflict and how they are shaping up for a potential

oil related conflict.

5.3 Conclusions

In conclusion, the presence of oil in any political or geographical context should lead to

growth. This is because oil revues help countries to undertake capital investments, expand

economies and create opportunities for its youthful generation. However, this has not been

the case with most the countries in Africa, where majority of the oil producing countries have

experienced inverse relationship between oil production and economic growth. This situation

has been described as the oil curse. Somalia unlike other countries in Africa, has a unique

opportunity to avert the negative effects of the oil curse, way before the exploration,

exploitation and production begins. According to research, for a country to succeed, it ought

to have effective institutions and promote transparency and accountability in the allocation oil

revenues. This should be proceeded with sound investment in the productive sector of the

economy to boost economic growth as well as create employment.

This study also concludes that the prospects for peace in Somalia are mixed; on one hand the

potential for economic growth and development is possible with oil exploration signifying

substantial oil finds. On the other hand, the decades- old conflict still has its actors and issues

that have for long not comprehensively resolved. This study concludes that with large areas

76
of the country balkanized along ethnic, regional and political divides, the discovery of the oil

resource- unless purposively addressed in this conflict context, there is a likelihood that

Somalia will also experience the resource curse.

Another conclusion is that the geopolitics of oil will likely make Somalia become a new

hotspot for control of the oil resource. As many powerful governments such as China, the

USA, Russia and Turkey seek newer sources of energy, they are likely to find Somalia

irresistible because of the geopolitical positioning of the country vis-à-vis the global shipping

lanes and potential markets. Control of the resource in Somalia will be less arduous a task as

compared with the struggles for control of the same resource in Venezuela and the Middle

East. With weak governments and potential for arm twisting through aid, Somalia is likely to

become a pawn in this struggle for energy.

This study further concludes that the haphazard entry and legitimation of oil exploration

companies is actually reducing the leverage of the Somali governments and its autonomous

regions have in ensuring that Somalia makes the most of this resource. The entry of this

multiple players in the oil sector are complicating the conflict dynamics. The multiplicity of

oil exploration contracts with these governing entities are actually giving clout to emerging

actors to the conflict while legitimizing otherwise unrecognized entities. In this situation,

Somalia is stating at the intricate web of the conflict actually becoming worse. Instead of

focusing on development, these new entrants are actually solidifying their zero-sum positions

in this conflict situation.

77
5.4 Recommendations

As a result of the analysis and inferences made in this study, the following recommendations

are made;

First of all, the various governing units and the TFG should in the short term freeze oil

exploration contracts and dialogue on the appropriate legal and administrative mechanisms of

allowing these companies to operate. This stop gap measure should be intended to allow for

multisectoral consultations and an evaluation of the Somali economic and political climate in

order to create a suitable environment for the proper exploitation of this resource.

Drawing on the resource curse thesis, the broad failures of anticipating the impacts of oil

extraction has the possibility of not only worsening the already existing security situation, but

also opening new frontiers of conflicts. In the immediate start of extraction, there would be

direct loss of livelihoods, that could be accompanied by the possible displacement and which

would disrupt individuals’ everyday life.

Secondly, the TFG should, with the help of other local and international partners build sound

governance through functioning legal and political structures. The traditional structures of

governance ought to be fully functional for crises of legitimacy and identity to be addressed.

For Somalia to create conditions for peace and stability, it has to also navigate the

international and regional interests in oil. In terms of national interests, ensuring that all of

the regional interests are properly taken care of. This would include the social investments,

infrastructure and the associated benefits that would be derived from oil. Partnership with an

established oil-producing country(ies) can help the country to acquire best practice in the

exploitation and use of this resource. Furthermore, Somalia ought to enrol in initiatives such

that make it possible for residents to peer review documents oil exploration and extraction

transactions.

78
Purposive steps should also be taken to demilitarize the country by allowing only legitimate

security sector players to thrive and systematically thinning the operating space of operating

space of insurgents and armed groups. The international community can partner with the TFG

and the autonomous units to widen the reach of governance and also ensuring maximum

control of the Somali border. Care would thus be needed for Somalia to put in place

mitigation measures to pre-empt grievances turning into conflicts. Taking a practical example

from the Nigerian case study, the lax regulation of existing laws by the federal government

has meant that oil multinationals have operated with impunity. The poor enforcement of

environmental standards has meant that oil multi-nationals have not been held accountable

for environmental degradations with wide ranging impacts for human.

Diversifying the natural resource rent from the non-oil economic sector should also be

considered. This would then mean investing the proceeds of oil to other non-oil sectors of the

economy such as trade and manufacturing. The net effect of diversifying into other economic

sectors of the economy would have a positive economic growth trajectory for the country.

This would result in additional income generating ventures, address unemployment while

shielding herself from the negative economic effects occasioned by price volatilities of oil in

the international market. Somalia too is in a process of reconfiguring its statehood and such

has to manage the associated complexities so as to manage prudently her natural resources. It

would be judicious to observe however the absence of a singular framework that would

address the resource curse dynamic.

It is imperative too for continuous dialogue between the federal government and the regions

around oil extraction. A debate too that is important to have in the context of oil extraction is

associated impacts of oil extraction in the community. This would help to pre-empt

grievances that could arise from resource extraction. Investing in these concerns would help

obstruct the experiences of oil rich regions such as the Niger Delta experiences in Nigeria

79
where a series of environmental grievances have come to the fore. The Niger Delta region has

held a growing spectacle of violence that is tied to both environmental grievances and

resource sharing.

Among others there would be the additional risk that the new conflict fault lines would arise

out of rapid population flow into resource rich areas. This could create conflicts between

residents of a particular region and the newcomers seeking to benefit from oil extraction (Le

Billon, 2005). In the context of a federal and clan structures in Somalia, the aforementioned

would not be far-fetched possibilities. Anticipating the socio-economic impacts and the

counter-mitigation measures would thus be necessary for Somalia.

80
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LIST OF APPENDIX

Appendix I: Questionnaires

This questionnaire is designed to gather research information on the project “influence of

credit management on commercial banks performance, a case of equity bank, Kenya.” For

section A, please fill only in one blank where appropriate.

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

Respondent’s Particulars

1. What is your gender?

Male [ ]

Female [ ]

2. For how long have you worked in the institution?

Less than 1 year [ ]

6-10 years [ ]

1-5 years [ ]

Over 10 years [ ]

3. What is your age bracket?

Below 20 [ ]

21-30 [ ]

31-40 [ ]

41-50 [ ]

51 and above [ ]

4. What is your highest level of formal education?

Certificate [ ]

Diploma [ ]

89
Bachelor [ ]

Master’s Degree [ ]

Other- Specify ……………………......................

5 How long have you worked in the organization?

Less than 2 years [ ]

2-5 years [ ]

6-10 years [ ]

More than 10 years [ ]

The Trends of Oil Related Conflicts

1. Has oil resulted insecurity incidents in south Somalia?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………

2. How do you rate the extent to which oil exploration contributes to insecurity Somalia
residents?

Very High Extent [ ]

High Extent [ ]
Medium Extent [ ]
Low Extent [ ]
Very Low Extent [ ]
Explain
…………………………………………………………………………………….............
..
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….

3. Does the oil exploration affect social activities among Somalia residents?
YES [ ] NO [ ]

90
 Explain
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………
4. Do the indigenous people feel primarily entitled to oil benefits?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
5. What are some of the impacts of these security threats?

...........................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................
6. Do you agree that oil exploration has security effects social activities among Somalia
residents?

Strongly Agree
Agree
Undecided
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Explain
…………………………………………………………………………………….................
.................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................
The Relationship between Oil and Conflict in Somalia
1. On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 =Neither significant nor
insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the
general significance of security implication oil exploration on security among Somalia
residents?

Very significant ( )
Significant ( )
Neither significant nor insignificant ( )

91
 Insignificant ( )
Very insignificant ( )
2. On a scale of 1-5, where 1= Very High Extent, 2= High Extent, 3 = Medium Extent, 4=
Low Extent and 5=Very Low Extent; how does oil exploration affect security of the
following aspects of social activities among Somalia residents.

Very High High Medium Low Very

Extent Extent Extent Extent Low
Extent

Category 1 2 3 4 5

Cultural sites and

practices

Family roles setup

Environmental pollution
and health risks

Politics

Human Rights

Security Challenges Arising From Oil Exploration in Somalia

1. Is oil exploration a serious threat in Somalia?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
2. What are the main sources of main economic activities of the residents within
Somalia?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………

3. Does oil exploration affect economic activities among Somalia?

Yes [ ]

92
 No [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
Explain your answer
……………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………..

4. To what extent does oil exploration affect security of economic activities in Somalia?

Very High Extent [ ]

High Extent [ ]
Medium Extent [ ]
Low Extent [ ]
Very Low Extent [ ]
Explain…………………………………………………………………………………….........
......
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………..5.
On a scale of 1-5, where 1=Very significant, 2=Significant, 3 =Neither significant nor
insignificant, 4= Insignificant and 5=Very insignificant; How would you rate the general
significance of security implication of oil exploration on economic activities among Somalia
residents?
Very significant ( )
Significant ( )
Neither significant nor insignificant ( )
Insignificant ( )
Very insignificant ( )
Explain your answer
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………………..
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SECURITY MANAGEMENT ISSUES DUE TO OIL EXPLORATION
7. Is there sufficient community participation in oil exploration and natural resources
management activities?
YES [ ] NO [ ]

Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………

8. What security management strategies/measures have been instituted in the area since
oil discovery?
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………

9. In your opinion, are the security management measures instituted sufficient?

YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………….

10. Are there human rights abuses since oil discovery in Somalia?
YES [ ] NO [ ]

Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
11. Are civil societies participating in oil exploration activities?
YES [ ] NO [ ]
Explain

94
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………

12. To the best of you knowledge, what resource management policies are in place for oil
exploration?
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………….

13. Are the resource management policies adequate?

YES [ ] NO [ ]

Explain
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………

14. What measures can be instituted to curb negative security effects of oil exploration?
a) ………………………………………………………………………………
b) ………………………………………………………………………………
c) ………………………………………………………………………………
d) ………………………………………………………………………………

95