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Philosophy 114 X5
Sachen selbst (back to the things themselves) – has long been heard but oft
misinterpreted. A naïve view will be that Husserl is proposing for realism to become the
underlying worldview by which the sciences and all related search for truths be founded.
None could be farther from the actuality. It is this paper’s intent to show that Husserl’s
Initially, we will define subjectivism and realism and delineate the senses which
phenomenology starting with his concept of επσχή (epoché), his theories on intentionality
Each section will show Husserl’s thought and identify the marks by which we
classify it as leading to subjectivism. We will end with a summation to the effect that
Husserl’s phenomenology suspends, if not actually negating, the realist view that objects
the measure of anything, whether it be knowledge, morality, truth, &c.1 For our purposes,
we will here use the following sense of subjectivism. With Wittgenstein in his Tractatus:
The subject doesn’t belong to the world but it is a limit of the world.
Taken in this context, this view holds that objects and their essences are wholly
within perception. An extreme view will be that there exists no objective reality apart
Such a view stemmed from Rene Descartes’ concept of the Cogito, which is seen
as the container of all possible knowledge and of all essences. In his Meditations II:
“… bodies themselves are not properly perceived by the senses nor by the
faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone; and since they are not perceived
because they are seen and touched, but only because they are understood [ or
will, I did not think that I ought on that ground to conclude that they proceeded
from things different from myself, since perhaps there might be found in me some
1
Extrapolated from various sources. The Encarta Dictionary defines subjectivism as a theory
stating that people can only have knowledge of what they experience directly. Webster’s Online
on the other hand defines it as a theory that limits itself to subjective experience.
2
René Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy.
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/meditations.html (accessed 23
May 2007)
faculty, though hitherto unknown to me, which produced them (mind).” (my
italics)3
Descartes method of doubt was taken further to include everything that is not
apprehended by the mind alone. In the light of his “Brains in a Vat” story, reality then is
or thinking about them.4 At first glance, to one who is unfamiliar with Husserl’s
phenomenological methodology, die Sachen selbst could easily mean that there are outer
henceforth examine Husserl’s concept of επσχή as the starting point of his reduction, and
manifests itself actually in the derived acts to the original objects of our most primordial
acts.5 We have to abandon the prejudices of the positive sciences and must try to reach
επσχή. Επσχή is that “bracketing” of the thesis of the natural standpoint so as to suspend
3
Ibid.
4
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9108671/Realism
(accessed 23 May 2007)
5
Joseph Kockelmans. “What is Phenomenology,” Phenomenology and Physical Science, Henry
J. Koren, trans. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1966)
6
Ibid.
all judgment regarding the existence or being qua being of the intended object. This then
allows us to correctly examine how our knowledge of the world comes about – in effect,
As επσχή does not immediately negate the existential thesis of the natural world,
and Husserl himself does not completely deny the existence of this natural world, one is
compelled to think that Husserl enjoins realism after all. This is not the case. This
disconnexion or bracketing of the thesis reduces the being of the natural world to mere
contingency or relativity.
similar to the Cartesian methodical doubt of the world’s existence, proceeds beyond
actually suspend the existence of the natural world.7 Perhaps we can clarify this further
by looking at Husserl’s words themselves. For him, the General Thesis of the natural
standpoint does not posit the world as something apprehended, but as a fact world that
has its being out there… [It] does not consist of course in an act proper, in an articulated
judgment about existence, it is and remains something all the time the standpoint is
adopted.8 To doubt this will be to doubt “Being” qua being of some form or other… it is
clear that we cannot doubt the Being of anything, and in the same act of consciousness,
bring what is substantive to this Being under the terms of the Natural Thesis.9 A
judgmental suspension at first glance; however, as this judgment is basically what posits
existence to the objects of the natural standpoint, the suspension of this judgment entails
7
H. Chapman. Sensations and Phenomenology, (Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 124-125
8
Edmund Husserl. “The thesis of the Natural Standpoint and Its Suspension,” Ideas: General
Introduction to Phenomenology, W.R. Boyce Gibson trans. (London: George Allen and Unwin
Lrd., 1931)
9
Ibid.
a radical transvaluation of the judgment and the objects themselves. Judgment is
The world is not something absolute in itself…, but it is nothing at all in the
What then is absolute? And on what grounds shall we base our knowledge of the
Where are the clowns? Ober der, ober der! (On Intentionality and Givenness)
an object originated from Franz Brentano. In his attempt to differentiate between physical
and psychical phenomena, he said of the latter that they are those phenomena which,
precisely as intentional, contain an object in themselves.11 Husserl made use of this same
Intentionality, instead, is that class of mental facts (acts) which have the peculiarity of
presenting the subject with an object.12 Furthermore, to each act of consciousness there
corresponds a noema, namely, an object such, exactly and only such, as the subject is
aware of it and has it in view.13 When we perceive say, a solved Rubik’s cube, and look
10
E. Husserl. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie,
citation from H. Philipse. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith, ed. “Transcendental
Idealism.” The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1995)
11
Franz Brentano. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte, from an article on
Phenomenology, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-
68553/Phenomenology
12
Aron Gurwitsch. “On the Intentionality of Consciousness.” in Martin Farber, ed. Philosophical
Essays in Memory of Husserl (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940)
13
Ibid.
directly at one of its sides, we intuit that we apprehend an object that is six-sided, that we
are viewing it from one of its sides, that it is at a certain distance from us, that it has the
character of being manipulated to show a mixture of colors from all its other sides, that
we know we apprehend a Rubik’s cube and not the Pyramids of Giza, this is the what he
calls noema.
the process of reduction, we can see that what is intended is not the external object qua
being an object in the outer world but actually the perception-senses of the thing as given
by its noemata. These noemata are multitudinous in number, dependent upon the many
although Husserl only gives an account of spatial adumbrations - Abschattung), and are
the noeses (sing. noesis) are within consciousness itself – immanent. We want to note
here that these noemata can not be perceived from the natural standpoint; only if we
perform the process of transcendental reflection can we view that which is, not natural,
In the natural standpoint the apple tree is for us an existing thing in the
that the perceived apple tree before us does not really exist. In this event, the real
14
E. Husserl. Logische Untersuchungen, citation from J. Kockelmans. Phenomenology and
Physical Science.
15
Harmon Chapman. Sensations and Phenomenology, (Indiana University Press, 1966)
relation, which was previously meant (gemeint) as really obtaining, is now
disturbed. The perception alone remains; there is nothing real out there to which
it relates.16
We can see from here at this point that Husserl now distinguishes between two
types of object - those outer objects, which are problematic as above shown, and those
immanent objects, that with phenomenological reduction are apodictic, as they are
departure of the view vis-à-vis realism, from the suspension of the naturalistic thesis to
the positioning of perceptual objects to an elevated point above their natural counterparts.
We have seen how Husserl treats the objects of our perceptions and how they are
reduced to what he calls noema. We would now like to examine the process by which
summarizes:
objects and parts of objects, which in general transcend the experiential sphere”
there correspond the phenomenological moments of unity, which give unity to the
example, colour sensations to the monadic and relational moments of form, there
16
E. Husserl. Ideas, H. Chapman cit., Ibid.
correspond form sensations. And to the way moments hang together in and
Sensations are however, not the noema yet. What constitutes the noema is our
present or represent: It is these sensations “in their interpretation” which have the
interpret raw sensations is to actually perceive an object, like the Rubik’s cube above, a
tree, a flower, etc. These interpretations also include within them a series of implied
perceptual aspects that correspond to further noemata (what is included within the
subject’s internal horizon). But mind that interpretations are not just the influx of new
“mindedness.”20 Hence, Husserl distinguishes noema from the act, and the object of
perception.
What then is this noema? Apparently, it is an unreal or ideal entity which belongs
to the same sphere as meanings or significations. This is the sphere of sense (Sinn).21 To
experience an act is the same thing as to actualize a sense.22A corollary of this is that in
actualizing senses, what we are merely doing is objectifying our internal horizons, our
interpreted:
17
E. Husserl. Logical Investigations, Kevin Mulligan cit. Barry Smith and David Woodruff
Smith, ed. “Perception.” The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1995)
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Aron Gurwitsch. “On the Intentionality of Consciousness.” in Martin Farber, ed. Philosophical
Essays in Memory of Husserl (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940)
22
Ibid.
the object is co-determined by the character of the act in which the object
appears… the intentional act is essentially an act that gives meaning. Thus the
structure of thinking itself; this thinking itself first gives meaning to the object
and then continues to orient itself to the pole of identity which it itself has already
created.23
phenomenology. It is not concerned with the reality of outer objects vis-à-vis the natural
standpoint. His intention is to find the meaning within the objects of consciousness
themselves. “Back to the things themselves” then is not a call to emphasis on the outer
“real” objects but instead as to how these objects give themselves in consciousness.
The three different points explained above show how Husserl’s Zu den Sachen
selbst is not a call to realism, but instead borders more on the subjective conscious
experience. It is not hardline subjectivism in the sense that all reality is based on the
internal subject, rather a Radical Cartesianism, as some authors labeled it, due to his
method of suspending the existence of the real world through the phenomenological
consciousness that provides itself with objective noema, whether the correlate “real
object” be one outer or inner, we see that what Husserl defines as the focal point of his
23
Joseph Kockelmans. “What is Phenomenology,” Phenomenology and Physical Science, Henry
J. Koren, trans. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1966)
phenomenology is the object as it is actually presented to the subjective consciousness,
and the various interpretative objectivating acts as they happen within it. Here, within
One may still actually espouse the hardline view and hold, as Chapman did, that
the world is internal to consciousness. If one did that, however, what is one to call that
container of outer objects from wherein we gather perceptual data? Descartes doubted
this world altogether, so as to hold it in a very paranoiac view, thus trusting only to
subjective experience. What Husserl merely did was suspend the postulate of its
existence, and thus, does not contradict nor oppose the theses of realism, so much as to
Thus we have cleared the misinterpretation that Zu den Sachen selbst exhorts us
towards realism. What we are concerned with in Husserl’s phenomenology are the
structures and objects of our subjective consciousness, and that meaning as to be found in