NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation

CADASTRAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS Manila and the municipality of Cainta appealed, but subsequently
A. SECTION 53 OF CA 141 the appeal of the latter was dismissed for failure to prosecute. The
B. SECTION 35-38 OF PD1529 contest has thus narrowed down to one between the Church as
appellant and various individuals as appellees. 

[G.R. No. 14869. October 27, 1920. ] A ruling as to four of the lots can quickly be made. By stipulation
during the trial, and by admission of counsel for appellant,
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant-appellee, v. THE ROMAN Policarpio Buenviaje is conceded to have title to lot 2187. As to lot
CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, objector-appellant. 2186, the only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of the
JUSTA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., objectors-appellees.  trial court, is, that Mamerta Roxas went into possession of the
same in 1895; and when counsel for the Church made his offer to
Hartigan & Welch for Appellant.  present rebuttal testimony, he failed to mention this lot. Likewise,
as to lots 2213 and 2214, the only evidence before us, confirmed
Gregorio C. Concepcion for Appellees.  by the findings of the trial court, is, that Antonio, Benito, and
Gervasio de la Paz went into possession of the same in -1896; the
SYLLABUS record states that "ambas partes dan por terminadas sus
1. CADASTRAL PROCEEDINGS; NATURE; TRIALS. — A cadastral pruebas," while counsel for the Church in making his offer of
petition is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted by the rebuttal testimony again failed to include these two lots. 
Director of Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and
investigation leading to a judicial decree.  A more difficult situation has arisen with reference to the nine
remaining cadastral lots. To understand it, a brief narration of the
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — In one sense, in cadastral proceedings, there is course of the proceedings in the trial court will have to be made.  
no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the
Government is the plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants.  The trial as to the land now before us opened with a stipulation to
the effect that the composition title of the Church with the
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The usual rules of practice, procedure, and Spanish Government included this land. The Church presented
evidence govern registration proceedings.  one witness and rested. The private oppositors then called their
respective witnesses. Each endeavored to prove title by
4. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ORDER OF TRIAL; REBUTTAL possession, best understood by the following table:
EVIDENCE. — The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case Parcel No. Oppositor Possession Acts of possession
out when he commences. 
began.
5. ID.; ID.; ID. — A relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound 2176, 2191, 2182 Justa de Guzman 1895 Planted rice; paid taxes
discretion of the court. 
2178, 2180, 2190 Melecio S. Buenaventura 1882 Planted rice
6. ID; ID.; ID. — The proper rule, for the exercise of discretion by
the court, is that material testimony should not be excluded, 2184, 2185 Justo S. Buenaventura 1885 Cultivation and harvest
because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested,
although in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and 2192 Justo Javier 1885 Planted rice; harvested
for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case Counsel for the Church, thereupon, made an offer to present
injuriously.  additional testimony with reference to lots 2176, 2178, 2180,2182,
2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, or the above enumerated in
7. ID. - ID.; ID. — While in the Philippine Code of Civil Procedure the table. Three witnesses were called to the stand, but each time,
the general rule is rightly recognized, yet it also authorizes the before any pertinent testimony could be secured from them, an
judge "for special reasons" to change the order of the trial and "for objection was made by counsel for the oppositors that the proof
good reason, in the furtherance of justice" to permit the parties "to related to the evidence in chief of the Church, and this was
offer evidence upon their original case. (Sec. 132.)  sustained by the court. 

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CADASTRAL. PROCEEDINGS. — The trial opened
with a stipulation that the composition title of the church with the
Spanish Government included the land in question. The church
presented one witness and rested. The private oppositors then
called their respective witnesses to prove title by possession, and
rested. Counsel for the church thereupon made an offer to present
additional testimony intended to show that the possession of the
private claimants had been interrupted and that it was merely
possession through the tolerance of the church. Held: That the
offer of counsel for the church could properly be classified as
rebuttal evidence and that in the interest of justice and the
ascertainment of the truth, it should have been received.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were begun to settle the title to a
considerable tract of land situated in the Province of Rizal.
Thirteen of the cadastral lots were claimed by the municipality of
Cainta, Province of Rizal, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila, and various private individuals. The judgment of the trial
court adjudicated the parcels in question to the private claimants.
From this judgment both the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
To resolve the facts into their simplest terms, it is evident that
when an admission was made of the royal title, the Church had
shown that it was the legitimate owner of the land to which it
refers. The most perfect title could, however, be lost by
abandonment. When, therefore, the private oppositors showed
possession for the prescriptive period, they had made their case,
and the burden of proof had shifted. To overcome this burden, it
was then incumbent upon the Church to demonstrate that such
possession had been interrupted, or that it was merely possession
through the tolerance of the Church. 
This brings us to the specific consideration of assignment of error
No. 2 of the appellant to the effect that the court erred in refusing
to admit evidence tendered by this claimant and appellant in
answer to rival claims. A correct ruling can most appropriately be
arrived at by a consideration of the nature of cadastral
proceedings, with reference to the usual rules of trial practice and
evidence. 
The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is, that the title to
the various lots embraced in the survey may be settled and
adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted
by the Director of Lands, somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and
investigation leading to a judicial decree. In one sense, there is no
plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the
Government is the plaintiff and all the- claimants are defendants.
(Act No. 2259, sec. 10.) The trial is conducted in the same manner
as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land

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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
Registration. (Sec. 11.) As to this court, now abolished, the Land
Registration Act provides that it "shall conform, as near as may
be, to the practice in special proceedings in courts of first
instance." (Act No. 496, sec. 2.) The Code of Civil Procedure, which
is thus brought into relation with the Cadastral Act, prescribes the
order in which the trial must proceed. (Secs. 56, 132.) The usual
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence govern registration
proceedings.  donor, as ground for new trial. This Court held that this was not
Obviously, orderly procedure must be followed if injurious
surprises and annoying delays in the administration of justice are
to be avoided. Evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The strict rule
is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences.
Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound
discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this
discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that
material testimony should not be excluded because offered by the
plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal,
unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of
deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously." (1
Thompson on Trials, sec. 346.)  recovery of the land against the same defendants in the previous
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While
the general rule is rightly recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure
authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the order of
the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to
permit the parties "to offer evidence upon their original case." (Sec.
132.) These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the
character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so
many parties are involved, and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be
expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulae, an
opportunity should be given to parties to submit additional
corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the
ends of justice so require. (Rodriguez v. Director of Lands [1915],
31 Phil., 272; Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural
[1919], 39 Phil., 996.)  a new action based upon his assertion that he had acquired title
We believe that the offer of counsel for the Church could properly
be classified as evidence in denial of an affirmative fact but that
even if not technically rebuttal evidence, yet in the interest of
justice and the ascertainment of the truth it should be received.
Whether such evidence would be sufficient to overcome the case
which exists in favor of the claimants of the nine lots cannot now
be determined.  Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
In so far as the judgment relates to lots Nos. 2186, 2187, 2213,
and 2214, it is affirmed, and in so far as it relates to lots Nos.
2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, it is
reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court for
the taking of additional evidence under the offer of counsel for the
Church found on page 83 of the stenographic notes. No finding as
to costs is made in this instance. So ordered.  If the nature and objective of the cadastral scheme are kept in
G.R. No. L-48480             July 30, 1943
FABIAN B. S. ABELLERA, petitioner,  initiates a cadastral case, compelling all claimants in a
vs.
MEYNARDO M. FAROL, ET AL., respondents.
Fabian B.S. Abellera in his own behalf.
Pedro C. Quinto and Agaton R. Yaranon for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
Whether in a cadastral case, the judge may upon motion of
adverse claimants order the cancellation of the claimant's answer
and keep the latter from introducing evidence to prove his
ownership because the case is barred by a prior judgment, is the
legal question at issue in this case. An order to that effect issued
by the Court of First Instance of La Union, is impugned by Fabian
B.S. Abellera in a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real estate
involved herein, sued Hermegildo Balanag and others who are
either the same parties in this case or the latter's predecessors in
interest, alleging ownership of the land. But his complaint was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance on two grounds: (1)
prescription in favor of defendants; and (2) the deed of donation of
these lands to him had not been formally accepted according to
Article 633 of the Civil Code. Upon appeal to this Court, the
judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the second ground
aforementioned (Abellera vs. Balanag G.R. No. 11970,
promulgated March 22, 1918, and reported in 37 Phil. 865).
It appears in that decision of this Court that after the perfection of
the appeal, Abellera executed a public document formally
accepting the donation of the land, and presented and deed of
acceptance together with proofs of notification of acceptance to the
newly-discovered evidence, and that Abellera had not acquired
title to the hacienda until the execution of the deed of acceptance
and the notification thereof to donor. This Court added:
So that whether rights he may have to institute and maintain a
new action of ejectment in reliance upon his claim that he has
acquired title to the hacienda, since the date of the dismissal of
this action, it is clear that the present action was properly
dismissed on the ground of failure of proof of title in the plaintiff at
the time when the action was instituted and later when judgment
of dismissal was entered by the trial court.
In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned
decision of this Court, petitioner herein brought another action for
case. The second suit was later dismissed by the Court of First
Instance and transferred to cadastral case No. 5 which included
the hacienda in question that had in the meantime been
subdivided into lots. When the cadastral case came up before the
Hon. Meynardo M. Farol at Aringay, La Union, in July 1941,
Fabian B.S. Abellera appeared as claimant while Narciso de
Guzman and others appeared as adverse claimant. The latter
through counsel moved that Abellera's claim over the lots
concerned be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and
prescription.
A careful examination of the decision of this Court in the previous
case (37 Phil., 865) convinces us that there is no res judicata. We
merely held that Abellera had not acquired title to the hacienda
until the execution of the deed of acceptance and the notification
thereof, and we clearly refused to prevent Abellera from instituting
to the estate since the dismissal of his original action.
The other ground for the motion for dismissal, prescription, is not
involved in the present proceedings.
The next question is: Did the cadastral court, on the ground of res
judicata, have any power to entertain the motion to dismiss
Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to prove his
ownership of these lots?
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when two
conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to supplement the
cadastral law, and (2) practicability and convenience.
view, a motion to dismiss in a cadastral case on the ground of
prior judgment would seem to be out of place. The Government
municipality to litigate against one another regarding their
respective claims of ownership. By this plan, all the private lands
in a town are registered in one single collective proceeding. Thus,
the piece-meal and isolated registration of lands, so inadequate in
more ways than one, is avoided. The principal aim is to settle as
much as possible all disputes over land and to remove all clouds
over land titles, as far a practicable, in a community. To attain
this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all claimants ample
freedom to ventilate whatever right they may assert over real
estate, permitting them, in keeping with the law of evidence, to
offer proofs in support of their allegations. To countenance the
contrary opinion, by suppressing the presentation of evidence in
support of claims, would but serve to perpetuate conflicts over
land, for such stifled affirmations of ownership will fester like
wounds unskillfully treated. No sufficient leeway having been give
all claimants to demonstrate the strength and consistently of their
alleged rights, the stability of decrees of title is jeopardized.
In Haw Pia vs. Roman A. Cruz (G.R. No. 48506), we declared that
the Court of First Instance in a cadastral proceeding cannot
appoint a receiver because its jurisdiction is special and limited.
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
We declined in that case to apply the new Rules of Court by
analogy.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral case res
judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged
rights of another claimant, nevertheless prior judgment can not
set up in a motion to dismiss.
The order appealed from is hereby reversed. Petitioner herein shall
in the cadastral proceedings be allowed to present evidence to
prove his claim over the lots in question. With costs against the
adverse claimants who are respondents herein. So ordered.
PROHIBITED ALIENATIONS AND TRANSFER OF PRIVATE
LANDS
G.R. No. L-68109             July 17, 1991
SEVERINO GAYAPANAO, TEODORO GAYAPANAO, LAURO
GAYAPANAO, SALVADOR GAYAPANAO, RAYMUNDA
GAYAPANAO-RAMOS, HEIRS OF ELEUTERIO GAYAPANAO and
HEIRS OF ROBERTO GAYAPANAO, petitioners,  IT IS SO ORDERED.
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
SIMEONA GAYAPANAO-NOVENARIO,respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners Severino
Gayapanao and his siblings question the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) 1 in AC-G.R. No. CV-59589,
entitled "Severino Gayapanao, et al. vs. Simeona Gayapanao-
Novenario" upholding the validity of the sale of two (2) hectares of
the ten-hectare homestead land by their father in favor of their
sister Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario.
Briefly, the facts of the case as found by the Appellate Court are
as  was made in favor of Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario, who is one
follows:2
. . . the 2-hectare land subject of this case is part and parcel of a
homestead lot registered in the name of Constantino Gayapanao
under Original Certificate of Title No. 3625 (Exhibits B and 2,
Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 2). The homestead application of
the late Constantino Gayapanao over the said lot was approved on
September 7, 1931 (Exhibit C, Ibid., p. 5) and the final order of the
Director of Lands for the issuance of patent was issued on
December 10, 1937, (Exhibit A, Ibid., p. 1). On July 13, 1939, the
Homestead Patent Title was issued in the name of Constantino
Gayapanao married to Aurelia Maamo (Exhibit D, Ibid., p. 2). On
November 15, 1938, the late Constantino Gayapanao executed a
private deed entitled Kasulatan ng Bilihan in favor of Serafin
Novenario and his wife, Simeona Gayapanao over 20,000 square
meters of the homestead land (Exhibit 4, Defendants' Folder of
Exhibits, p. 8).
Constantino Gayapanao and his wife Aurelia Maamo died intestate
on December 22, 1942 and September 29, 1966, respectively
(Record on Appeal, p. 70) . . .
On January 2, 1974, Severino, Teodoro, Roberto, Salvador, and
Lauro, all surnamed Gayapanao, Raymunda Gayapanao-Ramos
and the heirs of Eleuterio Gayapanao filed before the then Court of
First Instance of Oriental Mindoro Civil Case No. R-317, a
Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Prayer for
Appointment of Receiver against their sisters Gloria Gayapanao-
Saet and Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario (private respondent
herein) who were then occupying the subject homestead lot. Both
defendants filed their Answer to the complaint.
On March 11, 1975, the court a quo rendered a decision3 declaring
as null and void Exhibit 4, the contract of sale between Simeona
Gayapanao-Novenario and her father Constantino Gayapanao for
having been executed within the five-year prohibitory period
provided under Section 118 of the Public Land Law, 4 and at the
same time declaring as valid Exhibit 5, the deed of sale executed
by Teodoro Gayapanao in favor of his sister Gloria Gayapanao-
Saet covering the former's hereditary share in the homestead lot.
Accordingly, the lower court ruled as follows: 5
WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
A. Adjudicating unto plaintiffs SEVERINO, ROBERTO,
SALVADOR, LAURO, RAYMUNDA and the heirs of ELEUTERIO, all
surnamed Gayapanao and Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario one-
ninth 1/9 each of the intestate estate of the deceased Constantino
and Aurelia Maamo covered in and embraced by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3625 and the remaining two-ninths (2/9) to
Gloria Gayapanao-Saet, she having purchased the one-ninth (1/9)
hereditary share of plaintiff Teodoro Gayapanao;
B. Authorizing the herein parties to agree among themselves to
cause the relocated survey of the entire land in question covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 3625 so that their respective
shares may be properly delineated;
C. Ordering the parties to submit the necessary project of partition
after the relocation survey has been executed not later than three
(3) months after entry of this judgment in order to terminate tills
proceeding;
D. Declaring as null and void document marked Exhibit "4", the
same having been executed one year prior to the issuance of the
patent, but Exhibit "5" is confirmed and declared valid.
WITHOUT special findings as to costs.
Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario moved to reconsider, but failed.
She then sought relief before the IAC which, finding the sale in her
favor to be perfectly valid, set aside the decision of the lower court
and entered a new one dismissing the complaint against her. 6
Hence, this appeal filed by Severino Gayapanao, et al. after their
motion for reconsideration was denied7 by the respondent
appellate court.
In upholding the sale of a portion of the homestead lot by
Constantino Gayapanao to his daughter, herein private
respondent Simeona Gayapanao-Novenario, the respondent court
interpreted the prohibition against the alienation or encumbrance
of the homestead land under Section 118 of the Public Land Law
as referring to an alienation or encumbrance in favor of a third
person outside the family circle of the original homesteader. Since,
according to the appellate court, the conveyance involved herein
of the nine (9) children of the original homesteader and who is the
"continuity of the personality of her father for all legal intents and
purposes," such sale is "not in contravention of the avowed policy
of the State, which is to preserve and keep to the homesteader and
his family the land granted to him by the State." 8
We rule otherwise. The pertinent portion of Section 118 of the
Public Land Law provides:9
Except in favor of the government or any of its branches, units or
institutions land acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to qualified persons, associations or corporations.
The provision of law which prohibits the sale or encumbrance of
the homestead within five years after the grant is mandatory.
From the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
cannot be subject to encumbrance or alienation, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period. The only exception mentioned by the
law is the sale or encumbrance in favor of the government or any
of its branches, units or institutions.
In a number of cases, we have consistently ruled that a sale of
homestead within the five (5) year prohibitive period is void ab
initio and the same cannot be ratified nor can it acquire validity
through the passage of time.
In the case of Arsenal vs. IAC,10 we said:
The above provisions of law are clear and explicit. A contract
which purports to alienate, transfer, convey or encumber any
homestead within the prohibitory period of five (5) years from the
date of issuance of the patent is void from its execution. In a
number of cases, this Court has held that such provision
is mandatory(De los Santos vs. Roman Catholic Church of
Midsayap, 94 Phil. 405).
It is dangerous precedent to allow the sale of a homestead during
the five-year prohibition to anyone, even to the homesteader's own
son or daughter. As aptly put by the petitioners, a clever
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
homesteader who wants to circumvent the ban may simply sell the
lot to his descendant and the latter after registering the same in
his name would sell it to a third person. This way, public policy
would not be subserved.
Moreover, the sale to a descendant is not one of the exceptions
contemplated by law.1âwphi1 Only the government or any of its
branches, units or institutions is given the right to acquire
homestead by purchase at any time and even during the five-year
prohibitory period. To hold valid the sale at bar would be to throw
the door open to schemes and subterfuges which would defeat the
law prohibiting the alienation of homestead within five (5) years
from the issuance of the patent.
The respondent Court cited the case of Lasud v. Lasud,11 in
support of its decision. Said case is not applicable to the case at
bar, considering that the plaintiff, Sigbe Lasud sold the inherited
homestead to his brother Santay Lasud and the latter's wife
twenty-one (21) years after the patent was issued to his father the
homesteader. On the other hand, the questioned conveyance in
the case at bar was done within the five year prohibitory period.
Furthermore, what was involved in the Lasud case is the right of
therein plaintiff under Section 119 of the Public Land Law to
redeem the portion sold. In contrast, the case at bar centers on
Section 118 of the same law
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision in Civil Case No. R-317 of the then Court of
First Instance of Oriental Mindoro is REINSTATED. Costs against
private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-11597. May 27, 1959.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ISABELO GARCIA, DOMINGO COLORADO, RAYMUNDO DE
GUZMAN, INOCENCIO PADAMA, IGNACIO RAMOS, LEON DE
GUZMAN, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE PROVINCE
OF COTABATO, Defendants-Appellants.  Garcia and his wife. Three years and three months after the
Eugenio M. Millado for Appellants.  consideration of the sum of P11,000, by an instrument executed
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Camilo D.
Quiason for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. HOMESTEAD PATENTS; ENCUMBRANCE OF ALIENATION
WITHIN FIVE YEARS PROHIBITED; REGISTRATION NOT
NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE VIOLATION. — To constitute a
violation of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, it is
enough that the home stead be encumbered or alienated with the
prohibition period of five years; it is not necessary that the
encumbrance or alienation be registered in the office of the
Registration of Deeds.  years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
2. ID.; ID.; PARTIAL SALE OF HOMESTEAD LAND WITHIN
PROHIBITIVE PERIOD CAUSE FOR REVERSION TO THE STATE
OF THE WHOLE GRANT. — Even if only part of the homestead
land had been sold or alienated within the prohibited period of five
years from the date of issuance of the patent to the grantee, such
alienation is sufficient cause for reversion to the State of the whole
grant. In granting a homestead to an applicant, the law imposes
as a condition that the land should not be encumbered, sold or
alienated within five years from the issuance of the patent. The
sale or alienation of part of the homestead violates that condition.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato decreeing the reversion to the State of a homestead land
covered by Patent No. V-532 and original certificate of title No. V-
17 issued by the Registrar of Deeds in and for the province of
Cotabato. The dispositive part of the judgment is:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
IN VIEW THEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) ordering defendant Isabela Garcia to return the owner’s
Certificat of Title No. V-17 to the Register of Deeds;
(b) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cotabato that homestead
patent No. V-532 be returned to the Bureau of Lands for
cancellation;
(c) ordering the Register of Deeds of Cotabato to cancel Certificate
of Title No. V-17; and 
(d) declaring hereby reverted to the public domain as belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines the land covered by said Certificate
of Title No. V-17, with costs against the defendants. 
Only questions of law are raised. 
From the pleadings, stipulation of facts and documentary evidence
submitted by the parties, the following facts are gathered:
Sometimes before the last war appellant Isabelo Garcia and his
wife Tagumpay Dumaguindin acquiered by purchase the
homestead rights of Lingasa Bapanialag to a parcel of homestead
land situated at Mabay, Kiamba, Cotabato, containing an area of
23.21 hectares (Homestead Application No. 182259 [E-90722]. The
transfer was approved by the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural
Resources upon recommendation of the Director of Lands and
Patent No. V-532 was issued in favor of the appellant Isabelo
issuance of the homestead patent, or on 14 April 1950, for and in
and acknowledged before a notary public the appellant Isabelo
Garcia and his wife sold and conveyed to Domingo Colorado,
Raymundo de Guzman, Inocencio Padama, Ignacio Ramos and
Leon de Guzman 19 hectares of the homestead land (Exhibit A).
The vendees took possession of the part sold to them. The deed of
sale was not submitted to the Secrectary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources for approval nor presented to the Registrar of
Deeds in and for the province of Cotabato for registration . 
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 partly
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provision shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior or the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pleged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations. 
Section 124 of the same Act provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Any acquisition conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract
made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections
one hundred and eightee, one hundred and twenty, one hundred
and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred
and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void
from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title patent, or permit originally issued,
recogized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvement to the State. 
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
Corollarily, is a formal offer to redeem accompanied with tender of
As the sale of the 19 hectares of the homestead land was made payment a condition precedent to the filing of an action for the
wihtin the prohibited period of five years-three years and three valid exercise of the right of legal redemption? Plainly stated, is the
months after the issuance of the homestead patent is null and filing of the action with consignation equivalent to a formal offer to
void, 1 and is a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State.  redeem?
A valuable piece of land in Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with
Appellants’ defense set up in the court below was that the an area of 24,576 square meters and covered by OCT No. 0-5290
document Exhibit A was intended merely as a mortgage on the is disputed by petitioner Lee Chuy Realty Corporation (LEE CHUY
improvements and crops existing on the 19 hectares of the REALTY) and private respondent Marc Realty and Development
homestead land to secure the payment by instalment of a loan, Corporation (MARC REALTY). Originally the property was co-
only that it was drawn upp by mistake as an absolure sale upon owned by Ruben Jacinto to the extent of one-sixth and
the insistence of the vendees. If it was draw up as an absolute sale Dominador, Arsenio, Liwayway, all surnamed Bascara, and
upon the insistence of the vendees, then there was no mistake Ernesto Jacinto who collectively owned the remaining five-sixths.
committed. The document Exhibit A is so clearly worded as to On 4 February 1981 Ruben Jacinto sold his one-sixth pro-
preclude an interpretation other than what the parties had indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY. The sale was registered on
intended it to be — a deed of absolute sale of the 19 hectares of 30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto Jacinto
the homestead land. Moreover, as found and held by the trial also sold their share to MARC REALTY. The sale was registered on
court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library 16 October 1989.
LEE CHUY REALTY claims that it was never informed of the
. . . as stated in Annex "A", the improvement on the land only existence of the sale between MARC REALTY on one hand and the
consist of 50 coconut trees, 5 mango trees, 1 nangka tree, Bascaras and Jacinto on the other, and that on the contrary it
bananas and other fruit trees. It is unbelievable that defendants was only upon inquiry from the Register of Deeds of Bulacan that
Domingo Colorado, Raymundo de Guzman, Inocencio Padama, the sale was brought to its attention. MARC REALTY contends
Ignacio Ramos and Leon de Guzman would grant a loan of otherwise. It insists that LEE CHUY REALTY was verbally notified
P11,000.00 for such as small security as those improvements of the sale and was in fact given a copy of the deed of sale.
specified above. Then if it is true that the transaction had between On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint for
them is only a loan, to be paid by instalment every year, the legal redemption against MARC REALTY 1 and consigned in court a
defendants failed to produce any evidence that any installment manager's check for 614,400. In its Amended Answer with
has ever been paid, taking into consideration that already elapsed Counterclaim with Motion to Dismiss, MARC REALTY insisted that
more than five (5) years from that time up to the hearing of this the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
case.  there being no allegation of prior valid tender of payment nor a
prior valid notice of consignation.
The fact that the appellant Isabelo Garcia moved to the On 26 December 1990 the trial court 2 ruled in favor of LEE CHUY
municipality of Bislig, province of Surigao, and abandoned his REALTY holding that there was a prior valid tender of payment
homestead in Kiamba, Cotabato, is proof that he sold 19 hectares and consignation. It further decreed that "(n)either a separate offer
of his homestead.  to redeem nor a formal notice of consignation are (sic) necessary
for the reason that the filing of the action itself, within the period
Appellants content that, under section 50, Act No. 496, the of redemption, is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem." 3
operative act to convey and effect lands registered there under is On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a Petition for
the act of registration, that inasmuch as the deed of sale Exhibit A Certiorari, Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order and/or
was never registered there was actually no conveyance made of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction with this Court. The petition however
19 hectares of the homestead land, and that for the reason there was referred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Sec. 9, B.P. Blg.
was no infringement of section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 129.
To constitute a violation of the section just referred to, it is enough On 22 November 1991 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
that the homestead be encumbered or alienated wihtin the reversing that of the lower court and ruling that "a prior tender or
prohibitive period of five years; it is not necessary that the offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of
encumbrance of alienation be registered in the Office of the an action for legal redemption." It further ruled that "there must
Register of Deeds. To uphold the appellant’s contention would be tender of the redemption price within the required period . . .
defeat the very prohibition established by law, for no party to a because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in
prohibited sale or conveyance would register such an illegal uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period." LEE CHUY
transaction. Besies, the vendees already, had taken possession of REALTY filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied hence
the part sold to them.  the present petition.
MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of payment is a
Even if only 19 out of the 23.21 hectares of the homestead land condition precedent to the filing of an action in court in order to
had beem sold or aliednated withim the prohibitive period of five validly exercise the right of legal redemption. LEE CHUY REALTY
years from date of issuance of the patent to the grantee, such however argues that the filing of the action itself is equivalent to a
alienation is a sufficient cause for reversion to the State of the formal offer to redeem, which is a condition precedent to the valid
whole grant. In granting a homestead to an applicant, the law exercise of the right of legal redemption.
imposes as a condition that the land should not be ecumbered, We sustain LEE CHUY REALTY. Arts. 1620 and 1623 of the Civil
sold or alienated wihtin five years from the issuance of the patent. Code on legal redemption provide:
The sale or alienation of part of the homestead violates that Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of
condition.  redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any
of them are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable
appellants.  one.
xxx xxx xxx
G.R. No. 104114 December 4, 1995 Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not
LEE CHUY REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,  be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by
vs. the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARC REALTY AND deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
BELLOSILLO, J.: MARC REALTY would apply the ruling in Cabrera
Is a judicial action to redeem coupled with consignation of the v. Villanueva4 and De la Merced v. De Guzman5 where an offer to
price within the redemption period equivalent to a formal offer to redeem was required for the exercise of the right of redemption.
redeem under Art. 1623 in relation to Art. 1620 of the Civil Code? On the other hand, LEE CHUY REALTY anchors its claim

5
 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
on Tioseco v. Court of Appeals,6 Tolentino v. Court of
7
Appeals,  and Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate
Court.8Specifically, in Cabrera v. Villanueva9 we held that for the
legal and effective exercise of the right of legal redemption one
must make the offer within the period set in Art. 1623. In other
words, if no claim or offer is made within thirty (30) days from
written notice, no action may be allowed to enforce the right of
redemption. But in Tolentino v. Court of Appeals,10 Tioseco
v. Court of Appeals11 and Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate
Court12 we adopted the view that a formal offer to redeem,
accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, is not
essential where the right to redeem is exercised through a judicial
action within the redemption period and simultaneously
depositing the redemption price. The formal offer to redeem
accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price
prescribed by law is only essential to preserve the right of
redemption for future enforcement even beyond the period of
redemption. The filing of the action itself within the period of
redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
A judicious scrutiny of the cases herein cited impugns the
impression of MARC REALTY that they enunciate conflicting
doctrines. On the contrary, we view them as complementing one
another. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that a prior
tender or offer of redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to
the filing of the action for legal redemption, notwithstanding
prevailing jurisprudence holding that to avail of the right of
redemption what is essential is to make an offer to redeem within
the prescribed period. There is actually no prescribed form for an
offer to redeem to be properly effected. Hence, it can either be
through a formal tender with consignation, or by filing a complaint
in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within
the prescribed period. What is condition precedent to a valid
exercise of the right of legal redemption is either the formal tender
with consignation or the filing of a complaint in court. What is
paramount is the availment of the fixed and definite period within
which to exercise the right of legal redemption. 13
In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the Court, citing previous
decisions, declared that the formal offer to redeem, accompanied
by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, within the
prescribed period is only essential to preserve the right of
redemption for future enforcement beyond such period of
redemption and within the period prescribed for the action by the
statute of limitations. Where, as in the instant case, the right to
redeem is exercised through judicial action within the
reglementary period the formal offer to redeem, accompanied by
a bona fide tender of the redemption price, while proper, may be
unessential. The filing of the action itself is equivalent to a formal
offer to redeem.
In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a distinct step or
condition sine qua non to the filing of the action in Court for the
valid exercise of the right of legal redemption. What constitutes a
condition precedent is either a formal offer to redeem or the filing
of an action in court together with the consignation of the
redemption price within the reglementary period.
The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and Belisario cases was
jettisoned by the Court of Appeals on the ground that they do not
involve legal redemption by a co-owner but by a mortgagor. It
concluded that the application of the rules on legal redemption by
a co-owner differs from the legal redemption by a mortgagor. But
the law does not distinguish; neither should we. For sure, the
principle in the aforecited cases is applicable regardless of whether
the redemptioner is a co-owner or a mortgagor. Public policy
favors redemption regardless of whether the redemptioner is a co-
owner or mortgagor, although perhaps with unequal force and
effect since each is given a fixed but different period. A co-owner
desirous of exercising his right of legal redemption is given a
period of thirty (30) days from notice of the sale within which to
avail of the right to redeem. 15 Under the free patent or homestead
provisions of the Public Land Act a period of five (5) years from the
date of conveyance is provided, 16 the five-year period to be
reckoned from the date of the sale and not from the date of
registration in the office of the Register of Deeds. 17 The redemption
of extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on the other hand, is
exercisable within one (1) year from the date of the auction sale as
provided for in Act No. 3135.18
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24220
dated 22 November 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 7, in
Civil Case No. 661-M-89 dated 26 December 1990 holding that the
filing of the action for legal redemption coupled with the
consignation of the redemption price is equivalent to a formal offer
to redeem as a condition precedent to the valid exercise of the
right of legal redemption, is REINSTATED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the court of origin
for further proceedings in the light of this pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172720, September 14, 2015
ELISEO MALTOS AND ROSITA P. MALTOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS
OF EUSEBIO BORROMEO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The sale of a parcel of agricultural land covered by a free patent
during the five-year prohibitory period under the Public Land Act
is void. Reversion of the parcel of land is proper. However,
reversion under Section 101 of the Public Land Act is not
automatic. The Office of the Solicitor General must first file an
action for reversion.
On February 13, 1979, Eusebio Borromeo was issued Free Patent
No. 586681 over a piece of agricultural land located in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-9053.1
On June 15, 1983, well within the five-year prohibitory period,
Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos. 2
Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991. His heirs claimed
that prior to his death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta
Borromeo,3 and his children to nullify the sale made to Eliseo
Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477
cancelled because the sale was within the five-year prohibitory
period.4
On June 23, 1993, Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of
Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity of Title and Reconveyance
of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of
Deeds of Agusan del Sur.5 The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
946.6
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their
Answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith and that in
purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo's title.
Further, the parties were in pari delicto. Since the sale was made
during the five-year prohibitory period, the land would revert to
the public domain and the proper party to institute reversion
proceedings was the Office of the Solicitor General. 7
The Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur also filed an Answer,
arguing that the deed of sale was presented for Registration after
the five-year prohibitory period, thus, it was ministerial on its part
to register the deed.8
The heirs of Borromeo countered that good faith was not a valid
defense because the prohibitory period appeared on the face of the
title of the property. 9
The Regional Trial Court10 of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur
narrowed down the issues to the following:
1. Whether or not the herein plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the
late Eusebio Borromeo.
2. Whether or not the sale of the disputed property within the
prohibitory period is valid or binding. 11
The trial court dismissed the Complaint on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.12 Also, the heirs of Borromeo did not have
a right of action because they were unable to establish their status
as heirs of the late Eusebio Borromeo. 13 They may have declared
6
 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
themselves the legal heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, but they did not
present evidence to prove their allegation. 14 Further, the
determination of their rights to succession must be established in
special proceedings.15
The trial court also ruled that "[t]he sale was null and void
because it was within the five (5) year prohibitionary [sic]
period"16 under the Public Land Act.17 The defense of
indefeasibility of title was unavailing because the title to the
property stated that it was "subject to the provisions of Sections
118, 119, 121, 122 and 124"18 of the Public Land Act.19 Since the
property was sold within the five-year prohibitory period, such
transfer "result[ed] in the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land to the public domain." 20
As to the defense of in pari delicto, the trial court ruled against its
applicability,21 citing Egao v. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division).22
The rule of pari delicto non oritur action (where two persons are
equally at fault neither party may be entitled to relief under the
law), admits of exceptions and does not apply to an inexistent
contract, such as, a sale void ab initio under the Public Land Act,
when its enforcement or application runs counter to the public
policy of preserving the grantee's right to the land under the
homestead law.23 (Citation omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court further held that since the sale was null and void,
no title passed from Eusebio Borromeo to Eliseo Maltos. 24 The
dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision states:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the� complaint under
consideration is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.25
On appeal, the heirs of Borromeo argued that they were able to
prove their status as heirs through the testimony of their mother,
Norberta Borromeo.26
The heirs of Borromeo also argued that the trial court should have
ordered the "revival of [Original Certificate of Title] No. P-9053 in
the name of the Heirs of EUSEBIO BORROMEO."27
The Court of Appeals28 reversed the Decision of the trial court and
held that since Eusebio Borromeo sold his property within the
five-year prohibitory period, the property should revert to the
state.29 However, the government has to file an action for reversion
because "reversion is not automatic." 30 While there is yet no action
for reversion instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General, the
property should be returned to the heirs of Borromeo. 31 The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal
is GRANTED. The Decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No.
946 is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is entered (1) ordering
Appellee ELISEO MALTOS to reconvey the property subject matter
of this litigation to Appellants upon the refund by the latter to
Appellee ELISEO MALTOS the sum of P36,863.00, all expenses for
the reconveyance to be borne by the buyer, ELISEO MALTOS,
herein Appellee and (2) ordering the Register of Deeds of
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur to cancel TCT No. T-5477 and revive
OCT No. P-9053.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished! the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) for its information and appropriate action and to
inform this court within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
hereof of the action done under the premises.
SO ORDERED.32 (Emphasis supplied)
The Maltos Spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that since the prohibition on transfers of property is provided by
law, only the heirs of Borromeo should be
punished.33 Punishment, in this case, would come in the form of
preventing the heirs of Borromeo from re-acquiring the
land.34 Instead, the land should revert back to the state. 35 The
Maltos Spouses also prayed that they be reimbursed for the
improvements they introduced on the land. 36 Assuming that they
would be found to be also at fault, the principle of in pari delicto
should apply.37
The Court of Appeals38 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration,39 reasoning that it could not rule on the issue of
who between the parties had the better right to the
property.40 Also, it was the government who should decide whether
the heirs of Borromeo "should retain ownership of the
land."41 With regard to the applicability of the in pari delicto
doctrine, the Court of Appeals held that in pari delicto does not
apply in cases where its application will violate the policy of the
state.42
On May 10, 2006, the Maltos Spouses |filed a Petition 43 for Review
before this court, questioning the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77142. 44
This court, in a Resolution 45 dated July 5, 2006, required the heirs
of Borromeo to file their Comment.
The heirs of Borromeo filed their Comment, 46 which was noted by
this court in a Resolution 47 dated September 25, 2006. In the
same Resolution, this court required the Maltos Spouses to file
their Reply.48
In a Resolution dated March 28, 2007, this court required Attys.
Ma. Cherell L. De Castro and Gener C. Sansaet, counsels for the
Maltos Spouses, to show cause why they should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for their failure to file a Reply. They were
also required to comply with the Resolution dated September 25,
2006.50
Counsels for the Maltos Spouses filed a] Compliance, 51 together
with the Reply.52 In a Resolution53 dated August 15, 2007, this
court noted and accepted the Compliance, and also noted the
Reply.
I
The Maltos Spouses argue that the heirs of Borromeo did not
present evidence to prove that they are indeed the heirs of Eusebio
Borromeo. The heirs of Borromeo did not present the death
certificate of Eusebio Borromeo, the marriage certificate of Eusebio
Borromeo and Norberta Borromeo, or any of the birth certificates
of the children of Eusebio. 54 While Norberta Borromeo and two of
her children testified,55 their testimonies should be considered as
self-serving.56 The Maltos Spouses cite Article 17257 of the Family
Code, which enumerates how filiation may be established. 58
The Maltos Spouses also contest the Court of Appeals' ruling
stating that they did not rebut the testimonies of the heirs of
Borromeo because they continuously argued that the heirs of
Borromeo were unable to prove their status as heirs. 59
The Maltos Spouses further argue that it was error for the Court of
Appeals not to apply the in pari delicto rule, considering that the
sale violated Section 11860 of the Public Land Act.61 Since both
parties are at fault, it follows that Article 1412 62 of the Civil Code
applies.63
In addition, the Maltos Spouses pray for the reimbursement of the
value of the improvements on the property to prevent unjust
enrichment on the part of the heirs of Borromeo. 64 The Maltos
Spouses enumerate the following circumstances to show why they
should be reimbursed:
a. EUSEBIO has already long received and enjoyed the amount of
the purchase price of the subject land from petitioners.
b. The value of the purchase price of PHP36,863.00 paid in 1983
have since then greatly depreciated. If petitioners had deposited
that money in bank or loaned it to another person instead of
purchasing EUSEBIO's property, it would have at least earned
some interest. However, the Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed
that the return of the purchase price would be sufficient
compensation to the petitioners.
c. The value of the improvements introduced by petitioners on the
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
subject property is much greater than the purchase price that
they initially paid on the land. Petitioners estimate the value of the
improvements, including hundreds of various fruit-bearing trees
and four residential houses, to be at least PHP900,000.00.
Because of these improvements, not only can respondents sell the
land at a much higher price, they can even sell the improvements
and profit from them. It would be the height of injustice if all the
petitioners would receive in turning over the subject property to
the respondents is the purchase price that was previously paid
EUSEBIO under the deed of sale.65ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, the heirs of Borromeo argue that the
testimonies of Norberta Borromeo and Susan Borromeo Morales
on their relationship to Eusebio Borromeo were not refuted by the
Malios Spouses. Thus, they were able to prove their status as
heirs.66
The heirs of Borromeo also argue that the in pari delicto rule is
not applicable because in Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of
Midsayap, et al.,67 this court stated that the in pari delicto rule
does not apply if its application will have the effect of violating
public policy.68
With regard to the claim for reimbursements, the heirs of
Borromeo argue that the Maltos Spouses did not raise their claim
for reimbursement in their Answer to the Complaint. They are now
barred from claiming reimbursement since this was not raised at
the first instance.69
Based on the arguments of the parties, the issues for resolution
are:
First, whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Decision
of the trial court and ordering the reconveyance of the property
from petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos to
respondents heirs of Eusebio Borromeo;cralawlawlibrary
Second, whether the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the
doctrine of in pari delicto; and  subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow
Finally, whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
petitioners Spouses Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos are not
entitled to reimbursement for the improvements they introduced
on the land.
II
The five-year period prohibiting the sale of land obtained under
homestead or free patent is provided under Section 118 of the
Public Land Act, which states:
SECTION 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five
years from and after the date of issuance1 of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged] or pledged
to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
The reason for prohibiting the alienation or encumbrance of
properties covered by patent or grant was explained
in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Viray.70
In Metropolitan Bank, Edgardo D. Viray and his wife contracted
several loans with Metrobank which they failed to
pay.71 Metrobank filed a Complaint for sum of money before the
Regional Trial Court in Manila.72In 1982, during the pendency of
the case, free patents over three parcels of land were issued in
favor of Viray.73 The Complaint for sum of money was decided in
1983 in favor of Metrobank. 74 In 1984, the trial court issued a writ
of execution over the parcels of land. 75 An auction sale was held,
and Metrobank emerged as the winning bidder. 76 Viray filed an
action for annulment of sale.77 This court ruled that the auction
sale was made within the five-year prohibitory period 78 and
explained that:
[T]he main purpose in the grant of a freq patent of homestead is to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of
public land which the State has given to him so he may have a
place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and a
useful member of the society. In Jocson v. Soriano, we held that
the conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead
laws. The policy of the state is to foster, families as the foundation
of society, and thus promote general welfare. . . .
Section 118 of CA 141, therefore, is predicated on public policy. Its
violation gives rise to the cancellation of the grant and the
reversion of the land and its improvements to the government at
the instance of the latter. The provision that "nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
that expiration of the five-year period" is mandatory and any sale
made in violation of such provision is void and produces no effect
whatsoever, just like what transpired in this case. Clearly, it is not
within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public
policy by law seeks to preserve.79 (Citations omitted)
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,80 Josefina L. Morato applied for
free patent over a parcel which was granted. 81 Morato mortgaged
and leased a portion of the land within the five-year prohibitory
period.82Later on, it would also be discovered that Morato's land
formed part of Calauag Bay. 83 The Republic filed a Complaint for
cancellation of title and reversion of the parcel of land. 84 This court
held that "lease" and "mortgage" were encumbrances on the parcel
of land.85 This court also discussed the policy behind the five-year
prohibitory period:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute
citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance
of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of
the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial
purpose to favor the homesteader and his family the statute
provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be
or heirs within five years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a
complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the
family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the
State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in
keeping with this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the
right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader
makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or
heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the
statute.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The effect of violating the five-year prohibitory period is provided
under Section 124 of the Public Land Act, which provides:
SECTION 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer,
or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred
and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and
twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this. Act shall
be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall
produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property
and its improvements to the State.
In this case, Section 101 87 of the Public Land Act is applicable
since title already vested in Eusebio Borromeo's name. Both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the sale was made
within the five-year prohibitory period. Thus, there is sufficient
cause to revert the property in favor of the state. However, this
court cannot declare reversion of the property in favor of the state
in view of the limitation imposed by Section 101 that an action for
reversion must first be filed by the Office of the Solicitor General. 
III
The doctrine of in pari delicto non oritur actio is inapplicable when
public policy will be violated.
constitute criminal offenses.
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
The in pari delicto rule is provided under Articles 1411 and 1412
of the Civil Code. Article 1411 pertains to acts that constitute
criminal offenses, while Article 1412 pertains to acts that do not
These provisions state:
ART. 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the
cause or object of the contract,� and the act constitutes a
criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have
no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal
of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the
things or the price of the contract.
This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty;
but the innocent one may claim what he has given, and shall not
be bound to comply with his promise.
ART. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules
shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties,
neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or
demand the performance of the other's
undertaking;cralawlawlibrary
(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot
recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the
fulfilment of what has been promised him. The other, who is not at
fault, may demand the return of what he has given without any
obligation to comply with his promise.
Santos involved the sale of a parcel of land within the five-year
prohibitory period.88 The Roman Catholic Church raised the
defense of in pari delicto. 89 It was also argued by the Rornan
Catholic Church that the effect of the sale would be the reversion
of the] property to the state.90 This court held that:
Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that any
acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of
its provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the
reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari
delicto has been applied by this Court in a number of cases
wherein the parties to a transaction have proven to be guilty of
effected the transaction with knowledge of the cause of its
invalidity. But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked
considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of
the Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as
known here and in the United States is not absolute in its
application. It recognizes certain exceptions one of them being
when its enforcement or application runs counter to an avowed
fundamental policy or to public interest. As stated by us in the
Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject to one important limitation,
namely, [']whenever public policy is considered advanced by
allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction[']"
The case under consideration comes within the exception above
adverted to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which
was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari
delicto would apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has
carried out the sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality,
but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of public land,
public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-
acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her home
and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is
predicated. This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the
competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law
seeks to preserve." We are, therefore, constrained to hold that
appellee can maintain the present action it being in furtherance of
this fundamental aim of our homestead law. 91 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
The non-application of the in pari delicto rule where public policy
would be violated has also been applied in other cases.
In Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals,92 this court held that in pari delicto
"is not [applicable to [e]jectment [c]ases" 93 and cited Drilon v.
Gaurana,94 which discussed the policy behind ejectment cases:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry
and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title
to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not
be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this
remedy of restitution the object of the statute is to prevent
breaches of the peace and criminal disorder which would ensue
from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope such
withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to
those persons who, believing themselves entitled to the�
possession of property, resort to force to gain possession rather
than to� some appropriate action in the courts to assert their
claims.95ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This court elucidated that:
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a case of
ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out
relief to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite
mayhem and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter
from possession of the lot that the latter had illegally occupied,
emboldened by the knowledge that the courts would leave them
where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way of the ousted
squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what
ejectment cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to
prevent. Even the owner who has title over the disputed property
cannot take the law into his own hands to regain possession of his
property. The owner must go to court.96 (Citation omitted)
In Loria v. Mu�oz, Jr.,97 Carlos Loria asked Ludolfo Mu�oz, Jr. "to
advance [P]2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a [P]50,000,000.00
river-dredging project in Guinobatan." 98 Loria informed Mu�oz
that the project would be awarded to Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation, and Sunwest would subcontract to
Mu�oz.99 Mu�oz agreed to Loria's proposal. 100 When the river-
dredging project was finished, Loria did not return the
P2,000,000.00 despite Mu�oz's demand.101 Complaint for sum of
money.102 Loria raised the argument that Mu�oz "should not be
allowed to recover the money" 103 since they were in pari
delicto.104 This court held that under the principle of unjust
enrichment, the sum of money should be returned. 105 In so ruling,
this court cited Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.106 where it was explained
that:
. . . the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always
rigid. An accepted exception arises when its application
contravenes well-established public policy. In this jurisdiction,
public policy has been defined as "that principle of the law which
holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to hi injurious to the public or against the public
good."ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders,
Inc., "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of
another, or when a person retains money or property of another
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized
public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance
by another, or any other meins, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." It is wel I to note that
Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between
human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of
justice."107ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the in pari delicto rule is not applicable, the question now
arises as to who between the parties have a better right to possess
the subject parcel of land. This issue was addressed in Santos:
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
What is important to consider now is who of the parties is the
better entitled to the possession of the land while the government
does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon
annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the
purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs,
the purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any
intruder. Such is the situation of the appellants. Their right to
remain in possession of the land is no better than that of appellee
and, therefore, they should not be allowed to remain in it to the
prejudice of appellee during and until the government takes steps
toward its reversion to the State. 108 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
In Binayug v. Ugaddan,109 which involved the sale of two
properties covered by a homestead patent, 110this court cited
jurisprudence showing that in cases involving the sale of a
property covered by the five-year prohibitory period, the property
should be returned to the grantee. 111
Applying the ruling in Santos and Binayug, this court makes it
clear that petitioners have no better right to remain in possession
of the property against respondents.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that while there
is yet no action for reversion filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, the property should be conveyed by petitioners to
respondents.
III
Petitioners' argument that respondents failed to establish their
status as heirs is belied by their admissions during trial and in
their pleadings. Petitioners t know the identity of Eusebio
Borromeo's wife. As quoted in the trial court's Decision, petitioners
alleged in their Answer that:
[I]t was the late Eusebio Borromeo and his wife who came along in
Bayugan 2, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, requesting the said
defendants to purchase their land because they badly need money
and notwithstanding the fact that they have a little amount and
out of pity bought the said land.112ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the Reply, respondents alleged:
The allegation that the late Eusebio Borrjomeo and his wife went
to Bayugan II, San Francisco, Agusan del Sur in order to sell the
land to the defendant Eliseo Maltos has no factual basis, the truth
of the matter is that the late Eusebio Borromeo, together with
defendant Eliseo Maltos went to Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat to
secure the signature of the wife.113
In addition, when petitioner Eliseo Maltos was presented in court,
he identified the signatures of the witnesses on the deed of sale as
the signatures of Eusebio Borromeo's children, namely, Susan,
Ana, and Nicolas Borromeo.114
Respondents' allegation that they are the heirs of Borromeo is
admitted by petitioners. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
ruling that "the fact that Appellants [referring to respondents] are
the spouse and children of the late EUSEBIO remains
unrebutted."115
IV
With regard to the claim for reimbursement, respondents argue
that it was not raised as a counterclaim in the Answer to the
Complaint.
During trial, petitioner Eliseo Maltos testified that when he
entered the land, there were around 100 trees, including coconut
trees and a few banana trees. He then planted additional coconut
trees which, at the time of the trial, were already bearing
fruit.116 Petitioner Eliseo Maltos' testimony was not rebutted by
respondents.
The general rule is that "[a] compulsory counterclaim . . . not set
up shall be barred."117 Further, the computation of the value of the
improvements on the land entails findings of fact.
In any case, the Court of Appeals did not err when it stated in its
Resolution dated April 7, 2006 that: 
With respect to Appellees' claim for the reimbursement of the
improvements on the land in question, they are hereby declared to
have lost and forfeited the value of the necessary improvements
that they made thereon in the same manner that Appellants
should lose the value of the products gathered by the Appellees
from the said land.118
The Court of Appeals cited Angeles, et at v. Court of Appeals, et
al.119 and Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 120 In Angeles,
this court discussed that:
The question that now poses is whether the return of the value of
the products gathered from the land by the defendants and the
expenses incurred in the construction of the dike�all useful and
necessary expenses�should be ordered to be returned by the
defendants to the plaintiffs. While we believe that the rule of in
pari delicto should not apply to the sale of the homestead, because
such sale is contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
homestead law, the loss of the products realized by the defendants
and the value of the necessary improvements� made by them on
the land should not be excepted from the application of the said
rule because no cause or reason can be cited to justify an
exception. It has been held that the rule of in pari delicto is
inapplicable only where the same violates a well-established public
policy.
. . . .
We are constrained to hold that the heirs of the homesteader
should� be declared to have lost and forfeited the value� of the
products gathered from the land, and so should the defendants
lose the value of the necessary improvements that they have made
thereon.121ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Arsenal, the property covered by a homestead patent had been
sold to Suralta in 1957,122 while the Complaint was filed before the
trial court in 1974. 123 The case was decided by this court in
1986.124Thus, Suralta had been in possession of the property for
approximately 17 years before a Complaint was filed. This court
held that:
The value of any improvements made on the land and the
interests on the purchase price are compensated by the fruits the
respondent Suralta and his heirs received from their long
possession of the homestead.125ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Angeles and Arsenal both involved the sale of a parcel of land
covered by a homestead patent within the five-year prohibitory
period. These cases also involved the introduction of
improvements on the parcel of land by the buyer.
Restating the rulings in Angeles and Arsenal, this court finds
that while the rule on in pari delicto does not apply policy, if its
effect is to violate public policy it is applicable with regard to value
of the improvements� introduced by petitioner Eliseo Maltos.
Petitioners had been in possession of the land for 20 years before
the heirs of Borromeo filed a Complaint. The expenses incurred by
petitioners in introducing improvements on the land for which
they seek reimbursement should already be compensated by the
fruits they received from the improvements.
V
Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public
Land Act:
SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of
lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be
instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of Commonwealth of the
Philippines.
The purpose of reversion is "to restore public land fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to
the mass of public domain."126
The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not
automatic, and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
party to file an action for reversion.
In Villacorta v. Ulanday,127 defendant-appellee Vicente Ulanday
admitted that his purchase of a parcel of land covered by a
homestead patent was made within the five-year prohibitory
period, but argued that since the sale was in violation of
law,128 the property should automatically revert to the
state.129 This court held that reversion was not automatic, and
government must file an appropriate action so that the land may
be reverted to the state.130
Ortega v. Tan131 involved the sale and mortgage of a parcel of land
covered by a free patent. 132 The series of transactions for the sale
and mortgage of the property had been initiated within the five-
year prohibitory period but was finalized after the prohibitory
period.133 This court held that the sale and mortgage violated
Section 118 of the Public Land Act and that reversion was
proper.134 This court also clarified that:
[Reversion] is not automatic. The government has to take action to
cancel the patent and the certificate of title in order that the land
involved may be reverted to it. Correspondingly, any new
transaction would be subject to whatever steps the government
may take for the reversion to it. 135 (Citation
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Alvarico v. Solau136 involved a miscellaneous sales application over
a parcel of land by Fermina Lopez.137Subsequently, Lopez executed
a deed of self-adjudication and transfer of rights in favor of
Amelita Sola.138 The Bureau of Lands approved the transfer of
rights, and title was issued in Sola's name. 139Castorio Alvarico
then filed an action for reconveyance, claiming that the parcel of
land was donated to him.140 He also alleged that Sola acquired the
property in bad faith. 141 This court held that Alvarico's allegation
of bad faith was not supported by evidence and that in any case,
"only the State can institute reversion proceedings under Sec[tion]
101 of the Public Land Act."142 This court restated Section 101 of
the Public Land Act:
[A] private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any
action which would have the effect of canceling a free patent and
the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof,
such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in
his stead may do so. Since [the] title originated from a grant by the
government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee.143 (Citations omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The rule in Alvarico was cited in Cawis, et al. v. Hon. Cerilles, et
al.144 In Cawis, the validity of a sales patent and original certificate
of title over a parcel of land in Baguio was questioned. 145 This
court denied the Petition146 and ruled that the Complaint was
actually a reversion suit, which can be filed only by the Office of
the Solicitor General or a person acting in its stead. 147
It was also discussed in Cawis that:
The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the
cancellation of the certificate of title an|l the resulting reversion of
the land covered by the title to the State| This is why an action for
reversion is oftentimes designated asj an annulment suit or a
cancellation suit.148
We clarify that the remedy of reversion is not the same as the
remedy of declaration of nullity of free patents and certificate of
title. In reversion, the "allegations in the complaint would admit
State ownership of the disputed land[,]"149 while in an action for
the declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title, the
allegations would include "plaintiffs ownership of the contested lot
prior to the issuance of [the] free patent and certificate of title[.]" 150
Since an action for reversion presupposes that the property in
dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General, being the real party-in-
interest.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that reversion is not
automatic. Section 29 of the Public Land Act provides:
SECTION 29. After the cultivation of the land has begun, the
purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, may convey or encumber his rights to any person,
corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to
purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or
encumbrance does not affect any right or interest of the
Government in the land: And provided, further, That the
transferee is not delinquent in the payment of any installment due
and payable. Any sale and encumbrance made without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling the
acquisition and reverting the property and all rights to the State,
and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the
Government shall be forfeited. After the sale has been approved,
the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire agricultural public
lands under the provisions of this Act, provided he has the
necessary qualifications. (Emphasis supplied)
In Francisco v. Rodriguez, et al,151 this court differentiated
reversion under Sections 29 and 101 of the Public Land
Act.152 This court explained that reversion under Section 29 is self-
operative, unlike Section 101 which requires the Office of the
Solicitor General to institute reversion proceedings. 153 Also,
Section 101 applies in cases where "title has already vested in the
individual[.]"154 The Director of Lands sought to execute the
Decision in Francisco v. Rodriguez which petitioner Ursula
Francisco opposed, arguing that only 29 hectares were reverted to
the state since she was in possession of the remaining four
hectares.155 This court held that the entire property reverted to the
state.156 This court also explained why Francisco v. Rodriguez was
covered by Section 29 and not Section 101 of the Public Land Act:
By transgressing the law, i.e., allowing herself to be a dummy in
the acquisition of the land and selling the same without the
previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, plaintiff-appellant herself [referring to Ursula�
Francisco] has eliminated the very source (Sales Application) of
her claim to Lot No. 595, as a consequence of which, she cannot
later assert any right or interest thereon. This is the imperative
import of the pronouncements in G.R. No. L-8263 and in G.R. No.
L-15605 that the invalidity of the conveyance by plaintiff-appellant
"produced as a consequence the reversion of the property with all
rights thereto to the State." As a matter of fact, Section 29 of the
Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act No. 141) expressly ordains
that any sale and encumbrance made without the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
"shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of annulling
the acquisition and reverting property and all rights thereto to the
State, and all payments on the purchase price theretofore made to
the Government shall be forfeited." . . . .
In fact, even if a sales application were already given due course
by the Director of Lands, the applicant is not thereby conferred
any right over the land covered by the application. It is the award
made by the Director to the applicant (if he is the highest bidder)
that confers upon him a certain right over the land, namely, "to
take possession of the land so that he could comply with the
requirements prescribed by law." It is at this stage, when the
award is made, that the land can be considered "disposed of by
the Government," since the aforestated right of the applicant has
the effect of withdrawing the land from the public domain that is
"disposable" by the Director of Lands under the provisions of the
Public Land Act. . . . However, the disposition is merely provisional
because the applicant has still to comply with the requirements
prescribed by law before . . . . any patent is issued. After the
requisites of the law are complied with by the applicant to the
satisfaction of the Director [of] Lands, the patent is issued.� It is
then that the land covered by the application may be considered
"permanently disposed of by the Government."157(Citations
omitted)
In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was
issued to Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that he already had title
to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Thus,
Section 101 of the Public Land Act applies.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is denied, and the Decision and
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 NATURAL RESOURCES: Cadastral – Prohibited Alienation
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77142
are AFFIRMED, without prejudice to the appropriate institution of
a case for reversion.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor

General for its appropriate action with respect to the reversion of
the land in question.

SO ORDERED.

12