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G.R. No.

L-15499             February 28, 1962 Manila, and having received the same on December
10, 1958, said law office delivered them to plaintiff-
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant, appellant's son, Mr. Miguel Papa, who in turn
vs. personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee. Butte, on December 11 and 12, 1958. Aside from this
letter of defendant-appellant, the vendor, thru her
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant. attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers, wrote said bank on
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee. December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's letter
regarding the sale of her 1/6 share in the Sta. Cruz
property for the sum of P500,000.00. Said letter was
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
received by the bank on December 15, 1958 and
having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's counsel, the latter
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance received the same on December 16, 1958. Appellant
of Manila dismissing the action for legal redemption received the letter on December 19, 1958.
filed by plaintiff-appellant.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty.
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a Philippine
was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. National Bank cashier's check in the amount of
Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering to
No. 52789, issued in the name of the following co- redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda.
owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff
Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, on the same day consigned the amount in court and
1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6. filed the corresponding action for legal redemption.
Without prejudice to the determination by the court of
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. the reasonable and fair market value of the property
Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive,
instituted to settle his estate, that included the one- plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for
sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned actual, moral and exemplary damages.
property. And although his last will and testament,
wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a
grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto, trial was
Mrs. Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as held, after which the court rendered decision on May
plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the 13, 1959, dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the
estate proceedings are still pending up to the present grounds that she has no right to redeem the property
on account of the claims of creditors which exceed and that, if ever she had any, she exercised the same
the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal
Philippine Islands was appointed judicial redemptions provided by the Civil Code. The
administrator. counterclaim of defendant for damages was likewise
dismissed for not being sufficiently established. Both
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier parties appealed directly to this Court.
Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late
Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed
undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. in this appeal are: (1) whether or not plaintiff-
defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free
P500,000.00. After the execution by her attorney-in- portion of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez, can exercise
fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold
effect that formal notices of the sale had been sent to by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the
all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly presence of the judicial administrator and pending the
registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 final distribution of her share in the testate
was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued proceedings; and (2) whether or not she exercised the
in the name of the vendee and the other-co-owners. right of legal redemption within the period prescribed
by law.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine The applicable law involved in the present case is
Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of the Civil
late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the above- Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:
mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the
bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte c/o
her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta,
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771).
exercise the right of redemption in case the Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
shares of all the other-co-owners or of any of valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the
them, are sold to a third person. If the price of death of the testator (Art. 935),and the fruits accruing
the alienation is grossly excessive, the after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee
redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one. (Art. 948).

Should two or more co-owners desire to As a consequence of this fundamental rule of


exercise the right of redemption, they may succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his
only do so in proportion to the share they may undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the
respectively have in the thing owned in moment of his death, and from that instant, they
common. (1522a) became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together
with the original surviving co-owners of their decedent
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is
redemption shall not be exercised except necessarily a co-owner of the whole. Wherefore, any
within thirty days from the notice in writing by one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became
the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption
the case may be. The deed of sale shall not (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner
be accorded in the Registry of Property, (Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
vendor that he has given written notice thereof This right of redemption vested exclusively in
at all possible redemptioners. consideration of the redemptioner's share which the
law nowhere takes into account.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes
that of adjoining owners. (1524a) The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of
a judicial administrator of the estate of Jose V.
That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the
exercise the right of legal redemption is clear. As administrator has the right to the possession of the
testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as
and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the undivided needed for the payment of the decedent's debts and
one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor the expenses of administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and
(causante) in the Santa Cruz property, from the the administrator may bring or defend actions for the
moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
Ramirez. By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of possession
deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from and administration do not include the right of legal
the moment of his death, and the right of succession redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy &
includes all property rights and obligations that Company by Mrs. Garnier Ramirez. The reason is
survive the decedent. obvious: this right of legal redemption only came into
existence when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was
perfected, eight (8) years after the death of Jose V.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the
Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate. The
property, rights and obligations of a person
redemption right vested in the heirs originally, in their
which are not extinguished by his death. (659)
individual capacity, they did not derivatively acquire it
from their decedent, for when Jose V. Ramirez died,
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property
transmitted from the moment of the death of had as yet sold his undivided share to a stranger.
the decedent. (657a) Hence, there was nothing to redeem and no right of
redemption; and if the late Ramirez had no such right
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a at his death, he could not transmit it to his own heirs.
right to the pure and simple legacies or Much less could Ramirez acquire such right of
devisees from the death of the testator, and redemption eight years after his death, when the sale
transmits it to his heirs. (881a) to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made; because death
extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore, all
The principle of transmission as of the time of the further juridical capacity to acquire or transmit rights
predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is and obligations of any kind (Civil Code of the Phil.,
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity Art. 42).
of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent
died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs.
the same moment(Art. 908), and so is the in Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez has not been
specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation
and that the liquidation of estate of Jose V. Ramirez in favor of the stranger, the redemption period began
may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine
portion in the Sta. Cruz property, in which event Mrs. legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a
Butte would have no interest in said undivided portion. particular method of giving notice, and that method
Even if it were true, the fact would remain that so long must be deemed exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne
as that undivided share remains in the estate, the vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] 528). As ruled in Wampler vs.
heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it, as the deceased did Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law Ed. [U.S.]
own it before his demise, so that his heirs are now as 275) —
much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V.
Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his Why these provisions were inserted in the
lifetime. As co-owners of the property, the heirs of statute we are not informed, but we may
Jose V. Ramirez, or any one of them, became assume until the contrary is shown, that a
personally vested with right of legal redemption as state of facts in respect thereto existed, which
soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso warranted the legislature in so legislating.
interest to Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the
undivided share of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should The reasons for requiring that the notice should be
eventually be sold to satisfy the creditors of the given by the seller, and not by the buyer, are easily
estate, it would not destroy their ownership of it before divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the
the sale, but would only convey or transfer it as in turn best position to know who are his co-owners that
sold (of it actually is sold) to pay his creditors. Hence, under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the
the right of any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem the notice by the seller removes all doubts as to the fact
Garnier share will not be retroactively affected. All that of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice
the law requires is that the legal redemptioner should being a reaffirmation thereof, so that the party need
be a co-owner at the time the undivided share of not entertain doubt that the seller may still contest the
another co-owner is sold to a stranger. Whether or not alienation. This assurance would not exist if the notice
the redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after should be given by the buyer.
exercising the legal redemptioner is irrelevant for the
purposes of law.
The notice which became operative is that given by
Mrs. Chambers, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact of
Nor it can be argued that if the original share of the vendor Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under
Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his heirs would date of December 11, 1958, she wrote the
stand in law as never having acquired that share. This Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her
would only be true if the inheritance is repudiated or principal's one-sixth (1/6) share in the Sta. Cruz
the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for
heirship is undisputed, the purchaser of hereditary P500,000.00. The Bank received this notice on
property is not deemed to have acquired the title December 15, 1958, and on the same day endorsed it
directly from the deceased Ramirez, because a dead to Mrs. Butte, care of Delgado, Flores and Macapagal
man can not convey title, nor from the administrator (her attorneys), who received the same on December
who owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can 16, 1958. Mrs. Butte tendered redemption and upon
only derive his title from the Ramirez heirs, the vendee's refusal, judicially consigned the price of
represented by the administrator, as their trustee or P500,000.00 on January 15, 1959. The latter date
legal representative. was the last one of the thirty days allowed by the
Code for the redemption, counted by excluding
The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the December 16, 1958 and including January 15, 1959,
redemption being established, the next point of inquiry pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the
is whether she had made or tendered the redemption redemption was made in due time.
price within the 30 days from notices as prescribed by
law. This period, be it noted, is peremptory, because The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the
the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's Administrator Bank (December 15) can not be
title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day counted as determining the start of thirty days; for the
period. In considering whether or not the offer to Administrator of the estate was not a proper
redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to
the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. redeem the share of Marie Garnier did not form part
The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez.
prescribes that the thirty days for making the
redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by
We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the
the vendor. Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art.
P500,000,00. paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for the Garnier
1524), it was immaterial who gave the notice; so long
share is grossly excessive. Gross excess cannot be the intestate estate and the distribution of the property
predicated on mere individual estimates of market of Casiano Abaya it appears:
price by a single realtor.
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried,
The redemption and consignation having been the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia,
properly made, the Uy counterclaim for damages and died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as
attorney's fees predicated on the assumption that the mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista
plaintiff's action was clearly unfounded, becomes Conde, whom the states she had by Casiano Abaya,
untenable. on the 6th of November, 1905, moved the settlement
of the said intestate succession; that an administrator
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed having been appointed for the said estate on the 25th
from is hereby reversed and set aside, and another of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said
one entered: Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the parents of
the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and opposed
(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 said appointment and claimed it for himself as being
made by appellant Angela M. Butte duly and the nearest relative of the deceased; that this was
properly made; granted by the court below on the 9th of January,
1906; that on the 17th of November, 1906, Roman
Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court
(b) Declaring that said appellant properly
declare him to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to
exercised in due time the legal redemption of
the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula
the one-sixth (1/6) undivided portion of the
Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take
land covered by Certificate of Title No. 59363
possession of all the property of said estate, and that
of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22,
City of Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by
1906, the court ordered the publication of notices for
Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez to appellant
the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
of the estate.
(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde,
to accept the consigned price and to convey
in replying to the foregoing motion of Roman Abaya,
to Angela M. Butte the undivided portion
filed a petition wherein she stated that she
above referred to, within 30 days from the
acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman
time our decision becomes final, and
Abaya, but that she considered that her right was
subsequently to account for the rentals and
superior to his and moved for a hearing of the matter,
fruits of the redeemed share from and after
and, in consequence of the evidence that she
January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and.
intended to present she prayed that she be declared
to have preferential rights to the property left by
(d) Ordering the return of the records to the Casiano Abaya, and that the same be adjudicated to
court of origin for further proceedings her together with the corresponding products thereof.
conformable to this opinion.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting
Without finding as to costs. documentary and oral evidence, and the court below
entered the following judgment:
G.R. No. L-4275             March 23, 1909
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee, Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose
vs. Conde as being natural children of Casiano
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant. Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should
succeed to the hereditary rights of her
C. Oben for appellant. children with respect to the inheritance of their
L. Joaquin for appellee. deceased natural father Casiano Abaya; and
therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the
ARELLANO, C.J.: only heir to the property of the said intestate
estate, to the exclusion of the administrator,
Roman Abaya.
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman
Abaya in the special proceedings brought in the Court
of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing witness. Any party in interest whose
judgment, appealed to this court, and presented the distributive share is affected by the
following statement of errors: determination of such controversy, may
appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary Instance determining such controversy to the
action for the acknowledgment of natural children Supreme Court, within the time and in the
under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be manner provided in the last preceding section.
brought in special probate proceedings.
This court has decided the present question in the
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed manner shown in the case of Juana Pimentel vs.
to be an unacknowledged natural child, the mother of Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may
bring an action to enforce the acknowledgment of her The main question with regard to the second error
deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and assigned, is whether or not the mother of a natural
137 of the Civil Code. child now deceased, but who survived the person
who, it is claimed, was his natural father, also
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged deceased, may bring an action for the
continuos possession of the deceased children of acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of
Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive
late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in these the inheritance from the person who is supposed to
proceedings; and be his natural father.

4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate In order to decide in the affirmative the court below
the property of this intestate estate to Paula Conde, has assigned the following as the only foundation:
as improperly found by the court below, the court
erred in not having declared that said property should In resolving a similar question Manresa says:
be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to "An acknowledgment can only be demanded
the third degree, and in not having previously by the natural child and his descendants
demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee whom it shall benefit, and should they be
the transmission of the property to those who might minors or otherwise incapacitated, such
fall within the reservation. person as legally represents them; the mother
may ask it in behalf of her child so long as he
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as is under her authority." On this point no
to whether in special proceedings for the positive declaration has been made,
administration and distribution of an intestate estate, undoubtedly because it was not considered
an action might be brought to enforce the necessary. A private action is in question and
acknowledgment of the natural child of the person the general rule must be followed. Elsewhere
from whom the inheritance is derived, that is to say, the same author adds: "It may so happen that
whether one might appear as heir on the ground that the child dies before four years have expired
he is a recognized natural child of the deceased, not after attaining majority, or that the document
having been so recognized by the deceased either supporting his petition for acknowledgment is
voluntarily or compulsorily by reason of a preexisting discovered after his death, such death
judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in perhaps occurring after his parents had died,
the special proceeding itself, he be recognized by the as is supposed by article 137, or during their
presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim lifetime. In any case such right of action shall
to be entitled to the succession opened in the special pertain to the descendants of the child whom
proceeding. the acknowledgment may interest." (See
Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, Civil
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Code, Vol. I.)
Procedure —
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most
If there shall be a controversy before the eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks legal
Court of First Instance as to who the lawful and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the
heirs of the deceased person are, or as to the right of such action by the natural child to his
distributive share to which each person is descendants can not be sustained under the law, and
entitled under the law, the testimony as to still less to his mother.
such controversy shall be taken in writing by
the judge, under oath, and signed by the
It is without any support in law because the rule laid 1. If the father or mother died during the
down in the code is most positive, limiting in form, maturity of the child, in which case the
when establishing the exception for the exercise of latter may institute the action before the
such right of action after the death of the presumed expiration of the first four years of its maturity.
parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by
any doctrine, because up to the present time no 2. If, after the death of the father or mother,
argument has been presented, upon which even an some instrument, before unknown, should be
approximate conclusion could be based. discovered in which the child is expressly
acknowledged.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the
condition of recognized natural children, granting In this case the action must be instituted with
them rights and actions that they did not possess the six months following the discovery of such
under the former laws, they were not, however, instrument.
placed upon the same place as legitimate ones. The
difference that separates these two classes of On this supposition the first difference that results
children is still great, as proven by so many articles between one action and the other consists in that the
dealing with the rights of the family and the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole
succession in relation to the members thereof. It may lifetime of the child, that is, it can always be brought
be laid down as legal maxim, that whatever the code against the presumed parents or their heirs by the
does not grant to the legitimate children, or in child itself, while the right of action for the
connection with their rights, must still less be acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his
understood as granted to recognized natural children whole lifetime, and, as a general rule, it can not be
or in connection with their rights. There is not a single instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents,
exception in its provisions. inasmuch as it can be exercised only during the life of
the presumed parents.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis
of the absolute family rights of the child, the With regard to the question at issue, that is, the
acknowledgment of the natural child is, among transmission to the heirs of the presumed parents of
illegitimate ones, that which unites him to the family of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to
the father or the mother who recognized him, and recognize the natural filiation, there exists the most
affords him a participation in the rights of the family, radical difference in that the former continues during
relatively advantageous according to whether they are the life of the child who claims to be legitimate, and he
alone or whether they concur with other individuals of may demand it either directly and primarily from the
the family of his purely natural father or mother. said presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily
from the heirs of the latter; while the second does not
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during
nothing is more logical than to establish a comparison the life of the presumed parents. Hence the other
between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to difference, derived as a consequence, that an action
enforce acknowledgment. for legitimacy is always brought against the heirs of
the presumed parents in case of the death of the
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy latter, while the action for acknowledgment is not
may be brought by the child at any time of its brought against the heirs of such parents, with the
lifetime and shall be transmitted to its heirs, exception of the two cases prescribed by article 137
should it die during minority or in a state of transcribed above.
insanity. In such cases the heirs shall be
allowed a period of five years in which to So much for the passive transmission of the obligation
institute the action. to admit the legitimate filiation, or to acknowledge the
natural filiation.
The action already instituted by the child is
transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of
lapsed before then. the latter's action to claim his legitimacy, or to obtain
the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen
ART. 137. The actions for the that the code grants it in the first case, but not in the
acknowledgment of natural children can be second. It contains provisions for the transmission of
instituted only during the life of the presumed the right of action which, for the purpose claiming his
parents, except in the following cases: legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a
word with regard to the transmission of the right to
obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child
above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of action may, as an exception, be exercised against the heirs
which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the
under article 118, may be transmitted to his heirs in event of the death of the latter during the minority of
certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
the right of action for the acknowledgment of natural instrument of express acknowledgment of the child,
children to which article 137 refers, can never be executed by the father or mother, the existence of
transmitted, for the reason that the code makes no which was unknown during the life of the latter.
mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct child can only be exercised by him. It can not be
interpretation, that the right of action to secure transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
acknowledgment by the natural child should be
presumed to be transmitted, independently, as a rule, In support of the foregoing the following authorities
to his heirs, while the right of action to claim may be cited:
legitimacy from his predecessor is not expressly,
independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law,
heirs of the legitimate child, but only relatively and as propounds the question as to whether said action
an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the should be considered transmissive to the heirs or
right of action on the part of the child to obtain the descendants of the natural child, whether he had or
acknowledgment of his natural filiation is transmitted had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and
to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No legal decides it as follows:
provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor can
an argument of presumption be based on the lesser
There is an entire absence of legal provisions,
claim when there is no basis for the greater one, and
and at most, it might be deemed admissible
when it is only given as an exception in well-defined
as a solution, that the right of action to claim
cases. It is placing the heirs of the natural child on a
the acknowledgment of a natural child is
better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one,
transmitted by the analogy to his heirs on the
when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural
same conditions and terms that it is
child is no better than, no even equal to, that of a
transmitted to the descendants of a legitimate
legitimate child.
child, to claim his legitimacy, under article
118, but nothing more; because on this point
From the express and precise precepts of the code nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural
the following conclusions are derived: child on a better footing than those of the
legitimate child, and even to compare
The right of action that devolves upon the child to them would not fail to be a strained and
claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, while questionable matter, and one of
the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural great difficulty for decision by the courts, for
child lasts only during the life of his presumed the simple reason that for the heirs of the
parents. legitimate child, the said article 118 exists,
while for those of the natural child, as we have
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to said, there is no provision in the code
claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life, he may authorizing the same, although on the other
exercise it either against the presumed parents, or hand there is none that prohibits it. (Vol. V.)
their heirs; while the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The
last during his whole life, but depends on that of the Civil Code as construed by the supreme court of
presumed parents, as a general rule can only be Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
exercised against the latter.
Article 118, taking into account the privileges
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving due to the legitimacy of children, grants them
upon the child is of a personal character and pertains the right to claim said legitimacy during their
exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission
any time during his lifetime. As an exception, and in of said right for the space of five years to the
three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of heirs thereof, if the child die during his
the child, to wit, if he died during his minority, or while minority or in a state of insanity. But as article
insane, or after action had been already instituted. 137 is based on the consideration that in the
case of a natural child, ties are less strong
and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not In a decision like the present one it is impossible to
fix such a long and indefinite period for the bring forward the argument of analogy for the purpose
exercise of the action; it limits it to the life of of considering that the heirs of the natural child are
the parents, excepting in the two cases entitled to the right of action which article 118
mentioned in said article; and it does not concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The
allow, as does article 118, the action to pass existence of a provision for the one case and the
on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does absence thereof for the other is a conclusive
not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be argument that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, and
deemed on general principles of law to it can not be understood that the provision of law
consent to it, such a supposition is should be the same when the same reason does not
inadmissible for the reason that a comparison hold in the one case as in the other.
of both articles shows that the silence of the
law in the latter case is not, nor it can be, an The theory of law of transmission is also entirely
omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in the
wide difference between the advantages Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir
granted to a legitimate child and to a natural who did not accept an inheritance during his lifetime
one. was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs,
included at the same time the idea that if the
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.) inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did
not possess it, there were, however, certain things
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Código Civil) raises which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the
the question: "Can the heirs of a natural child claim law and the right to accept the inheritance, for the
the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal,
father or mother are under obligation to shall pass to the heir; quia haeres representat
acknowledge"? And says: defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to the
article 659 of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of all the property, rights, and obligations of a person,
Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right which are not extinguished by his death." If the
of investigation forms a part of the estate of mother is the heir of her natural child, and the latter,
the child, and along with his patrimony is among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to
transmitted to his heirs. The affirmation is exercise an action of his acknowledgment against his
altogether too categorical to be admissible. If father, during the life of the latter, if after his death in
it were correct the same thing would happen some of the excepting cases of article 137, such right,
as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to
and as already seen, the right of action to his mother as being his heir, and it was so understood
demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to by the court of Rennes when it considered the right in
the heirs in every case and as an absolute question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the
right, but under certain limitations and child which is extinguished by his death, but a any
circumstances. Now, were we to admit the other right which might be transmitted after his death.
doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result This right of supposed transmission is even less
would be that the claim for natural filiation tenable than that sought to be sustained by the
would be more favored than one for legitimate argument of analogy.
filiation. This would be absurd, because it can
not be conceived that the legislator should The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his
have granted a right of action to the heirs of legitimacy is in all respects superior to that of the child
the natural child, which is only granted under who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it
great limitations and in very few cases to is evident that the right of action to claim his
those of a legitimate one. Some persons insist legitimacy is not one of those rights which the
that the same rules that govern legitimate legitimate child may transmit by inheritance to his
filiation apply by analogy to natural child are heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his
entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by inheritance. If it were so, there would have been no
the article 118. The majority, however, are necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an
inclined to consider the right to claim exception in the terms and conditions of article 118 of
acknowledgment as a personal right, and the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a
consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. portion of the child's inheritance, it is necessary that
Really there are no legal grounds to warrant the conditions and the terms contained in article 118
the transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.) shall be present, since without them, the right that the
child held during his lifetime, being personal and
exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule
not susceptible of transmission, would and should a deceased resident Chinese merchant to enter the
have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, Philippine Islands as such widow and children; and,
where no express provision like that of article 118 second, the right of such widow, as a merchant and
exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a the successor to her husband, to enter the said
natural child is, in principle and without exception, Islands and to bring her children with her."
extinguished by his death, and can not be transmitted
as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child. Counsel then says: "It would appear that the first part
of the foregoing questions has been resolved by this
On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part honorable tribunal against such right of entrance."
of the child's inheritance, it would be necessary to This statement is true. We have held in the case of
establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an Ng Hian vs. Collector of Customs (34 Phil. Rep., 248)
acknowledgment from the presumed natural father that the widow and minor children of a deceased
and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of Chinese merchant resident and doing business in the
the child, not limited by certain circumstances as in Philippine Islands at the time of his death are not
the case of the heirs of a natural child with a entitled to enter the Philippine Islands solely by
legitimate one to place the heirs of a natural child and reason of such relationship. Counsel for the appellant
his inheritance on a better footing than those of a asks us to overrule that decision and admit the
legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, applicants in this case, setting forth with ability
as stated in one of the above citations, most absurd arguments to that end. We must say, however, that,
and illegal in the present state of the law and in after a careful consideration of such arguments, we
accordance with the general principles thereof. are unable to see our way clear to overrule the former
decision and accordingly decline to do so.
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse
the judgment appealed from in all its parts, without With regard to the second question, it may be said
any special ruling as to the costs of this instance. that it does not appear in the record of this case that
the applicant is a merchant. It appears simply that her
husband was, at the time of his death, a resident
Chinese merchant doing business in the Philippine
Islands, and that he died leaving property including a
G.R. No. L-12379            March 14, 1917
mercantile business. The assumption of the appellant
is that the mere fact of the death of a merchant makes
LAO HU NIU, petitioner-appellant, his wife and children also merchants, as it leaves to
vs. them as heirs and next of kin a mercantile business
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF as a part of their inheritance. We do not believe that
CUSTOMS, respondent-appellee. this necessarily follows. But if it does, the fact remains
that she is not a resident merchant. She is still outside
Williams, Ferrier and SyCip for appellant. of the Philippine Islands and has never held the status
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee. of a resident merchant. She must, therefore, establish
her right to enter as a merchant in the first instance.
MORELAND, J.: This she did not do. She did not present the section
six certificate which is the only evidence upon which
This case involves the exclusion from the Philippine her right to enter can be based.
Islands of a Chinese woman and her minor children.
She claims to be the wife of a former resident From these observations it necessarily follows that
Chinese merchant who, prior to the attempt of the the applicant is not entitled to enter the Philippine
appellant to enter, died in the Philippine Islands Islands upon the status of her deceased husband;
owning property therein and leaving as his only heirs and that when she seeks to enter upon her own
at law and next of kin his widow, the appellant herein, personal status she must produce the evidence which
and her minor children. the law requires to establish that status. Not having
done this her application to enter was properly
The board of special inquiry refused them permission denied.
to enter and that refusal was affirmed by the Court of
First Instance of Manila. This appeal is from the action The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
taken by the Court of First Instance. So ordered.

Counsel for appellant says in his brief that: "The


question involved here is a double one: First, as to the
right of the widow and the legitimate minor children of G.R. No. L-31845 April 30, 1979
GREAT PACIFIC LIFE ASSURANCE his strong recommendation for the approval of the
COMPANY, petitioner, insurance application. Then on April 30, 1957,
vs. Mondragon received a letter from Pacific Life
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. disapproving the insurance application (Exhibit 3-M).
The letter stated that the said life insurance
G.R. No. L-31878 April 30, 1979 application for 20-year endowment plan is not
available for minors below seven years old, but
LAPULAPU D. MONDRAGON, petitioner, Pacific Life can consider the same under the Juvenile
vs. Triple Action Plan, and advised that if the offer is
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NGO acceptable, the Juvenile Non-Medical Declaration be
HING, respondents. sent to the company.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Sycip, The non-acceptance of the insurance plan by Pacific
Salazar, Luna & Manalo for petitioner Company. Life was allegedly not communicated by petitioner
Mondragon to private respondent Ngo Hing. Instead,
on May 6, 1957, Mondragon wrote back Pacific Life
Voltaire Garcia for petitioner Mondragon.
again strongly recommending the approval of the 20-
year endowment insurance plan to children, pointing
Pelaez, Pelaez & Pelaez for respondent Ngo Hing. out that since 1954 the customers, especially the
Chinese, were asking for such coverage (Exhibit 4-
M).

DE CASTRO, J.: It was when things were in such state that on May 28,
1957 Helen Go died of influenza with complication of
The two above-entitled cases were ordered bronchopneumonia. Thereupon, private respondent
consolidated by the Resolution of this Court dated sought the payment of the proceeds of the insurance,
April 29, 1970, (Rollo, No. L-31878, p. 58), because but having failed in his effort, he filed the action for the
the petitioners in both cases seek similar relief, recovery of the same before the Court of First
through these petitions for certiorari by way of appeal, Instance of Cebu, which rendered the adverse
from the amended decision of respondent Court of decision as earlier refered to against both petitioners.
Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, ordering "the The decisive issues in these cases are: (1) whether
defendants (herein petitioners Great Pacific Ligfe the binding deposit receipt (Exhibit E) constituted a
Assurance Company and Mondragon) jointly and temporary contract of the life insurance in question;
severally to pay plaintiff (herein private respondent and (2) whether private respondent Ngo Hing
Ngo Hing) the amount of P50,000.00 with interest at concealed the state of health and physical condition
6% from the date of the filing of the complaint, and the of Helen Go, which rendered void the aforesaid
sum of P1,077.75, without interest. Exhibit E.

It appears that on March 14, 1957, private respondent 1. At the back of Exhibit E are condition precedents
Ngo Hing filed an application with the Great Pacific required before a deposit is considered a BINDING
Life Assurance Company (hereinafter referred to as RECEIPT. These conditions state that:
Pacific Life) for a twenty-year endownment policy in
the amount of P50,000.00 on the life of his one-year A. If the Company or its agent, shan
old daughter Helen Go. Said respondent supplied the have received the premium deposit ...
essential data which petitioner Lapulapu D. and the insurance application, ON or
Mondragon, Branch Manager of the Pacific Life in PRIOR to the date of medical
Cebu City wrote on the corresponding form in his own examination ... said insurance shan
handwriting (Exhibit I-M). Mondragon finally type- be in force and in effect from the date
wrote the data on the application form which was of such medical examination, for such
signed by private respondent Ngo Hing. The latter period as is covered by the
paid the annual premuim the sum of P1,077.75 going deposit ..., PROVIDED the company
over to the Company, but he reatined the amount of shall be satisfied that on said date the
P1,317.00 as his commission for being a duly applicant was insurable on standard
authorized agebt of Pacific Life. Upon the payment of rates under its rule for the amount of
the insurance premuim, the binding deposit receipt insurance and the kind of policy
(Exhibit E) was issued to private respondent Ngo requested in the application.
Hing. Likewise, petitioner Mondragon handwrote at
the bottom of the back page of the application form
D. If the Company does not accept agent, no liability shall attach until the principal
the application on standard rate for approves the risk and a receipt is given by the agent.
the amount of insurance and/or the The acceptance is merely conditional and is
kind of policy requested in the subordinated to the act of the company in approving
application but issue, or offers to issue or rejecting the application. Thus, in life insurance, a
a policy for a different plan and/or "binding slip" or "binding receipt" does not insure by
amount ..., the insurance shall not be itself (De Lim vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of
in force and in effect until the Canada, 41 Phil. 264).
applicant shall have accepted the
policy as issued or offered by the It bears repeating that through the intra-company
Company and shall have paid the full communication of April 30, 1957 (Exhibit 3-M), Pacific
premium thereof. If the applicant does Life disapproved the insurance application in question
not accept the policy, the deposit shall on the ground that it is not offering the twenty-year
be refunded. endowment insurance policy to children less than
seven years of age. What it offered instead is another
E. If the applicant shall not have been plan known as the Juvenile Triple Action, which
insurable under Condition A above, private respondent failed to accept. In the absence of
and the Company declines to approve a meeting of the minds between petitioner Pacific Life
the application the insurance applied and private respondent Ngo Hing over the 20-year
for shall not have been in force at any endowment life insurance in the amount of
time and the sum paid be returned to P50,000.00 in favor of the latter's one-year old
the applicant upon the surrender of daughter, and with the non-compliance of the
this receipt. (Emphasis Ours). abovequoted conditions stated in the disputed binding
deposit receipt, there could have been no insurance
The aforequoted provisions printed on Exhibit E show contract duly perfected between thenl Accordingly,
that the binding deposit receipt is intended to be the deposit paid by private respondent shall have to
merely a provisional or temporary insurance contract be refunded by Pacific Life.
and only upon compliance of the following conditions:
(1) that the company shall be satisfied that the As held in De Lim vs. Sun Life Assurance Company
applicant was insurable on standard rates; (2) that if of Canada, supra, "a contract of insurance, like other
the company does not accept the application and contracts, must be assented to by both parties either
offers to issue a policy for a different plan, the in person or by their agents ... The contract, to be
insurance contract shall not be binding until the binding from the date of the application, must have
applicant accepts the policy offered; otherwise, the been a completed contract, one that leaves nothing to
deposit shall be reftmded; and (3) that if the applicant be dione, nothing to be completed, nothing to be
is not ble according to the standard rates, and the passed upon, or determined, before it shall take
company disapproves the application, the insurance effect. There can be no contract of insurance unless
applied for shall not be in force at any time, and the the minds of the parties have met in agreement."
premium paid shall be returned to the applicant.
We are not impressed with private respondent's
Clearly implied from the aforesaid conditions is that contention that failure of petitioner Mondragon to
the binding deposit receipt in question is merely an communicate to him the rejection of the insurance
acknowledgment, on behalf of the company, that the application would not have any adverse effect on the
latter's branch office had received from the applicant allegedly perfected temporary contract (Respondent's
the insurance premium and had accepted the Brief, pp. 13-14). In this first place, there was no
application subject for processing by the insurance contract perfected between the parties who had no
company; and that the latter will either approve or meeting of their minds. Private respondet, being an
reject the same on the basis of whether or not the authorized insurance agent of Pacific Life at Cebu
applicant is "insurable on standard rates." Since branch office, is indubitably aware that said company
petitioner Pacific Life disapproved the insurance does not offer the life insurance applied for. When he
application of respondent Ngo Hing, the binding filed the insurance application in dispute, private
deposit receipt in question had never become in force respondent was, therefore, only taking the chance
at any time. that Pacific Life will approve the recommendation of
Mondragon for the acceptance and approval of the
Upon this premise, the binding deposit receipt (Exhibit application in question along with his proposal that the
E) is, manifestly, merely conditional and does not insurance company starts to offer the 20-year
insure outright. As held by this Court, where an endowment insurance plan for children less than
agreement is made between the applicant and the seven years. Nonetheless, the record discloses that
Pacific Life had rejected the proposal and
recommendation. Secondly, having an insurable insurance companies allegedly do.
interest on the life of his one-year old daughter, aside Until such a definite policy is however,
from being an insurance agent and an offense adopted by the company, it can hardly
associate of petitioner Mondragon, private respondent be said that it could have been bound
Ngo Hing must have known and followed the progress at all under the binding slip for a plan
on the processing of such application and could not of insurance that it could not have, by
pretend ignorance of the Company's rejection of the then issued at all. (Amended Decision,
20-year endowment life insurance application. Rollo, pp- 52-53).

At this juncture, We find it fit to quote with approval, 2. Relative to the second issue of alleged
the very apt observation of then Appellate Associate concealment. this Court is of the firm belief that
Justice Ruperto G. Martin who later came up to this private respondent had deliberately concealed the
Court, from his dissenting opinion to the amended state of health and piysical condition of his daughter
decision of the respondent court which completely Helen Go. Wher private regpondeit supplied the
reversed the original decision, the following: required essential data for the insurance application
form, he was fully aware that his one-year old
Of course, there is the insinuation that daughter is typically a mongoloid child. Such a
neither the memorandum of rejection congenital physical defect could never be ensconced
(Exhibit 3-M) nor the reply thereto of nor disguished. Nonetheless, private respondent, in
appellant Mondragon reiterating the apparent bad faith, withheld the fact materal to the
desire for applicant's father to have risk to be assumed by the insurance compary. As an
the application considered as one for insurance agent of Pacific Life, he ought to know, as
a 20-year endowment plan was ever he surely must have known. his duty and
duly communicated to Ngo; Hing, responsibility to such a material fact. Had he diamond
father of the minor applicant. I am not said significant fact in the insurance application fom
quite conninced that this was so. Ngo Pacific Life would have verified the same and would
Hing, as father of the applicant herself, have had no choice but to disapprove the application
was precisely the "underwriter who outright.
wrote this case" (Exhibit H-1). The
unchallenged statement of appellant The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith
Mondragon in his letter of May 6, uberrima fides meaning good faith, absolute and
1957) (Exhibit 4-M), specifically admits perfect candor or openness and honesty; the absence
that said Ngo Hing was "our of any concealment or demotion, however slight
associate" and that it was the latter [Black's Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition], not for the alone
who "insisted that the plan be placed but equally so for the insurer (Field man's Insurance
on the 20-year endowment plan." Co., Inc. vs. Vda de Songco, 25 SCRA 70).
Under these circumstances, it is Concealment is a neglect to communicate that which
inconceivable that the progress in the a partY knows aDd Ought to communicate (Section
processing of the application was not 25, Act No. 2427). Whether intentional or
brought home to his knowledge. He unintentional the concealment entitles the insurer to
must have been duly apprised of the rescind the contract of insurance (Section 26, Id.: Yu
rejection of the application for a 20- Pang Cheng vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 105 Phil 930;
year endowment plan otherwise Satumino vs. Philippine American Life Insurance
Mondragon would not have asserted Company, 7 SCRA 316). Private respondent appears
that it was Ngo Hing himself who guilty thereof.
insisted on the application as originally
filed, thereby implictly declining the We are thus constrained to hold that no insurance
offer to consider the application under contract was perfected between the parties with the
the Juvenile Triple Action Plan. noncompliance of the conditions provided in the
Besides, the associate of Mondragon binding receipt, and concealment, as legally defined,
that he was, Ngo Hing should only be having been comraitted by herein private respondent.
presumed to know what kind of
policies are available in the company WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
for minors below 7 years old. What he set aside, and in lieu thereof, one is hereby entered
and Mondragon were apparently trying absolving petitioners Lapulapu D. Mondragon and
to do in the premises was merely to Great Pacific Life Assurance Company from their civil
prod the company into going into the liabilities as found by respondent Court and ordering
business of issuing endowment the aforesaid insurance company to reimburse the
policies for minors just as other
amount of P1,077.75, without interest, to private share. 5 Not satisfied, the petitioner went to the Court of Appeals, ** which
affirmed the challenged decision in toto.6 The petitioner is now before us
respondent, Ngo Hing. Costs against private and faults the respondent court with grave abuse of discretion for upholding
respondent. the trial court.

SO ORDERED. We do not agree that the respondent court erred. On


the contrary, we find that its findings are supported by
the evidence of record and in accord with the
ERNESTO ROBLES, petitioner,
applicable law and doctrine.
vs.
HON. DELFIN FL. BATACAN, HON. CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ, HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ. ATANACIO Thus, on the nature of the work performed by
GERONIMO and BENEDICTO Severino Geronimo, it quoted with approval the
GERONIMO, respondents. conclusion of the trial court that he "was the tenant on
the subject parcel for quite a time and was recognized
by Ernesto Robles as such," discharging such tasks
as supervising the harvest, cutting down bushes,
clearing the land, picking up the fallen nuts, and
paying the laborers, like the coconut gatherers and
CRUZ, J.: huskers, from his 1/3 share.  This was based on the
7

declarations of several witnesses,   including the 8

The central figure in this case is Severino Geronimo, petitioner himself, and the several documents
who worked in the petitioner's land for twenty years presented by Atanacio in which his father was
until 1969 and died the following year at the age of described by the petitioner as his "kasama" to whom
86. The central question in this case is the nature of was being given his "bahagui" or share.  9

the work he performed and the compensation he was


supposed to receive. As for the private respondent's right to succeed his
father, the respondent court was correct in affirming
After his death, an ejectment suit was filed against his the ruling of the trial court that, as the son of Severino
two sons by the petitioner, who claimed they had no Geronimo, Atanacio had the right to take over as
right to remain in his land.1 Benedicto Geronimo did not choose agricultural tenant in the petitioner"s land in
to answer and so was declared in default. 2 The other defendant. Atanacio accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and R.A. No.
Geronimo, averred that he was entitled to succeed his father as the
petitioner's agricultural tenant in accordance with R.A. No. 1199 and 3844.10 Obviously, Atanacio was the only heir interested in succeeding
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844. his father as his brother, Benedicto, had not seen fit to claim his right and in
fact defaulted in resisting the petitioner"s claims in the ejectment suit.
Significantly, when in his prayer the petitioner asks for authority to appoint
The private respondent's position is that his father the said Benedicto to succeed his father, it is presumably as his watcher
only and not as agricultural tenant. The petitioner"s consistent claim, it
was an agricultural tenant of the petitioner during the should be noted, is that Severino Geronimo was not his tenant but only his
twenty years the former worked in the latter"s land. watcher.
Hence, in accordance with the aforementioned laws,
he could remain in the petitioner"s land under the The Court gave cited due course to this petition to
same terms and conditions of the original tenancy enable the parties to argue on the amount of
share arrangement entered into between his father damages in view of the apparent lack of a credible
and the petitioner. His share should also be P100.00 basis therefor as observed by the trial court. 11 In his
more or less per harvest every forty days during the memorandum, the petitioner says the basis should be the weight of the
time he continued discharging his father"s work as his coconut harvested and then, consistent with his main thesis, urges that no
damages should be awarded at all.12 The private respondent says that the
statutory successor.  3
basis should be the number of nuts harvested and then asks that the
damages be doubled.13 In his reply, realizing probably that the matter may
have gotten out of hand, the petitioner now counters that the private
The petitioner, for his part, insists that Severino respondent cannot claim an increase in the amount of damages because
Geronimo was never an agricultural tenant of his but he has not, providentially, appealed the same. 14 This is correct and estops
the private respondent.
worked merely as a watcher in his land. He did
receive the sum of P100.00 every harvest but not as
his share therein for that amount was given to him as In La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court said:
a reward for his past services. The only work he did
was watch over the petitioner"s land and make The increase of the award of damages
brooms out of the fallen coconut leaves he would from P3,000.00 to P6,000.00 by the
gather. He sold these brooms and kept the proceeds Court of Appeals, however, cannot be
for himself without sharing them with the petitioner.  4 sustained. Generally, the Appellate
Court can only pass upon the consider
After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations * rendered questions or issues raised and argued
judgment recognizing the defendant as the agricultural tenant of the plaintiff in appellant"s brief, plaintiff did not
and ordering the payment to him of the sum of P12,000.00 as his tenancy appeal from that portion of judgment
of the trial court awarding them WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs
damages. Neither does it appear that, against the petitioner. This decision is immediately
as appellees to the Court of Appeals, executory.
plaintiffs have pointed out in their brief
inadequacy of the award or that the SO ORDERED.
inclusion of the figure P3,000.00 was
merely a clerical error, in order that
G.R. No. 100588 March 7, 1994
the matter may be treated as an
exception to the general rule. Thus,
the court of Appeals committed error UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC., SISTER
in raising the amount for damages. CONCEPCION CAJILIG, NENALYN ABIODA,
MARY ESPINO, RHODORA AZUCENA, MA. DULCE
SOCORRO POSA and COSETTE
In Dy v. Kuizon, 16 we declared:
MONTEBLANCO, petitioners,
vs.
It is a well-settled rule in this COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO H. LARA,
jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is EDUARDO MAGANTE, JOSE SANCHO,
taken in a civil case, an appellee who REYNALDA F. SO and WINNEFRIDA C.
has not himself appealed cannot VALENZUELA, as parents/guardians of Antonio
obtain from the appellate court any Marco Ho, Ma. Elanie Magante, Roy D. Sancho,
affirmative relief other than the ones Michael Kim So and Bernardina
granted in the decision of the court Cainoy, respondents.
below. An appellee who is not
appellant may assign errors in his brief
Tirol & Tirol for petitioner.s
where his purpose is to maintain the
judgment on other grounds, but he
may not do so if this purpose is to Nilo S. Sampiano for private respondents.
have the judgment modified or
reversed for, in such a case, he must
appeal. Here, the respondent did not
appeal and so it was error for the NOCON, J.:
Court of Appeals to award him a relief
not granted by the lower court. The present case involves third year Nursing students
who failed to meet the retention policy of the school,
In Madrideo v. Hon. Court of Appeals,  17 our ruling was: that is, minimum grade of 80% in any major Nursing
subject and in two minor subjects. As a consequence,
... whenever an appeal is taken in a the school refused to re-admit them. In view of the
civil case, an appellee who has not rights granted to students by the provisions of Section
appealed cannot obtain from the IV, paragraph 107 of the Manual of Regulations for
appellate court any affirmative relief Private Schools, Section 9(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
other than the ones granted in the 232 and Article XIV, Section 5(3) of the 1987
decision of the court below. Constitution, may they compel the school to allow
them to complete their course?
The latest decision on this matter is Aguilar v.
Chan,18 where the Court noted that although the actual damages The antecedent facts are undisputed:
suffered by the plaintiff-appellee exceeded the amount awarded to her by
the lower court, this amount could not be increased because she had not
appealed. Private respondents Antonio Marco Ho, Ma. Elaine
Magante, Roy D. Sancho, Michael Kim So and
The trial court had the opportunity to assess the Bernardita Cainoy were third year Nursing students of
evidence first-hand and so was in the best position to petitioner University of San Agustin (USA) who were
determine the factual relationship between the parties refused re-admission in the summer classes of 1989
as well as the share to which the private respondent and last two semesters of school year 1989-1990 on
was entitled. We do not find that the respondent court the alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing Practice
decision of the court a quo and see no reason to II with Related Learning Experience). Its persistent
reverse it. We too affirm. refusal to re-admit them prejudiced their right to freely
choose their field of study and finish a college degree
and worse, no other school within the city and nearby
areas is willing to accept them due to the difference in
the curriculum and school residency requirement. 2. That Mandamus will not lie to
Thus, they filed a petition for mandamus before the compel the respondents to enroll
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to command petitioning students because of their
petitioner USA to re-admit them. Aside from the academic deficiencies and that this
prayer for re-admission, they also prayed for actual refusal of respondents university falls
and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for within its right to do so under the
each of them. academic freedom clause of our
Constitution.
Submitting a joint answer to the petition, petitioner
USA and the other petitioners, Dean Concepcion This petition is hereby dismissed with
Cajilig and Clinical Instructors Nenalyn Abioda, Mary cost upon petitioners.
Espino, Rhodora Azucena, Ma. Dulce Socorro Posa
and Cosette Monteblanco admitted having barred SO ORDERED. 1

private respondents from finishing their Nursing


course but justified the decision not to re-admit them It supported its ruling on the basis of the following
as being in pursuance of the school's policy that only considerations:
students with grades of at least 80% in any major
Nursing subject, including Nursing 104, and two minor
When petitioning students enrolled at
subjects, are allowed enrollment in the following year.
respondent university, they and their
Private respondents were duly informed and
parents/guardians signed agreements
forewarned of their below 80% performance rating. To
of admission wherein they bound
buttress petitioner's stance, they placed reliance on
themselves to abide by the policies of
Section 9(2) of the Education Act of 1982 (B.P. Blg.
the school, otherwise to discontinue.
232) which recognizes the right of students to freely
This is also provided for in the Nursing
choose their field of study subject to existing curricula,
Catalog of respondent university.
and to continue their course up to graduation, except
in cases of academic deficiency or violation of
disciplinary regulations; and Section 13(2) thereof These petitioning students have been
vesting in institutions of higher learning the right to given warnings of their sub-standard
determine on academic grounds who shall be performance after and before
admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be examination periods and informed of
the subjects of study and research. their efficiency and performance
ratings. During the evaluation and
promotional meetings, some of the
Additionally, petitioners contended that private
students were advised to discontinue
respondents have no cause of action
while those on the boarder (sic) line
for mandamus under the premises because there is
were, for humanitarian reasons (sic),
no clear and well-defined right of the latter which has
allowed to sign promises to improve,
been violated neither do the former have a
otherwise they agreed to withdraw
corresponding ministerial duty to re-admit them, since
from the course. Respondents'
petitioner USA is a private educational institution not
judgment not to readmit petitioning
performing public functions and duties. Under the
students was based on sound reasons
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, petitioner
and good faith.
USA enjoys the right to academic freedom.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court was not persuaded that private
respondents are entitled to the relief sought. The
dispositive portion of its order dated September 15, Upon the admission of petitioning
1989 thus reads: students at (sic) the First Year of (sic)
the School of Nursing of respondent
university, they as well as their
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves
parents or guardians signed
that:
Agreements for Admission, (Annex 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 to Answer) where they
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this agreed to maintain very good
case as the correct and proper docket academic performance so that the
fees has (sic) been paid by petitioners student belongs to the rank No. 100 of
when so required by the Court; the class.
Upon admission to the Second Year at xxx xxx xxx
the start of the school year 1987-88,
they also signed Agreements for Under the principle of equitable
Admission, (Annex 6, 7, 8, 9 and estoppel, the petitioning students, their
10).Among other things they agreed parents/guardians are now estopped
that at anytime after the first semester to deny what they have signed at the
of the first semester internship, they start of the semester and to question
may be asked to discontinue the the same signing only at about the
course due to grades below 80 on two end of the semester when they could
minor and any nursing subjects and not keep up with the grades required
agreed that at anytime for failure to of them.
meet said standard, the College of
Nursing can disqualify said students Petitioning students, their
from the BSN Course and that the parents/guardians who has (sic) full
disqualification does not render the knowledge of the facts that the
college liable for damages said agreement of admission is one-sided
students may suffer. against them but continued to keep
quite (sic) and acted on the
The students involved were in the third requirements of the respondent
year of the Nursing Course of the university not to have a grade below
respondent University at the start of 80% but having failed to obtain the
the school year 1988-89 but at the same at grading time shall not be
start and by the end of the first permitted to act in a manner
semester were borderline cases. They inconsistent with their former position
and their parents/guardians signed or conduct to the injury of the other.
2

promises to improve, copies attached


are Annexes 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 Respondent Court of Appeals did not agree with the
and 17. They promised to "improve ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
my academic performance" (a grade decision dated April 23, 1991 reads:
of at least 80% in all major nursing
subjects) and "improve my behaviour
WHEREFORE, the judgment
and attitude in the classroom and/or
appealed from is hereby REVERSED
the clinical area" and "should I fail to
and respondent USA and the other
meet the above considerations, I will
respondents are hereby ordered to re-
voluntarily withdraw from this college."
admit petitioners as 4th year students
However, even these borderline
in the College of Nursing of
students now petitioning failed to
respondent USA for the current school
make good.
year, 1991-1992. Costs against the
respondents.
. . . .Mandamus will not lie to compel
the school authorities to graduate a
SO ORDERED. 3

student who has failed to comply with


the disciplinary and academic rules of
the school as said writ cannot review It expressed the different view that:
or control the exercise of discretionary
powers (Magtibay vs. Garcia L-28971, . . . . The outcome of the case under
Jan. 25, 1983). The same rule was consideration hinges on the decisive
applied in the recent case of issue as to whether or not petitioners,
Tangonan vs. Pano 137 SCRA 245 with grades ranging from 77% to 78%
where our Supreme Court held that a in Nursing 104, are deemed, within
school may refuse to enroll a student legal contemplation, to be with
for academic delinquencies. It cannot academic deficiency. And on this
be compelled by mandamus to enroll crucial issue, We cannot help but
a student. In the same case it was resolve in the negative. In our
held that a school has the right to considered view, petitioners possess
refuse to enroll a student and such no academic deficiency within the
refusal falls within the academic purview of the aforecited law (Section
freedom clause of the Constitution. IV, paragraph 107 of the Manual or
Regulations for Private Schools), and
are not disqualified from re-admission of rules on discipline, students have
to respondent USA's College of the right to be re-admitted to finish and
Nursing. While it is true that they did graduate from their chosen course. In
not obtain a grade of at least 80% in the instant case, We hold that
Nursing 104, they passed and did not petitioners neither have any academic
fail in said subject. It is irrefutable that deficiency nor violated any rule of
75% is the passing grade in discipline, and, therefore, richly
respondent USA, and in all deserve re-admission in the
educational institutions of this country; respondent educational institution. It
so that petitioners' grades of 77% and bears stressing that the right of every
78% are well above passing mark. Filipino to acquire an education is
Therefore, petitioners having been impressed with public interest; and
given passing grades in all their any contract tending to defeat or
subjects and full credit for the nullify such right cannot be
corresponding number of units; it countenanced and is not entitled to
stands to reason, and conclude, that judicial recognition and protection.
far from suffering from any academic Thus infirmed, the agreements for
deficiency petitioners have admission relied upon by respondent
satisfactorily complied with the USA cannot defeat the right of
prescribed curriculum, entitling them petitioners to pursue a successful
to re-admission and enrollment as 4th conclusion their nursing course.
year students in the College of
Nursing of respondent USA. Indeed, It is not Our purpose, however, to
to be fair to all concerned, especially undermine or disregard rules and
to the students and their parents who regulations promulgated to maintain
sacrifice day and night for the desirable academic standards; but it
education of their children, academic bears repeating that when a school,
deficiency should be construed to such as respondent USA here, has
refer to failing or flunking grades or, to given a student a passing grade of
be more precise, grades lower than 75% or higher, that passing mark is, to
75% in any subject; something herein all intents and purposes, a certification
petitioners never obtained. This must and acknowledgment of the student's
be so because exceptions or eligibility for promotion to the next
limitations to the constitutionally higher grade; which, in the case of the
protected right of students to enroll in herein petitioners, signified their
schools of their preference must be eligibility for re-admission and
strictly construed and should not be enrollment as 4th year students in the
given an unreasonably broad and College of Nursing of respondent USA
expanded scope. To our mind, this is because if the latter itself, which gave
the proper interpretation and petitioners ratings ranging from 77%
approach, the agreement between the to 78% well above the passing mark of
parties to the contrary 75%, is not ready to re-admit
notwithstanding. More concretely petitioners, how can other schools
stated; the stipulation between with different curricula be expected to
petitioners and respondent USA to the admit petitioners who already finished
effect that a grade of at least 80% in 3rd year and cannot therefore meet
all major nursing subjects and two (2) the usual residence requirement?
minor subjects is a prerequisite for re- Obviously, then, there aforesaid
admission is repugnant to public policy contracts invoked by respondent USA
and is consequently unavailing to are not only contrary to public policy
defeat the constitutionally guaranteed but are most unfair to petitioners, and
right of petitioners to re-admission, cannot be upheld.
absent any academic deficiency or
violation of rules of discipline. Verily, Respondents' stance — that
clear, express and succinct is the petitioners are precluded by the
mandate of Section 4, paragraph 107 principle of estoppel from impugning
of the Manual of Regulations for or assailing such agreements, is
Private Schools — that in the absence untenable. We believe that the
of any academic deficiency or violation equitable principle of estoppel cannot
muzzle or defeat the constitutional and instruction is intended to develop the quality of
right of a citizen to pursue higher extraordinary diligence which is expected of
education subject only to reasonable professionals. This goal cannot be accomplished by
rules and regulations. Here, to repeat, graduates who pass the ordinary and dilute standard
what the respondents required of of 75%.
petitioners are unreasonable, nay
unconscionable. Private respondents do not deny that they had
enrolled in the Lanting College of Nursing and
Prior to the decision of respondent court, or on April 4, finished the Nursing course therein in October, 1990.
1991, petitioners already filed a motion for dismissal Nevertheless, they contend that even if a case were
of appeal  averring, inter alia, that the appeal has
4
moot and academic, a statement of the governing
become moot and academic because private principle is appropriate in the resolution thereof for the
respondents have enrolled in and graduated from the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly
Lanting College of Nursing, Tandang Sora, Quezon situated. Petitioners cannot dispute the fact that
City. In the resolution dated April 25, 1991, private respondents obtained grades of 77% or 78%
respondent court merely noted said motion, in Nursing 104, as reflected in their respective
considering that the appeal has been decided and the transcripts of records. And they earned credits for the
importance of the issues involved.  Petitioners then
5
subject, signifying that they have passed. The
filed a motion for reconsideration ad cautelam of the pertinent provisions of the Manual of Regulations for
April 23, 1991 decision, reiterating their previous Private Schools that were cited by petitioners can
averments. The motion was denied in the resolution very well be construed to mean that a student given
dated June 10, 1991 because: credit for the completion of a course is eligible for
promotion.
[t]he importance of the issues involved
and jurisprudential relevance and We rule that the special civil action of mandamus is
significance of the ponencia sought to not available in this instance.
be vacated militate against
(petitioners') posture.
6
The petition which was filed by private respondents
before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ
Hence, the present petition. of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them
for enrollment.  Taking into account the admission of
7

Petitioners fault respondent court for: 1) not private respondents that they have finished their
dismissing the case although moot and academic; Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing
and 2) ordering them to re-admit private respondents. even before the promulgation of the questioned
decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by
Petitioners allege that the private respondents, before events and should therefore be dismissed. However,
rendition of the questioned decision of respondent the case of Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE)
court, had already enrolled in the Lanting College of v. Dans, etc., et al.  is the authority for the view that
8

Nursing, Tandang Sora, Quezon City and graduated even if a case were moot and academic, a statement
in October, 1990. Therefore, respondent court's of the governing principle is appropriate in the
directive to re-admit them is futile and illusory. resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the
Moreover, while the Manual of Regulations for private parties but of others similarly situated.  We shall
9

Schools (Sections X, XII, and XIII thereof) is very adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits
specific about 75% being the passing grade for the of this petition.
elementary and secondary courses (or stating with
Grade IV up to the intermediate grades), vocational Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of
courses, and in night school (secondary subjects), it is Court, mandamus lies under any of the following
silent with respect to the collegiate course. This can cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully
only mean that the passing grade therein can be neglects the performance of an act which the law
based on school standards and policies, in specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any
consonance with the principle of academic freedom. corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
With respect to the Nursing course in particular, it is performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty
undeniable that Nursing as a profession involves the resulting from an office, trust or station; and (3) in
life and death of patients, and petitioners bear a case any tribunal, corporation, board or person
heavy responsibility to the local community, the unlawfully excludes another from the use and
nation, and the world to produce graduates of enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
competence and high quality. The high standard of legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy
grading which they have set coupled with rigid training and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  10
The nature of mandamus has been the subject of While petitioner questions the findings
discussions in several cases. It is settled of respondent school as to her
that mandamus is employed to compel the academic competence, the Court
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this cannot find any legal jurisdiction to
being its main objective. It does not lie to require interfere in the exercise of judgment of
anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a the school on this matter. . . .
16

course of conduct,   nor to control or review the


11

exercise of discretion.   On the part of the


12
The late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
petitioner,   it is essential to the issuance of a writ
13
supplied the rationale underlying our attitude
of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right towards academic decisions or policies in his
to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative concurring opinion in the case of Garcia v.
duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It The Faculty Admission Committee, et al.,   to 17

never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be wit:


necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it
must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to Only . . . when there is marked
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty arbitrariness, will the courts interfere
to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the with the academic judgment of the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. school faculty and the proper
The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It authorities as to the competence and
is simply a command to exercise a power already fitness of an applicant for enrollment. .
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.  14
. . The courts simply do not have the
competence nor inclination to
In the present case, private respondents have failed constitute themselves as Admission
to satisfy the prime and indispensable requisites of Committees of the universities and
a mandamus proceeding. There is no showing that institutions of higher learning and to
they possess a clear legal right to be enrolled in substitute their judgment for that of the
petitioner USA. Moreover, assuming that petitioner regularly constituted Admission
USA has an imperative duty to enroll them, it does not Committees of such educational
appear to this Court that the duty is merely ministerial; institutions. Were the courts to do so,
rather, it is a duty involving the exercise of discretion. they would conceivably be swamped
This was likewise our ruling in the case of Tangonan with petitions for admission from the
v. Paño et al.,   which involves a factual setting similar
15
thousands refused admission every
to the present petition. We adopted as our own the year, and next the thousands who
rationalization of the trial court therein: flunked and were dropped would also
be petitioning the courts for a judicial
. . . . Every school has a right to review of their grades.
determine who are the students it
should accept for enrolment. It has the Section IV, paragraph 107 of the Manual of
right to judge the fitness of students. Regulations for Private School states:
This is particularly true in the case of
nursing students who perform Every student has the right to enrol in
essential health services. Over and any school, college or university upon
above its responsibility to petitioner is meeting its specific requirement and
the responsibility of the school to the reasonable regulation: Provided, that
general public and the community. except in the case of academic
This Court take (sic) judicial notice delinquency and violation of
that nursing has become a popular disciplinary regulation, the student is
course because of the great demand presumed to be qualified for enrolment
for Filipino Nurses abroad, especially for the entire period he is expected to
in the United States. It is essential complete his course without prejudice
therefore that Nursing graduates who to his right to transfer. 
18

go abroad and become in a sense our


own ambassador (sic) should be
The meaning of this provision is that the school, after
highly qualified to perform their
having accepted a student for enrollment in a given
tasks. This is the responsibility of our
course may not expel him or refuse to re-enroll him
school and in the discharge of this
until he completes his course, except when he is
responsibility, they certainly should be
academically deficient or has violated the rules of
given the greatest latitude in
discipline. He is presumed to be qualified to study
formulating their admission policies.
there for the entire period it will take to complete his freedom of educational institutions has been defined
course. 19
as the right of the school or college to decide for itself,
its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them
This presumption has been translated into a right in — free from outside coercion or interference save
Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known as the possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
"Education Act of 1982."   Section 9(2) of this Act
20 some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
provides: certainly extending to the choice of students. Said
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would
— In addition to other rights, and be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its intent. 22

subject to the limitations prescribed by


law and regulations, students and While it is true that an institution of learning has a
pupils in all schools shall enjoy the contractual obligation to afford its students a fair
following rights: opportunity to complete the course they seek to
pursue,   since a contract creates reciprocal rights
23

xxx xxx xxx and obligations, the obligation of the school to


educate a student would imply a corresponding
obligation on the part of the student to study and obey
(2) The right to freely choose their field
the rules and regulations of the school.   When a
24

of study subject to existing curricula


student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails
and to continue their course therein up
to maintain the required academic standard, he
to graduation, except in cases of
forfeits his contractual right. In this connection, this
academic deficiency, or violation of
Court recognizes the expertise of educational
disciplinary regulations. (emphasis
institutions in the various fields of learning. Thus, they
supplied)
are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable
rules and regulations in the admission of
Article XIV, Section 5(3) of the 1987 Constitution students,   including setting of academic standards.
25

affords a similar right, although limited to citizens: Within the parameters thereof, they are competent to
determine who are entitled to admission and re-
Sec. 5 (3) Every citizen has a right to admission.
select a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable, and We find the challenged regulation of petitioner USA
equitable admission and academic reasonable and relevant to its objective, namely: . . .
requirements. (emphasis supplied). to produce graduates of proven competence and
aptitude in a demanding profession, for which it is
At the same time, educational institutions are entitled responsible to society-at-large, not only nationally but
to pursue their academic freedom and in the process also internationally, considering the good fame and
have the concomitant right to see to it that this reputation of Filipino nurses abroad.   Although
26

freedom is not jeopardized.  21


private respondents did not flunk in Nursing 104 but
on the contrary earned credits therefor, nevertheless,
Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 232 provides: their performances are still academically deficient for
failure to meet the standards set by petitioner USA.
Sec. 13. Rights of Schools. — In Besides, it is worthy to note that they were apprised
addition to their rights provided for by fully beforehand about the rules and regulations of
law, school shall enjoy the following: petitioner USA. When they applied for admission to
first year at petitioner USA, they signed agreements
xxx xxx xxx therefor, containing the following terms and
conditions:
2. The right for institutions of higher
learning to determine on academic 1. That the College of Nursing,
grounds who shall be admitted to University of San Agustin admits
study, who may teach, and what shall _________ to the BSN Courses for a
be the subjects of the study and period of one year;.
research. (emphasis supplied)
2. That after this period of probation, a
Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the final deliberation will take place to
1987 Constitution is that academic freedom shall be decide the Candidates who will be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. Academic
taken in for BSN second year based "a. poor academic
on the following conditions: performance, such as
failure in one nursing
"a. very good subject or a grade of
academic performance 70%;
so that the student
belongs to the rank "b. receipt of a grade
No. 100 of the class; below 80 on two minor
and any nursing
"b. very good attitudes subjects;
such as punctuality in
classes, cooperation in "c. frequent absences
the activities in the from classes and
school, respectfulness related clinical
and cordiality in experience without
dealing with others, legitimate reasons;
honesty;
"d. poor physical and
"c. good physical and mental health and;
mental health;
"e. failure to comply
"d. obedience to the with the requirements
rules and regulations of the University and/or
of the College of the rules and
Nursing. regulations of the
College of Nursing.
3. That I hereby waive any right and
agree that anytime for failure of the 3. That I hereby waive any right and
above-named student to meet the agree that any time for failure of the
necessary standards specifically above-named student to meet the
mentioned above, the College of necessary standards specifically
Nursing, USA can disqualify said mentioned above, the College of
student from the BSN Course; Nursing, USA can disqualify said
student from the BSN Course;
4. That the disqualification of the said
student from the department does not 4. That the College of Nursing has no
render the College of Nursing, USA right to disqualify the said student
liable from (sic) whatever damage the possessing the necessary
said student may suffer. 27
qualifications and has completed the
requirements both academic and
A year later, or on April 5, 1987, private respondents related clinical experience and thus
signed new agreements for admission, subject to the has met the standards set by the
following terms and conditions: College of Nursing, USA and the
MECS office;
1. That the College of Nursing,
University of San Agustin admits 5. That the disqualification of the said
_________ to the BSN Course for a student from the department does not
period of probation of at least one (1) render the College of Nursing,
semester; University of San Agustin liable from
(sic) whatever damage the said
2. That after the period of probation student may suffer. 28

(first semester of the first year


internship) and at anytime thereafter, On October 28, 1988, private respondents, except
unless officially accepted as a Michael Kim So, wrote to the Dean, College of
candidate for graduation, the above- Nursing of petitioner USA promising to:
named student may be asked to
discontinue the course due to:
a. improve my academic performance "FIRST
(a grade of at least 80% in all major
nursing subjects). I give, leave and bequeath the following property
owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141
b. improve my behavior and attitude in P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
the classroom and/or the clinical area.
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
Should I fail to meet the above covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
considerations I will voluntarily RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my
withdraw from this college.  29
name according to the records of the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
Our conclusion is, as sure to follow as night follows
the day, that the dismissal of private respondents' (b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of
petition by the trial court is proper. me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The be inherited and acknowledged by the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 23, 1991 children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
and its resolutions dated April 25, 1991 and June 10,
1991 are SET ASIDE. The order of the Regional Trial xxx
Court of Iloilo City dated September 15, 1989 is
REINSTATED. FOURTH

SO ORDERED. (a)....It is also my command, in this my addition


(Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall
G.R. No. 113725               June 29, 2000 have already received the ownership of the said Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, petitioner, 1  Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and
vs. also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have
MARLENA COSCOLUELLA

Y BELLEZA the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria
VILLACARLOS, respondents. Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic)
piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of
Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
DECISION
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
PURISIMA, J.:
FIFTH
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he
Court of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-

shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,


G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
(10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly,
and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to
testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on
reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its
the month of December of each year.
fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SIXTH
The antecedent facts are as follows:
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament
No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have
of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner,
lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect
511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land
and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each
The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic,
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
contained the following provisions:
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza,
respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and new certificate of title in the names of the surviving
the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the
obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were
sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the Order
in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny
of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they
cannot negotiate with others than my near During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
descendants and my sister." 4

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private


Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of
transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs,
in his name. arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following
his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), effect:
Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered
Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, docketed as not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to
Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the wit:
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to 75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or
enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose
Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of
the conditions of the Codicil, in that: each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and,
this is considered compliance of the annuity as
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance
Philippine National Bank and the Republic of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's
specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86,
only to the near descendants and sister of the 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in cash
testatrix. equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned
therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their into consideration the composite price of sugar during
obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of
of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena (P105,000.00).
Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years
1985 up to the filing of the complaint as That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or
mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated delivered on a staggered cash installment, payable on
demands for compliance. or before the end of December of every sugar crop
year, to wit:
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th
paragraph of the Codicil which provided that For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee before December of crop year 1988-89;
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver
100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO
private respondent.
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1989-90;
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered
ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot No.
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO estate, secure the appointment of an administrator,
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal
before December of crop year 1990-91; and heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by
the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392
HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or until she dies.
before December of crop year 1991-92." 5

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET


However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-
Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
sugar crop year 1988 -1989. interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out SO ORDERED." 7

with a decision, dismissing the complaint and


disposing as follows: Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner found his way to this
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, Court via the present petition, contending that the
the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed as Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot
no cause of action against the defendants has as yet 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the
arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the non- basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that
performance of the command as mandated exaction the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a
from them simply because they are the children of modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of
Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in the New Civil Code.
question, does not warrant the filing of the present
complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, The petition is not impressed with merit.
being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is
opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge resolving the appeal in accordance with Article 882 of
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
semblance to her claim under the Codicil. deviating from the sole issue raised which is the
absence or prematurity of the cause of action.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find
being prematurely filed is DISMISSED without application as there was no modal institution and the
prejudice. testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be
SO ORDERED." 6 substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants"
should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of private respondent be not complied with. And since
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
ratiocinating and ordering thus: be no valid substitution and such testamentary
provision cannot be given any effect.
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established
plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no
annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; valid substitution for the reason that the substituted
defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to merely referred to as "near descendants" without a
deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; definite identity or reference as to who are the "near
defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843 and 8 

said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive 845 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be

consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the deemed as not written.
Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its
reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary
such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to to his supposition that the Court of Appeals deviated
order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from from the issue posed before it, which was the
the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the
Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no
separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the
private respondent had a cause of action against the Again, the contention is without merit.
petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution
was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent Substitution is the designation by the testator of a
had a legally demandable right against the petitioner person or persons to take the place of the heir or
pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general,
of Appeals ruled in accordance with law. the testator may either (1) provide for the designation
of another heir to whom the property shall pass in
It is a general rule under the law on succession that case the original heir should die before him/her,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are
10 
inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her
12 

called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate property to one person with the express charge that it
children and descendants, in relation to their be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued
13 

compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother


11 
upon contemplates neither of the two.
and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the
of law, without need of further proceedings, and the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
successional rights were transmitted to them from the incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case
14 

moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil
Rabadilla. do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance testatrix's near descendants would substitute him.
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized
subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here
the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his mandated to preserve the property and to
death. transmit the same later to the second heir. In the 15 

case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact


In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property
No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the provided the negotiation is with the near descendants
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important
to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking;
death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
succeeded to his rights and title over the said preservation of the property and its transmission to
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve
obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
herein private respondent. Such obligation of the fideicommissary substitution." Also,
16 
the near
instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or definite. The property will only pass to them should
performance of which is now being demanded by the Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation
latter through the institution of the case at bar. to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action
against petitioner and the trial court erred in Another important element of a fideicommissary
dismissing the complaint below. substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863,
the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New property is transmitted must not be beyond one
Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
because what the testatrix intended was a substitution fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the
- Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the first heir is not related by first degree to the second
testatrix's near descendants should there be heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near
17 

noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs descendants are not at all related to the instituted
of sugar to private respondent. heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon
is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, the instituted heir without, however, affecting the
Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of efficacy of such institution.
law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide: Then too, since testamentary dispositions are
generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution upon the heir should not be considered a condition
or the application of the property left by the testator, unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such
or the charge imposed on him, shall not be was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
considered as a condition unless it appears that such institution should be considered as modal and not
was his intention. conditional.22

That which has been left in this manner may be Neither is there tenability in the other contention of
claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his petitioner that the private respondent has only a right
heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself
the testator and for the return of anything he or they from the instituted heir because the right to seize was
may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or
or they should disregard this obligation. mortgagee.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty
institution referred to in the preceding article cannot arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
to and in conformity with his wishes. consideration the circumstances under which it was
made. Such construction as will sustain and uphold
23 

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in the Will in all its parts must be adopted.24

Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession


as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is
modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100) piculs
the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such
property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an
18 
Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On
19 
otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil
the other hand, in a conditional testamentary further provides that in the event that the obligation to
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza
in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to
testator. The condition suspends but does not the testatrix's near descendants. The non-
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not performance of the said obligation is thus with the
suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
20 
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion
condition.21
thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the
said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-
can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix intended in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix in
that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted in-interest.
heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed
make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is
the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
though, that should the obligation be not complied compliance of his obligation through the
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's consummated settlement between the lessee and the
near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. private respondent, and having consummated a
settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino,
private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents,
under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of
subject property. Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child,
revocable and free act by which a person disposes of Jovita (Jovito) Alib.   It is not clear why the latter is not
1

his property, to take effect after his death. Since the 25  included as a party in this case.
Will expresses the manner in which a person intends
how his properties be disposed, the wishes and Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could
a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise not attend to the other portions of the two lots which
agreement which would thereby defeat the very had a total area of around twenty-four hectares. The
purpose of making a Will. record does not show whether the children of Felipe
also cultivated some portions of the lots but it is
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby established that Rufino and his children left the
DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, province to settle in other places as a result of the
dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs the "Japanese time up to peace time", they did not
visit the parcels of land in question but "after
liberation", when her brother went there to get their
G.R. No. L-68053 May 7, 1990
share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed
that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella)
LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773.  2

RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE
Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.
COURT and JESUS YANES, ESTELITA YANES,
RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of
ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and
37,818 square meters.   TCT No. RF 2694 describes
3

ILUMINADO YANES, respondents.
Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral
survey of Murcia and as originally registered under
Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner. OCT No. 8804.

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents. The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831
square meters was also registered in the name of
Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under
TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ).   Said transfer certificate
4

FERNAN, C.J.: of title also contains a certification to the effect that


Lot 773-B was originally registered under OCT No.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the 8804.
decision of the Fourth Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus
Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8, On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-
1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it
ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in consideration of the
the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A sum of P7,000.00.   Consequently, on February 20,
5

and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291 and T-19292 were issued in
and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of
P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages Fuentebella's name.  6

and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate
court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of its
decision. After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of
his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings
identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which were No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros
originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots
Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773, with an area of 773-A and 773-B.   By virtue of a court order granting
7

156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of said motion,   on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de
8

the heirs of Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo
of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, Alvarez.   Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-23165
9

1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were
(Exh. A). respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez.  10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of
and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Rodolfo Siason who had purchased them from
Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the
First Instance of Negros Occidental a complaint plaintiffs as Siason was "not a party per writ of
against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de execution."  17

Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of


Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022
and possession of Lots 773 and 823. They also having met a hindrance, herein private respondents
prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of
from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint be made by First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the
the defendants, that after court approval of said issuance of a new certificate of title and for a
accounting, the share or money equivalent due the declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-
plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be 23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez.   Thereafter, the
18

ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the court required Rodolfo Siason to produce the
form of attorney's fees. 
11
certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.

During the pendency in court of said case or on Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that
November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not Lots
and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable
Siason.   Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920
12
consideration without any knowledge of any lien or
were issued to Siason,   who thereafter, declared the
13
encumbrances against said properties"; that the
two lots in his name for assessment purposes.  14
decision in the cadastral proceeding   could not be
19

enforced against him as he was not a party thereto;


Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in and that the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could
his own behalf and in behalf of the other plaintiffs, and neither be enforced against him not only because he
assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil was not a party-litigant therein but also because it had
Case No. 5022 stating that the therein plaintiffs long become final and executory.   Finding said
20

"renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court,
monetary or otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia in its order of September 4, 1965, nullified its previous
Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above- order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of
entitled case." 
15
title mentioned therein. 
21

On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil Case No.
Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads: 5022. Siason opposed it.   In its order of September
22

28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the lower court,


WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action
ordering the defendant Rosendo for the recovery of the land in question, ruled that at
Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs the judgment therein could not be enforced against
lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Siason as he was not a party in the case.  23

Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental,


now covered by Transfer Certificates The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968
of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in was for recovery of real property with
the name of said defendant, and damages.   Named defendants therein were Dr.
24

thereafter to deliver the possession of Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,
said lots to the plaintiffs. No special Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of
pronouncement as to costs. Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued
SO ORDERED.  16 to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the issuance of
a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses
It will be noted that the above-mentioned "in accordance with the sheriffs return of service
manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of
the aforesaid decision. possession of Lot 773 to the Yaneses; and if, delivery
thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a
new title could not be made, that the Alvarez and
However, execution of said decision proved
Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum
unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of
of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render
service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that
an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November
he discovered that Lot 773 had been subdivided into
13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the the defendants, Laura, Flora and
defendants jointly and severally pay the Yaneses Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is
moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary hereby dismissed.
damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P4,
000.00.  25
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and
Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the hereby ordered to pay the costs of this
validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-B, having suit.
been passed upon by the court in its order of
September 4, 1965, had become res judicata and the SO ORDERED.  29

Yaneses were estopped from questioning said


order.   On their part, the Alvarez stated in their
26
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate
answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been Appellate Court which in its decision of August 31,
"barred by res judicata, statute of limitation and 1983   affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as
30

estoppel."  27
it ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos.
that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,
question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico Negros Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it
pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
faith for a valuable consideration. Although the P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and
Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a attorney's fees, respectively."   The dispositive portion
31

notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of of said decision reads:


Negros Occidental in order to protect their rights over
the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
equity demanded that they recover the actual value of from is affirmed insofar as it ordered
the land because the sale thereof executed between defendants-appellants to pay jointly
Alvarez and Siason was without court approval.   The 28
and severally the plaintiffs- appellees
dispositive portion of the decision states: the sum of P20,000.00 representing
the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING and 773-B of the cadastral survey of
CONSIDERATION, judgment is Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is
hereby rendered in the following reversed insofar as it awarded the
manner: sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral
A. The case against the defendant Dr. damages and attorney's fees,
Rodolfo Siason and the Register of respectively. No costs.
Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed,
SO ORDERED.  32

B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and


Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion
being the legitimate children of the for reconsideration, said appellate court denied the
deceased Rosendo Alvarez are same.
hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the sum of Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum
P20,000.00 representing the actual petitioners raised the following issues:
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental;
1. Whethere or not the defense of
the sum of P2,000.00 as actual
prescription and estoppel had been
damages suffered by the plaintiff; the
timely and properly invoked and raised
sum of P5,000.00 representing moral
by the petitioners in the lower court.
damages and the sum of P2.000 as
attorney's fees, all with legal rate of
interest from date of the filing of this 2. Whether or not the cause and/or
complaint up to final payment. causes of action of the private
respondents, if ever there are any, as
alleged in their complaint dated
C. The cross-claim filed by the
February 21, 1968 which has been
defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against
docketed in the trial court as Civil
Case No. 8474 supra, are forever litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous litigations
barred by statute of limitation and/or will multiply in number to the detriment of the
prescription of action and estoppel. administration of justice. 
36

3. Whether or not the late Rosendo There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to
Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. the properties in question have been finally
5022, supra and father of the adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the
petitioners become a privy and/or lower court, from the uncontroverted evidence
party to the waiver (Exhibit 4- presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived
defendant Siason) in Civil Case No. of ownership and possession of the lots in
8474, supra where the private question.   In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under
37

respondents had unqualifiedly and review, arose from the failure to execute Civil Case
absolutely waived, renounced and No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be
quitclaimed all their alleged rights and reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses, the
interests, if ever there is any, on Lots same having been sold during the pendency of the
Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did
Cadastre as appearing in their written not know about the controversy, there being no lis
manifestation dated November 6, pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also
1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a
not been controverted or even purchaser in good faith.
impliedly or indirectly denied by them.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul
4. Whether or not the liability or the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr. Siason on
liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial
from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and court ordered the heirs of Rosendo Alvarez who lost
773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private
Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, respondents herein) the amount of P20,000.00
could be legally passed or transmitted representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in
by operations (sic) of law to the dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said
petitioners without violation of law and amount.  38

due process .  33

As to the propriety of the present case, it has long


The petition is devoid of merit. been established that the sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is erroneously registered in another's name is to bring
powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the
ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in dispute to hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
herein private respondents. Said decision had long damages.   "It is one thing to protect an innocent third
39

become final and executory and with the possible party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of
exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said justification if deceit would be rewarded by allowing
case, the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
the case between the parties thereto. It ended when decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of
Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision decisions coming from this Court, such an
against them.  34 undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be
guarded against."  40

Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been


judicially tried and determined by a court of competent The issue on the right to the properties in litigation
jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be
privity with them in law or estate.   As consistently
35 reopened in the instant case on the pretext that the
ruled by this Court, every litigation must come to an defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been
end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there properly considered by the lower court. Petitioners
must be a limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been could have appealed in the former case but they did
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent not. They have therefore foreclosed their rights, if any,
court, he should not be granted an unbridled license and they cannot now be heard to complain in another
to return for another try. The prevailing party should case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment
not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless which has longing become final and executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising The rule is a consequence of the
from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B made by progressive "depersonalization" of
Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the patrimonial rights and duties that, as
sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his observed by Victorio Polacco has
estate, after his death. characterized the history of these
institutions. From the Roman concept
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the of a relation from person to person,
doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the general the obligation has evolved into a
transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the relation from patrimony to patrimony
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs. Thus, with the persons occupying only a
the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state: representative position, barring those
rare cases where the obligation is
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of strictly personal, i.e., is
acquisition by virtue of which the contracted intuitu personae, in
property, rights and obligations to the consideration of its performance by a
extent of the value of the inheritance, specific person and by no other.
of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either xxx xxx xxx
by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences
the property, rights and obligations of of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the
a person which are not extinguished present claim for damages. That petitioners did not
by his death. inherit the property involved herein is of no moment
because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only thereof devolved into the mass of their father's
between the parties, their assigns and hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the
heirs except in case where the rights hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for
and obligations arising from the the payment of the debts of the estate.  42

contract are not transmissible by their


nature, or by stipulation or by It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are
provision of law. The heir is not liable liable only to the extent of the value of their
beyond the value of the property inheritance. With this clarification and considering
received from the decedent. petitioners' admission that there are other properties
left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice amount adjudged in favor of private respondents, we
J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41 conclusions of the Court of Appeals.

The binding effect of contracts upon WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein
the heirs of the deceased party is not above stated, the assailed decision of the Court of
altered by the provision of our Rules of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
Court that money debts of a deceased petitioners.
must be liquidated and paid from his
estate before the residue is distributed SO ORDERED.
among said heirs (Rule 89). The
reason is that whatever payment is G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980
thus made from the state is ultimately
a payment by the heirs or distributees, CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO
since the amount of the paid claim in PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,
fact diminishes or reduces the shares vs.
that the heirs would have been entitled VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO
to receive. MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA
MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO,
Under our law, therefore. the general SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA,
rule is that a party's contractual rights LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA
and obligations are transmissible to MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO
the successors. MENDOZA, respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners. without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased
wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents. conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be
effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona,
married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of
absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for
P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a
GUERRERO, J.:
description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781
square meters and covered by transfer certificate of
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto,
the decision of the Court of Appeals   in CA-G.R. No.
1
married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was
35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff- acquired during their marriage. As a result of the sale,
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants- the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new
Appellants," affirming the decision of the Court of First transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in
Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan. the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to
Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from,
show that: After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of
sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano Pamplona
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the
and wife. During their marriage, they acquired eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the
adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he
Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter,
Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house
in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary
Maniega." with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto
and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega time that the portion of 781 square meters which was
begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely, the subject matter of their sale transaction was No.
Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject
surnamed Moreto. matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact
is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo,
Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano
surnamed Moreto. Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house
and they even constructed a piggery corral at the
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 back of their said house about one and one-half
leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza. meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.

La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate.
the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to
Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed vacate the premises where they had their house and
Mendoza. piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no
right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal
as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto. partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the
latter was already dead when the sale was executed
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs
no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein. Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises
occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted
by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of July 30,
Calamba, Laguna. 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half of the
property subject matter of said deed; to declare the
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said
death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half
portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671
of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the of the office of the Register of Deeds
defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and
to order the defendants to pay actual and moral registered in the name of Cornelio
damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte,
the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from is by virtue of this decision ordered
August 1958 until they have vacated the premises cancelled. The defendants are
occupied by them for the use and occupancy of the ordered to surrender to the office of
same. the Register of Deeds of Laguna the
owner's duplicate of Transfer
The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Certificate of Title No. 5671 within
Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is thirty (30) days after this decision shall
registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they have become final for cancellation in
are purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor accordance with this decision.
was the sole owner of the lot sold.
Let copy of this decision be furnished
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made the Register of Deeds for the province
by agreement of the parties, it was found out that of Laguna for his information and
there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and guidance.
the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale
because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is With costs against the defendants.  2

lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it


was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with
No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale said judgment, appealed to the Court of Appeals,
transaction. which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to
this Court.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the
dispositive part thereof being as follows: The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar
is whether under the facts and circumstances duly
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to
rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only
deed of absolute sale dated July 30, one-half of the same.
1952 pertaining to the eastern portion
of Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 There is no question that when the petitioners
square meters null and void as purchased the property on July 30, 1952 from
regards the 390.5 square meters of Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife
which plaintiffs are hereby declared Monica Maniega had already been dead six years
the rightful owners and entitled to its before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence,
possession. the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano
Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been
The sale is ordered valid with respect dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article
to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the
square meters of Lot 1496 measuring conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated,
390.5 square meters of which settled and divided by the heirs thereto in accordance
defendants are declared lawful owners with law. The necessary proceedings for the
and entitled to its possession. liquidation of the conjugal partnership were not
instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate
After proper survey segregating the proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act
eastern one-half portion with an area 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was
of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving
the defendants shall be entitled to a spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was
certificate of title covering said portion an ordinary action for partition brought for the
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property
9843 of the office of the Register of of a community between the surviving husband,
Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased
accordingly and new titles issued to Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership.
the plaintiffs and to the defendants
covering their respective portions.
The community property of the upon agreement of the parties during the proceedings
marriage, at the dissolution of this of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496.
bond by the death of one of the
spouses, ceases to belong to the legal Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the
partnership and becomes the property spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as
of a community, by operation of law, well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including
between the surviving spouse and the the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on
heirs of the deceased spouse, or the the land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by
exclusive property of the widower or the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period
the widow, it he or she be the heir of of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the
the deceased spouse. Every co-owner private respondents who are the heirs of Monica
shall have full ownership of his part Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died
and in the fruits and benefits derived intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to
therefrom, and he therefore may the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and the occupation, possession and ownership of the land
even substitute another person in its purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are
enjoyment, unless personal rights are persuaded and convinced to rule that private
in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of
17 Phil. 107) the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by
laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment
Court said that "(t)here is no reason in law why the and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse
heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership without presenting the same. (International Banking
with the surviving husband for the management and Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
control of the community property of the marriage and
conceivably such a partnership, or rather community We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the
of property, between the heirs and the surviving conjugal partnership was already dissolved six years
husband might be formed without a written before and therefore, the estate became a co-
agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving
Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the wife husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica
dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is
community property, has authority to sell the property applicable and it provides a follows:
withut the concurrence of the children of the
marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have
favor of the children, with the result of bringing about the full ownership of his part and of
a conventional ownership in common between the the fruits and benefits pertaining
father and children as to such property; and any one thereto, and he may therefore
purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
the property will acquire only the undivided interest of even substitute another person in its
those members of the family who join in the act of enjoyment, except when personal
conveyance. rights are involve. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with
It is also not disputed that immediately after the respect to the co-owners, shall be
execution of the sale in 1952, the vendees limited to the portion which may be
constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot allotted to him in the division upon the
1496 which the vendor pointed out to them as the termination of the co-ownership.
area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a
son of the vendees, also built his house within Lot We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial
1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was partition of the co-ownership when at the time of the
constructed by the vendees at the back of their house sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and
about one and one-half meters from the eastern location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the
boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their
believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of
subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent
to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 coral for piggery.
sq. meters so that the deed of sale between the
parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano
1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor
Moreto and Monica Maniega owned three parcels of
land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one
sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, of the contracting parties obligates
and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The himself to transfer the ownership of
three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. and to deliver a determinate thing, and
These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one the other part to pay therefore a price
another as each is bounded on one side by the other, certain in money or its equivalent.
thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot
1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is A contract of sale may be absolute or
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is conditionial.
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear
that the three lots constitute one big land. They are Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to
not separate properties located in different places but transfer the ownership of and deliver,
they abut each other. This is not disputed by private as well as warrant the thing which is
respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co- the object of the sale.
ownership constituted or covered these three lots
adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance
was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land
which private respondents received from their
area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a
deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest
perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq.
included all the property rights and obligations which
meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed,
were not extinguished by their parents' death. And
there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters
under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the
belonging to him at the time of the sale.
contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano
Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was and heirs, who are the private respondents herein.
valid as to one-half and invalid as to the other half for Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted
the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole
vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was
meters of the communal estate, a title which he could the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano
dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private
The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the respondents must comply with said obligation.
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its
location and even indicated the boundaries over
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters
which the fences were to be erectd without objection,
sold to and occupied by petitioners for more than 9
protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the
years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961
contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such
had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel
alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a
Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the
factual partition or termination of the co-ownership,
area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843
although partial, was created, and barred not only the
covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their
private respondents herein from asserting as against
name based on the relocation survey.
the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation
of the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano
Moreto. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification in the sense that the sale made and
Equity commands that the private respondents, the
executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the
successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano
petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid
Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to
in its entirely.
impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who
indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
and which he, including his children, benefitted from Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full
the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the eastern portion
Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and
are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of whereon their houses and piggery coral stand.
Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the
obligation of the vendor of the property of delivering The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to
and transfering the ownership of the whole property segregate the area of 781 sq. meters from Certificate
sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer
herein private respondents. The articles cited provide, Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the
thus: segregated area of 781 sq. meters.
No costs. deceased grandfather by the right of
representation is subject to the debts and
SO ORDERED. obligations of their deceased father who died
without any property whatsoever. lawphi1.net

G.R. No. L-44837             November 23, 1938


3. That the trial court erred in condemning the
defendants to pay jointly and severally the
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.
LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants- The only facts to be considered in the determination
appellants. of the legal questions raised in this appeal are those
set out in the appealed decision, which have been
established at the trial, namely:
Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.
Simeon Bitanga for appellees.
In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro
Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M.
Quitco, while the latter was still single, of
which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was
born a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana
VILLA-REAL, J.: Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the
relation between Socorro Ledesma and
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the
the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo Quitco, latter executed a deed (Exhibit A),
Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Ledesma as his natural daughter and on
Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the
reads: plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note
(Exhibit C), of the following tenor:
For the foregoing considerations, the court
renders judgment in this case declaring Ana P2,000. For value received I promise to pay
Quitco Ledesma an acknowledged natural Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two
daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, thousand pesos (P2,000). Philippine currency
for legal purposes, but absolving the under the following terms: Two hundred and
defendants as to the prayer in the first cause fifty pesos (P250) to be paid on the first day of
of action that the said Ana Quitco Ledesma be March 1922; another two hundred and fifty
declared entitled to share in the properties left pesos (P250)to be paid on the first day of            
by the deceased Eusebio Quitco. November 1922; the remaining one thousand
and five hundred (P1,500) to be paid two
As to the second cause of action, the said years from the date of the execution of this
defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan. 21,
Socorro Ledesma, jointly and severally, only 1922.
the sum of one thousand five hundred
pesos(P1,500), with legal interest thereon Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the
from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he
No pronouncement is made as to the costs. had four children, who are the other
So ordered. defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M.
Quitco died (Exhibit 5), and, still later, that is,
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court Quitco also died, and as the latter left real and
in its aforesaid decision: personal properties upon his death,
administration proceedings of said properties
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the were instituted in this court, the said case
action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500, being known as the "Intestate of the deceased
representing the last installment of the note Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this
Exhibit C has not yet prescribed. court.

2. That the trial court erred in holding that the Upon the institution of the intestate of the
property inherited by the defendants from their deceased Eusebio Quitco and the
appointment of the committee on claims and prescribed under section 43, No. 1, of the Code of
appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on Civil Procedure.
August 26, 1935, filed before said committee
the aforequoted promissory note for payment, The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore,
and the commissioners, upon receipt of said well-founded.
promissory note, instead of passing upon it,
elevated the same to this court en consulta As to the second assignment of alleged error,
(Exhibit F), and as the Honorable Jose Lopez consisting in that the trial court erred in holding that
Vito, presiding over the First Branch, returned the properties inherited by the defendants from their
said consulta and refrained from giving his deceased grandfather by representation are subject
opinion thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid to the payment of debts and obligations of their
commissioners on claims and appraisal, deceased father, who died without leaving any
alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the property, while it is true that under the provisions of
claim, denied he same (Exhibit H). articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children
presents his father or mother who died before him in
On             November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this
court issued an order of declaration of heirs in right of representation does not make the said child
the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, answerable for the obligations contracted by his
and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen
among the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure
as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is
the reconsideration of said order, a petition received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say,
which the court denied. From the order the heirs only answer with the properties received
denying the said petition no appeal was taken, from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as
and in lieu thereof there was filed the heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their
complaint which gives rise to this case. father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the
indebtedness of their said father from whom they did
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised not inherit anything.
in the first assignment of alleged error, is whether or
not the action to recover the sum of P1,500, The second assignment of alleged error is also well-
representing the last installment for the payment of founded.
the promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.
Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed alleged errors, the third assignment of error is also
by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on January 21, well-founded.
1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid
two years from the date of the execution of said For the foregoing considerations, we are of the
promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim
complaint in the present case was filed on June 26, before the committee on claims and appraisal,
1934, that is, more than ten years after he expiration appointed in the intestate of the father, for a monetary
of the said period. The fact that the plaintiff Socorro obligation contracted by a son who died before him,
Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the does not suspend the prescriptive period of the
committee on claims and appraisal appointed in the judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness;
intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the (2) that the claim for the payment of an indebtedness
running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for
for the recovery of said debt, because the claim for its collection before the committee on claims and
the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and
note should no have been presented in the intestate the propertiesinherited from the latter by the children
of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the of said deceased do not answer for the payment of
one who executed the same, but in the intestate of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said
Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted person.
by the said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section
642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and
creditor to institute said case through the appointment
the defendants are absolved from the complaint, with
of an administrator for the purpose of collecting his
the costs to the appellees. So ordered.
credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from
the expiration of the period for the payment of said
debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has G.R. No. 174727               August 12, 2013
ANTIPOLO INING (DECEASED), SURVIVED BY Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted
MANUEL VILLANUEVA, TEODORA VILLANUEVA- respondents.
FRANCISCO, CAMILO FRANCISCO, ADOLFO
FRANCISCO, LUCIMO FRANCISCO, JR., Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six
MILAGROS FRANCISCO,* CELEDONIO children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad),
FRANCISCO, HERMINIGILDO FRANCISCO; Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro;
RAMON TRESVALLES, ROBERTO TAJONERA, Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto
NATIVIDAD INING-IBEA (DECEASED) SURVIVED Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo
BY EDILBERTO IBEA, JOSEFA IBEA, MARTHA Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores
IBEA, CARMEN IBEA, AMPARO IBEA- is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales
FERNANDEZ, HENRY RUIZ, EUGENIO RUIZ AND and Remedios Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived
PASTOR RUIZ; DOLORES INING-RIMON by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY JESUS RIMON, Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo),
CESARIA RIMON GONZALES AND REMEDIOS Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr.
RIMON CORDERO; AND PEDRO INING (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio
(DECEASED) SURVIVED BY ELISA TAN INING Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo).
(WIFE) AND PEDRO INING, JR., PETITIONERS, Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and
vs. Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for
LEONARDO R. VEGA, SUBSTITUTED BY Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made
LOURDES VEGA, RESTONILO I. VEGA, party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.
CRISPULO M. VEGA, MILBUENA VEGA-
RESTITUTO, AND LENARD In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon
VEGA, RESPONDENTS. Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses
DECISION thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).

DEL CASTILLO, J.: In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject


property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir,
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 52756 for partition,
co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, recovery of ownership and possession, with
he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In his Amended
the estate that was formed among the decedent’s Complaint,7 Leonardo alleged that on several
heirs. occasions, he demanded the partition of the property
but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands;
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are that the matter reached the level of the Lupon
the March 14, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687 and its September 7, court action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs
2006 Resolution3 denying petitioners’ Motion for claimed sole ownership of the property; that portions
Reconsideration.4 of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera,
which portions must be collated and included as part
Factual Antecedents of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that
in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband
of herein petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez
ownership of the property and transferred in his name
(Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter
the tax declaration covering the property; that from
parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan
1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (24071)
(Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated at
RO-6305 (OCT RO-630). Leon and Rafaela died
₱1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred
without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings
expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation
Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining
costs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the
(Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
owner of half of the subject property; that the same be
partitioned after collation and determination of the
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion portion to which he is entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs be
Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. ordered to execute the necessary documents or
Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be awarded
turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children actual damages in the amount of ₱1,000.00 per year
Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega- from 1988, attorney’s fees of ₱50,000.00, and
lawyer’s appearance fees of ₱500.00 per hearing.
In their Answer8 with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, RTC can take cognizance of the partition
Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that case;15
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that
they have become the sole owners of the subject 2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to
property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same Enriquez through an unnotarized document
in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn
who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on
Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were in November 25, 1943 via another private sale
continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive document;17
possession of the property with a just title; that they
have been paying the taxes on the property; that 3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the
Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches; property for more than 30 years, while
and that they have suffered damages and were forced Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
to litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit.
They prayed that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed;
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed
that Leonardo be declared to be without any right to
an Affidavit of Ownership of Land19 claiming
the property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender
sole ownership of the property which he
the certificate of title to the property; and that they be
utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration
awarded ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00
No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and
as temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as
to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in Leon’s
attorney’s fees, and double costs.
name;20
The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and
5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and
Tajonera were declared in default.9
6. The property was partitioned among the
As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court
petitioners, to the exclusion of Leonardo.21
commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M.
Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the
property.10 The resulting Commissioner’s Report and Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary
Commissioner’s Report,12 were duly approved by the On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a
parties. The parties then submitted the following Decision,22 which decreed as follows:
issues for resolution of the trial court:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s hereby rendered:
estate;
Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’
Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141
and of the New Civil Code;

Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630
is barred by estoppel or laches.13 (24071) to be the common property of the heirs of
Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue whereof, OCT
In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the
duly substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.14 Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed
to issue a transfer certificate of title to the heirs of
Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of
During the course of the proceedings, the following
Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of
additional relevant facts came to light:
Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of
Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.
1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners
Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC
For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is
Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and
ordered dismissed.
referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997, With cost against the plaintiffs.
the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for
lack of jurisdiction and declared that only the SO ORDERED.23
The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November Report (Supplementary) to the herein
25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded plaintiffs;
that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in
turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., 4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-
hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s 630 (24071) in the name of Leon Roldan and
estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the issue transfer certificates of title to the
subject property in equal shares. Leonardo and the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and
respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the
latter’s successors. Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) and
the remaining portion thereof be adjudged to
However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only the defendants.
30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 –
within which to file the partition case. Since Leonardo Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was
already barred by prescription. It held that under Costs against the defendants-appellees.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition
and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
SO ORDERED.28
of land is a real action over immovable property which
prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held
that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity
laches as well. Consequently, the property should go of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of
to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively. sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively,
became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to
appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that
Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the
no valid prior disposition of the property was made by
same was denied by the RTC in its February 7, 2002
its owner Leon and that the property – which
Order.26
remained part of his estate at the time of his death –
passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana
Ruling of the Court of Appeals and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein –
who are Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners
Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. of the property in equal shares, the appellate court
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal held that only the issues of prescription and laches
questioned the propriety of the trial court’s dismissal were needed to be resolved.
of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article 1141,
and the award of the property to Gregoria’s heirs The CA did not agree with the trial court’s
exclusively. pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for partition
was barred by prescription. The CA declared that
On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in
Decision,27 which contained the following decretal 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit
portion: of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a
repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494
GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o
Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5275 is prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
judgment is rendered as follows: expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,"
the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr.
1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979
share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest and obtained a new tax declaration over the property
of Romana Roldan; (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his
co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which
2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the repudiation effectively commenced the running of the
share of the defendants as successors-in- 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141.
interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;
The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession
3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the of the property for more than 30 years to the
possession of the portion described in exclusion of Leonardo and the respondents as a valid
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his
exclusive possession of the property and REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
appropriation of its fruits – even his continuous COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO
payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-
against strangers, may not be deemed so as against OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.
Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive
evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or II
deprived of his rights as co-owner with the intention of
assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT
absent a showing that this was effectively made UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
known to Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate court held that as a THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND
rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed LACHES.33
to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held
to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in
Petitioners’ Arguments
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself
and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if
he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that
the obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943 and his
co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or possession thereof amounted to a repudiation of the
trustee. co-ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and
acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such
length of time operated to bestow upon petitioners –
The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo
as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits
Sr. and the issuance of a new tax declaration in his
of acquisitive prescription which proceeded from the
name do not prove ownership; they merely indicate a
repudiation.
claim of ownership. Moreover, petitioners’ act of
partitioning the property among themselves to the
exclusion of Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from
may it be considered a repudiation of the co- Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in 1943, up to 1995,
ownership as it has not been shown that the partition when Leonardo filed Civil Case No. 4983 for partition
was made known to Leonardo. with the RTC Kalibo – amounted to laches or neglect.
They add that during the proceedings before the
Lupon Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was
The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot
informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in
apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It
1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did not take
held that laches is controlled by equitable
action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in
considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice
1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which was
or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive
eventually dismissed and referred to the MTC. They
the respondents of their rightful inheritance.
argue that, all this time, Leonardo did nothing while
Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its
On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA fruits for himself.
granted respondents’ prayer for partition, directing
that the manner of partitioning the property shall be
Respondents’ Arguments
governed by the Commissioner’s Report and Sketch
and the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report which
the parties did not contest. Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their
Comment35 that –
Petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its assailed For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted
September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the present that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been
Petition. filed in this case for consideration in banc [sic] and
nine (9) copies in cases heard before a division in that
[sic] all copies of pleadings served to the offices
Issues
concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were
not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic]
Petitioners raise the following arguments: the adverse parties [sic] to the clerk of court, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to
I the Honorable Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action
shall be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda,
THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED motions, and other papers as fail [sic] to comply with
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN the requisites set out in this paragraph.
The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits
F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate,
[sic] who sent [sic] by Registered mail to Court of assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another
Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu City; to Counsel person in their enjoyment, except when personal
for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court rights are involved.38 Each co-owner may demand at
Supreme Court Manila [sic]. any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.39 Finally, no
These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs
the requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each against the others so long as he expressly or
concerned party [sic] under the Rule of Courts [sic].36 impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.40

Our Ruling For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be


done by a co-owner.
The Court denies the Petition.
Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner
The finding that Leon did not sell the property to cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other
Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in
property remained part of Leon’s estate. favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the
One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to
other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation
the trial court is whether Leon sold the property to
have been made known to the other co-owners; and
Lucimo Sr.  The trial court, examining the two deeds
(3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."41
1âwphi1

of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr.,


found them to be spurious. It then concluded that no
such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that
Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive
Consequently, any doubts regarding this matter period within which Leonardo may seek partition from
should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners’ the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article
insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall
property to reinforce their claim over the property begin to run in favor of a co-owner and against the
must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to other co-owners only from the time he positively
Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property clearly renounces the co-ownership and makes known his
remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in repudiation to the other co-owners.
1962.
Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when
Romana and Gregoria. the former executed the Affidavit of Ownership of
Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in
his name, and informed the latter – before the Lupon
Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his
Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the
siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited
property. These apparent acts of repudiation were
the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and
followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of withholding
Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became
Leonardo’s share in the fruits of the property,
entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing.
beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the
Amended Complaint. Considering these facts, the CA
succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
held that prescription began to run against Leonardo
only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has
subject property. renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole
ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded
Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just
Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within
became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may the period prescribed under Article 1141.
use the property owned in common, provided they do
so in accordance with the purpose for which it is What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice,
intended and in such a way as not to injure the however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co- Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a
owners from using it according to their rights.37 They
repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a vs.
co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA,
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA,
married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P.
Family Code, family relations, which is the primary ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and
basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity. ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents.

Art. 150. Family relations include those: DECISION

(1) Between husband and wife; TINGA, J.:

(2) Between parents and children; Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property
of the estate pending the appointment of an
(3) Among other ascendants and administrator is the issue in this case.
descendants; and
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside
the full or half blood. the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner its Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying
of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which
he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died
not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal
seek a partition of the property has not been lost. and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan
City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow,
Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married
admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings – on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven
that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of the property children who are the herein respondents, namely:
since 1943 – should be taken against him, is Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada,
unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P.
of the land, and Lucimo Sr. knew this very well, being Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P.
married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.4
of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is
registered under the Torrens system and covered by Apart from the respondents, the demise of the
OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
ceased only in 1962, upon his death when the children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who
property passed on to his heirs by operation of law. became a part of his life when he entered into an
extra-marital relationship with her during the
In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime
repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and
could seek partition of the property at any time. Rowena.6

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James
March 14, 2006 Decision and the September 7, 2006 and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29,
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children
74687are AFFIRMED. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in
SO ORDERED.
Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of
Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos.
G.R. No. 129008             January 13, 2004 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners
Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista,
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos.
EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY Respondents also found out that petitioners were able
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank
ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate
BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,
Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra- The Court of Appeals rendered the
judicial settlement.7 assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating
that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the
Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of public respondent judge when he denied petitioners’
Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, of its discretionary nature.
praying that letters of administration encompassing
the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners
him.8 but it was denied.20 Hence, the petition before this
Court.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint
for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial The issue presented by the petitioners before this
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased
Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 subsequent to the commencement of the
and 63984 and Other Related Documents with administration proceedings.21
Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of
Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for
Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch denying their motion to set the case for preliminary
42, Dagupan City.9 hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper
party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the
the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative
the property subject of the contested deed of extra- defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear
judicial settlement pertained to the properties from the Rules of Court, thus:
originally belonging to the parents of Teodora
Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative
her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal
managed to register them in his name.11 Petitioners provided for in this rule, except improper
also raised the affirmative defense that respondents venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative
are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the defense, and a preliminary hearing may be
Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had
pendency of the administration proceedings.12 On been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set
Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on the aforesaid Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the
ground. provision is clearly indicative of the optional character
of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes
The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated discretion and cannot be construed as having a
June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as mandatory effect.23 Subsequently, the electivity of the
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997
absence of an administrator who is yet to be Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the
appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved phrase "in the discretion of the Court", apart from the
for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise retention of the word "may" in Section 6, 24 in Rule 16
denied.16 thereof.

This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on
Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the lower court’s doorstep for not hearing petitioners’
the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for
42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order heirs to bring the suit.
which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground
that the proper party to file the complaint for the Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the
annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit
of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
the respondents.18 with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code
"that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent." The
provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that As the appellate court did not commit an error of law
the property, rights and obligations to the extent and in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted this Court is not warranted.
through his death to another or others by his will or by
operation of law.25 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of
Even if administration proceedings have already been Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the SO ORDERED.
proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely
G.R. No. 156879               January 20, 2004
Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the
Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young,28  this Court recognized the legal standing of the FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR
heirs to represent the rights and properties of the CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs
decedent under administration pending the appointment of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., Petitioners,
of an administrator. Thus: vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA,
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO
executor or administrator to represent or to and NARCISA PRADO, Respondents.
bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not
prohibit the heirs from representing the DECISION
deceased. These rules are easily applicable
to cases in which an administrator has YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in The property under litigation is the northern half
which special proceedings for the portion of a residential land consisting of 552.20
settlement of an estate have already been square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue,
instituted, yet no administrator has been Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer
appointed. In such instances, the heirs Certificate of Title No. 71344 issued on August 15,
cannot be expected to wait for the 1963 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the
appointment of an administrator; then wait name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first
further to see if the administrator appointed husband, Patricio Prado, Sr., namely, Roberto,
would care enough to file a suit to protect the Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna,
rights and the interests of the deceased; and respondents herein.
in the meantime do nothing while the rights
and the properties of the decedent are The pertinent facts are as follows:
violated or dissipated.
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura. In
jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if order to support her minor children with her first
the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas
bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged Calpatura, Sr., executed on April 26, 1968
to have participated in the act complained of31 and he an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the
is made a party defendant. 32 Evidently, the necessity former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half
for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00. On1 

of the estate is as compelling when there is no July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute
appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. 2

an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined


to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
In 1976, Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora,
built a two-storey duplex with firewall on the northern

All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal half portion of the property. Respondents, who
standing to sue for the recovery of property of the occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not
estate during the pendency of administration object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora and her
proceedings has three exceptions, the third being husband Wilfredo declared the property for taxation
when there is no appointed administrator such as in purposes and paid the corresponding taxes

this case. thereon. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of



Tomas’ cousin, built a small house on the northern by the Court of Appeals declaring that respondents
portion of the property. were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale
was valid only insofar as Narcisa’s 1/7 undivided
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for share thereon was concerned. The dispositive portion
declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of of the said decision reads:
possession of the northern half portion of the subject
property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED,
Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. with the MODIFICATION that the sale in dispute is
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh
Branch 100, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91- (1/7) share of plaintiff-appellant NARCISA H. PRADO
8404. Respondents alleged that the transaction

in the subject property, which is equivalent to 78.8857
embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and square meters. In all other respects, the same
Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one of decision stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisa’s children tried
to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned SO ORDERED. 11

that the blank document which their mother had


signed was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale; Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half denied in a Resolution dated January 14,
portion of the property considering that she was 2003. Hence this petition for review on the following
12 

prohibited from selling the same within a period of 25 assigned errors:


years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition
annotated at the back of the title; that Narcisa, as

I
natural guardian of her children, had no authority to
sell the northern half portion of the property which she
and her children co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
Tomas. DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE
DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO
In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa
CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE
owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of ½ as her
DECLARATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE
share in the conjugal partnership with her first
SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE
husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her
TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE
deceased husband; that the consideration of the sale
SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION
in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of
OF THE RESPONDENTS AND
April 1, 1968; that Narcisa sold her conjugal share in
INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.
order to support her minor children; that Narcisa’s
claim was barred by laches and prescription; and that
the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, not II
the respondents, was the real party in interest to
question the sale within the prohibited period. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
On April 2, 1997, the court a quo dismissed the
8  DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE
complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL
the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of TRIAL COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO
Absolute Sale were duly executed; that the sum of CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND
P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN THE SALE
was fully paid there being no demand for the payment THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE
of the remaining balance; that the introduction of CONJUGAL SHARE OF RESPONDENT
improvements thereon by the petitioners was without NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER
objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and RESPONDENTS HAD NO FINANCIAL
Erlinda failed to contest the transaction within four CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE SAID
years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE MINORS
reaching the majority age in violation of Article 1391 THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
of the Civil Code.
9 TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of III


Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision was rendered
10  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute
HEREIN RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is
LACHES IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE contained in a notarized document. In Spouses
21 

ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18 Alfarero, et al. v. Spouses Sevilla, et al., it was held
22 

YEARS AFTER THE SAID SALE WITH THE that a public document executed and attested through
PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the
POSSESSION OF SAID PORTION OF THE facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein
PROPERTY. expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial
documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged
IV or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the
THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
APPEALS WILL UNDULY ENRICH THE evidence of the execution of the instrument or
RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE document involved. In order to contradict the
HEREIN PETITIONERS. 13 presumption of regularity of a public document,
evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than
merely preponderant.
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions
of law may be raised in petitions for review before this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was 14  It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that
thus error for petitioners to ascribe to the Court of alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Except for
23 

Appeals grave abuse of discretion. This procedural the bare allegation that the transaction was one of
lapse notwithstanding, in the interest of justice, this mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to
Court shall treat the issues as cases of reversible adduce evidence in support thereof. Respondents
error.
15 also failed to controvert the presumption that private
transactions have been fair and regular. 24

The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject


property conjugal or paraphernal? (2) Is the Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she
transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that executed an Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo and
the transaction is a sale, what was the area of the Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the
land subject of the sale? two-storey duplex and her house sometime in 1976.
The duplex was made of strong materials, the roofing
being galvanized sheets. While the deed of sale
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at
between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered
the time the sale was entered into, provides that all
nor annotated on the title, respondents had
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
knowledge of the possession of petitioners of the
conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains
northern half portion of the property. Obviously,
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of
respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas,
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest.
non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership to operate. 16

Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00


out of the P10,500.00 consideration was paid.  Both
In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during
1âwphi1

the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of


cross-examination that she bought the subject
Absolute Sale state that said consideration was paid
property from People’s Homesite Housing
in full. Moreover, the presumption is that there was
Corporation with her own funds, she, however
17 

sufficient consideration for a written contract. 25

admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and


the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her
conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr. A 18  The property being conjugal, upon the death of
verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property
funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
agreement under the parole evidence rule. The so-
19  Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership.
called parole evidence rule forbids any addition to or Particio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share
at or before the execution of the parties’ written as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a
agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-
by the parties, varying the purport of the written ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs
contract. Whatever is not found in the writing is in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was
understood to have been waived and abandoned. 20 transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By
the law on intestate succession, his six children and Murphy, Quezon City and covered by Transfer
Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh Certificate of Title No. 71344;
(1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa
26 

inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal 2) the sale of the undivided one half portion
share in the said property and is the owner of one-half thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor of Tomas
(1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total Calpatura, Sr. is valid.
of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could
validly convey her total undivided share in the entire Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the
property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are court of origin, only for the purpose of
deemed co-owners of the subject property. determining the specific portion being
conveyed in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr.
Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of pursuant to the partition that will be agreed
encumbering the property within 25 years from upon by the respondents.
acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al., it was
27 

held that: SO ORDERED.

xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento


G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983
spouses could not resell the property except to the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC
for short) within the next 25 years after appellees’ EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND
purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of VICENTE V. FELIPE, petitioners,
the PHHC, and not one in favor of the Sarmiento vs.
spouses. The condition conferred no actionable right HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA
on appellees herein, since it operated as a restriction ALMOSARA, SOFIA ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON,
upon their jus disponendi of the property they bought, AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
and thus limited their right of ownership. It follows that APPEALS, respondents.
on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee
Salud and the foreclosure sale violated the condition Romulo D. San Juan for petitioner.
in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled
to invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Gerundino Castillejo for private respondent.
Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the sheriff's
foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended
exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack the
sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; ABAD SANTOS, J.:
but it (PHHC) also could waive the condition and treat
the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936.
assailed for breach of the condition aforestated.
The spouses bought several pieces of land sometime
between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the lands were
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the
identified as yet and delineated as the object of the San Jacinto Public Land Subdivision, San Jacinto,
sale considering that the property had not yet been Masbate.
partitioned in accordance with the Rules of
Court. While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the
28 

In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the


subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same,
spouses Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe.
she could not have particularly conveyed the northern
The sale was made without the consent of her
portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which
husband, Maximo.
was still to be determined by the parties before the
trial court.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely
his widow Gimena and their children Sofia and
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of First
on October 3, 2002, as well as the Resolution dated
Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. The
January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to
complaint which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2372
the following MODIFICATIONS:
alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of Lots
1370, 1371 and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged
1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the the same to the defendants; and an offer to redeem
residential land consisting of 552.20 square the mortgage had been refused so they filed the
meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, complaint in order to recover the three parcels of land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the was one of sale, accordingly,
lots from the plaintiffs by purchase and subsequent redemption was improper. The
delivery to them. The trial court sustained the claim of appellees claim that plaintiffs never
the defendants and rendered the following judgment: conveyed the property because of a
loan or mortgage or antichresis and
a. declaring the defendants to be the that what really transpired was the
lawful owners of the property subject execution of a contract of sale thru a
of the present litigation; private document designated as a
'Deed of Purchase and Sale' (Exhibit
b. declaring the complaint in the 1), the execution having been made
present action to be without merit and by Gimena Almosara in favor of
is therefore hereby ordered dismissed; appellee Hermogena V. Felipe.

c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the After a study of this case, we have
defendants the amount of P2,000.00 come to the conclusion that the
as reasonable attorney's fees and to appellants are entitled to recover the
pay the costs of the suit. ownership of the lots in question. We
so hold because although Exh. 1
concerning the sale made in 1951 of
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of
the disputed lots is, in Our
Appeals which rendered the following judgment:
opinion, not a forgery the fact is that
the sale made by Gimena Almosara is
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the invalid, having been executed without
decision appealed from is hereby the needed consent of her husband,
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a the lots being conjugal. Appellees'
new one is hereby RENDERED, argument that this was an issue not
ordering the defendants-appellees to raised in the pleadings is baseless,
surrender the lots in question as well considering the fact that the complaint
as the plaintiffs'-appellants' muniments alleges that the parcels 'were
of title thereof to said plaintiffs- purchased by plaintiff Gimena
appellants, to make an accounting of Almosara and her late husband
the produce derived from the lands Maximo Aldon' (the lots having been
including expenses incurred since purchased during the existence of the
1951, and to solidarity turn over to the marriage, the same are presumed
plaintiffs-appellants the NET monetary conjugal) and inferentially, by force of
value of the profits, after deducting the law, could not, be disposed of by a
sum of P1,800.00. No attorney's fees wife without her husband's consent.
nor moral damages are awarded for
lack of any legal justification therefor.
The defendants are now the appellants in this petition
No. costs.
for review. They invoke several grounds in seeking
the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The ratio of the judgment is stated in the following One of the grounds is factual in nature; petitioners
paragraphs of the decision penned by Justice claim that "respondent Court of Appeals has found as
Edgardo L. Paras with the concurrence of Justices a fact that the 'Deed of Purchase and Sale' executed
Venicio Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa: by respondent Gimena Almosara is not a forgery and
therefore its authenticity and due execution is already
One of the principal issues in the case beyond question." We cannot consider this ground
involves the nature of the because as a rule only questions of law are reviewed
aforementioned conveyance or in proceedings under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
transaction, with appellants claiming subject to well-defined exceptions not present in the
the same to be an oral contract of instant case.
mortgage or antichresis, the
redemption of which could be done The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal
anytime upon repayment of the effect of a sale of lands belonging to the conjugal
P1,800.00 involved (incidentally the partnership made by the wife without the consent of
only thing written about the transaction the husband.
is the aforementioned receipt re the
P1,800). Upon the other hand,
appellees claim that the transaction
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
rules: The husband is the administrator of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they
conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold.
certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of
partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166, the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo
Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What
partnership without the husband's consent, except in she could not do during the marriage, she could not
cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.) do thereafter.

In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different.
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to
consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by question the defective contract insofar as it deprived
the phrase "except in cases provided by law." The them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in
Court of Appeals described the sale as "invalid" - a the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the
term which is imprecise when used in relation to lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-
contracts because the Civil Code uses specific names third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
in designating defective contracts,
namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et The petitioners have been in possession of the lands
seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et since 1951. It was only in 1976 when the respondents
seq.), unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime,
inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.) Maximo Aldon died.

The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the
contract but of what category? The answer: it is a petitioners acquired the lands by acquisitive
voidable contract. prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and
Salvador Aldon barred by the statute of limitations?
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the
voidable contracts are "[T]hose where one of the Anent the first question, We quote with approval the
parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." following statement of the Court of Appeals:
(Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena had no capacity
to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to
We would like to state further that
give consent belonged not even to the husband alone
appellees [petitioners herein] could not
but to both spouses.
have acquired ownership of the lots by
prescription in view of what we regard
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a as their bad faith. This bad faith is
voidable contract is supported by the legal provision revealed by testimony to the effect
that contracts entered by the husband without the that defendant-appellee Vicente V.
consent of the wife when such consent is required, Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo
are annullable at her instance during the marriage Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe)
and within ten years from the transaction questioned. attempted in December 1970 to have
(Art. 173, Civil Code.) Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made
document purporting to self the
Gimena's contract is not rescissible for in such disputed lots to the appellees. This
contract all the essential elements are untainted but actuation clearly indicated that
Gimena's consent was tainted. Neither can the the appellees knew the lots did not
contract be classified as unenforceable because it still belong to them, otherwise, why
does not fit any of those described in Art. 1403 of the were they interested in a document of
Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or sale in their favor? Again why did
inexistent because it is not one of those mentioned in Vicente V. Felipe tell Gimena that the
Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By process of elimination, purpose of the document was to
it must perforce be a voidable contract. obtain Gimena's consent to the
construction of an irrigation pump on
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to the lots in question? The only possible
annulment by her husband only during the marriage reason for purporting to obtain such
because he was the victim who had an interest in the consent is that the appellees knew the
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for lots were not theirs. Why was there an
the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their attempted improvement (the irrigation
tank) only in 1970? Why was the WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby
declaration of property made only in ordered to pay complainant her
1974? Why were no attempts made to monthly allotments from March, 1980
obtain the husband's signature, up to the amount of P54,562.00 within
despite the fact that Gimena and ten (10) days from receipt of this
Hermogena were close relatives? An decision. Respondent is likewise
these indicate the bad faith of the further ordered to pay complainant her
appellees. Now then, even if we were future monthly allotment up to the
to consider appellees' possession in arrival of the M/V EASTERN
bad faith as a possession in the MINICON in the port of Manila or after
concept of owners, this possession at four (4) years when the presumptive
the earliest started in 1951, hence the death established by law takes effect.
period for extraordinary prescription
(30 years) had not yet lapsed when The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as
the present action was instituted on follows: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero,
April 26, 1976. Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc., Company for short, as master/captain to
As to the second question, the children's cause of its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the
action accrued from the death of their father in 1959 HongkongManila route, with the salary of P5,560.00
and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141, exclusive of ship board allowances and other benefits.
Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well Under the contract, his employment was good for one
within the period. (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would
automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further
hereby modified. Judgment is entered awarding to agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad,
Sofia and Salvador Aldon their shares of the lands as should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in
stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners Manila.
as possessors in bad faith shall make an accounting
of the fruits corresponding to the share On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute
aforementioned from 1959 and solidarity pay their from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to
value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon; costs against the arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three
petitioners. (3) messages to the Company's Manila office:

SO ORDERED. First Message:  1

February l6,1980 0700 GMT Via


Intercom
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs. EMINICON
JOSEPHINE LUCERO, respondents.
Urgent Eastship Manila
Valera, Cainglet & Dala Law Office for petitioner.
REGRET TO INFORM YOU
Jose R. Millares for private respondent. ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS
WEATHER WITH STRONG
NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH
GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE
VESSEL ROLLING AND PITCHING
VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW
ESCOLIN, J.: INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES
PORT FEARING MIGHT JETTISON
Petition for review filed by the Eastern Shipping Lines, CARGO ON DECK IF EVERYTHING
Inc. to set aside the decision of the National Labor COME TO WORSE SITUATION
Relations Commission, which affirmed the judgment HOWEVER TRYING UTMOST BEST
rendered by the National Seamen Board, the TO FACILITATE EVERYTHING IN
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: ORDER STOP NO FIX POSITIONS
FROM NOON 15th UP TO 0600 HRS
TO DATE NEED ASSISTANCE
APPROXIMATE DR POSITIONS AT U.S. Air Force based at Clark Air
0600 HRS 10TH WITHIN THE Base. Respondent also released radio
VICINITY LATITUDE 20-02, ON messages to all vessels passing the
LONGTITUDE 110-02, OE COURSE Hongkong/Manila route requesting
120 DEGREES REGARDS ... them to be very cautious and vigilant
for possible survivors and to scan the
LUCERO area whether there are signs of debris
from the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN
Second Message:  2 MINICON" which has foundered In the
meantime, two (2) vessels of the
respondent were also dispatched to
February l6/80 1530 GMT VIA
the area last reported by the Master
INTERCOM
for search and rescue operation, but
the collective efforts of all parties
EMICON concerned yielded negative results, (p.
79, Rollo)
EAST SHIP MANILA
Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the
RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed
WASTE PAPER CARGO ON PORT the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid
SIDE AND HAD BEEN WASH OUT the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the
VESSEL AGAIN LISTING ON crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero,
STARBOARD SIDE REGRET WE who refused to accept the same.
HAVE TO JETTISON STARBOARD
SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucerofiled a complaint with
ORDER TO BALANCE THE VESSEL -the National Seamen Board, Board for short, for
NOW ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL payment of her accrued monthly allotment of
POSITION HOWEVER VESSEL P3,183.00, which the Company had stopped since
STILL LABORING VIOLENTLY March 1980 and for continued payment of said
REGARDS allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned
to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract
LUCERO of employment entered into by her husband with the
Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and that
Third Message: 3
the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's
arrival in Manila.
FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD Mrs. Lucero was no longer entitled to such allotments
because: [a] the Lloyds of London had already
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE confirmed the total loss of the vessel and had in fact
POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E settled the company's insurance claim and [b] the
SEAWATER ENTERING INSIDE Company, with the approval of the Board, had
HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO likewise paid the corresponding death benefits to the
20 DEGREES PORT IF POSSIBLE heirs of the other seamen The Company further
SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE invoked the provisions of Article 643 of the Code of
VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING Commerce, to wit:
TO ABANDON ANYTIME
Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo
MASTER should be totally lost, by reason of
capture or wreck, all rights shall be
Acting on these radio messages, the Company, extinguished, both as regards the
respondent below, took the following steps: crew to demand any wages
whatsoever, and as regards the ship
agent to recover the advances made.
RESPONDENT informed of the grave
situation, immediately reported the
matter to the Philippine Coast Guard xxx xxx xxx
for search and rescue operation and
the same was coordinated with the
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited have been totally lost which, in the first
judgment in favor of Mrs. Josephine Lucero and place, was admittedly merely based
against petitioner Company. The Board held that the on presumption as even the
presumption of death could not be applied because whereabouts of the vessel remains
the four-year period provided for by Article 391(l) of unknown. Similarly, even the
the Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the agreement, which formed the basis of
payment of death benefits to the heirs of the other the Decision of the NSB ordering
crew 'members was based upon a voluntary payment of death benefits to the heirs
agreement entered into by and between the heirs and of some of the crew must have been
the Company, and did not bind respondent Mrs. predicated upon a presumption of
Lucero who was not a party thereto. death of the crew members
concerned. Such circumstances do
On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations not suffice to establish the actual
Conunission affirmed the said decision. It held that: death of Capt. LUCERO.

Within the context of the foregoing xxx xxx xxx


circumstances, the only recourse is to
presume the vessel totally lost and its Indeed, by the terms of the
crew members dead. But in this appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his
connection, the question that comes to engagement terminates upon the
the fore is: When will the presumption return of the vessel at the Port of
arise? Article 391 of the Civil Code Manila. He is considered to be still
provides the answer, to wit: working entitling his spouse to
allotment until the vessel returns or
Art. 391. The following shall be until it is officially declared totally lost,
presumed dead for all purposes, or until the presumption of his death
including the division of the estate becomes effective in which case the
among the heirs: (1) A person on burden of proving that he is alive is
board a vessel lost during a sea shifted to his wife for purposes of
voyage, or an aeroplane which is continuing her allotment.
missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the We are unable to agree with the reasoning and
vessel or aeroplane;... conclusion of the respondent NLRC.

By the aforequoted law, it is quite It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the
clear that the person to be presumed Company received three (3) radio messages from
dead should first "not been heard of Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the
for four years since the loss of the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a
vessel" before he can be presumed call for immediate assistance in view of the existing
dead for all purposes. Applied to Capt. "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the
LUCERO, it is evidently premature to vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and they
presume him dead as four years has were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After
not yet expired. Thus, even in Judge this message, nothing more has been heard from the
Advocate General vs. Gonzales, et vessel or its crew until the present time.
al., (CA) 48 O.G. 5329, the very case
cited by the respondent herein, the There is thus enough evidence to show the
court Id. in the case of the missing circumstances attending the loss and disappearance
soldier that although nothing was of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The
heard of him since 7 May 1942, the foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead
fact of his death is not presumed until Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and
seven years after 1942. that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon
this premise, the rule on presumption of death under
Since Capt. LUCERO cannot yet be Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule
presumed dead as demonstrated of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said
hereinabove, it logically follows that as in Joaquin vs. Navarro   "Where there are facts,
4

of now, he is presumed have It is of no known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion


moment to Us that the vessel was can be made, the presumption does not step in, and
conceded by the Lloyds of London to the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
Of similar import is the following pronouncement from and the criminal agency be proven.
American Jurisprudence: 5
There are even cases where said
death and the intervention of the
Loss of Vessel.— Where a vessel sets criminal agency that caused it may be
out on a voyage and neither the presumed or established by
vessel nor those who went in her are circumstantial evidence.
afterward heard of, the presumption
arises, after the utmost limit of time for Moreover, it may be remembered that
her to have completed the voyage and in several treason cages decided by
for news of her arrival at any this Court, where besides the act of
commercial port of the world to have treason the accused is held
been received, that the vessel has responsible for the death of persons
been lost and that all on board have he had or tortured and later taken
perished. The presumption of death in away, where the victims were never
such cases does not rest on the fact later seen or heard from, it has been
alone that the person in question has presumed that they were lulled or
been absent and unheard from for a otherwise criminally disposed of or
specific length of time, but also on the liquidated by the accused this, for the
fact that the vessel has not been purpose of fixing the penalty.
heard front The question, moreover, is
not whether it is impossible that the If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof
person may be alive, but whether the required for conviction must be beyond reasonable
circumstances do not present so doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and
strong a probability of his death that a the fact of death was deemed established, with more
court should act thereon. The reason is this Court justified in entering a finding of
presumption of death from absence of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to
tidings of the vessel on which the override, or be substituted for, the facts established in
absentee sailed is strengthened by this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty
proof of a storm to which the vessel that Capt. Lucero died shortly after he had sent his
probably was exposed. The last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16,
presumption is even stronger where it 1980.
appears affirmatively that the vessel
was lost at sea, that nothing has been In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it
heard of a particular person who unnecessary to discuss the other issued raised in this
sailed thereon, and that a sufficient case, they being mere adjuncts to the principa issue
time has elapsed to permit the receipt already disposed of.
of news of any possible survivors of
the disaster.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of
this petition is hereby set aside, and the complaint of
In People vs. Ansang   where, in open sea, the
6
respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However,
appellant aboard a vinta ignited three home-made Mrs. Lucero is entitled to death benefits. No costs.
bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the
victims, and the said boat was later washed ashore
SO ORDERED.
and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen
again by anybody, this Court convicted the appellant
of multiple murder, holding that the victims were dead. EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner,
vs.
Similarly, in People vs. Sasota,   the claim of the
7 COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE
appellants therein that there was no conclusive TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE
evidence of death of the victim because his body was WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO
never found was overruled by this Court in this wise: DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA,
ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT
TABANAO, respondents.
In a case of murder or homicide, it is
not necessary to recover the body or
to show where it can be found. 'Mere YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
are cases like death at sea, where the
finding or recovery of the body is Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and
impossible. It is enough that the death Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business
concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry.
Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction
of partition and distribution of the partnership over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of
properties among them, consequent to Jacinto capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue.5 On August
Divinagracia's withdrawal from the 30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
partnership.1 Among the assets to be distributed were It held that venue was properly laid because, while
five (5) fishing boats, six (6) vehicles, two (2) parcels realties were involved, the action was directed against
of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay, Negros a particular person on the basis of his personal
Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of liability; hence, the action is not only a personal action
the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential but also an action in personam. As regards
Bank. petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction over the
action because the prescribed docket fee was not
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and paid considering the huge amount involved in the
even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in claim, the trial court noted that a request for
1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs accounting was made in order that the exact value of
any statement of assets and liabilities of the the partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the
partnership, and to render an accounting of the correct docket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial court
partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his held that the heirs of Tabanao had aright to sue in
promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the their own names, in view of the provision of Article
deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to
partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum the succession are transmitted from the moment of
of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for the death of the decedent.6
payment thereof.2
The following day, respondents filed an amended
Consequently, Tabanao' s heirs, respondents herein, complaint,7 incorporating the additional prayer that
filed against petitioner an action for accounting, petitioner be ordered to "sell all (the partnership's)
payment of shares, division of assets and assets and thereafter pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield
damages.3 In their complaint, respondents prayed as to the plaintiffs" their corresponding share in the
follows: proceeds thereof. In due time, petitioner filed a
manifestation and motion to dismiss,8 arguing that the
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case
accounting of all the assets and liabilities of due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay the proper docket
the partnership at bar; and fees. Further, in a supplement to his motion to
dismiss,9 petitioner also raised prescription as an
additional ground warranting the outright dismissal of
2. After due notice and hearing defendant be
the complaint.
ordered to pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to
the plaintiffs the following:
On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an
Order,10 denying the motion to dismiss inasmuch as
A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the
the grounds raised therein were basically the same as
assets, properties, dividends, cash,
the earlier motion to dismiss which has been denied.
land(s), fishing vessels, trucks, motor
Anent the issue of prescription, the trial court ruled
vehicles, and other forms and
that prescription begins to run only upon the
substance of treasures which belong
dissolution of the partnership when the final
and/or should belong, had accrued
accounting is done. Hence, prescription has not set in
and/or must accrue to the partnership;
the absence of a final accounting. Moreover, an
action based on a written contract prescribes in ten
B. No less than Two Hundred years from the time the right of action accrues.
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages;
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals,11 raising the following issues:
C. Attorney's fees equivalent to Thirty
Percent (30%) of the entire
I.       Whether or not respondent Judge acted
share/amount/award which the
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
Honorable Court may resolve the
discretion in taking cognizance of a case
plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00
despite the failure to pay the required docket
for every appearance in court.4
fee;
II.      Whether or not respondent Judge acted We do not agree. The trial court does not have to
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of employ guesswork in ascertaining the estimated value
discretion in insisting to try the case which of the partnership's assets, for respondents
involve (sic) a parcel of land situated outside themselves voluntarily pegged the worth thereof at
of its territorial jurisdiction; Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Hence, this
case is one which is really not beyond pecuniary
III.     Whether or not respondent Judge acted estimation, but rather partakes of the nature of a
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of simple collection case where the value of the subject
discretion in allowing the estate of the assets or amount demanded is pecuniarily
deceased to appear as party plaintiff, when determinable.13 While it is true that the exact value of
there is no intestate case and filed by one the partnership's total assets cannot be shown with
who was never appointed by the court as certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and
administratrix of the estates; and must ascertain, through informed and practical
estimation, the amount they expect to collect from the
IV.     Whether or not respondent Judge acted partnership, particularly from petitioner, in order to
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of determine the proper amount of docket and other
discretion in not dismissing the case on the fees.14 It is thus imperative for respondents to pay the
ground of prescription. corresponding docket fees in order that the trial court
may acquire jurisdiction over the action.15
On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision,12 dismissing the petition for Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester
certiorari, upon a finding that no grave abuse of Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,16 where there
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was clearly an effort to defraud the government in
was committed by the trial court in issuing the avoiding to pay the correct docket fees, we see no
questioned orders denying petitioner's motions to attempt to cheat the courts on the part of
dismiss. respondents. In fact, the lower courts have noted their
expressed desire to remit to the court "any payable
balance or lien on whatever award which the
Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for
Honorable Court may grant them in this case should
review, raising the same issues resolved by the Court
there be any deficiency in the payment of the docket
of Appeals, namely:
fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court." 17 There is
evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket
I.       Failure to pay the proper docket fee; fee paid so far is inadequate is not an indication that
they are trying to avoid paying the required amount,
II.      Parcel of land subject of the case but may simply be due to an inability to pay at the
pending before the trial court is outside the time of filing. This consideration may have moved the
said court's territorial jurisdiction; trial court and the Court of Appeals to declare that the
unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien on the
III.     Lack of capacity to sue on the part of judgment award.
plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao; and
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the
IV.     Prescription of the plaintiff heirs' cause Court of Appeals erred in condoning the non-payment
of action. of the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to
become a lien on the monetary or property judgment
It can be readily seen that respondents' primary and that may be rendered in favor of respondents. There
ultimate objective in instituting the action below was to is merit in petitioner's assertion. The third paragraph
recover the decedent's 1/3 share in the partnership' s of Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states
assets. While they ask for an accounting of the that:
partnership' s assets and finances, what they are
actually asking is for the trial court to compel The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary
petitioner to pay and turn over their share, or the or property judgment in favor of the pauper-
equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the litigant.
sale of the partnership assets. They also assert that
until and unless a proper accounting is done, the Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in
exact value of the partnership' s assets, as well as their favor because it specifically applies to pauper-
their corresponding share therein, cannot be litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that
ascertained. Consequently, they feel justified in not respondents are litigating as paupers, and as such
having paid the commensurate docket fee as required are exempted from the payment of court fees.18
by the Rules of Court. 1âwphi1.nêt
The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only
of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which defines the the difference between the amount finally awarded
two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are and the fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is
immediately ascertainable; and (2) those which subject to adjustment and which may be subjected to
cannot be immediately ascertained as to the exact alien.
amount. This second class of claims, where the exact
amount still has to be finally determined by the courts In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
based on evidence presented, falls squarely under Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,22 this Court held that when
the third paragraph of said Section 5(a), which the specific claim "has been left for the determination
provides: by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall be the
In case the value of the property or estate or responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
the sum claimed is less or more in accordance authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
with the appraisal of the court, the difference collect the additional fee." Clearly, the rules and
of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case jurisprudence contemplate the initial payment of filing
may be. (Underscoring ours) and docket fees based on the estimated claims of the
plaintiff, and it is only when there is a deficiency that a
In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of lien may be constituted on the judgment award until
Appeals,19 this Court pronounced that the above- such additional fee is collected.
quoted provision "clearly contemplates an Initial
payment of the filing fees corresponding to the Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not
estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment dismissing the complaint outright despite their failure
as to what later may be proved."20 Moreover, we to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in
reiterated therein the principle that the payment of other procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in
filing fees cannot be made contingent or dependent certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy
on the result of the case. Thus, an initial payment of disposition of an action. While the rule is that the
the docket fees based on an estimated amount must payment of the docket fee in the proper amount
be paid simultaneous with the filing of the complaint. should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions
Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees which must be strictly construed.23
should the judgment later turn out to be adverse to
any claim of the respondent heirs. In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict
adherence to the Manchester doctrine, allowing the
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees within a
triviality. These fees are necessary to defray court reasonable time before the expiration of the
expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.24
order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and
to the government as well, the payment of docket fees In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of
cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the Appeals,25 this Court held that:
case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.
The court acquires jurisdiction over the action
Applied to the instant case, respondents have a if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
specific claim - 1/3 of the value of all the partnership accompanied by the payment of the requisite
assets - but they did not allege a specific amount. fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of
They did, however, estimate the partnership's total the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full
assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos payment of the fees within such reasonable
(P30,000,000.00), in a letter21 addressed to petitioner. time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
Respondents cannot now say that they are unable to prescription has set in the meantime.
make an estimate, for the said letter and the
admissions therein form part of the records of this It does not follow, however, that the trial court
case. They cannot avoid paying the initial docket fees should have dismissed the complaint for
by conveniently omitting the said amount in their failure of private respondent to pay the correct
amended complaint. This estimate can be made the amount of docket fees. Although the payment
basis for the initial docket fees that respondents of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional
should pay. Even if it were later established that the requirement, the trial court may allow the
amount proved was less or more than the amount plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a
alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the reasonable time before the expiration of the
Rules of Court specifically provides that the court may applicable prescriptive or reglementary
refund the 'excess or exact additional fees should the period. If the plaintiff fails to comply within this
requirement, the defendant should timely The action filed by respondents not only seeks
raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would redress against petitioner. It also seeks the
be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, enforcement of, and petitioner's compliance with, the
the balance between the appropriate docket contract that the partners executed to formalize the
fees and the amount actually paid by the partnership's dissolution, as well as to implement the
plaintiff will be considered a lien or any award liquidation and partition of the partnership's assets.
he may obtain in his favor. (Underscoring Clearly, it is a personal action that, in effect, claims a
ours) debt from petitioner and seeks the performance of a
personal duty on his part.29 In fine, respondents'
Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the
determine the proper docket fee based on the assets of the partnership with damages is a personal
estimated amount that respondents seek to collect action which may be filed in the proper court where
from petitioner, and direct them to pay the same any of the parties reside.30 Besides, venue has nothing
within a reasonable time, provided the applicable to do with jurisdiction for venue touches more upon
prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet the substance or merits of the case.31 As it is, venue in
expired, Failure to comply therewith, and upon motion this case was properly laid and the trial court correctly
by petitioner, the immediate dismissal of the ruled so.
complaint shall issue on jurisdictional grounds.
On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving
On the matter of improper venue, we find no error on spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to
the part of the trial court and the Court of Appeals in sue since she was never appointed as administratrix
holding that the case below is a personal action or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's objection in this
which, under the Rules, may be commenced and tried regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not
where the defendant resides or may be found, or need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of
where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the the estate before she can file the action. She and her
latter.26 children are complainants in their own right as
successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights
laid since the action is a real action involving a parcel insofar as the partnership was concerned were
of land that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession
of the court a quo. This contention is not well-taken. are transmitted from the moment of death of the
The records indubitably show that respondents are decedent.32
asking that the assets of the partnership be
accounted for, sold and distributed according to the Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had
agreement of the partners. The fact that two of the against the partnership and petitioner were
assets of the partnership are parcels of land does not transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more
materially change the nature of the action. It is an particularly by succession, which is a mode of
action in personam because it is an action against a acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
person, namely, petitioner, on the basis of his obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
personal liability. It is not an action in rem where the of a person are transmitted. 33 Moreover, respondents
action is against the thing itself instead of against the became owners of their respective hereditary shares
person.27 Furthermore, there is no showing that the from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.34
parcels of land involved in this case are being
disputed. In fact, it is only incidental that part of the A prior settlement of the estate, or even the
assets of the partnership under liquidation happen to appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
be parcels of land. administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to
acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who
The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his
al.,28 settled this issue thus: death, they can commence any action originally
pertaining to the decedent.35 From the moment of his
The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the death, his rights as a partner and to demand
assets of the partnership, including the fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their
fishpond in question, did not change the dissolution agreement were transmitted to
nature or character of the action, such sale respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue
being merely a necessary incident of the and seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner
liquidation of the partnership, which should to fulfill his obligations.
precede and/or is part of its process of
dissolution.
Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should substantial issues of this controversy is now long
have dismissed the complaint on the ground of overdue and must proceed without further delay.
prescription, arguing that respondents' action
prescribed four (4) years after it accrued in 1986. The WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
trial court and the Court of Appeals gave scant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the case
consideration to petitioner's hollow arguments, and is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
rightly so. City, Branch 60, which is ORDERED to determine the
proper docket fee based on the estimated amount
The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said
dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3) termination.36 The plaintiffs to pay the same within a reasonable time,
partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
and its legal personality is retained, at which time it period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court
completes the winding up of its affairs, including the is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings
partitioning and distribution of the net partnership in Civil Case No. 416-C.
assets to the partners.37 For as long as the
partnership exists, any of the partners may demand Costs against petitioner. 1âwphi1.nêt

an accounting of the partnership's business.


Prescription of the said right starts to run only upon SO ORDERED.
the dissolution of the partnership when the final
accounting is done.38
G.R. No. L-50261 May 31, 1982
Contrary to petitioner's protestations that respondents'
right to inquire into the business affairs of the IN THE MATTER OF GUARDIANSHIP OF THE
partnership accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) MINORS CECILIA, REBECCA, FLORIDA,
years thereafter, prescription had not even begun to RAPHAEL, RODOLFO, LUISITO, TEODORO, all
run in the absence of a final accounting. Article 1842 surnamed LAVIDES, ALBERTO C.
of the Civil Code provides: LAVIDES, petitioner,
vs.
CITY COURT OF LUCENA, Branch I, respondent.
The right to an account of his interest shall
accrue to any partner, or his legal
representative as against the winding up
partners or the surviving partners or the
person or partnership continuing the business, DE CASTRO, J.:
at the date of dissolution, in the absence of
any agreement to the contrary. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the two (2)
orders of respondent City Court of Lucena, Branch I,
Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which one dated December 5, 1978 dismissing petitioner's
also deal with the duty to account, the above-cited petition for guardianship for lack of jurisdiction and the
provision states that the right to demand an other, dated December 27, 1978 denying petitioner's
accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the motion for reconsideration of the order of December
absence of any agreement to the contrary. When a 5, 1978.
final accounting is made, it is only then that
prescription begins to run. In the case at bar, no final There is no dispute as to the following facts:
accounting has been made, and that is precisely what
respondents are seeking in their action before the trial Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Alberto Lavides
court, since petitioner has failed or refused to render instituted on April 5, 1971 before respondent City
an accounting of the partnership's business and Court a guardianship proceeding (Special Proceeding
assets. Hence, the said action is not barred by No. 0609) with respect to the person and property of
prescription. their seven (7) minor children named Cecilia,
Rebecca, Florida, Raphael, Rodolfo, Luisito and
In fine, the trial court neither erred nor abused its Teodoro, all surnamed Lavides. Said petition alleged
discretion when it denied petitioner's motions to that the estate left by the deceased wife of herein
dismiss. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not petitioner, mother of the above- named minors, has a
commit reversible error in upholding the trial court's total value of thirty-five thousand pesos (P35,000.00)
orders. Precious time has been lost just to settle this or an amount of P5,000.00 pertaining to each minor.
preliminary issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very Although there had been no previous settlement of
same arguments from the trial court all the way up to the estate of the deceased, petitioner was appointed
the Supreme Court. The litigation of the merits and and qualified as judicial guardian on May 10, 1971.
On June 23, 1971, respondent City Court, then cannot be exercised when the estate has a value in
presided by Honorable Judge Filemon Juntereal, excess of the jurisdictional amount for the former
upon motion, authorized petitioner to settle the estate courts.
extrajudicially and to sell a portion thereof consisting
of shares of stocks. Pursuant to said authority, Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that in the
petitioner extrajudicially settled the estate, and on case of petition for guardianship of more than one
August 28, 1971, sold the said shares of stocks for minor, the individual share of each minor which is
the sum of P64,512.00 then the estate of said minors determines the
jurisdiction of the court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 92
On November 22, 1978, petitioner filed a motion for of the Revised Rules of Court; that inasmuch as there
confirmation and approval of a Deed of Exchange are seven (7) minor children sought to be placed
Agreement dated November 18, 1978. While this under guardianship and that the total value of the
latter motion was still pending consideration, the estate is P35,000.00, then by simple mathematical
respondent court, now presided by Honorable Judge computation, the value of the property of each minor
Jose J. Parentela, Jr., reviewed the records of the is P5,000.00, already a determined estate, which is
case and finding that the undivided estate left by the well within the jurisdiction of the respondent city court;
deceased was worth at least P35,000.00, dismissed that the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, promulgated in
the case in an Order dated December 5, 1978, for 1962, invoked by respondent city court in dismissing
lack of jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of his petition has been overruled and abandoned by the
petitioner as guardian and annulled all proceedings promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court, which
taken prior to the issuance of the said order of took effect in 1964.
December 5, 1978.
Section 1, Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said granting concurrent jurisdiction to the municipal and
order which was denied by respondent city court in its city courts with the Court of First Instance in the
order dated December 27, 1978. Hence, this instant appointment of guardians, provides:
petition, petitioner raising the following issues,
namely: Section 1. Where to institute
proceedings.— Guardianship of the
a. Whether or not respondent city person or estate of a minor or
court's jurisdiction over a petition for incompetent may be instituted in the
general guardianship is based on the Court of First Instance of the province,
total value of the estate or on the or in the justice of the peace court of
value of the individual share of the the municipality, or in the municipal
minors in the estate of their deceased court of the chartered city where the
mother; and minor or incompetent person resides,
and if he resides in a foreign country,
b. Whether or not the promulgation of in the Court of First Instance of the
the Revised Rules of Court which was province wherein his property or part
made effective on January 1, 1964 thereof is situated; provided, however,
overruled the doctrine laid down by that where the value of the property of
this Honorable Tribunal in the case of such minor or incompetent exceeds
"Delgado vs. Gamboa," G. R. No. L- the jurisdiction of the justice of the
14326, February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA peace or municipal court, the
505. proceedings shall be instituted in the
Court of First Instance.
It appears that respondent city court dismissed the
petition for guardianship on ground of lack of In the City of Manila the proceedings
jurisdiction 1) because a perusal of the records of the shall be instituted in the Juvenile and
case shows that the undivided estate left by the Domestic Relations Court.
deceased is worth P35,000.00 which is clearly outside
its jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 92 of the The above section, in clear terms, grants concurrent
Revised Rules of Court, and 2) because of this jurisdiction between municipal and city court and
Court's ruling in the case of Delgado vs. Courts of First Instance in the appointment of
Gamboa, supra, to the effect that the concurrent guardians either with respect to the person or
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Courts with the property of the minor or incompetent, except that
Court of First Instance over the guardianship of the where the value of the property of such minor or
person and properties of the minors and incompetents incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction of the municipal
or city courts, the guardianship proceedings shall be courts. 3 In the case at bar, there are seven (7) minor
instituted in the Court of First Instance. It is clear, children to share in an undivided estate valued at
therefore, that the value of the property of the minor P35,000.00 or a share of P5,000.00 for each minor,
or incompetent sought to be placed in guardianship which amount is well within the jurisdiction of the
determines which court has jurisdiction. And that respondent city court, 4 which, therefore, cannot validly
property referred to is the individual estate of the invoke the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa to support its
minor so much so that when there are more than one dismissal of the petition for guardianship. For what is
minor or in competent sought to be placed under decisive is not the total value of the estate of the
guardianship, what determines which court has decedent, but the value of the individual share of each of
the minor heirs for whom a guardian is sought to be
jurisdiction is the value of the individual property of
appointed individually not collectively.
each minor or incompetent.
But petitioner would contend, as raised in the second
In the case at bar, it appears that respondent city
issue of this petition, that the doctrine laid down by
court dismissed the petition for guardianship on
this Court in the aforecited case of Delgado vs.
ground of lack of jurisdiction because a perusal of the
Gamboa, has been overruled by the promulgation of
record of the case shows that the undivided estate left
the Revised Rules of Court, particularly Section 1 of
by the deceased mother is worth P35,000.00 which
Rule 92, He argued that the case of Delgado vs.
amount is clearly outside its jurisdiction. This
Gamboa, promulgated on February 28, 1962, was
reasoning must be rejected for it overlooks the fact
decided when Section 1, Rule 93 of the former Rules
that the petition for guardianship filed by herein
of Court was still effective, which rule commands that
petitioner before the respondent city court clearly
guardianship shall be originally cognizable by the
alleged that the individual estate or share of each of
Court of First Instance; that when the Revised Rules
the seven minor children sought to be placed under
of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, the institution
guardianship is P5,000.00, which amount is well
of guardianship proceedings is now governed by
within the jurisdiction of the respondent city court
Section 1 of Rule 92 which states that guardianship
(Section 88, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
proceedings may be instituted in the Courts of First
R.A. No. 3828). That the respondent city court has
Instance or in the municipal courts.
jurisdiction over the case cannot be denied, for the
rule is well-settled that jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter is determined by the allegations of A perusal of the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa,
the complaint and/or petition. 1 That each of the seven decided when Section 1 of former Rule 93, as
(7) minor children became owner of a one- seventh (1/7) amended by R.A. No. 643, was still effective, shows
share or an amount of P5,000 from the estate left by the that it merely restated and confirmed the doctrine laid
deceased mother valued at P35,000.00 upon the death down in the case of Morales vs. Marquez, G. R. No.
of the latter cannot also be denied for Article 777 of the L-7463, May 27, 1955, which in effect, expounded the
New Civil Code expressly provides that "the rights to the grant of concurrent jurisdiction between inferior courts
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of and Court of First Instance, as provided for by R.A.
the decedent," and from then on, the heir becomes the No. 643. And a comparison of the provisions of
absolute owner of the decedent's property, subject of the Section 1 of former Rule 93, as amended, and
rights and obligations of the decedent and he cannot be Section 1 of the present Rule 92 shows that the latter
deprived of such right except by methods provided for by rule restates the former rule. Under the former rule,
law. 2 municipal or city courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of First Instance in cases where the
Respondent city court, however, would also base its value of the property of such minor or incompetent
dismissal of the case in the light of this Court's ruling falls within the jurisdiction of the former courts.
in the case of Delgado vs. Gamboa, supra, to the Likewise, under the present rule, concurrent
effect that the concurrence of jurisdiction between jurisdiction was also granted except that "where the
Courts of First Instance and inferior courts over value of the property of such minor or incompetent
guardianship of the minors or incompetents cannot be exceeds the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
exercised when the estate has a value in excess of proceedings shall, be instituted in the Court of First
the jurisdictional amount for the latter courts. The Instance." The criterion, therefore, in determining in
respondent Court, however, overlooked one vital fact. which court the guardianship proceeding shall be
A more careful examination of the facts of said case, instituted under the provision of both the former Rule
decided in 1962, reveals that it involved guardianship 93 and the present Rule 92 remains the same.
proceeding over the person and property of three (3) Hence, it cannot be accurately stated that the
minor children of decedent and an undivided estate Delgado ruling has been abandoned. In any case, the
valued at P7,000.00. That would make a share of Delgado doctrine, as already demonstrated, does not
P2,333.33 for each minor child, which amount is militate against petitioner's contention that the City
also in excess of the jurisdictional amount for inferior has jurisdiction over the instant guardianship case.
Lastly, there is still one aspect of this case which must No. L-62895               July 23, 1987
not be overlooked. It is not disputed that the
respondent City Court has entertained and granted JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,
petitioner's petition for guardianship in its Order as vs.
early as May 10, 1971 and has exercised its HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
jurisdiction by granting authority to petitioner to settle FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As presiding Judge of
the estate extrajudicially and to sell a portion thereof the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region
consisting of shares of stock; that after the lapse of VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the
seven (7) years or on November 22, 1978, Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R,
respondent City Court dismissed the case for lack of NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L.
jurisdiction, revoked the appointment of petitioner as ANTIGUA, respondents.
guardian and annulled all proceedings taken. Would it
serve the interest of justice to dismiss the case at this x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
stage and let a new petition for guardianship be filed
in another court? To draw a tenuous jurisdictional line
No. L-63818               July 23, 1987
is to undermine stability in litigations. The time to be
lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented, additional
expenses incurred—these are considerations which DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as
weigh heavily if this situation is allowed to happen. As Administrator of the Intestate Estate of VITO
aptly stated by the petitioner.—"To let the respondent BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R,
court reverse its stand now will pave a pattern of Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON.
judicial instability which, to reason and logic, is JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding
definitely not healthy administration of justice and not Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of
inducive of court's veneration." 5 Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M.
ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO
ESTENZO, petitioners,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of
vs.
respondent City Court of December 5, 1978
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
dismissing the petition and the Order of December 27,
COURT, JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, and PETRA
1978 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
O. BORROMEO, respondents.
thereof are hereby set aside and the case is
remanded to it for further proceedings. No costs.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
SO ORDERED.
No. L-65995               July 23, 1987

G.R. No. L-41171               July 23, 1987 PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO,
AMELINDA BORROMEO, and JOSE CUENCO
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, petitioners,
BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEO- vs.
HERRERA, petitioner, HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding
vs. Judge of Branch XV, Regional Trial Court of Cebu;
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate
P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and
of Cebu, Branch II, respondents. DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

No. L-55000               July 23, 1987 These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO.
916-R of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO
BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR N. BORROMEO, G.R. No. 41171
MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO,
JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of
AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., heirs- Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque,
appellants, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but
vs. leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court Borromeo represented by Jose Talam filed
of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the probate of a oppositions to this claim.
one page document as the last will and testament left
by the said deceased, devising all his properties to When the aforementioned petitions and claims were
Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed heard jointly, the following facts were established:
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case 1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan,
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The husband and wife (the latter having predeceased the
document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed former), were survived by their eight (8) children,
and thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of namely,
Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and
Felixberto Leonardo who acted as witnesses.
Jose Ma. Borromeo
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On
Cosme Borromeo
May 28, 1960, after due trial, the probate court held
that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery. Pantaleon Borromeo

On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate Vito Borromeo


court disallowing the probate of the will was affirmed
in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera Paulo Borromeo
et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656).
Anecita Borromeo
The testate proceedings was converted into an
intestate proceedings. Several parties came before Quirino Borromeo and
the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves
as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. Julian Borromeo

The following petitions or claims were filed: 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952,
without any issue, and all his brothers and sisters
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. predeceased him.
Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a
petition for declaration of heirs and 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the
determination of heirship. There was no following children:
opposition filed against said petition.
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16,
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo 1939
also filed a petition for declaration as heir. The
heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1,
Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition. 1955, or 3 years after the death of Vito
Borromeo. He was married to Remedios
3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March 28,
Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, Ramon 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco
Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Borromeo one of the petitioners herein.
Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre,
Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and Patricia c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs
and determination of shares. The petition was 4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died
opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme ahead of him and left an only daughter, Aurora B.
Borromeo. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the
following children:
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo
Atega, Luz Borromeo, Hermenegilda a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo,
and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose
Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, b. Ramon Ocampo
Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos
c. Lourdes Ocampo
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6,
1946
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased),
survived by claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr. e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3,
1923, but survived by his children:
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito
Borromeo, died before the war and left the following aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
children:
bb. Luz Borromeo
a. Marcial Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo
b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, Nonnenkamp
1965,survived by his wife, Remedios Alfonso,
and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo dd. Rosario Borromeo
Talam
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
c. Asuncion Borromeo
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948. the Civil Code, issued an order declaring the
following, to the exclusion of all others, as the
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944. intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:

f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925. 1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo

The last three died leaving no issue. 2. Judge Crispin Borromeo

6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito 3. Vitaliana Borromeo


Borromeo, died before the war and left the following
children: 4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera

a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 5. Salud Borromeo


29, 1949
6. Asuncion Borromeo
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31,
1959, leaving the following children: 7. Marcial Borromeo

aa. Federico Borromeo 8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and

bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. 9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo


Putong, Rec. p. 85)
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr. estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and
5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable
dd. Jose Borromeo shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate
heirs.
ee. Consuelo Borromeo
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the
ff. Pilar Borromeo exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an
agreement of partition of the properties of the
gg. Salud Borromeo deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the
trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this same
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty
Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the
deceased in the way and manner they are divided
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and
further ordered that 40% of the market value of the
4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul
attorney's fees shall be taken and paid from this and set aside the trial court's order dated December
segregated portion. 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion for
who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, reconsideration.
filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito The petitioner argues that the trial court had no
Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of
deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a
the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law money claim against the decedent but a claim for
making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitime properties, real and personal, which constitute all of
like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged the shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs
illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The
legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the claim of the private respondent under the waiver
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. agreement, according to the petitioner, may be
likened to that of a creditor of the heirs which is
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was improper. He alleges that the claim of the private
already barred by the order of the court dated April respondent under the waiver agreement was filed
12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was
legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court filed only sometime in 1973, after there had been a
dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973. declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of
partition (April 30, 1969), the approval of the
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for agreement of partition and an order directing the
reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969),
support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato when in a mere memorandum, the existence of the
changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the waiver agreement was brought out.
estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly It is further argued by the petitioner that the document
signed by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights" executed on
Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and
Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo,
Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without
B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. force and effect because there can be no effective
Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a
to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to
motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to
acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid,
cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato the person must be certain of the death of the one
Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the
agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were
was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the not certain of their right to the inheritance until they
same is void having been executed before the were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is
the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code
inexistent for lack of subject matter. which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify
their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial the court has issued an order for the distribution of the
court concluding that the five declared heirs who estate.
signed the waiver agreement assigning their
hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand,
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code
the estate of Vito Borromeo. there is no need for a person to be first declared as
heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance.
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied What is required is that he must first be certain of the
on July 7, 1975. death of the person from whom he is to inherit and
that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance.
He points out that at the time of the signing of the
waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to
the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo The circumstances of this case show that the
was already dead as well as of their rights to the signatories to the waiver document did not have the
inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself. clear and convincing intention to relinquish their
rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato,
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled
court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for
hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that the amicable settlement of the case. In that
since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the eight
took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties,
the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature of personal and real, including all cash and sums of
a partition of the properties of the estate needing money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of
approval of the court because it was executed in the October 31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them
course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that in any action then pending in the Court of First
the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and
after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this
remaining estate is distributed to those entitled to the document, the respondent recognizes and concedes
same. that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the
waiver document, is an heir of the deceased Vito
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows
rights is that "the properties included in an existing that the "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to meant to be what the respondent now purports it to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be
of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
such properties have the character of future property, Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the
because the heirs acquire a right to succession from case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of
the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle the estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30,
established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be
the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, distributed. This Agreement of Partition was approved
time may elapse from the moment of the death of the by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29,
deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to
retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and
with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B.
although conditioned upon the adjudication of the Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an
corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito
and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531). The Borromeo. The stated consideration for said
heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date,
1967 even if the order to partition the estate was June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, and Amelia
issued only in 1969. Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of
assignment) in turn executed a "Deed of
Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of
in the same deed of assignment. The stated
Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are
Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was
essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an
October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed
intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
this document on March 24, 1969.
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to
waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly, and when the only proof of intention With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that
rests in what a party does, his act should be so the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the validity
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in
to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court
advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as
conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v. fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of
Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159). the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-
18498. Subsequently, several parties came before the
lower court filing claims or petitions alleging
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by
exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims or waiving their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato
petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the by virtue of the same act, they lost their rights
settlement of the estate. because the rights from that moment on became
vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the
trial court dated December 24, 1974, is hereby SET It is also argued by the appellee that under Article
ASIDE. 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person
to be declared as heir first before he can accept or
G.R. No. 55000 repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is
certain of the death of the person from whom he is to
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the time
Appeals from an order of the Court of First Instance of of the signing of the waiver document on July 31,
Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
declaring the waiver document earlier discussed in certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they
G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court certified were also certain of their right to the inheritance as
this case to this Court as the questions raised are all shown by the waiver document itself.
of law.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court
The appellants not only assail the validity of the did not acquire jurisdiction over the claim because of
waiver agreement but they also question the the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on
action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo. August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order
specifically calling on all oppositors to the waiver
document to submit their comments within ten days
The appellants argue that when the waiver of
from notice and setting the same for hearing on
hereditary right was executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar
September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the
Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own
claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no
any hereditary right in the intestate estate of the
question of title to property and, therefore, the probate
deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary
court can decide the question.
right was only acquired and owned by them on April
10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised
in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in this case, who
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there
are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are
is no such contract of waiver of hereditary right in the
contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated
present case because there was no object, which is
December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo
hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of
entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo under
said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary
the waiver agreement.
right was not only null and void ab initio but was
inexistent.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of
hereditary rights can not be validated. The essential
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants
elements of a waiver, especially the clear and
contend that without any formal pleading filed by the
convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are
lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the
not found in this case.
waiver agreement and without notice to the parties
concerned, two things which are necessary so that
the lower court would be vested with authority and The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable
jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said settlement conceding to all the eight (8) intestate heirs
waiver agreement, nevertheless, the lower court set various properties in consideration for the heirs giving
the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without to the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia
asking for the requisite pleading. This resulted in the Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed
issuance of the appealed order of December 24, inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the
1974, which approved the validity of the waiver heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their
agreement. The appellants contend that this hereditary rights to the respondent.
constitutes an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed,
the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the deed of
reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents
deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all previously set in his court in an order dated June 4,
argue against the purported waiver of hereditary 1979, pursuant to the resolution and restraining order
rights. issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining him to
maintain status quo on the case.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already
stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court acquired As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30,
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the partition of the properties of the deceased Vito
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its
settlement of the estate. order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order, the
trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE. Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the
deceased in the way and manner they are divided
G.R. No. 62895 and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and
further ordered that 40% of the market value of the
4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul
reserved for attorney's fees.
M. Sesbreno, representative of some of the heirs-
distributees, praying for the immediate closure of
Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco
May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No.
motions were grounded on the fact that there was 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine
nothing more to be done after the payment of all the (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following
obligations of the estate since the order of partition circumstances:
and distribution had long become final.
1. The court's determination of the market
Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos value of the estate in order to segregate the
failed or refused to resolve the aforesaid motions, 40% reserved for attorney's fees;
petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for
mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the 2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring
respondent judge to terminate and close Special Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9
Proceedings No. 916-R. of the estate because of the waiver
agreement signed by the heirs representing
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was the 5/9 group which is still pending resolution
due to pending motions to compel the petitioner, as by this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);
co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash 3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco
in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and Borromeo to render his accounting; and
that mandamus will not lie to compel the performance
of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied 4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the
the petition on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion estate causing annotations of notices of lis
for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of pendens on the different titles of the
merit. Hence, this petition. properties of the estate.

The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the Since there are still real properties of the estate that
respondent judge on the motion filed on April 28, were not vet distributed to some of the declared heirs,
1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending
cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its
inventory and accounting because the latter motion resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the
was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, to
under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the expedite the determination of Special Proceedings
respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or No. 916-R and ordered the co-administrator Jose
matter within three months from the date of its Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real
submission. properties of the estate and to render an accounting
of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of
The respondents contend that the motion to close the several properties.
administration had already been resolved when the
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the
G.R. No. 65995. motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua
ultimately withdraw his motions for production
Considering the pronouncements stated in: of titles.

1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting 7. The incident concerning the production of
aside the Order of the trial court dated titles triggered another incident involving Atty.
December 24, 1974; Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel
of herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said
review seeking to modify the decision of the incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct
disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. contempt because among others, Atty.
Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding
Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the Judge stands to receive "fat commission" from
remand of the case to the Executive,Judge of the sale of the entire property. Indeed, Atty.
the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being
and declared in contempt of court with the dim
prospect of suspension from the practice of
his profession. But obviously to extricate
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to
himself from the prospect of contempt and
restrain the respondents from further acting
suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose
on any and all incidents in Special
rapproachment and ultimately joined forces
proceedings No. 916-11 because of the
with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together,
affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate
continued to harass administrator
Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818.
x x x           x x x          x x x
the trial court may now terminate and close Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of
an inventory of the real properties of the estate and 9. The herein movants are informed and so
an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the they allege, that a brother of the Hon.
petitioner, as co-administrator of the estate, if he has Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty.
not vet done so, as required by this Court in its Domingo L. Antigua.
Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be
effected with all deliberate speed. 10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween
Atty. Antigua, et al. who are agitating for the
G.R. No. 63818 sale of the entire estate or to buy out the
individual heirs, on the one hand, and the
herein movants, on the other, who are not
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco
willing to sell their distributive shares under
Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion for
the terms and conditions presently proposed.
inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment has
Branch 11, presided over by Judge Francisco P.
become apparent against the herein movants,
Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in
especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the
Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants
harassments employed by Atty Antigua et al.
alleged, among others, the following:
are the pending motions for the removal of
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the
x x x           x x x          x x x subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank
which seeks to invade into the privacy of the
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo,
Antigua filed a motion for the production of the and the other matters mentioned in paragraph
certificates of title and to deposit the same 8 hereof. More harassment motions are
with the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for expected until the herein movants shall finally
the ready inspection of interested buyers. yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation,
Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in the herein movants beg for an entirely
its order of October 2, 1978 which, however, independent and impartial judge to pass upon
became the subject of various motions for the merits of said incidents.
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who
contended that as owners they cannot be
deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue that it is highly improper for respondent Hon.
to sit and take cognizance of this proceeding, Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside
including the incidents above-mentioned, he is over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the
liable to be misunderstood as being biased in following circumstances:
favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced
against the herein movants. Incidents which (a) He has shown undue interest in
may create this impression need not be the sale of the properties as initiated
enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo) by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose
sister is married to a brother of
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge respondent.
Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the private respondents filed a (b) The proposed sale cannot be
petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with legally done without the conformity of
preliminary injunction before the Intermediate the heirs-distributees, and petitioners
Appellate Court. have openly refused the sale, to the
great disappointment of respondent.
In the appellate court, the private respondents
alleged, among others, the following: (c) The shot gun motion of Atty.
Antigua and similar incidents are
x x x           x x x          x x x clearly intended to harass and
embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco
16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the Borromeo in order to pressure him into
necessity of having to state herein that acceding to the proposed sale.
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has
shown undue interest in pursing the sale (d) Respondent has shown bias and
initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. prejudice against petitioners by failing
Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. to resolve the claim for attorney's fees
Francisco P. Burgos is married to a sister of filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and
Atty. Domingo L. Antigua. the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar
claims by the other lawyers were
17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire resolved by respondent after
properties of the estate cannot be legally done petitioners refused the proposed sale.
without the conformity of the heirs-distributees (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
because the certificates of title are already
registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its
the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. decision granting the petition for certiorari and/or
Francisco P. Burgos urged the heirs- prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P.
distributees to sell the entire property based Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
on the rationale that proceeds thereof Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the
deposited in the bank will earn interest more transmission of the records of the case to the
than the present income of the so called Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region
estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, VII for re-raffling.
however. have been petitioner timid to say
their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by A motion for reconsideration of the decision was
Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the courage denied by the appellate court on April 11, 1983.
to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell Hence, the present petition for review seeking to
clearly favored by respondent Hon. Francisco modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
P. Burgos. Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case of
x x x           x x x          x x x Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the
remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the
20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.
herein the merits of the shotgun motion of
Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other The principal issue in this case has become moot and
incidents now pending in the court below academic because Judge Francisco P. Burgos
which smack of harassment against the herein decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of
petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of Cebu sometime before the latest reorganization of the
said incidents, petitioners respectfully contend judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its
merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this case Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion
will be reassigned and others concerned. of Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a
request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco the Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co.,
Borromeo has been harassed. They contend that Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of
Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the Deeds for the Province of Cebu and another
proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco
in favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that Borromeo.
this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of March
2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a
P15,000,000.00. They add that he only ordered the subpoena duces tecum to the Managert of the bank,
administrator to sell so much of the properties of the the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the
estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers- Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to
claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
would have been unreasonable because his orders
against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v.
administrator, to give an accounting and inventory of Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial Borromeo
the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr.,
They claim that the respondent court, should also joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion
have taken judicial notice of the resolution of this for relief of the administrator.
Court directing the said judge to "expedite the
settlement and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request
54232. And finally, they state that the disqualification for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to
of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who and produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the
is conversant with the 47 volumes of the records of court presided order by Judge Burgos.
the case.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he subpoena duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose
had been harassed. countered that Judge Burgos Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in
appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of court.
the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was
singled out to make an accounting of what t he was
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June
supposed to have received as rentals for the land
7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979, before the date of the
upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from
hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the
January, 1977 to February 1982, inclusive, without
private respondents' motion for reconsideration and
mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of
the motion to quash the subpoena.
Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to
1avvphi1

sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge


Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of It was further argued by the private respondents that if
conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the ,judge Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or
conferences, Atty. Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there
the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past
cover up the projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua. twelve years, he had not done anything towards the
closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the
properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences,
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million pesos
a motion was filed by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua
while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at
praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to
15 million pesos.
file an inventory when he has already filed one to
account for cash, a report on which the administrators
had already rendered: and to appear and be The allegations of the private respondents in their
examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by motion for inhibition, more specifically, the insistence
Judge Burgos lt was also prayed that of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at
subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected,
of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the
Co., bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In the
Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this
appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo Court stated:
Talam and another heir distributee Vitaliana
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the claimants who were individually hired by their
trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should
hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At be legally charged against their respective clients and
the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to not against the estate.
his actions, whether well grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but inhibit On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the
himself from the case. A judge may not be petition is a dilatory one and barred by res
legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R.
when circumstances appear that will induce No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to expedite
doubt to his honest actuations and probity in the settlement and liquidation of the decedent's
favor or of either partly or incite such state of estate. They claim that this resolution, which was
mind, he should conduct a careful self- already final and executory, was in effect reversed
examination. He should exercise his discretion and nullified by the Intermediate Appellate Court in its
in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it granted the
Justice is not impaired, "The better course for petition for certiorari and or prohibition and
the Judge under such circumstances is to disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking
disqualify himself "That way he avoids being further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R
misunderstood, his reputation for probity and as well as ordering the transmission of the records of
objectivity is preserve ed. what is more the case to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
important, the Ideal of impartial administration Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983,
of justice is lived up to. which was appealed to this Court by means of a
Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private
respondents is based on sound reasons. As Earlier We agree with the petitioners' contention that
stated, however, the petition for review seeking to attorney's fees are not the obligation of the estate but
modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate of the individual heirs who individually hired their
Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the
Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the
Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market
remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be
Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED taken and paid should be deleted.
for the decision is not only valid but the issue itself
has become moot and academic. Due to our affirmance of the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818, we
G.R. No. 65995 grant the petition.

The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from WHEREFORE, —


further acting on any and all incidents in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this (1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the
petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of respondent judge dated December 24, 1974,
the respondents related to the said special declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the
proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order
respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's
court be declared null and void and without force and motion for reconsideration of the
effect whatsoever. aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE
for being NULL and VOID;
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has
set for hearing all incidents in Special Proceedings (2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial
No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs- court declaring the waiver document valid is
distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties hereby SET ASIDE;
already titled in their names as early as 1970,
notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby
before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No.
DENIED. The issue in the decision of the
63818.
Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and
ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Burgos from further hearing Special
Special Proceeding No. 916-R requires only the Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and
appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers- academic. The judge who has taken over the
sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos 1996, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41283, which reversed the
shall immediately conduct hearings with a decision, dated June 10, 1992, of the Regional Trial
view to terminating the proceedings. In the Court, Branch 67, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 59705.
event that the successor-judge is likewise
disqualified, the order of the Intermediate The facts of the case are, as follows:
Appellate Court directing the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died
the case shall be implemented: intestate, without issue. She left five (5) parcels of
land situated in Orambo, Pasig City.
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. 'The issue seeking to restrain At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by
Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced,
in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC: her legitimate brother; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her
niece who is the only daughter of Rosa dela Merced-
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby Platon (a sister who died in 1943); and (3) the
ordered to speedily terminate the close legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the (another sister of Evarista who died in 1965), namely:
submission of an inventory of the real Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor
properties of the estate and an accounting of and Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon
the cash and bank deposits by the petitioner- Adriano-Ongoco and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.
administrator of the estate as required by this
Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983; Almost a year later or on March 19, 1988, to be
and precise, Francisco (Evarista's brother) died. He was
survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, their three legitimate children, namely, Luisito E. dela
1969, segregating 40% of the market value of Merced, Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M.
the estate from which attorney's fees shall be Paredes.
taken and paid should be, as it is hereby
DELETED. The lawyers should collect from On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the
the heirs-distributees who individually hired decedent, Evarista M. dela Merced, referring to (1)
them, attorney's fees according to the nature the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P.
of the services rendered but in amounts which Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of
should not exceed more than 20% of the Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial settlement, entitled
market value of the property the latter "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the
acquired from the estate as beneficiaries. Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced" adjudicating the
properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share
SO ORDERED. of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.

G.R. No. 126707 February 25, 1999 On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela
Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la
BLANQUITA E. DELA MERCED, LUISITO E. DELA Merced, filed a "Petition for Annulment of the
MERCED, BLANQUTIA M. MACATANGAY, MA. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
OLIVIA M. PAREDES, TERESITA P. RUPISAN, Evarista M. Dela Merced with Prayer for a Temporary
RUBEN M. ADRIANO, HERMINIO M. ADRIANO, Restraining Order", alleging that he was fraudulently
JOSELITO M. ADRIANO, ROGELIO M. ADRIANO, omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners,
WILFREDO M. ADRIANO, VICTOR M. ADRIANO, who were fully aware of his relation to the late
CORAZON A. ONGOCO, JASMIN A. MENDOZA Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private
and CONSTANTINO M. ADRIANO, petitioners, respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as
vs. one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3)
JOSELITO P. DELA MERCED, respondent. pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased
Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
 
On August 3, 1990, the trial court issued the
PURISIMA, J.: temporary restraining order prayed for by private
respondent Joselito, enjoining the sale of any of the
real properties of the deceased Evarista.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 17,
After trial, however, or on June 10, 1992, to be In its Decision of October 17, 1996, the Court of
definite, the trial court dismissed the petition, lifted the Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court of
temporary restraining order earlier issued, and origin and ordered the petitioners to execute an
cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the certificates amendatory agreement which shall form part of the
of title covering the real properties of the deceased original settlement, so as to include private
Evarista. respondent Joselito as a co-heir to the estate of
Francisco, which estate includes one-third (1/3) pro
In dismissing the petition, the trial court stated: indiviso of the latter's inheritance from the deceased
Evarista.
The factual setting of the instant
motion after considering the The relevant and dispositive part of the Decision of
circumstances of the entire case and the Court of Appeals, reads:
the other evidentiary facts and
documents presented by the herein xxx xxx xxx
parties points only to one issue which
goes into the very skeleton of the It is a basic principle embodied in
controversy, to wit: "Whether or not Article 777, New Civil Code that the
the plaintiff may participate in the rights to the succession are
intestate estate of the late Evarista M. transmitted from the moment of the
Dela Merced in his capacity as death of the decedent, so that
representative of his alleged father, Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of
Francisdo Dela Merced, brother of the his sister's estate at the moment of the
deceased, whose succession is under latter's death. Said 1/3 of Evarista's
consideration. estate formed part of Francisco's
estate which was subsequently
xxx xxx xxx transmitted upon his death on March
23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among
It is to be noted that Francisco Dela whom is appellant as his illegitimate
Merced, alleged father of the herein child. Appellant became entitled to his
plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an share in Francisco's estate from the
illegitimate. Plaintiff, on the other time of the latter's death in 1987. The
hand, is admittedly an illegitimate child extrajudicial settlement therefore is
of the late Francisco Dela Merced. void insofar as it deprives plaintiff-
Hence, as such, he cannot represent appellant of his share in the estate of
his alleged father in the succession of Francisco M. dela Merced. As a
the latter in the intestate estate of the consequence, the cancellation of the
late Evarista Dela Merced, because of notice of lis pendens is not in order
the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil because the property is directly
Code which states that: affected. Appellant has the right to
demand a partition of his father's
An illegitimate child has no right to estate which includes 1/3 of the
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate property inherited from Evarista dela
children and relatives of his father or Merced.
mother, nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner WHEREFORE, premises considered,
from the illegitimate child. the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The application of Art. 992 cannot be Defendants-appellees are hereby
ignored in the instant case, it is clearly ordered to execute an amendatory
worded in such a way that there can agreement/settlement to include
be no room for any doubts and herein plaintiff-appellant Joselito dela
ambiguities. This provision of the law Merced as co-heir to the estate of
imposes a barrier between the Francisco dela Merced which includes
illegitimate and the legitimate 1/3 of the estate subject of the
family. . . . (Rollo, p. 87-88) questioned Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Evarista M.
dela Merced dated April 20, 1989. The
Not satisfied with the dismissal of his petition, the
amendatory agreement/settlement
private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
shall form part of the original Domestic Relations Court in which court her husband
Extrajudicial Settlement. With costs (one of the legal heirs of the decedent) had instituted
against defendants-appellees. a case for legal separation against her on the ground
of an attempt against his life. When Mauricio (her
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 41) husband) died, she should have commenced an
action for the settlement of the estate of her husband,
In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist in which case she could receive whatever allowance
that being an illegitimate child, private respondent the intestate court would grant her.
Joselito is barred from inheriting from Evarista
because of the provision of Article 992 of the New The present case, however, relates to the rightful and
Civil Code, which lays down an impassable barrier undisputed right of an heir to the share of his late
between the legitimate and illegitimate families. father in the estate of the decedent Evarista,
ownership of which had been transmitted to his father
The Petition is devoid of merit. upon the death of Evarista. There is no legal obstacle
for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of
the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable
to his father's estate, which estate includes a one-
because involved here is not a situation where an
third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a
legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by
the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition is hereby
where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the DENIED and the Appealed Decision of the Court of
latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.
SO ORDERED.
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in
the present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code
which provides that the rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the G.R. No. L-28394 November 26, 1970
decedent.
PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant,
Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, vs.
the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former SILVESTRE GAYON and GENOVEVA DE
as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco GAYON, defendants-appellees.
died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate
children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an German M. Lopez for plaintiff-appellant.
illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in
the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito
Pedro R. Davila for defendants-appellees.
does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of
representation but participates in his own right, as an
heir of the late Francisco, in the latter's share (or
portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Petitioners argue that if Joselito desires to assert
successional rights to the intestate estate of his Appeal, taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon, from an order
father, the proper forum should be in the settlement of of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing his
his own father's intestate estate, as this Court held in complaint in Civil Case No. 7334 thereof.
the case of Gutierrez vs. Macandog (150 SCRA 422
[1987]) The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon
filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Gutierrez vs. Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging
Macandog (supra) is misplaced. The said case substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses
involved a claim for support filed by one Elpedia executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the
Gutierrez against the estate of the decedent, Agustin complaint, as Annex "A" — whereby they sold to
Gutierrez, Sr., when she was not even an heir to the Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of
estate in question, at the time, and the decedent had unregistered land therein described, and located in
no obligation whatsoever to give her support. Thus, the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal,
this Court ruled that Elpedia should have asked for province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon,
support pendente lite before the Juvenile and subject to redemption within five (5) years or not later
than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption A reconsideration of this order having been denied,
had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff interposed the present appeal, which is well
Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs or taken.
successors, despite the expiration of the period
therefor; that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Said order is manifestly erroneous and must be set
Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale — copy of aside. To begin with, it is not true that Mrs. Gayon
which was attached to the complaint, as Annex "B" — "has nothing to do with the land subject of plaintiff's
dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land complaint." As the widow of Silvestre Gayon, she is
to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that one of his compulsory heirs and has, accordingly, an
2

plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon interest in the property in question. Moreover, her own
improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, motion to dismiss indicated merely "a necessity of
fully paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and amending the complaint," to the end that the other
that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require successors in interest of Silvestre Gayon, instead of
a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in the latter, be made parties in this case. In her
and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, opposition to the aforesaid motion for reconsideration
and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in of the plaintiff, Mrs. Gayon alleged, inter alia, that the
plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in "heirs cannot represent the dead defendant, unless
and to the aforementioned property. there is a declaration of heirship." Inasmuch,
however, as succession takes place, by operation of
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged law, "from the moment of the death of the
that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January 6, decedent"  and "(t)he inheritance includes all the
3

1954, long before the institution of this case; that property, rights and obligations of a person which are
Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the not extinguished by his death,"  it follows that if his
4

signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not heirs were included as defendants in this case, they
hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had would be sued, not as "representatives" of the
ever executed "any document of whatever nature in decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the
plaintiff's favor"; that the complaint is malicious and property in question, even if the precise extent of their
had embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs interest may still be undetermined and they have
of Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued
counsel for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses without a previous declaration of heirship, provided
of at least P200.00"; and that being a brother of the there is no pending special proceeding for the
deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert settlement of the estate of the decedent. 5

efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before


filing his complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise, as
same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to an alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of
pay damages. our Civil Code provides:

Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss, reproducing No suit shall be filed or maintained
substantially the averments made in her answer and between members of the same family
stressing that, in view of the death of Silvestre Gayon, unless it should appear that earnest
there is a "necessity of amending the complaint to suit efforts toward a compromise have
the genuine facts on record." Presently, or on been made, but that the same have
September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the order failed, subject to the limitations in
appealed from, reading: article 2035.

Considering the motion to dismiss and It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this
it appearing from Exhibit "A" annexed provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between
to the complaint that Silvestre Gayon members of the same family." This phrase, "members
is the absolute owner of the land in of the same family," should, however, be construed in
question, and considering the fact that the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to
Silvestre Gayon is now dead and his which:
wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing
to do with the land subject of plaintiff's Family relations shall include those:
complaint, as prayed for, this case is
hereby dismissed, without
(1) Between husband and wife;
pronouncement as to costs. 1

(2) Between parent and child;


(3) Among other ascendants and their 10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount
descendants; of P725,270.00.

(4) Among brothers and sisters. The following properties belonging to the late Don
Filemon Sotto and administered by respondent
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration 1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049,
contained in said Art. 217 — which should be covered by TCT No. 27640 of the
construed strictly, it being an exception to the general Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City;
rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be
excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that the 2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052,
same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, covered by TCT No. 27642 of the
and plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City;
filing the complaint does not bar the same.
3. Parcel of land on Lot No.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of
aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the Banilad Friad Lands Estate, Cebu
the inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of City;
the administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre
Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the 4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of
absence of such administrator or executor, of the the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City,
heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, and for further covered by TCT No. 27639;
proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with
the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee,
5. Parcel of land situated at
Genoveva de Gayon. It is so ordered.
Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu,
covered by TD No. 010661, with an
area of 76-708; (sic)

G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987 6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of
the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio Sa-ac
MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner, Mactan Island, with an area of Forty
vs. Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty
HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Four (44,644) square meters more or
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and less;
MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator, respondents.
7. Residential House of strong
materials, situated on a Government
lot at Lahug, Cebu City;
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
8. Residential House of strong
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of materials, situated at Central, Cebu
the then Court of First Instance of Cebu declaring the City. " (Rollo, p. 40)
deed of redemption executed for the petitioner null
and void and denying the petitioner's motion that the Seven of the above-described properties were
Registrar of Deeds of the City of Cebu be directed to awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone bid for them for
transfer the Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title to the amount of P217,300.00.
Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to
her and to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate The residential house situated on a government lot at
of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name. Lahug, Cebu City, was awarded to lone bidder
Asuncion Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held
pursuant to a writ of execution issued on February 5, Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S.
1979 by the respondent judge and to a court order Palicte, as one of the heirs of the late Don Filemon
dated June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4)
vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil Case No. R- lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed OF THE REVISED RULES OF
by Deputy Provincial Sheriff Felipe V. Belandres and COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON
approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as EXECUTION AGAINST THE ESTATE
Ex-Officio Sheriff, was issued for these lots: OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE,
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C- OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre, Cebu City,
bid at P20,000.00; B

2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN


covered by TCT No. 27642, of the RULING THAT PETITIONER, WHO
Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE
bid at P15,000.00; DECEDENT, IS NOT THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR DOES
3. A parcel of land or Lot SHE QUALIFY AS A SUCCESSOR-
No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, IN-INTEREST OF THE
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
Cebu City, at P5,000.00; ENTITLED TO RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF
covered by TCT No. 27640, of the COURT.
Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City,
at P20,000.00. (Rollo, p. 42) C

On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
respondent Judge Ramolete for the transfer to her RULING THAT ALTHOUGH
name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land PETITIONER IS A DECLARED HEIR
covered by the deed of redemption. OF THE DECEDENT, HER RIGHT
TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT OF
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil REDEMPTION OF CERTAIN
Case No. R-10027, entitled "Pilar Teves, et al. vs ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY
Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, ARISE AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF
principal among which, is that movant, Palicte, is not THE ESTATE AS THERE IS STILL
one of those authorized to redeem under the JUDGMENT DEBT CHARGEABLE
provisions of the Rules of Court. AGAINST THE ESTATE.

A hearing on the said motion, with both parties D


adducing evidence was held.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of RULING THAT PETITIONER'S
the declared heirs in Spl. Proc. No. 2706-R, she does REDEMPTION OF FOUR (4)
not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may PARCELS OF LAND OF THE
redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the deed ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD
of redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
was denied. AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL
AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE.
(Rollo, pp. 17-18)
Hence, the present petition.
These assigned errors center on whether or not
The petitioner raises the following assignment of
petitioner Palicte may validly exercise the right of
errors:
redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
A
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN provides:
RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT
DEBTOR ENTITLED TO REDEEM
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real
UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39
property so sold. — Real property sold
as provided in the last preceding interest in the property. (G. Urruitia &
section, or any part thereof sold Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28 Phil.,
separately, may be redeemed in the 260, 268). (Emphasis supplied).
manner hereinafter provided, by the
following persons: In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of
the late Don Filemon Sotto whose estate was levied
(a) The judgment debtor, or his upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment
successor in interest in the whole or against it. She is one of the declared heirs in Special
any part of the property; Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir, she
qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
(b) A creditor having a lien by
attachment, judgment or mortgage on Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
the property sold, or on some part
thereof, subsequent to the judgment The rights to the succession are
under which the property was sold. transmitted from the moment of the
Such redeeming creditor is termed a death of the decedent.
redemptioner.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to to own the property, subject to the decedent's
redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even
or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of while the property is under administration. (Barretto
the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73
"successor-in-interest"? Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in
the decedent's property even while it is under
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states administration. With more reason should the heirs be
that: allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the
presence of an administrator.
The rule is that the term "successor-in-
interest" includes one to whom the The respondents contend that the petitioner must
debtor has transferred his statutory positively prove that the three other co-heirs, the
right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. administrator, and the intestate court had expressly
vs Cochran, 276 Fed., 216, 223); one agreed to the redemption of the disputed parcels of
to whom the debtor has conveyed his land. We see no need for such prior approval. While it
interest in the property for the purpose may have been desirable, it is not indispensable
of redemption (Southern California under the circumstances of this case. What is
Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, important is that all of them acquiesced in the act of
99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson vs. Castle, redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner
52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. contends that the administrator and the three other
Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61; 127 Pac., heirs agreed to the redemption. There is, however. no
1057); one who succeeds to the clear proof of such approval. What is beyond dispute
interest of the debtor by operation of from the records is that they did not disapprove nor
law (XI McKinney's California reprobate the acts of the petitioner. There is likewise
Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint nothing in the records to indicate that the redemption
debtors who were joint owners of the was not beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite
Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal., 50; 85 It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not
Pac., 122); the wife as regards her yet fixed and determinate pending the order of
husband's homestead by reason of distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the
the fact that some portion of her preservation of the estate and the recovery of its
husband' title passes to her (Hefner properties is greater than anybody else's, definitely
vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). more than the administrator's who merely holds it for
This court has held that a surety can the creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
not redeem the property of the
principal sold on execution because The petitioner cites precedents where persons with
the surety, by paying the debt of the inchoate or contingent interest were allowed to
principal, stands in the place of the exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-
creditor, not of the debtor, and interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103 Phil.
consequently is not a successor in 889, 892) where a son redeemed the property of his
parents sold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial entitled to the same, naming them and
Sheriff of Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife the proportions, or parts, to which
by virtue of what the Court called "inchoate right of each is entitled, and such persons
dower or contingent interest" redeemed a homestead may demand and recover their
as successor-in-interest of her husband. respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that: having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court
... The right of a son, with respect to as to who are the lawful heirs of the
the property of a father or mother, is deceased person or as to the
also an inchoate or contingent distributive shares to which each
interest, because upon the death of person is entitled under the law, the
the father or the mother or both, he controversy shall be heard and
will have a right to inherit said conjugal decided as in ordinary cases.
property. If any holder of an inchoate
interest is a successor in interest with No distribution shall be allowed until
right to redeem a property sold on the payment of the obligations above
execution, then the son is such a mentioned has been made or provided
successor in interest, as he has an for, unless the distributees, or any of
inchoate right to the property of his them, give a bond, in a sum to be
father. fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the such time as the court directs.
person of the administrator as the judgment debtor
and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of These provisions cannot mean
the deceased is the judgment debtor and the heirs anything less than that in order that a
who will eventually acquire that estate should not be proceeding for the settlement of the
prohibited from doing their share in its preservation. estate of a deceased may be deemed
ready for final closure, (1) there should
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the have been issued already an order of
properties, her motion to transfer the titles of the four distribution or assignment of the
(4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of estate of the decedent among or to
Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon those entitled thereto by will or by law,
Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this time. but (2) such order shall not be issued
until after it is shown that the "debts,
funeral expenses, expenses of
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount
administration, allowances, taxes, etc.,
to a distribution of the estate.
chargeable to the estate" have been
paid, which is but logical and proper,
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and (3) besides, such an order is usually
Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56 SCRA 267, 345- 346): issued upon proper and specific
application for the purpose of the
Indeed, the law on the matter is interested party or parties, and not of
specific, categorical and unequivocal. the court."
Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months
SECTION 1. When order for period to join as co-redemptioners in the redemption
distribution of residue made. — When made by the petitioner before the motion to transfer
the debts, funeral charges, and titles to the latter's name may be granted.
expenses of administration, the
allowance to the widow, and WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to respondent court's orders declaring the deed of
the estate in accordance with law, redemption null and void and denying the motion to
have been paid, the court, on the transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilda
application of the executor or Palicte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, subject to
administrator, or of a person the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as
interested in the estate, and after stated above.
hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons
SO ORDERED. (b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian
Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mariano, Jose,
G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992 Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. (c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in
LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN, MATILDE L. Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in
CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and
V. DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, in Legazpi City went to his son Mariano, which
vs. Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN, in 1908. Catalina, for her part, brought into the
FLORENTINO JAUCIAN, MERCEDES JAUCIAN marriage untitled properties which she had inherited
ARBOLEDA, HEIRS OF JOSEFINA J. BORJA, from her parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson.
HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF These were augmented by other properties acquired
VICENTE JAUCIAN, respondents. by the spouses in the course of their union,  which 1

however was not blessed with children.


Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for
petitioners. Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina
were brought under the Torrens System. Those that
Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin,
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.
were surveyed cadastrally and registered in the name
of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.''  2

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament


NARVASA, C.J.: instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal
heir of all his properties.   The will was drawn up by
3

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in his wife's nephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney
CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 — affirming with modification Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in spouses being childless, they had agreed that their
favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7152 entitled properties, after both of them shall have died should
"Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an revert to their respective sides of the
action for recovery of real property with damages — is family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his
sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition for "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or
review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her
Rules of Court. "Jaucian relatives."  4

The petition was initially denied due course and Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14,
dismissed by this Court. It was however reinstated 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was
upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of
petitioners, and the respondents were required to Albay without any opposition from both sides of the
comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given family. As directed in his will, Doña Catalina was
due course and the parties were directed to submit appointed executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the
their memorandums. These, together with the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the
evidence, having been carefully considered, the Court inventory of her husband's estate   which she 5

now decides the case. submitted to the probate court for approval,   Catalina 6

declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33


First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the are the private properties of the deceased and form
evidence on record: part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the
surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named conjugal."  7

Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin.


He owned extensive residential and agricultural Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doña
properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. Catalina was closest to her nephew, Attorney
After his death, his estate was divided among his Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria
three (3) children as follows: Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria Olbes-Velasco, and the
husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and
(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Fernando Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that
she made him custodian of all the titles of her properties; and before she
Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his daughter, disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-nephew,
Magdalena Locsin; Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal
documents and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were 7 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,404 P
her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or
their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her life-long companion in 4,050 - ditto -
her house. favor of Aurea B. Locsin

Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out the 15 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 261 P
terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his 4,930 - ditto -
death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, Aurea Locsin
and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in
years, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, 16 Oct. 17, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 533 P 2,000
donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her Delfina Anson
own, properties to their respective nephews and Aurea Locsin M. Acabado
nieces. She made the following sales and donation of
properties which she had received from her husband's
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P
estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
WITNESSES
19 Sept. 1, 1975 Conditional Donation in 1,130 P
3,000 - ditto -
23 Jan. 26, 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale in 962 P 481 favor of Mariano Locsin
favor of Mariano Locsin
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance
1-JRL Apr. 7, 1966 Deed of Sale in favor of 430,203 P 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
20,000 in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Antonio Illegible
Jose R. Locsin Rosario whose maternal
grandfather was Getulio
1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P Locsin
1,000 Hostilio Cornello
Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian 2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance
319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
1 Nov. 29, 1974 Deed of Donation in 26,509 in favor of Manuel V. del (Lot 2155) Salvador Nical
favor Aurea Locsin, Rosario but the rentals
Matilde L. Cordero from bigger portion of
and Salvador Locsin Lot 2155 leased to Filoil
Refinery were assigned to
2 Feb. 4, 1975 Deed of Donation in 34,045 Maria Jaucian Lorayes
favor Aurea Locsin, Cornelio
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin Of her own properties, Doña Catalina conveyed the
following to her own nephews and nieces and others:
3 Sept. 9, 1975 Deed of Donation in (Lot 2059)
favor Aurea Locsin, EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
Matilde L. Cordero
and Salvador Locsin 2-JJL July 16, 1964 Deed of Sale in favor 5,000 P
1,000
4 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,424 Vicente Jaucian (lot 2020)
Hostilio Cornelio (6,825 sqm. when
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco resurveyed)

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 24 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale 100 P 1,000
5,750 Hostilio Cornelio in favor of Francisco M.
favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian Maquiniana

6 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,237 P 26 July 15, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 130 P
5,720 - ditto - 1,300
favor of Aurea B. Locsin favor of Francisco
Maquiniana
27 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 100 P 1,000 (1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the
favor of Ireneo Mamia heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduardo
Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful
28 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 75 P 750 heirs and entitled to the entire estate,
favor of Zenaida Buiza in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian
Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest
29 May 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P 1,500 collateral heirs by right of
favor of Felisa Morjella representation of Juan and Gregorio,
both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood
brothers of Catalina;
30 Apr. 3, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 31 P 1,000
favor of Inocentes Motocinos
(2) declaring the deeds of sale,
donations, reconveyance and
31 Feb. 12, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 150 P
exchange and all other instruments
1,500
conveying any part of the estate of
favor of Casimiro Mondevil
Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin including,
but not limited to those in the inventory
32 Mar. 1, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 112 P 1,200 of known properties (Annex B of the
favor of Juan Saballa complaint) as null and void ab-initio;

25 Dec. 28, 1973 Deed of Absolute Sale in 250 P (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of
2,500 Albay and/or Legazpi City to cancel all
of Rogelio Marticio certificates of title and other transfers
of the real properties, subject of this
Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977. case, in the name of defendants, and
derivatives therefrom, and issue new
Four years before her death, she had made a will on ones to the plaintiffs;
October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying the transfers
she had made during her lifetime in favor of her (4) ordering the defendants, jointly and
husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of severally, to reconvey ownership and
her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no possession of all such properties to
need to submit it to the court for probate because the the plaintiffs, together with all
properties devised to them under the will had already muniments of title properly endorsed
been conveyed to them by the deceased when she and delivered, and all the fruits and
was still alive, except some legacies which the incomes received by the defendants
executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador from the estate of Catalina, with legal
Lorayes, proceeded to distribute. interest from the filing of this action;
and where reconveyance and delivery
In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's demise, cannot be effected for reasons that
some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had might have intervened and prevent the
already received their legacies and hereditary shares same, defendants shall pay for the
from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court value of such properties, fruits and
of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to incomes received by them, also with
recover the properties which she had conveyed to the legal interest from the filing, of this
Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the case
conveyances were inofficious, without consideration,
and intended solely to circumvent the laws on (5) ordering each of the defendants to
succession. Those who were closest to Doña Catalina pay the plaintiffs the amount of
did not join the action. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and the further sum of P20,000.00
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 each as moral damages; and
in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and against the
Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which (6) ordering the defendants to pay the
reads: plaintiffs attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, in the amount of
WHEREFORE, this Court renders P30,000.00 without prejudice to any
judgment for the plaintiffs and against contract between plaintiffs and
the defendants: counsel.
Costs against the defendants. 9
supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be
The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA- reduced on petition of any person
G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its now appealed affected. (634a)
judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's
decision. The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doña
Catalina was already 90 years old when she died on
The petition has merit and should be granted. July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her
advanced years she may have been imposed upon,
The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her
declaring the private respondents, nephews and husband's nephews and nieces (the petitioners) to
nieces of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to transfer to them the properties which she had
inherit the properties which she had already disposed inherited from Don Mariano's estate. The records do
of more than ten (10) years before her death. For not support that conjecture.
those properties did not form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years
obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) before her death, Doña Catalina had already begun
death and those which have accrued thereto since the transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the
opening of the succession."   The rights to a person's
10 properties which she received from Don Mariano. She
succession are transmitted from the moment of his sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his
death, and do not vest in his heirs until such nephew and namesake Mariano Locsin II.   On April
13

time.  Property which Doña Catalina had transferred


11 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she
or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no also sold a 43 hectare land to another Locsin nephew,
longer formed part of her estate at the time of her Jose R. Locsin.  The next year, or on March 22,
14

death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died 1967, she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to
intestate, only the property that remained in her estate Julian Locsin. 15

at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs;


and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020   was partitioned by
16

as donations, the right arising under certain and among Doña Catalina, Julian Locsin, Vicente
circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or Jaucian and Agapito Lorete.  At least Vicente
17

revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not Jaucian, among the other respondents in this case, is
inure to the respondents since neither they nor the estopped from assailing the genuineness and due
donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.  12
execution of the sale of portions of Lot 2020 to
himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the
There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on partition agreement that he (Vicente) concluded with
the part of Doña Catalina, in transferring the the other co-owners of Lot 2020.
properties she had received from her late husband to
his nephews and nieces, an intent to circumvent the Among Doña, Catalina's last transactions before she
law in violation of the private respondents' rights to died in 1977 were the sales of property which she
her succession. Said respondents are not her made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in
compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had 1975.18

any such, hence there were no legitimes that could


conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that
property during her lifetime. All that the respondents Doña Catalina was mentally incompetent when she
had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such
freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject suggestion be made in light of the fact that even as
only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she
which, even if it were breached, the respondents may was also contemporaneously disposing of her other
not invoke: properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her
nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years
Art. 750. The donation may before her death) one-half (or 5,000 sq.m.) of Lot
comprehend all the present property 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she
of the donor or part thereof, provided sold another 5000 sq.m. of the same lot to Julian
he reserves, in full ownership or in Locsin. 19

usufruct, sufficient means for the


support of himself, and of all relatives From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers
who, at the time of the acceptance of of her properties to her relatives and other persons,
the donation, are by law entitled to be namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia,
Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella, Inocentes Motocinos, advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively
Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio demonstrates that Doña Catalina acted as a
Marticio.   None of those transactions was impugned
20
completely free agent when she made the
by the private respondents. conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact,
considering their closeness to Doña Catalina it would
In 1975, or two years before her death, Doña Catalina have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to
sold some lots not only to Don Mariano's niece, Aurea employ "fraud, undue pressure, and subtle
Locsin, and his nephew, Mariano Locsin manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her
II,   but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian
21 properties to them. Doña Catalina's niece, Elena
Arboleda.   If she was competent to make that
22 Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian,
conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any lived with her in her house. Her nephew-in-law,
doubt that she was equally competent to transfer her Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her
other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II? properties. The sales and donations which she signed
in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her
The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador
bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated November
"consciousness of its real origin" which carries the 19,
implication that said estate consisted of properties 1974  in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of
23

which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in donation dated February 4, 1975   in favor of Matilde
24

the teeth of Doña Catalina's admission in her Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September
inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the 9, 1975   in favor of Salvador Lorayes, were all
25

private properties of the deceased (Don Mariano) and witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to
forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the Doña Catalina's niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando
marriage with the surviving spouse, while items 34 to Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria
42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the Olbes.  The sales which she made in favor of Aurea
26

marriage." She would have known better than anyone Locsin on July 15, 1974   were witnessed by Hostilio
27

else whether the listing included any of her Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those
paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none circumstances, said transactions could not have been
was in fact included. The inventory was signed by her anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.
under oath, and was approved by the probate court in
Special Proceeding No. 138 of the Court of First Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court
Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing this
of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground
Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false of prescription. Commenced decades after the
inventory that would have been prejudicial to his transactions had been consummated, and six (6)
aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood to years after Doña Catalina's death, it prescribed four
inherit from her eventually. (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded
in the Registry of Property,  whether considered an
28

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney action based on fraud, or one to redress an injury to
Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano died, he the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents
and his wife (Doña Catalina), being childless, had may not feign ignorance of said transactions because
agreed that their respective properties should the registration of the deeds was constructive notice
eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As thereof to them and the whole world. 29

the trusted legal adviser of the spouses and a full-


blood nephew of Doña Catalina, he would not have WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The
spun a tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his decision dated March 14, 1989 of the Court of
own interest. Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' complaint
Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of
fact that among Doña Catalina's nephews and nieces, properties in Civil Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial
those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED,
Salvador Lorayes; (b) her niece and companion Elena with costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs
Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and therein.
Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and their respective
husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio SO ORDERED.
Cornelio, did not join the suit to annul and undo the
dispositions of property which she made in favor of G.R. No. 98709 May 13, 1993
the Locsins, although it would have been to their
MAGDALENA LLENARES, petitioner, Petitioner filed the aforementioned complaint on 12
vs. July 1977 after she had been allegedly dispossessed
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and APOLINAR of the property in question by private respondent
ZABELLA, respondents. Apolinar Zabella in 1976, and after the latter had
caused to be annotated in Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 28170 an affidavit of adverse claim on 17
February 1977. She prayed therein that, inter alia, she
DAVIDE, JR., J.: be restored to the possession of the said property and
that the adverse claim be cancelled. 4

Petitioner availed of this recourse under Rule 45 of


the Revised Rules of Court to obtain a reversal of the As disclosed by the pleadings and the challenged
Decision of the Seventh Division of Court of Appeals decision, the antecedent facts are as follows:
in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853, promulgated on 24 April
1990,  and the reinstatement of the 4 April 1986
1 Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares were co-
Decision of Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court owners, in equal shares, of a parcel of land situated in
(RTC), Lucena City, in a case  involving the recovery
2 barrio Silangang Mayao of the then Municipality, now
of the possession and quieting of title over a parcel of City, of Lucena. In the cadastral survey of the said
land. The dispositive portion of the trial court's municipality, the lot was designated as Cadastral Lot
decision reads as follows: No. 4804-D. This designation was later changed to
Lot. No. 5015.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiff who is On 21 December 1929, Anastacio Llenares sold his
declared the true and absolute owner one-half (1/2) share in the lot to Ariston Zabella,
of the land covered by TCT No. 28170 private respondent's father. Subsequently, after due
(Registry of Deeds, Lucena City) proceedings, the cadastral court awarded Lot. No.
particularly described in par. 2 of 5015 to Juan Zabella and Anastacio Llenares in equal
plaintiff's complaint and it is hereby shares. Decree No. 54398 was issued to both of them
ordered — and on the basis thereof, Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 43073 was issued in their names on July
1. That the defendant or any person 1937.
acting in his behalf surrender and
transfer possession of the land in Anastacio Llenares passed away on 27 March 1931
question (covered by TCT No. 28170 leaving the petitioner, his only child, as his sole heir.
to the plaintiff; On the other hand, Juan Zabella and niece Irene
Catapat. On 5 February 1960, Rosario and Irene
2. That the defendant render an adjudicated to themselves Juan Zabella's one-half
accounting of the fruits he received (1/2) share in the lot. This adjudication was annotated
from the aforementioned property from in OCT No. 43073. Rosario died on 5 June 1962
August 1976 until possession is leaving, as her only heirs, her children Godofredo,
transferred to the plaintiff, said Noemi, Natividad, Olimpio and Numeriana, all
accounting to be approved by the surnamed Zaracena.
court;
On 22 June 1976, petitioner, as the sole heir of
3. That in keeping with the findings of Anastacio Llenares, adjudicated to herself, by way of
this court, the Register of Deeds, a Salaysay ng Pagmamana ng Nag-iisang
Lucena City, should, as he is hereby Tagapagmana (Exhibit "A"), the one-half (1/2) share
ordered cancel Entry No. 35285 in in the property belonging to Anastacio Llenares. This
TCT No. 28170, said entry being an fact was likewise annotated in OCT No. 43073.
annotation of the adverse claim of
defendant Apolinar Zabella inscribed On 26 August 1976, however, OCT No. 43073 was
on Feb. 17, 1977; cancelled and in its place, TCT No. T-27166 was
issued for the entire lot. On 16 February 1977, private
4. That the defendant pay to plaintiff respondent Zabella filed an adverse claim which was
the amount of P2,500.00 as attorney's duly annotated in TCT No. T-27166.
fees and P1,000.00 as expenses of
litigation.
3 As a consequence of a Kasunduan ng
Pagsusukat (Exhibit "I") executed by and between
Irene Catapat and the heirs of Rosario Zabella
Zaracena, Lot No. 5015 was subsidivided into Lot. which to ventilate this infirmity has
Nos. 5015-A, 5015-B and 5015-C. Lot No. 5015-A, long expired. It is a postulate in law
which comprises one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 5015 that "no title to registered land in
corresponding to Anastacio's share, was allotted to derogation to that of the registered
the petitioner. TCT No. T-27166 was thereafter owner shall be acquired by
cancelled and separate Transfer Certificate of Title prescription or adverse possession.
were issued for each of the subdivided lots. TCT No. Prescription is unavailing not only
28170 was issued in the petitioner's name for Lot No. against the registered owner but also
5015-A. against his hereditary successors
because the latter merely step into the
As regards the issue of possession, the petitioner's shoes of the decedent by operation of
evidence discloses that since she was only four (4) law and are merely the continuation of
years old when her father died, her cousin Rosario the personality of their predecessor in
Zabella administered the land in question until 1959 interest." (Barcelona vs. Barcelona,
when she (petitioner) placed Rufo Orig as tenant 100 Phil. 251). On this score alone,
therein. The latter worked as such, delivering to the defendant's claim of prescription
petitioner her share of the harvest until 1976, when he should fail. The court also notes, in
stopped doing so as he was ordered by the private passing, that defendant's evidence
respondent not to give the petitioner her share does not convincingly establish that he
anymore. Private respondent allegedly claimed possessed the property publicly,
ownership over the property. Petitioner further proved exclusively and peacefully in the
that she had been paying the land taxes on the concept of owner. For one thing, he
property until the filing of the case. has not even paid any realty tax on
the property as the property is not
On the other hand, according to his own version, declared for taxation purposes in his
private respondent and his siblings took possession of name. The court is neither impressed
that portion of the land sold by Anastacio Llenares with the credibility of defendant's
after Ariston Zabella's death on 21 March 1930. He witnesses. For example, the witness
then converted the same into riceland. It was irrigated Sergio Dalida testified that in 1918 the
in 1955 and he has been paying the irrigation charges land in litigation was in the possession
since 1960. Moreover, he and his co-heirs have been of Ariston Zabella (T.S.N. 8-21-84 p.
in possession of the property without interference by 8). There seems to be no truth to this
any party until "the present."
5 because the property was bought by
Ariston Zabella only in the year 1929.
And then, there was that other witness
The trial court limited the issues to the following:
Cosme Ranillo who unequivocally
whether the private respondent had acquired absolute
admitted during cross-examination
ownership of the land in question by prescription and
that he was coached by the defendant
whether the plaintiff's (petitioner) action is barred by
(vide: t.s.n. 11-20-84 p. 24-26).
laches.  In finding for the petitioner, the lower court
6

made the following disquisitions:


As regards the Deed of Sale of the
property in litigation in favor of Ariston
It is beyond cavil that the land in
Zabella (Exh. "1") which is apparently
question (then part of a big parcel) has
the cornerstone of defendant's claim
been registered and titled in the name
over the property the court concurs
of plaintiff's father Anastacio Llenares
with the submission of the plaintiff that
since July 28, 1937 even as it is now
after final judgment has been
registered in the name of plaintiff who
rendered in the cadastral proceedings,
made an affidavit of self-adjudification
all rights or claims prior thereto are
on June 22, 1976 being the only child
deemed barred by the principle of res
of Anastacio Llenares. Anastacio
judicata. Hence after the finality of the
Llenares became the registered owner
judgment in the cadastral case, the
by virtue of a cadastral proceedings, a
Deed of Sale has lost its efficacy
proceedings in rem that is binding and
being functus oficio.
conclusive against the whole world.
No evidence of irregularity or fraud in
the issuance of the title has been With respect to the defense of laches
adduced, and even if there is intrinsic so emphatically and exhaustively
fraud, the period of one year within discussed by defendant's counsel in
his brief we find this to be devoid of
merit because of the following cogent thereabout (sic).
reasons, viz: Except for filing an
adverse claim on
Firstly, the defense of February 17, 1977,
laches was never defendant has not
interposed or pleaded taken any step to have
in the answer filed by the title of the property
the defendant. Not and its tax declaration
even in our most transferred to his
gratuitous moment can name.
we see a nuance of
this defense being Thirdly, as adverted to,
asserted in the a title once registered
answer: It is a rule of cannot be defeated
procedure that even by adverse, open
defenses and and notorious
objections not pleaded possession. In the
either in a motion to same vein, laches, too,
dismiss or in the may not be considered
answer are deemed a valid defense for
waived. (Sec. 2 Rule 9 claiming ownership of
of the Rules of Court). registered land. Where
prescription would not
Secondly, the lie, neither would
evidence shows that laches be available
plaintiff has not been (De La Cruz vs. De La
sleeping on her rights. Cruz, CA-G.R. No.
According to her she 4700-R, Aug. 14,
was dispossessed of 1950; Adove vs,
the land in 1976. It is Lopez, CA-G.R. No.
admitted by the 18060-R, Aug. 30,
defendant that in 1977, 1957. 7

plaintiff lodged a
complaint against the From this adverse decision, the private respondent
defendant regarding appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, which
the land in question docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 09853. He
with the Presidential asked the respondent Court to reverse the RTC
Action Committee On because the latter erred: (a) in not considering the
Land Problems unsullied testimonial and documentary evidence for
(PACLAP) as (sic) the appellant; (b) in appreciating the plaintiff-
Camp Wilhelm, appellee's flimsy and insufficient testimonial evidence;
Lucena City. And then (c) in not declaring that prescription and laches were
the instant action was raised by the defendant; (d) in declaring that the
filed in court on July failure to present to the cadastral court the deed of
12, 1977. absolute sale bars the appellant (private respondent)
from proving his ownership over the land in suit; and
On the contrary it is (e) in rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
8

the defendant and/or


his predeccessor in In its Decision, the respondent Court upheld the
interest who have private respondent's position and decreed as follows:
been sleeping on their
rights if any. They did WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
not assert their right of is reversed and another one entered
ownership over the —
land in question arising
from the Deed of Sale (1) declaring defendant-appellant the
during the cadastral true and lawful owner of the 12,501
proceedings in the square meters of land described in
year 1937 or
and covered by Transfer Certificate of The other tax payments were not in her name, but in
Title No. T-28170 of the Registry of the names of Godofredo Zaracena and Juan Zabella.
Deeds of Lucena City; The respondent Court opined that "[N]ormally, one
who claims possession in ownership will declare the
(2) ordering the plaintiff-appellee to property in his name and will pay taxes on it,"  and
12

execute to the defendant-appellant the concluded that the petitioner's claimed possession "is
proper deed of conveyance not possession in law that deserves protection and
transferring full ownership of Transfer recognition."  On the other hand, it gave credit to the
13

Certificate of Title No. T-28170 to the private respondent's version chiefly because he has
said defendant-appellant; been paying irrigation charges since 1960.

(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner took this recourse,
Lucena City to cancel said Transfer and raises the following issues:
Certificate of Title No. T-28170 and to
issue thereafter a new one in the 1. Whether or not the alleged sale of a
name of defendant-appellant, in the property by virtue of an instrument
event the plaintiff-appellee shall fail or which was not filed or registered under
refuse to execute the conveyance; Act 3344 and was not submitted
before the Cadastral Court during the
(4) ordering the plaintiff-appellee to hearing thereof may deprived (sic) an
pay attorney's fees of P10,000.00. adjudicated-declared owner the (sic)
enjoyment of possession and the
Costs against the plaintiff-appellee. 9 improvements thereof.

In resolving the appeal against the petitioner, the 2. Whether or not a party in (sic)
respondent Court stressed the fact that although OCT whose title was vested by virtue of a
No. 43073 was issued in 1937, it was only on 26 rendition of judgment and issuance of
August 1976 that the petitioner initially moved "to the decree of registration in a judicial
change the registered ownership" of the property with proceeding in rem which as such,
the issuance of TCT No. 27166. At that time, binds the whole world and who ever
petitioner was already forty-nine (49) years old. In claim (sic) thereafter on the said land
short, the respondent Court observed that she are (sic) deemed barred under the
allowed twenty-eight (28) years to pass — from the principle of res judicata.
time she attained the age of majority — before taking
any affirmative action to protect her rights over the 3. Whether (sic) or not property
property. It thus concluded that "suspicion then is not covered by Torence (sic) Title can be
altogether unjustified that the inaction was because acquired by prescription or adverse
the appellee knew of the sale by her father Juan possession. 14

Zabella (sic)," and that such knowledge is notice "that


appellee had no right over half of the land. "10
After the private respondent filed his Comment, We
gave due course to the petition and directed both
Anent the petitioner's contention that the private parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which
respondent is not only guilty of laches but that they complied with.
prescription had already set in against him, the
respondent Court ruled that the former's evidence The petition is impressed with merit.
speaks otherwise because after TCT No. T-27166
was issued on 26 August 1976, the private 1. In the first place, the public respondent's factual
respondent promptly filed his adverse claim, thereby findings on the issuance of possession — on the
making of record his interest in the land. Thus, neither basis of which it rejected the findings of fact and
prescription nor laches applies against him. 11
conclusions of the trial court — are conjectural and
speculative. Hence, We cannot be bound by such
Public respondent also overturned the trail court's findings under the rule that findings of fact of the
finding that the petitioner was in possession of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on this Court.  The15

property until she was dispossessed in 1976 by the trial court gave credence to the petitioner's account
private respondent principally because it was in the that she had legally possessed the property in
third quarter of 1977 that she (petitioner) declared the question until 1976, categorically ruling that the
questioned property in her name, and had paid land private respondent's "evidence does not convincingly
taxes thereon only for the same third quarter of 1977. establish that he possessed the property publicly,
exclusively and peacefully in the concept of was because the appellee knew of the
owner."  The reasons for this pronouncement have
16
sale by her father to Juan (sic)
already been given. Clearly, these matters are Zabella. . . .
20

inexorably anchored on the witnesses' credibility. It is


a settled judicial precept that the issue of the Such a suspicion has no basis at all. The
credibility of witnesses is primarily addressed to the parties do not dispute the fact that at the time
trial court since it is in a better position to decide such of Anastacio Llenares' death on 27 March
a question, having seen and heard the witnesses and 1931, the petitioner was only four (4) years
having observed their deportment and manner of old. The deed of sale was executed by
testifying during the trial.
17
Anastacio Llenares on 21 December 1929,
when the petitioner was only two (2) years old.
Moreover, its findings on such credibility carry great Being at that time very much below the age of
weight and respect, and will be sustained by the reason, the petitioner could not have been
appellate court unless certain facts of substance and expected to be aware of the existence of the
value have been overlooked which, if considered, said deed of sale, much less understand its
might affect the result of the case.  That the petitioner
18
contents. The evidence failed to show that the
neither declared the property in her name nor paid the private respondent informed the petitioner of
taxes thereon until 1977 is not, contrary to the public such a sale at any time before the former filed
respondent's conclusion, fatal to her cause. Until 27 the adverse claim on 17 February 1977.
June 1976, the property remained covered by OCT
No. 43073 in the names of Juan Zabella and 2. Secondly, the respondent Court erroneously
Anastacio Llenares. The private respondent's alleged applied the rule on prescription against the petitioner
claim was not annotated thereon. There is, as well, no and not against the private respondent. The evidence
evidence to show that the private respondent had conclusively established that at an appropriate
earlier made any extrajudicial or judicial demands to cadastral proceedings, Lot No. 5015 was awarded by
enforce his claim on the property based on the so- the cadastral court to Juan Zabella and Anastacio
called deed of sale which Anastacio had executed on Llenares in equal pro-indiviso shares; the decision
21 December 1929 in favor of Ariston Zabella, the became final; and on 28 July 1937, OCT No. 43073
private respondent's predecessor-in-interest. Since was issued in favor of Juan Zabella and Anastacio
the petitioner is Anastacio Llenares's sole heir, the Llenares. It was only on 17 February 1977, or after
continued existence of OCT No. 43073 fully protected the lapse of over thirty-nine (39) years, that the
her rights; and her failure to declare for taxation private respondent, as a successor-in-interest of
purposes the one-half (1/2) portion of the land Ariston Zabella, took the first legal step — i.e., the
pertaining to Anastacio did not, therefore, prejudice filing of the affidavit of adverse claim — to protect and
her because the payments of the real estate taxes by preserve his supposed right acquired under the deed
other — such as Godofredo Zaracena and Juan of sale. Unfortunately, however, this move did not
Zabella, as found by the public respondent per produce any legal effect. An adverse claim under
Exhibits "C", "C-1" and "C-2"   — for and in behalf of
19
Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act No.
the registered owners — benefited the registered 496), the governing law at that time, referred to a
owners themselves and their successors-in-interest. claim of "any part or interest in registered land
On the other, the private respondent neither had the adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent
property declared in his name for taxation purposes to the date of the original registration."  In the instant
21

nor paid the real estate taxes thereon. All that he case, the private respondent's "adverse claim" is one
paid, and this was only beginning in 1960, were the based on a transaction which had occurred long
irrigation charges. And yet, the respondent Court before the rendition of the decision in the cadastral
resolved the issue in his favor. This palpable proceedings and the issuance of OCT No. 43073.
inconsistency on the part of the Court of Appeals This seems to have escaped the attention of the
defies all logic. public respondent which instead concluded that it was
the petitioner who did not take any legal action from
Furthermore, the respondent Court's conclusion that 1937, when OCT No. 43073 was issued, until 26
the petitioner made no move to have the property August 1976, when TCT NO. 27166 was issued
declared in her name or pay the real estate taxes following her execution on 22 June 1976 of the
thereon before 1976 because she knew all along affidavit of "self-adjudication." This conclusion has no
about the 1929 sale executed by her father to Ariston basis. As has been earlier adverted to, the continued
Zabella, is plain speculation and, as characterized by existence of OCT No. 43073 in Juan Zabella's name
the public respondent, a mere "suspicion," thus: protected the petitioner as the sole heir of Anastacio
Llenares. There is no law which requires her, as a
. . . The suspicion then is not sole heir, to execute an affidavit of adjudication and
altogether unjustified that the inaction cause both the cancellation of the OCT and the
issuance of a new one in her name and in the names It is now settled that an action for the conveyance of
of the heirs of co-owner Juan Zabella in order to property based on an implied or constructive trust
transfer the ownership of the property to her, or prescribes in ten (10) years. 30

protect her rights and interests therein. The transfer in


her favor took place, ipso jure, upon the death of WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
Anastacio Llenares. 22
GRANTING the instant petition, ANNULING the
challenged decision of the public respondent Court of
3. Finally, the so-called deed of sale executed by Appeals of 24 April 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 09853
Anastacio Llenares in 1929 had lost its efficacy after and REINSTATING the decision of the trial court
the judgment in the cadastral proceedings subject of the appeal in the latter case.
adjudicating Lot No. 5015 to him and Juan Zabella
became final. Ariston Zabella, the vendee in the said Costs against the private respondent.
sale, did not file any answer in the cadastral
proceedings or advance any claims on the said lot. It SO ORDERED.
is to be noted that the proceedings under the
Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended)  are 23

judicial and in rem. As such, they bind the whole G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990
world. The final judgment rendered therein is deemed
to have settled the status of the land subject thereof; BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS,
any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and CLAUDIO, all
therefore deemed barred under the principle of res surnamed, GEVERO, petitioners,
judicata.  In a cadastal proceeding, the Government
24 vs.
is actually the plaintiff and all the claimants are INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and DEL
defendants.  This is because the former, represented
25 MONTE DEVELOPMENT
by the Solicitor General, institutes the proceedings by CORPORATION, respondents.
a petition against the holders, claimants, possessors
or occupants of such lands or any part thereof while Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.
the latter, or those claiming interest in the entire land
or any part of it, whether named in the notice or not, Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.
are required to appear before the court and file an
answer on or before the return day or within such
further time as may be followed by the court.  All 26

conflicting interest shall be adjudicated therein and


PARAS, J.:
the decree awarded in favor of the party entitled to the
land; when it has become final, the decree shall serve This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of
as the basis for an original certificate of title in favor of the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV
the said party. This shall have the same effect as a No. 69264, entitled Del Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique
Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision 2 of the then Court of First Instance
certificate of title granted under the Land Registration (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the plaintiff
Act.27
corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the
Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred
A party fraudulently deprived of his property in a Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.
cadastral proceeding may nevertheless file, within
one (1) year from the entry of the decree, a petition As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as
for review.   After the lapse of the said period, if the
28
follows:
property has not yet passed on to an innocent
purchaser for value, an action for conveyance may The parcel of land under litigation is
still be filed by the aggrieved party.  In the instant
29
Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision Plan
case, that action for conveyance could have only Psd-37365 containing an area of
been based on an implied trust in Article 1456 of the 20,119 square meters and situated at
Civil Code: Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot
was acquired by purchase from the
Art. 1456. If property is acquired late Luis Lancero on September 15,
through mistake or fraud, the person 1964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale
obtaining it is, by force of law, executed in favor of plaintiff and by
considered a trustee of an implied virtue of which Transfer Certificate of
trust for the benefit of the person from Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff
whom the property comes. (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in
turn acquired the same parcel from
Ricardo Gevero on February 5, 1952 the land in good faith and for value,
per deed of sale executed by Ricardo occupying the land since the sale and
Gevero which was duly annotated as taking over from Lancero's possession
entry No. 1128 at the back of Original until May 1969, when the defendants
Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering Abadas forcibly entered the property.
the mother lot identified as Lot No. (Rollo, p. 23)
2476 in the names of Teodorica
Babangha — 1/2 share and her After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered
children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as
Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all follows:
surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2
undivided share of the whole area WHEREFORE, premises considered,
containing 48,122 square meters. judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the plaintiff corporation as the true and
Teodorica Babangha died long before absolute owner of that portion of Lot
World War II and was survived by her No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre,
six children aforementioned. The heirs particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the
of Teodorica Babangha on October subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450,
17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial containing an area of SEVEN
Settlement and Partition of the estate THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878) square
two lots, among them was lot 2476. By meters, more or less. The other
virtue of the extra-judicial settlement portions of Lot No. 2476 are hereby
and partition executed by the said adjudicated as follows:
heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot
2476-A to Lot 2476-I, inclusive, under Lot No. 2476 – B – to the heirs of
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 Elena Gevero;
duly approved by the Land
Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D,
Lot No. 2476 – C – to the heirs of
among others, was adjudicated to
Restituto Gevero;
Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at
the time of extra-judicial settlement
and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private Lot No. 2476 – E – to the defendant
respondent herein) filed an action with spouses Enrique C. Torres and
the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis Francisca Aquino;
Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the
partition made by the heirs of Lot No. 2476 – F – to the defendant
Teodorica Babangha insofar as the spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia
same prejudices the land which it Merida Rumohf ;
acquired a portion of lot 2476.
Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 —
Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or G — to defendant spouses Enrique
annul the partition made by the heirs Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.
of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the
same prejudices the land which it No adjudication can be made with
acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. respect to Lot No. 2476-A considering
Plaintiff proved that before purchasing that the said lot is the subject of a civil
Lot 2476-A it first investigated and case between the Heirs of Maria
checked the title of Luis Lancero and Gevero on one hand and the spouses
found the same to be intact in the Daniel Borkingkito and Ursula Gevero
office of the Register of Deeds of on the other hand, which case is now
Cagayan de Oro City. The same with pending appeal before the Court of
the subdivision plan (Exh. "B"), the Appeals. No pronouncement as to
corresponding technical description costs,
(Exh. "P") and the Deed of Sale
executed by Ricardo Gevero — all of SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on
which were found to be Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)
unquestionable. By reason of all
these, plaintiff claims to have bought
From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13, 1989). In
Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC (now fact it has long been settled that a public document
Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, executed and attested through the intervention of the
1986, affirmed the decision appealed from. notary public is evidence of the facts in clear,
unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has the
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for presumption of regularity and to contradict all these,
reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was denied on April evidence must be clear, convincing and more than
21, 1986. merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA
520-521 [1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must
Hence, the present petition. be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10,
1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of
consideration of the deed was not substantiated.
This petition is devoid of merit.
Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is
presumed unless the contrary is proven.
Basically, the issues to be resolved in the
instant case are: 1) whether or not the deed of
As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had
sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis
recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed when he
Lancero is valid; 2) in the affirmative, whether
signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to
or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica
Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it is a basic rule of
Babangha in one of the litigated lots, lot no.
evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced
2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the
by an act, declaration, or omission of another (Sec.
deed of sale; and 3) whether or not the private
28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is
respondents' action is barred by laches.
embodied in the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130,
Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely Rules of Court "where one derives title to property
invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as that: 1) the from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
signature of Ricardo was forged without his latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property
knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero had recognized is evidence against the former." It is however stressed
the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he that the admission of the former owner of a property
signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to must have been made while he was the owner thereof
Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in in order that such admission may be binding upon the
the property notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) present owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil.
the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465 [1910]).
number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the
included the share of Eustaquio Gevero without his 1968 document have no binding effect on DELCOR,
authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR
the area of 20,119 square meters from the bigger in 1964.
area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other
co-owners; 7) Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision
Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property,
survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring
notwithstanding the alleged sale by Ricardo to
about the segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot
Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact
from the mother lot 2476 which brought about the
already raised and passed upon by both the trial and
issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title
appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:
T4320, both of which were illegally issued; and 8) the
area sold as per document is 20,649 square meters
whereas the segregated area covered by TCT No. T- Contrary to the allegations of the
1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square appellants, the trial court found that
meters (Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 62-78). Luis Lancero had taken possession of
the land upon proper investigation by
plaintiff the latter learned that it was
As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in
indeed Luis Lancero who was the
the 1952 deed of sale in favor of Lancero was forged
owner and possessor of Lot 2476
without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p.
D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6).
71) it will be observed that the deed of sale in
question was executed with all the legal formalities of
a public document. The 1952 deed was duly
acknowledged by both parties before the notary
public, yet petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal
presumption of the regularity of the notarized
document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]);
As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely
Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595 [1963]; Gaduco to the shares of Ricardo and Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-
vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 68).
19 SCRA 289 [1967]; Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54
[1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so
SCRA 737 [1970]; Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 construed as to harmonize and give effect to the
[1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]). different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission
v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA 203 [1970]), to
Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract,
petitioners which allegedly invalidated the 1952 deed its entirety must be taken into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff
of sale have not been raised before the trial court nor of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation
before the appellate court. It is settled jurisprudence insisted upon by the petitioners, by citing only one
that an issue which was neither averred in the paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create
complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it naught the entire provisions thereof.
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by
SCRA 276 [1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 laches considering that the petitioners have remained
[1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987]; in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse
Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty possession thereof until at present (Rollo, p. 17).
and Development Corporation v. C.A., 157 SCRA
[1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989). An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the
case at bar is a public instrument (Eacnio v. Baens, 5
Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Phil. 742). The execution of a public instrument is
Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476 under OCT equivalent to the delivery of the thing (Art. 1498, 1st
No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence,
was intended to limit solely to Ricardos' proportionate its execution was considered a sufficient delivery of
share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97;
to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Title [1906]; Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda.
and that the Deed did not include the share of de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960]; Phil.
Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63
Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time SCRA 397 (1975]).
it was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).
Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is
The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is the act of registration that transfers the ownership of
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January
the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest 20, 1989). If the property is a registered land, the
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the
no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting certificate of title and is under no duty to go behind it
capacity) disposing of his hereditary share to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-
immediately after such death, even if the actual extent 26852, March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA
of such share is not determined until the subsequent 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427, March 13,
liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 1989).
SCRA 577 [1972]).
Under the established principles of land registration
Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, law, the person dealing with registered land may
hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of
from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect title and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind
to state that it was only in 1966, the date of the certificate to determine the condition of the
extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his property (Tiongco v. de la Merced, L-2446, July 25,
share in the lot as inheritance from his mother 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20,
Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 1989; Davao Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612
2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica [1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than
was also included unless expressly excluded in the that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The
deed of sale. Court of Appeals found that it had first investigated
and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name
Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from of Luis Lancero. It likewise inquired into the
Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering that a Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical
description and the deed of sale executed by Ricardo that his counsel will make good his representations
Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 169) and has the right to
in order. It even went to the premises and found Luis expect that his lawyer will protect his interests during
Lancero to be in possession of the land to the the trial of his case. For the general employment of an
exclusion of any other person. DELCOR had attorney to prosecute or defend a cause or
therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiff's attorney the
question. implied authority to take all steps or do all acts
necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly
Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by prosecution or management of the suit, and in a
laches. defendant's attorney the power to take such steps as
he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect
The main issues having been disposed of, discussion the interests of the defendant (7A C.J.S. 315).
of the other issues appear unnecessary. Petitioner, therefore, had the right to expect that her
counsel de parte, Atty. San Luis, would protect her
interests during the trial of the cases. However, as
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is
aforestated, Atty. San Luis failed to discharge his
hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
duties as counsel for petitioner.
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
3. ID.; ID.; CLIENT BOUND BY HIS COUNSEL'S
SO ORDERED.
NEGLIGENCE; EXCEPTION. — As a general rule, a
client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence,
G.R. No. 91133. March 22, 1993. and mistakes in handling the case during the trial
(Fernandez vs. Tan Ting Tic, 1 SCRA 1138 [1961];
ROMINA M. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT Rivera vs. Vda. de Cruz, 26 SCRA 58 [1968]; Don
OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 61
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXI, ANGELES SCRA 87 [1974]). However, the rule admits of
CITY, respondents. exceptions. A new trial may be granted where the
incompetency of counsel is so great that the
Ranel L. Trinidad for petitioner. defendant is prejudiced and prevented from fairly
presenting his defense (People vs. Manzanilla, 43
The Solicitor General for public respondents. Phil. 167 [1922]; 16 C.J. 1145; 24 C.J.S. 68). Where a
case is not tried on the merits because of the
negligence of counsel rather than the plaintiff, the
SYLLABUS
case may be dismissed but, in the interest of justice,
without prejudice to the filing of a new action (De Los
1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; OBLIGATIONS. — Reyes vs. Capule, 102 Phil. 464 [1957]).
The legal difficulty petitioner finds herself in is
imputable to the negligence of her de parte counsel,
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner was
Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning the conduct of
deprived of her right to present and prove her defense
the case without formally withdrawing or at least
due to the negligence of her counsel. The appearance
informing petitioner that he would be permanently
of a certain Atty. Buen Zamar is of no moment as
staying in the U.S.A. so that petitioner could appoint
there was no client-attorney relationship between him
another counsel. A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to
and petitioner who did not engage his services to
the cause of his client. He owes his client full devotion
represent her in said cases. The fact that notices of
to his genuine interests, warm zeal in the
the promulgation of judgment were sent to petitioner
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the
at her address of record produced no legal
exertion of his utmost learning and ability (Canon 17,
consequence because notice to a party is not
Code of Professional Responsibility; Agpalo's Legal
effective notice in law (Elli vs. Ditan, 5 SCRA 503
Ethics, p. 157). A lawyer is required to exercise
[1962]; Mata vs. Rita Legarda, Inc., 7 SCRA 227
ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care
[1963]). We rule, therefore, that under the facts of the
and skill having reference to the character of the
case, petitioner was deprived of due process of law. It
business he undertakes to do (Agpalo's Legal Ethics,
is the better part of judicial wisdom and prudence to
p. 174). Among his duties to his client is attending to
accord to petitioner the opportunity to prove her
the hearings of the case (People's Homesite and
defense. It is abhorrent to the judicial conscience to
Housing Corp. vs. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471 [1964];
consign petitioner to the ordeals of imprisonment
Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 175).
without affording her full opportunity to present her
evidence including, of course, the assistance of
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF CLIENTS; NOT PROTECTED competent counselling.
IN CASE AT BAR. — A client may reasonably expect
DECISION On May 17, 1988, the trial court issued a notice in
Criminal Case No. 7650 setting the promulgation of its
MELO, J p: decision on May 13, 1988 and said notice was sent by
registered mail to Atty. San Luis and the petitioner's
Before is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to bondsmen and served by personal service by the
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- court's process server at her address of record upon
G.R. SP No. 17488 and to direct respondent trial her mother who informed the process server that
court to reopen the joint trial of Criminal Cases No. petitioner had been out of the country for almost two
7284 to 7296, 7302-7303, and 7650. years already. Her mother did not forward the notice
to petitioner.
It appears from the record that on May 7, 1985
petitioner was charged in Criminal Cases No. 7284- On May 31, 1988, when Criminal Case No. 7650 was
7296, and No. 7302-7303 before the Regional Trial called for promulgation of judgment, the trial court
Court, Branch 61, Angeles City with violation of Batas appointed Atty. Augusto Panlilio as counsel de oficio
Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Check Law. On to represent the absent petitioner. The judgment of
August 21, 1985, petitioner was again charged in the conviction of petitioner was promulgated by the
same court with the same offense in Criminal Case reading of the decision in open court by the Branch
No. 7650. All these cases were consolidated for trial Clerk of Court and furnishing the parties through their
and decision in Branch LXI of the Regional Trial Court respective counsel present in court with copies of the
of the Third Judicial Region in Angeles City, at that decision. Likewise, copies of the decision were sent
time presided over by the Honorable Ramon C. by registered mail to petitioner's bondsmen, her
Tuazon who has since retired. At the arraignment, attorney of record, and petitioner herself at her
petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to all the informations address of record, 1799 Burgos St., Angeles City.
against her. She then posted bail in all the cases and
was granted provisional liberty. On June 14, 1988, the trial court issued notices to all
the parties setting the promulgation of its joint
At the trial of the cases, petitioner did not appear in decision in Criminal Cases No. 7284-7296 and 7302-
court despite notices sent to her residence as 7303 for June 29, 1988. Copies of the notices were
appearing on the record and to her bondsmen. Her sent by registered mail to petitioner's counsel of
counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San Luis appeared in record, Atty. Vicente San Luis, and to her bondsmen.
her behalf during the time the prosecution was Copy of the notice was served upon petitioner by
presenting its evidence up to October 20, 1987 when personal service at her given address, which notice
it was the turn of the defense to present its evidence. was received by her mother who again informed the
However, the hearing on said date was postponed process server that petitioner was out of the country.
because of the absence of the private prosecutor and
the continuation of the hearing was reset to On June 29, 1988, promulgation of the joint judgment
November 19, 1987. On said date, Atty. Buen Zamar of conviction of petitioner in the aforementioned was
entered a special appearance for Atty. San Luis as made by the Branch Clerk of Court who read the
counsel for the accused without, however, the decision. Petitioner was represented by Atty. Buen
consent of petitioner. From said date Atty. San Luis Zamar at the reading of sentence.
Did not appear in court as he had left for the United
States of America and has not returned since then, On December 31, 1988, petitioner was arrested and
without informing petitioner or withdrawing his detained in the local jail of Angeles City.
appearance. Atty. Zamar, together with the
prosecution, asked for deferment of the hearing that On February 6, 1989, petitioner, now represented by
day as he was not conversant with the facts of the a new counsel de parte filed three motions, namely:
case, and the continuation of hearing was reset to (1) for temporary release as she was pregnant and
January 6, 1988, on which date Atty. Zamar again allegedly suffering from a heart ailment; (2) to set
asked for postponement and the hearing was reset to aside promulgation of judgment (p. 44, Rollo); and (3)
February 3, 1988. However, also on January 6, 1988, to re-open trial (p. 50 Rollo). The prosecution
the trial court issued an order forfeiting in favor of the opposed the motions The trial court then denied the
government the bonds posted by petitioner for her motions to set aside judgment and to re-open trial, but
provisional liberty in view of the failure of her with regard to the motion for temporary release,
bondsmen to produce her at the scheduled hearing of directed that "should a medical examination or
the cases against her. It appears that sometime in confinement in the hospital be necessary, the court
June, 1987, petitioner got married and lived with her may allow the accused under guard to consult a
husband at their conjugal dwelling at the Villa Dolores physician or enter a hospital for medical treatment."
Subdivision, Angeles City.
Thereupon, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus undertakes to do (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 174).
with this Court which was later docketed as G.R. No. Among his duties to his client is attending to the
87564-79. The petition was, however, per our hearings of the case (People's Homesite and Housing
resolution dated April 24, 1989, referred to the Court Corp. vs. Tiongco, 12 SCRA 471 [1964]; Agpalo's
of Appeals where the petition docketed as CA. G.R. Legal Ethics, p. 175).
SP No. 17488. On September 26 1989, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the Atty. Vicente San Luis, petitioner's counsel de parte in
petition. the afore-stated cases, was unquestionably negligent
in the performance of his duties to his client, herein
Hence, the instant petition where petitioner assigns petitioner. His negligence consisted in his failure to
the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals: attend to the hearings of the case, his failure to advise
petitioner that he was going to stay abroad so that the
I. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING petitioner could have secured the services of another
THAT PETITIONER IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR counsel, and his failure to withdraw properly as
THE CHECKS SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL CASES counsel for petitioner. This is a clear case where a
NOS. 7284, 7285 AND 7303 EVEN IF SHE WAS party was totally abandoned by her counsel. A client
NEITHER THE DRAWER NOR MAKER OF THE may reasonably expect that his counsel will make
SAME; good his representations (Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p.
169) and has the right to expect that his lawyer will
II. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING protect his interests during the trial of his case. For
THAT THERE WERE VALID PROMULGATIONS OF the general employment of an attorney to prosecute
JUDGMENTS IN THE SAID CASES; or defend a cause or proceeding ordinarily vests in a
plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all
steps or do all acts necessary or incidental to the
III. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
regular and orderly prosecution or management of the
THAT PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS
suit, and in a defendant's attorney the power to take
CONTAINED IN THE CHECKS SUBJECT OF THE
such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit
CRIMINAL CASES WOULD (NOT) MERIT LESS
and protect the interests of the defendant (74 C.J.S.
SEVERE PENALTIES IF NOT THE
315). Petitioner, therefore, had the right to expect that
EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE ENTIRE CRIMINAL
her counsel de parte, Atty. San Luis, would protect
LIABILITY;
her interests during the trial of the cases. However, as
aforestated, Atty. San Luis failed to discharged his
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING duties as counsel for petitioner.
THAT NO SUFFICIENT GROUNDS EXIST TO
WARRANT THE REOPENING OF THE JOINT TRIAL
As a general rule, a client is bound by his counsel's
OF THE CASES SUBJECT OF THE PETITION.
conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the
case during the trial (Fernandez vs. Tan Ting Tic, 1
(pp. 7-8, Rollo.) SCRA 1138 [1961]; Rivera vs. Vda. de Cruz, 26
SCRA 58 [1968]; Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs.
The resolution of this case hinges on the issue of Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 87 [1974]. However the
whether or not petitioner was denied her day in court. rule admits exceptions. A new trial may be granted
where the incompetency of counsel is so great that
The legal difficulty petitioner finds herself in is the defendant is prejudiced and prevented from fairly
imputable to the negligence of her de parte counsel, presenting his defense (People vs. Manzanilla, 43
Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning the conduct of Phil. 167 [1922]; 16 C.J. 1145; 24 C.J.S. 68). Where a
the case without formally withdrawing or at least case is not tried on the merits because of the
informing petitioner that he would be permanently negligence of counsel rather than the plaintiff, the
staying in the U.S.A. so that petitioner could appoint case may be dismissed but, in the interest of justice,
another counsel. without prejudice to the filing of a new action (De Los
Reyes vs. Capule, 102 Phil. 464 [1957].
A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his
client. He owes his client full devotion to his genuine Clearly, petitioner was deprived of her right to present
interests, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense and prove her defense due to the negligence of her
of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning counsel. The appearance of a certain Atty. Buen
and ability (Canon 17, Code of Professional Zamar is of no comment as there was no client-
Responsibility; Agpalo's Legal Ethics, p. 157). A attorney relationship between him and petitioner who
lawyer is required to exercise ordinary diligence or did not engage his services to represent her is said
that reasonable degree of care and skill having cases. The fact that notices of the promulgation of
reference to the character of the business he judgment were sent to petitioner at her address of
record produced no legal consequence because It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley
notice to a party is not effective notice in law (Elli vs. died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a will
Ditan, 5 SCRA 503 [1962]; Mata vs. Rita Legarda, (Exhibit 5) and considerable amount of real and
Inc. 7 SCRA 227 [1963]). personal properties. On june 14, 1922, proceedings
for the probate of his will and the settlement and
We rule, therefore, that under the facts of the case, distribution of his estate were begun in the Court of
petitioner was deprived of due process of law. It is the First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to
better part of judicial wisdom and prudence to accord probate. Said will provides, among other things, as
the petitioner the opportunity to prove her defense. It follows:
is abhorrent to the judicial conscience to consign
petitioner to the ordeals of imprisonment without 4. I direct that any money left by me be given
affording her full opportunity to present her evidence to my nephew Matthew Hanley.
including, of course, the assistance of competent
counselling. 5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at
the time of my death be not sold or otherwise
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after
CA G.R. SP No. 17488, the decision of the trial court my death, and that the same be handled and
in the subject criminal cases, and the order of the trial managed by the executors, and proceeds
court denying petitioner's motion to set aside the thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew
promulgation of judgment and to reopen the cases Hanley, at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine,
are hereby SET ASIDE. The trial court is hereby County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that he
DIRECTED to reopen Criminal Cases No. 7284-7296, be directed that the same be used only for the
7302-7303, and 7650 for the reception of evidence for education of my brother's children and their
the defense. descendants.

SO ORDERED. 6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death


my property be given to the above mentioned
G.R. No. L-43082             June 18, 1937 Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way
he thinks most advantageous.
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of
Thomas Hanley, deceased, plaintiff-appellant, xxx     xxx     xxx
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal 8. I state at this time I have one brother living,
Revenue, defendant-appellant. named Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew,
Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother,
Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for plaintiff-appellant. Malachi Hanley.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for defendant-
appellant. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered
it proper for the best interests of ther estate to appoint
LAUREL, J.: a trustee to administer the real properties which,
under the will, were to pass to Matthew Hanley ten
years after the two executors named in the will, was,
On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his
on March 8, 1924, appointed trustee. Moore took his
capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley,
oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He
deceased, brought this action in the Court of First
acted as trustee until February 29, 1932, when he
Instance of Zamboanga against the defendant, Juan
resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his
Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal Revenue,
stead.
for the refund of the amount of P2,052.74, paid by the
plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the
deceased, and for the collection of interst thereon at During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the
the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from defendant Collector of Internal Revenue, alleging that
September 15, 1932, the date when the aforesaid tax the estate left by the deceased at the time of his
was [paid under protest. The defendant set up a death consisted of realty valued at P27,920 and
counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due personalty valued at P1,465, and allowing a deduction
on the tax in question and which was not included in of P480.81, assessed against the estate an
the original assessment. From the decision of the inheritance tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which,
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga dismissing both together with the penalties for deliquency in payment
the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's consisting of a 1 per cent monthly interest from July 1,
counterclaim, both parties appealed to this court. 1931 to the date of payment and a surcharge of 25
per cent on the tax, amounted to P2,052.74. On The following are the principal questions to be
March 15, 1932, the defendant filed a motion in the decided by this court in this appeal: (a) When does
testamentary proceedings pending before the Court of the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be
First Instance of Zamboanga (Special proceedings satisfied? (b) Should the inheritance tax be computed
No. 302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff herein, be on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of
ordered to pay to the Government the said sum of the testator's death, or on its value ten years later? (c)
P2,052.74. The motion was granted. On September In determining the net value of the estate subject to
15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said amount under protest, tax, is it proper to deduct the compensation due to
notifying the defendant at the same time that unless trustees? (d) What law governs the case at bar?
the amount was promptly refunded suit would be Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the
brought for its recovery. The defendant overruled the tax-payer be given retroactive effect? (e) Has there
plaintiff's protest and refused to refund the said been deliquency in the payment of the inheritance
amount hausted, plaintiff went to court with the result tax? If so, should the additional interest claimed by
herein above indicated. the defendant in his appeal be paid by the estate?
Other points of incidental importance, raised by the
In his appeal, plaintiff contends that the lower court parties in their briefs, will be touched upon in the
erred: course of this opinion.

I. In holding that the real property of Thomas (a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from
Hanley, deceased, passed to his instituted the obligation to pay the same. Section 1536 as
heir, Matthew Hanley, from the moment of the amended, of the Administrative Code, imposes the
death of the former, and that from the time, tax upon "every transmission by virtue of inheritance,
the latter became the owner thereof. devise, bequest, gift mortis causa, or advance in
anticipation of inheritance,devise, or bequest." The
II. In holding, in effect, that there was tax therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or
deliquency in the payment of inheritance tax devolution of property of a decedent, made effective
due on the estate of said deceased. by his death. (61 C. J., p. 1592.) It is in reality an
excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to
succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a
III. In holding that the inheritance tax in
will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to
question be based upon the value of the
become operative at or after death. Acording to article
estate upon the death of the testator, and not,
657 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession of
as it should have been held, upon the value
a person are transmitted from the moment of his
thereof at the expiration of the period of ten
death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ". . . the
years after which, according to the testator's
heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
will, the property could be and was to be
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs
delivered to the instituted heir.
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and
IV. In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the delivered to them a deed for the same before his
determination of the net amount of the estate death." (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232. See also,
subject to said tax, the amounts allowed by Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil., 195; Suilong & Co., vs. Chio-
the court as compensation to the "trustees" Taysan, 12 Phil., 13; Lubrico vs. Arbado, 12 Phil.,
and paid to them from the decedent's estate. 391; Innocencio vs. Gat-Pandan, 14 Phil., 491;
Aliasas vs.Alcantara, 16 Phil., 489; Ilustre vs. Alaras
V. In not rendering judgment in favor of the Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19
plaintiff and in denying his motion for new trial. Phil., 434; Bowa vs. Briones, 38 Phil., 27; Osario vs.
Osario & Yuchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531;
The defendant-appellant contradicts the theories of Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Dais vs. Court of First
the plaintiff and assigns the following error besides: Instance of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396; Baun vs. Heirs of
Baun, 53 Phil., 654.) Plaintiff, however, asserts that
The lower court erred in not ordering the while article 657 of the Civil Code is applicable to
plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of testate as well as intestate succession, it operates
P1,191.27, representing part of the interest at only in so far as forced heirs are concerned. But the
the rate of 1 per cent per month from April 10, language of article 657 of the Civil Code is broad and
1924, to June 30, 1931, which the plaintiff had makes no distinction between different classes of
failed to pay on the inheritance tax assessed heirs. That article does not speak of forced heirs; it
by the defendant against the estate of does not even use the word "heir". It speaks of the
Thomas Hanley. rights of succession and the transmission thereof from
the moment of death. The provision of section 625 of
the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the (a) In the second and third cases of
authentication and probate of a will as a necessary the next preceding section, before
condition to effect transmission of property does not entrance into possession of the
affect the general rule laid down in article 657 of the property.
Civil Code. The authentication of a will implies its due
execution but once probated and allowed the (b) In other cases, within the six
transmission is effective as of the death of the testator months subsequent to the death of the
in accordance with article 657 of the Civil Code. predecessor; but if judicial
Whatever may be the time when actual transmission testamentary or intestate proceedings
of the inheritance takes place, succession takes place shall be instituted prior to the
in any event at the moment of the decedent's death. expiration of said period, the payment
The time when the heirs legally succeed to the shall be made by the executor or
inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs administrator before delivering to each
actually receive such inheritance. "Poco importa", beneficiary his share.
says Manresa commenting on article 657 of the Civil
Code, "que desde el falleimiento del causante, hasta If the tax is not paid within the time
que el heredero o legatario entre en posesion de los hereinbefore prescribed, interest at the rate of
bienes de la herencia o del legado, transcurra mucho twelve per centum per annum shall be added
o poco tiempo, pues la adquisicion ha de retrotraerse as part of the tax; and to the tax and interest
al momento de la muerte, y asi lo ordena el articulo due and unpaid within ten days after the date
989, que debe considerarse como complemento del of notice and demand thereof by the collector,
presente." (5 Manresa, 305; see also, art. 440, par. 1, there shall be further added a surcharge of
Civil Code.) Thomas Hanley having died on May 27, twenty-five per centum.
1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
A certified of all letters testamentary or of
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on admisitration shall be furnished the Collector
May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the obligation to of Internal Revenue by the Clerk of Court
pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the within thirty days after their issuance.
payment on inheritance tax is clearly fixed by section
1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended
It should be observed in passing that the word
by Act No. 3031, in relation to section 1543 of the
"trustee", appearing in subsection (b) of section 1543,
same Code. The two sections follow:
should read "fideicommissary" or "cestui que trust".
There was an obvious mistake in translation from the
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions Spanish to the English version.
and transmissions. — The following shall not
be taxed:
The instant case does fall under subsection (a), but
under subsection (b), of section 1544 above-quoted,
(a) The merger of the usufruct in the as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee
owner of the naked title. or donee. Under the subsection, the tax should have
been paid before the delivery of the properties in
(b) The transmission or delivery of the question to P. J. M. Moore as trustee on March 10,
inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary 1924.
heir or legatee to the trustees.
(b) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas
(c) The transmission from the first heir, Hanley, in so far as the real properties are concerned,
legatee, or donee in favor of another did not and could not legally pass to the instituted
beneficiary, in accordance with the heir, Matthew Hanley, until after the expiration of ten
desire of the predecessor. years from the death of the testator on May 27, 1922
and, that the inheritance tax should be based on the
In the last two cases, if the scale of taxation value of the estate in 1932, or ten years after the
appropriate to the new beneficiary is greater testator's death. The plaintiff introduced evidence
than that paid by the first, the former must pay tending to show that in 1932 the real properties in
the difference. question had a reasonable value of only P5,787. This
amount added to the value of the personal property
SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. — The tax left by the deceased, which the plaintiff admits is
fixed in this article shall be paid: P1,465, would generate an inheritance tax which,
excluding deductions, interest and surcharge, would
amount only to about P169.52.
If death is the generating source from which the allowed a deduction of only P480.81. This sum
power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes takes represents the expenses and disbursements of the
its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, executors until March 10, 1924, among which were
succession takes place and the right of the estate to their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. The
tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the plaintiff contends that the compensation and fees of
vlaue of the estate as it stood at the time of the the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28 (Exhibits C,
decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ, LL, NN, OO), should also be
contingency value of any subsequent increase or deducted under section 1539 of the Revised
decrease in value. (61 C. J., pp. 1692, 1693; 26 R. C. Administrative Code which provides, in part, as
L., p. 232; Blakemore and Bancroft, Inheritance follows: "In order to determine the net sum which
Taxes, p. 137. See also Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned,
U.S., 41; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 747; 44 Law. ed., 969.) there shall be deducted, in case of a resident, . . . the
"The right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate
the moment of death, and hence is ordinarily proceedings, . . . ."
measured as to any beneficiary by the value at that
time of such property as passes to him. Subsequent A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair
appreciation or depriciation is immaterial." (Ross, compensation for his services (Barney vs. Saunders,
Inheritance Taxation, p. 72.) 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047). But from this it
does not follow that the compensation due him may
Our attention is directed to the statement of the rule in lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the
Cyclopedia of Law of and Procedure (vol. 37, pp. estate subject to tax. There is no statute in the
1574, 1575) that, in the case of contingent Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to
remainders, taxation is postponed until the estate be deducted in determining the net value of the estate
vests in possession or the contingency is settled. This subject to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705).
rule was formerly followed in New York and has been Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been
adopted in Illinois, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Ohio, created, it does not appear that the testator intended
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. This rule, horever, is by that the duties of his executors and trustees should be
no means entirely satisfactory either to the estate or separated. (Ibid.; In re Vanneck's Estate, 161 N. Y.
to those interested in the property (26 R. C. L., p. Supp., 893; 175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's Estate,
231.). Realizing, perhaps, the defects of its anterior 161 N. Y. Supp., 455.) On the contrary, in paragraph
system, we find upon examination of cases and 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his
authorities that New York has varied and now real estate be handled and managed by his executors
requires the immediate appraisal of the postponed until the expiration of the period of ten years therein
estate at its clear market value and the payment provided. Judicial expenses are expenses of
forthwith of the tax on its out of the corpus of the administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but, in State vs.
estate transferred. (In re Vanderbilt, 172 N. Y., 69; 69 Hennepin County Probate Court (112 N. W., 878; 101
N. E., 782; In re Huber, 86 N. Y. App. Div., 458; 83 N. Minn., 485), it was said: ". . . The compensation of a
Y. Supp., 769; Estate of Tracy, 179 N. Y., 501; 72 N. trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate,
Y., 519; Estate of Brez, 172 N. Y., 609; 64 N. E., 958; but in the management thereof for the benefit of the
Estate of Post, 85 App. Div., 611; 82 N. Y. Supp., legatees or devises, does not come properly within
1079. Vide also, Saltoun vs. Lord Advocate, 1 Peter. the class or reason for exempting administration
Sc. App., 970; 3 Macq. H. L., 659; 23 Eng. Rul. Cas., expenses. . . . Service rendered in that behalf have no
888.) California adheres to this new rule (Stats. 1905, reference to closing the estate for the purpose of a
sec. 5, p. 343). distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and are not
required or essential to the perfection of the rights of
But whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, we the heirs or legatees. . . . Trusts . . . of the character
hold that a transmission by inheritance is taxable at of that here before the court, are created for the the
the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding benefit of those to whom the property ultimately
the postponement of the actual possession or passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the
enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the preservation of the estate. No sound reason is given
tax measured by the value of the property transmitted to support the contention that such expenses should
at that time regardless of its appreciation or be taken into consideration in fixing the value of the
depreciation. estate for the purpose of this tax."

(c) Certain items are required by law to be deducted (d) The defendant levied and assessed the
from the appraised gross in arriving at the net value of inheritance tax due from the estate of Thomas Hanley
the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised
computed (sec. 1539, Revised Administrative Code). Administrative Code, as amended by section 3 of Act
In the case at bar, the defendant and the trial court No. 3606. But Act No. 3606 went into effect on
January 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not the law in force and even those which, without expressly prohibiting
when the testator died on May 27, 1922. The law at certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission
the time was section 1544 above-mentioned, as (59 C. J., p. 1110). Revenue laws, generally, which
amended by Act No. 3031, which took effect on impose taxes collected by the means ordinarily
March 9, 1922. resorted to for the collection of taxes are not classed
as penal laws, although there are authorities to the
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed contrary. (See Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
by the statute in force at the time of the death of the 361; Twine Co. vs. Worthington, 141 U. S., 468; 12
decedent (26 R. C. L., p. 206; 4 Cooley on Taxation, Sup. Ct., 55; Rice vs. U. S., 4 C. C. A., 104; 53 Fed.,
4th ed., p. 3461). The taxpayer can not foresee and 910; Com. vs. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St., 150;
ought not to be required to guess the outcome of State vs. Wheeler, 44 P., 430; 25 Nev. 143.) Article
pending measures. Of course, a tax statute may be 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to the
made retroactive in its operation. Liability for taxes case at bar, and in the absence of clear legislative
under retroactive legislation has been "one of the intent, we cannot give Act No. 3606 a retroactive
incidents of social life." (Seattle vs. Kelleher, 195 U. effect.
S., 360; 49 Law. ed., 232 Sup. Ct. Rep., 44.) But
legislative intent that a tax statute should operate (e) The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay
retroactively should be perfectly clear. (Scwab vs. a tax may arise at a certain time and the tax may be
Doyle, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep., 491; Smietanka vs. First paid within another given time. As stated by this court,
Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S., 602; Stockdale vs. "the mere failure to pay one's tax does not render one
Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 323; Lunch vs. Turrish, 247 delinqent until and unless the entire period has
U. S., 221.) "A statute should be considered as eplased within which the taxpayer is authorized by
prospective in its operation, whether it enacts, law to make such payment without being subjected to
amends, or repeals an inheritance tax, unless the the payment of penalties for fasilure to pay his taxes
language of the statute clearly demands or expresses within the prescribed period." (U. S. vs. Labadan, 26
that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . ." (61 C. J., Phil., 239.)
P. 1602.) Though the last paragraph of section 5 of
Regulations No. 65 of the Department of Finance The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the
makes section 3 of Act No. 3606, amending section executor to pay the inheritance tax before the delivery
1544 of the Revised Administrative Code, applicable of the decedent's property to the trustee. Stated
to all estates the inheritance taxes due from which otherwise, the defendant contends that delivery to the
have not been paid, Act No. 3606 itself contains no trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the
provisions indicating legislative intent to give it beneficiery in this case, within the meaning of the first
retroactive effect. No such effect can begiven the paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the
statute by this court. Revised Administrative Code. This contention is well
taken and is sustained. The appointment of P. J. M.
The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue Moore as trustee was made by the trial court in
maintains, however, that certain provisions of Act No. conformity with the wishes of the testator as
3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer than those of expressed in his will. It is true that the word "trust" is
Act No. 3031, that said provisions are penal in nature not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to
and, therefore, should operate retroactively in create one is clear. No particular or technical words
conformity with the provisions of article 22 of the are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C. J.,
Revised Penal Code. This is the reason why he p. 711). The words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for
applied Act No. 3606 instead of Act No. 3031. Indeed, the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the use of
under Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent these two words is not conclusive on the question that
is based on the tax only, instead of on both the tax a trust is created (69 C. J., p. 714). "To create a trust
and the interest, as provided for in Act No. 3031, and by will the testator must indicate in the will his
(2) the taxpayer is allowed twenty days from notice intention so to do by using language sufficient to
and demand by rthe Collector of Internal Revenue separate the legal from the equitable estate, and with
within which to pay the tax, instead of ten days only sufficient certainty designate the beneficiaries, their
as required by the old law. interest in the ttrust, the purpose or object of the trust,
and the property or subject matter thereof. Stated
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes otherwise, to constitute a valid testamentary trust
punishment for an offense committed against the there must be a concurrence of three circumstances:
state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has (1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; (2) a definite
the power to pardon. In common use, however, this subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in
sense has been enlarged to include within the term some jurisdictions expressly or in effect so providing."
"penal statutes" all status which command or prohibit (69 C. J., pp. 705,706.) There is no doubt that the
certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation, testator intended to create a trust. He ordered in his
will that certain of his properties be kept together For this reason, no one is allowed to object to or resist
undisposed during a fixed period, for a stated the payment of taxes solely because no personal
purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound benefit to him can be pointed out. (Thomas vs. Gay,
judgment in appointment a trustee to carry into effect 169 U. S., 264; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 340; 43 Law. ed.,
the provisions of the will (see sec. 582, Code of Civil 740.) While courts will not enlarge, by construction,
Procedure). the government's power of taxation (Bromley vs.
McCaughn, 280 U. S., 124; 74 Law. ed., 226; 50 Sup.
P. J. M. Moore became trustee on March 10, 1924. Ct. Rep., 46) they also will not place upon tax laws so
On that date trust estate vested in him (sec. 582 in loose a construction as to permit evasions on merely
relation to sec. 590, Code of Civil Procedure). The fanciful and insubstantial distictions. (U. S. vs. Watts,
mere fact that the estate of the deceased was placed 1 Bond., 580; Fed. Cas. No. 16,653; U. S. vs.
in trust did not remove it from the operation of our Wigglesirth, 2 Story, 369; Fed. Cas. No. 16,690,
inheritance tax laws or exempt it from the payment of followed in Froelich & Kuttner vs. Collector of
the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax Customs, 18 Phil., 461, 481; Castle Bros., Wolf &
should have been paid on or before March 10, 1924, Sons vs. McCoy, 21 Phil., 300; Muñoz & Co. vs. Hord,
to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the 12 Phil., 624; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
reason already stated that the delivery of the estate to Corporation vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil., 145; Luzon
the trustee was in esse delivery of the same estate to Stevedoring Co. vs. Trinidad, 43 Phil., 803.) When
the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A proper, a tax statute should be construed to avoid the
trustee is but an instrument or agent for the cestui possibilities of tax evasion. Construed this way, the
que trust (Shelton vs. King, 299 U. S., 90; 33 Sup. Ct. statute, without resulting in injustice to the taxpayer,
Rep., 689; 57 Law. ed., 1086). When Moore accepted becomes fair to the government.
the trust and took possesson of the trust estate he
thereby admitted that the estate belonged not to him That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy
but to his cestui que trust (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 deeply intrenched in our tax system. Thus, no court is
Phil.,126, cited in 65 C. J., p. 692, n. 63). He did not allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of
acquire any beneficial interest in the estate. He took any internal revenue tax ( sec. 1578, Revised
such legal estate only as the proper execution of the Administrative Code; Sarasola vs. Trinidad, 40 Phil.,
trust required (65 C. J., p. 528) and, his estate ceased 252). In the case of Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas (47
upon the fulfillment of the testator's wishes. The Phil., 461), this court had occassion to demonstrate
estate then vested absolutely in the beneficiary (65 C. trenchment adherence to this policy of the law. It held
J., p. 542). that "the fact that on account of riots directed against
the Chinese on October 18, 19, and 20, 1924, they
The highest considerations of public policy also justify were prevented from praying their internal revenue
the conclusion we have reached. Were we to hold taxes on time and by mutual agreement closed their
that the payment of the tax could be postponed or homes and stores and remained therein, does not
delayed by the creation of a trust of the type at hand, authorize the Collector of Internal Revenue to extend
the result would be plainly disastrous. Testators may the time prescribed for the payment of the taxes or to
provide, as Thomas Hanley has provided, that their accept them without the additional penalty of twenty
estates be not delivered to their beneficiaries until five per cent." (Syllabus, No. 3.)
after the lapse of a certain period of time. In the case
at bar, the period is ten years. In other cases, the trust ". . . It is of the utmost importance," said the Supreme
may last for fifty years, or for a longer period which Court of the United States, ". . . that the modes
does not offend the rule against petuities. The adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be
collection of the tax would then be left to the will of a interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the
private individual. The mere suggestion of this result proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is
is a sufficient warning against the accpetance of the developed of collecting the taxes, may derange the
essential to the very exeistence of government. operations of government, and thereby, cause serious
(Dobbins vs. Erie Country, 16 Pet., 435; 10 Law. ed., detriment to the public." (Dows vs. Chicago, 11 Wall.,
1022; Kirkland vs. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S., 491; 25 Law. 108; 20 Law. ed., 65, 66; Churchill and Tait vs.
ed., 558; Lane County vs. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71; 19 Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580.)
Law. ed., 101; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. vs.
Kentucky, 199 U. S., 194; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep., 36; 50 It results that the estate which plaintiff represents has
Law. ed., 150; Charles River Bridge vs. Warren been delinquent in the payment of inheritance tax
Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; 9 Law. ed., 773.) The obligation and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and
to pay taxes rests not upon the privileges enjoyed by, surcharge provided by law in such cases.
or the protection afforded to, a citizen by the
government but upon the necessity of money for the
support of the state (Dobbins vs. Erie Country, supra).
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, twelve per centum per annum from March 10, 1924,
1924, the date when Moore became trustee. The the date of delinquency, to September 15, 1932, the
interest due should be computed from that date and it date of payment under protest, a period covering 8
is error on the part of the defendant to compute it one years, 6 months and 5 days. To the tax and interest
month later. The provisions cases is mandatory thus computed should be added the sum of P724.88,
(see and cf. Lim Co Chui vs. Posadas, supra), and representing a surhcarge of 25 per cent on both the
neither the Collector of Internal Revenuen or this tax and interest, and also P10, the compromise sum
court may remit or decrease such interest, no matter fixed by the defendant (Exh. 29), giving a grand total
how heavily it may burden the taxpayer. of P3,634.43.

To the tax and interest due and unpaid within ten As the plaintiff has already paid the sum of P2,052.74,
days after the date of notice and demand thereof by only the sums of P1,581.69 is legally due from the
the Collector of Internal Revenue, a surcharge of estate. This last sum is P390.42 more than the
twenty-five per centum should be added (sec. 1544, amount demanded by the defendant in his
subsec. (b), par. 2, Revised Administrative Code). counterclaim. But, as we cannot give the defendant
Demand was made by the Deputy Collector of more than what he claims, we must hold that the
Internal Revenue upon Moore in a communiction plaintiff is liable only in the sum of P1,191.27 the
dated October 16, 1931 (Exhibit 29). The date fixed amount stated in the counterclaim.
for the payment of the tax and interest was November
30, 1931. November 30 being an official holiday, the The judgment of the lower court is accordingly
tenth day fell on December 1, 1931. As the tax and modified, with costs against the plaintiff in both
interest due were not paid on that date, the estate instances. So ordered.
became liable for the payment of the surcharge.
Article 779
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for
us to discuss the fifth error assigned by the plaintiff in
G.R. No. L-21993             June 21, 1966
his brief.
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET
We shall now compute the tax, together with the
AL., petitioners,
interest and surcharge due from the estate of Thomas
vs.
Hanley inaccordance with the conclusions we have
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of
reached.
First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA
At the time of his death, the deceased left real JACALAN, respondents.
properties valued at P27,920 and personal properties
worth P1,465, or a total of P29,385. Deducting from
Lorenzo Somulong for petitioners.
this amount the sum of P480.81, representing
Torres and Torres for respondents.
allowable deductions under secftion 1539 of the
Revised Administrative Code, we have P28,904.19 as
the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax. REYES, J.B.L., J.:

The primary tax, according to section 1536, Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio,
subsection (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ
should be imposed at the rate of one per centum of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First
upon the first ten thousand pesos and two per centum Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their
upon the amount by which the share exceed thirty motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331,
thousand pesos, plus an additional two hundred per which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance
centum. One per centum of ten thousand pesos is of without jurisdiction.
P100. Two per centum of P18,904.19 is P378.08.
Adding to these two sums an additional two hundred The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the
per centum, or P965.16, we have as primary tax, order of the respondent court, dated June 13, 1963
correctly computed by the defendant, the sum of (Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:
P1,434.24.
It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by
To the primary tax thus computed should be added Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio
the sums collectible under section 1544 of the Rodriguez, through counsel, that this Court
Revised Administrative Code. First should be added "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled
P1,465.31 which stands for interest at the rate of case in view of the pendency of another
action for the settlement of the estate of the therefore has precedence over the case filed
deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp.
Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter The Court of First Instance, as previously stated
of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead difference of a few hours did not entitle one
of the instant case". proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early
as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of
The records show that Fr. Celestino the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in
Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to
City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the
Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose
delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from exercising
purported last will and testament of Fr. jurisdiction over the probate proceedings".
Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Reconsideration having been denied, movants, now
Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on
counsel filed a petition for leave of court to Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, and invoking
allow them to examine the alleged will; that on our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792,
March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on July 27, 1955.
the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on
March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased
filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal persons settled. — If the decedent is an
a petition for the settlement of the intestate inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of shall be proved, or letters of administration
Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be First Instance in the province in which he
appointed as Special Administratrix of the resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a First Instance of any province which he had
petition in this Court for the probation of the estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
was stipulated by the parties that Fr. exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of court, as far as it depends on the place of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to residence of the decedent, or of the location
the time of his death in 1963; that he was of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
buried in Parañaque, and that he left real proceeding, except in an appeal from that
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and court, in the original case, or when the want of
Bulacan. jurisdiction appears on the record.

The movants contend that since the intestate We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became
Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late
1963 while the petition for probate was filed in Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no upon the will being deposited the court could, motu
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
probate, citing as authority in support thereof proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77,
of the old Rules):
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on
the other hand, take the stand that the Court SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving
of First Instance of Bulacan acquired will. Notice thereof to be published. — When a
jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by will is delivered to, or a petition for the
them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having
4, 1963, and that the case in this Court jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and
place for proving the will when all concerned and the same case will have to be
may appear to contest the allowance thereof, commenced anew before another court of the
and shall cause notice of such time and place same rank in another province. That this is of
to be published three (3) weeks successively, mischievous effect in the prompt
previous to the time appointed, in a administration of justice is too obvious to
newspaper of general circulation in the require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy
province. Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No.
But no newspaper publication shall be made 190, providing that the estate of a deceased
where the petition for probate has been filed person shall be settled in the province where
by the testator himself. he had last resided, could not have been
intended as defining the jurisdiction of the
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is probate court over the subject matter,
delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is because such legal provision is contained in a
filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the law of procedure dealing merely with
mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even procedural matters, and, as we have said time
if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where and again, procedure is one thing and
the petition for probate is made after the deposit of jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad
time when the will was delivered. Since the testament Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the jurisdiction — Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5
Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners — confers upon Courts of First Instance
initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First jurisdiction over all probate cases
Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, independently of the place of residence of the
the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the deceased.1 Since, however, there are many
Bulacan court is incontestable. Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the
Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600,
1äwphï1.ñët

fixes the venue or the place where each case


But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76
shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence
(old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the
of the deceased is not an element of
Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
Bulacan court did not have it because the decedent
of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the
was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard
new Rules of Court the province where the
Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest
estate of a deceased person shall be settled
in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do
is properly called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.)
so, and consider that he retained throughout
Motion for reconsideration is denied.
some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in
Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that the
Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous The estate proceedings having been initiated in the
decisions, the power to settle decedents' estates is Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other,
conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the
the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of
not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old
Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins
Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the that:
late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left
personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan The Court first taking cognizance of the
(t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
before us. other courts. (Sec. 1)

In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that: This disposition presupposes that two or more courts
have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement
"... If we consider such question of residence of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper
as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking
be that the whole proceedings including all venue into account.
decisions on the different incidents which
have arisen in court will have to be annulled
There are two other reasons that militate against the Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied.
success of petitioners. One is that their commencing Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.
intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of
the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to
divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of
by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority
Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed
JR., petitioner,
to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a
vs.
race between applicants, with the administration of
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court
the properties as the price for the fleetest.
of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B.
ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law,
intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.
to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines: Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes


place:
AQUINO, J.:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a
void will, or one which has subsequently lost Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the
its validity; order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated
February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the
or dispose of all the property belonging to the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and
testator. In such case, legal succession shall ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to
take place only with respect to the property in creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents
which the testator has not disposed; of the appeal are as follows:

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur,
institution of heir does not happen or is not died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix
or repudiates the inheritance, there being no Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children
substitution, and no right of accretion takes named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz
place; B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban
and Emilia B. Pabaonon.
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of
succeeding, except in cases provided in this Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition
Code. dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which
is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10
declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern
Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of
half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the
testate succession could an intestate succession be
absolute owner of two parcels of land which she
instituted in the form of pre-established action". The
inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was
institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not
her desire that her properties should not be divided
thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of
among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and
Father Rodriguez is pending.
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits
of her properties (Par. IV).
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was
entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after
question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate.
her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in
proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of
1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal
discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that
lands (which she described as "my properties")
should be discontinued.
should be divided and distributed in the manner set
forth in that part of her will. She devised and
partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed
owned by her. She disposed of in the will her that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the
husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. * proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding.
In another motion of the same date he asked that the
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on corresponding notice to creditors be issued.
the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of
the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The
oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through
which he had received from the testatrix.
Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated October
15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion
Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed
attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. that the will be declared void for being contrary to law
dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his and that an intestacy be declared.
opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that
he was interested in its probate. On the same date The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty.
Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to
"Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on
Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and
respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of
his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the
children. In that same instrument he confirmed the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an
agreement, which he and his wife had perfected intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice
before her death, that their conjugal properties would to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for
be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will. hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did
not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October
Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April
contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the
Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17,
order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.
reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect
to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M.
an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974,
branch clerk of court as special administrator of the asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's
decedent's estate. order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty.
Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for
Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was
lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to
(a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr.,
owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia
that she could not partition the conjugal estate by B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's
allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. services and informed him that his withdrawal of the
Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo petition for the probate of the will was without their
Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder
denied it in its order of October 15, 1973. to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to
them.
In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the
case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the
lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the
record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it
September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw declared the will void on the basis of its own
probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and independent assessment of its provisions and not
requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.
proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the
lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in
Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon. ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in
declaring it void.
Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the
will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual prejudice the legitime of the
provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, compulsory heirs.
and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for
probate (which the lower court assumed to have been A parent who, in the interest of his or
filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court her family, to keep any agricultural,
acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic industrial, or manufacturing enterprise
validity even before its formal validity had been intact, may avail himself of the right
established. The probate of a will might become an granted him in this article, by ordering
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be that the legitime of the other children
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations to whom the property is not assigned
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed be paid in cash. (1056a)
upon, even before it is probated, the court should
meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire
SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, conjugal estate among her six children (her husband
L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half
vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). 1äwphï1.ñët

conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate


to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080.
But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes
February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may
converting the testate proceeding into an intestate remain undivided only for a period of twenty years.
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of So, the provision that the estate should not be divided
June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving during her husband's lifetime would at most be
husband's conformity to the will and to his effective only for twenty years from the date of her
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably death unless there are compelling reasons for
included his one-half share of the conjugal estate. terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the hereditary rights and his one-half share of the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil
presumed that the testator would not have made such Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a
other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half
been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code),
the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the
from the invalid without defeating the intention of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his
testator or interfering with the general testamentary support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime
scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 should be respected.
C.J.S. 873).
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition
"southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the
because, although she was a coowner thereof, her creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution
share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil and partition would become effective upon the death
Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income
Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration should be equitably divided among the children and
does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. the surviving spouse.

The provision of the will that the properties of the It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving
testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during husband's conformity to his wife's will and his
her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half
that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's
article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads: estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the
partition made in paragraph V of the will without
ART. 1080. Should a person make a prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and
partition of his estate by an act inter the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property
acquired after the making of a will shall only pass
thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making legally tenable, such desire be given effect
the will, should it expressly appear by the will that independent of the attitude of the parties affected
such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-
Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to 27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the To give effect to the intention and wishes of the
thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of
testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June
his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect." 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable
to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix testamentary disposition operative takes precedence
and her husband intended to partition the conjugal over a construction that will nullify a provision of the
estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her
half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of
since the husband, after the dissolution of the testacy especially where the will evinces an intention
conjugal partnership, had assented to her on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his
testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such whole estate. So compelling is the principle that
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of
be probated. the testator should prevail that sometimes the
language of the will can be varied for the purpose of
The instant case is different from giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February
the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).
as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will
was intrinsically void because it preterited her As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of
compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the the testator must be followed and the dispositions of
Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque
one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540,
the direct line, whether living at the time of the 546).
execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the
devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they testator as expressed in his will because any
are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the disposition therein is better than that which the law
parents annulled the institution of the sister of the can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28,
testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).
intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It


In the instant case, the preterited heir was the erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no
surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce executor or regular administrator has been appointed.
intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his The record reveals that it appointed a special
wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. . administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if
only a special administrator has been appointed.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing
with the probate of the will as contemplated in its that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary
uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an or of administration, the court shall issue a notice
extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically requiring all persons having money claims against the
void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said
the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an
the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara executor or regular administrator and not that of a
vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; special administrator.
Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967,
21 SCRA 428). It is the executor or regular administrator who is
supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule
existence of a purported testament is in itself prima 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).
facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that
his estate should be distributed in the manner therein We also take this occasion to point out that the
provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of
court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon,
salutary practice because it might engender the containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less,
suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan
are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE.,
Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12,
devastavit in the course of his administration, the by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649,
probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292.
strict accountability. A court employee should devote x x x 2
his official time to his official duties and should not
have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged
estate. property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold
to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held
WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate
28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of of Sale3 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the
June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for Bank. The property was not redeemed within the
probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to period allowed by law. More than two years after the
conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed
in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the a Definite Deed of Sale4 in the Bank's favor.
private respondents. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the
Bank.
SO ORDERED.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and
781 respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate5 adjudicating to each of them a specific one-
third portion of the subject property consisting of
G.R. No. 168970               January 15, 2010
10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement
also contained provisions wherein the parties
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner, admitted knowledge of the fact that their father
vs. mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS they intended to redeem the same at the soonest
VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents. possible time.

DECISION Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial


Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject
PERALTA, J.: property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed
of Sale of Registered Land6 was executed by the
Assailed in the present petition for review Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.) 7 was
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile,
2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint8 for
3263. Recovery of Possession and Damages against
petitioner, contending that they had already informed
The facts of the case are as follows: petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of
the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of surrender possession of the same to them.
the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all
died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but
6, 1984. to no avail.

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a
which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained Decision9 disposing as follows:
from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte
(Bank). The said property was originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more
particularly described as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE
ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE
favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE
property in question, presently possessed by him, and RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST
described in the deed of partition, as follows: SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE PRICE.11

A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-
T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title ownership by him and respondents over the subject
No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and property persisted even after the lot was purchased
Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name,
Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot and even after it was eventually bought back by the
5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and respondents from the Bank.
Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649,
Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting of Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full
10,246 square meters, including improvements knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed
thereon. property was already in the name of the Bank, they
still proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial
and dismissing all other claims of the parties. Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing
back the property together with petitioner and of
The amount of ₱6,733.33 consigned by the defendant continuing their co-ownership thereof.
with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered delivered to
the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial
portion of the land in question. Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between him
and respondents, because it contains a provision
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs. whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-
ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or
SO ORDERED.10 "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This
agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between
the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase
result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of
from the respondents his share in the disputed
buying the disputed property from the Bank without
property was recognized by the provisions of the
notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties
right to claim his rightful portion of the property,
had executed before the respondents bought the
comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents
subject lot from the Bank.
the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein
The Court is not persuaded.
respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently
premise that, at the time of the execution of the
assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed
Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to
part of the estate of their deceased father to which
immediately surrender possession of the subject
they may lay claim as his heirs.
property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when
petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no
consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new dispute with respect to the fact that the subject
title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
extinguished. respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was
mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties
during the hearing conducted by the trial court on
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
October 28, 1996.12 Evidence shows that a Definite
Deed of Sale13 was issued in favor of the Bank on
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption
PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title
PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on
(EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the
BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested
PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted parties shall be accorded primordial consideration. 16 It
from the moment of his death. 14 In addition, the is the duty of the courts to place a practical and
inheritance of a person consists of the property and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the to the context in which it is negotiated and the
time of his death, as well as those which have purpose which it is intended to serve.17 Such intention
accrued thereto since the opening of the is determined from the express terms of their
succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and
ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical interpretations
only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed should also be avoided.19
parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to
which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject is an agreement between him and his siblings to
lot from their father. continue what they thought was their ownership of the
subject property, even after the same had been
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of
assuming that they became co-owners of the subject the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.
lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of
petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-
is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the ownership to talk about and no property to partition,
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of
and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any their deceased father.
given point in time.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a respondents' intention of continuing with their
necessity for a complete determination of the issues supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than
raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's his assertions in the present petition that on several
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject
independent contract which gives him the right to property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he
enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it
bought by respondents. 1avvphi1
offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such
offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of also his intention to purchase the subject property
the Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the
consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which, In addition, it appears from the recitals in the
according to their nature, may be in keeping with Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the
good faith, usage and law. execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that
the subject property was already exclusively owned
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, the part of petitioner and respondents that the
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the
convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, property was already transferred to the Bank does not
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. give them the right or the authority to unilaterally
declare themselves as co-owners of the disputed
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would
subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the
express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to party-litigants and not on the evidence adduced and
continue with their supposed co-ownership of the the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.
contested lot.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of siblings intended to continue their supposed co-
the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, ownership of the subject property contradicts the
support petitioner's contention that it was his and his provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement
sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the where they clearly manifested their intention of having
Bank and continue what they believed to be co- the subject property divided or partitioned by
ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a
interpretation of contracts that the intention of the specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion siblings executed a Special Power of Attorney
of the property owned in common. It seeks a authorizing him to mortgage the said property. The
severance of the individual interests of each co- other mortgaged parcel of land, covered by OCT No.
owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a 10271, was registered in the name of Sergio and
specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy Juana. Subsequently, Sergio died without being able
his estate without supervision or interference from the to pay his obligations with DBP. Since the loan was
other.20 In other words, the purpose of partition is to nearing its maturity and the mortgaged properties
put an end to co-ownership,21 an objective which were in danger of being foreclosed, Leandro paid
negates petitioner's claims in the present case. Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that
respondents were unable to reimburse Leandro for
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The the advances he made in Sergio's favor, respondents
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May agreed that Sergio's share in the lot which he co-
31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED. owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in
the name of Sergio and Juana, shall be assigned in
SO ORDERED favor of Leandro ahd Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's
brother, Domingo, was tasked to facilitate the transfer
of ownership of the subject properties in favor of
G.R. No. 198434 Leandro ·and Juliana. However, Domingo died
without being able to cause such transfer.
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA V. Subsequently, despite demands and several follow-
NATIVIDAD, Petitioners, ups made by petitioners, respondents failed and
vs. refused to honor their undertaking.
JUANA MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD, and SPOUSES
JEAN NATIVIDAD CRUZ AND JERRY Respondents filed their Answer denying the
CRUZ, Respondents. allegations in the complaint and raising the following
defenses: (1) respondents are not parties to the
DECISION contract between Sergio and DBP; (2) there is neither
verbal nor written agreement between petitioners and
PERALTA, J.: respondents that the latter shall reimburse whatever
payment was made by the former or their
Challenged in the present petition for review predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean was only a minor
on certiorari are the Decision  and Resolution  of the
1 2 during the execution of the alleged agreement and is
Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 7, 2011 and not a party thereto; (4) that whatever liability or
August 25, 2011, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. obligation of respondents is already barred by
92840. The assailed CA Decision modified the prescription, laches and estoppel; (5) that the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San complaint states no cause of action as respondents
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75, in Civil Case No. 1637-02- are not duty-bound to reimburse whatever alleged
SM, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners' payments were made by petitioners; and (6) there is
motion for reconsideration. no contract between the parties to the effect that
respondents are under obligation to transfer
The present petition arose from an action for specific ownership in petitioners' favor as reimbursement for
performance and/or recovery of sum of money filed the alleged payments made by petitioners to DBP.
against herein respondents by the spouses Leandro
Natividad (Leandro) and Juliana Respondents waived their right to present evidence
Natividad (Juliana), who are the predecessors of arid they merely filed their memorandum. Also, during
herein petitioners. pendency" of the trial, Leandro died and was
substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.
In their Complaint, Leandro and Juliana alleged that
sometime in 1974, Sergio On November. 4, 2008, the RTC rendered its
Natividad (Sergio), husband of respondent Juana Decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion
Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and father of respondent of which reads as follows:
Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the
Development Bank of t.he Philippines (DBP). As WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged two parcels of hereby rendered as follows:
land, one of which is co-owned and registered in his
name and that of his siblings namely, Leandro, 1. Defendants Juana Mauricio [Vda.] de
Domingo and Adoracion. This property is covered by Natividad and Jean Natividad-Cruz are
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5980. Sergio's ordered to effect the transfer of title in OCT
No. 5980 with respect to the undivided share II. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE
of the late Sergio Natividad; and in OCT No. COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
10271 both of the Registry of Deeds of the THAT THE INTEREST ON THE UNPAID
Province of Rizal in favor of plaintiff Juliana [V LOAN .OBLIGATION SHOULD BE IMPOSED
da.] de Natividad and the Heirs of the late ONLY ON JUNE 23, 2001, DATE OF THE
Leandro Natividad. DEMAND FOR PAYMENT INSTEAD OF
SEPTEMBER 23, 1994, WHEN THE
2. Defendants to pay jointly and severally, PARTIES VERBALLY AGREED TO CONVEY
attorney's fees in the sum of Thirty Thousand THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH THE
Pesos (P30,000.00); and cost of suit. EXECUTION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF SERGIO
SO ORDERED. 3 NATIVIDAD. 5

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondents filed an Petitioners, insist that there was a verbal agreement
Appeal with the CA. between respondents and Leandro, their
predecessor-in-interest, wherein the subject
properties shall be assigned to the latter as
On February 7, 2011, the CA promulgated its
reimbursement for the payments he made in Sergio's
questioned Decision, disposing as follows:
favor. To support this contention, petitioners relied
heavily on the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs,
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY which was executed by respondents to prove that
GRANTED. The Decision dated November 4, 2008 is there was indeed such an agreement and that such a
hereby MODIFIED in that defendants-appellants Settlement is evidence of the partial execution of the
Juana Mauricio-Natividad and Jean Natividad-Cruz said agreement. The provisions of the said Settlement
are ordered instead to reimburse plaintiffs-appellees are as follows:
Juliana Natividad and the heirs of the late Leandro
Natividad the amount of P162,514.88 representing
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AMONG HEIRS
the amount of the loan obligation paid to the
Development Bank of the Philippines, plus legal
interest of 12% per annum computed from June 23, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
2001 until finality of the judgment, the total amount of
which shall be to the extent only of defendants- This EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, made and
appellants' successional rights in the mortgaged entered into by and among:
properties and Juana's conjugal share in [the]
property covered by OCT No. 10271. The award of JUAN M. NATIVIDAD, widow; JEAN N. CRUZ,
attorney's fees and cost of suit are AFFIRMED. married to JERRY CRUZ; JOSELITO M. NATIVIDAD,
single, all of legal age, Filipino citizens, and residents
SO ORDERED. 4 of Malanday, San Mateo, Rizal

Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, WITNESSETH


while respondents filed their own Motion for
Reconsideration, both of which, however, were That the above-named parties, is the legitimate wife
denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution dated and children and sole heirs of the deceased SERGIO
August 25, 2011. NATIVIDAD, who died in San Mateo, Rizal on May
31, 1981;
Hence, the instant petition based on the following
grounds: That the said deceased, at the time of his death, left
certain real estate properties located at San Mateo,
I. WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE Rizal, and Montalban, Rizal, more particularly
COURT OF APPEALS' RULING THAT THE described as follows:
VERBAL AGREEMENT TO CONVEY THE
PROPERTY SHARES OF SERGIO a. A whole portion of a parcel of land (Plan
NATIVIDAD IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS Psu-295655, L.R. Case No. Q-29, L.R.C.
OBLIGATION IS COVERED BY THE Record No. N-295___ , situated in the Barrio
STATUTE OF FRAUDS DESPITE THE FACT of Malanday, Municipality of San Mateo,
THAT IT HAS BEEN PARTIALLY Province of Rizal, containing an area of TWO
EXECUTED, IS CONTRARY TO'EXISTING HUNDRED EIGHT (208) SQUARE METERS,
JURISPRUDENCE. more or less, and covered by OCT
NO. 10271.
b. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, the
land situated in Guinayang, San Mateo, Rizal, self-serving claims of Leandro on the witness stand,
containing an area of 2,742 square meters, as well as the cash voucher,   which supposedly
7

covered by OCT No. 10493. represented payment of P8,000.00 given to Atty.


Domingo Natividad for the expenses in transferring
c. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of the title of the subject properties in Leandro's favor,
land situated in San Jose, Montalban, Rizal, would hardly count as competent evidence in the
containing an area of 4,775 square meters, eyes of the law. Respondents' claim of the existence
and covered by OCT No. ON-403. of a verbal agreement between them, on one hand,
and petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, on the other,
d. A one-fourth (1/4) share in the parcel of remains to be mere allegation. It is an age-old rule in
land situated in Cambal, San Mateo, Rizal, civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden
containing an area of 13,456 square meters, of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. 
8

and covered by OCT No. 5980.


In relation to petitioners' contention that the subject
That no other personal properties are involved in this verbal agreement actually existed, they reiterate their
extrajudicial settlement. contention that the conveyance of the subject
properties in their favor is not covered by the Statute
of Frauds because they claim that respondents'
That to the best knowledge and information of the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs
parties hereto, the said deceased left certain
constitutes partial execution of their alleged
obligations amounting to P175,000.00 representing
agreement.
loan obligations with the Development Bank of the
Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
That a notice of this extrajudicial settlement had been
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in Suffice it to say that there is no partial execution of
___________ a newspaper of general circulation any contract, whatsoever, because petitioners failed
in_______, as certified by the said newspaper hereto to prove, in the first place, that there was a verbal
attached as Annex "A"; agreement that was entered into.

That the parties hereto being all of legal age and with Even granting that such an agreement existed, the
full civil capacity to contract, hereby by these presents CA did not commit any en-or in ruling that the
agree to divide and adjudicate, as they hereby divide assignment of the shares of Sergio in the subject
and adjudicate, among themselves the above- properties in petitioners' favor as payment of Sergio's
described real estate property in equal shares and obligation cannot be enforced if there is no written
interest. contract to such effect. Under the Statute of Frauds , 9

an agreement to convey real properties shall be


unenforceable by action in the absence of a written
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this
note or memorandum thereof and subscribed by the
document on this 2nd day of September, 1994 in San
party charged or by his agent. As earlier discussed,
Mateo, Rizal, Philippines.
the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners,
consisting of respondents' acknowledgment of
xxx 6
Sergio's loan obligations with DBP as embodied in the
Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, as well as the
After a careful reading of the abovequoted Extra cash voucher which allegedly represents payment for
judicial Settlement Among Heirs, the Court agrees taxes and transfer of title in petitioners' name do not
with the CA that there is nothing in the said document serve as written notes or memoranda of the alleged
which would indicate that respondents agreed to the verbal agreement.
effect that the subject properties shall be transferred
in the name of Leandro as reimbursement for his The foregoing, notwithstanding, the Court finds it
payment of Syrgio's loan obligations with the DBP. On proper to reiterate the CA ruling that, in any case,
the contrary, the second to the last paragraph of the since respondents had already acknowledged that
said Settlement clearly shows that herein Sergio had, in fact, incurred loan obligations with the
respondents, as heirs of Sergio, have divided the DBP, they are liable to reimburse the amount paid by
subject properties exclusively among themselves. Leandro for the payment of the said obligation even if
such payment was made without their knowledge or
There is no competent evidence to prove the verbal consent.
agreement being claimed by respondents. Aside from
Article 1236 of the Civil Code clearly provides that: Among Heirs, because there is nothing therein to
prove that petitioners, at that time, made a demand
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or for reimbursement.
performance by a third person who has no interest in
the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a However, the rate of interest should be modified in
stipulation to the contrary. view of the issuance of Circular No. 799, Series of
2013 by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary
Whoever pays for another may demand from the Board (BSP-MB). The said Circular reduced the "rate
debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
without the knowledge or against the will of the goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in
debtor, he can recover only insofar as the the absence of an express contract as to such rate of
payment has been beneficial to the interest," from twelve percent (12%) to six percent
debtor. (Emphasis supplied) (6%) per annum. The Circular was made effective on
July 1, 2013. Hence, under the modified guidelines in
Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing the imposition of interest, as laid down in the case
that they were not parties to the contract between of Nacar v. Gallery Frames,   this Court held that:
12

Sergio and the DBP. As earlier stated, the fact


remains that, in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among xxxx
Heirs, respondents clearly acknowledged Sergio's
loan obligations with the DBP. Being Sergio's heirs, II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in
they succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also the concept of actual and compensatory damages,
to his obligations. the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on
this matter, to wit: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
of which the property, rights and obligations to the money, the interest due should be that
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are which may have been stipulated in writing.
transmitted through his death to another or others Furthermore, the interest due shall itself
either by will or by operation of law. earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
rights and obligations of a person which are not 6% per annum to be computed from
extinguished by his death. default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only
Code.
the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also
those which have accrued thereto since the opening 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan
of the succession. or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court
In the present case, respondents, being heirs of
at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
Sergio, are now liable to settle his transmissible
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
obligations, which include the amount due to
claims or damages, except when or until the
petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of
demand can be established with reasonable
Sergio's estate to them, in accordance with Section
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
1,   Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
10

established with reasonable certainty, the


interest shall begin to run from the time the
As to when the interest on the sum due from claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
respondents should be reckoned, the Court finds no 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty
error in the ruling of the CA that such interest should cannot be so reasonably established at the
be computed from June 23, 2001, the date when time the demand is made, the interest shall
petitioners made a written demand for the payment of begin to run only from the date the judgment
respondents' obligation.   There is no merit in
11
of the court is made (at which time the
petitioners' contention that the reckoning date should quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been September 23, 1994, the date when have been reasonably ascertained). The
respondents executed the Extrajudicial Settlement
actual base for the computation of legal SO ORDERED.
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged. G.R. No. L-3362             March 1, 1951

3. When the judgment of the court TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL
awarding a sum of money becomes final HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-appellee,
and executory, the rate of legal interest, vs.
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-
or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per appellant.
annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being
Eligio C. Lagman for appellant.
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili for appellee.
forbearance of credit. (Emphasis supplied)
JUGO, J.:
xxx 13

The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to


The Court explained that:
probate the alleged will and testament of the
deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de
[F]rom the foregoing, in the absence of an express Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only question
stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern of law. Her counsel assigns the two following alleged
the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or errors:
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve
Primer Error. — El Juzgado inferior erro al
percent (12%) per annum - as reflected in the case
dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento
of Eastern Shipping Lines and Subsection X305.1 of
de Carlos Gil no ha sido otogar de acuerdo
the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections
con la ley.
4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of
Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions,
before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 - Segundo Error. — Erro finalmente a legalizar
but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective el referido testamento.
July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the
new rate could only be applied prospectively and not The alleged will read as follows:
retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent
(12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until Primera Pagina (1)
June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013, the new rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN
interest when applicable.  14

Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 años de edad, residente


Thus, in accordance with the above ruling, the rate of de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., hallandome sano
interest on the principal amount due to petitioners y en pleno goce de mis facultades
shall be 12% from June 23, 2001, the date when intelectuales, libre y expontaneamente, sin
petitioners made a demand for payment, to June 30, violencia, coaccion, dolo o influencia ilegal de
2013. From July 1, 2013, the effective date of BSP- persona extraña, otorgo y ordeno este mi
MB Circular No. 799, until full satisfaction of the testamento y ultima voluntad en castellano,
monetary award, the rate of interest shall be 6%. idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera
siguiente:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, 1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi
dated February 7, 2011 and August 25, 2011, esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros no tuvimos
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 92840 hijos;
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by ORDERING 
respondents to pay petitioners, in addition to the 2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en
principal amount of P162,514.88, interest thereon at Manila y en la Provincia de Pampanga;
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, computed from June 23, 2001 to June 30,
3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel
2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1,
Herretos todos mis bienes ya que muebles e
2013 until full satisfaction of the judgment award.
inmuebles situados en Manila y en
Pampanga, bajo la condicion de que cuando
esta muera y si hayan bienes remanentes and appellee." Both parties are agreed that
heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes this is a true and correct copy of the will. (P.
remanentes se adjudicaran a Don Carlos 10, Record on Appeal).
Worrel.
The appeal being only on questions of law the above
4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes finding of the court below cannot be disputed. The
despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano conclusions of law reached by said court are based
Coronel a quien tengo absoluta confianza, on it. Moreover, the finding is correctly based on the
con relevacion de fianza; evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy
is true and correct. If it were otherwise, they would not
En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an
testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada essential character and is fatal to the validity of the
una de sus dos paginas, utiles con la clausula attestation clause.
de atestiguamiento en presencia de los
testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una It will be noted that the attestation clause above
de dichas paginas y la clausula de quoted does not state that the alleged testor signed
atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de the will. It declares only that it was signed by the
ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise
Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the
novecientos treinta y nueve. testator signed the will, this being the most essential
element of the clause. Without it there is no
attestation at all. It is said that the court may correct a
CARLOS GIL
mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error
for it effects the very essence of the clause. Alleged
Testificacion: errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of
form which do not affect the substance of the
statement.
Segunda Pagina (2)
It is claimed that the correction may be made by
Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of
de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que inferences, when are we going to stop making
precede este escrito en la lengua castellana inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where
que conoce la testadora, compuesto de dos are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we
paginas utiles con la clausula de would be making interpolations by inferences,
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente implication, and even by internal circumtantial
en letras y numeros en la parte superior de la evidence. This would be done in the face of the clear,
casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the
en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de attestation clause should be made. It is to be
nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the
documento y todas las hojas del mismo en clear words of the statute when he prepared it. For
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be
nosotros. against the evident policy of the law. Section 618 of
Act No. 190, before it was amended, contained the
(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA following provision:

(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA . . . But the absence of such form of


attestation shall not render the will invalid if it
proven that the will was in fact signed and
(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAÑA
attested as in this section provided.

Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature,
above-copied alleged will, the court below said: passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing the
contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed
. . . The only copy available is a printed form the above-quoted provision. This would show that the
contained in the record appeal in case G.R. purpose of the amending act was to surround the
No. L-254, entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos execution of a will with greater guarantees and
Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and solemnities. Could we, in view of this, hold that the
appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor court can cure alleged deficiencies by inferences,
implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The portion of section
Even in ordinary cases the law requires certain 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
requisities for the conclusiveness of circumstantial amended, which provides that "The attestation
evidence. clause shall state the number of sheets or
pages used, upon which the will is written, and
It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation the fact that the testator signed the will and
clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of every page thereof, or caused some other
the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first person to write his name, under his express
glance, it is queer that the alleged testator should direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
have made an attestation clause, which is the function and the latter witnessed and signed the will
of the witness. But the important point is that he and all pages thereof in the presence of the
attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be testator and of each other" applied and
accurate, his signature certifies itself. It is evident that enforced.
one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not
increase the evidence of its authenticity. It would be 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — An attestation clause
like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps. which does not recite that the witnesses
Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot signed the will and each and every page
cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation thereof on the left margin in the presence of
clause of the witnesses. Adding zero to an insufficient the testator is defective, and such a defect
amount does not make it sufficient. annuls the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, supra.)

It is said that the rules of statutory construction are In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil.,
applicable to documents and wills. This is true, but 481, 482), Judge Manuel V. Moran, now Chief Justice
said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the
testamentary provisions, but not to the attestation following pronouncement:
clause, which must be so clear that it should not
require any construction. . . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del
testamento en cuestion, se hace constar que
The parties have cited pro and con several decisions los testadores firmaron el testamento
of the Supreme Court, some of which are said to be en presencia de los tres testigos
rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of instrumentales y que estos firmaron el
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended by Act No. testamento los unos en presencia de los
2645. otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos
testigos firmaron el testamento
In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), en presencia de los testadores, ni que estos y
the court had the following to say: aquellos firmaron todas y cada una de las
paginas del testamento los primeros en
1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR presencia de los segundos y vice-versa.
DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND 634
OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que
CONSTRUED. — The right to dispose of the se pide la legalizacion del alegado testamento
property by will is governed entirely by statute. Exhibit A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen
The law is here found in section 618 of the Quinto, y se declara que Gregorio Pueblo
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. The murio intestado.
law not alone carefully makes use of the
imperative, but cautiously goes further and The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying
makes use of the negative, to enforce down the following doctrine:
legislative intention.
1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE;
2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. — The Philippine EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. —
authorities relating to the attestation clause to The attestation clause must be made in strict
wills reviewed. The cases of Saño vs. conformity with the requirements of section
Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said
vs. Mojal and Aguilar ([1924], 47 Phil., 152), clause fails to show on its face a full
particularly compared. The decision in In re compliance with those requirements, the
Will of Quintana, supra, adopted and defect constitutes sufficient ground for the
reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana,
and Aguilar, supra, modified. 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil.,
30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted held not to be fatally defective and to conform
to establish facts not appearing on the to the law.
attestation clause, and where said evidence
has been admitted it should not be given the This very different from the attestation clause in the
effect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. case at bar.
Sioca, 43 Phil., 405, 409.).
In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 Off. Gaz., 1st
2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939), the will was
618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED. — objected to on the ground that, although the
Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, attestation clause stated that "each of the pages of
should be given a strict interpretation in order which the said will is composed" was signed by the
to give effect to the intention of the testatrix at the left margin and at the foot of the fifth
Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to page, it did not state that the signature was made in
be observed in the execution of wills are very the presence of the witnesses. It was held, however,
strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the that said deficiency was cured by the phrase "as well
defensive execution of will. (40 Cyc., p. 1079; as by each of us in the presence of the testatrix." The
Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.) words "as well as" indicate that the testatrix signed
also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase
It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has "as well as" in this case is equivalent to "also." The
somewhat relaxed the doctrine of the Gumban vs. language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in
Gorcho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating the present case, does not necessitate any correction.
an attestation clause similar to that involved herein. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she
signed in the presence of each and all of the three
In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration,
testatrix signed the attestation clause which was but it was unnecessary.
complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting
witnesses. For this reason, the court said: In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd
Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October 18, 1939; 68
In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows:
makes the declaration about the points
contained in the above described paragraph; Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio
however, as the witnesses, together with the Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento
testatrix, have signed the said declaration, we en presencia de todos y cada uno de
are of the opinion and so hold that the words nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador,
above quoted of the testament constitute a firmamos el presente cada uno en presencia
sufficient compliance with the requirements of de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo
section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides testsador, Valerio Leynez. El testamento
that: . . . (p. 381, supra.) consta de dos (2) paginas solamente.

The attestation clause involved herein is very The objection was that the attestation clause did not
different. state that the testator and the witnesses signed each
and every page of the will. This fact , however,
In the case of Dischoso de Ticson vs. De Gorotiza (57 appears in the will itself. It is clear, therefore, that in
Phil., 437), it was held that: case of the will complied with all the requisites for its
due execution. In the instant case, essential words
An attestation clause to a will, copied from a were omitted.
form book and reading: "We, the undersigned
attesting witnesses, whose residences are In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa  1 (40 Off. Gaz., 14th
stated opposite our respective names, do Supplement, 131, 134-135, No. 23, April 18, 1939),
hereby certify that the testatrix, whose name the attestation clause reads as follows:
is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us
the foregoing will consisting of two pages as Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo
her Last Will and Testament, and has signed arriba mencionadios otorgo el Sr. Emiliano
the same in our presence, and in witness Alcala su ultima voluntad o testamentao
whereof we have each signed the same and compuesto de cuatro paginas incluida ya esta
each page thereof in the presence of said clasula de atestiguamiento. Que estabamos
testatrix and in the presence of each other," presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el
que el testamento arriba mencionado es su
ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de creation, and is available only upon the
cuatro paginasen papel de maquinilla. Que compliance with the requirements of the
igualmente estabamos presentes cuando el statute. The formalities which the Legislature
firmo este documento al pie del mismo y en el has prescribed for the execution of a will are
margen izquierdo de cada pagina del testador essential to its validity, and cannot be
tambien en presencia suya y de cada uno de disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the
nosotros en cada pagina y en el margen measure for the exercise of the right, and the
izquierdo de esta escritura o testamento. En heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by
su testimonio firmamos abajo en prsencia del a compliance with this mode. For the purpose
testador y de cada uno de nosotros. of determining whether a will has been
properly executed, the intention of the testator
The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. in executing it is entitled to no consideration.
The only clerical error is that it says "testador" instead For that purpose only intention of the
of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del Legislature, as expressed in the language of
testador." The word "tambien" renders unnecessary the statute, can be considered by the court,
the use of the verb "firmamos." and whether the will as presented, shows a
compliance with the statute. Estate of Walker,
In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil  2 (40 Off. Gaz., 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815, 30 L. R. A., 460,
1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the attestation clause 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman's Estate,
did not state the number of pages of the will. 80 Pac., 700, 701.)
However, it was held that this deficiency was cured by
the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts
pages and in fact it had three pages. have rigidly opposed any exception tending to
weaken the basic principle underlying the law,
In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, the chief purpose of which is to see that the
4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947), decided by the testator's wishes are observed. It is possible,
Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in in some or many cases, a decedent may have
Spanish) reads as follows: thought he had made a will, but the statute
says he had not. The question is not one of
his intention, but of what he actually did, or . . .
Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este
failed to do. . . . It may happen . . . that . . .
que hemos firmado es el testamento y ultima
wills . . . truly expressing the intertions of the
voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro
testator are made without observations of the
paginas, de Numeriano Rallos, quien despues
required forms; and whenever that happens,
de leer y de leer y de leerle el mencionado
the genuine intention is frustrated. . . . The
testamento, y despues de que ella dio su
Legislature . . . has taught of it best and has
conformidad, firmo y marco con su dedo
therefore determined, to run the risk of
pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en
frustrating (that intention, . . . in preference to
presencia de cada uno de nosotros, que
the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the
asimismo cada uno de nosotros, los testigos,
formation of spurious wills, by the absence of
firmamos enpresencia de la testadora y en
forms. . . . The evil probably to arise by giving
presencia de cada uno de nosotros.
to wills made without any form, . . ." or, in
derogation of testator's wishes, fraudulently
It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the imposing spurious wills on his effect on his
statement as to the signing of the testatrix and the estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101,
witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the 103 Atl. 533.
omission is cured by the fact that their signatures
appear on every page. This attestation clause is
It has always been the policy of this court to
different from that involved in the present case.
sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so,
but we cannot break down the legislative
There is no reason why wills should not be executed barriers protecting a man's property after
by complying substantially with the clear requisites of death, even if a situation may be presented
the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A.
elements. The right to dispose of property by will is L. R., pp. 419, 420.)
not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements
should be satisfied.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is
reversed, denying the probate of the alleged will and
The right to make a testamentary disposition declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos
of one's property is purely of statutory Gil. With costs against the appellee. It is so ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla and Reyes, casilla, asi como todos las hojas del mismo
JJ., concur. (Ha sido firmado por el testador) en nuestra
presencia y que cada de nosotros hemos
atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y
todas las hojas del mismo presencia del
testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
Separate Opinions
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was
TUAZON, J., dissenting: inadvertently left out. The probabilities of error in the
copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the will
was not in controversy. The form of the will being
The decision takes for granted that the will was immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or on care
written just as it was copied in the stipulation of facts was employed in the copying thereof in the pleading
by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes the or record on appeal above mentioned. The absence
correctness of the copy an issue thereby raising the of the signature of the testator on the first page of the
question of not whether the burnt will possessed the copy is an additional proof that little or on pain was
statutory requirements but whether the copy is taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The
erroneous. Since this is a chief feature on which the appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el
appellee's case is built; since, in fact, the objection to testador" is another.
form of the attestation clause, with which the decision
wholly deals, would disappear if the appellee's
contention were well founded, it is proper that in this Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to
dissenting opinion we should accord the matter at know the law, as the decision says. Certainly,
least a passing notice. Attorney Mariano Omaña, who drafted the whole
instrument and signed it as an attesting witness, knew
the law and, by the context of the whole instrument,
It may be stated as background that the original of the has shown familiarity with the rules of grammar and
will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila in ability to express his idea properly.
1943; that in 1945, before the will came up for
probate, it was destroyed by fire or looters; that in the
probate proceeding after liberation, the parties Read in the light of these circumstances — without
submitted an agreed statement of facts in which the mentioning the evidence or record, not objected to,
will was reproduced as copied in the record on appeal that the testator signed the will in the presence of the
in another case docketed in this court on appeal as attesting witnesses — so important an omission as to
G.R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It make the sentence senseless — granting such
further appears from the record of that case and from omission existed in the original document-could not
the decision of this court that the controversy there have been intentional or due to ignorance. The most
concerned the right of a nephew of the testator to that can be said is that the flaw was due to a clerical
impugn the will, it being alleged that he was not a mistake, inadvertance, or oversight.
legal heir and had no interest in the probate.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that
As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen the will read as it was "reproduced in the record on
that the attestation clause is truncated and Appeal" above mentioned is bound by the agreement.
meaningless. The last of the compound sentence in This is not an absolute rule. The binding effect of a
incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase. Counsel for stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of
appellee contends that the phrase "ha sido firmado barring them or either of them from impeaching it on
por el testador" or equivalent expression between the the score of clerical error or clear mistake. That there
words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra was such mistake, is indubitable. It is noteworthy that
presencia" should be inserted if the sentence is to be the opponent and appellant herself appears not to
complete and have sense. The attestation clause with have noticed any defect in the attestation clause as
the inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we italicize copied in the stipulation. It would seem that in the
should read thus: court below she confined her attack on the will to the
alleged failure of the testator to sign the first page. We
say this because it was only the alleged unsigning of
Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores the first page of the document which the trial court in
de edad, certificamos que el testamento que the appealed decision discussed and ruled upon.
precede escrito en la lengua castellana que There is not the slightest reference in the decision,
conoce la testador, compuesto de las direct or implied, to any flaw in the attestation clause
paginadas utiles con la clausula de — which is by far more important than the alleged
atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente absence of the testator's signature on the first page.
en letras y numeros en la parte superior de la
As stated the problem posed by the omission in expressed in the will; but not where the effect of
question is governed, not by the law of wills which inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat
requires certain formalities to be observed in the such intention, or change the meaning of words that
execution, but by the rules of construction applicable are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50, 51, the
to statues and documents in general. And this rule same work says: "To aid the court in ascertaining and
would obtain even if the omission had occurred in the giving effect to the testator's intention in the case of
original document and not in the copy alone. In either an ambiguous will, certain rules have been
case, the court may and should correct the error by established for guidance in the construction or
supplying the omitted word or words. interpretation to be placed upon such a will, and in
general a will should be construed according to these
In Testamentaria del finado Emilio Alcala, a similar established rules of construction." Speaking of
situation arose and the Court said: construction of statutes which, as has been said, is
applicable to construction of documents, the same
Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de work, in Vol. 59, p. 992, says: "Where it appears from
atestiguacion se nota a simple vista que en su the context that certain words have been inadvertently
redaccion se ha incurrido en omisiones que la omitted from a statute, the court may supply such
razon y el sentido comon pueden suplirlas sin words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to
alterar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto del express the legislative intent.
testador como la de los tres testigos que
intervinieron en el otorgamiento de la misma. Adding force to the above principle is the legal
Teniendo en cuenta la fraselogia de la presumption that the will is in accordance with law. (2
segunda parte de la clausula se observara Page on Wills, 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)
que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales,
consisten en meros errores gramaticales que Let us assume, for the purpose of this decision only,
los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion that the attestation clause was drawn as the
y en la aplicacion de las reglas de draftsman intended, that the mistake in language in
interpretacion de documentos, pueden said clause was not inadvertent, and consider the
subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la case on the premise from which the court has
intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los approached it; is the decision well grounded, at least
terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan in the light of this court's previous decisions?
sus efectos.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that as early as
La interpritacion que se acaba de bar a la 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the will
clausula de atestacion y la correccion de los was sustained, found its way into this court. (Aldaba
errores gramaticales de que misma adolece, vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378). The case was more than
incluyendo la insercion del verbo "firmamos" four-square behind the case at bar. There the
que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de departure from the statutory formality was more
acuerdo con las reglas fundamentals de radical, in that the testator took charge or writing the
interpretacion de documentos segun las entire attestation clause in the body of the will, the
cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la witnesses limiting their role to signing the document
intencion del que haya redactado el below the testator's signature. Here, at most, the
instrumento (art. 288, Cod. de Proc. Civ.; testator took away from the witness only a small part
Pecson contra, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R. C. L., of their assigned task, leaving them to perform the
sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.) rest.

La solucion que se acaba de bar al asunto es Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by
la que se halla mas conforme con la justificia law," this court, in a unanimous decision in banc,
en vista de que se ha presentado prueba through Mr. Justice Villamor said (syllabus): "When
alguna que insinue siquiera que en el the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to
otorgamiento del testamento se ha cometido the instruments besides the testator, such attestation
dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudiar a clause is valid and constitutes a substantial
cualquiera. (Testamentaria de Emiano Alcala, compliance with the provisions of section 1 of Act No.
40 G. O., 14. Suplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 2645, even though the facts recited in said attestation
132.) appear to have been make by the testator himself."

From 69 C. J., 82 83, we quote: "Words omitted from That was good doctrine when it was announced. We
a will may be supplied by the court whenever think it is good law still. That ruling should set the
necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as present case at rest unless the court wants to discard
it. On the possibility that this is the intention, we will the case above cited by the opponents of the new
dwell on the subject further. trends. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer any
puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to
This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De serious consequences. The decisions we have cited
Gorostiza, (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that there have been to tell us when and where to stop; the dividing line is
noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies drawn with precision. They say "Halt" when and
in the law of wills — the one being planted on strict where evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the
construction and the other on liberal construction. A document is attempted. They only permit a probe, an
late example of the former views may be found in the exploration within the confines of the will, to ascertain
decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, its meaning and to determine the existence or
sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic absence of the formalities of law. They do not allow
case in the other direction, predicated on reason, the courts to go outside the will or to admit extrinsic
is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft- evidence to supply missing details that should appear
cited approvingly in later decisions." In the Abangan in the will itself. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
case, unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice uncertainly and ought to banish any fear of dire
Avanceña, later Chief Justice, observed: "The object results.
of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid The case at hand comes within the bounds thus
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty defined. If the witnesses here purposely omitted or
their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this forgot that the testator signed the will in their
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to presence, the testator said that he did and the
attain these primodial ends. But, on the other hand, witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it
also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and
the object of the law to restrain and curtail the none was introduced or taken into consideration.
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but and of the law behind it was the thing that led to
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must the injustice of the old way that impelled this court, so
be disregarded." we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn
worship of form in preference to substance. It has
Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted been said, and experience has known, that the
the Abangan principle were numerous: Avera vs. mechanical system of construction has operated more
Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones.
Roque (1922), 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922,) That, it must be conceded, is the effect in this case of
43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil., this court's rejection of the will under consideration.
216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., For the adverse party concedes the genuineness of
922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala the document. At least, the genuineness is super
vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs. obvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of
Cartegana (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator of
Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de M. fraud.
Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs.
Pañganiban (1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs. It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed
Yap (1939)1, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. the will in the witnesses' presence "would be like
194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939)2, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile,
No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939)3, 40 Off. we say with due respect, does not look to us quite
Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940)4, well placed. Under physical law a man cannot raise
40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. his body from the ground by his own bare hands
Fernandez (1941)5, 40 Off. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs. without the aid of some mechanical appliance, at least
Pilapil (1941)6 40 Off. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De not for more than a flitting moment. But there is no
Villa (1941)7, 40 Off. Gaz., 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own
and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948)8, 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. act unless forbidden by rules of positive law. The
1, p. 211. rationale of our dissent is that he is not. If we were to
make a metaphorical comparison, it would be more
The majority decision says, and we quote: "If we cure appropriate to say that a man can and generally does
a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we himself pull the bootstraps to put the boots on.
going to stop making inferences to supply fatal
deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line?"
These same questions might well have been asked in
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate The will in question was presented for probate in the
practical reason for objecting to the testator instead of Court of First Instance of Manila in 1943 with Roberto
the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the Toledo y Gil, decedent's nephew, and Pilar Gil Vda.
presence of the latter. The will is the testator's and the de Murciano, decedent's sister opposing the
intervention of attesting witnesses is designed merely application. Toledo's legal right to intervene was
to protect the testator's and not anybody else's questioned by the proponent of the will, and the
interest. objection was sustained in an order which was
affirmed by this court in G. R. No. L-254. As a result
If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain of the latter decision, Toledo was eliminated from the
that the testator has definite and complete intention to case and did not appear when the trial was resumed.
pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible,
any chance of substituting one instrument for another The proceeding seems to have held in abeyance
(1 Page on Wills, 481), What better guaranty of the pending final disposition of Toledo's appeal, and early
genuineness of the will can there be than a in 1945, before the application was heard on the
certification by the testator himself in the body of the merit, the record, along with the will, was destroyed,
will so long as the testator's signature is duly necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. In the
authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by reconstitution, a stipulation of facts was submitted in
muddling it or attestation clause. For the testator, who which, according to the appealed order, "both parties .
is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a . . agreed that the will as transcribed in the record on
contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an appeal in Case G. R. No. L-254 is true and a correct
end and not the end themselves, and that end is copy.
achieved by another method slightly different from the
prescribed manner, what has been done by the The will consisted of only two pages, and the
testator and the witnesses in the execution of the attestation clause as thus copied reads:
instant will should satisfy both law and conscience.
The chief requirements of statutes are writing, NOSOTROS los que suscribimos, todos
signature by the testator, and attestation and mayores de edad, certificamos: que el
signature of three witnesses. Whether the courts testamento que precede escrito en la lengua
profess to follow the harsher rule, whether to follow castellana que canoce la testador, compuesto
the milder rule, they agree on one thing — that as de dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
long as the testator performs each of those acts the atestigamiento paginadas correlativamente en
courts should require no more. (1 Page on Wills, 481, letras y numeros en la parte superior de la
484.) casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo,
en nuestra presencia y que cada uno de
Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho
JJ., concur. documento y todas las hojas del mismo en
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de
nosotros.

(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA.


RESOLUTION
(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA.
March 20, 1953
(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAÑA

TUASON, J.: It will be noted from the above copy that the last of the
compound sentence is truncated and meaningless.
This appeal is before us on a motion for This defect is the main basis of the appellant's sole
reconsideration of this court's decision. Whereas assignment of error.
formerly six justices voted for reversal and five for
affirmance of the probate court's order admitting the Counsel for appellee contend that the phrase "han
will to probate, the vote upon reconsideration was six sido firmadas por el testador" or equivalent
for affirmance and five for reversal, thereby making expression between the words "del mismo" and the
the dissenting opinion, which had been filed, the words "en nuestra presencia" should be inserted if the
prevailing rule of the case. Under the circumstances, attestation clause is to be complete and have sense.
this resolution will largely be confined to a With this insertion the attestation clause would read
restatement of that dissenting opinion. ". . ., asi como todas las hojas del mismo han sido
firmadas por el testador en nuestra presencia . . ." redaccion se ha incurrido en omisiones que la
The point is well taken. razon y el sentido cumon pueden suplirlas sin
altenar ni tergiversar la intencion tanto del
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out testador como la de los tres testigos que
from the copy. The probabilities of error in the copy intervenieron en el otorgamiento de la misma.
are enhanced by the fact that the form of the Will was Teniendo en cuenta la fraseologia de la
not controversy in Toledo's appeal. The form of the segunda parte de la clausula se observara
will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales,
or no care was employed in transcribing the consisten en meros errores gramaticales que
document in the agreement or record on appeal. The los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion
absence of the signature of the testator on the first y en la aplicacion de las reglas de
page of the copy is an additional proof that little or no interpretacion de documentos, pueden
pain taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la
appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el intencion y hacer que el conjunto de los
testador" is another indication of the haste and terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan
carelessness in the transcription. efectos.

Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to La interpretacion que se acaba de dar a la
know the law, as the trial court says. Certainly, clausula de atestacion y la correccion de los
Attorney Mariano Omaña, who drew the instrument errores gramanticales de que misma adolece,
and signed it as an attesting witness, knew the law incluyedo la insercion del verbo "firmamos"
and, by the context thereof, has shown familiarity with que se omitio involuntariamente, esta de
the rules of grammar and ability to express his idea acurdo con las reglas fundamentales de
properly. In the light of these circumstances and of interpretacion de documentos segun las
further fact that the clause was brief and, by its cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la
importance, must have been written with utmost intencion del que haya redactado el
concern, so important an omission as to make the instrumento (art 286, Cod. de Proc. Civil;
clause or sentence senseless could not have been Pecson contra Coronel, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R.
made, intentionally or otherwise, in the original. C. L., sec. 187, pages. 225, 226).

There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that La solucion que se acaba de dar al asunto es
the will read as it was "reproduced in the Record on la que se halla mas conforme con la justicia
appeal" is bound by the agreement. This is not an en vista de que no se ha presentado prueba
absolute rule. The binding effect of a stipulation on alguna que insinue siquiera que en el
the parties does not go to the extent of barring either otorgamiento del testamiento se ha cometido
of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudicar a
error or clear mistake. The mistake just pointed out cualquiera. Testamentaria de Emiliano Alcala,
clearly brings the case within the exceptions of the 40 Gaz. Of., 14. Supplemento, No. 23, pags.
rule. The able counsel for the proponent of the will 131, 132.)
could not possibly have subscribed to the agreement
if they had noticed the incomplete sentence in the From 69 C. J. 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from
copy without making an objection or reservation. a will may be supplied by the court whenever
necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as
The problem posed by the omission in question is expressed in the will: but not where the effect of
governed, not by the law of wills which requires inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat
certain formalities to be fulfilled in the execution, but such intention, or change the meaning of words that
by the rules of construction applicable to statutes and are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50 and 51, the
documents in general. And this rule would obtain same work says: "To aid the court in ascertaining and
whether the omission occurred in the original giving effect to the testator's intention in the case of
document or in the copy alone. In either case, the an ambiguous will, certain rules been established for
court may and should correct the error by supplying guidance in the construction or interpretation to be
the omitted word or words. placed upon such a will, and in general a will should
be construed according to these established rules of
In Testamentaria del finado Emiliano Alcala, a similar construction." And referring to construction of statues
situation arose and the court said: which, as has been said, is applicable to construction
of documents, C. J. S., in Vol. 59, p. 992, tells us that
"Where it appears from the context that certain words
Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de
have been inadvertently from a statute, the court may
atestiguacion se nota a simple vista que en su
supply such words as are necessary to complete the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150,
sense, and to express the legislative intent." sanctioning a literal enforcement of the law. The basic
rule in the other direction, predicated on reason,
Adding force to the above principle is the legal is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-
presumption that the will is in accordance with law. (2 cited approvingly in later decisions."
Page on Wills 840; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)
In the Abangan case, a unanimous court, speaking
But let it be assumed, for the sake of this decision through Mr. Justice Avanceña, later Chief Justice,
only, that the attestation clause was drawn exactly as observed:
it was copied in Toledo's record on appeal, was the
mistake fatal? Was it, or was it not, cured by the "The object of the solemnities surrounding the
testator's own declaration? to wit: "En testimonio de lo execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con testaments and to guaranty their truth and
la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should
testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi primodial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
presencia cada uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de marzo de mil law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to
novecientos treinta y nueve." The answer is in the make a will. So when an interpretation already given
negative. assures such ends, any other interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
As early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and
of the will was sustained, found its way into this court. frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
See Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378. That case was disregarded."
more than foursquare behind the case at bar. There
the departure from the statutory formality was more Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted
radical, in that the testator took charge of writing the the Abangan principle were: Avera vs. Garcia (1921),
entire attestation clause in the body of the will, the 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922), 43 Phil.,
witnesses limiting their role to signing the document 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922), 43 Phil., 494; Pecson
below the testator's signature. Here, at the most, the vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs.
testator took away from the witnesses only a small Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil., 922; Neyve vs.
part of their assigned task, leaving to them the rest. Mojal (1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs.
Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs.
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by Cartagena (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs.
law," this court, in a unanimous decision in banc, Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de N.
through Mr. Justice Villamor said in the Adalba-Roque Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs.
case (syllabus): Panganiban (1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs.
Yap (1939), 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p.
When the attestation clause is signed by the 194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939), 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl.,
witnesses to the instruments, besides the testator, No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939), 40 Off. Gaz.,
such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs. Martir (1940), 40
substantial compliance with the provisions of section Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs.
1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in Fernandez (1941), 40 Off. Gaz., 1844; Mendoza vs.
said attestation clause appear to have been made by Pilapil (1941), 40 Off. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De
the testator himself. Villa (1941), 40 Off. Gaz., 14th Suppl. No. 23, p. 131;
and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948), 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No.
1, p. 211.
That ruling should set the present case at rest unless
we want to revert to the old, expressly abandoned
doctrine, in a long line of what we believe to be better- It is objected that "If we cure a deficiency by means of
considered decisions. inferences, when are we going to stop making
inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where
are we to draw the line?" These same question might
This court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De
well have been asked by the opponents of the new
Gorostiza (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that there have been
trends in the cases above cited. But the so-called
noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies
liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor
in the lie of wills — the one being planted on strict
does it open the door to serious consequences. The
construction and the other on liberal construction. A
later decisions do tell us when and where to stop;
late example of the former views be found in the
they draw the dividing line with precision. They do not of the will can there be than a certification by the
allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the
document or supply missing details that should testator's signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses
appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into may sabotage the will by muddling and bungling it or
the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain the attestation clause. For the testator, who is
its meaning or to determine the existence or absence desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a
of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an
limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish end and not the end themselves, and that end is
any fear of dire results. achieved by another method slightly from the
prescribed manner, what has been done by the
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus testator and the witnesses in the execution of the
defined if the witnesses here purposely omitted or instant will should satisfy both law and conscience.
forgot to say that the testator signed the will in their
presence, the testator said that he did and the A second ground of attack on the questioned will is
witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it that the first page or sheet thereof does not bear the
was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and testator's signature. The discussion on the
none was introduced or taken into consideration. correctness of the copy of the attestation clause
amply answers this objection in fact, the appellee's
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will case is much stronger on this point for the reason that
and of the law behind it was the thing that led to there is not only speculative but also positive basis for
unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the conclusion that the testator's signature was affixed
the injustice of the old way that impelled this court, so to the first page of the original. Both the testator and
we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn the attesting witnesses stated in the will and in the
worship of form in preference to substance. It has attestation clause, respectively, that the former signed
been said, and experience has shown, that the both pages or sheets of the testament.
mechanical system of construction has operated more
to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. Upon the foregoing consideration, the order of the
That, must be conceded, would be the effect in this probate court is affirmed with costs.
case if the will under consideration were rejected. For
the adverse party now concedes the genuineness of A motion dated February 17, 1953, was filed after the
the document. At any rate, the genuineness is super motion for reconsideration was deliberated and voted
obvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of upon, in behalf of the minor children of Carlos Worrel,
undue pressure, mental incapacity of the testator, or who was a residuary legatee under the will and who is
fraud. alleged to have died on February 6, 1949. The motion
prays that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed said children, and allowed to intervene and file "A
the will in the witnesses' presence "would be like Supplementary Memorandum in Support of
lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile Appellant's (Appellee's?) Motion for reconsideration."
does not look to us quite well placed. There is no Counsel for the appellant objects to the motion on the
impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own ground that the movants having only a contingent
act unless forbidden by rules of positive law. The interest under the will are not of right entitled to
rationale of this decision is that he is not. If we were to intervene.
make a metaphorical comparison, it would be more
correct to say that a man can and generally does As this case has already been considerably delayed
himself pull the bootstraps when he puts his boots on. and thoroughly considered and discussed from all
angles, it is the sense of the court that the children's
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate, intervention with the consequent further delay of the
practical reason for objecting to the testator instead of decision would not serve the best interest of the
the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the parties. For this reason, the motion is denied.
presence of the latter. The will is of the testator's own
making, the intervention of attesting witnesses being G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988
designed merely to protect his interest. If the sole
purpose of the statute in requiring the intervention of
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-
witnesses is to make it certain that the testator has
SANSON, petitioners,
definite and complete intention to pass his property,
vs.
and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F.
substituting one instrument for another (1 Page on
HERNANDEZ, respondents.
Wills, 481), what better guaranty of the genuineness
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court,
finding the evidence presented in support of the
GANCAYCO, J.: petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered
its decision allowing the probate of the disputed will.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 promulgated August 29,1986 affirming in toto the decision of the Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXII 2 dated March 21, 1985, the
dispositive part of which reads: court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
in toto the decision. 
8

WHEREFORE, the Court renders


judgment declaring the holographic On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the
will marked in evidence as Exhibit "H" respondent court a motion for new trial.   Attached to
9

as one wholly written, dated, and her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio
signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that
Montinola in accordance with law witnesses have been located whose testimonies
while in possession of full could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as
testamentary capacity, and allowing well as undue influence exerted on the latter.
and admitting the same to probate.
The appellate court in its resolution of October 13,
Upon the finality of the decision, let 1986,   denied the motion for new trial of petitioner on
10

letters testamentary issue to the the following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit
executor, Eduardo F. Hernandez, as attached to the motion alleged that efforts were
well as the certificate of probate exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the
prescribed under Section 13 of Rule court's decision was handed down, and (2) the
76 of the Rules of Court. unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the
fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the
SO ORDERED.  3 undue influence exerted on her which are merely
corroborative or cumulative since these facts were
This case arose from a petition filed by private brought to light during the trial.
respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22,
1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated
Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of the October 27, 1986   was likewise denied by the
11

holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola appellate court in its resolution of November 20,
executed on January 28, 1980.   The testatrix, who4 1986   on the ground that the affidavit of one Patricia
12

died single, parentless and childless on March Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes
29,1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will cumulative evidence and the motion being in reality a
several of her real properties to specified persons. second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed
by law.
On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named
executor in the will filed an urgent motion for In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the
appointment of special administrator.   With the 5 following errors:
conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix
except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5, I
1981   appointed private respondent as Special
6

Administrator of the testate estate of deceased. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF


APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW
(petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE
but who was not named in the said win, filed her EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE
Opposition to Probate of Will,   alleging inter alia: that
7 PRESENTED IS MERELY
the subject will was not entirely written, dated and CUMULATIVE.
signed by the testatrix herself and the same was
falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in II
full possession of her mental faculties to make
testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was THE SAID COURT ERRED IN
exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION
the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of RESOLUTION DENYING THE
the estate.
AFORESAID MOTION FOR NEW Section 1, Rule 53 provides —
TRIAL.
Before a final order or judgment
III rendered by the Court of appeals
becomes executory, a motion for new
AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT trial may be filed on the ground of
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE newly discovered evidence which
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION could not have been discovered prior
WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN, DATED to the trial in the court below by the
AND SIGNED BY THE LATE exercise of the diligence and which is
HERMINIA MONTINOLA. of such a character as would probably
change the result. The motion shall be
IV accompanied by affidavits showing the
facts constituting the grounds therefor
and the newly discovered evidence.
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL
WAS FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola
TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE Sanson alleged the following:
OF EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT
FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS xxx xxx xxx
TO THE TESTAMENTARY
CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE 3. That in her plea for new trial in the
ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE TIME said case, I have exerted efforts to
OF ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION. locate witnesses whose whereabouts
were not known to us during the trial in
V the lower court, but I have finally
succeeded in tracking them down;
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE LATE 4. That despite their initial reluctance
HERMINIA MONTINOLA WAS NOT to testify in this case,I am convinced
SUBJECTED TO UNDUE that they would testify under proper
PRESSURE AND subpoena for purposes of shedding
IMPROPERIMPORTUNINGS ON light on the fact that the testatrix was
THE PART OF THOSE STANDING gravely ill at or but the time that the
TO BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED questioned will was allegedly
WILL. executed;

VI 5. That they had the clear opportunity


to know the circumstances under
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN which the purported will was executed;
ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC and that they know for a fact that there
WILL IN QUESTION TO PROBATE. was 'undue influence' exerted by
petitioner and other relatives to
procure improper favors from the
In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on
testatrix;
November 3, 1986, was substituted by her heirs.
xxx xxx xxx  13

In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners


maintain that the appellate court erred in denying the
motion for new trial insisting that the new evidence Said motion for new trial is not in substantial
sought to be presented is not merely corroborative or compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The
cumulative. lone affidavit of a witness who was already presented
said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the
holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were
On the other hand, the contention of private
unnamed without any certainty as, to their
respondent is that the motion for new trial was a pro-
appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests
forma motion because it was not in accordance with
only on his belief that they would testify if and when
Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We find merit in
they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the
this contention.
allegations in the affidavit as to the undue influence
exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of
statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state the probate court as to the due execution of the will
facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now
they are not valid.   The affidavits are required to
14
conclusive.  20

avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered


evidence turns out to be immaterial or of any At any rate, even assuming that We can still review
evidentiary weight. this case on its merits, the petition will also have to
fail.
Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence
sought to be presented is new having been During the hearing before the probate court, not only
discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix
allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who
witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the declared that the contested will and signature are in
appellate court was handed down. The trial lasted for the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies
about four years so that petitioner had ample time to more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the
find said alleged witnesses who were admittedly Civil Code   in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76,
21

known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now Revised Rules of Court,   or the probate of
22

propose to present could have been discovered and holographic wills.


presented during the hearing of the case, and there is
no sufficient reason for concluding that had the As regards the alleged antedating of the will,
petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not petitioner failed to present competent proof that the
have been able to discover said evidence.  15
will was actually executed sometime in June 1980
when the testatrix was already seriously ill and dying
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the
since the alleged illness of the testatrix as well as the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of
charges of undue influence exerted upon her had Asuncion Gemperle, niece and constant companion
been brought to light during the trial, and new of testatrix, which upon careful examination did not
evidence on this point is merely corroborative and prove such claim of antedating.
cumulative which is generally not a ground for new
trial.   Accordingly, such evidence even if presented
16
The factual findings of the probate court and the Court
win not carry much probative weight which can alter of Appeals that the will in question was executed
the judgment.  17
according to the formalities required by law are
conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed evidence.   We have examined the records of this
23

by petitioner only for the purpose of delaying the case and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by
proceedings. In fact, petitioners son in his the respondent court that the contested will was duly
manifestation admitted that he had to request a new executed in accordance with law.
law firm to do everything legally possible to meet the
deadline for the filing of a motion for reconsideration Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged
and/or for new trial.   This would explain the
18
holographic will was without rhyme or reason, being
haphazard preparation of the motion, thus failing to the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she
comply with the requirements of rule 53, which was shares an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating
filed on the last day of the reglementary period of the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.
appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon
is questionable. The appellate court correctly denied
In the case of Pecson v. Coronel,   it was held —
24

the motion for new trial.


The appellants emphasize the fact
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not
that family ties in this country are very
interrupt the running of the period for appeal.   Since
19

strongly knit and that the exclusion of


petitioner's motion was filed on September 24,1986,
a relative from one's estate is an
the fifteenth or last day of the period to appeal, the
exceptional case. It is true that the ties
decision of the respondent court became final on the
of relationship in the Philippines are
following day, September 25. And when the motion
very strong, but we understand that
for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October
cases of preterition of relatives from
30,1986, it was obviously filed out of time.
the inheritance are not rare. The
liberty to dispose of one's estate by
Since the questioned decision has already become will when there are no forced heirs is
final and executory, it is no longer within the province
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not
force in the Philippines since 1889... enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue
influence or a possibility that it may have been
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who exercised.   The exercise of improper pressure and
28

has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his undue influence must be supported by substantial
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having evidence that it was actually exercised.  29

capacity to succeed.
Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her respondent court —
only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her will.
Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, There is likewise no question as to the
the latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry worth due execution of the subject Will. To
P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's Our minds, the most authentic proof
son Francis was instituted as an heir in the contested that decreased had testamentary
will. capacity at the time of the execution of
the Will, is the Will itself which
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her according to a report of one of the two
holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3)
her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her reveals the existence of significant
mind. handwriting characteristics such as:

We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of 1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of
the Civil Code provides — writing

A will shall be valid even though it xxx xxx xxx


should not contain an institution of an
heir, or such institution should not 3. good line quality.
comprise the entire estate, and even
though the person so instituted should 4. presence of natural variation...
not accept the inheritance or should (Exhibit X).
be incapacitated to succeed.
The characteristics of spontaneity,
In such cases, the testamentary freedom and good line quality could
dispositions made in accordance with not be achieved by the testatrix if it
law shall be complied with and the was true that she was indeed of
remainder of the estate shall pass to unsound mind and/or under undue
the legal heirs. influence or improper pressure when
she the Will.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix
disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the petition is DENIED for lack of merit with costs
the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the against petitioner. The decision of respondent court
estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the dated August 29, 1986 in toto the decision of the
deceased in intestate succession. Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21, 1985
is hereby declared to be immediately executory.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood
relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been SO ORDERED.
omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the
Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-
G.R. No. L-4888             May 25, 1953
compulsory heirs.   The fact that some heirs are more
25

favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue


influence.   Diversity of apportionment is the usual
26 JOSE MERZA, petitioner,
reason for making a testament, otherwise, the vs.
decedent might as well die intestate.  27 PEDRO LOPEZ PORRAS, respondent.

The contention of the petitioner that the will was Primicias, Abad, Mencies & Castillo for petitioner.
obtained by undue influence or improper pressure Moises Ma. Buhain for respondent.
exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be
TUAZON , J.: It must be admitted that the attestation clause was
very poor drawn, its language exceedingly
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals which ungrammatical to the point of being difficult to
affirmed an order of the Court of First Instance of understand; but from a close examination of the
Zambales denying the probate of the last will and whole context in relation to its purpose the implication
testament and seems clear that the testatrix signed in the presence
so-called codicil, identified as Exhibits A and B, of of the witnesses. Considering that the witnesses' only
Pilar Montealegre, deceased. The testatrix was business at hand was to sign and attest to the
survived by the husband and collateral relatives, testatrix's signing of the document, and that the only
some of whom, along with the husband, were actors of the proceeding were the maker and the
disinherited in Exhibit B for the reasons set forth witnesses acting and speaking collectively and in the
therein. first person, the phrase "in our presence," used as it
was in connection with the process of signing, can not
The opposition to Exhibit A was predicated on alleged imply anything but the testatrix signed before them.
defects of the attestation clause. Written in the local No other inference is possible. The prepositional
dialect known to the testatrix, the attestation clause, phrase "in our presence" denotes an active verb and
as translated into English in the record on appeal, the verb a subject. The verb could not be other than
reads: signed and the subject no other than the testatrix.

The foregoing instrument consisting of three The use of the word "also" is no less enlightening. It
pages, on the date above-mentioned, was denotes that, as each of the witnesses sign in the
executed, signed and published by testatrix presence of the testatrix and of one another, so the
Pilar Montealegre and she declared that the testatrix sign in similar or like manner — in their
said instrument is her last will and testament; presence.
that in our presence and also in the very
presence of the said testatrix as likewise in In consonance with the principle of the liberal
the presence of two witnesses and the interpretation, adhered to in numerous later decision
testatrix each of us three witnesses signed of this Court and affirmed and translated into
this a testament. inactment in the new Civil Code (Article 827), we are
constrained to hold the attestation clause under
The opponent objected that this clause did not estate consideration sufficient and valid.
that the tetratrix and the witnesses had signed each
and every page of the will or that she had signed the "Precision of language in the drafting of the attestation
instrument in the presence of the witnesses. The clause is desirable. However, it is not imperative that
Appellate Court dismissed the first objection, finding a parrot-like copy of the word of the statue be made. It
that "failure to estate in the attestation clause in is sufficient if from the language employed it can
question that the testatrix and/or the witnesses had reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause
signed each and every page of Exhibit A were cured fulfills what the law expects of it."
by the fact that each one of the page of the instrument (Ticson vs. Gorostiza, supra.)
appears to be signed by the testatrix and the three
attesting witnesses (Nayve vs. Mojal, 47 Phil., 152, "It could have been the intention of the legislature in
(1924); Ticson vs. Gorostiza, 57 Phil., (1932); providing for the essential safeguards in the execution
Leynes vs. Leynes, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. (October of a will to shackle the very right of the testamentary
18, 1939), 510, 528; Rallos vs. Rallos, 44 Off. Gaz., disposition which the law recognizes and holds
4938, 4940)." But granting the correctness of the sacred." (Leynes vs. Leynes, supra.)
premise, the court held the second objection well
taken and thus concluded: "The question whether the With reference of Exhibit B the Court of Appeal
testatrix had signed in the presence of said witnesses agreed with the trial court that the document having
can not be verified upon physical examination of the been executed one day before Exhibit A could not be
instrument. Hence, the absence of the require considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the
statement in said clause may not, pursuant to the word implies, is only an addition to, or modification of,
decisions of the Supreme Court, be offset by the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the
proof aliunde even if admitted without any objection." content of Exhibit B are couched in the language of
ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may
The premise of the conclusion is, in our opinion, not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary
incorrect. disposition." Furthermore, the Court of Appeals
observed, disinheritance "may not be made in any
instrument other than the will of Exhibit A, as
expressly provided for in article 849 of the Civil Code,"
and, "there being no disposition as to the
disinheritance of the oppositor, Pedro Lopez Porras
(the surviving spouse), in the said Exhibit A, it is quite
SARMIENTO, J.:
clear that he can not be disinherited in any other
instrument including Exhibit B, which is, as above
stated, a simple affidavit." This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by
this Court   involving the probate of the two wills of the
1

late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York,


Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is
U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private
defined in article 667 of the Civil code of Spain as "the
respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In
act by which a persons dispose of all his property or a
our said decision, we upheld the appointment of
portion of it," and in article 783 of the new Civil Code
Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs.
as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower,
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain
petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect
after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a
motion asking for authority from the probate court to
Being of testamentary character and having been
sell certain shares of stock and real properties
made with all the formalities of law, Exhibit B is
belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
entitled to probate as an independent testementary
advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66,
desposition. In the absence of any legal provision to
plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds.
the contrary — and there is none in this jurisdiction —
As found by the Court of Appeals,   the alleged
2

it is the general, well-established rule that two


advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the
separate and distinct wills may be probated if one
payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency
does not revoke the other (68 C.J., 885) and provided
estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment
that the statutory requirements relative to the
thereto."   According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the
3

execution of wills have been complied with (Id. 881).


sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings
As seen, Exhibit B embodied all the requisites of a
account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America,
will, even free of such formal of literary imperfections
Makati, Metro Manila.
as are found in Exhibit A.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the
It also follows that Exhibit B is a legal and effective
motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
vehicle for excluding lawful heirs from testate or
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were
intestate succession. Article 849 of the Civil Code of
conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate,
Spain does not, as the appealed decision seems to
and hence, there was allegedly no ground for
insinuate, require that the disinheritance should be
reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure
accomplished in the same instrument by which the
to include the sums in question for inventory and for
maker provides the disposition of his or her property
"concealment of funds belonging to the estate."  4

after his or death. This article merely provides that


"disinheritance can be affected only by a will (any will)
in which the legal cause upon which it is based is Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive
expressly stated." property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife
and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement
It is our judgment therefore that the instruments
provides:
Exhibit A and B admitted to probate, subject of courts
to the right of the disinherited person under particle
850 to contest the disinheritance, and it is so ordered, We hereby agree with each other and
with costs against the appellee. with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner, as the BANK), that all money now or
vs. hereafter deposited by us or any or
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and either of us with the BANK in our joint
ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents. savings current account shall be the
property of all or both of us and shall
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner. be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by either or any of us
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private during our lifetime, and after the death
respondent. of either or any of us shall belong to
and be the sole property of the Co.   and Macam v. Gatmaitan   in which we
11 12

survivor or survivors, and shall be sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements"


payable to and collectible or and considering them as aleatory contracts.  13

withdrawable by such survivor or


survivors. The petition is meritorious.

We further agree with each other and The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one
the BANK that the receipt or check of of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A
either, any or all of us during our will has been defined as "a personal, solemn,
lifetime, or the receipt or check of the revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
survivor or survivors, for any payment disposes of his property and rights and declares or
or withdrawal made for our above- complies with duties to take effect after his
mentioned account shall be valid and death."   In other words, the bequest or device must
14

sufficient release and discharge of the pertain to the testator.   In this case, the monies
15

BANK for such payment or subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the
withdrawal. 5
nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera
v. People's Bank and Trust Co.,   we rejected claims
16

The trial courts   upheld the validity of this agreement


6
that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one
and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate of party's separate properties in favor of the other, but
Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used simply, their joint holdings:
to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the
total sum of P667,731.66 ... ."  7
xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the ... Such conclusion is evidently
petition for certiorari filed by the herein private predicated on the assumption that
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship Stephenson was the exclusive owner
agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis of the funds-deposited in the bank,
causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a which assumption was in turn based
valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil on the facts (1) that the account was
Code,"   and secondly, assuming that it is a mere
8
originally opened in the name of
donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana
the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 
9
Rivera "served only as housemaid of
the deceased." But it not infrequently
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of happens that a person deposits
Appeals states: money in the bank in the name of
another; and in the instant case it also
WHEREFORE, the order of appears that Ana Rivera served her
respondent Judge dated November master for about nineteen years
26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby without actually receiving her salary
set aside insofar as it granted private from him. The fact that subsequently
respondent's motion to sell certain Stephenson transferred the account to
properties of the estate of Dolores L. the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera
Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged and executed with the latter the
advances to the estate, but the same survivorship agreement in question
order is sustained in all other respects. although there was no relation of
In addition, respondent Judge is kinship between them but only that of
directed to include provisionally the master and servant, nullifies the
deposits in Savings Account No. assumption that Stephenson was the
35342-038 with the Bank of America, exclusive owner of the bank account.
Makati, in the inventory of actual In the absence, then, of clear proof to
properties possessed by the spouses the contrary, we must give full faith
at the time of the decedent's death. and credit to the certificate of deposit
With costs against private which recites in effect that the funds in
respondent.  10 question belonged to Edgar
Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the were joint (and several) owners
appellate court's ruling on the strength of our thereof; and that either of them could
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust withdraw any part or the whole of said
account during the lifetime of both, It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no
and the balance, if any, upon the modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as
death of either, belonged to the held by the Court of Appeals,   by "mere 21

survivor. 17
stipulation"   and that it is no "cloak"   to circumvent
22 23

the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the


xxx xxx xxx spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal
property, say, by way of a joint and several bank
In Macam v. Gatmaitan,   it was held:
18 account, more commonly denominated in banking
parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar,
when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No.
xxx xxx xxx
35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged
to them in a money-making venture. They did not
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have
C is an aleatory contract whereby, arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.
according to article 1790 of the Civil And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said
Code, one of the parties or both that one spouse could have pressured the other in
reciprocally bind themselves to give or placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
do something as an equivalent for that
which the other party is to give or do in
The validity of the contract seems debatable by
case of the occurrence of an event
reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality,
which is uncertain or will happen at an
that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term,
indeterminate time. As already stated,
the term being death. Such agreements are permitted
Leonarda was the owner of the house
by the Civil Code.  24

and Juana of the Buick automobile


and most of the furniture. By virtue of
Exhibit C, Juana would become the Under Article 2010 of the Code:
owner of the house in case Leonarda
died first, and Leonarda would ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract,
become the owner of the automobile one of the parties or both reciprocally
and the furniture if Juana were to die bind themselves to give or to do
first. In this manner Leonarda and something in consideration of what the
Juana reciprocally assigned their other shall give or do upon the
respective property to one another happening of an event which is
conditioned upon who might die first, uncertain, or which is to occur at an
the time of death determining the indeterminate time.
event upon which the acquisition of
such right by the one or the other Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an
depended. This contract, as any other aleatory contract depends on either the happening of
contract, is binding upon the parties an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to
thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship
died before Juana, the latter agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a
thereupon acquired the ownership of transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and
the house, in the same manner as insurance have been held to fall under the first
Leonarda would have acquired the category, while a contract for life annuity or pension
ownership of the automobile and of under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been
the furniture if Juana had died first. 
19
categorized under the second.   In either case, the
25

element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk


xxx xxx xxx was the death of one party and survivorship of the
other.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively
belonged to one party, and hence it must be However, as we have warned:
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired
during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
xxx xxx xxx

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter But although the survivorship


vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take agreement is per se not contrary to
effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a law its operation or effect may be
donation between the spouses because it involved no violative of the law. For instance, if it
conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other. be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21
inofficious donation, to transfer (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the
property in fraud of creditors, or to ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases,
defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc.
may be assailed and annulled upon No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the
such grounds. No such vice has been Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D.
imputed and established against the Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of
agreement involved in this case.  26
the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio,
Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
xxx xxx xxx
The facts of the cases are as follows:
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship
agreement had been executed for such unlawful On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a
purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98–
conjugal partnership. 90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of
private respondent Elisa D. Seangio–Santos as
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. special administrator and guardian ad litem of
Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
acquired upon her death a vested right over the
amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all
Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They
ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in
by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no Segundo executed a general power of attorney in
more part of the estate of the deceased. favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and
exercise control and supervision over his business in
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of
resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE. Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated
No costs. September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private
respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of
the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that
SO ORDERED.
in the event the decedent is found to have left a will,
the intestate proceedings are to be automatically
G.R. Nos. 140371-72             November 27, 2006 suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and
VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the
vs. holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as No. 99–93396, was filed by petitioners before the
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc.
ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, No. 98–90870 because testate proceedings take
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. proceedings.2
SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents. The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo’s
holographic will is quoted, as follows:
DECISION
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
AZCUNA, J.:
Tantunin ng sinuman
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon
ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783
anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na of the Civil Code. According to private respondents,
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by
sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named
labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there
Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such
daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa being the case, private respondents maintained that
ibabaw. while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only
on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when
kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng testamentary disposition of the property of the
babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking decedent.
ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders
ng China Banking. Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to
dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng the probate court is limited only to a determination of
kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents
of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of
si Virginia. the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si preterition does not apply because Segundo’s will
Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6
Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha
mana. On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed
order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa
longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3 A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly
(signed) shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he
other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil
Segundo Seangio
Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy
Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not
Nilagdaan sa harap namin apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct
line.
(signed)
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition,
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed) for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v.
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)]
has made its position clear: "for … respondents to
(signed) have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the
case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to
ikatlong saksi be intrinsically void … would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners’ motion, SP. Proc. expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
No. 98–90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99–93396 were denied its probate outright or could have passed upon
consolidated.4 the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (underscoring supplied).
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings5 primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
merit. Special Proceedings No. 99–93396 is hereby INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs. SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE
SO ORDERED.7 PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Petitioners argue, as follows:


the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3
Petitioners contend that: and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which
respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF place for proving the will when all concerned may
HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS notice of such time and place to be published three
OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF weeks successively previous to the appointed time in
LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and
ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 devisees of the testator Segundo;
OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B"
HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT: Second, the holographic will does not contain any
institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly
I states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply
contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;
COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE
76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER
PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs,
INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF petitioners and private respondents alike, with the
THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of
TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo
THAT THE TESTATOR’S WILL IS VOID were preterited in the holographic will since there was
ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF no institution of an heir;
PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face
FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and
AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to
ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR’S Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was
II presented by petitioners was dated, signed and
written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ground of preterition, private respondents did not
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE document.
WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR’S WILL The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo’s intention of
WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND, estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect,
Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
III
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO Code requires that the same must be effected through
SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified. With regard to the reasons for the
disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance
child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
Code: itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
for the disinheritance of children and descendants, Alfredo.10
legitimate as well as illegitimate:
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent
(1) When a child or descendant has been or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
found guilty of an attempt against the life of within the limits prescribed by law, must be
the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, recognized as the supreme law in succession. All
or ascendants; rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the
(2) When a child or descendant has accused intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or
the testator of a crime for which the law public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
prescribes imprisonment for six years or more,
if the accusation has been found groundless; Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared
by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in
(3) When a child or descendant has been the present case, should be construed more liberally
convicted of adultery or concubinage with the than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account
spouse of the testator; the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
instrument and the intention of the testator. 12 In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document,
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud,
even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng
violence, intimidation, or undue influence
Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last
causes the testator to make a will or to
testamentary act and was executed by him in
change one already made;
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance cannot
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to be given effect.14
support the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or descendant;
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court
believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court’s
deed, by the child or descendant; 8 opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
(7) When a child or descendant leads a exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute
dishonorable or disgraceful life; an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate
the penalty of civil interdiction. to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. 1âwphi1

document executed by Segundo can be considered


as a holographic will. Considering that the questioned document is
Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot
the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
to no other form, and may be made in or out of the property unless it is proved and allowed in
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the
will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come property may be rendered nugatory.17
across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms
to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore,
should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders


of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21,
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set
aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and
hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate
case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended
until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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