e .

X reSSlOn

Prof. G.D. Sumanapala .

 Reality and Expression
Paiiiiatti in the
A Study on the Conception of

© Sumanapala Galmangoda 1999

Theravada Abhidhamma

Published in 1999

Paramita International Buddhist Society Ltd

Prof. Sumanapala Galmangoda
No.7, Kadugannawa, Kandy Rd
Royal Pandit, B.A.(Hons.) M.A, Phd
Sri Lanka

ISBN : 955-8321 -00- 1

•

PARAMITA INTERNATIONAL BUDDHIST

Cover Design: Lynn Kong & Joyce Woo SOCIETY LTD

PARAMITA
 Abstract

Table of Contents
The present study deals with a detailed analysis of
the abhidhamma conception of paiiiiatti (expression), the
Abstract
•
Theravida concept of language and its usage with reference
1
to the ultimate reality (paramattha) of the world of
Acknowledgements
. . .

111
experience. The content of this thesis is presented in five
Abbreviations
•

VI
chapters as follows:
Introduction
•

IX
The first chapter deals with the Buddha's sayings
Chapter One
which represent the early Buddhist attitude towards language
Paiiiiatti : Early Buddhist Background 1 and its usage. It is noted that early Buddhism av oids the
Chapter Two extremist views on language while accepting its usefulness
Paiiiiatti : Philosophical Context 12 as a means of communication. Accordingly it is
Chapter Three recommended that language should be used without strict
Paiiiiatti : Analysis in the Abhidhamma 49 adherence to it and without transgression of common
parlance.
Chapter Four
The· second chapter clarifies the philosophical
Paiiiiatti : Grammatical Analysis 80
context in which the abhidhamma conception of paiiiiatti
Chapter Five came into being. The Pili canon as well as the commentarial
Paiiiiatti : Parallel Developments 100 literature has been utilized for this purpose. It is evident
Bibliography 113 from the history of Buddhist order that after the Buddha's
passing away his disciples have paid much attention for the
Index 1 28
preservation of the teachings in prinstine purity. For this
purpose the abstract concepts of his teachings have been
classified and analysed in a systematical order. In doing so
they have introduced methods of exposition which are
closely related to the philosophy of Buddhism. Further they
are mainly based on textual interpretation and thereby
•

I
 paving the way for speculations on language and its usage
with reference to the doctrinal discussions based on the
abstract concepts. In this context the concepts such as two
truths , four kinds of analytical knowledge
. (catupa(isamhhida) and sadhana analysis have been
discussed in detail.
The third chapter discusses in detail the ahhidhamma
conception of paiiiiatti with special atfention to its two
components viz. sound and meaning. Paiiiiatti has two
aspects as attha (meaning) and nama (sound or noun). The
definitions and examples that clarify these two aspects have
been discussed in detail. The interconnection of two truths
with the two aspects of paiiiiatti which can be considered
purely a Theravada interpretation has been clarified here.
Accordingly conventional truth is related to meaning (attha)
of expressions and both conventional and absolute truths
are connected with nouns or sounds (nama).
The fourth chapter see �s to explain the conception
of paiiiiatti under the aspects of phonology and semantics
as described in the pa/i grammatical works. This is an
important aspect which has not been taken into consideration
in modern studies of the ahhidhamma.
The last chapter refers to parallel developments in
""
other schools of Buddhist thought so as to bring the subject
into a wider perspective . Here, special attention was
focussed on the Vaihha�ika theory of words and meanings
and some passing comments have been added to other
theories of language such as apoha.
• •
11
Acknowledgements
The present work was submitted to the Australian
National University as a PhD thesis in 1 998. At the very
outset I should be thankful to Professor Virginia Hooker,
Head, Southeast Asia and South and West Asia Centres,
Faculty of Asian Studies, ANU for his kind assistance in
making necessary arrangements for the submission of this
thesis.
I should b e grateful to Ven . B eUanw i l a
Dhammaratana, the religious advisor and the members of
the Buddhist Research Society, Singapore for their kind
assistance in undertaking the publication of this work.
In regard to the successful completion of this thesis
I must expre ss my deep sense of gratitude to my supervisors
(better A caryas) Dr. L.A Hercus, Dr. T. Rajapatirana and
Professor Y. Karunadasa under whose guidance this study
was pursued. Their constant encouragement and valuable
suggestions have guided me throughout this study. In this
connection I should also be grateful to Dr. B .I. Terwiel, my
advisor, Professor I.W. de long, the Emeritus Professor of
South Asian and Buddhist Studi es, the Australian National
University, Professor L. Schmithausen and Professor C.
Oetke from Hamburg University, Germany, all of whom,
went through my thesis and made suggestions for its
improvement.
I should be grateful to authorities of the Australian
National University for granting me a scholarship without
• • •
111
 which I would not have been able to carry out this research. Chandrika Malkanthi and two children Nalini Priyanwada
In this regard I must also be thankful to the (daughter) and Dileepa Mahanama (son) for their patience
University of Kelaniya for granting me necessary facilities and kind co-operation during the period of compiling this
and leave for this purpose. Here I must record my gratitude work.
to the Dean, Faculty of Buddhism, the Chulalankorn Finally I am thankful to Mr. Mahinda and Mr. Shiran,
University, B angkok, for providing me with reading and Mrs. Chitra Sarojini of the Dept. of Pali and Buddhist
facilities. Studies, University of Kelaniya for their assistance in
I am most grateful to Professor Anthony H. Johns, making photocopies of the thesis and other matters related
the then Dean of the Faculty of Asian Studies and Dr. to this study.
Richard Barz, the Head, South and West Asia Centre, ANU,
for providing me with all the facilities necessary for this
study. Members of the Registrar's office and the Assistant
Faculty secretary of the Faculty of Asian Study, ANU, were
always helpful in official correspondence and I must be
thankful to them.
I should express my gratitude to the staff of the ANU
library, especially Mr. Royce Wiles , for their constant
awareness of my needs in academic matters .
•

It is my duty to record here my gratitude to Elisabeth

Kat, the Centre Administrator of the South and West Asia
Centre, ANU, for her kind assistance in all matters relating
to my study and especially for her keen attention to the
preparation of my thesis.
I would like to expres s my gratitude to Ven .
Tapovanaye Sutadhara, Lecturer, Dept. of Linguistics,
University of Kelaniya and Mr. Sumal Chandrika Weeraratna .
for their kind assistance in preparation of the computer type­
setting of the thesis for submission.
I should record my sincere gratitude to my wife
•

IV v
 DAT. - Dighanikiiya A((hakathiitikii
Abbreviations DhpA. - Dhammapada A((hakathii
Dhs. - Dhammasangani
DhsA. - Dhammasangani A((hakathii (Atthasiilini)
A. - Anguttaranikiiya
JHSSUK. - Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences of
AA. -
Anguttaranikiiya A((hakathii
the University of Kelaniya
ABHD. - Abhidhrmadipa (with Vibhiifiiiprabhiivrtti)
HP. - Journal of Indian Philosophy
ABHKBH. - Abhidharmakosabhiifiya.
- JPTS. - Journal of the Piili Text Society, London
ABHPK. Abhidhiinappadipikii
,

Kvu. Kathiivatthu
ABHSYBH. -
-

Abhidharmasamuccayabhiifiya
M. - Majjhimanikiiya
ABHVK. - Abhidhammatthavikiisini
MA. - Majjhimanikiiya A((hakathii
ABHVT. - Abhidhammiivatiira
MhNdA. - Mahiiniddesa Atthakathii
ADS. - Abhidhammatthasangaha ••

Miln. -
Milindapaiiha
ADSDP. - Abhidhammatthasangahadipanipiili
M Kvr. - MiUamiidhyamakasiistra (Devaniigari Edition)
ADSS. - Abhidharmiirthasamgrahasannaya
- MKVS. - Miilamiidhyamakakiirikiivyiikhyii (Sinhala
SVT SankhepavaIJIJaniitikii
Edition)
ADSVT. - Abhidhammatthasangahavibhiivinitikii
MMK. - Miilamiidhyamakakiirikii (Roman Edition)
•

AK. - Abhidhrmakosa
MMT. - MaIJisiiramaiijusiitikii
AKT. - Abhidharmakosatikii
MT. - Miilatikii
•

BCP. - Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii •

Mvn. - Mohavicchedani
BD. -

Buddhist Dictionary (Nyanatiloka)

NdA. - NiddesavaIJIJanii (Saddhammapajjotikii)
B JMAKvy - Buddha Jiiiinasiistra Mimiimsii
NettA. - NettippakaraIJa A((hakathii
Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii
NRP. - Niimariipapariccheda
B SOAS. - Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Ps. - Pa(isambhidiimagga
Studies
PsA. - Pa(isambhidiimagga A((hakathii
,

B SSAK. - Bhiifiya-sphutiirthii-sahita Abhidharmakosam

PTS. - Piili Text Society
Cpd. - Compendium of Philosophy
PTSD. - Piili English Dictionary of the Piili text Society
D. - Dighanikiiya
Pug. - Puggalapaiiiiatti
DA. - Dighanikiiya A((hakathii
PugA. - Puggalapaiiiiatti A((hakathii
•

VI
Pvn. - Paramatthavinicchaya
S. -
Samyuttanikaya Introduction
Sn. - Suttanipata
SnA. -
Suttanipata Atthakatha As far as the Nikaya literature is concerned the noun
SS. -
Saccasankhepa Paiiiiatti is used in the common sense of description,
SVT - SankhepavalJlJanatika designation, name, idea, notion and concept. ( 1 ) As a verbal
Vino -
Vinayapitaka form its two meanings have been noted:
VinA. - Vinaya Atthakatha (Samlmtapasadika) i, dassana, pakasana showing, explaining
-

Vism. -
Visuddhimagga ii, thapana, nikkhipana keeping, laying down (2)
-

VismS. - Vis uddhimargasannaya The Abhidhammapitaka and the post-canonical exegetical

VismT -
Visuddhimaggatika (Paramatthamaiijusa) sources use the term in a specific sense to which the English
renderings "concept" or "expression" would be more
appropriate. In this study our attention is focused on the .
latter usage of the term with a view to investigate into its
philosophical and philological implications . In the
Puggaiapaiiiiatti, one of the seven texts of the
Abhidhammapitaka, this term has been used in a
philosophical sense and in the grammatical literature its
philological aspects have been clarified on a psychological
basis.
Although the term paiiiiatti does not always occur
in the sense of language and its nature of usage in the
Nikaya literature, the statements found there in regard to
that aspect cannot be ignored. Certainly the later definitions
and descriptions of the . term have been based on these
statements. In this regard the discourses include several
important 'statements and the modern scholars have
adequately analysed them. . Among them the
AralJavibhangasutta of Majjhimanikaya where the Buddha
• • • •

Vlll
•

IX
advises the monks not to strict to the provincial dialects
and not to transgress the common parlance, is of more
importance. The mostly used method of propagation of the
Dhamma at the earliest stage was verbal communication.
Generally in communication an idea or a message is
transmitted to the hearer. It was extremely important for
the Buddha and his disciples to pay their attention to the
medium of communication in regard to ·the propagation of
Dhamma in a multi-lingual country like India. Further this
attention was probably influenced by the contemporary
Vedic attitude towards the divine nature of language which
was closely connected with the recitation of scriptures in
the performance of sacrifices. The request made by the two
monks, Yamelu and Tekula to translate the Buddha' s
teachings into Vedic language or metre is a clear evidence
for that influence. The liberal attitude of the Buddha towards
the use of language is implied by the response to the above
request that his teaching may be studied through the hearer' s
own language and it should not be translated to Vedic
language or metre.
The Buddha who realised the importance of language
in the missionary works, included the skillfulness of dialects
(niruttipa(isambhida) as one aspect of the four kinds of
analytical knowledge. This knowledge is particularly
connected with the skillfulness of the means of
communication. The appointment of some disciples as
foremost among those who possessed special abilities in
communication can also be taken as a testimony in this
regard. As ven. Buddhaghosa states in his Visuddhimagga
x
one should possess a knowledge of hundred . dialects as a
requirement for the obtainment of niruttipa(isambhida
(analytical knowledge of communication).
Language means a combination of sounds and meanings.
Sounds represent pronunciation and the meanings are
derived from the articulated sounds. Meanings generally
represent an idea or a message and this message is mentally
created prior to the articulation of sounds. These two
component parts of language have been emphasised in the
Buddha's teachings in connection with the propagation of
Dhamma. In his first address to the group of sixty monks
the two aspects have been noted as sattham with meaning,
-
sabyanjanam with sound. Further in his teachings the
-
uselessness of meaningless expressions is also emphasised.
According to the Buddha's teachings language should be
used for the communication of factual messages and it has
no divine nature.
Sometimes we find in the Suttapi(aka, the Buddha's
brief statements and discourses explained in detail by his
disciples. The tradition of interpretation by the disciples can
be considered as one of the important factors that influenced
the origin of Pali commentaries at a later date. The
. Suttapi(aka itself bears ample examples to prove the
existence of such a tradition even at the earliest
stage of the evolution of Buddhism. Among them the
Saccavibhangasutta is of great importance because its
sevenfold method of exposition has been developed in the
Nettippakaral)a as an inevitable means of understanding the
Buddha's teachings. The Niddesapali, one of the fifteen texts
•
Xl
of the Khuddakanikaya, is definitely a commentary on the
a((hakavagga of the Suttanipata. Ven. Mahakaccana has
been declared as the foremost among those who explain
the short expressions of the Buddha in detail.
The descriptions related to the methods of preaching
the dhamma found in the Nikaya literature are also worthy
of consideration in this regard. Of them the gradual
preaching (anupubbikatha) , ex" a lted preaching
(samukkamsikadesana), direct exposition
(ekamsavyakara1}a), and exposition after analysis
(vibhajjavyakara1}a) etc. can be considered as the methods
of preaching used in connection with the capacity of
understanding of the hearers. The two ways of preaching -
conventional (sammuti) and absolute (paramattha) - based
on the teaching of two kinds of discourses (neyyattha and
nitattha) are directly connected with the usage of language.
The history of Buddhist thought clarifies that these two
divisions of the method of preaching have taken a central
position in almost all the later Buddhist traditions.
The two aspects of language viz. sound and meaning
are extremely connected with the process of sense­
perception. The articulation is connected with the tongue
and several positions of the mouth while the meaning mainly
depends on mental behaviour of the person. Hearing of
sounds which enables one to understand the meanings of
different expressions depends on the ear. Further the senses
such as the eye and the nose are helpful in creating various
ideas or meanings in the mind. These psychological and
the philological aspects of language have also been the .
• •
Xll
central themes of some of the discourses in early Buddhism.
In addition to supplying a description of the proces s of
articulation and understanding of language, these details
were essential to analyse the personality in order to clarify
its impermanent nature. In the �xplanation of the six senses,
their respective objects and the interaction between them
necess arily involv es the aspect s of langua ge such as
articulation, hearing and understanding. The analyses of
papaiica (concepts) in the discourses are directly connected
with the above aspects. Accordingly the contact between
the senses and sense-obj ects causes the arising of
consciousness which produces feeling. Perception depends
on feeling and discursive thinking is caused by perception.
Concepts come into being as a result of discursive thinking .
These concepts can be recognised as various meanings of
the express ions. Thus it is clear that the descriptions of the
origin of concepts in the discourses can also be considered
as psychological analyses of the meaning of expres sions.
Further attention has been paid in the discourses to analyse
'
the subtle states of mind connec ted with the spiritua l
progres s where language is inevitably involve d. In the
consciousness of a person arising from the absorption called
extinction of perception and feeling (saiiiiavedayitanirodha)
occurs the thoughts of reflection (vicara) and inquiry before
the expres sion. The statem ents like these prepar e a
psycho logical basis for the analysi s of the nature o f
language.
The early Buddhist ideas about the language and its
nature reflected in the aforesaid statements have directly or
• • •
X111
indirectly influenced the later speculations on the analyses
of pannatti. But it seems that the practical attitude of early
Buddhism has been neglected to some extent in the later
analyses of language and its nature based on the conception
of pannatti. Nevertheless it should be mentioned that the
early B uddhist ideas about language have been
sy stematically arranged and analysed under the
abhidhamma conception of pannatti. Amon g the seven
works of the Theravada abh i.!!,h ammapi(aka, the
Puggalapannatti is totally devoted to analyse the concept
of person. It should be noted here that this text deals only
with the concept of person because the other concepts such
as aggregates (khandha), sense-bases (ayatana) and
elements (dhatu) have already been dealt with in the other
texts of the abhidhammapi(aka. By this it becomes clear
that the entire subject-matter of the abhidhamma is treated
under the term pannatti. It means that the whole Buddhist
teaching is a conventiona� expression of language. The
dhamma included in it is the message or meaning. The
expression or communication of this message or meaning
through language is called pannatti or enactment. Thus it
is clear that the term pannatti is used in the Theravada
tradition in the sense of linguistic expression. Although
the concept of two truths involves the analysis of the nature
of pannatti, it is used as a common term representing both
kinds of truth viz. conventional and absolute. On the other
hand pannatti can be defined as the medium through which
the absolute truth and the conventional truth are expressed.
Thus we notice that the facts considered as absolute truth .
•
XIV
such as aggregates as well as the concepts such as person
treated under conventional truth have been regarded as
pannatti in the abhidhammapi(aka. In this context pannatti
is not synonymous with sammuti (convention) of the pair
of terms sammuti - paramattha (conventional-absolute).
It indicates the common idea of communication, expression
or convention as the term sammuti used in the early
Buddhist discourses. But it should be noted here that the
term pannatti denotes both the aspects of language viz.
sound and meaning. The analysis of the nature of sounds
and meanings paved the way for the dichotomy of
conventional and absolute truth as found in the later
exegetical literature. No doubt that the two terms sammuti
and pannatti are synonymous. But these terms when used
in conjunction with the term paramattha (absolute sense)
denotes a qualitative difference in meaning. This qualitative
meaning of the term has come into focus with emphasis on
the two degrees of truth only in the commentarial literature
belonging to a later period. But in this· context the term
paramattha is always used with the term sammuti. The
context is more important than the etymological meaning
in determining the exact usage of a term in a given instance.
Therefore, more precisely we can assume that the term
pannatti when used as a single word in the later Theravada
texts of abhidhamma indicates merely expression or
language.
The two components of language" namely sound and
meaning have been analysed in detail under the term
pannatti. The meaning represents the psychological aspect
xv
of communication while sound represents its expression
through the vocal instruments in the form of words and
sentences. Through the contact between the senses and sens­
obj ects there arise various concepts in the mind of an
ordinary being which are normally conventional. Because
of this fact those various concepts which are expressed
.
.
through the words and sentences as meanings are necessarily
conventio nal. Thus between the two aspects of language ,
the meaning s as well as their expres sions are always
conventional. The verbal expression of those concepts or
meanings is called niimapannatti. The enlightened beings
also express the reality of the world through the medium of
language with reference to their understanding. Although
the words that they use are conventional the meanings
denoted by them cannot be considered as referring to the
same but to the real nature of the world (paramattha). In
their expressions the sounds or words are conventional but
the indicated meanings ref�r to the absolute truth. On the
contrary there are numerous words in language referring to
the conventional ideas of the world. Thus the aspect of sound
of a given language is connected with both the senses viz.
conventional and absolute. The words referring to absolute
sense are not capable of creating a similar sense in the minds
of the ordinary people. Instead they create conventional
ideas out of those expressions. Now it is clear that how the
concept of two truths is related to pannatti. The later
interpretations like these, however, seem to have innovated
the practical aspect of early Buddhism . They represent
mostly an academic tradition. The systematic presentation
• ..
XVI
of the processes related to the origin of ideas or meaning,
their verbal expression, hearing the statements and creating
ideas in the minds of the others through hearing, in the later
exegetical literature can be considered as an example for
the above fact. Further various classifications of the concept
of meaning (atthapannatti) based on the conceptual aspect
of verbal expressions and the divisions of the concept of
sound or name (niimapannatti) based on the phonological
aspect of verbal expressions have been added. Thus it
becomes clear that the early B uddhi st conception of
convention or enactment (sammuti- pannatti) has been
extended up to a theory of language in the Theraviida
tradition.
The conceptual or mental aspect of paniiatti has
mainly been developed in the abhidhamma philosophy and
its philological aspect has found accommodation in the
traditio nal grammar. The gramma tical tradition of the
Theraviidins, unlike that of the Sanskrit tradition, is fully
devoted to the explanation of the Buddha' s teachings. We
find long discussions on the phonological aspect of paiiiiatti
in all the main traditions of Piili grammar viz. Kacciiyana,
Moggalliiyana and Saddaniti (Burmese ). Any explanation
of the phonolo gical aspect of languag e inevitab ly
accompanies its morphological aspect. Therefore, we find
in addition to the gramma tical explanat ion s , the
psychological analyses related to meaning in almost all the
gramma tical treatise s. These explana tions are closely
connected with the abhidhamma philosophy. It is a well­
known fact that the Theraviida abhidhamma was developed
XVll
to interpret early Buddhist teachings on a systematic
philosophical basis in the exegetical literature.
Moreover, the understanding of the conception of
paiiiiatti does not become complete unless it is compared
iii, comparative approach
Further, through the above methods, we should clarify the
following aspects of the conception of paiiiiatti :
,

with the same conception of the other Buddhist traditions.

•

1, its relationship with early Buddhism

The Kathavatthuppakara1}a includes ample instances to
• •

11, its relationship with the Abhidhammapi{aka

understand how the concepts of person (puggala) and
• • •

111, its affinity with the methods of exposition

elements (dhamma) in the Puggalavada and the
•

IV, its relationship with the grammatical analyses

Sarvastivada respectively paved the way for the emergence and
of divergent opinions regarding the nature of language. v, its similarities and dissimilarities in connection
There is a category of elements called with the theories of language of the other
cittaviprayuktasamskara (non-mental non-material Buddhist traditions
elements) in the Sarvastivada and three of them deal with
the aspects of language namely sounds, words and sentences. The chapters henceforth presented in this text are the
The Buddhist traditions which professed a kind of result of this research carried out under the above mentioned
transcendental reality emphasised the ineffability of that methods and aspects.
reality creating an opportunity to deal with the nature of
language. The concept of two truths in the Mahayana
traditions is mainly related to this problem of language. A
comparison with such theories of language found in the other
Buddhist traditions necessarily becomes helpful for the
understanding of the Theravada conception of paiiiiatti.
According to the foregoing brief observation it
becomes clear that a critical study on the conception of
paiiiiatti should be directed along the following methods of
research:

i, historical approach
ii, . analytical approach and
• • • •

XV111 XIX
 Chapter 1
·

Paiiiiatti : Early Buddhist Background

Although we do not find a systematic exposition of

language, there are numerous references to the nature and
usage of language in the early Buddhist discourses. In such
references, mainly the terms such as samaiiiiii, salikhii,
vohiira, nirutti, sammuti, adhivacana and paiiiiatti( 1 ) are
affiliated with the aspects of linguistic communication. A
study on these terms and their context reveal some important
insight into the Buddha's attitude towards the nature and
usage of language which might have influenced the evolution
of the conception of paiiiiatti in the later Piili commentarial
literature. The term paiiiiatti which is used in the discourses
synonymously with some other terms like nirutti and
samaiiiiii has been singled out in the post-canonical
Theraviida abhidhamma directly to refer to the linguistic
communication. Therefore, in search of the early Buddhist
attitude towards the nature and usage of language, we should
pay our attention not only to the term paiiiiatti but also to
the other terms synonymous with it.
The Buddhist discourses include the facts regarding
the nature of the world of experience. These facts are
generally designated as dhamma. Dhamma has been
explained in the discourses through language. The language,
whatever its form, is the primary means of communication.(2)

1
Early Buddhist Background
The communicator is necessarily aware of the medium that
he uses to communicate his message. This is · true even in
regard to the Buddha's teachings. In many discourses we
find the Buddha expressing his ideas about the nature and
usage of language to his disciples. Prof. D.J. Kalupahana
summarises the content of such expressions of the Buddha
as follows:
"The Buddha, who perceived the world of human
experience as being in flux, was not willing to recognize
language as a permanent and eternal entity. Like everything
else, .language (loka-siimaiiiia = generality of the world,
loka-vohiira usage of the world, loka-nirutti convention
= =
of the world) is in flux".(3)
As far as the numerous references that occur in the
discourses regarding the nature and usage of language are
concerned, the following facts can be discerned which
probably influenced the evolution of the conception of
paiiiiatti in the post-canonical Theraviida abhidhamma:
•
i, two constituents of language: sound and meaning
ii, conditional nature of language
iii, contextual basis of the meaning of language
iv, the existence of various methods of communication
v, psychological basis of linguistic communication
Language is a system which relates sounds with meanings.(4)
Sounds and meanings are the two main constituents of
language. Therefore, any explanation of the nature of
language should be focus sed on these two aspects. The
2 3
Early Buddhist Backg round
B uddha who was well aware of the medium of
communication, advised the disciples to preach the dhamma
through a perfect style of language. According to him not
only the meaning but also the sound of language (siittham
sabyaiijanam) should be perfect. (5) This clarifies the
Buddha's intention of the usefulness of a standard means of
communication for the propagation of his message. The
Buddha himself was gifted with polite address, distinct, not
husty, suitable for conveying the relevant meaning. (6) Some
of his disciples were well known for their skills in analysing
the meaning of s tatements and delivering attractive
sermons.(7) Further, some of them have been declared as
foremost among those who possess special qualities related
to linguistic communication.
e.g. :
Ven. Bhaddiya for sweet voice
Ven. Bhiiradviija for deep voice
Ven. PUl)l)amantiiniputta for teaching
Ven. Mahiikacciiyana for exposition
Ven. Sonakutikanna for clear utterance
• • • •
Ven. Kumiirakassapa for brilliant expression
Ven. Mahiikouhita for logical analysis
Ven. Nandaka and Ven. Kappina for admonition (8)
The proper understanding of Dhamma was of great
importance on the part of the disciples becau se
misunderstanding of it inevitably causes confusion among
them. Therefore, once the Buddha advised Ven. Cunda not
to quarrel over the doctrines and compare meaning with
meaning and phrase with phrase so as to come to a right
 Early Buddhist Background
conc1usion.(9) In this regard Prof. K.N. Jayatilleke observes
that "the failure to understand the limitations of language,
which employs static concepts to describe dynamic
processes" of the world i s partly responsible for
misunderstanding of the reality. ( 1 0) This might have been
the reason for the B uddha's great emphasis on the nature
and usage of language.
Language though sometimes causes
misunderstanding, is of great benefit if properly used with
awarenes s of its true nature. The Buddha has stated this
dual nature of language as follow s:
"Just, Ci�ta, as from a cow comes milk, and from the milk
curds, and from the curds butter, and fro m the butter ghee,
and from the ghee junket; but when it is milk it is not called
curds, or butter, or ghee, or junket; and when it is curds it
is not called by any of the other names; and so on. Jus t so,
Cilia, when any one of the three modes of personality is
going on, it is not called by the name of the other. For these,
Citta, are merely names, express ion s, tur ns of spe ech ,
designations in common use in the world. And of these a
Thatiigala (one who has won the truth) makes use indeed,
but is not led astray by them. ( l l )
Commenting on the above discourse K.N . Jayatilleke says
that " the Bu ddha use s the term attapatiliibha to describe
these states but does not assume the existence of an entity
or entities corresponding to the word 'atta' within one 's
person or body". And again he say s: "At the stage when
milk has turned into any of these states it cannot be called
by any other name than the name appropriate to describe
4 5
Early Buddhist Background
each state. To this extent one cannot overstep convention.
Nor should one assume that each of these names signifies
an entity within the changing process" . ( 1 2) In essence,
though the terms such as curd, butter, ghee, etc. refer to the
same milk we cannot reject them when we deal with them
in our day-to-day life. On the other hand we should not be
attached to those terms thinking that they refer to separate
things when we try to understand reality by means of
language or convention. Referring to the same passage the
translator describes the function of language in relation to
reality as: "There are a number of qualities that, when united,
make up a personality - always changing. When the change
has reached a certain point, it is convenient to change the
designation, the name by which the personality is known -
just as in the case of the products of the cow. But the abstract
form is only a convenient form of expression.( 1 3) In the
PiiU Nikiiyas we find mostly such clarifications of the
limitations of the various expressions of language. Once we
understand its limitations, we are not led astray by them.
Ignorance of the limitations of language not only becomes
an obstacle for spiritual progress but also causes many
disputes among people. Therefore, the Buddha on many
occasions has shown its limitations in order to use it
cautiously. This becomes evident in the Ara1}avibhangasutta,
where the Buddha advises the monks not to affect the dialect
of the countryside and not to deviate from recognised
parlance:
"When it is said: 'One should not affect the dialect
· of the countryside, one should not deviate from
Early Buddhist Background
recognised parlance' , in reference to what is it said?
. And what, monks, is affectation of the dialect of the
countryside and what is departure from recognised
parlance? In this case, monks, in different districts
they know (the d ifferent words ) :
pati patta vittha sarava dhiiropa .po1Jil .pisila
• •. • •. . • • • • • •• • • • • •
(all the terms refer to the same object 'bowl'). Thus
as they know the word as this or that in these various . .
districts so does a person, obstinately clinging to it
and adhering to it, explain: 'This indeed is the truth,
all else is falsehood' . Thus, monks, is affectation of
the dialect of the countryside and departure from
recognized parlance. And what, monks, is non­
affectation of the dialect of the countryside and non­
departure from recognised parlance? In this case,
monks, in different districts they know (the different
words) : pati , yet although they know the word as
. • •
this or that in thes � various districts a person does
not cling to it but explains: 'These venerable ones
definitely express it thus' . This, monks, is non­
affectation of the dialect of the countryside and non­
departure from recognised parlance. When it is said:
'One should not affect the dialect of the countryside,
one should not deviate from recognised parlance' , it
is said in reference to this."( 14)
Prof. Kalupahana points out two important facts
regarding language as revealed by the above passage.
i. "recognition of the kinship of words, based
on usage rather than on simple etymology
6 7
Early Buddhist Background
adopted by the grammarians
..
11. language drift which is a repudiation of the
absolute structures of language that are
supposed to be revealed by linguistic
analysis"( 1 5)
Commenting on the same passage further he says that the
Buddha's attitude towards language focuses on a midway
position between strict adherence (abhinivesa) to it and
,
transgression of its common usage. Because of this liberal
attitude of the Buddha towards language, his disciples
concentrated more on hermeneutical problems. ( 1 6) The
Buddha's permission for his disciples to use their own
languages (sakayanirutti) in disseminating the teachings ( 1 7)
is also relevant to the above point.
Another important fact regarding the early Buddhist
attitude to language was the emphasis on contextual
interpretation rather than literary meaning. The conception
of two kinds of discourses, neyyattha-the discourses which
need explanation and nitattha( 1 8)-which need no explanation
points to the fact that a particular statement should be
understood with reference to its context but not necessarily
on etymology. The contextual interpretation of statements
prohibits the innovations and refers to the current usage.
This might have been one of the reasons for categorising
the Buddha' s sermons according to various modes of
expression. Some of them can be cited from the commentarial
literature as follows:
sankhitta dhammadesana - concise sermon
vittharadhammadesana - detailed sermon
Early Buddhist Backg round Early Buddhist Background

samukkamsika dhammadesana exalted sermon

- of consideration. As Prof. Y. Karunadasa states both the
anupubbikadhammadesana graduated sermon
- terms "sammuti" and "pannatti" are often used in the early
nippariyayadesana non-discursive sermon
- Buddhist discourses more or less synonymously to mean
pariyayadesana discursive sermon ( 1 9)
- things whose reality is based on con ventions . (22)
As stated above', language, according to Buddhism Conventions vary in nature owing to various causes and
is not an absolute phenomenon as recognized in the conditions. So the enlightened beings do not attach to them
brahmanical tradition. It has mainly a psychological basis. but use them cautiously. (23)
Ven Nanananda says that the term ''papancasaiiiiasankha'' . Despite the fact that language has limitations in
in the Madh upi1)fjikasutta refers to language or realis ation of truth, Buddhism further emphasises its
convention . (20) The discourse clarifies the arising of usefulness by including language as one of the four branches
''papancasannasankha'' as follows: of logical analysis. They are as follows:
"Visual consciousness, brethren, arises because of eye Atthapatisambhida discrimination of meaning
-

and material shapes; the meeting of the three is Dhammapatisambhida discrimination of ideas
-

sensory·· impingement ; because of sensory Niruttipatisambhida discrimination of language

-

impingement arises feeling ; what one feels one Patibhanapatisambhida -discrimination of

•

perceives, one reasons about; what one reasons about, perspicuity (24)
one turns into 'papanca ' (papanceti) ; what one turns The foregoing observation reveals that the conception
into 'papanca ', due to that 'papancasannasankha '
•
of language (pannatti) which evolved as a theory of language
assail him in regard to material shapes cognisable by in the post canonical exegetical literature has a close
the eye, belonging to the past. . . (2 1 ) relationship with the early Buddhist discourses.
According to the above description conventions
(papancasannasankha) come into being as a result of the
psychological process caused by contact between senses and
their respective objects. Concepts that arise in consciousness
are communicated through words and sentences in a given
language. So language necessarily represents thoughts which
are considered as meanings.
With regard to · the canonical background of the
conception of pannatti, the term "sammuti" also is worthy

8 9
Notes 23. Sn., p. 175
24. The Path of Discrimination, pp. 1 2 1 -22
1 . Dhs.,p. 1 1 0
2. D.J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy:
Continuities and Discontinuities, p.60
3 . ibid. .

4. Victoria Fromkim and Robert Rodman, An Introduction

to Language, pp . 1 2- 1 3
5 . Vino V, p.2 1
6 . D I, p . 1 l 5
7. D II. P.3 1 7
8 . A I , pp.23-25
9. D Ill, p . 1 27
10. K.N. JayatiIleke, The Massage of the Buddha, ed. Ninian
Smart, London, p.5 1
1 1 . D I, pp.20 1 ,202
1 2. K.N. JayatiIleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
p.3 1 9 •

1 3 . Dialogues of the Buddha, I, footnote, p.263

14. op.cit ., p.245
1 5 . D.J. Kalupahana, op.cit. p.6 1
1 6 . op. cit., p.62
1 7 . Vino 11, p. 139
1 8 . A.I, p.60
1 9 . DhsA, pp.3 17,403;Vism., pp.473,499; MA.I, p.300
20. Bhikkhu Nanananda, Concept and Reality, p.5
2 1 . M.I, pp. l l l -12
22. Y. Karunadasa, The Abhidhamma theory of paiiiiatti,
p.76

10 11

Chapter 2 5. The concept of senses (indriya-paiiiiaUi)
Paiiiiaui : Philosophical Context
In the first chapter we dealt with the early Buddhist
teachings which might have directly or indirectly influenced
the formulation of the conception ofpaiiiiatti in the post- .
can oni cal abhidhammic literature. Here we pro pos e to
examine its philosophical context wit h refere nce to the
Abhidhamma canon and the exegetical literature based on
it. It should be emphasised that the term "philosophical" is
used here strictly in the sense of the Theravada abhidhamma
philosophy.
Paiiiiatti as a general term referring to expression or
language is applicable to all states of the world of experience.
The Atthasalini explains the fact as follows :
"One state fits in with all states and all states coincide
•
with one state. How so? The concept as name is
that one state which fits in with all states in any of
the four planes. There is no being, nor thing that may
not be called by a name." ( 1 )
The whole subject-matter of the Abhidhamma canon comes
under the conception of paiiiiaUi. The Puggalapaiiiiatti
which deals with the conception of person enumerates six
paiiiiattis at the beginning :
1 . The concept of aggregates (khandha-paiiiiatti)
2. The concept of bases (ayatana-paiiiiatti)
3 . The concept of elements (dhatu-paiiiiatti)
12
Philosophical Context
4. The concept of truth (sacca-paiiiiatti)
6. The concept of persons (puggala-paiiiiatti) (2)
Among these concepts, except the last one, all other
concepts have been analysed in the Abhidhamma canonical
works namely Dhammasangan.i, Vibhanga, Dhatu and
Yamaka. Therefore the Puggalapaiiiiatti deals only with the
concept of persons.
Dealing with the philosophical context of paiiiiatti it
is very important to consider here what Prof. Kalupahana
points out with reference to the Kathavatth u and the
Puggalapaiiiiatti. "Moggaliputtatissa rej ected the
conception of a person as an absolute truth, as an ultimate
reality (saccikauha-paramaUha). What the Puggalapaiiiiatti
deals with is only a "conception of a person" not a
metaphysical conception of a person". (3) The first chapter
of the Kathavatthu deals with the concept of person
advocated by the J/QtsiputriY(ls who were in the opinion that
there exists a person in the real and ultimate sense. According
to the explanation given by the personolists this is a
metaphysical entity like the concept of soul in the
brahmanical teachings. The term paiiiiaUi which is used with
the terms khanda, ayatana, dhatu, sac ca, indriya and
puggala does not refer to such a metaphysical entity. It is a
common term most probably referring to "expression" . .
In understanding the philosophical context of the
conception· of paiiiiaUi, it is extremely important to pay
attention to the contexts of the abhidhamma canon. The
Theravada canon of abhidhamma consists of seven texts.
13
Philosophical Context
Among them Dhammasaligani (Enumeration of phenomena)
has four sections viz. cittupp a da, rupa, nikkhepa and
a(thakatha. Of them the first two sections analyse mental
and material phenomena repectively and the other two
sections point out the main doctrines related to specific terms
such as "wholesome things". The Vibhaliga (The Book of
Treatises ) has eighteen analyses (vibhaliga) such as
aggregates , bases, elements, truth 'and senses. The
Dhatukatha (Discussion with reference to the elements)
explains the five aggregates in various ways, pointing out
their connections with the bases, elements etc. The Yamaka
( The Book of Pairs) in the form of questions and answers,
deals with the same subjects such as aggregates, bases and
elements, pointing but their interconnections. It includes pairs
of questions, hence the name "Yamaka". The last book
Pa(thana (The Book of Origination) explains the various
ways of relations that exist among the facts of phenomena.
As pointed out earlier, tlte Kathavatthu (Points of
Controversy), which is the only text of the canon ascribed
to a disciple, deals with the controversial points belonging
to different schools of B uddhism. Puggaiavada,
Sabbatthivada and Suttantika are some of them. It is the
metaphysical entity called "person-puggaia" that comes
under Puggaiavada · which was upheld by the personalist
schools. (4)
As mentioned earlier, although the conception of
paiiiiatti is confined to the Puggaiapaiiiiatti, it covers the
whole subj ect-matter of the Abhidhammapitaka. The
Abhidhamma canon as a whole deals with an. analysis of
14
Philosophical Context
the world of experience including its synthetic aspect. The
analysis is mainly based on the conception of five aggregates
namely : rupa-matter, vedana-sensation, saiiiiii-perception
and salikhara-dispositions. · All other material and mental
elements treated in the abhidhamma can be considered as
,
sub-divisions of these five aggregates. With this analysis of
the existence the abhidhamma philosophy seeks mainly to
establish the theory of impermanence while discarding the
eternalist views on it. On the other hand the relations among
the factors or elements explained in the Pa(thana which
adopts the method of synthesis clarify the conditioned nature
of the existence by rejecting the nihilistic views on it. Thus
the abhidhamma consists of a complete description of the
world of experience with an empirical point of view. They
are not metaphysical entities but the factors that come into
contact with developed knowledge. These factors should be
realised through human experience which is based on a moral
ground. In this task language or communication becomes
one of the most influencing factors. Unless the practitioner
is not well informed his attempt would be unsuccessful.
Therefore, the medium of communication plays a prominent
role in the task of instruction. That is why the Buddha has
paid much attention on the nature of language in his
discourses to the disciples. The abh idhamma analyses also
cannot escape from this factor because those should be
communicated properly without leading the hearers astray.
For this pu:rpose the abhidhamma includes a complete
description of the nature of expression · or communication. .
If endowed with a good knowledge · of the way s of
15
Philosophical Context
expression, no one would be led astray by different usages
,
of language. Further, the abstract form of the Buddha's
teachings which c�une into being as ahhidhamma necessarily
includes a technical terminQlogy. This characteristic of the
,
ahhidhamma teachings, might have emphasised the need of
"
.
delimitation of the term�Hthat refer to a particular meaning.
So the introduction of paiiiiatti was an inevitable part of
,
the ahhidhmma teachings. The, terms tn a given language
generally possess connotative and denotative meanings. The
ahhidhamma as a philosophical interpretation of the early,
Buddhist teachings should be endowed with a technical
,
terminology so as to fulfil its main purpose of preserving
,
the doctrine in pristine purity. The conception of paiiiiatti
serves well to achieve this purpose because it establishes
the particular , meanings attached to various ahhidhammic
terms.
Now in regard to the nature of the content of the
Puggalapaiiiiatti it is worthy of consideration what Prof.
•
Kalupahana says as follows :
'
"The list of fifty conceptions focuses on the
,
psychological constitution and moral standing of
human Persons, not their physical composition. It
includes the ordinary person or the one who, in terms
of his moral , standing, can be described as an
"individualist" (puthujjana), as well as the person
who has ' attained perfect enlightenment
(sammasamhuddha) and who has reached such moral
heights on the' basis of an understanding of
,
phenomena (dhamma) not previously available. The
16
Phi losophical Context
, latter refers to the founder of the teachings. Between
these two is a variety of persons who can be
distinguished from one another in terms of their
psychological , constitution, ' moral development, and
ethical behaviour, H, owever, to avoid any assumption
that these conc epts can be distinguished in terms of
, ' "
their ontological reference as well, the definitions that
follow relate these concepts to others in the list. Thus
the second, fourth, and sixth, for example, are said
to be related to the twenty-first, namely, the noble
,
(ariya)." (5)
According to him the conceptions referred to in the
Puggalap aiiiiatti are empirica l not substanti alist or
essentialist. And further he comes to the conclusion that the
Puggalapaiiiiatti can be considered the summation of the
ahhidhamma technique of enumeration, classification and
synthesis. (6) The Puggalapaiiiiatti includes a list of 1 4 1
types of persons which refer to the psychological constitution
and moral s tanding of human person s . (7) And the
characteristics of these personalities are essencially related
to the progressive and degrading aspects of the moral
behavior of individuals. However the attribution of the term
paiiiiatti not only is confined to various persons but also to
inanimate things. At .the beginning of the text it is clarified
that paiiiiattis are sixfold as khandhapaiiiiatti-concept of
aggregates, ayatanap a iiiiatti-concept " , 'of bases,
dhatupaiiiiatti-concept of elements, saccap aiiiiatti-concept
of truth, indriyapaiiiiatti-concept of senses,jJuggalpaiiiiatti-
' concept of persons. (8) The text further enumerates the
17
Philosophical Context
exact number of facts or elements treated under each and
every group of concepts. For instance the aggregates of
matter, feelings, perception,· dispositions and consciousness
are given under the group of the concept of aggregates . (9)
Some of the persons to whom the term paiiiiatti is attributed
are as follows :
The "individualist" (puthujjan a), the "noble" (ariya) ,
the "ignoble" (anariya), the "trainee" (sekha), the
"trained" (asekha), a person possessed of threefold
kno wle dge (tevijja ) , of sixf old kno wle dge
(ch ala bhiiiiio ), the "perfectly enl igh ten ed one "
(sammasambuddha), the person who is freed through
wis dom (pa iiiia vim utta ), freed thr oug h fai th
·
(sa ddh avi mu tta ), wh o fol low s the doc trin e
(dhammanusari) , who follows faith (saddhanusari) ,
the worthy one (araha) , and so on. The detailed
explanation that foll ows this matrix outlines the
qualities on the basi� of which each of the fifty can
be identified.(1 0)
The terms like puthuj jana and ariya had already existed prior
to the emergence of Bud dhi sm in the usage of Ind ian
languages . The B uddha and his �isciples used them in the
con tex t of B uddhis t way of life w ith the ir ow n
interpretations. In a way, one of the special features of the
Buddha's teachings was to re-interprel the current terms of
the Indian religions and philosophical traditions at the time.
In the event of emergence of the abhidhammapitaka with
a view to preserve the Buddha 's teachings in its pristine
purity, the task of delimitation of the Buddhist terminology
18
Philosophical Context
was much emphasised. In this regard the interpretation or
delimitation of the Buddhist terms in the Puggaiapaiiiiatti
as listed above is of great importance.
Now it is clear that the conception ofpaiiiiatti in the
abhidhamma canon is described · · with the intention of
delimiting the meanings of the technical terms used in the
philosophy of abhidhamma with regard to the path leading
to the realisation of nibbana.
•
As Prof. Kalupahana emphasises the treatment of paiiiiatti
in the abhidhamma canon is clearly empirical.
The empirical outlook of early Buddhism as well as
the abhidhamma canon seems to have been changed into a
metaphysical point of view in the post-canonical
abhidhamma literature. As we know, the abhidhamma
.
canon as well as the discourses were interpreted in the
commentaries on a purely metaphysical basis. In this attempt,
the subject-matter of the abhidhamma canon was mainly
classified under four headings which were introduced as
realities : citta-the consciousness, cetasika-mental
concomitants, riipa-matter and nibba�a-extinction of
defilements. ( 1 1 ) When these were treated as realities
(dhamma) which bear their own nature, the abhidhammikas
had to define them in a philosophical context. For the sake
of definition they created a dichotomy between the substance
and its quality as dhamma and its characteristics. The
following definition given to the realities (dhammas) will
prove the fact :
The dhammas are so c alled because they bear own
characteristics and common characteristics. · ( 1 2) Here the
19
Philosophical Context
own characteristic means the particular nature of dhammas.
A particular dhamma is ' understood according to its own
nature and that nature is not shared by others. The common
characteristics which are applicable only to the conditioned
dham mas are comm on to all. They are considered as
impermanence, suffering and soullessne ss. The own nature
or characteristic differs from one dhamma to another. For
example the hardn ess (kakkhalatta) 'of the earth element .
.
(pa(havidhatu), the inflation or distension (thambhitatta)
of the air element (vayodhatu) and knowing the objec t
(arammaIJavijanana) of the consciousness (citta) can be
cited. ( 1 3) As a result of these discreet analyses of the
dhammas the methods of definitions came into being
providing the abhidhamma with a separate topic of
.
.
discussion. These methods of exposition inevitably evolved
as gradual development of the consideration of the nature
of language or expre ssion . The abhidhammikas, owing to
their emph asis on the r�al and absol ute nature of the
dhammas, thought that the structure of language whic h
adop ts static conc epts in order to descr ibe dyna mic
proce sses, is not adequate to explain the real nature of the
dhammas or it leads to wrong views regarding their nature.
The analysis of sadhana in the Theravada abhidhamma can
be considered as one of such explanations of the nature of '
language. What is emphasised by this method of sadhana is
that there is no agency or instrumentality separate from the
nature of the dhammas. In the task of giving definitions to
dhammas, the commentators had to use various syntactic
'
devices. In those definitions, owing to the peculiarities of
20
Philosophical Context
language, there sometimes arose ideas completely contrary
to the accepted theories of the nature of dhammas. Because
of this, the commentators had to explain the nature of
language and its usage. They have added those additional
explanations " in order to safeguard readers from
misconceptions regarding the nature of dhammas. Among
those explanations, the sadhana-definition is very popular
in the commentaries. According to the Vibhavini(ika, citta
(consciousness) can be defined in three ways:
(i) kattusadhana (agency-denoted definition):
cintetiti cittalh-citta means that which thinks. In
this context, citta is the doer or agent Thinking
is its action. But in reality consiousness does not
think.
(ii) KaraIJasadhana (instrumentality-denoted
definition) : cintenti va etena karaIJabhiitena
sampayuttadhamma ti cittam
If we change the order of this sentence and put .
it in a more simple and short way we have it as:
Sampayuttadhamma etena cintentiti cittam -
citta means that with which the accompanying
dhammas (mental properties) think.
Here sampayuttadhamma means ' mental properties'
(cetasika). These are so called because they always come
into close contact with consciousness. ( 14) One could argue
that sampayuttadhamma can even mean material dhammas
(riipadhamma) because it is accepted that mental and
material dhammas also come into contact in the process of
perception. The Vibhavini(ika definitely states that in this
21
Philosophical Context
context, only the mental properties (cetasika) are meant. ( 1 5)
Anyway, it is stated that in this case the two intimations,
bodily and vocal (kayaviiiiiatti and vaciviiiiiatti), cannot be
avoided. ( 1 6) Now it is clear that in the above definition,
sampayuttadhamma means 'mental properties ' . Thus the
sentence sampayuttadhamma etena cintenti means 'the
cetasikas (mental properties) think with consciousness
(citta)' . Instrumentality is attributed to consciousness (citta)
which is to be defined (pa(ipadetabbadhamma).
(iii) bhavasadhana (non-attributive definition) :
cintanamattam cittam - thinking itself is
conSCIOusness.
•
According to this method of definition, consciousness is
defined as 'the mere fact of thinking itself' without there
being any attribution of agency or instrumentality to what is
sought to be defined. This method of definition is absolutely
valid for all real dhammas. The other two definitions
mentioned earlier are valiq only provisionally. Further, it
should be remembered that there is no agency or
instrumentality separate from the nature of the dhammas.
The above explanation of sadhana is given according to the
Vibhavini(ika. ( 17)
Not only the Vibhavini(ika, but some other sources
too speak about these methods of definition. The Sinhalese
paraphrase on the Visuddhimagga says that the
bhavasadhana definition is given to elucidate that dhammas
exist according to the causal laws. ( 1 8) The agency-denoted
definition (kattusadhana) is given to show that there is no
agency separate from the nature of the dhammas. The
22
Philosophical Context
Vikasini(ika explains thes e methods with more expl icit
examples and it is worthwhile to examine it here in brief
though it resembles the Vibhavini(ika in almost every aspect.
. (i) kattusadhana: cintetiti cittam -
Consciousness is that which thinks
(ii) kara1}asadhana: tena cittam vicaratiti vicaro.
In this example, which is given to illustrate kara1}asadhana,
the verb 'vicarati' should be read as 'vicareti' in accordance
with the reading found in the Vibhavini(ika. When defining
the term 'vicara ', this text states 'arammane tena cittam
•
vicaretiti vicaro '. ( 1 9) On another occasion the Vikasinitika
•
itself defines the same term in a similar way as 'tenati' tena
vicarena, karanabh iitena hetubhiitena va cittam arammane
•
•
vicareti'. (20) The example for kara1}asadhana, given in
the Vibhavinitika runs thus:
•
' aram ma1} e tena cittam vicaretiti vica ro ' -
Consciousness is being applied on the obje ct with
the help of the sustained application (vicara).
Here the term vicara refers to the agent but it is a nominative
subject.
(i) bhavasadhana: visayavijananam cittam the -
knowing of objects itself is consciousness.
This is the example given for bhavasadhana. According to
the bhavasadhana definition, several facts of the dhammas
are clarified as follo ws:
(a) The Vibhavini(ika says that consciousness
arises only when there is a contact with an
object. This shows the impermanency of citta.
(b) Moreover, it clarifies the behavior of citta
.
23
Philosophical Contex t .
bound with objects.
(C) · By the statement 'knowing itself is
consciousness' , the absence of an agent
•
(aklirakabhliva) of consciousness is clarified.
Explaining the slidhna further in a manner similar to the
Vibhavinitikli, the Viklisinitikli says that the bhlivaslidhana
definition is absolutely valid and the other two are provisional
(pariyaya). (2 1 )
The examples presented in the Ma1)isliramaiijuslitikli
to elucidate the three slidhanas are simple and clear. Instead
of the term slidhana this text uses the term niddesa.
Kattuniddesa: phusatiti phasso -it is contact
because it touches.
Kara1)aniddesa: phusanti etenliti phasso - because by
means of it they touch, it is contact.
Bhlivaniddesa: phusanamattam phasso - mere
touching itself is contact.
These and many other e�amples and explanations scattered
in the commentaries clearly show that the commentators had
definitely understood the limitations and wrong implications
of . language when it is employed for the task of defining
dhammas.
In addition to the slidhana analysis we find various
other definitions attached to clarify the nature of dhammas
specifically resulting from considerations of the nature of
language. The aim of these definitions has mainly been
focus sed on identifying the real nature of dhammas separate
from the structure of language. In this regard the following
definitions are worthy of consideration:
24
Philosophical Context
"The three characteristics (impermanence, . suffering,
soullessness) cannot be obtained separate from the nature
of dhammas" . (22)
"Even among the dhammas
.
,
which bear in common the
dhamma-nature, the special characteristics by which they
differ from one another should be differentiated for the sake
of easy understanding". (23)
"There is no function separate from dhamma". (24)
"There is no agent distinct from the nature of ·
dhammas". (25)
"There is no difference of nature of the dhammas in
connection with the three periods of time". (26)
It seems . that language has become a great barrier for the
commentators in attempting to clarify the metaphysical nature
of the dhammas. Thus it becomes clear that why the
conception of paiiiiatti has been given a prominent place in
the discussions of the doctrines of abhidhamma.
Further the classification of the subject-matter itself
necessitated the inclusio n of paiiiiatti as a topic in the
abhidhamm a treatise s. Among the topic s of Pali
abhidhamma the objects (liramma1)a) cover a wider field.
•
(27) The Objects are grouped according to the senses
(indriya) and thus the visible (rupa), sounds (sadda), smells
(gandha ), tastes (rasa), and touch (phot(habba) correspond
to the senses of the eye (cakkhu) , ear (sota), nose (ghlina),
tongue (jivhli) and body (kliya) respectively. The sixth sense,
that is mind (mana), includes several objects as: citta (mind),
cetasika . (mental properties), paslidarupa and sUkhumarupa
(sensitive and sbtle qualities of body), paiiiiatti (name, idea,
25
Philosophical Context
notion, concept) and nibbana. (28) Thus as an object
panna tti had to be explai ned along with the other
abhidhmmic topics.
The two methods adopted in the abhidhamma to
explain the dynamic process es of the existenc e were analysis
.
and synthesis . Synthesis is explained in the pa(thananaya
(method of conditioned genesis) and there also a prominent
place is given to the objects (arammlllJa ). (29) Among the
twenty..four conditions explained in the Pa(thana, the second
is the aramalJapaccaya (object-condition). (30) Not only
the real dhammas but also the pannattidhamm as are
conside red as the objects of the senses. Therefore in
explain ing the aramm alJapac caya (obj ect-con dition)
pannatti had to be explained. The topic pannatti is generally
connected with the explanations of paccayas (conditions) in
the abhidhammic treatises and this indicates its importance
as a condition. Further abhidhammikas wanted to religate
some conceptual dhamm�s regarded as real by the other
sectarians into the category of pannattis, thereby explaining
them as mere mental creations. The definitions given to the
term pannatti in the exegetical literature also provide some
insight regarding its philosophical context.
The term pannatti is used in many commentaries (3 1 ) and
great emphasis is placed upon elucidating the meaning of
this term along with its implications for the teachings of the
Buddha. The commentary on Puggalapannatti, one of the
seven abhidhammic canonical texts, which has pannatti as
its main subject matter, not only defines the term pannatti
but also gives a number of classifications of the categories
26
Philosophical Context
of pannatti. The fact that there are several different
classifications of pannatti clearly indicates that there had
been . various traditions with regard to its interpretation
ascribed in the schools of the individual commentators as
well as the early teachers. Thus the commentator himself
says, that he is giving all these different lists of the categories
of pannatti according to the method of the commentaries
(atthakathanaya) (32) and the method of the teachers
(acariyanaya) . (33) Perhaps these lists have been taken
from the Sinhalese commentaries and the traditions of the
BhalJakas (reciters) which have been some important Sources
of the Pali commentaries. (34)
The term pannatti . which occurs in the phrase cha
pannattiyo (35) has two different meanings according to
the commentary, viz.
i. dassana, pakasana - showing, explaining
ii. (hapana, nikkhipana - setting up, laying down. (36)
These two meanings are given to the term in accordance
with its occurrence in two separate contexts. In this context
A . K . Warder seems to take the term paricchinna­
dhammanidassanam as defining the term pannatti and
translates it as " showing a determined doctrine" . (3 7 )
However, what the commentary seeks to show by the words
paricchinna-dhamma-nidassanam is that in this context and
in this sense the pannatis are six in number. (38)
Defining the term further the commentary says "
namapannatti (i.e. the nominal) indicates the various
dhammas and also sets them up according to various groups,
while the khandhapannatti etc. (i.e. the conceptual) indicate
27
Philosophical Context
the nature of those pannattis. " (39) This clearly shows that
the commentator has taken the two main divisions of
paniiatti to be nominal and the conceptual . The two
definitions "paiiiiapanato paiiiiatti - that which makes
known" and "pannapiyatta paiiiiatti that which is made
- explanation, paiiiiatti means to make known what is dukkha
known (40) of the term pannatti which appear in the most
of abhidhammic compendiums, have also been familiar to
this commentator as he uses the very 'same definitions later .
in his commentary. (4 1 )
One of the very clear meanings of paniiatti is 'to
make known [the meanings] in various ways' .
'Pannatti is so called because it makes known [the
meanings] in various ways, e.g. takka (reasoning),
vitakka (reflection), sankappa (intention) etc. (42)
The netti-commentary also expresses the same idea
when it says:
''paiiiiatti means to make known in various ways"
(43) •
Through references like these it is evident that paiinatti
means to make known meanings through classifications in
various ways. The Netti-commentary further clarifies what
is meant by 'in various ways' .
"by this, or here, it is by kind (pakiira) or by class
(pabheda) t h a t me a n i n g s a r e m a d e k n o w n
( n iip iyanti) , t h u s i t i s a description". (44)
Another important function of paiiiiatti is to delimit the
.
meaning of a given term. It gives a determined sense to a
term by abandoning the other discursive meanings attached
to that particular term used in a philosophical context.
28
Philosophical Context
"Idam dukkhan ti paiiifiipemi (I make known this
as suffering) means to make known ' to the being who
understands in this way, "this much is suffering, other than
,
there is no suffering". (45) According to the above
precisely or to show its limitations. As words have many
connotative and denotative meanings, it is necessary to
delimit their meanings in order to direct the hearer's mind
to the exact meaning intended in each context. It is essential
that a precise meaning should be given to a concept especially
when it is used in a philosophical context. But explaining
something in conventional form is often indispensable in
order to assist the hearer. These two ways of explanation
followed in Buddhist texts are implicit in the following
quotation.
"It is easy to understand the various divisions of the
dhammas as paiiiiattis when they (dhammas) are
explained discursively". (46)
The other important fact the above quotation indicates is
that the function of the paiiiiattis is contrasted with that-of
" "
pariyaya, the conventional explanation. When something is
explained conventionally, the meaning becomes complex. the .
technique of paiiiiatti is employed to eliminate ' such
complexities from the philosophical concepts that have been
•
• •
promulgated in the abhidhamma. The Netti-commentary
further elaborates upon this:
"Paiiiiatti means to make known (the meanings) in
various ways or to establish (the meanings) without
complexity" .
29
Philosophical Context
Thus the pannatti becomes 'a mark of manifestation of the
. ,
meamng .
According to the foregoing definitions of the term
pannatti, there are several important meanings ascribed to
it as a technique of establishing concepts. Taking them as a
whole pannatti can be described as a method of establishing
the precise meaning of a term in regard to its various
. traced to the commentaries. For example, the Atthasalini
divisions and limitations.
Dhammasanga1)i, . the first book of the
abhidhammapitaka, gives a list of synonyms of pannatti,
when it defines the term:
"Ya tesam tesam dhammanam sankha samanna
pannatti voharo naniam namakammam
namadheyyam nirutti vyanjanam abhilapo "(47)
"That which is an enumeration, that which is a
designation, an expression, a current term, a name, a
denomination, the assigning of a name, an
interpretation, a dis�inctive mark of discourse on this
or that dhamma. (48)
The foregoing observation of various definitions given
to the term reveals several important aspects regarding its
philosophical context. Firstly the tradition has understood
the two aspects sound and meaning which should be taken
into consideratio n regarding pannatti. Secondly the
understanding of the usage of pannatti has been conceived
as an inevitable need of effective communication. The third
•
and fourth aspects attached to the conception of pannatti
are its objectives of establishment and delimitation of
particular meanings refferring to different terms. As was
30
Philosophical Context
already mentioned, in a philosophical treatment of Buddhist
teachings it was necessary . to introduce a perfect way of
expression and the result was the conception of pannatti.
It is interesting that not only the sound and meaning
of pannatti but also the psychological · aspect related to it
has been a topic of much consideration. It is mainly linked
with the meaning of terms. The origin of this trend can be
points out that perception (sanna) is one of the causes for
variety of convention.
"By the analysis of the variou s divisions and
subdivisions of mutually different kammas arises the
determination of the various divisions and
subdivisions of mutually different features. By the
analysis of the various divisions and subdivisions of
mutually different features various divisions and
subdivi sions of mutually different ideas are
determined. By analyzing the various divisions and
subdivisions of mutually different ideas, . the
discrimination of the various divisions and
subdivisions of mutually different usages in language
is effected" . (49) .
Though the term sanna has been translated here as 'idea',
we have taken it as 'perception' . (50) The above passage
clearly explains the interconnection between expre�sion and
mental process. When the difference of perception is taken
as a cause of difference in the usage of language, it paves
the way for the later commen tators to deal with the
psychological analyses regarding the conception of language
31
Philosophical Context
or paiiiiatti. As revealed in the Pali discourses the arising
of perception is a process of interaction between internal
,
sense organs and external objects. The Madhupil}l/ikasutta
explains the process as follows:
"Visual consciousness, brethren, arises because of eye
and material shapes ; the meeting of the three is
sensory impingement ; . because of sen sory
impingement arises feeling ; ' what one feels one
perceives". (5 1 )
Ven. Buddhaghosa explains perception (saiiiia) as a formal
step of recognising an object by the mind:
"For though the state of knowing (jiinanabhava) is
equally present in perception (saiiiia) , in
consciousness (viiiiial}a), and in understanding
(paiiiia), nevertheless perception is only the mere
perceiving of an object as, say 'blue' or 'yellow' ; it
cannot bring about the penetration of its
characteristics as impermanent, painful, and non-self' .
•
Accordingly, there arise various perceptions in one's mind
in connection with the various objects that come into contact
with the sense-organs. As to those vivid perceptions, the
conventi on or the words that we use (vohara) differ
enormously. .
The discussions as the above clarifies the fact that
paiiiiatti occupies an important place in the psychological
process that occurs between the sense-organs and the
corresponding objects. Therefore, a prominent place is given
to the conception of paiiiiatti in the descriptions of
consciousness in the later abhidhammic interpretations.
32
Philosophical Context
Sometimes, the commentatots describe namapaiiiiatti
(the nominal aspect of paiiiiatti) as a state which dominates
all the other states thereby ascribing a universal condition
to paiiiiatti in philosophical and common discussions of
communication.
"One state fits in with all states and all states coincide
with one state. How so? The concept as name is that
one state which fits in with all states in any of the
four planes. There is no being, nor thing that may
not be called by a name". (52)
The reason for this interpretation is the fact that all the states
have a certain name. There is nothing without a name. To
confirm this idea the Expositor further says that if there is
something without a name, people tend to call it " a nameless
thing". (anamika).
"Even of the tree the name of which they know not,
they say, 'It is the nameless tree' . And that also stands
as the established name of that tree". (53)
These references prove that the commentators had already
understood the importance of paiiiiatti as a unique factor in
determining the exact meaning of a term. Though it is a
dominating factor it is timeless and not included in the
category of five aggregates. Y.Karunadasa explains the fact
as follow s : "As such they have no reference to time
(kalavimutta). For this self-same reason, they have no place
in the traditional analysis of empiric existence into five
khandhas "( 54)
. . .
Another important fact regarding the philosophical
context of paiiiiatti is its relationship with the theory of
33
Philosophical Context
catupa(isambhidii ( four branches of logical analysis). (55)
As paiiiiatti and catuptltisambhidii mainly deal with the two
aspects of language, namely word and meaning, it is
extremely important to examine their common basis here.
In accordance with the Kath iivatth u and the
Patisam bhidiimagga commentary K.N. Jayatilleke explains
-
catupa(isambhidii as follows:
"atthapatisambhidii stands for analysis of meanings
'in extension' , dhammapa(isambhidii for analysis of
reasons, conditions or casual relations,
niruttipatisambhidii for analysis of (meanings 'in
intension ' as given in) definitions and
pa(ibhiinapa(isambhidii for analysis of intellect to
which things knowable by the foregoing processes
are presented". (56)
Bhikkhu Nyiinamoli translates the four terms thus:
"discrimination of meaning [atthapa(isambhidii]
discrimination of ideas [l/.hammapa(isambhidii]
discrimination of language [niruttipa(isambhidii]
discrimination of perspicuity
[pa(ibhanapatisambhidii]" (57)
Explaining the meanings of the four terms, ,namely attha,
dhamma, nirutti and patibhiina, K.N. J ayatilleke further
says that 'this analysis of language, meaning and knowledge
combined with an empiricist outlook seems to have resulted
in a few important insights about the nature of language,
meaning and its relation to truth' . (58) It seems that before
the formulation of the abhidhammic theory of paiiiiatti, the
theory of patisambhidii might have considered an
34
Philosophical Context
explanation of the nature of langu�ge, in the Theraviida
tradition. In fact, when we further investigate into the details
of pa(isambhidii, we can clearly see its influence on the
evolution of the systematic classification of the subject-matter
of paiiiiatti, in later abhidhammic compendiums such as
Abhidhammatthasangaha, Abhidhammiivatiira and
Niimariipapariccheda.
Ven. Buddhaghosa introduces the four pa(isambhidas
as one of the constituents of wisdom (paiiiiii).
"It is of four kinds as knowledge of the truths, and
as the four discriminations."(59)
The wisdom or the insight which has a close relationship
with pa(isambhidiis has been described as that:
" . . . which is understanding consisting in insight
•
knowledge associated with profitable consciousness. (60)
It is worthy of mention here that this wisdom (paiiiiii) is an
inevitable result of the understanding of the abhidhamma
as it is described in almost all ,,'R e abhidhammic
compendiums as the last topic. It should be noted here that
what is understood by wisdom is the own nature of the
dhammas:
"Firstly as having the characteristic of penetrating the
individual essences of states, it is of one kind" . (6 1 )
In order to complete the process of understanding of the
, real nature or the own nature of the dhammas, it is a
necessity to have an understanding of the medium through
which those dhammas and their nature are expressed.
Among the four pa(isambhidiis (i) attha (meaning) and (ii)
dhamma (reason) refer to the understanding of dhamma
35
Philosophical Context
and (iii) nirutti (la,nguage) · refers to the medium through
which the dhammas are expressed. Let us see how the
commentator defines these terms in detail. Attha means the
effect of a cause:
"Herein, meaning (attha) is briefly a term for the fruit
of a cause (hetuy'. (62) It has five divisions as follows:
(i) yam kiiici paccayasambh iitam - anything
conditionally produced '
(ii) · nibbiinam - [deliverance]
(iii) bhiisit 'attho - the meaning of what is spoken
(iv) vipiiko - (kamma- )result
(v) kiriyii functional (consciousness) (63)
- concerned with the root-speech of all beings, the
Dhamma means the cause in brief: "Law (dhamma) is briefly
a term for a condition (paccaya)'\ (64) It also has five
divisions:
(i) yo koci phalanihbattako hetu - any cause that
produces fruit
(ii) ariyamaggo - the Noble Path
(Hi) bhasitam - what is spoken
•
(iv) kusalam - what is profitable
(v) akusalam - what is unprofitable. (65)
Based upon the above two lists the Visuddhimiirga sannaya,
a Sinhalese paraphrase to the Visuddhimagga makes an
interesting obs'ervation regarding the relationship of the
pa(isambhidas with the abhidhamma. It says that the four
items of the above two lists, namely vipiiko, kiriyii, kusalam
and akusalam, have been included according to the
abhidhamm classification. (66) The two main divisions of
- functions, and so on". (69)
paiiiiatti, namely the word and meaning (niima and attha)
36
Philosophical Context
are represented in the above lists as bhiisita and bhasit'attha
(what is spoken and the meaning of what is spoken).
The third item of the four patisambhidiis is described
as follows:
"Knowledge about enunciation of language dealing
with meaning and law:
there is the language that is individual essence, the
usage that has no exceptions, and deals with that
meaning and that law. Any knowledge falling within
the category concerned with the enunciation of that,
with the speaking, with the utterance of that,
Magadhan language that is individual essence, in
other words, the language of law (dhamma), (any
knowledge that) as soon as it heard it spoken,
pronounced, uttered, knows "This is the individual­
essence language; this is not the individual-essence
language' (such knowledge) is discrimination of
language". (67)
Commenting on this third item, nirutti, the Visuddhimiirga
sannaya quotes an opinion of the ancient teachers that nirutti
means the niima-paiiiiatti (the nominal). (68)
The fourth item, patibhiinapatisambhidii is described
as follows:
"Knowledge about kinds of knowledge: . . . . any
knowledge about these aforesaid kinds of knowledge, which
is concerned, with de tails oftheir individual domain s,
.
It is clear that this fourth item does not include anything
37
Philosophical Context Philosophical Context
<', .' " , , " ,

other than the knowledge of all the preceding items.
According to tbe above description of the palisambhidas,
it can be assumed that the theory of pa{isambhida provides
a good basis for the conception of paiiiiatti.
The above . mentioned items belonging to the four
pa(isambhidas can be re-formulated in connection with
paiiiiatti as follows:
(i) dhamma bhasita expression
= =
As such, it is very important to see how the abhidhamma
relates to the palisambhidas and thereby · to paiiiiatti. We
can see a close relationship between the abhidhamma and
the pa{isambhidas when we consider the subject-matter of
the later abhidhammic compendiums and its arrangement
therein. In most of them the subject-matter is arranged in
the following order:
(i) citta consciousness
-

(ii) attha = bhasitattha the meaning of the

= (ii) cetasika - mental states
expressIOn (iii) riipa matter
•

(iii) nirutti =definition of the medium of (iv) nibbana -

expressIOn (v) paliccasamuppiida and paccaya dependent
•

(iv) palibhana understanding.

= arising and causal relations
The two main 'divisions of paiiiiatti (i) the name (nama) (vi) pannattl -
- - .

and (ii) the meaning (attha) correspond well with (i) the (vii) samatha and vipassana concentration and -

(dhamma) expression and (ii) attha (meaning) of the theory insight.

of palisambhida. The various explanations, divisions and .
sub-divisions of paiiiiatti !n abhidhamma, when taken as a
whole, correspond to the third item of pa(isambhida, namely
nirutti-medium of expression.
It is also interesting to note here that the knowledge of
Though these items generally form the subject-matter of the
abhidhammic compendiums their arrangement does not
necessarily follow the above order.
In the abhidhamma what is explained as consciousness
(citta) mental states (cetasika), and matter (riipa) are the
,

palisambhidas is considered as an inevitable effect of
understanding the abhidhamma.
"The bhikku, who is well cultivated in the
abhidhamma, arrives, by his attainment of understanding,
at the four analyses (catupa{isambhida), which are fully
treated of therein". (70)
The above passage clarifies the close relationship
between the theory of palisambhida and the abhidhamma.
dhammas or the meanings (attha) of the Buddha's teachings.
Stated otherwise, those are the results or effects conditioned
by various causes (hetuphala). The law of dependent arising
and the law of causal relations explain the causes of those
effects . Alongside the explanation of the causes and
conditions, paiiiiatti is mentioned. It corresponds to the third
item of palisambhida namely nirutti (language or medium).
In almost all the compendiums of abhidhamma, the Buddhist

38 39
Philosophical Context
conception of meditation (hhavana) is described as the final
topic. In this are included all the details of the divisions of
wisdom (paiiiia) which is the fourth item of pa(isamhhida,
namely pa(ihhanapa(isamhhida (knowledge of knowledges).
Accordingly we can see that the subj ect-matter of the
ahhidhamma mainly corresponds with that of
pa(isamhhidas. In the light of this, the above statement of
Atthasalini which says that the knowledge of ahhidhamma
results in attainment of pa(isamhhidas, becomes more
meaningful.
The canonical . text which includes a full description of the
four pa(isamhhidas is the Pa(isamhhidamagga, one of the ·
fifteen books of the fifth nikaya of the Theravadins. Though
it is not included in the ahhidhammapi(aka it is generally
accepted as an ahhidhamma text. (7 1 ) Though nirutti, the
third item of pa(isamhhida, is described there as the skill in
the Magadhi language, we find evidence to prove that it
also includes the knowledge of the languages with their
•
linguistic and semantic aspects in general . In the
Visuddhimagga, . five causes are shown for the
accomplishment of the understanding of the four
pa(isamhhidas as:
(i) adhigama - achievement, the reaching of
Arahantship
(ii) panyattl - mastery of scriptures or the Buddha's
• •
word
(iii) savana - hearing or learning . the dhamma care
fully and attentively
(iv) paripuccha - questioning, discussion of knotty pas
40
Philosophical Context
sages and explanatory passages in the
texts, commentaries, and so on.
(v) puhhayoga - prior effort, devotion to
insight in the dispensation of former
Buddhas, up to the vicinity of (the
stages of) conformity and change-of­
lineage by one who has prac tised (the
duty of) going (with the medi tation
subject) on alms round and coming
back (with it). (72)
In addition to the above five causes the Visuddhimagga
presents another set of causes for the same purpose. As it
includes parallel items with paiiiiatti it is worthy of mention
here.
(i) puhhayoga - prior effort
(ii) hahusacca - skill in some science or sphere of craft
(iii) desahhasa - skill in the hundred-and-one tongues,
particularly in the language of Magadha.
(iv) agama - mastery of the Buddha's word, even if only
of the chapter of similes.
(v) paripuccha - questioning about defining the meaning
of even a single stanza.
(vi) adhigama - arahantship . .
(vii) garusannissaya - living with very learned
intelligent teachers.
(viii) mittasampatti - acquisition of friends.(73')
According to the above two lists, skill in the language and
its various usages is clearly a prerequisite for the attainment
of pa(isamhhidas. Bahusacca is explained as having a
41
Philosophical Context
knowledge of some science or sphere of craft and desahhiisii
explained as having skill in hundred usages with special
regard to Miigadhi. This explains the necessity of having
competence in various mediums of communication and
sciences for obtaining patisamhhidiis. This prerequisite is
not limited to skillfulness in the Miigadhi language.
The foregoing analysis of the theory ofpatisamhhidii
clarifies the position of language in the process of attainment
of wisdom (paiiiiii). The fact that the Patisamhhidiimagga
is treated as an ahhidhammic text confirms its relationship
with the conception of paiiiiatti. It was already mentioned
above that one of the main objectives of understanding
ahhidhamma is to attain the four kinds of analytical
knowledges. It is also noteworthy he.re that the four kinds
of profundity required for the elucidation of dhamma or
ahhidhamma includes paiiiiatti as an essencial aspect:
profundity of the doctrine (dhamma) , meaning (attha)
exposition (desanii) and in�uition (pativedha). (74) Among
these the profundity of exposition includes paiiiiatti and skill
in preaching the dhamma. (75) In a way these four kinds of
profundity fits in well with the four patisamhhidas. In this
connection the methodology of disposition of the Buddha's
teachings explained in the Saddhammapajjotikii (76) which
closely resembles with similar descriptions of the
Nettippakaral)a is worthy of consideration. In these texts
the sound and meaning of the teachings are singled out as
two important aspects of expression in order to specify more
subtle characteristics of them. The external structure of
language is analysed under the aspect of sound and the
42
Philosophical Context
meaning is clarified under the term attha. Their divisions
and subdivisions are numerous to be mentioned here. (77)
The classification of the constituents of language in these
lists mostly resembles with the divisions and subdivisions of
paiiiiatti enumerated in the ahhidhamma literature. The
knowledge of various divisions of paiiiiatti is an essential
requirement in order to train the hearers who are worthy of
instruction (neY.Ya) (78)
The foregoing discussion of the philosophical context
of paiiiiatti draws attention mainly to two aspects of
language or expression viz. sound and meaning. The medium
of communication is important in regard to hearing,
understanding and expres sion. These aspects of
communication became prominent in Buddhism because
verbal expression was its main method of propagation. On
the other hand, after the demise of the Buddha, the disciples
had to depend on his verbal expressions in realisation and
propagation of the dhamma. Thus the medium itself became
one of the most important topic of discussion. In order to
safeguard the doctrines imbedded in the Buddha's teachings
from misconceptions, they had to be presented in a precise
form of language. So the nature of language had to be
connected with the nature of dhamma emphasising its two
aspects namely sound and meaning.
Ven. Buddhagosa describes how the two aspects of
language could be attributed to the Buddha's teaching as
follows:
"The dhamma is with meaning (siittham) because of
perfection of meaning, and it is 'with detail' (ahyaiijanam)
43
 Philosophical Context

because of perfection of detail, as it is proper that it should Notes :

be. It is 'with meaning ' (slittham) because it conforms to
the words declaring is meaning by pronouncing, clarifying, 1 . Expositor 11, p.500; DhsA, p.39 1
revealing, expounding and explaining it. It is with detail' 2. Pug, p. l
(sabyaiijanam) because it has perfection of syllables, words, 3 . D.J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist philosophy,
details, style, language and descriptio ns. It is 'with meaning ' p. 149
(slittham) owing to profundity of meaning and profundity 4. Yen . Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the
of penetration. It is 'with detail' (sabyaiijanam) owing to Abhidhammapi(aka
profundity of law and profundity of teaching. It is 'with 5 . D.J. Kalupahana, op.cit., p. 1 5 1
meaning ' (slittham ) because it is the province of the 6. ibid.
discriminations of meaning and perspicuity. It is 'with detail' 7 . ibid.
(sabyaiijanam) because it is the province of the S. Pug. p. l
discriminations of law and of language". (79) 9. ibid.
10. D.J. Kalupahana, op.cit., pp. 1 50-5 1
1 1 . ADS, p. l
1 2 . Abhuk, p . 1 7 ; ADSDP, p.6 1 ; ADS, p.41
1 3. MMT 11, pp.540-4 1
1 4 . ADS, p.6
1 5 . ADSVT, p.27
1 6. ibid.
1 7 . op.cit., p.4
I S. Visuddhimlirga Sannaya HI, p. l080
1 9. ADSVT, p. 17
20. ABHVK, p. 1 l 6
2 1 . op.cit., pp. 1 6, 1 7
22. ADSVT, p. 1 l 5
23. ABHVK, p 1 66
24. MT I, pp.322
25. Visuddhimlirga Sannaya 11, p. l OSO

45
26. ADSVT, p. 1 23 47 . Dhs, p. 1 1 0
27 . Cpd., Introductory Essay, p.6 48. Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p.340
28. ADS, p. 1 3 ; Cpd., Introduction, p.3 ; Nrada, A Manual 49 . The Expositor I, p.87
of Abhidhamma, pp. 1 8 1 -83 50. PTDS
29. Cpd., Introductory Essay, p.6 5 1 . M I, p. l 1 1
30. ADS , p . 37 ; Cpd . , p . 1 9 1 ; Narada, A Manual of 52. The Expositor 11, p.500
Abhidhamma, p.367 ; AB HVT, p. 1 34 53. ibid.
3 1 . DhsA, p.22, 5 1 , 142, 346, 390; KvuA, pp.28,29; SuA, 54. Karunadasa, The Abhidhamma Theory of Paiiiiatti,
pp. 106, 107; Vism, pp.239, 509 op.cit, p.77
32. PugA, p. 1 7 1 5 5 . The Path of Discrimination, pp. 1 2 1 -22
33. op.cit., 173 56. K.N. layatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
34. Norman, Pili Literature, pp. 1 1 8, 1 1 9; Adikaram, Early p.3 1 1
History of Buddhism in Ceylon, pp. 1 O-32 57. The Path of Discrimination, 1 2 1 -22
3 5 . Pug, p. l 5 8 . K.N. Jayatilleke, op.cit, p.3 1 2
36. PugA, p. 1 7 1 59. The Path of Purification, op.cit., p.482, Vism, p.438
37. Warder, The Concept of a Concept, Journal of Indian 60. The Path of Purification, op.cit., p.479
Philosophy I, p. 188 6 1 . op.cit., p.48 1
38. PugA, p. 1 7 1 ; ADSVT, p.)3; Mvn, p. 1 l6 62. op.cit., p.485
39. ibid. 63 . ibid.
40. Karunadasa, Abhidhamma Theory of Paiiiiatti; Buddhist 64. ibid.
Philosophy and Culture, Essays in Honour of N.A. 65. ibid.
Jayawikrema, p.79 66. VismS Ill, p. 1035
41 . PugA, p. 173 67 . The Path of Purification, op .cit. , pp.486-87 ; Vism,
42. DhsA, p.5 1 ppA4 1 -42
43. NettA, p.28 68. VismS Ill, p. 1 035
44. op.cit., p . 1 4 ; The Guide, Translators Introduction, 69. The Path of Purification, op.cit., pA87
p.XXXIX 70. The Expositor I, p.30
•

45. AA 11, p.282 7 1 . ABHD, Introduction, p.35

I
46. NettA, p.30 72. The Path of Purification, op.cit., pA87

46 47
73. op.cit., p.488
74. DhsA, p.22
75 . ibid. Chapter 3
76. MhNdA I, p.5, 6
77. See appendix Paiiiiatti : Analysis in the Abhidhamma
78. MhNdA I, p.5
79. The Path of Purification, op.cit., p.232; SnA 11, p.445 , Some canonical and post canonical statements which
VismS I, pp.5 2 1 -25 led to the emergence of the theory of paiiiiatti were clarified
earlier.( l ) However, the later analyses of paiiiiatti are mainly
based on a statement that occurs in the Dhammasangani as
follows:
"ra tesam tesam dhammanam sankha samaiiiia
paiiiiatti voharo namam namakammam namadheyyam
nirutti byaiijanam abhilapo ". (2)
There is no evidence at all in the Dhammasangani or in its
commentary (Atthasalini) to prove the fact that the above
statement indicates two kinds or two divisions of paiiiiatti.
It merely contains a set of synonyms for designations
(paiiiiatti) which applies to all the dhammas. This can be
further clarified when we look at the explanation given to
the above statement in the Atthasalini:
"In the exposition of the couplet on 'equivalents' ,
the phrase 'that which is of these or those states'
indicates an inclusion of all such states. 'Utterance'
is an uttering, the meaning being a predicating. What
is it that is predicated? It is I, mine, another's, a
person, .a state, an individual, a man, . a youth, Tissa,
Datta, a couch, a chair, a mat, a pillow, a monastary,
a cell, a door, a window - these are various ways of

48 49
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
predicating. ' Designation ' is rightly making
known . . . Concept' means a revealing. 'Current term'
means what is commonly said, . . . This fourfold kind
of name is only the one term 'name ' . Denomination'
is name made. 'Name-assigning' is name established.
'Interpretation' is name-making. 'Distinctive mark'
is name showing the meaning, said because this name
signifies or indicates meaning. ' Si'gnification' is
significant of name". (3)
Though the case was so, the authors of the later
Abhidhammic literature explained paiiiiatti dividing the
above passage into two parts as indicating atthapaiiiiatti
(meaning or concept) and namapaiiiiatti (name).
Accordingly the first four words of the above, that is sankha,
samaiiiia, paiiiiatti and voharo, have been explained as
referring to the paiiiiatti which is made known
(paiiiiapetabbato paiiiiatti atthapaiiiiatti meaning). The
= =
remaining six words of the statement as referring to the
paiiiiatti which makes known (paiiiiapanato paiiiiatti = be made known in various way s . ( 1 0) The above
namapaiiiiatti = name) . (4) On the contrary, some
commentators say that those words are applicable to the six
kinds of paiiiiatti as a whole.(5) MiUatika clarifies that
those words sankha, samaiiiia etc. have been used in one
and the same meaning and as such it is not suitable to divide
it into two as referring to two kinds of paiiiiatti. (6) Further
elucidating the fact the MiUatika says that the twofold
division of the above statement cannot be justified even by
the commentarial explanations.(7) The criticism does not
end here. Even the definitions given to the individual words
50
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
of the statement do not agree with the doctrinal explanations
of the Buddha. The fact is explained as follows:
"Vacanamattam eva adhikaram katva pavatta
adhivacana nama " (8)
"With the mere words made their bases, such
expressions as . . . are termed ' synonyms' . (9)
In regard to the above definition of 'adhivacana' Miilatika
says: Because paiiiiatti has been described as having no the
moments of arising (uppada) and vanishing (vaya), how can
there be synonyms based on mere words ? A state of being
can only be applied to a thing which has an arising and
vanishing nature . Also the definition 'nirutti means
signification (abhilapa) expres sed with reason ' i s
contradictory because there cannot be an expression through
determination with reason on the part of a noun devoid of
sound and meaning. Also the definition 'paiiiiatti means
making known in various ways' is contradictory because an
object whose nature has not been determined properly cannot
explanations of Miilatika and Madhhutika become more
meaningful when we pay our attention to the statement of
Dhammasangani and its definition in Atthasalini. However,
irrespective of these criticisms, the other authors of
Abhidhammic texts based their explanations of two kinds
of paiiiiatti upon this statement. For the additional details
of namapaiiiiatti and atthapaiiiiatti they might have paid
their attention to some other post-canonical references, ( 1 1 )
which deal with the explanations of words and meanings.
Though they divided paiiiiatti into two, . they were aware
51
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
that those two divisions were mutually interconnected. For
the sake of definition and because of some other problems
they faced in connection with the theory of two truths it
was necessary to explain paififatti as na"'.a (name) and attha
(meaning) separately. Nevertheless it is very clear that the
details given under those divisions of paififatti make a broad
foundation for a definite conception of expression in the
.
Theravada tradition.
There are quite a number of Abhidhmmic definitions
of the two divisions of paififatti, namely namapaififatti and
atthapaififatti. ( 1 2) The most familiar definitions of the two
are as follows. ( 1 3)
(1) namapaififatti is that which makes known,
and
(2) atthapaififatti is that which is made known.
The former defini tion is based on subj ect-de notati on
(kattu sadha na) and the latter on objec t - denot ation
(kam masa dhan a). B oth �he defin itions show that
namapaififatti is that which makes atthapaififatti known and
atthapaififatti is that which is made known by namapaififatti
and that they are mutually interdependent. ( 1 4) The different
appearances and particular phases of the real dhammas, rupa
etc. , are made known by the namapaififatti. These are not
real but special phases of real dhammas. In other words
they belong to the category of convention. As these phases
are made known depending on the real dhammas they are
also designated as upadapaififatti. A noun or a word always
stands in relation to a certain meaning. In this case what the
noun indicates is a different appearance or a particular phase
52
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
of the real dhammas. Therefore those different appearances
of the real dhammas are called atthapaififatti. ( 1 5 ) On the
other hand all divisions of paififatti are dependent upon a
certain meaning and as such they can be designated as
upadapaififatti as a whole. ( 1 6)
Namapaififatti has been defined as that which makes known
because it makes atthapaififatti (concepts or meanings)
known in various ways. This indicates that nouns and
meanings are always interconnected and the very same fact
is relevant to the two divisions of paififatti. The nouns or
words that represent meanings are sometimes called
abhidhana. ( 1 7) Thus atthapaififatti means that which is
expressed (vacya) and namapaififatti means that which
expresses (vacaka). ( 1 8) In the same sense the former is
vacaniya and the latter vacaka.( l 9) According to the
Sankhepava1}1}ana, atthapaififatti means the relationship of
the conceived meanings with the words and namapaififatti
means the word ' s relationship with the conceived
meanings. (20) In this case the most noteworthy aspect is
that the so-called meanings which connect with the words
are only the results of conceptualisation. These meanings
become the objects of the mind in the form of shadows or
reflections of the real dhammas. (2 1 ) They are so
conceptualised according to the symbols of the · world,
because paififatti has no nature of its own.(22) This implies
that the real dhammas in their nature do not become objects
of the ordinary consciousness. The real nature of the
dhammas always become the object of intuition (paififa)
which is the direct result of Buddhist meditation.(23)
53
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
The reality or the true nature of the dhammas can be realised
and therefore it is an empirical truth. But their true nature
cannot be completely understood by means of intellectual
approach through the words and meanings which represent
it. Language represents the static concepts originated in the
mind according to the appearances of the world. Reality
means the true nature of all the conditioned dhammas, that
is the dynamic process of arising and vanishing. This true
nature can only be seen (dassana) through intuition. It should
not be overlooked here language is indeed a useful means
to direct our minds towards reality provided there is a good
understanding of its limitations. The concepts or the
meanings that arise in the mind as the shadows of the real
dhammas are designated in various ways. It is worthy to
remember here how beautifully the Dhammasangani has
explained this variegated nature of those concepts and
designations with a number of synonyms without using a
particular technical term. T4e reality or truth is one but not
two. It is not a plurality either. (24) Quite the opposite is
paiiiiatti and it is always a plurality. In it there is no
characteristic of unity at all. It is very important that to
explain this complex nature of paiiiiatti, a set of synonyms
has been used in the Dhammasangani. It is worthwhile to
reconsider how beautifully this set of synonyms explains the
true nature of the process of language in connection with
words and meanings.
"That which is an enumeration, that which is a
designation, an expression, a current term, a name, a
denomination, the assigning . of a name, an
54
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
interpretation, a distinctive mark of discourse on this
or that dhamma". (25)
Two definitions of paiiiiatti according to the method of
,
sadhana.
According to the method of sadhana the definition
of atthapaiiiiatti, that is paiiiiapiyatta paiiiiatti (that which
is made known) , is based on kammasadhana (obj ect­
.
denotation). In this case atthapaiiiiatti acts as an object.
The definition of namapaiiiiatti, that is paiiiiapanato
paiiiiatti (that which makes known), is based on
kattusadhana (agency denotation) . In thi s case
namapaiiiiatti acts as the subject.(26) This definition can
al so be considered as instrumentality-denotation
(karaIJasadhana) and bhavattha- denotation perhaps taking
it as 'the meanings are designated by means of nouns' and
mere naming itself i s namapaiiiiatti. (27) Though the
sadhana explanation has been done for the sake of easy
understanding, the namapaiiiiatti occupies an important
place among the other divisions of paiiiiatti. Certainly the
analyses of paiiiiatti have originally been based on the
explanations of nouns or names. The atthapaiiiiatti-analysis . ,
it seems, is a development of the later Abhidhammic
literature. This all-pervading characteristic of namapaiiiiatti
and its antecedence can also be confirmed by a statement in
the Atthasalini.
"All states are processes of equivalent nomenclature'
means' there is no state which is not such a process.
One state fits in with all states and all states coincide
with one state. How so? The concept as 'name' is
55
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
that one state which fits in with all states in any of
. the four planes. There is no being, nor thing that may
not be called by a name". (28)
By the words 'adhivacanapatha ', 'ekadhamma' in the
above pas sage, the all pervading characteristic of
nlimapaiiiiatti is well expressed. · It can be assumed that as
a result of further defining the nlimapaiiiiatti, the definitions
of atthapaiinatti have been given an important place among
the abhidhammic interpretations of paiiiiatti.
Sense-perception and paiiiiatti.
Another aspect that influenced the emergence of the two­
fold interpretation of paiiiiatti was the explanation of sense­
perception in connection with paiiiiatti. Sounds, taste, smells
etc. of the outer world come into contact with the five
physical senses according to the appearances. As a result
there arise ideas or meanings in the consciousness. These
ideas are expressed through words. On the other hand when
these expressions of others are h�ard there also arise ideas
in one's consciousness. In order to explain this process of
communication it was necessary to point out separately the
processes of hearing words, expres sing words, and
understanding meanings. Accordingly atthapaiiiiatti was
introduced as the meanings, ideas or dhammas that become
the objects of six kinds of consciousness namely the eye­
consciousness, ear . . . ,nose . . . ,tongue . . . ,body . . . and mind . . . .
These ideas are twofold as real
(paramatthapaiiiiatti) and conventional concepts (sammuti­
paiiiiatti). Between those two the real concepts refer to the
meanings of the terms riipa (corporeality), vedanli (feeling),
56
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
saiiiili (perceptions) etc. Conventional concepts refer to the
meanings of the terms pugga/a (person), itthi (woman), geha
(house), saka(a (cart), etc. While the real concepts are called
vijjamlinapaiiiiatti, the conventional concepts are called
avijjamlinapaiiiiatti. (29) Thus it is very clear now that the
meanings of the terms itthi, purisa etc . which are the
different appearances or particular phases of the real
dhammas(30) as well as the meanings of the names of real
dhammas, that is riipa, vedanli etc., are included in the
category of paiiiiatti. It should be emphasised here that even
the meanings of the names of real dhammas are categorised
under paiiiiatti. Whatever ideas occur in the consciousness,
all of them have the obj ects of the six senses and
corresponding six kinds of consciousness as their foundation.
Thus to explain atthapaiiiiatti as objects of six kinds of
consciousness is logical.
Nlimapaiiiiatti means the dhammas that become the
objects of ear-consciousness and mind-consciousness. They
are also two-fold as real paiiiiatti and unreal paiiiiatti.
Between them real paiiiiatti means the names of the real
dhammas such as riipa, vedanli which become the objects
of ear-consciousness. Unreal paiiiiatti means the names of
the unreal, such as Yaiiiiadatta, SirivatJtJhaka. These two
also are designated as vijjamlinapaiiiiatti and
avijjamlinapaiiiiatti respectively. (3 1 )
concepts
Thought-proces ses (cittavithi) of paiiiiatti.
The thought-processes which occur when paiiiiatti
becomes an object of the consciousness are also described
57
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
Abhidhammic treatises. The details regarding these
•
III
processes are based on such explanations as are found in
.
the Nikayas as well as in the commentaries. The explanations
of thought-processes regarding the sound can be seen in the
Tikas but in somewhat different ways. Vikasinitika presents
a certain opinion of it as follows: . means of communication as ( 1 ) intimation by the body
In the mind of the person who hears a word like
ghata (pot), there arises two javanas (apperception) (32)
as present and past objects regarding each sound of that
word. Then arises one javana regarding the whole collection
of the sounds. After this there arises another javana
regarding namapaiiiiatti. Thus the namapaiiiiatti becomes
clear only after the javana-process to which the whole set
of sounds becomes the object. After this the meaning is
understood. (33)
The explanation in the Vibhavinitika concerning the same
process is mostly similar to the above. (34)
Sankhepava1}1}ana explains t�e process with more details.
According to it the gradual procedure regarding the thought­
processes of paiiiiatti is as follows:
For example, when the word g01}o(bull) is heard there
arise two javanas concerning each sound of that word, as
present and past in the form of ear-door-process
(sotadvaravithi) as well as mind- door-proce s s
(manodvaravithi). Then arises the process of knowing the
name which comprises of the line of letters (akkharavali).
Again there occurs a process of understanding the meaning.
Thus there occur six thought-processes regarding the object
of sound. Concerning the other objects such as matter, smell,
58
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
taste there occur only four thought-processes, viz. one
consciousness-process, one mind-door-process, one name­
knowing-process and one meaning-knowing-process.(35)
It should be remembered here that in the chapters
on matter (rupa) of the Abhidhammic treatise s, we find two
(kaya viii iiatti) and (2) int ima tio n by spe ech
(vaciviiiiiatti).(3 6) While kayaviiiiiatti causes the production
of ideas by means of movements of the body, vaciviiiiiatti is
the means by which words are uttered .(37 ) According to
an oth er op ini on pa iiii atti is no thi ng bu t the sou nd
acc om pan ied wi th exp res sio n (viiiiiatti) and pla stic ity
(vikara) in the sen ses that makes the conventional and
absolute truths known .(38 ) Ma1}isaramaiijusa also quotes
the above opinion.(3 9)
Paiiiiatti and two truths.
It was clarified that the meanings of expres sions were
regarded as atthapaiiiiatti and the names given to them were
considered as namapaiiiiatti. An understanding of both the
above divisions is ess ential for the realization of the true
nature of the dhammas. What is meant by the term dhammas
in the Abhidhamma are the three categories namely nama
(mind), rupa (matter) and paiiiiatti. (40) Theravada tradition
recommends a prior understanding of all those · dhammas
for the practice of meditation which enables one to realize
the true nature of the world and thereby to tran scend it.( 4 1 )
It should be emphasised here that not only the objects of
real dhammas but also the objects of conventional things
59
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
are equally applied in the process of meditation. For example,
wh en one concentrates upo n com pas sio n (karul}a) and
sympathy (mudita ), the concept of being (sattapaiiiiatti) is
to be applied .(42 ) This perhaps might have been one of the
reasons why the Theravadins did not attempt to give a value
judgement regarding the two truths. In this connection it is
very important to pay attention to the etymological meanings
of the terms sammuti and paiiiiatti.
Namapaiiiiatti is designated as sammuti because it
helps us to understand the reality. Because it arises through .
the influence of worldly convention it is also called
conventional truth (sammutisacca).(43) Atthapaiiiiatti is
called sammuti in the sense of understanding well according
to the worldly designations. (44) Atthapaiiiiatti is so called
as it should be made known in various ways.(4S) Also it is
called paiiiiatti in the sense of making known through
knowledge. (46) By the above definitions, the basic meanings
of the two terms sammuti an4 paiiiiatti are well explained.
Accordingly:
( 1 ) paiiiiatti is derived from the root pa+/iia - to
know or understand in various ways = paiiiiatti
(2) sammuti is derived from the root sam+/mun -
to know or understand well=samm uti. (47)
Thus paiiiiatti or sammuti and paramattha are equally
beneficial or equally valid as far as realization is concerned.
Though the term sammuti is not included in the list of
. 'person' or '-self' is constructed depending on mind and
syn ony ms of the Dhammasangani mentioned above, it
becomes clear by the above explanations that the authors of
Abhidhammic literature have considered both the terms to
60
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
bear the same meaning except that paiiiiatti has developed
as a theory replacing sammuti in the Nikayas.
Two kinds of meaning.
When explaining atthapaiiiiatti, two kinds of meaning
are mentioned as sammuti-attha (conventional meaning) and
paramattha-attha (absolute meaning).(48) The earth, rock
etc. are given as examples of sammuti-attha and matter,
feeling etc. as para�attha-attha. (49) The definition of
atthapaiiiiatti that is paiiiiapiyati (that which is made known)
also indicates that the two kinds of meaning are made known
by namapaiiiiatti. (SO) Among the divisions of paiiiiatti,
vijjamanapaiiiiatti refers to the meanings which exist in
reality. Avijjamanapaiiiiatti refers to the meanings that do
not exist in reality.(S I ) For example 'pal}a' means 'being'
(satta) conventionally but in reality it means 'psychic life'
(jivitindriya).(S2) Puggala (person) is also a convention
because it does not exist in reality. When the real dhammas
are analysed, their own nature can be understood. For
example when the water element (apodhatu) is mentally
analysed we can understand that there exists even earth
element (pa(havidhatu) because all the four elements (earth,
water, fire, air) do not exist separately. Though the case is
so when the five aggregates (paiicakkhandha) are analysed,
we cannot find a person inside or outside them because the
concept of person (puggala) is not real.(S3) The concept
matter which are existing ih reality. As · there arises the
,
concept 'chariot' (ratha) when all the constituent parts are
61
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
put together, so the concept 'person' arises when five
aggregates are existing. Behind the phenomena of aggregates,
senses and elements etc. which exist in accordance with the
theory of causality there is no doer, person or author who
acts.(54) Any concept, if it disappears when analysed is not
real. The reality does not disappear when analysed because
it exists in reality. The senses, eye etc. come into contact
with the visible (rupa) etc. and as a result there arise various
perceptions such as being, woman, chariot in the
consciousness. They are variously designated according to
those various perceptions. But apart from those eye and the
visible etc. there does not exist anything such as being,
chariot and hence their designation avijjamanapaiiiiatti. But
these cannot be stated as false because they exist as world­
conventions agreed upon by many people. Because of this
reason they are introduced as conventional truth
(sammutisacca).(55) Suttanipata-commentary gives an
interesting explanation about the two-fold reality when it
explains the terms 'kayassa iiijana' as follows:
Kiiyassa liijana means the movements of the body
such as stretching and sleeping. When it is explained thus
conventionally, we understand that there is a person who
does those actions. But the real situation of those actions is
as follows: Because of the diversity of mind there arises the
diversity of air. Because of the diversity of air, the movements
of the body come into being. This is the reality regarding . making known in various ways with the help of
those actions. (56)
In this regard it is very essential to clarify the analysis
of two paiiiiattis in the sub-commentaries. ADS. defines
62
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
paiiiiatti in two ways as that which is made known
(paiiiiapiyatta paiiiiatti) and that which makes known
(paiiiiapanato paiiiiatti) . (57) Commenting on this the
Vibhavini(ikii says that paiiiiapiyatta means to be made
known in various ways. This refers to the atthapannatti
(meaning) which has divisions of particular positions or
phases of real dhammas and which is considered as
conventional truth. This atthapaiiiiatti is made known by
namapaiiiiatti (noun).(58) The above explanation clearly
indicates that the atthapaiiiiatti belongs to the conventional
truth (sammutisacca). Commenting on the same term of
ADS. , the ADSS. also says that atthapannatti belongs to
the conventional truth.(59) Again AD SDP. also commenting
on the same term says that atthapannatti means the different
appearances or particular phases of the five aggregates and
it connects with the conventional truth. (60) Vikiisinitika
•• •
comments on it in a different way as: pannapetabbato means
to be made known according to the world-convention
because it does not exist in reality as the real dhammas
exist with their own nature.(6 1 ) Now it is further clarified
by the above explanations that atthapaniiatti as well as its
definition paiiiiapiyatta paniiatti- refers to the conventional
-
truth. Let us now see how the second definition of pannatti
(pannapanato pannatti) is explained in the sub­
commentaries . Vibhavini says that pannapanato means
namapannatti. This refers to the words that represent
meanings.(62) ADSDP. explains namapannatti as the sound
which represents the words of meanings.(63) Vikasini says
63
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
that paiiiiapanato means making known the real and unreal
dhammas in the form of expressions. (64) ADSS. explains
that paiiiiapanato means the names (namapaiiiiatti) of the
dhammas both conventional and absolute'. (65) Among the
above definitions Vikasini and ADSS. clearly state that
namapaiiiiatti includes both conventional truth as well as
absolute truth. But the other two sub-commentaries do not
state it specifically. As all the sub-commentaries unanimously
agree that atthapaiiiiatti belongs only to the conventional
truth, we can assume that the tradition has accepted the view
'namapaiiiiatti belongs to both the truths in common. It
should be mentioned here that the Sankhepava1}1}ana
ascribes ' two truths ' to both the paiiiiattis without
discrimination.(66} Except the definition given in the
Sankhepava1}1}ana which is not a sub-commentary held in
high rank, if we take all the other explanations of paiiiiattis
into consideration, the following equation can be made
regarding the two truths and t�e two paiiiiattis.
atthapaiiiiatti (meaning) sammutisacca
= truth, the meanings of the words in language do not
(conventional truth)
namapaiiiiatti (name) sammutisacca (conventional
= (2)
truth) and paramatthasacca (absolute
truth)
Now let us pay attention to the following stanza
which appears in the ADS . at the end of the passage on
paiiiiatti. It runs thus:
"By following the sound of speech thr'hearing's path
brought to our ken,
By following next the sign, when mind forth with its
64
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
door flings open, then
The sense of things cognized becomes. But of the
signs themselves, 'tis said
They (in the far-off ages) were by world-convention
fashioned" . (67)
It is said in the above stanza that atthas (meanings) are
known by paiiiiatti. Vihhavini commenting on this term
'attha' says that here atthas means the two-fold meanings,
namely conventional and absolute.(68) Sankhepava1}1}ana
. and ADSDP. also confirm the same fact. (69) These
commentaries further elaborate on this saying that these two- .
fold meanings become the objects of mind-door (manodvara)
which arises after the arising of the process of ear­
consciousness (sotaviiiiia1}a) in connection with ear (sota)
and sound (sadda).
All the above explanations of paiiiiatti and two truths
as a whole can be summarised as follows:
(1) As atthapaiiiiatti connects only with conventional
convey the absolute truth or reality completely.
As namapaiiiiatti connects with both conventional
and absolute truths, the absolute truth can be named
or expressed by means of the words in language.
(3) Though the two truths can be expressed by the words
in language, their relative meanings that are
constructed in ordinary minds, refer to the
conventional truth only.
Now let us turn again to the above stanza quoted from ADS .
It says that the two-fold meaning (conventional and absolute)
65
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
can be known through pannatti. Though this statement
appears at once contrary to the above conclusions, we should
not forget that this understanding of two-fold meanings is
directly connected with mind-door (manodvara). Though
the absolute truth can be expressed by the words, its exact
and true nature ' cannot be represented by the meanings
related to thos e words because the meanings or ideas
constructed according to the words in al1 ordinary mind are
always reflections of the reality but not the reality itself.
But this does not in any way contribute to the idea that the
absolute truth or reality is inexpressible and unrealisable
because it is clearly stated in the above stanza that the two
,
truths become the objects of the mind-door. And it is already
clarified earlier that the absolute truth can be expressed
through the words in language. This is how Theravadins
overstepped the two extremes (i) the absolute is in fact un­
u tterable, inexpres sible and (ii) un-understandable,
unrealisable, unknowable.(70) •
It is well known that the terms or words rupa,
vedana, sanna etc. indicate real dhammas. But the untrained
or ordinary persons (putthujjana) do not understand the real
nature of the dhammas or reality when they hear those
words. In the mind-door of the person who has developed
intuition (panna) through meditation there arises the
understanding of the real nature of the dhammas when those
words are heard by him. In other words, the reality becomes
only the object of intuition but not of ordinary mind. It is
very important that the Theravadins have explained the
interconnection between two truths and words and meanings
66
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
of language without contributing to the extremist conclusions
of reality and expression. It is emphasised above that the
absolute nature can be realised only by intuition. It is not a
state of unknowable and inexpressible but completely
empirical. The words of language always create the ideas of
different appearances or particular phases of real dhammas
in the minds of the ordinary people. There are many
expressions or words indicating reality in the teachings of
the Buddha and liberated saints. Even those words create
the ideas of partial truth in the ordinary mind if it is not
matured enough to realize the truth. In the mind which is
freed from defilements and which is fully concentrated, there
arises the real understanding of absolute truth when those
expressions are heard. The conditions of the mind differ from
person to person. Some people have highly matured minds
according to their experiences of previous lives. The minds
of some others should be developed through meditational
practices. To the people essential . They can directly
understand the reality through absolute teachings. Regarding
the others, the conventional teachings should be given at
the beginning in order to make their minds suitable to grasp
the nature of reality. ' Because of this reason, generally
Buddhas preach first in conventional mode and then in
absolute mode. This understanding is not a matter of
knowing but a matter of seeing (dassana) through intuition.
Before developing the intuition in the mind of an ordinary
man, there arises a general understanding of reality through
the expressions of language; when those teachings are heard.
When he develops intuition gradually through meditation he
67
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
sees the true nature of reality. Knowing and seeing are two
different aspects of the process of realization. Regarding the
realization of absolute truth it is completely a matter of seeing
but not knowing.(7 1 ) To achieve this purpose of seeing the
reality, the words and meanings of language are useful means.
On the other hand that absolute nature which is seen through
intuition is a dynamic process existing in accordance with
the theory of causality which represents impermanence,
unsatisfactoriness and substancelessness. The words with
meanings which represent static concepts, cannot express
that dynamic process completely except its different
appearances or particular phases. But the words indicating
absolute truth as well as conventional truth are capable of
directing the persons to the realization of absolute truth.
The usefulness of two kinds of paiiiiatti depends on the type
of character of the hearers. Those whose intelligence is not
matured, are not capable of understanding reality through
the words or expressions of absolute truth. They need ·
•
explanations of reality in conventional form of language and
thereby they can understand reality eventually. For those
whose intelligence is matured, there is no need to elaborate
in conventional forms. They can easily understand the reality
•
through words or expressions referring to the absolute truth
directly. Here in this case it should be remembered that
paiiiiatti is connected with the types of characters of the
various kinds of persons. Though the modes of expression
are varied all the followers finally realize the one and only
reality. There are no two or more realities in the world.(72)
The idea of two truths is not a matter of degrees of truth
68
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
but a matter of two ways of expressing reality. As if a clever
teacher who is well versed in several dialects, teaches to the
students in their own dialects, the Buddha has preached his
doctrine in the form of two kinds of expression or paiiiiatti
according to the types of characters of hearers. (73) For
example in the Abhidhamma, among the twenty-four causal
relations anantarapaccaya (causal relation of contiguity) and
samanantarapaccaya (causal relation of immediacy) have
no difference in meaning except the prefix 'sam' . But it is
so preached for the sake of different characters who
understand it in various ways.(74) The variegated nature of
language is caused by the various perceptions of the persons.
Therefore in instructing various persons, different forms of
expression should be used.
Time and paiiiiatti.
The two Abhidhammic concepts, paiiiiatti and
nibblma, have been introduced as "time-free" in the
commentaries and sub-commentaries.(75) It means that
those two are not affected by the three moments of arising
(uppiida), existing ((hiti) and vanishing (bhanga). The
unconditioned dhamma cannot be included in time. Between
these two, there is no doubt that nibbiina is unconditioned
because it is merely the extinction of defilements through
understanding. Thus the term conditioned, unconditioned,
.
past, present, future etc. do not apply to it in reality except
for the convenience of expressing its nature. But it is
questionable how these terms, ie. unconditioned, past, future
etc., do not apply to paiiiiatti.
69
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
Y. Karu nada s say s that acco rding to Kath iivatth u­
commentary, paiiiiatti cannot be termed as conditioned or
unco nditi oned . (76) It is inter estin g to note that the
Mal} isiir amaiijus ii com men ting on the state men t of
Vibhiivini that paiiiiatti is free from time, says that paiiiiatti
cannot be introduced as timel ess or belon ging to time.
Accordingly nibbiina and paiiiiatti are not related with
cause s and condition s. But while paiiiiatti is not a real
dhamma, nibbiina is considered as a real dhamma bearing
its own nature. Hence it is logical to say that nibbiina can
be intro duce d as ' time -free ' , on the grou nd that in
abhidhmma it is given under the real dhammas. All the
real dhammas except nibbiina undergo the three moments
and therefore they can be related with the time factor and
such chara cteri stics as impe rman ence . It shou ld be
remembered here that all the dhammas except nibbiina exist
in the present moment in reality. Though nibbiina does not
undergo such changes, it is .introduced as a real dhamma.
Henc e we have a reaso n to argue on it as timel ess or
. view that akkh aras (letters or chara
belonging to time. Accordingly it should be stated that
nibbiina thou gh a real . dhamma is unco nditi oned and
therefore it is timeless. Paiiiiatti is not a real dhamma and
has no nature of its own. As the time factor cannot be applied
to an unreal dhamma it is not suitable to talk of it as being
timeless or belonging to time.(77) The next thing to be
clarified is whether niimapaiiiiatti or atthapaiiiiatti can be
considered as unreal or not having its own nature. It was
already stated above that
atthapaiiiiatti means the idea that occurs in the mind in
70
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
relation to the name heard. The ideas or the concepts that
arise in the mind belong to the process of mentality. In other
words, they belong to the process of mind and mental
properties (citta and cetasikas). As we know clearly, these
mental concepts or ideas undergo the momentary phases such
as arising and vanishing. If so, atthapaiiiiatti cannot be
described as timeless because it changes. Now we can
consider whether niimapaiiiiatti could be described as
timeless. Niima means sound. This cannot be the sound
(sadda) which is introduced as one of the twenty-eight
material dhammas (riipa) in the Abhidhamma because all
those riipas or material dhammas are conditioned. (78)
Therefore that sound which is considered as a material
dhamma comprises of three moments and the statements of
. time are applicable to it. Vibhiivini, Mal}isiiramaiijusii etc.
when commenting on niimapaiiiiatti have explained it as a
line of letters (akkhariivall).(79) Accordingly it is reasonable
to conclude that by niimapaiiiiatti they have meant the sets
of letters in a language. In the Piili tradition it is an accepted
cters) are so called
because they are never destroyed by writing even thousand
times . Padasiidhanatikii explains this view of letters held
by the Kacciiyana grammar school as follow s: Although only
consisting of forty-one, the letters (of the Piili language)
would not be destroyed even after using them to write
Tripitaka (the three collections of the Piili canon) . (80)
Thus we have enoug h reaso ns to concl ude that those
statements, namely 'unconditioned ' , 'timeless' and cannot
be described as timele ss · or belonging to time should be
71
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
applied to the namapaiiiiatti but not to the atthapaiiiiatti.
Here in this connection it is worth noting that the
abhidhammic commentaries refer to a kind of paiiiiatti
named opapatika (spontaneously arisen) when discussing
namapaiiiiatti. According to those explanations, pa{havi
(earth), vedana (feeling), saiiiia (perception), saitkhara
(mental formations), viiiiial;la (consciousness) and nibbana
belong to the category of opaptuika-paniiatti. ( 8 1 ) Thus
for the inclusion of those terms in the opapatika-paiiiiatti,
there should have been a certain reason. Earlier it was
pointed out that the atthapaiiiiatti means the reflections of
real dhammas. The names given to those reflections are
called namapaiiiiatti. If so even the Theravadins ' real
dhammas become ineffable. But this assumption is prevented
by designating the terms of real dhammas (vedana, saiiiia,
etc.) as opapatikapaiiiiatti,i.e. names not given by anyone
but spontaneously-arisen. According to this explanation the
real dhammas are utterable. Here it should be remembered
•
again that the reality represented by these terms can only be
completely realised by intuition�
The classifications of paiiiiatti.
Here we propose to explain the general characteristics
of the two divisions of paiiiiatti through the examples given
in the compendia and sub-commentaries. The sub-divisions
of paiiiiatti enumerated in those texts are mostly similar to
those of the Puggalapaiiiiatti-a{{hakatha. (82)
Between the two divisions of paiiiiatti, the examples given
to the namapaiiiiatti are very similar in almost all the .
72
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
compendia and sub-commentataries. The most detailed
accounts and various examples have been given to the
atthapaiiiiatti. Though, due to some specific reasons,
explained earlier, paniiatti has been explained dividing into
two main sections, it is very clear that they are inseparable
aspects of expression, i.e. words and meanings.
This will be further clarified when attention is paid to the
examples given to those two divisions. Let us observe first
the examples given to the namapaiiiiatti.
(1) vijjamanapaiiiiatti - (a concept ' occurring' ) e.g.
riipa-matter, vedana-feeling, saiiiia-perception,
saitkhara-mental formations, viiiiial;la-consciousness,
dhatu-elements, ayatana-sense-bases.
(2) Avijjamanapaiiiiatti - a concept 'not occurring' e.g.
itthi-woman, purisa-person, bhiimi-earth, pabbata- .
rock, maiica-bed.
..
(3) vlJJamanena aVlJJamanapannattl - a concept not
. . . - . . . - "' ''' .
occurring with occurring' e.g. tevijja-possessor of the
three higher knowledges, chalabhiiiia-possessor of
the six supernonnal knowledges, si/ava-person having
moral discipline, paiiiiava-a person of wisdom.
(4) aVIJJamanena vlJJamanapannattl - a concept
I"W I"oJ
• •• _ •• • _ •
'occurring with not occurring' ego itthiriipa-the form
of female, purisariipa-the form of male, itthisadda­
the sound of female, itthicitta-the mind of female.
(5) VIJJamanena vlJJamanapannattl - a concept
••• _ ••• _ I"'t.,I N .
' occurring with occurring' ego cakkhusamphassa
•
eye-contact, sotasamphassa .. ear - contact,
cakkhuviiiiial;la-eye-consciousness.
73
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma
(6) avijjamanena avijjamanapaiiiiatti a concept 'not
- should be emphasised here that these real concepts or rather
occurring with not occurring' ego khattiyaputta­
warrior ' s son, brahmaIJaputta-brahmin ' s son,
rajaputta-king' s son.
Though the namapaiiiiatti has been divided into six
as the above, in brief, it has only two divisions as vijjamana
and avijjamana. By mixing these two the other four divisions
have been devised. Among the six divisions 1 , 3 , 4 and 5
have connections with 'vijjamanapaiiiiatti'. When all those
examples representing real and unreal concepts are collected,
the following list can be obtained:
(1) vijjamanapaiiiiatti (real)
matter, feeling, perception, mental formations,
con� iousness, elements, sense-bases, three higher
knoW-ledges, six supernormal knowledges, morality,
wisdom, sound, eye, contact, ear.
(2) avijjamanapaiiiiatti (unreal)
woman, person, the earth, rock, bed, warrior, son,
brahmin, king.
Now taking these examples into consideration we can come
to a conclusion regarding the two main divisions of
namapaiiiiatti. The names or words that refer to the
dhammas accepted as real in the abhidhamma as well as in
the Buddha's teachings in common such as five aggregates
have been considered as vijjamana. In other words the
abstract or concise teachings (matika) of the Buddha which
are normally represented by technical terms relating to the
fundamental constituent parts of the empirical existence and
the path to perfect freedom are designated as vijjamana. It
74
Analysis in the Abhidhamma
words refer to the empirical reality (dhammas) but not to
an absolute reality underlying or beyond our experience. Also
•
these can be introduced as a result of the abhidhammic
analysis of person and the related phenomena. They are real
in the sense that they come into the focus of intuition which
1
is to be developed through meditation. When these real
dhammas are analysed mentally their own nature does not
disapper, becau se it is real. On the contrary, when the
avijjamana concepts such as woman, person, are analysed
those concepts disappear because they are not real. They
are merely mental constructions done according to the
various appearances of the real dhammas. Generally in a
given language there are terms that refer to both vijjamana
and avijjamana conce pts and they are mostl y used in
combination s. According to these various usage s, the sub­
divisions of namapaiiiiatti have been introduced. Now it is
very important to compare these examples of namapaiiiiatti
with those of the atthapaiiiiatti so as to have a clear
understanding of both the divisions.
Atthapaiiiiatti has many sub-divisions and some of the examples
given to them are as follows:
Bhumi-earth, jJ abbata-rock, geha house, purisa­
-
person, disa-direction, kala-time, Tissa (a personal name).
.
It is interesting to note that among these examples there is
no even a single term that refers to the real dhammas.
Probably the reason for this is that the atthapaiiiiatti has
been described as the different appearances or particular
phases of the real dhammas. As we have pointed out earlier,
75
 Analysis in the Abhidhamma

ct al so su pp or ts th e id ea th at th e w or ds re fe rr in g Notes:
the above fa
to th e re al dh am m as ar e in cl ud ed on ly in th e nii m ap aii iia tti.
dh am m as ca n be na m ed or 1 . see chapters 1 and 2
This im pl ie s th at th e re al
. no t de pe nd on th e 2. Dhs. , p. l IO
expres se d bu t th ei r re al na tu re do es
th e m en ta l 3 . Expositor 11, pp.449; DhsA, pp.390-9 l
synthetic fu nc tio n of th e m in d. At th a m ea ns
4. ADS, p.39; MT, p . 1 29; ABHVT, p.83; PVN, p.2 l 4
concept relatin g to w or ds . Th er ef or e th e m ea ni ng s th at ar ise
5 . Madhu(ikii I, pp.25 l -52
di na ry m in d w he n th os e te rm s of re al dh am m as ar e
in the or 6. MT, p. 130
al na tu re ca n be re al ise d
•

heard, cannot be re al as w el l. Th eir re 7 . op.cit., p. 1 29

only by in tu iti on . A s po in te d ou t it is no t a m at te r of
8 . DhsA, p.5 l
understanding bu t a m at te r of se ei ng (d as sa na ). Th is is th e 9. Expositor I, p.69
re as on fo r in cl us io n of co nv en tio na l tr ut h in th e 10. MT, p . 1 29
an d bo th co nv en tio na l an d ab so lu te tru th s in 1 1 . e.g. Nettippakaral}a, Pe(akopadesa
atth apaiiiiatti
the nii m ap aii iia tti. A no th er im po rta nt fa ct to be no te d he re 1 2. PVN, p . 1 6 1
is that the mos t of ex am pl es gi ve n to th e at th ap aii iia tti ar e 1 3 . ADS, p.39; SVT, p.52
simila r to th os e of av ijj am iin ap aii iia tti in cl ud ed in th e 14. Karunadasa, Theraviida Version of Dharmaviida, p.75
m ap aiiiia tti . Th e ab ov e di sc us sio n re ve al s th at 1 5 . ADSVT, p. 1 5 1 ; MMT 11, p.464
category of nii
ha ve di vi de d pa iiii at ti in to nii m a an d at th a 1 6 . ABHVK, p.3 1 8
the co m m en ta to rs
iti on of th e tw o tru th s in re lat io n 1 7 . ADSVT, p. 1 5 1
for the sake of a cl ea re r de fin
1 8 . ADSS, p.21O
•

to language leading to a better understanding of sense

1 9 . MMT 11, p.46 l ; ADSDP, p.3 1 I
perception and in doing so to formulate a theory of language
20. SVT, p.52
with a distinctly Theraviida bias.
2 1 . ADS, p.39; ADSDP, p.3 1 2
22. ABHVK, p.3 1 7
23 . Vism, p.328
24. Sn, p . 1 72
25. Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p.340; Dhs,
p. 1 1 0
26.ADSS, p.21O; ABHVK, p.3 17
. 27. Madhu(ikii I, p.251
28. Expositor 11, p.500; DhsA, p.39 l

76 77
29. SVT, p.52 57. ADS, p.39
30. MMT 11, pA63 5 8 . ADSVT, p. 1 5 1
3 1 . SVT, p.52 59. ADSS, p.2 1O
32. Cpd., p.27; Narada, A Manual of Abhidhamma, pp.226-27 60. ADSDP, p.3 1 1
33. ABHVK, pp.3 1 9-20 6 1 . ABHVK, p.3 17
34. ADSVT, p. 1 53 62. ADSVT, p. 1 5 1
35. SVT, p.53 ; Cpd., Introductory Essay, pp.35-36 63. ADSDP, p.3 1 1
36. Cpd., p. 157 64. ABHVK, p.3 17
37. ADSVT, pp. 106-7; ABHVK, pp.273, 278 65 . ADSS, p.2 1O
38. SS, p.24 66. SVT, p.52
39. MMT 11, pp A63-64; see also Karunadasa, Buddhist 67. ADS, pAO; Cpd, p.201
Analysis of Matter, pp.69,77 68. ADSVT, p. 1 50
40. ADSVT, p. 1 50 69. ADSDP, p.303 ; SVT, p.52
4 1 . ABHVK, p.326 70. BCP, p.367
42. op.cit., p.91 7 1 . K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
43 . MMT 11, pA63 pA32
44. ibid. 72. Sn, p. 172
45 . ADSDP, p.3 1 1 , MMT 11, pA63 73. ABHVK, p.324
46. MMT 11, pA64 74. ADSVT, pp. 1 4 1 -2
47. PTSD s.v'. under the verb Munati 75. ADSVT, p.50; SVT, p.24; ADS, p. 14
48. SVT, p.52 76. Karunadasa, · The . Theravada Version of Dharmavada,
49. APSS, p.214 p .72
50. ADSDP, p.3 1 3 ; ABHVK, p.3 1 9 . 77. MMT I, pAOO
5 1 . SVT, p.52 78. MT, p.54
52. ADSVT, p.84 79. MMT lI, pA69; ADSVT, p. 153
·· 80. Padasadhana{ika, p . 1 2
53. MT, p. 1 3 1
54. PVN, p.208-9 8 1 . DhsA, p . 392; MT, p A 3 ; Diana Paul, Paramartha 's
55. MT, p. 1 3 1 Theory of Language, HP, vol.VII, p.254
56. SuA I, p.245 82. See Appendix

78 79

Chapter 4 of the Pali language through the following :
Paiiiiatti : Grammatical Analysis
Buddha's teachings have been recorded in several
languages and Pali is the medium of the canon of the
Theravada tradition. It is a historical fact that the Pali canon
has come down to us through an oral tradition extending
over several centuries.( l ) It developed into a written form
by the first century B.C.(2) in Sri Lanka. After the Buddha's
demise, his disciples understood the importance of the clarity
of the medium in regard to the communication of his
doctrines. As a result they showed a keen interest in
compiling grammar books for the Pali language. Unlike the
other languages, Pali has mostly been employed only for
the elucidation of Buddha's teachings and to record the
history of the order. Therefore, even the grammatical analyses
of Pali are mostly influenced by the doctrines of the Buddha.
The necessity of writing grammar books has always been
emphasised, quoting a passage from the Anguttaranikaya,
which expresses the importance of clarity of sounds and
meanings for the progress of the dhamma. (3)
Moreover, almost all the grammatical treatises written
in Pali explain their objective as providing a grammar
suitable for the Buddha's words (jinavacana).(4) By the
term 'jinavacana ' they meant the Pali canon which
comprises the teachings of Sutta, Vinaya and
abhidhamma.(5)
80
Grammatical Analysis
The traditional grammar books explain the principles
i. Sutta ii. Vutti iii. Udaharana
•
The term Sutta means a very short statement of a
principle of grammar which is made mainly for easy
remembrance. Detailed explanation of the Sutta is called
Vutti. By the third ( Udahara1)a ) they give examples which
prove the principle and also the relevant exceptions.
All the grammar books explain the alphabet as the
first topic (5) and the Kaccayana which is considered to be
the olde s t , lays down a principle of characters by
following
sutta : ,
"Attho akkharasaiiiiato " (7)
This sutta is considered to be delivered by the Buddha
himself. There is an ancient story recorded in the grammar
books which supplies the background for its delivering. Two
hrahmins called ' Yama' and ' Uppala ' were practising
meditation near a river bank repeating the words
'khayavaya ' (vanishing). One of them, seeing a crane
catching a fish became confused and started reciting
'udakabaka ', (crane in the water,) instead of 'khayavaya '.
The other one seeing a peace of cloth on a pot, started to
recite words 'ghatapata ', "cloth on a pot." The Buddha
seeing their confusion of the relationship between words and
meanings, through his divine eye, made them understand the
principle that 'the meaning should be reflected through the
characters' (attho- akkharasaiiiiato). Having heard this
principle, they rid themselves of their confu sion,
81
Grammatical Analysis
understanding the close connection among the words and
meanings. On this basis, Yen. Kaccayana, one of the chief
disciples of the Buddha, composed the Kaccayana grammar
starting with the sutta-attho akkharasaiiiiato. (8)
Another fact that the grammarians · emphasize is the
necessity of the knowledge of Pa/i for the realization of
nibbana. Because of the knowledge of the characters one
can understand the canon as well as its commentaries.(9)
Through this knowledge One fulfils the practise of si/a,
samadhi, and paiiiia (morality, concentration, and wisdom)
which are the three main steps of the Buddhist path of
deliverance. By this way the knowledge of language causes
the three levels of attainments of the Order namely :
i. pariyatti - learning the sacred texts
ii. patipatti - the practice and
iii. pativedha - realization of nibbana.
The meanings, both mundane and supra-mundane, are
expressed and understood through the characters or sounds
•
which combine together in the form of words and sentences.
If the nature of characters such as aspirated and non­
aspirated is changed the meaning varies-e.g. satta-being,
sattha-weapon. Therefore, the skillfulness in the letters is
essential in understanding the Buddha's word.OO) The one
who is not well versed in grammar will also not be clever in
the doctrine (dhamma and vinaya). As a result, he will be
unable to follow the path correctly and will be subjected to
suffering in existences again and again.( l l ) It should be
.
remembered here that the attainment of catupatisambhida
(four analytic insights) also has a close relationship with
82
Grammatical Analysis
language and grammar. One of the conditions relevant to
the attainment of the four insights is to have a knowledge
of hundred languages or dialects . Among the four
patisambhidas (attha, dhamma, nirutti, patibhana) nirutti .
is closely connected with the knowledge of grammar. ( 1 2)
This fact is emphasised even by the grammarians. ( 1 3)
Because of the above reasons the Buddhist scholars
have paid special attention to the following areas of language
and have composed a number of books · elucidating them
throughout the history of the Order:
writing
•
1.
expressIOn
• • •
11.
hearing and
• • •
111.
iv. comprehension.
As pointed out by Yen. Buddhadatta, ( 1 4) the
number of Pa/i grammars written in Sri Lanka and Burma
exceeds fifty-three. Counted with their ancillary works
written up to the fifteenth century, their number is more
than two thousand.
Paiiiiatti and Pa/i Grammar
Most of the Pa/i traditional grammars treat paiiiiatti
. as an important and essential topic for their explanations of
sounds and meanings.(5) Here it is worthwhile to look at
the reasons which caused their emphasis on paiiiiatti.
According to traditional explanations paiiiiatti entails
a philological and psychological analysis of · sounds and
meanings of language. Even in a descriptive grammar, a
83
Grammatical Analysis
prominent place is given to the sounds and meanings as they
represent the two main divisions of a given language.
Therefore, the grammarians who composed philological
treatises depending on a Buddhist background, naturally tend
to analyse paiiiiatti as a preface for their discussion.
In the Pa!i traditional grammar paiiiiatti is always .
connected with the concept of '!ingattha ' . As a technical
term '!ingattha ' means the fundamental meaning of a noun.
More correctly, it is. the meaning of a noun before its
declension in the noun-cases such as accusative and dative.
The fundamental meaning of a noun is expressed through
the nominative case. In the other cases its meaning is changed
to some extent. Following examples of the noun 'nara' will
,
clarify the fact:
Nominative - naro - the man - nara - the men
Dative - narassa - to the man - naranam - to the men
Ablative - naramha -from the man - narehi -from the
men •
The fundamental unit of a given noun (Unga) could
be explained as a meaningful noun which is free from case
endings, prefixes, suffixes etc. This is taken as the basis of
the nouns before their declension in the cases.( 1 6) e.g.
purisa, mala, citta.(17) The meanings of these fundamental
units of the nouns (!inga) are called '!ingattha '.
'Lingattha ' is also called ' upadapaiiiiatti '. According
.
.
to Abhidhamma, paiiiiatti is divided into two main groups:
i. atthapaiiiiatti - conceptual and real meanings
ii. namapaiiiiatti - sounds, words, sentences . .
Of them 'atthapaiiiiatti ' is called ' upadapaiiiiatti' because
84
Grammatical Analysis
the nouns are always based on meanings. Thus the following
terms are synonymous as far as their usage in the paiiiiatti
analysis is concerned in comparison with the grammatical
analysis of 'lingattha '. Lingattha = atthapaiiiiatti,
upadapaiiiiatti, tajjapaiiiiatti, paiiiiapiyatta paiiiiatti,
vacamya.
-
The two kinds of meanings, conceptual and real
belong to the upadapaiiiiatti or Ungattha. gha(a-pot, pa(a­
cloth etc . are called conceptual meanings and
kakkhalalakkhalJa pa(havidhatu- hardness of the element
of earth etc . . which are the characteristics of real dhammas
are called real meanings.( 1 8) In other words, !ingattha is
two-fold as follows:
i. sammuti-attha or voharattha-conceptual or
conventional meanings
ii. paramattha-attha- meanings of the real dhammas.
The objects of our senses which appear as wholes
•
are really the various combinations of fundamental elements
of existence. Depending upon these various appearances the
concepts such as gha(a-pot, para-cloth, ratha-chariot are
constructed in our minds. These are called sammuti-attha
or voharattha. The hardness of earth element (pathvidhatu),
viscosity of water element (apodhatu), caloricity of fire
element (tejodhatu), inflation of air element (vayodhatu)
etc. which are the characteristics of dhammas symbolised
by the respective words are called paramattha-attha. (l 9)
A grammatical analysis of a language should consist
of the explanations of expression, writing, hearing and
comprehension. In this case articulation of sound and its
85
 Grammatical Analysis
physical and psychological basis should also be explained.
In traditional grammars we find the descriptions relating to
the origin of sounds and psychological background for their
origination. On the other hand in such a grammar the
psychological process and the task of comprehending in
relation to the hearing of sounds should also be explained.
In these analyses the grammarians seem to follow closely
the abhidhammic explanations of paiiiiatti. f\s the theory
of paiiiiatti is related to the two kinds of meanings
(conventional
and real), the grammarians also pay their attention to the
two levels of truth (sammutisacca and paramatthasacca).
Now it is clear that the abhidhammic theory of
paiiiiatti is closely related to the Pali traditional grammar.
Sound and meanings
The foregoing discus sion j ustifies that the
grammatical explanations of sounds and meanings should be
. introduced as a grammatical analy�is of paiiiiatti.
In the traditional grammar, the terms va1}1}a, akkhara
and sadda are used as synony ms for sounds . In the
abhidhammic analysis of paiiiiatti, the terms namapaiiiiatti,
vacaka, abhidhana and paiiiiapanato paiiiiatti have been
used for sounds. It is the opinion of the grammarians as
well as the ancient Buddhist scholars that the meanings
conveyed through the sounds are five-fold:
1. sankhara - all things produced by causes
and conditions
2. vikara - deformity
3. lakkhana
•
- characteristics
86
Grammatical Analysis
4. nibbana - extinction of defilements
5. paiiiiatti - concepts. (20)
The units of sounds which express the meanings
related to the above five areas are called 'akkhara' (letters).
When these akkharas are shown in written forms, various
symbols are used. In the Pali language there are forty-one
akkharas. (2 1 ) These are called akkhara because of several
reasons:
1 . Everything becomes extinct by use again and
again. But the akkharas never become extinct
though they have been used thousands of times
to express meanings. Etymologically the term
akkhara is defined as na-kharanti do not vanish.
(22)
2. Unlike nouns akkharas have no synonyms.
Because of this reason akkharas posses a kind
of uniqueness. They do not move or represent
other akkharas. For example the noun 'nara ' is
represented by 'manussa '. But the letter ' a'
cannot be represented by any other letter. Thus
the definition 'na kharanti na calanti' is given
to the term 'akkhara '. (23)
3 . Buddhism emphasizes the impermanence of every
thing that exists. (24) If so, the akkharas cannot
be explained as eternal or not vanishing. It is inter­
esting that the grammarians explain the term
akkhara as "not van ishing" (na kharanti) in a man­
ner which is related to the abhidhammic philoso­
phy. It is directly connected with the abhidhammic
87
 Grammatical Analysis Grammatical Analysis

theory of dhamma. (25) nibbiina (3 1 ) belong to paramattha-attha. (32) Some

The characteristics of arising and vanishing are appli­ grammarians classify the meanings into there groups as
cable only to the dhammas which are conditioned by ca follows:
uses .
(26) Their limits, phases etc. are not accepted as real dham i. lokiya-attha : meanings which are mundane
mas.
(27) The common characteristics (anicca, dukkha, an The dhammas (phenomena) with defilements
atta)
and own nature (sabhiivalakkhal}a-hardness of pa(havi related to the three spheres (kiima-sensual, riipa-
dhiitu
etc. ) can be applied only to the real dhammas. It was po
,

inted form, and ariipa formless) belong to this category.

-

ou t that akkhara co m es under the category of paii They have many divisions such as khandha­
iiatti.
Paiiiiattis are not real dhammas according to the th aggregates, iiyatana-bases, dhiitu-elements.(33)
eory of
dhamma. As the akkharas are not really conditioned dh ii. lokuttara-attha : meanings which are
ammas,
the charaCteri stics, such as impermanence are not applicab supra-mundane
le to
them .(2 8) To this belong the following dhammas which are free
To ju stify this , the grammarians quote the following from defilements:
statement of the Buddha: Four paths (sotiipatti, sakadiigiimi, aniigiimi, arahatta) and
'Niimagottam na jirati ' (name and clan do not disappea their results and nibbiina.
r.( 29 )
Thus the traditional grammariaris hold the opinion th .
at the iii. vohiirha-attha- conventional meanings.
ak kh ar as ar e so ca ll ed be ca us e th ey do no t
,

pe ri sh . The conventional meanings are those which represent

Grammatical analysis of akkhara does not end here the various combinations, phases and limits of the real
· . The
w ho le pr oc es s of their origination under fi ve he dhammas. (34) A single meaning may represent several
ad in gs
/thiina, karal}a, payatana, suti, kiila-place, instrumen nouns. ego The meaning 'king of gods' is expressed by the
tality,
at te m pt , he ar in g an d ti m e) and th e di vi si on s su nouns, sakka, purindada, devariija, vajirapiil}i, sujampati,
ch as
aspirated, no-aspirated are discussed in detail. (3 0) sahassakkha, mahinda, vajiriivudha. (35) Due to various
Now it is worthwhile to direct our discussion towards reasons a particular meaning is conveyed through many
the analysis of meaning and its relationship with soun nouns. Hence the definition of the term paiiiiatti fits in well
ds. It
w as sa id that 'atth a' means the tw o kinds of mea to the above explanation.
ning
(conventional and real) comprehended through the so 'Paiiiiatti is so called because it makes the hearer's
unds.
Categories of meanings such as gha(a, pa(a which de mind pleasant in various ways and conveys meanings to
pend
on conventional usages are called sammuti-atth a, an improve his intelligence. (36)
d five
aggregates (r iipa, vedanii, saiiiiii, sankhiira, viiii i iil}a) and The next problem the grammarians tried to solve is

88 89
Grammatical Analysis
Grammatical Analysis

whe ther the mea ning is con vey ed thro ugh a sing le
of sand as well as a collection of them do not
letter(sound) or a collection of letters. As the words comprise
produce oil.'
of several letters in many cases, no one can say that meaning
On one hand the first solution can be
• • •

111.
is conveyed through a single letter. If so, the other letters in
considered as valid. According to the
that particular word become redundant. On the other hand
Buddha's teachings the causes are capable of
we do not experience the meanings coming out of each and
producing the relevant results when the real
every letter separately. Thus the saying 'the meaning is
conditions are present. A cause which does
conveyed through single letters' becomes inv.alid. Again we
not produce a result owing to the lack of other
notice that the letters disappear one by one when the words
relevant conditions cannot be considered as a
are spoken. Letters do not exist as · a whole at the same
non-cause because it is capable of producing
time. So we cannot say that the meaning is conveyed through
that result when the required conditions are
a collection of letters. And it is also not valid to say that the
present. Likewise, a letter which has no
meaning is conveyed through any other way, either.(37 ) This
meaning without the other letters cannot be
is the problem that the ,grammarians had to solve in regard
considered as meaningless. For example, one
to sounds and meanings and in solving it they sought help
is not counted as an unskillful person owing
in the abhidhammic analysis of paiiiiatti. It is interesting,
to the fact that one is unable to bear a litter
before we go to the solution, to have a look at the simile
which should be borne by a number of people.
given by the grammarians to clarify the above problem.
He is really unskillful if he is unable to bear it
i. Though the spokes', · rims, shafts etc. do not
when the others are present
make the task of moving, when those parts
iv. This third argument is also not acceptable
are put together as a wheel they are capable
because in the case of a litter all the people
of moving. Likewise though the individual
are present at the same time but in the case
letters do not convey the meaning, a
of hearing, the sounds or letters disappear one
combination is capable of conveying it.
by one when they are heard. When we hear
ii. The above solution is not acceptable as it is
the letter '1}a' of the term 'va1}1}a ' the former
against the theory that 'if a single unit of
letter 'va' has disappeared.(38)
som ethi ng is inc apa ble of pro duc ing a
Now - it is clear that the problem of sound and
particular result, a collection of them also
meanings has become more complex. In order to solve this,
would not be able to produce it. A single unit
the traditional grammarians have adopted the theory of
90
91
 Grammatical Analysis Grammatical Analysis

paiiiiatti. When a fire-brand is rotated it seems like a circle the origination of sounds (ka�tha-throat tiifu-palate,
of fire though in reality there is none. After the arising of muddha-cerebrum, danta-teeth ottha-lips, niisikii-nose) .
,

thousands of thoughts in relation to the appearances and
disappearances of the fire-brand there arises a thought taking
,
together all shapes of the fire-brand as its object and then
the fire-brand appears as a circle. The reason for this is the
speedy appearances and disappearances of the consciousness.
.
(39 )
The sounds are called 'niima ' (nam-to bend) because
of two reasons :
i. the nouns seem to bend towards the meanings
ii. the meaning seems to bend towards the nouns.
The grammarians are of the opinion that only the former
one is applicable to the Buddha's teachings because the
,
meanings are more important than the nouns as far as the
Again as a result of the former experience or karma, there
arises the very same collection of eight material elements in
the same place. Then owing to the motion of the element of
air, (viiyo) the two elements of earth (pathavi) produced
psychologically and karmatically, strike together. Because
of this striking, sounds are produced in one of the six places
of origination of sounds. The sounds are named according
to the places of their origination as ka�thaja, tiifuja etc.
(42 )
The above process of articulating sounds can be
explained under six steps as follows:
i. thinking ,
physical reaction to the psychological action
• •

11.
Buddhist philosophy is concerned. (40) physical reaction caused by the former
• • •

111.

experience or karma
Expression and Hearing motion (viiyu air)
•

IV. -

Expression : V. striking (pathavi solidity)

-

Articulating sounds through the vocal organs and the origination of sounds
•

VI.
related psychological process has been explained by the The above six steps clearly show that the Theraviida
grammarians depending solely on such abhidhammic conception of the origination of vocal sounds is founded on
explanations. a psychological basis.
There arises a thought of expression in the mind of the person It is a clear fact that the articulation is preceded by a thinking
who thinks to express something. At the same time, that process. The arising of eight material elements can , be
thought causes the arising of the collection of eight material regarded as a stimulation of the place of articulation caused
elements (pathavi, iipo, tejo, viiyo, va��a, gandha, rasa, by thinking: According to abhidhamma there arise seven
ojii, elements of extension, cohesion, heat, motion, colour, thoughts (mental
odour, taste and nutriment) (4 1 ) in one of the six places of concomitants- c etasika ) with each and every

92 93
Grammatical Analysis
consciousness.(43) The first one of them is phassa (contact).
It means the contact between senses and their respective
objects. This is a very subtle process unlike the striking of
two material things. It is compared to an arising of saliva
when we see the others eating sour fruits. (44) Stimulation
of the places of articulation caused by thinking can also be
considered as a similar process. The material elements
produced by kamma or former experience are nothing but
the same places of articulation of the body. According to
abhidhamma one of the main causes for the origin of
physical body is kamma or former experience. (45) Thus
we can understand the difference of two sets of the same
material elements caused by thinking and kamma. In the
process of articulation motion connects with the air-element.
The air-stream that comes from lungs is pressed through
the mouth and the nose in order to express sounds and the
grammarians explain this as motion connected with the air­
element. The next step phassa or contact is also caused by
the air-element. In articulation, three places of the tongue
(jivhagga, jivhopagga, jivhamajjha-the end, near the end
and the middle of the tongue) (46) are pressed to the places
of articulation. These are called karaf)aUhaf)a. (47) When
the karaf)a-Uhanas are pressed to the places of articulation
, the air-stream goes through them and as a result sounds are
produced. The grammarians explain the above process as
.
.
the task of motion by air-element and the task of contact by
the earth-element. Now we can decide that grammarians have
tried to explain the process of expression or articulation on
a theoretical and scientific basis.
94
Grammatical Analysis
Hearing :
As in the case ' of expression, the details of the process
of hearing in the grammar are compatible with those of the
abhidhamma. The following quotation will prove the fact:
"In the mind of the person who hears a word like
'vaf)f)a' (letter), there arise two javanas (apperceptions) as
present and past regarding each sound of that word. Then
aris es one javana regarding the whole collection of sounds.
•
Aft er thi s ther e aris es ano ther jav ana , reg ard ing
nam apaiiiiatti (nominal concept) or the nou n. Thus the
namapaiiiiatti becomes clear only after the javana-process
to which the whole set of sounds becomes the obje ct. After
this meaning is understood." (48) In order to understand
the above quotation we should pay our attention to some
other facts explained in the abhidhamma. The sound (sadda)
whi ch is the obj ect of the ear is a real phe nom eno n
(dhamma). (49 ) Noun or namapaiiiiatti belongs to the
category of concepts and therefore it is not a real dhamma.
As in the collection of many threads there q.rises the concept
o f clo th in our min ds , in the sam e way num ero us
namapaiiiiattis are produced in our minds depending on
various combinations of sounds . (50) Thus the nouns in
reality are mental productions and they are paiiiiattis. When
the paiiiiatti becomes an object of mind-door (manodvara ),
(5 1 ) after several thought moments there arise seven javanas.
(52)
The above process of hearing can also be explained
under several steps:
95
Grammatical Analysis

hearing of sounds Notes

•

1.

assimilation of the memories of sounds past

• •

11.

and present in the mind an,d their identification 1 . Adikaram, E.W., Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon,
understanding of the words which are the Colombo, 1 953 , pp. 24-26
• • •

111 .

various combinations of sounds 2. op. cit. pp. 76-79

iv. understanding the relationship among the 3 . Aliguttaranikiiya, i, p. 1 16
words and meanings. 4 . Mah iirupasiddhi, ed. D . S . Dharmananda, p . 3 0
•

In the process of hearing the first task is to identify Biiliivatiira, ed. Devarakkhita, p. 8
the sounds. Depending on the former experience the present
<
Kacciiyanava{l{lanii, ed. B . Pannalankara, H .
sounds are understood. Next to it there occurs the Sumanasara, U. Piyatissa, p. 68
understanding of various combinations of sounds or words Biiliivatiira(ikii, (Subodhika) ed. Sri Sumangala, p.23
(vacana). The final result of this process of hearing is to 5 . Buddhippasiidani (Padasiidhana(ikii), ed. Dhirananda,
understand the meanings related to those words. Thus it is
<

Vacissara, p. 10
clear that the words as' well as their meanings which we 6. Kaccayana, Miiharupasiddhi, Baliivatiira,
understand through communication are merely mental Moggallayana, Saddaniti
productions and they are not real. Hence the abhidhammikas 7. Kaccayanava{l{lana, p.8
grouped them as paiiiiattis or concepts under two headings: 8 . ibid
i. niimapaiiiiatti - concepts related with sounds 9 . Miihiirupasiddhi(ikii, ed. D.S. Dharmananda, p.3
ii. atthapaiiiiatti -concepts related with meanings. 10. Maharupasiddhi, p. 1 <

Sounds are metal productions based on the space and
air in our bodies. (53) According to Theraviida tradition
sound is not a divine and unperishable element as is accepted
in the Hindu tradition. (54)
As a whole what the Theravadins try to say is that
the process of hearing expression and comprehension are a
<
1 1 . Moggalliiyanapaiicikii, ed. D. Dhammananda, pA
1 2 . Visuddhimagga, ed. P. B uddhadatta, pp. 329-33 1
1 3 . Saddaniti, ed. A. Seelananda, p. 530
14. Buddhadatta, A.P. Piili Siihityaya, Vol. ii, ppA60-526
1 5 . Maharupasiddhi, p. 1 0 1 ; Mahiirupasiddhi(ika, p. 5 1 ;

Saddaniti, p. 626
natural process caused by mental and physical reactions. We 1 6 . Maharupasiddhi, p. lOl
conceptualize meanings depending on various combinations 1 7 . Saddaniti, ' p. 563
< <

of sounds as we guess the existence of fire depending on 1 8. Karunadasa, Y. , The Abhidhammic Theory of Paiiiiatti
smoke. (55) : The Category of the Nominal and the Conceptual,

96 97
 Buddhist Philosophy and Culture, Essays in Honor of Consciousness in the Abhidhamma Psychology,
N.A. Jayawickrama, pp. 7 1 -74 International Buddhist Association, Japan, Bukkyo
1 9. op, cit. pp.75-88 . Kenkyu, vol. 1 xx., pp. 1 9 1 - 2 1 2
20. Saddaniti, p. 532 44. ABHVT., p.27
2 1 . Baiavatara, ed. Devarakkhita, p. 14 45. Cpd., p. 1 65
22. Saddaniti, p. 532 46. Mahariipasiddhi, p.2
23. Buddhippasadani, p. 1 2 47. ibid
24. Mahavaggapa!], vol. I, ed. D. Pannasara, p. 1 1 48. Buddhippasadani, p . 1 5
25. Y. Karunadasa, ibid, pp. 75-88 49. Cpd., pp. 1 98-20 1
26. ibid. 50. op. cit., introduction, pp.3-6
27. Abhidharmarthasamgrahasannaya, ed. Pannamolitissa, 5 1 . ibid. pp. 1 98-20 1
p. · 158 52. ibid.
28. Mahariipasiddhi{ika, p. 5 53 . Saddaniti, p . 1
29. Riipam jirati maccanam - namagottam na jirati 54. Buddhippasadani, p. 1 5
30. Mhariipasiddhi, pp. 2, 3 ; Baiavatara, pp. 1 , 2 ; 55. Mahariipasiddhi{ika, p.4
Moggallayanapaiicika, pp. 7-9
3 1 . B uddhippasadani, pp. 1 3 , 14
32. Cpd., pp. 1 -6
3 3 . Karunadasa, Y. , ibid.
34. Mahariipasiddhi, pp. 1 3 , 1 4
3,5 . Saddaniti, p. 342
1 6 . op. cit., 797
37. Buddhippasadani, p. 14 .
38. ibid.
39. ibid, Mukhamattadipani (Kaccayana{ika), pp. 1 1 , 12
40. Buddhippasadani, p.8
4 1 . Cpd., pp. 154- 1 57
42. Buddhippasadani, p. 1 6; Saddaniti, p. 1
43. Karunadasa, Y. , The Universal Concomitants of

98 99
 Parallel Developments

. .

Nyliyabindu and the Sanskrit grammatical texts such as the

Chapter 5 Plil}ini, Laghusiddhlintakaumudi including the Klivylidarsa,
Dhvanyliloka on poetics are worthy of mention in this
Paiiiiatti : Parallel Developinents regard.
The ancient Indian scholars, who focused their
In the previous chapters an attempt has been taken attention on language, were aware of its relationship with
to elucidate the gradual development and the main tenets of truth and reality. The concept of Brahman, the reality of
the Theravlida conception of paiiiiatti. Paiiiiatti, the the world was considered as an ineffable entity. The reality
conception of language and its usage is not confined only to of the world mentioned in some Mahliylina texts also was
the Buddhist traditions. It finds accommodation in the non­ considered as inexpressible. ( l ) The great Sanskrit poet
Buddhist religious and philosophical traditions as well. Dam/in says in his Klivylidarsa that the world. would be full
Further, the modem works on language and philosophy are of darkness unless it is illuminated with the light of language.
numerous to mention here. Therefore, a work on this subject, Although there existed mutually different opinions on the
if confined only to the Theravada tradition, becomes nature of language among the scholars of Vylikaral}a,
incomplete without at least an awareness to those theories Mimlimsli and Nyliya traditions, all of them agreed on the
and explanations of the other traditions. On this ground here point that sentence is not merely a collection of words.(2)
we propose to examine in brief the major trends of the other According to Bhartrhari who represents vylikaral}a tradition
traditions towards the conGeption of language and a sentence means an indivisible concept (meaning) and what
philosophy. However this is not an exhaustive treatment of is divisible is its sounds but not the meaning there of .(3)
those opinions and theories of the subject but a mere glance The Nyliya tradition holds the view that there exists a causal
at them so as to bring the content of the thesis into a wider basis of words and meanings. Further it recommends that a
knowledge of words, meanings and the way of expression is
perspective.
ou ld be m en ti on ed th at th e Sa ns kr it essential for an adequate understanding of language. (4)
At the outset it sh
om th e Ve da is fu ll of in fo rm at io n Although language is one as to its common nature, the
literature beginn in g fr
d us ag e of la ng ua ge . T he B ud dh is t ancient grammarians such as Plinini had noticed different
regarding the nature an •

th e A bh idh ar m ak os a to ge th er w it h layers of its usage. The use of language for itself, the modem
Sans krit texts su ch as
, A bh id h ar m as am u cc ay a, . concept of meta-Ianguage has been compared with Plil}ini's
it s Bh li�ya and co m m en tary
h it s co m m en ta ry Vib hli �lip ra bh livrt ti, statement: "svam riipam sbdasya asabdasamjiili " in this
Abhidh armadip a w it
T a tt va sa m g ra h a, A p oh as id d hi , regard. For instance the Plil}ini sutra-agnert/hak-means the
Pra m lin a vlirtika,
•

101
100

Parallel Developments
suffix "4hak" should be added to the noun " agm''' , It does
. absolute nature of the existence had to consider the nature
not mean that the suffix should be added to "fire" (agni) .
Such statements are considered as meta-Ianguage.(5) The
opinion of the grammarians that the use of "na-not" has not
only a negative meaning but also a positive meaning
(paryudasa, prasajjaka) can also be considered as an
assumption of the nature of language. Because of such
evidence as the above . the scholars are in the opinion that
the ancient grammatical tradition represents the preceding
phase of the Nyaya tradition. (6) It is accepted that although
the traditions of Vaiyakara1)a, Mimamsaka and Naiyayika
differ from one another in some concepts of the nature of
language, all of them agree "as to the basis in reality of the
conceptual cognition as also of the relation subsisting
between a particular term and the object referred to by it".
(7) Bhattacharya further says that "the B uddhist
philosophers are opposed to the above orthodox views. They
repudiate the realistic basis of the conceptual cognition. They
admit however that when a word is he ard we cognize a
corresponding concept. It is as much unreal as the cognition
of two moons by a man of defective vision". (8) Prof.
Kalupahana points out that the grammarians explained the
kinship of words depending on simple etymology while
Buddhism recognised it based on usage. Further he says that
the absolute structures of language supposed to be revealed
by linguistic analysis has been rejected on the basis of
"language drift" caused also by usage.(9) Although the early
Buddhist attitude towards language holds a midway position
between strict adherence to it and transgression of common
102
Parallel Developments
parl ance , the abh idharmikas who concentrated on the
of language accommodating it in the list of dharmas. So
the Vaibha#kas accepted three dharmas (forces) related to
language under the category · of cittaviprayuktadharmas
which are considered as distinct from the traditional three
categories of dharmas, viz. riipa (matter), citta (mind), and
caitasikas (men tal conc omit ants) . ( l 0) They are the
.
namakaya, padakaya and vyaiijanakaya imparting
significance to words, sentences and letters or words, phrases
and syllables respectively.( l l ) Stcherbatsky and laini agree
with the point that the formulation of these three dharmas .
has been influenced by the theory of Spho ta and the
Mimamsaka theory of eternal words. ( 1 2) laini, further
holds the view that the Buddhists made their entry into the
field of language philosophy under the influence of their
contemporary Mimamstikas and Vaiyakara1)as, who had
developed their theories of eternal words and of Sphota.
( 1 3) The definitions given to these three dharmas seen to
be different from tradition to tradition. Therefore first of all
it is worthwhile to pay attention to those definitions in order
to have a clear understanding of those dharmas, Gho�aka
in his Abhidharmamrta defines namakaya as meaningful
letters, the padakaya as naming a thing by an aggregate of
padas, and the vyaiijanakaya as a collection of letters.( 1 4)
This definition is different from that of the Vaibh asikas ,
mentioned above. Asanga, mentions in his
Abhidharmasamuccaya that the notion of namakaya comes
into being as a result of naming the own-natures of the
103
Parallel Developments
dharmas and the notion of padakaya arises as a result of
designating the peculiarities of the dharmas. In his opinion,
vyanjanakaya means letters which support the namakaya
and the padakaya. ( 1 5 ) According to the Vaibha�ikas
"verbal sound alone is not capable of conveying any meaning.
A verbal sound(vak) operates on the naman, and the latter
conv eys the mean ing . ( 16) The Sautrantikas with an
empiricist outlook emphasize that the "verbal sounds (vak)
which are agreed upon by convention to mean a particular
thing (krta-sanketa) do convey their meanings" .( 17) This
view is definitely identical with the early Buddhist attitude
towards language mentioned earlier. However, it is clear that
the attribution of an eternal posit ion to language or its
constituents is not in eonformity with the Buddhist view of
impermanent nature of the world. In regard to the actual
nature of the Vaibha�ika category of nama, pada and
vyaiijanakayas, here, it is of grearimportance to quote the
defin ition given to them in the Abhidharmavatara of
Skandhila.
"Words, phrases and syllables are those which are
produced with the support of speech (vac), and which
causes the understanding [in each case] of a
corresponding import (svartha-pratyayaka), in a
similar manner as knowledge (jiiana) mainfests with
the representation of an object (artha) [it cognizes].
These are the synonyms, respectively, for ideation
(samjiia), sentence (vakya) and phoneme (ak�ara).
Just as visual consciousness etc., are produced with
eyes etc., as their support; manifesting with the
104
Parallel Developments
representation of the object, the visible etc ., and
[thus] comprehend their respective objects. The same
applies to words, etc.
It is not the case that vocal sound can directly
express the import, [for] it cannot be that when one
utters the word 'fire' , one's mouth is immediately
burnt! Words like 'fire' etc., must rely on speech for
their production. From these words the import of fire
etc., are then expressed.
By 'expressing' is meant producing in others
a comprehension (buddhi) of the import to be
illumined (dyotita). It does not mean that [the word]
unites with the import. As sound is resistant, and as
the eternal sound falsely held by the grammarians
(vaiyakaral}ena parika/pita) are unreasonable, there
cannot be any dharma [such as sound] , apart from
these three-words, phrases and syllables-which are
capable of expressing a corresponding import. These
four dharmas-sound, word, import and knowledge­
however, appear to be identical in form, [though they
are in fact distinct entities] .
Here, by a word is meant an ideation, like
that pertaining to matter, etc. By a phrase is meant
that which expresses complete meaning; as for
example the verse "Not to do evil"., etc. In the world,
people also utter · [such statements as] "Devadatta,
drive· the white cow here for milking". etc. By a
syllable is meant a phoneme like 'a' , 'i', etc. When
the three are assembled into their collection
105
Parallel Developments
(samukti), they are known respectively as a group
(kaya) [of words, of phrases, and of syllables].
"There are scriptural evidence to prove that
these three dharmas are real". Thus the Great Sage
has said. "0 bhiku�us, when the Thatagata has arisen
in the world, there are the groups of words, phrases
and syllables which can be known". This refers to
those of the [Four} Truths (satya), the' [Three] Jewels
(ratna), the [five] aggregates (skandha), the [twelve]
entrances (ayatana), the [eighteen] spheres (dhatu),
the [four] fruit of the ascetic (srama1}aphala), the
dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada), etc.
Again, the Bhagavat has said, "The Thatagata
acquires such and such groups of words, phrases and
sy llables". This refers to those pertaining to the
dharmas unique to the Buddha (ave1}ika-buddha­
dharma) obtained by the Thatagata, etc."(18)
Though the three dharmas are accepted as distinct and real
entities the skandhila's definition seems more scientific than
the other definitions.
A comparison of the above mentioned views on
language and its usage with the conception of pannatti
reveals that the definitions of Sautrantikas and Skandhila
are compatible to some extent with those of the Theravada
abhidhamma because of several facts. One of them is that
the . Theravadins did not attribute an eternal position to
language as a whole or to its constituents. According to
abhidhammic treatises pannatti does not belong to the
category of real dharmas But they have emphasized the
• .
106 ·
Parallel Developments
importance of language as a means of communication by
accepting it as a separate topic of abhidhammic discussions.
The usefulness of language as an object of senses has not
been neglected at all. It also comes as a real dhamma under
the material elements. It is interesting to note that sound
(sadda) is treated as one of the primary material elements
and verbal intimation (vaciviiinatti) as a secondary element.
The term verbal intimation itself indicates that · it is not a
separate element but the function of words. The ten material
elements including verbal intimation are called secondary
mainly because they are not real as they do not possess their
own nature, the inevitable mark of a real dhamma. Sound
as the object of the ear was considered real because it occurs
in the lists of the constituent parts of the existence analysed
in the early discourses. Apart from this the functions,
constituents and the concept of language as a whole have
been accepted as unreal. Further the Theravadins did not
introduce a new category as viprayuktasamskara but defined
all elements under the scheme of five aggregates.
Almost all the theories of language focus attention on two
aspects namely sounds and meanings. The Buddhist theory
of apoha can be regarded as focusing attention mostly on
the latter. Although it has no direct bearing on the conception
of pannatti, it should be mentioned here as an advanced .
theory of language presented by the Buddhists. The
Tattvasangraha of �antarak�ita records the different views
of the realists and the negationists (apohists) on the
connotation of words as follows:
"What is apprehended by word and cognition is a
107
Parallel Developments
real entity ; hence what express by means of
affirmation and denial is only the real state of things";
such is the view of the realists. The view of the
negationists (apohists), on the other hand, is as
follows : "There is nothing real that is expressed by
words; all verbal cognition is wrong, because it
proceeds by imposing non-difference upon things that
are really different; in a case where there is indirect
connection with an entity, there is some sort of
aggreement with the obj ect, even though the
cognition is really wrong". Such is the view of these
people. The one uniform, non-different, form that is
imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the
apprehension of things in the form of the 'exclusion
of other things' ; and it being itself of the nature of
the 'exclusion or negation of other things ' , it is
mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be
one with that which is excluded by it, and it ultimately
•
brings about the apprehension of the thing 'excluded'
from others; for these reasons it comes to be known
as 'excluded from other things' . On this ground it
has been held that what is expressed by words is
apoha, the 'negation of others' .
The realists urge the following objection
(against the apohist, negationist, (Bauddha) : "If,
according to you, for verbal cognition, there is no .
real basis as the adjuncts qualifying factors in the
shape of substance, quality, action, universal, ultimate
individuality and inherence, then how is it that among
J08
Parallel Developments
peo ple , the re are suc h ver bal exp re s sio ns and
cognitions as 'the man with the stick' , which are all
based upon adjuncts in the shape of substance, etc. ?
For instance, such expres sions and notions as 'the
man with the stick' , 'the animal with horns' are
known to be based upon adjuncts in the shape of
substances ; such expressions and notions as 'white' ,
'black' are bas ed upon adju ncts in the shape of
qualities; such expressions and notions as 'moves ' ,
'wanders' are based upon adjuncts in the shape . M
action; such expressions and notions as 'is ' , 'exists '
are based upon adjuncts in the shape of 'being' ; such
exp res sio ns and not ion s . as ' Co w ' , ' Ho rse ' ,
"Elephant ' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of
universal and particulars ; and the expression and
notion 'The cloth in these yarns' are based upon
inference. If then, there did not exist any of these
substance and the rest, the expressions and notions
of the 'Man with the stick' and other things would
become bas eles s. The term 'adi' goes with every
member of the compound. So that every one of such
similar expressions and notions become included, as
'the umbrella-holder ' , 'the horned animal' and so
forth. As for the ultimate individualities, they are
cognisable by mystics only; hence these are not meant
to be included here.
"Any yet it is not right that these expressions
and notions should be regarded as entirely baseless.
1 09
Parallel Developments Parallel Developments

If they were so, they would be equally liable to appear dhammas but the cognition created by them in human
everywhere. consciousness always refer to conventions but not to the
"Nor are they found to apply promiscuously reality. The realization of real facts is a matter of wisdom
to all things, without distinction. but not of the ordinary consciousness. This Theravada view
"From all this it follows that substance and of the meaning of words indirectly supports to some extent
the rest do really exist. the theory of apoha.
"The argument may ' be formulated as follows: The foregoing brief account of the theories of
Expressions and notions that appear in mutually language by the other Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions
distinct forms must have a real basis, like the auditory suggests that the Theravada conception of pannatti though
and other notions; the expressions and notions of the shares some aspects with others holds a position of its own.
'stick-holder' , etc. do appear in distinct forms; hence
this is a natural reason (for regarding them as having
a real basis). If they had no such basis, things would
appear in all places without distinction; this is the
argument setting aside a contrary conclusion". ( 19)
The theory of apoha and all its implications cannot be
introduced by a short passage like the above. It is a vast
field of arguments and counter-arguments full of conflexity.
Anyway, by the above arguments of the apohists and the
realists it becomes clear that the apohists emphasized that
the words in a given language are not capable of
communicating anything real. Instead, the words of language
merely have a nagative connotation. For instance the word
,
,

"cow" does not express anything positive but it negates not-

cow or differentiates 'cow' from 'not-cow' . This view when ,
compared with the definition of atthapannatti (conception
of meaning) agrees to some extent to the view of the
Theravadins that the meaning of words are always ,
,

conventional. The words or nouns can refer to ' the real

,

110 111
 B
Notes :
Bibliography
1 . Bcp., p.367
2. Barlingay, · A Modem Introduction to Indian logic, p.25 (Original texts)
3 . op.cit., p.26
4. ibid. A b h idh a m m a tt h a s a ng a h a - Vib h ii vin i t ikii , e d . W.
5 . op.cit., p. 1 85 Panniinanda, Colombo, 1 898
6. ibid. Abhidhammatthasangaha, ed. T. W. Phys Davids, JPTS .
7 . Bhattacharya, A Study in Language and Meaning, p.79 1 884 ( 1 -48)
8. ibid. Abhidhammatthasangahadipanipiili, Rangoon, 1 929
9 . Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy, pp. 6 1 -2 Abhidhammatthavikiisini, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, Colombo,
10. Jaini, The Vaibhii#ka Theory of Words and Meanings, 1 96 1
BSOAS.xxii, p.95 ; Stechebatsky, The Central Conception Abhidhammiivatiira, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, Buddhadatta's
of Buddhism, p.23; Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine Manuals I (pp. I - 1 42), PTS, 1 9 1 5
(Skandhila 's Abhidharmiivatiira), tr. K. Dhammajoti, Abhidharmadipa (with Vibhii�iiprabhiivrtti), ed. P. S. Jaini,
pp. 1 39-40 Tibetan Sanskrit works series, IV, Patna, 1 959
1 1 . Jaini, op.cit., p.95; Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine, Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii (Sinhalese Edition), ed. And tr.
op.cit., 1 39-40 •
M. Siisanaratana, Colombo, 1 976
1 2. Jaini, op.cit., p.95; Stcherbatsky, op.cit., p.24 Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii (Sph utiirthii) I-Ill, ed. S .
1 3 . Jaini, ibid. Dvarikadas Sastri, Varanasi, 1 970- 1 972
1 4. op.cit., p.97 Abhidharmasamuccayabhii�ya, ed. N. Tatia, Patna, 1 976
1 5 . ibid. Abhidharmiirthasamgrahasannaya, ed. Panniimolitissa,
1 6. ibid. Ambalangoda, 1 926
1 7 . op.cit., pp.97-8 Abhidhiinappadipikii, ed. W. Subh ;Ui, W Wiichissara, ..

1 8. Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine, op.cit., pp. 1 39-40 Colombo, 1 93 8

19. The Tattvasangraha of S iintaraksita with the . Anguttaranikiiya Atthakathii (Manorathapiirani), 1-11, ed.
.
• •

Commentary of' Kamaiasila, tr. Ganganatha Jha, I,

,

M. Walleser,. H. Kopp, PTS, 1 924- 1956 '

i
pp.466-7 Anguttaranikiiya, I-IV, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, c.A.P. Rhys
Davids, PTS, 1 885- 1 9 1 0

1 12 1 13
Bodhicaryavatarapaiijika, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Mithila Institute,
Darbhanga, 1 960
Buddhippasadani (Padasadhanatika), ed. Dhirananda,
Viicissara, Colombo 1 908
Balavatara, ed. Devarakkhita, Colombo, 1 904
Balavataratika , (Sobhodhika), ed. Siri Sumangala,
Colombo, 1 9 1 3
Dhammapada, ed. Yen. Narada. , Colombo, 1973
Dhammapada Atthakatha, I, ed. H. Smith, H.C, Norman,
L.S. Tailang, PTS, 1 906- 1 9 1 5
Dhammasangani Atthakatha (Atthasalini), ed. E. Muller,
PTS, 1 897
Dighanikaya Atthakatha (Sumangalavilasini) , I-Ill, ed.
T.W. Rhys Davids, J.B.. Carpenter, W. Stede, PTS, 1 886-
1 932
Dighanikaya Atthakatha Tika (Linatthava1)1)ana), Ill, ed.
Lily de Silva, PTS, 1 970
Dighanikaya, I-Ill, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids, J.E. Carpenter,
•
PTS, 1 890- 1 9 11
Kaccayana and Kaccayanava1)1)ana, ed. B . Paiiiialankara,
H. Sumanasara, U. Piyatissa, Colombo, 1 905
Kathavatthu, 1-11, ed. A.C. Taylor, PTS, 1 894- 1 897
Kathavatthuppakara1)a Atthakatha, ed. N.A. Jayawickrema,
PTS, 1 979
Madhutika, I, Rangoon, 1 926- 1 928
Mahasaddaniti, ed. A. Seelananda, Colombo, 1 909
,
Mahaniddesa AUhakatha (Niddesava1)1)ana-
Saddhammapajjotika) 1-11, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, PTS ,
1 93 1 - 1 94 1
1 14
Mahariipasiddhi and Mahariipasiddhitika, ed. D . S . '
Dharmananda, Colombo, 1 9 1 5
Majjhimanikaya Atthakatha (Papaiicasiidani), I, ed. J.W.
Woods, D. Kosambi, LB. Homer, PTS, 1 922- 193 8
Majjhimanikaya, I-Ill, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, Mrs
Rhys Davids, PTS, 1 888 - 1 925
Manisaramaiijusatika, 1-11 , ed. Sixt h Bud dhis t Cou ncil ,
B uddhasasanasamiti, Rangoon, 1 960- 1 964
Milindapaiiha, ed. V. Trenckner, PTS , 196 2
Moggallana and Moggallanapaiicika, ed. D.
Dhammiinanda, Colombo, 1 93 1
Mohavicchedani, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, A.K. Warder, PTS,
1 96 1
Mukhamattadipani (Kacciiyanalikii), Colombo, 1921
Miilamadhyamakakarikii, ed. And tr. D.J. Kalupahana,
Delhi, 1 99 1
Mii lam adhyamakakarikavyii khya (S inh ales e) , ed. M .
Siisanaratana, Colombo, 1 963
Miilatika, ed. D. Paiiiiiisiira, P. Wimaladhamma, Colombo,
1 93 8
Nettippakara1)a Atthakatha, ed. W. Piyatissa, Colombo,
1 92 1
Niddesava1)1)ana (Saddhammapajjotika=Mahaniddesa
Atthakathii) I-Ill, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, PTS, 1 93 1 - 1 94 1
Namariipapariccheda, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, JPTS, ' 1 9 1 3-
1 9 14
Niimariipasamiisa, ed. P. Dhammarama, JPTS, 1 9 1 5 - 1 9 1 6
Paramatthavinicchaya, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, JPTS, 1 985
Patisambhidiimagga AUhakathii, 11
1 15
(Saddhammappakasini) 11, ed. c.v. Joshi, PTS, 1 933 - 1 947
Pa(isambhidamagga, 11, ed. A.C. Taylor, PTS, 1 905 - 1 907
Pugaa1apaiiiiatti, ed. R. Morris, PTS, 1 883
Saccasankhepa, ed. P. Dhammarama, JPTS, 1 9 1 7- 1 9 1 9
(pp. I 25 )
-
Samyuttanikaya, I-V, ed. L. Feer, Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS,
1 884- 1 904
Sankhepava1}1}ana(ika, ed. W. Paiiiiananda, Colombo, 1 899
Subhodhalankara, ed. L.Lankananda, Colombo, 1 947
Suttanipata AUhakatha (Paramatthajotika 11), ed. H.
Smith, PTS, 1 9 1 6- 1 9 1 8
Suttanipata, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, PTS, 1 9 1 3
Tattvasamgrahapaiijika 11, ed. S . Dwarikadas Sastri,
Varanasi, 1 968 ' Delhi, 1 937
Trimsatika, ed. and tr. B.J. Bhaskar, India, 1 97 1
Udana, ed. P. Steithal, PTS, 1 885
Vinaya A((hakatha (Samantapasadika), 1-11, ed. J .
Takakusu, M. Nagai, PTS, 1 924- 1 947
Vinayapi(aka, I-V, ed. H. Oldenberg, London, 1 879- 1 883
Visuddhimagga, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1 920- 1921
Visuddhimaggatika (Paramatthamaiijusa), ed. M .
Dhammananda, Colombo, 1 928
Visuddhimargasannaya, I-Ill, ed. B. Saddhatissa, Colombo,
1 949- 1 955
Translations
A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammatthasangaha), tr.
Narada, Kandy, 1 968
B uddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics
116
(Dhammasangani) , tr. Mrs . Rhys D avids, Oriental
Translation Fund, New Series, XII, London, 1 923
Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammatthasangaha), tr.
S.Z. Aung, revised and ed. by Mrs. Rbys Davids, PTS, 1 9 1 0
Dialogues of the Buddha (Dighanikaya), I-Ill, tr. T.W. Rhys
Davids, SBB, II-IV, London, 1 899- 1 9 1 2
Middle Length Sayings (Majjhimanikliya) Ill, tr. I . B .
Homer, PTS, 1 954
Milinda's Questions (Milindapaiiha), I, tr. I.B. Homer, SBB,
1 964- 1 969
Points of Controversy (Kathavatthu), tr. S .Z. Aung, Mrs
Rhys Davids, PTS, 1 9 1 5
Tattvasamgraha I, tr. Ganganatha Jha, Motilal Banarsidas,
The Book of the Discipline ( Vinayapi(aka) V (Cullavagga),
SBB, tr. I.B. Homer, 1 952
--
The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttaranikaya), I,
tr.F.L. Woodward, PTS, 1 95 1
The Expositor (Atthasalini), 1-11, tr. P. Tin, ed. and revised
by Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS, 1 920- 1 921
The Guide (Nettippakara1}a), tr. Bhikkhu Na1}amoli, PTS,
1 962
The Path of Discrimination (Pa(isambhidamagga) , tr.
Bhikkhu Na1}amoli, PTS, 1 982
The Path of Purification ( Visuddhimagga), tr. Bhikkhu
-
Na1}amoli, Colombo, 1 964
Verses of Uplift ( Udana), tr. F.L. Woodward, London, 1 948
Woven Cadences of Early Buddhists (Suttanipata), tr. E.M.
Hare, SBB, London, 1 947
117

Secondary Sources
Adikaram, E.W. , Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon,
Colombo, 1 953
Balingay, A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, India,
1 976
Bhattacharya B . , A Study in Language and Meaning,
Calcutta, 1 962
Bode, M.H., The Pali Literature of Burma, Rangoon, 1965
Buddhadatta, AP., Pali Sahityaya, 11, Colombo, 1 957
Fromkin, Victoria and Robert Rodman, An Introduction to
Language, U.S.A, 1 978
Jaini, P.S., The Vaibha�ika Theory of Words and Meanings,
BSOAS, vol. XXII, 1 959 (pp.95- 108)
Jayatilleke, KN., Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
AlIen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1 963
Jayatilleke, KN., The Message of the Buddha, ed. Ninian
Smart, London, 1 975 •
. Kalupahana, D . J . , Buddhist Philosophy, A Hi storical
Analysis, Hawaii, 1 976
. Kalupahana, D .J., Causality : The Central Philosophy of
Buddhism, Honolulu, 1933
Kalupahana, D . J . , A History of Buddhist Philosophy­
Continuties and Discontinuties, Motilal Banarsidass, India,
1 994
Karunadasa, Y. , Abhidhamma Theory of Pannatti, Buddhist
Philosohy and Culture, Es says in Honour of N .A.
Jayawikrema, Colombo, 1 987
Karunadasa, Y., Buddhist Analysis of Matter, Colombo, 1967
118
Karunadasa, Y. , The Buddhist Theory of Double Truth,
JHSSUK, vol.III and IV, 1 984- 1 985 (pp.25-55)
Karunadas, Y. , The Theravada Version of Dharmavada,
Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist
Comprehensive Research Institute, vol. 5, 1 987
Malalasekara, G.P., The Pali Literature of Ceylon, Colombo.
1958
Norman, KR., Pali Literature, Wiesbaden; Harrassowitz
(History of Indian Literature, vol.7), 1988
Nyanatiloka, Guide Through the Abhidhammapitaka,
Colombo, 1 938
�
Nanananda, Bhikkhu, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist
Throught, Kandy, 1 976
Paul, Diana, Paramartha's theory of Language., HP. VII
(pp.23 1 -255)
Pali English Dictionary, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and William
-
Stede, PTS, 1 972
Warder, AK, The Concept of a Concept, HP yoU, 1 970-
1 972
119
 Appendix 1.
•

cakkhu-eye
The various divisions of namapaiiiiatti and •

11.
•

sota-ear
atth-flpaiiiiatti are given below as they are inumerated in the •

111.
•

ghana-nose
•

Puggaiapaiiiiatti and the Pali abhidhammic commentarial IV.

•

jivha-tongue
literature. v. kaya-body
The Khandhapaiiiiatti is divided into five as (the five VI. manodhatu-mind-element
•

groups of existence) : V11. riipa-visible object

• •

i. riipa-corporeality V111 sadda-sound

• • •

• ii. . vedana-feeling IX. gandha-odour

•

sanna-perceptlOn
• • • N N _ •

ill . x. rasa-taste
IV. sankhara-mental formations
•

Xl. pho{thabba-tangible object

•

v. Vlnnana-ConSClOusness
• """ I"oJ _ •

X11 dhammadhatu-mind-object-element
• •

• •

The ayatanapaiiiiatti is divided into twelve as (the twelve X111. cakkhuviiiiiaIJa-eye-consciousness

• • •

bases) : . XIV. sotaVlnnana-ear-conSClousness

•
. '''''' I''00I _ •

i. cakkhu-eye XV. ghanaviiiiiaIJa-nose- consciousness

11. sota-ear
• •

xvi. jivhaviiiiiaIJa-tongue-consciousness
ghana-nose
• • •

111 . xvii. kayaviiiiiaIJa-body -consciousness

IV. jivha-tongue
•

•
xviii. manoviiiiiana-mind-consciousness-element •

v. kaya-body The saccapaiiiiatti is divided into four as (the four noble

VI. mana-mind-base
•

truths) :
V11. riipa-visible object
• •

1. dukkhasacca-the
•

truth about
. V111. sadda-sound
• • •

unsatisfactoriness
IX. gandha-smell
•

ii. dukkhasamudayasacca-the truth about the

X. rasa-taste origin of un satisfactoriness
Xl. phol{habba-tangible obj ect (three
•

111. dukkhanirodhasacca-the truth about the

• • •

, .

elements:solidity, heat, motion) extinction of unsatisfactoriness

xii. dhamma-mind-object •

IV. . dukkhanirodhagaminipatipadasacca-the
The dhatupaiiiiatti is divided into eighteen as (the eighteen truth about the path leading to the overcoming
elements): of un satisfactoriness

120 1 21
The indriyapaiiiiatti is divided into twenty-two as (the understood'
twenty-two faculties): (5) the six divisions of paiiiiatti
.
(1) the six organs vlJJamanapannattl-a nammg of something
· . . . - ".. """ .

1.

i. cakkhu-eye that exists

sota ear avijjamiinapaiiiiatti-a naming of something
• • • •

11, -
11.

ghiina-nose that does not exist .

• • •

111.

jivhii,.tongue vijjamiinena avijjamiinapaiiiiatti-a naming of

• • • •

IV. 111.

V. kiiya-body something that does not exist by something

mana mind that does exist
•

VI. -

vii. itthi-femininity avijjamiinena vijjamiinapaiiiiatti-a naming of

•

IV.

p urisa-virility something that exists by something else that

• • •

V111.

ix. jivita-vitality does not exist

(2) the five kinds of feelings v. vijjamiinena avijjamiinapaiiiiatti-a naming of
x. sukha-bodily ease something that does not exist by something
xi. dukkha-bodily pain that exists
. .
xii. somanassa-glad-mindedness aVlJJamanena aVlJJamanapannattl-a nammg
. . . - . . . - ,..... "' .

VI.

xiii. domanassa-sad-mindedness of something that does not exist by something

xiv. upekhii-indifference •
that also does not exist
(3) the five ethical faculties Further the commentary defines these terms and gives
xv. saddhii-faith examples for them as follows:
Vlrlya energy i. Vijjamiinapaiiiiatti-This represents something
• • •

XVI. -

.
satl-attentIveness which exists in a real and absolute sense
. • •

XVll.

samiidhi-concentration (saccikatthaparamatthavasena) . R iipa,

• • •

XV111.

xix; paiiiiii-wisdom vedanii etc. are the real concepts that are
(4) the three supra-mundane faculties existing. These terms are the names given to
xx. aiiiiiitam iiassiimitindriya-the thought 'I shall the concepts which have been conceptualized
come to know the yet unknown' depending on the real existents such as
xxi. aiiiiii-the perfect wisdom or 'Gnosis' matter(riipa) sensation (vedanii) etc.
,

..
xxii. aiiiiiitiivindriya-the faculty of 'one who has 11. Avijjamiinapaiiiiatti- This represents

1 22 123
 something which does not exist in a real and
absolute sense. Itthi-woman, purisa-person
etc. do not exist as real elements. They are
mental imaginations established by means of
. linguistic terms in common parlance. This also
. .
includes the concepts of primordial essence
(pakati), the fifth truth (paiicamasacca) etc.
which are postulated as realities by the non­
Buddhists.
,
The other four types of paiiiiattis are formed by mixing the
first two in different ways. Therefore, a few examples will
clarify the matter.
iii. Tevijjo-pos sesor of the three higher
knowledges.
Chalabhiiiiio-possesor of the six supernormal
knowledges.
In these examples the knowledges are real but the poseesor
is not real. According to the Abh�dhamma there is no real
existent called 'person' within or without the real elements.
iv. Itthiriipa-the form of the female.
Purisariipa-the form of the male.
Here the form is the real element and male and female are
not real as they represent the unreal concept of person.
v. Cakkhusamphassa-eye-contact.
Sotasamphassa-t;ar-contact.
Here the eye, the ear and the contact are recognized as real
existents in the Abhidhamma.
Khattiyaputta-warrior's son .
•
VI.
BrahmaQaputta-brahmin's son.
124
Here all the terms refer to the unreal concept of person.
Therefore they are not real existents.
The commentator again · presents a further six types of
paiiiiattis which he describes as not belonging to the
,
commentaries but as belonging to the method of the teachers
(acariyanaya). They are as follows:
i. upadapaiiiiatti-derivative concept.
Though these 'derivative concepts' do not
exist really they have been derived from the
appearances of the real existents. The concept
satta- 'being' is derived or is established
depending on the five aggregates such as
riipa-matter, vedana-feeling. Established
likewise are ratha-chariot, geha-house etc .
depending on the assemblance of the various
parts, kala-time, disa-direction etc. depending
on the revolution of the sun and the moon.
Upada means 'by means of, 'depending on' ,
'on the basis of etc. As these concepts are
established depending on something, they are
called upadapaiiiiatti.
..
11. upanidhapaiiiiatti-appositional concept.
These concepts are established depending on
,
mutual reference. One concept ari ses in
contrast with the other. For example 'second'
in contrast with 'first' 'third' in contrast with
'second' , 'long in constrast with ' short' etc.
As these concepts arise in mutual dependence
they are called upanidhapaiiiiatti.
125
 samodhanapaiiiiatti-collective concept.
• • •

111. strong or big one etc. are establi shed

These concepts have been established with according to the form or figure of something .
particular reference to collection or relative
• • •

111. liligapaiiiiatti-sign -concept.

situation of things . ego atlhapada-eight- The concepts like itthi-the woman, purisa­
footed, dhaiiiiarasi-heap of corn etc. the man, are established according to the
upanikkhittapaiiiiatti-additive concept.
•

IV. specific sign or a mark.

.
These concepts arise by the addition of a
•

IV. bhiimipaiiiiatti-Iocative concept.

number of a preceeding number. ego one, two,
three, four, etc.
v. tajjapaiiiiatti-appropriate concept.
These concepts correspond to the real
existents. They represent the intrinsic nature
of the realities. pa!havi-earth, tejo-heat, etc.
have been established depending on the nature
of the real existents.
They are established according to the location
they belong to, ego kamavacara-of the sensual
sphere, riipavacara-of the material sphere,
kosalaka-belonging to Kosala etc.
v. paccattapannatti-concept as individual name.
Tissa, Naga, Sumana etc. become concepts
by mere act of naming .
•

VI. asankhatapaiiiiatti-concept of unconditioned.

vi. santatipiiiiatti-concept of continuity. . Nirodha-extinction ( o f defi l e ment s ) ,
The concept of the identity of a thing on the Nibbana-deli verance etc . are considered
grounds of its c.ontinuity ; e . g . asitika­ as unconditioned states in B uddhi s t
octogenarian, navutika-nonagenarian. philosophy. The names and concepts relating
Once again the commentator presents another set of six types · to these unconditioned states are called
of paiiiiattis according to the method of the teachers as asankhatapaiiiiatti.
mentioned above. They are as follows:
i. kiccapaiiiiatti-functional concepts.
The concepts . such as atthabha1)aka­
expounder of meaning and dhammabha1)aka-
,

expounder of the Norm, are established

according to the functions they do.
ii. sa1)!hanapaiinatti-figure-concept.
The concepts such as kiso-the lean, thiilo-the

126 127
 Index Anamika- 33
A Anantarapaccaya- 69
Abhidhamma- 1 2, 1 3 , 14, 1 5 , 1 6, 1 7 , 1 9,2 0,2 5,- Anariya- 1 8
26, 29, 35, 36, 3 8,3 9,4 0,4 2,4 3, Anatta- 88
49, 50, 5 1 ,52 ,55 ,56 ,58 ,59 ,60 , Anguttaranikaya- 80
69, 70, 7 1 ,72 ,74 ,75 ,80 ,84 ,86 , Anicca- 88
87,90,92 ,93,94,95 , 1 06, 1 07 Anupubbikadhammadesana- 8
Abhidharmakosa- 100 Apo- 92
Abhidhammapitaka- 14, 1 8,3 0,40 Apoha- 1 07, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 1
Abhidhammatthasangaha- 35 Apohasiddhi- 100
Abhidhammavatara- 35, 1 04 Araha- 1 8
Abhidhammikas- 20, 26, 96, 103 Arahatta- 89
Abhidhana- 53 ,86 Aramma1}avijjanana- 20
Abhidharmadipa- 1 00 Ara1}avibhangasutta- 5
Abhidharmamrta- 1 03 Ariya- 17, 1 8
Abhidharmasamuccaya- 100 Ariyamaggo- 36
Abhilapo- 30 Arupa- 89
Abhinivesa- 7 Asekha- 1 8
A cariyanaya- 27 Atta- 4,34,35, 36
Adhigama- 40,4 1 Attapatilabha.. 4
Adhivacana- 1 ,5 1 Attha- 36,37,3 8,42,43,52, 6 1 ,65,76,83,85,88,89
-

Agama- 41 Atthakatha- 1 4,27,72

• •

Agni- 102 Atthapatisllmbhida- 9,34

Akarakabhava- 24 Atthapaiiiiatti- 50,5 1 ,52,53,55,56,57,59,
Akkharas- 7 1 ,86,87,88 60, 6 1 ,63,64,65,70,7 1 ,72,
Akkharavali- 58,7 1 73,75,76,84,85,96, 1 1 0
Aksara- 104
• Atthas ll)ti- 12,30,40,49,5 1 ,55
Akusalani- 36 Avijjamilna- 73,74,75
Anagami- 89 Avijjamanapaiiiiatti- 57,6 1 ,62,73,74,76

128 129
 Ayatana- 1 3 ,73,89, 1 06
Cha{abhiiiiio- 1 8
Ayatanapaiiiiatti- 1 2 , 1 7
Cakkhusamphassa- 73
Cakkhuviiiiilina- 73
B
•

-
Cintanamattam- 22
Cintetiti- 2 1
Bhaddiya- 3
Citta- 4,20,2 1 ,22,23 ,25,39,7 1 ,84, 1 03
Bauddha- 1 08
Cittavithi- 57
Blihusacca- 4 1
Cittupplida- 1 4
Bhiimi- 73,75
Cunda- 3
Bhli1)akas-· 27
Bhlifiya- 1 00
D
Bhliradvlija- 3
Dhdk- 1 02
•

Bhlisita- 36,37,38
Danta- 93
Bhlivanli- 40
Dassana- 27,54,67,76
Bhlivattha- 55 Desabhlisli- 4 1 ,42
Bhlivaslidhana- 22,23 ,24 Deverlija- 89
Bhanga- 69 Dhliropa- 6
Bhagavat- 1 06
Dhlitu- 1 3,73,89, 1 06
Bhikfius- 1 06 Dhlitukathli- 1 4
Brlihma1)aputta- 74 Dhlitupaiiiiatti- 1 7
Brahman- 1 0 1 Dhammli- 34
Brahmanical- 8 Dhammlinusliri- 1 8
Buddhi- 1 05
Dhamma- 1 ,3, 1 9,20, 2 1 ,22,23,24,25,26,
27,29,30,35,36,37,38,42,43 ,
C ,

49,52,53,54,55 ,56,57,59,6 1 ,
Caitasikas- 1 03
63,64,66,67,70,7 1 ,72,74,75,
Cakkhu- 25
76,80,82,83,85,88,89,95 , 1 07,
Catupatisambhidli- 34 ,38 ,82
•
•

111
Cetasika- 1 9,2 1 ,22,39,7 1 ,93
Dhammanidassanam- 27

130 131
Dhammaparisambhida- 9,34 J
Dhammasanga1)i- 1 3 , 14,30,49,5 1 ,54,60 Javana- 58,95
Dharmas- 103, 104, 1 05 , 1 06 Jananabhava- 32
Dhassana- 27 Jinavacana- 80
Dhvanyaloka- 101 Jivhamajjha- 94
Dukkha- 29,88 . Jivhagga- 94
Dyotita- 1 05 Jivhopagga- 94
Jivitindriya- 6 1
E
-
Jivha- 25
Ekadhamma- 56 Jnana- 104

G K
Gandha- 25,92 Kantha- 93
• •

Garusannissaya- 4 1 Kaccayana- 7 1 , 8 1 , 82
Geha- 57,75 Kakkhalalakkhana- 85
• •

Ghana- 25 Kakkhalatta- 20
Ghara- 58,85,88 Kala- 75,88
Gharapara- 8 1 Kalavimutta- 33
•

Gono- 58
• Kammas- 30,36,94
Kammasadhana- 52,55
H Kappina- 3
Hetubutena- 23 Karana- 88•

Hetu- 36 Karanatthana- 94
• •• •

Hetuphala- 39 Karanabhutena- 2 1 ,23

•

Karanasadhana- 2 1 ,23,55 .
•

I
-
Karma- 93
Indriya-pannatti- 13, 1 7 Karuna- 60 ·
•

Indriya- 1 3 Kathavatthu- 13, 14,34,70

Itthi- 57,73 Kattuniddesa- 24

132 133
Kattusadhana- 2 1 ,22,23 ,52,55 Manussa- 87
Kavyadarsa- 10 1 Magadhi- 40,42
Kaya- 25, 106 Mittasampatti- 4 1
.
Mimamsa- 1 0 1 , 1 02, 1 03
'"

Kayassainiijana- 62
Kayaviiiiiatti- 22, 59 Moggaliputtatissa- 1 3
Khandha- 1 3,33,89 Muddha- 93
Khandha paiiiiatti- 1 2, 1 7,27 Mudita- 60
Khattiyaputta- 74 MiUa(ika- 50,5 1
Khayavaya- 8 1
Kiriya- 36 N
Knotty- 40 Nandaka- 3
Kumarakassapa- 3 Nara- 84,87
Kusalam- 36 Nasika- 93
Namam- 30
L
-
Nama- 36,37,38,52,59,71 ,76,92,104
Lakkhana- 86
•
Namakaya- 1 03 , 1 04
Lingattha- 84,85 Namapaiiiiatti- 27,33 ,50,5 1 ,52,53,55,56,57,
Loka- 2
•
5 8,59,60,6 1 ,63 ,64,65,70,7 1 ,
72,73 ,74,75 ,76,84,86,95 ,96
M Namariipapariccheda- 35
Ma1}isaramaiijusa(ika- 24,59,70,7 1 Netti- 28,29
Maiica- 73 Nettippakara1}a- 42
Madhupi1}t/ikasutta- 8,30 Neyyattha- 7
Mahakaccayana- 3 Nibba1}a- 1 9,26,36,39,69,70,82,87,89
Mahakotthita- 3
• •
Niddesa- 24 .
Mahinda- 89 Nikaya- 58,61
Mana- 25 Nikkhepa- 14
Manodvara- 65,66,95 Nikkhipana- 27
Manodvaravithi- 58 Nippariyayadesana- 8 .

134 135
Nirutti- 1 ,2,30,34,36,37,38,39,40, 5 1 ,83 Paififa- 32,35,40,42,53 ,66,82
Mtattha- 7 Paififapetabbato- 50,63
Nyaya- 1 0 1 , 102 Paififapiyatta paififatti- 28,55,63,85
Nyayabindu- 10 1 Paififavimutta- 1 8
Paififattidhammas- 26
o Paifcakkhandha- 1 6 1
0uha- 93 Pabbata- 73,75
Oja- 92 Paccaya- 39
Opapatika- 72 Paccayasambhiitath- 36
Pada- 103 , 1 04
p
-
Padakaya- 103, 104
Pauhana- 1 4,1 5,26 Padasadhanatika- 7 1
•

Pa(a- 85,88 Pakasana- 27

Pa(havidhatu- 20, 6 1 ,85,88 Papaiica- 8
Pathavi- 72,92,93
• •
Papaifcasaiiifasankha- 8
Pa(ibhanapa(isambhida-. 9,34,37,40 Paramattha- 60,6 1 ,85,89
Pa(iccasamuppada- 39 Paramatthapaififatti- 56
Pa(ipadetabbadhamma- 22 Paramatthasacca- 64,86
•

Pa(ipatti- 82 Paricchinna- 27
Pa(isambhidamagga- 34,36,37,38,39, Paripuccha- 40,41
40,4 1 ,42,83 Pariyaya- 8,24,29
Pa(ivedha- 42 Pariyatti- 40,82
Paifiiatti- 1 ,2,8,9, 12, 1 3 , 1 6, 1 8, 1 9,25,26, Paryudasa- 102
27,29,30,3 1 ,32,33,34,35,36, Pasadariipa- 25
37,38,39,4 1 ,42,43 ,49,50,5 1 , Patta- 6
52,53,54,55 ,56,57,58,59,60, Payatana- 88
62,63,64,65 ,66,68,69,70,72, Panini- 1 0 1
•

73,76,80,83,84,85,86,87,88, Pa/i- 1 ,25,27,7 1 , 80,8 1 ,82,83,84,86,87

89,90,92,95,96, 100, 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 1 Pati- 6

136 137
Phasso- 24,94 Sabbatthivada- 14
Photthabba- 25 Sabyaiijanam- 3,44
Phusanamattam- 24 Sacca- 1 3
Phusatiti- 24 . Saccapaiiiiatti- 1 3 , 1 7
Pisila- 6 Saccikattha-paramattha- 1 3
Pona- 6
•
Sadda- 25,65,7 1 ,95, 107
Prasajjaka- 102
. Saddhanusari- 1 8
PU1)1)amantlmiputta- 3 Saddhavimutta- 1 8
Pubbayoga- 4 1 Saddhammapajjotika- 42
Puggala- 13, 14,57, 6 1 Sahassakkha- 89
Puggalapaiiiiatti- 1 2, 1 3, 14, 1 6, 17, 1 9,26 Sakata- 57
•

Puggalavada- · 1 4 Sakadagami- 89
Purindada- 89 Sakka- 89
Purisa- 57,73,75,84 Sakayanirutti- 7
Puthujjana- 1 6, 1 8,66 Samadhi- 82
Samaiiiia- 1 ,30,50
R Samanantarapaccaya- 69
Rasa- 25,92 •
Sammasambuddha- 16, 1 8
Ratha- 6 1 ,85 Sammuti- 1 ,8,9,56,60,6 1 , 85,88,
Rajaputta- 74 Sammutisacca- 60,62,63,64,86
Rupa- 14, 1 5 , 1 9,25,39,52,56,57,59,62,66,7 1 ,73,88,89, 103 Sampayuttadhamma- 2 1 ,22
Rupadhamma- 2 1 Samukti- 106
Sankhepava1)1)ana- 53,58,64,65
s
-
Sarava- 6
Saiiiia- 15,30,32,57,66,72,73,88 Satta- 6 1 ,82
Sankappa- 28 Sattapaiiiiatti- 60
Sankha- 1 ,50 Sautrantikas- 104,106
Sankhara- 72,73,86,88 Savana- 40
Sankhitta Dhammadesana- 7 Samaiiiia- 2

138 139
Sadhana- 20,21 ,22,24,55
Samukkhamsika Dhammadesana- 8
Satlham- 3,43,44
Sila- 82
Theravada- 1 3,35,59,76,80,93 ,
96, 100, 1 06, 1 07, 1 1 1
Theravada Abhidhamma- 1 ,2,12,20
. Thana- 88
•

Sekha- 1 8 Thapana- 27
Skandha- 106 •
Thiti- 69
Sonakutikanna- 3
• • • • •
Tikas- 58
Sotapatti- 89 !l
Sotasamphassa- 73 Udaharana- 8 1 •

Sotadvaravithi- 58 Upadapaiiiiatti- 52,53,84,85

Sotaviiiiiana- 65
•
Uppada- 5 1 ,69
Spho{a- 1 03
Sujampati- 89 V
Sukhumariipa- 25 Vanna- 86,9 1 ,92,95
• •

Suti- 88 Vaciviiiiiatti- 22,59, 107

Sutta-80, 8 1 ,82 Vacaniya- 85
Suttantika- 14 Vacana- 96
�antaraksita- 107
•
Vaibhasikas- 1 03, 104
• •

�rama1)yaphala- 106 Vajiravudha- 89

Vajirap(1)i- 89
T
-
Vaya- 5 1
Tajjapaiiiiatti- 85 Viicaka- 53,86
Takka- 28 Viitsiputriyas- 1 3
Tattvasamgraha- 100, 107 Viiyo- 92,93
Tlilu- 93 Viiyodhatu- 20
Tejo- 92 Veda- 1 00
Tevijja- 1 8,73 Vedana- 1 5,56,57,66,72,88
Thambhitatta- 20 Viiiiiana- 32,72,73,88
•

Thathagata- 4, 106 Vibha�aprabhavrtti- 1 00

140 141
Vibhavini- 63,65,70,7 1
Vibhavinitika- 2 1 ,22,23 ,24,58,63
Vibhaiiga- 1 3 , 14
Vicara- 23
Vicaratiti- 23
Vijjamana- 74,75
Vijjamanapaiiiiatti- 57,6 1 ,73,74
Vikara- 59,86
Vikasinitika- 23,24,58,63
Vinaya- 80,82
Vipako- 36
Viprayuktasamskara- 107
Visayavijjananam- 23
Visuddhimagga-22,36,37,40,4 1
Vittharadhammadesana- 7
Vitakka- 28
Vittha- 6
Vohara- 1 ,2,32,50,85
Vutti- 8 1
Vyakaral}a- 1 0 1
Vyaiijanam- 30
Vyaiijanakaya- 103 , 1 04

y
Yaiiiiadatta- 57
Yama- 8 1
Yamaka- 1 3 , 1 4

142