The Concept of The Individual in Bertrand Russell's Educational Thought PDF

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HE.CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN BERJRAND RUSSELL'S
EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT
by
HOWARD ROBERT WOODHOUSE
Department of Educational Theory

* " ^ *>
A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirement's

fo r the Degree of Doctor of.Philosophy in the
• University of Toronto,
Howard Robert Woodhouse 1980
j * > • • .
f Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UNIVERSITY OF.TORONTO
SCHOOL OF .GRADUATE'STUDIES , ,
• *’ * 'y ♦ •
PROGRAM OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION'
FOR THE DEGREE OF-DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.
OF
ppHousi
HOWARD ROBERT WOODHOUSE
10:00 a.m.', Friday, September 26, 1980
Room 201, 65 St. George Street' ," . *

V‘ , '‘
, * ' ' • V ' '
THE CONCEPT OF THE-INDIVIDUAL ..
IN BERTRAND RUSSELL*S. EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT
t
Committee ip Charge:
-k
Professor S.D. Qlyan, Chairman

Professor,C. Beck, Ipternal* Appraiser
Professor L. Greenspan, External Examiner
Professor H. Johnson •
Professor M. Levin
Professor C. Macpherson
Professor A. Rosenberg, , . . 4 *
Professor I. Winchester,- Supervisor' .
Mr. Howard Woodhouse
- Biography
1947 Born,'Pinner, England
1968 B.A..,,University of Exeter
1971 M.A., McMaster University

}
1971-Present Doctoral Studies, University of

, ” Toronto
i
Mr..Hovard Woodho
Graduate gtudiea v
r
Major: Philosophy of Education
J
Philosophical Theories or Methodology and Education
in History and the Social Sclent Professor J'.A. Eisenberg
Practice of. Philosophical Inquiry Professor JTA.,Eiseaherg
Philosophy of Mind in Education Professor E.C. Olsen
The Problem of. a Philosophical Anthropology ind
its Implications for Education Professor A. Wellmer
First Minor: Philosophy s.
Topice of Marxist Philosophy Professor F. Cunningham

Philosophy of History \ Professor T.D. Langan
Second Min^r: Phllosoph^
Credit granted on the basis of MyA.,"McMa^ter

University * »'■
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‘ • ABSTRACT' ' - - •
' .*• • *
'This thesis i s ’concerned w ith.the concept of the individual in
Bertrand Russell's educational philosophy. “I argue that thre concept
undergoes profound, changes which a.ffect his account of-the aims of

“; ' " ' *
* > •*
education. In. particu lar,- they a ffe c t his views concerning the funda
mer>tal dilemma o f ‘whethfeXpducatijjn .'should enhance individual develop
mentôr train useful citizens-. Russel-1 shifts around ^from th e f i rs t
to the second horn-of"this'.'dilemma. \ -V .
'\
In Chapter’One I argue'that Russell's educational theory |is an'
Integral part o f .his general philosophy. In Chapter Two I show- that
th,e-standard.interpretation of Russell's concept of the'individual in
his educational philosophy'regards i t as a uniform-concept undergoing
no radical change. *
j - .
In Chapter Three I an,alyse-the f i r s t 'organic:' concept of the
••
rndividualr prominent in Principles of Social Reconstruction. The
individual is an organic being endowed with an innate principle of
growth from which spring'.his v ita l instincts and impulses-. -The task
of education is to develop, individual growth and stimulate those corir

" ' A
-C -
structive impulses which make fo r l i f e and interpersonal harmony. y
S ’ ' t
In Chapter-Four I analyse the second 'mechanical' concept of the
..individual found mainly in On Education: *The individual i.s a complex
machine whose reflexes and in stincts are quickly overlaid with habits.
\ •
The task of education is to develop the 'correct' set o f habi.ts even
ii
when they resu lt in repression o f the; individual's in stincts and
v. * '
.. feeHngs:.
4 ’ «
% * • * *
^ * *
1
• V < In Chapter Five 1^ analysethe third 'a s o c ia l1 -collcept of the in d iv i-
dual'present ;in Education and the Social Order. ' -The individual is" com
posed of in te lle c t, emotion a n d ,w ill. The individual w ill is s e lf- V
, subsistent and d ic ta to ria l.. The task of Education is to-transform i t

* ' i j ' * * 1
into the cooperative w ill of the c itiz e ii, thereby preventing i t from
dominating-others and producing social disharmony. This can only be

- ' ^
done by an educational system based on the power o f a world s ta te .*
^ In Chapter.Six, I conclude that the transitions in Russell‘s con-

*’ 1 , ^
cept of the individual .resu lt in a diminution of individual freedom and'
a stress upon citizenship within a repressive world state as.the primary

• » "• 1 .
aim of educa-tion. „
. I
-ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
. • ' \
This thesis is dedicated to my father and mother.
I wish tp thank my supervisor, Ian Winchester, fo r the invaluable
help, and encouragement th a t’ he has given me in the course of w r itin g *
this thesis. He has been generous-With b'oth hi_s time and energy. I
v
wish also to thank my second reader, Harold Johnson, for the meticulous
care with which he has examined e a rlie r drafts of the thesi.s. Thanks
are also due tp my th ird reader, Cliye Beck, fo r suggestions concerning
the thesis' structure.
There.are many others who have contributed in various ways to this
work. Of these I shall mention:
Kpn Blackwell, Archivist at theJjfyrtrand Russell Archives, McMaster
University; .
John Eisenberg for his acjvice and'wit; ^
ATbrecht Wellmer, who was my supervis^N-before he returned to
Germany; and ’ .
Marx tyartofsky fo r his illum inating comments on my* paper a t The
Bertrand Russell Society.
To al‘l my friends in Canada who have given me moral support I

(
extend thanks, e s p e c ia lly ^ Julie Sheper whose friendship JKcherish.
'* *
F in a lly , I wish to thanl^ Joanne Lemon, who managed to transcribe my
w riting into the printed word against te rr ib le odds.
IV *
[ABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRAcj ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv
I
TABLE Olf CONTENTS v
f
INTRODUCTION . ' ’ 1
I. The Concept o f the Individual ' • 1
II. Russell's Educational Writings 5•
- III. 'The Transitions in Russel-1 ’s Concefft of tn£—
’ Individual? [ 8
IV ,_ C-lassical and Contemporary Liberallism 11
V. Conclusion / . r I 16
CHAPTER ONE: THE RELATION OF RUSSELL'S EDUCATIONAL '

THEORY TO HIS PHILOSOPHY 17
CHAPTER 1^0: THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION OF RUSSELL'S

PDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY v 35
1 v
CHAPTER THREE: THE ORGANIC INDIVIDUAL 42
I. In stin ct " , ' '
A. Instincts 48
B. The Principle of Growth . c 53
C. Impulse ’ 56
i. / Russell's Critique o*f Desire - 56
ii. The .Development of Impulse 57
iii. Constructive and DesJtructive’ Impulses J. 61
iv . Creative and Possessive Impulses . ’ 67
v. The Characteristics of Impulse 70
II. Mind ~ ‘ 73
A. The"Critical Role,of Mind 74
B. S e lf-D iscip lin e I 76
l’ i.' S e lf-D iscip lin e At the Elementary Level 77
ii. S elf-D isci pi|he At the Higher Levels
of Education' ; 79
iii. Moral S e lf-D iscip lin e 83.
C. 5>elf-Discipline and 1?heRole of the W ill 84
'III. S p ir it • 92
A. Spiritual Understanding 93
i. Russell1s S p iritu al Experience ,/93
ii. The Unity of i n s i s t e n t Purpose $6
iii. Platonic ElemWts Within S piritual
Understanding " 101 .
B. The Principle of Reverence 106
i. Aspects of Reverence 106
ii. HeVerence and Authority m
• iii. Reverence and the Joy of Mental
1 Adventure 114
iv . Reverence, Love and Knowledge - HO
v. Reverence and the Release of the :
Principle of Growth 117
IV. A Re-evaluation of Growth and S p irit . j. 125

A. -A Comparison of the Concepts of Growth in the
Works of Whitehead, Dewey, andRussell -126
B. Two'PrOblems in Russell’ s Account of the
Principle of Growth 133
, C..’ ’ The Role, of S p irit - 137
. ' - o '
V.- "Conclusion c 141
* ' *
CHAPTER FOUR: THE MECHANICAL INDIVIDUAL 145

I. * Reflex k 149
II. , In s tin c t ■' 152

A. The W ill to Power ’ r 152
,B! . The^Sources.of Satisfaction for the W ill-to
Power 158
C. -Constructive and Destructive A c tiv ity 161
D. D efinition "’of In stin c t -. 165
III. Habit ‘ - 172

A. Habit and S elf-D iscip iin e in theF irs t Year
of Life 174
B. Habit-and Moral Education , 162
. C. MoraT Virtues: V it a lit y , Courage, Sensitiveness 187
v -D. In telle c tu a l Virtues: The S c ie n tific Attitude '
.and S elf-D iscip lin e • ' _ • . ;192
E. Knowledge: A D istinctive Featureof Russell's
Theory >. ■ ' . 197
F. D efinition o f Habit ' 202
IV. Repression in the.Mechanical Individual: A •

Description j. . 210
; A. Fear: Instinctive-and Learned' - - 212
jl B. In stin c tiv e Fear and Repressive Methods 217
. C. Learned Fear and Repressive Methods ' 224
VI
V .' Repression in. the Mechanical Individual: An
Explanation • • ' . * - 226
A. Freud's Theory of the Unconscioi^ , ' 231 •
B. Russell's Behaviorist Theory of the Unconscious '.235
C. Russell 's«Behaviorist Account o*f Repression* 244 .
D-. -C onflicting Views' of Fear: Russell and N eill 247
<
VI. Confl ic tin g Vi,ews'of Freedom: The Organic, and

Mechanical Individuals 253-
V II.. Conclusion ' . 26'2
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ASOCIAL INDIVIDUAL V 266

I. The Individual • ___^ . 2;9
A. - In te lle c t . ' .' ,
i.. Knowledge and Solipsism > 271
ii. Knowledge: Contemplative and ' _ '
Instrumental '4^ * . . 277
6. Emotion * ' ^
i. Emotion, In stin c t and Impulse 287
-' ' ii. Emotions and the Environment , 291
iii. Emotions and Bod-i.ly Responses ■. • 296
■■-* C. The-Will ‘ * 302
i. Internal Harmony and the Will , '. 303
ii. Th.e A c tiv itie s of the Will • 310'
*' i i i . D efinition o f the Will 319
. I I . . . The C itiz e n . - . 322

. A. The National Citizen • ’ '324
B.« Herd In stin c t ' 326
C. Nationalism . ., *
D. Nationalism and the Will " . 333 .
III. The.State ' - ; . 336

A. The Functions of the State: M ilita ry and. C ivil 339
B. The International Citizen , . 342
C .‘ The International Bureaucrat
IV. Science As Power in the World State - - 357

' A. The Administration of Science „ 358
B. The Hobbesian Nature o f the'World State v 364
V. The Asocial Individual Reconsidered 370

A. The Psychological Concept o f Power 370
' B. Power and Universal Love , 380
V I. Conclusion ; * 383
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 387
BIBLIOGRAPHY • v ii 402
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■I.
. INTRODUCTION \ ..
• ■*
I. The Concept'of the Individual . ■
In this thesis I shall.examine‘ the concept of the individual in
Bertrand Russell's educational philosophy. By focussing upon his notion
of the individual and the remarkable transitions which i t underwent, we
gain an insight into the dynamics of RusselJ's educational thought in the

8 f .
context both of his in te lle c tu a l. development and the history of his times.
' ‘ ’ In -
Upon re fle c tio n , th;is'should seem unsurprising.* Education is an
a c tiv ity which seeks to introduce each'individual to the knowledge, 'Cul-

k • ■ -
■ *. * - I
tural mores and h isto rical trad itio n upon which his society is based'.
In .order to become* a f u ll participant in 'th a t society,, the individual
person must'acquire the in tellectual- and moral virtues necessary to

2 ■. ■ ’
exert personal autonomy. This marks the tran s itio n from childhood to-
•A ■'
adulthood. The aim of education then is to develop in the individual
the capacity to comprehend and c riti,c a lly evaluate .the structure of know
ledge and the moral ju s tific a tio n of' the. p o litic a l order through the-
; .■ j
• exercise of Inis own reason.^ A t-least this is the hope of the lib e ra l- .
• trad itio n..to which- Russell belongs’’. * • . >
The crucial pbjnt is that the adoption o f a particu lar conception
'^Maxine Green: Teacher as Stranger, Wadsworth Publishing Co-.,

B elm ont,.California, 1973, p. 3.
2Ib id . , pp. 138, 273. -
O k <
- R.S. Peters: 'Freedom and the Development of the Free Man1 in
V "1
♦ Barnes F .‘ Doyle (e d .): Educational Judgements, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
,
London, 1973,
•
pp. 124-125. *
, V • *•
of the;■‘type of being tp be educated determines the aims and methods of
one's jeducational philosophy. Educational philosophy may a rtic u la te
various, options necessary'for'both the fu lle s t individual development and
. the acceptance'of responsibility as a member of the social order. But
the specific conception of the individual adopted w ill entail that a
d iffe re n t emphasis is placed upon other such concepts as ’a u th o rity 1,
'growth', 'h a b it ', 'knowledge', 's e lf-d is c ip lin e ', 'freedom', 'c itiz e n
ship' etc. I t is for this.reason that I have concentrated'upon the
individual as the key concept in Russell's philosophy o f education. It
is individuals and th e ir development wi.th which Russell, lik e other
thinkers, is concerned in his educational philosophy. The concept pro-
\ vi'des 3 , toe-hold from which.to gain a vantage poi^|. in the understanding

• -J ' -''I.-1
of -that philosophy.. ' . •
Russl^KtnmselAputs this in sim ilar terms when he w ritesi,of the

tS
three main conceptions of education and th e ir relatio n to the individual:

' *\ . .
V N .. . . ... ■ v
. Three .divergent theories of education a ll have th e ir .
advocates in the present day. Of these the f i r s t con
siders th a t'th e sole purpose of education is to provide
■ opportunities of growth ancf to remove hampering in
fluences. The second holds that the purpose o f education •
is to give culture to the individual and to develop his
• capacities to the utmost'. The th ird holds that education
\ is 't o be considered rather in relation to th e community
than in relatio n to the in divid ual, and th at its'business
is to tra in useful c itize n s ...N o actual education proceeds
wholly and completely on any one o f the.thjree theories.
A ll three in varying.proportions are found in every sys
tem that actually exists. I t is , I think, f a ir ly clear
that no one o f the three is adequate by i t s e l f , and that
r -. . ‘the choice of a rig h t system of education depends.in
great measure upon the adoption of a due proportion
between-the-three theories.4 .
'v i A
I —• o ^ . Education and the Social Order, George Allen and Unwin, London,
i \ J . 1932, p. 29.
I - • ' I • ■ ' \
Russell links the f i r s t 'negative theory of education' to.the lib e ra lis m 1.
of Rousseau and, his followers, acknowledging that i t contains an impor-

5
tant kernel, of tru th . However, he suggests th at i t is open to the-sam'e >
9 ^
Objections as thedoctrine of ’laisser fa ir e ' economics: namely th a t/
there is need of some form of orderedplanning throughthe intervention .

i . "
of the authority of the state (in economics) or the adult-teacher and
parent (in education).®
The second theory, which conceives of the aim o f education as the*
self-development of the in divid ual, 'is the lib e ra l view o f John Stuart
M ill, to which Russell is fa r more sympathetic. I shall examine the
relationship between M i l l ’s and Russell's liberalism throughout
this thesis. Here I shall simply point out that Russellre
gards this form of liberalism as inadequate for the twentieth century.
There is now a greater, need -fbr the state to place s t r ic t lim its on-,
individual freedom in both education and psychology because of the com
p lexity and the potential for self-destruction in mass society.^
' ■* ‘
This leads Russell to consider a synthesis between the second and '
th ird theories of'education, the la tte r which conceives of the aim of
education as the production of-good, pbedient c itize n s . While Russell
• 5Ib id ., .pp. 29 - 30 and 44. ; . •
6 Ibid.., 30-32. ■ ,
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Ib id ., p. 243. , ;• W \ A.
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A‘ ■
. r
was well aware of the dangers-6f this view to-the self-development of
the in dividual, he came to believe that i t was necessary in r e la tio n ‘to
the needs of'post F irs t World War society. These demanded the s ta b i-
’ 8 '
lisi'ng influence of a world state.
i
.. The three theories represents development in Bussell's educational
-thinking, about the relationship of the 'individual to society and the
‘s ta te . The development moves f ’rom'the concept of the individual as a
free , organic, self-developing being surrounded by'socfal in stitu tio n s

■ ' • • • • * *
that enhance growthto one as an; asocial, power-seeking being with social
' - •■ •. v
in stitu tio n s that place lim its on these, tendencies. The task of this
thesis is to trace this development in d etail and c r itic is e i t ,
I might add th at I am using the term 'in d iv id u a l1 in the same way

' ' ’ \ _ •
as Russell does. He uses i t interchangeably with the terms ’ human being'
ând .'person' to denote the human individual . While he uses 'individual '
most commonly., he is not p a rtic u la rly concerned with defining i t in any
precise manner. Be does, however, contrast i t with two*other terms: .

*
ttje 'c itiz e n ' and 'the herd'. By the c itiz e n he means the social being
« • g
who co-operates in intention i f not in fact with other c itize n s . By
the herd, he means the mass of humanity that comprises the human race'
and who-manifest a certain uniformity, of behaviour (the 'herd in s tin c t')
8Ib id . , pp. 27-28.
^ Ib id ., *pp. 12-13'.
when organised into c o lle c tiv e , p o litic a l w holes.^ The individual',
then, stands in opposition to both of. these as a presdcial being, capable
of developing in a unique manner and resisting the c o llective lunacy of
the modern world through the exercise o f the s c ie n tific outlook, a broad
culture and strong, unthwarted passions.
«
II. Russell's Educational Writings 1'
k
The. period with which I am' obncerned is from about 1916, the publi-
ca.tion date o f Russell’s Principles of Social Reconstruction, until 1932

... * '
when he published Education and the Social Order, the la s t of his works
> ’ ,
concerned solely with education'.' .The period includes his On Education
(1926), in which he describes many of the methods used in the early edu
cation of his own children, John and Kate. I t also includes his involve-
ment with Beacon H illJJchool, a jo in t endeavour with Dora, his second

?•
-i w ife. I t is , then, both a b rie f,p erio d in the fu ll span o f Russell's '
10 '■ * ""X
Ib id ., pp. 88-89. In Human Society in Ethics and Politics-,
Simon and Schuster, New York, 1952, p. 156. Russell Writes:
"P o litics is concerned with herds rather than individuals,
and the passions which are important in pol-itics are, there- •
fore, those in which the various^members of a given herd can
feel a lik e . The broad in stin ctive mechanism upon which
p o litic a l edifices have to be b u ilt is one of co-operation
within the herd and h o s tility toward other herds. The. co-
‘ operation within the herd is never perfect. There are mem
bers who do not conform, who are, in the etymological sense
'egregri.ous ', that is to say, outside the flo ck. These mem
bers are those*who' have fa lle n below, or-risen above,, the
ordinary le v e l. They are: id io ts , crim inals, prophets, and ’
discoverers. A wise herd w ill learn, to to le ra te the eccen
t r ic it y of those who rise above the average, and to tre a t
\ with a minimum of fero city those who f a l l below i t . "
* \ . • ' ’ •. '
professional life*an d an intense one in which he thought.and wrote'a
- , ( great deal about the'problems of education. I s h a ll, i t is true, refer
to ;works both before and a fte r this period in order to shed lig h t upon
themain ideas under consideration. .

* '
I shall b'e concerned with three main'conceptions of-the individual
that emerge from an analysis of Russell's..educational philosophy. I have'
called thase^'The Organic Individual *, 'The Mechanical In d iv id u a l1 ajid
'The Asocial Individual' respectively-and devoted a chapter.toêach one.
•; Each conception is associated prim arily, though not exclusively, wi(th one
' t ; " & , k. ’ • -
"book in' Russell's educational■philosophy. Thus Russel 1 articulates an '
organic conception of the^ individual', in Principles of Social Recpnstruc-.
tion. (1916) and other, works w.ritten during and, soon a fte r the ’F irs t World
War. Having accepted the methodology of behaviourisTn as the s c ie n tific

'• . ' r ■■ . •
approach to the analysis of c h ild -rea rin g , Russell articulates. a'mbchani-.
cal conception of the individual in On Education (1926), in which' he. • -
. . -draws upon his own philosophical-psychology, as .laid out in The Analysis
of Mind (1921). Oncehe adopts the view that .the in divid u al's d icta-' ^
tp ria l w ill' is the source of power, the love of which in.hurrfan be'irftis is
boundless, Russell articulates an asocial conception of-the individual

’ 1 / * . , . • ’ 4 “
1 i • _ , . ' '
. , '-in Education and the Social Order (19,32). This conception beans a close
resemblance to that given in Power (1 9 3 8 ),;w ritten .'several years la te r .

- . - . . . .
* While I sha‘11, make. abundant reference to other works by Russell, :my focus
is ‘prim arily ojri the three books mentioned for three main reasons:
'■
* * ' . ‘ ‘ Russell id e a lly wishes edtâtibri .io'pro'duce arr eccentric, ?aibove average*
.‘ / •••*/.; s e lf - id ^ e 1 d p e .d ,in ( l lW T h e .a b t ic l d 'P b ljtic e lly .Important DeVires'
\ . 'l from which th is ' is, taken'was o rig in a lly Russell’s Nobel Prfze-.A^ceptance
'• Speech in - 195.0. " „ ‘ T ■-'-■■■> :.'v . ■
‘ ."'- -.V o . - ‘
1.. \ A's serious'works >in educational philosophy they contain what I
’ ■ ■• •*. . . . . . ' ■ n
consider to be Russell’s major statements in this area. Russell gives
„the -fullest cqnsideration in them of the type of individual that he ,
wishes education to develop. ' This<is'not tojdeny that many of the" v
.a rtic le s he wrote on-education contain interesting insights but that
'they-are less .important works in the overall context of his educational

. ' - ' * . '
philosophy. A fter a l l , are we to believe that.R ussell's a r tic le 'Are
L 12
Parents Bad for Children?' is 'O f the same .stature as Education and the-
Social Or.der? 'This raises a fundamental question concerning the nature
of Russell's educattona.1 writings which I shall consider in the f i r s t

* :• * ■
chapter of this thesis. That i s , “to what extent they can- be considered
philosophy. I shall argue that they can.

* v-
• ' ‘ V^Mary Warnock argues against any sharp distinction between edu
cational philosophy and educational .theory as follows:
There is a crucial area which must be the province

of both theory'and philosophy: both should concern
themselves-with questions about what should be
• ‘ 'taught, to whom and with what in mind. . . . I t i’s the
% theory behind these-questions, questions which have
• • ’ to be answered in one way or another, that I believe
to compose the philosophy of education.
Schools of Thought, Faber and Faber, London, 1977,
-pp. 9 and 14. - '
Jhusêven'if i t is denied that Russell engages.in educational philo
sophising in the same sense as Peters and Paul H irs t, we'could hardly
deny th a t he is engaged in educational theorising in the above sense.
Peters' rather d iffe re n t view of educational, philosophy is c le a rly
> > expressed in 'The Philosophy of Education' in. J.W. Tibbie ( ed.) : The
. . 1 -St’u4y of Education, Routledge and Keqan Paul, London, 1966, esp. p. 68.
' , 12 -
’* , Parent's Magazine, May 5, 1930, ppv 18-19.
t > .. . _. V, «. . . - , . ^ .
n -
-8
'■
2. The concept, of the individual that emerges from the three books fs
each d iffe re n t and indicates important transitions in Russell's educa
tional thinking^ f t is with the transitions in Russell's concept of the
individual sand th e ir implications upon the methods and aims of education
that I shall be concerned. \-
3. , The importance of B"eacon. H ill School to-R ussell's concept of the
individual can be gauged from the differences between the concept in

* %
On Education and th a t'in Education and the Social Order. The two books
span his involvement from .the school's opening in 1927 toJ«-s<[eavi ik
Dora in 1932. I shall not be d ire c tly concerned-with-anAnalysis of the
school but only with the lessons that Russell drew concerning both the
individual and education as a result of his experience with i t . . A
thorough consideration of Beacon H ill School is worthy of a th e s is in

\
. it s e lf .
' *
*
III. The Transitions in Russell’s. Concept of the Individual '■
i •
In b r ie f, Russell's concept of the individual in his educational
philosophy underwent the three following transitions:
1. The Organic In d ivid u al: In - Principles of- Social Reconstruction
Russell upholds a concept o f. the individual as an organic being endowed

,V ‘ & '
with a central, innate principle of growth, from which spring his v ita l
impulses. He describes the principle of growth as "an in stin ctive
urgency leading them [men and women] in a certain d ire c tio n ,'a s trees
13 ' -■-
seek the lig h t" . The' task of education, lik e that of a ll social in
s titu tio n s , is- to enhance and' develop individual growth and stimulate
constructive impulses which make for l i f e and interpersonal harmony.
2. The Mechanical In d ivid u al: .In On Education Russell tfdopts a be
haviourist concept of the individual (in this context, the child) in
which refTexes and instincts are quickly overlaid with habits. He con
siders the individual as basically a complex kind of machine. The'task .
of education is to-develop the correct set of habits, enabling the chilTJ

r - —
to pursue constructive a c tiv itie s without any sense of his instincts
being thwarted. •
«
3. The Asocial In d iv id u a l: In Education and the Social Order'Russell

1 ' * '
proposes a concept of the individual as possessing .in te lle c t, emotion
and w ill as fundamental elements. 'The in divid ual's w ill is basically
self-subsistent and aso cial. The task of education is twofold: to

A. • .. *
integrate each of the elements into an internal harmony, at the same
time producing an external harmony between his w ill and the w ills of
others as members of the community. ' ,
This b rie f encapsulation of the transitions in Russell's concept
of the individual underlines an important dilemma in his educational
philosophy. The dilemma is this: given the two main1, conflicting aims
o f education - the ediitation of the individual and the education, of the *
13
Principles of Social Reconstruction, George Allen and Unwin,
London, 1916, p. 24. ~
10
14 '----
citizen - how are they to be reconciled? Are we to educate fo r the
free development of individual ,capacities? Or are we to educate in d iv i-
duals so as to adapt to th e ir society and w illin g ly accept th e ir role .
as citizens? Russell's temperament seems always to favour the f i r s t o f" "

15
these a ltern atives. He prizes individual lib e rty , especially freedom
16
of thought, as a fundamental* good. - Yet he recognizes the dangers to
■e
s ta b ility which this freedom may pose in the modern world. The com
p lexity of modern society, in which a person's actions may have a direct
effec t on large numbers of people unkrlown to him and in which the uncon
tro lle d anarchy of international relations may resu lt i’n wars, which
to ta lly destroy human c iv ilis a tio n , suggest the need for a new emphasis
in education. A new educational philosophy (indeed a new social and
p o litic a l philosophy) is needed which maintains the truths'contained in
liberalism , a t the same time adapting and modifying them to the changed'
conditions of twentieth century s o c ie ty .^ The transitions in Russell's
14 ‘
This antithesis is stated most clearly in Education and the Social
Order, Chapters 1 and 15.
15
Boyd H. Bode: 'Russell's Educational Philosophy' in P.A. Schilpp
(e d .): The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Northwestern University
Press, Evanston, 1944, p. 632.
^ P o litic a l*Id e a ls , Unwin Books, London, 1963, Chapt. 5 (o rig in a lly
published by The Century Co., New York, 1917).
^ Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 9. Louis Greenspan des
cribes Russell's liberalism in th e .fo il owing terms: ■ -
Russell can be seen as a knigh.t errant of nineteenth\century
Whig liberalism , addressing the twentieth century. There is
nothing new or surprising in this view. What is required is
to show how this characterisation gives a certain unity and
^ sense to Russell's a c t iv it ie s .. . .The c o n f lic t .. .which.remains
' ‘ central to Russell's w ritin g s, is the c o n flic t between lib e rty
and s c ie n tific organisation. ‘ That both should enhance the —
other is central to the lib e ra l creed that he in herited , but
* in the twentieth century Russell witnessed the p o ss ib ility ,
that they would not complement each other.
s
<
11
concept of the individual chart*the course o f this, proposed revision pf
liberalism . They point to a gradual move away from an emphasis upon
education as a^means of enhancing individual freedom to education con-
ceived as a means of controlling individual behaviour. They .show.an
unmistakeable s h ift in emphasis in Russell's thought fr.om the f i r s t to
the second horn of the dilemma which he confronts. ; In order to under
stand this s i t is f i r s t necessary to situate Russell's place in
tl\e lib e ra l tra d itio n . .
IV. Classical and Contemporary Liberalism

« . *
When'writing of liberalism , i t is usual to distinguish between the
classical liberalism of John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart M ill and.
18 *
its contemporary forms as expressed by J.M. Keynes and others. The
former views society as composed o f individuals whose development can
best be promoted in a free market economy, based upon the exchange of
goods and commodities.. The worth of society is judged by the extent to
which i t allows persons to develop th e ir individual capacities. In
M ill's lib e ra lis m , the human essence is to exert and develop these
capacities: "The worth o f an individual is judged by the extent to

'1_
which he develops his human capacities: 'the e n d ...is the highest and
most harmonious development o f'h is powers to a complete and consistent

19 •■ -
whole'." Classical liberalism conceives of mankind as beings capable
Louis Greenspan: The Incompatible Prophecies: An Essay on Science and

Liberty in the P o litic a l Writings of Bertrand Russell. MosaicPress,
O akville, Ontario, 197£, p. 17. Greenspan is w riting s p e c ific a lly of
Russell's p o litic a l philosophy rather than his educational philosophy.
18Ib id ., pp. 27-28. '
IQ V %
C.B. MacpheV’Son: The Life and.Times of Liberal Democracy, Oxford
of developing th e ir individual capacities and o.f the state and society
t
as in stitu tio n s whose'aim is to promote individual development. '
Contemporary liberalism conceives of the.individual as a consumer
capable of choosing between various goods. These include the choosing

- < r?
20 '
of p o litic a l leaders a t election times. The role of society is to
*
maintain social welfare rather th^n promote individual development.-
This requires vast .increases in the power of the state to o ffs e t the
r *
power of .international corporations. State intervention in the economy,
is necessary both to maintain and regulate c a p ita lis t development.- /\±
the same-time, the welfare0state is expanded in order to maintain the
standards of services in health care, education, housing and unemploy
ment. This is the sense in which liberalism is used in contemporary •
society: ' ■
.1
In the'modern period the term 'lib e ra lis m ' has taken
on a very strange sense, i f you think of its history.
' Liberalism is now essentially the theory of State
capitalism , of State intervention in a -c a p ita lis t
economy. That has l i t t l e relation to classical
University Press, 1977, pp. 47-48. The quotation from M ill is from
On Liberty, Chapter 3 in Collected. Works, x v i i i , .p. 261, quoting
Humboldt. Russell e x p lic itly refers to Locke as an inspiration fo r his
revised lib e r a l, social and educational philosophy throughout his works:
See especially 'Outline of a P o litic a l Philosophy', Unpublished Manu
script prepared as a series o f lectures in America during World War I I ;
Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster U niversity, p. 1. Of. Principles
o f Social Reconstruction, p. 9. His social and p o litic a l philosophy is
likewise considered as "a revolutionary version o f John Stuart M ill"
by Greenspan: 0£. c i t . , p. 73. / '
20 Macpherson: Op. c i t . , p. 78.
lib eralism . In fact classical liberalism is now
what's called Conservatism, I suppose. , But th is new
view is 'h ig h ly authoritarian;. I t ' s one which accepts
a number of centres of authority and control - the
W ~ S t a t e , on the one handj agglomerations of private , .
power on the other - a ll in teracting, while indivi-.
duals are malleable cogs in this highly constrained
machine. I t may be called democratic, but given the
actual distrib utio n of power i t 's , very-far from being '
meaningfully democratic, and cannot be so.
Contemporary liberalism , then, conceives of mankind as consumers rather
than producers, and of the state and society as lim itin g individual
freedom and development where this conflicts with a highly regulated
social order.
In ternis of this d is tin c tio n , I shall argue in the course of this
thesis that Russell's educational philosophy shifts from one based on
the principles of classical to contemporary liberalism . This indicates
a fundamental change from an educational philosophy predicated on
individual development as’ the aim of both education and society to one
i .•
in which citizenship of ayworld state and adjustment to s c ie n tific t »
/ •
c -iv ilis a ti "ewed a s .th e ir ultimate aim. In terms of the three
theories of education that Russell o u tlin e s .in .th e e a rlie r quotation
from Education and the Social Order, his account s h ifts from the second
to the th ird ( ie . from one in which the purpose of education is the fu ll

*
■ / ■ •
development o f individual capacities to. one which emphasises the training

•i
of useful c itiz e n s ).
21 '
Noam Chomsky: 'The Ideas, of Chomsky', Men of Ideas, B.B.C.
Publications, London, 1978, p. 223. -
* 14
■ < ■ ■ ' ■
• o..--
The main r&son for Russell's fundamental change of emphasis is
his starkly contrasting concept of the individual. In conjunction witM>
’ the f i r s t theory, the in divid ualyis an organic being whose development] 0, '
"is rooted ip. his innate principle of growth. The instincts and impulses
stemming from this principle develop in constructive and harmonious ways
provided that the individual is allowed the greatest possible freedom
to assert himself. The.task of education and society is to grant to
the in divid ual this freedom.This is best done by in s titu tio n s founded
- 22
• on the principles o f guild socialism.
Russel l's adaptation o f-classical liberalism hing'es on his psycho-

' V- • . •
logy of impulse. This distinguishes his accoiipt-from M i l l ’ s by viewing-
pre-conscious impulse rather than conscious desire as the'majpr m o ti-.

', * ' x
23 •'
vating force of human beings. Russell thereby produces a social and
educational philosophy consistent with the emphasis on individual fre e
dom in classical liberalism , at the same time as .explaining individual
22 •J ■
Russell writes off guild socialism as follows: Guild Socialism .:;
concedes what is valid both in the claims of the State Socialists-and
"■ in the Syndicalist fear of the State by adopting a system of federalism .
among trades for reasons sim ilar to those which have recommended
federalism among nations. Roads to Freedoni, George Allen and Unwin, ;
London, 1918, p. 13. Guild Socialism would make possible Russell’s
dream'of a free society in which: I t is not only more'material.goods
that men need,.but more freedom, more s e lf-d ire c tio n , more o u tle t fo r •
creativeness, more opportunity fo r the joy of l.ife , more\voluntary co-
. operation, and*-less involuntary subservience to purposes hot th e ir own.
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 43. Cf. Chomsky: 7op. c i t . ,
pp. 222-223. I shall return to a discussion of Guild Socialism in the
chapter on the organic in dividual.
23
Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 16-18.
' .behaviour.in a ra d ically niew way and recommending fundamental in s titu -
* . • ’* ' •
tional change.
,!» ' . ' •
By contrast, the individual-in. the th ird theory is an asocial

. i • » " •
*• * «
being whose development is bjised on his dictatorial, w i l l . The w ill

.> * *' *
tends to exert its power by. dominating others. Unless education sue- '
. ceeds in transforming i t , into, the cooperative w ilT of the c itiz e n , the
, resu]t w ill be social'disharmony and chaos. >The task of'education and

v .■* **
society is to -limit the freedom and power of the individual w ill in
✓
order to prevent this from occurring. In th£ context o f the modern
world, the most e ffective means to this end is a world state responsible
■fo r education, propaganda, eeonomic development, .international relations

' ’ ‘ 24 • '
*and m ilita ry armaments , even i f this entails a loss of individual .
25
freedom. The individual psychology of power replaces that of impulse
- in -Russell's la te r theory, thereby fundamentally changing the basis for
his revision of liberalis'm. He. now conceives of the 'impuls\ to power1,

2 fi
- stemming from the w i ll, as the major motivating force.in mankind.
Its d ic ta to ria l character necessarily leads to social disharmony, re-

* *
quiriTig the controlling influence o f.th e state over the individual to
. prevent i t from producing worldwide chaos. Russell's capitulation to
• ■ : > \ - • ■ ■
7H' ~ .
Education and the Social■Order, pp. 26, 226* 243 and 246.
1 . 25Ib id ., pp. .26-27.

26 *
Power: A New Social Analysis, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1938,
p.. 14..
> , ^ jr .
r ' ■ \ V
'
contemporary liberalism 's emphasis upon the state's intervention in the •
l i f e of the individual hinges upon his psychology of power and the w ill.
.Because of its .asocial character', the state must increasingly lim it the
27
w ill's freedom of expression and. hence the freedom of the individual.
V. Conclusion ' . ,
Before analysing Russell' s contrasting concepts of the in dividual,
I shall examine the relationship between h-is educational theory and
general philosophy. I s h a ll then gi.ve a brief,'survey of the standard
interpretations o f Russell's educational thought in order to contrast
them with my own. The purpose of O

both these chapters is to prepare the
ground for my own in terpretation of Russell'*s educational philosophy.
This is based on the view that the changes that occur in the courseof
its development stem from the fundamental' transitions in his Joncept of
the in d iv id u a l. ,
,c> ;
& /
a 1, • '
1 *
I
J ‘ .' ■' . - *
- ■ ■
J . ’ •
- . %
.. * -4
27 • •
. Education and the Social. Order, p. 243.
; i. ■ . I '
i >v . " ■
y ,: -. <> * .
, CHAPTER ONE
THE-RELATION OF RUSSELL'S EDUCATIONAL THEORY
TO HIS PHILOSOPHY
Before proceeding w.ith an analysis of Russell's concept of. the
individual, I shall consider the question of-the relation'between his —
educational theory and his philosophy. I Suggested in the introduction
ih a t Russell's educational writings can be considered as philosophy and
wish now to ju s tify , this claim.- I f true, i t irafSTies that in order to
understand the concept of the individual one^rnust take into account his
work.in philosophical psychology and epislsemology.
The question of the genre of Russep^'s p o litic a l, social and educa
tional writings has become a matter of some debate, not least because
. . .
Russell himself suggests that there is3 a- sharp division between them
'and his 'technical philosophy': . .

<
e
With regard to Social Reconstruction, and-to some extent

with my other popular books, philosophic readers, knowing ‘
th a t.I am classified as a "philosopher-", are apt to be
led astray. I did not.w rite Social Reconstruction in my
. capacity as a "philosopher"; I wrote i t as a human being
who suffered from the state of the world, wished to fin d
' some way of improving i t , and was anxious to speak i-n
plain terms to others who had sim ilar feelings. I f I
had never w ritten technical books, this'wo.uld be obvious
■' .. to everybody; and i f the book is to be understood, my
technical a c tiv itie s must be fo rg e^ ten j
'1 \
‘ Reply to Criticism s' in-Paul Arthur Schilpp, (e d .): 0£. c i t . ,
pp. 730-731.
17
Russell's selection qf. Principles of Social Reconstruction as a non-
\ •; \ . . .
philosophical work ■t's surprising because i t begins with a declaration

- " ' ' ' '
that he wishes, to a d v ic e a p o litic a l philosophy more capable of standing
2
erect in a time of c ris is than trad itio n a l liberalism . The inference
to be drawn-is t h it Russell uses the term ‘ philosophy’ in two. d iffe re n t
possible1, namely logic;, the other in which i t is mo<re loosely defined
to include empirical questions arising in epistemology and philosophi
cal psychology and normative questions that arise in ethics, sodial,

n * *
p o litic a l and educational theory. I t is in this la tte r sense that he
apparently uses the term in referring to his own pol i ti.cal philosophy.
On the basis of the distinction Russell states that his*popularj
w ritings, which are. normative and aimed a t improving the lo t of mankind,

\
r1'
are nojj-philosophical in the f i r s t , 'technical sense. I t is clear that
in w riting Principles of Social Reconstruction, he is not interested in
4 defining such concepts as 'impulse' or 'the principle of growth' in the
precise manner that he would be i f his audience were professional
philosophers. Rather, he assumes that his lay readership has a general ■
fa m ilia rity with the terms,. However, i t is not clear that this re la tiv e
imprecision about_the concepts under consideration implies tha-t he does

■— - -. ■ ; — •
2
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 9.
3See Alan Wood: 'Russell's Philosophy: A Study of Its Development'
in Bertrand Russell: My Philosophical Development, George Allen arid
Unwin, London, 1959, pp. 276-277. ,
- I 1£ - .
19
not make use of philos'ophn cal notions in .a rtic u la tin g the’ fundamental
principles of his p o litic a l, social and educational theory. ‘ Indeed,
I want to suggest th.at i t is an over-sim plification of Russel 1 1s account

; I
of philosophy to suppose that there is.no conceptual lin k between, his
’s c ie n tific philosophy1 and his p o litic a l, social and educational theory.
In order to dg^s-d' i t is necessary to examine his account of s c ie n tific -
philosophy in*some d e ta il.
In>j'0n S c ie n tific Method in Philosophy' Russell argues’ against,
philosophical systems'derived' from ethics and re lig io n in favour of those
derived\from science. S c ie n tific philosophy,emancipates it s e lf from
the bias of ethical notions- by the tentative pursuit o^febjectiVe fa c t:
5 The view of the world taken.by the philosophy derived •,

v from ethical notions is thus never im p artial and
therefore never fu lly s c ie n tific . As compared with
science, i t f a ils to achieve the imaginative lib e ra -,
tion from s e lf which is necessary to such understanding
of the'world as man can hope to achieve and the philo
sophy which i t inspires is always more or less parochial,'
more or less infected with the prejudices of a time .ahd
a place.4 ' .
The person engaged in s c ie n tific philosophy, however, enlarges his
philosophical understanding to incorporate the universal and sweep away
the p a rtic u la ritie s of his position in space and time. The d is tin
guishing features o.f philosophy are determined b^” the nature of philo-
sophical propositions. These are twofold, namely general and a p r io r i,
4 '
’0.n S c ie n tific Method in Philosophy’ , Mysticism and Logic,
Longmans, Green and Co., Londonl 1917, p. 109. Cf. ’The Place.of
' A general proposition refers not to any specific entity, or set of
'
'• » - 5
" *' e n titie s but is applicable to "everything th a t exists or may e xist".
„ Russell has in mind the propositions of*Togic, sirite*they are true of

*I « ■
a ll possible worlds and hot simply.the world of sense experience.8 The

I - " ■ '
’ ' ' second c rite rio n of being a p rio ri also points to logic as the paradiqm
*
'J
* I
.
‘
•< . • of philosophical inquiry:

■/.. •* . " \
A philosophical proposition must be such as can be
■' •. , neither-proved nor disproved by empirical evidence.
v ■ ' Too often we find in philosophical books arguments
- • based upon the course of histo ry, or the convolutions
• ' of the brain, or the eyes of s h e ll-fis h . Special and
. - " ■ accidental facts of this kind are irrelevan t to
philosophy‘which must make only such assertions as
would.b,e equally true however the actual world were
f » constituted. ^ ‘
’ . •
. Again, evidence supporting phiTosophical propositions based on the
• .p a rtic u la ritie s of empirical science is to be avoided in favour of

• • . -r .* • ' I
. ’ . • a p rio ri tru th . Philosophical propositions ‘do not re fe r to the world
■s. t
‘ ' of sense, experience but to a ll possible worlds.- As a re s u lt,1 Bussell

'. . ' «• ** ■ ■■. * ■ ■ ■ , . ’
‘ ' ■, ; refers to philosophy as the science of-the possible (or the general)
and empha-sises th^kt* i t is indistinguishable from lo g ic .8 Logic in turn

/ .
: • . possesses two characteristics:
'5 ’
'On S c ie n tific Method in Philosophy', p. 110.
6Ib id .:, p. 111. '
7Ib id . •
8Ib id . , pp. 111-112.
21
, ' . The study of logic consists,'broadly speaking, "of two

not very sharply distinguished portions.. On the one
hand'it is concerned with those general statements
which can be made concerning everything without men
tioning any one thing or predicate or re la tio n , such
■ fo r example as ’ i f x is the member of the class a and
.every member of a is a member of B, then x is a member
of the class B, whatever x, a, and B may b e .’ On the
other hand, i t is concerned with the analysis and
enumerati*on of logical forms, i . e . with the kinds o f •;
propositions that may occur, with the various types of
fa c ts , and with the c la s s ific a tio n of the constituents
of facts. In this way, logic provides an inventory of
p o s s ib ilitie s , a repertory o f abstractly tenable hypo
theses. 9
jf „__
Thus ..logic is concerned on the one hand with universal statements, which
‘ .
K
in quantified form are conditional propositions making no. reference to"
p articulars. On the other-hand, i t is concerned with the investigation
. of logical forms - .for example, the forms of arguments used by Newtonian
physics in establishing the- laws of mo'tion. By enumerating the forms
o f ' these arguments, the subject matter disappears and the structure of
Newtonian physics becomes indistinguishable from that of other branches
of human knowledge.
Most in terp re te r^ Of Russell have inferred that his acco.unt of
s c ie n tific phi 1osonny excludes p o litic a l and educational philosophy.
A fter a l l , i t is heflrd to see how p o litic a l philosophy could meet the
c r ite ria ju s t la id down. The propositions of p o litic a l philosophy
necessarily re fe r to human beings and are hence neither general nor
9Ib id ., p. l l / .
. . 10
a_ p r io n .
The problem with this interpretation, is that i t not only excludes
p o litic a l and educational theory but other jjreas lik e philosophical
psychology and the philosophy of physics from the domain of philosophy.
'Russell certainly believes that these are amenable to the s c ie n tific
method. The philosophical psychology that he advances in The Analysis
of Mind, for example, violates the crite rio n of containing only-universal
statements, precisely because i t is based upon the s c ie n tific mejthodo-
logy of behaviourism and neutral monism and the empirical facts that ""
this method has brought to lig h t. By virtue of th e ir subject-ntatter,
the statements of this science make reference to both human beings and.
animals. Indeed Russell claims that his philosophical apalysis is in
fluenced by the s c ie n tific advances in both modern physics and modern.
See Joh-n G. S la te r: 'The P o litic a l. Philosophy of Bertrand

Russell1 in J.E. Thomas' and Ken Blackwell (ec|s.):. Russell in Review,
Samuel Stevens, Hakkert and. Co., Toronto, 19716, esp. pp. 1.4 ^ 142.
Others who take issue with this view include Noam Chomsky, who believes
’ the humanistic conception of man1 to be the lin k between Russell 's
analytic and social philosophy: Problems of Knowledge and. Freedom: The
Russell Lectures, Random House, New York, 1971 * pp. x i , 50-54. Ronald
Jager views Russell’s method and metaphysics as the unifying element,
p a rtic u la rly his account of freedom: The Development of Bertrand
Russell's Philosophy, George Allen and Unwin., London, 1972, pp. 428-431:
Elsewhere'he argues fo r a strikin g resemblance between Russell's meta
physical and religious concepts of the s e lf : ' ‘'Russell and R eligion'in
Thomas and Blaqkwell (ed s.): 0£. c i t .,, pp. 110-111. Richard Wollheim
suggests there to be a closer connection than Russell indicates without
saying what__it is: 'Bertrand Russell and.the Liberal Tradition' in
George Nakhnikian. (e d .): Bertrand Russell's Philosophy,' Duckworth,
London, 1974, p. 209. John Lewis: Bertrand Russell, Philosopher and
Humanist, ‘ International Publishers,.New York, 1968, pp. 10 and 84-85
argues fo r a relationship between Russell's logical and social atomism.
Louis Greenspan suggests that Russell's remarks have spawned a " s te rile
debate" concerning the relationship between his 'technical .philosophy'
and 'popular w ritin g s 1:. 0£. c i t . , pp. 11-12. But he believes Russell's
p o litic a l philosophy to be based on the principles of "Whig Socialism":
ib id . , p. 73. .
psychology and th e ir conflicting views of m atter. His analysis brings
the two together in the following manner: "I think that what has per
manent value in the outlook o f'th e behaviourists is the feeling that
physics is the most fundamental science at present in existence."^V The
important point is that Russell’s s tr ic t d e fin itio n of philosophy as s
indistinguishable from the a p rio ri truths of logic is modified during
his career to include the empirical truths baaed upon advances in the
/ ’
natural and social sciences. Thus s c ie n tific philosophy takes into ac-
4 • *
count not only logic but keeps abreast of the method and findings of v
12
empirical science. . Russell indeed claimed a t t he International
m
. ^
Congress fo r'S c ie n tific Philosophy in 1935 that s c ie n tific philosophy
had fin a lly caught up with natural science in making its method a syn
thesis of the a p rio ri and empirical:
In science, this combination has existed since the time

of Galileo; but in philosophy, until our time, those
who were influenced by mathematical method were a n ti-
em pirical, and the empiricists had l i t t l e , knowledge of
Pfhe Analysis of Mind, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1921, 5.

^sJ^-ra£iJ2n tion to its method, Russell embraces physics as the'fundamental
science because of the generality of the truths that i t contains. He
suggests that i t contrasts with psychology by virtue of the nature of
its causal laws, not its subject-matter, Ib id ., pp. 287 and 307.
12 * ■ ' r _
As-Russell puts i/t in c ritic is in g lin g u is tic philosophy's lack

of concern for the nature of the world and ourrrelation to i t : .
The only reason that I can imagine fo r the re stric tio n
of philosophy to such t r i v i a l i t y is the desire to sepa
rate it.s h a rp ly from empirical science. I do not.think
such a separation can be usefully made. A philosophy
which is to'have any value-should b e ;b u ilt upon a wide
ancf firm foundation of knowledge that is not s p e c ific a lly
philosophical. ' . ,
■' My Philosophical Development, p. 230.
24
mathematics. Modern science arose from the marriage

of mathematics and empiricism; three centuries la te r ,
the same union is giving birth to.a second child;
s c ie n tific philosophy, which is perhaps destined to
as. great a career. For i t alone can-provide the in
te lle c tu a l temper in which i t is possible to find a
cure for the diseases of the modern world
I want to suggestthat i f we examine Russell's description of the
s c ie n tific method in philosophy there is no reason to suppose that i t
excludes p o litic a l, social and educational philosophy. Indeed the
re la tiv e inexactitude that may belong to these fie ld s is an integral ,
part of the s c ie n ti.fic method as he describes i t . While the state of
■scientific knowledge in education (a precise analysis of the behaviour
of the individual in early childhood, for example) is less advanced than
that in physics (the s c ie n tific analysis gf matter) this does not imply
that the former is not amenable to the s c ie n tific method. I t may simply
be that its subject matter is more complex and as a re su lt the state of
the science less well developed. ■*
In My Phi.losophical .Development Russell describes .the s c ie n tific
method in the following terms:
My method is invariably to s ta rt from something vague

but puzzling,' something which seems indubitable but*
which I cannot express with any precision. I go through
a process which is like, that of f i r s t seeing something
with the naked eye and then examining i t through a
13
’ The Congress of S c ie n tific Philosophy', Actes du Congres In te r- .
national de Philosophie S c ie n tifiq u e , Paris, 1936, No. 1, p. 11. For a
critiq u e o f s c ie n tific philosophy as p o s itiv is t see, Max Horkheime’r:
'The Latest Attack on Metaphysics', C ritic a l Theory, Herder and Harder,
New York, 1972. . * " • . • /
/
microscope. I find that by f ix it y of atten tio n ,
divisions and distinctions appear where none a t
f i r s t Was v is ib le , ju s t as through a microscope
you can see the b a c illi in impure water that without
the microscope are not discernible. There are many
who decry analysis, but i t has seemed to me evident,
as in the case of the impure water, that analysis gives
new knowledge without destroying any of the previously .
existing knowledge. This applies not only to the
structure of physical things, but ^ u ite as much to con
cepts B e lie f in the, above process is my strongest
and most unshakeable prejudice as regards the methods
of philosophical in v e s tig a tio n .^
Three aspects to Russell's concept of philosophy emerge from this des
criptio n of his method: ——
1. The scientificm ethod it s e lf is analytic ( i . e . i t breaks down com
plex phenomena into th e ir constituent parts in order to examine them
more clearly) and applicable both to the investigation of empirical
matters and- the analysis of concepts. To this extent i t can be used in
'.the philosophical 'investi-gation- o f the empirical sciences (physics,
psychology, p o litic s e tc .) and the a prio ri sciences (lo g ic and mathe
matics). ✓
2. The successful results of the application of the s c ie n tific method
in philosophical investigation yields clear, precise knowledge, in dis
tinguishable from science. To this extent Russell considers both the .
philosophical analysis of the bases of logic and mathematics in Principia
Mathematica and the philosophical psychology of The Analysis of Mind to
«*
1 ^My Philosophical Development,- p. 133.
be indistinguishable from science. The application of the s c ie n tific
method may y ie ld s c ie n tific knowledge as a re su lt of the philosophical
investigation of both the a p rio ri and empirical sciences.
3. An indeterminate area where the s c ie n tific method-has not yet .
yielded s c ie n tific knowledge because the evidence is inconclusive. Many
of the tra d itio n a l problems of'philosophy reside here precisely because

j •
science has not been able to resolve them. To this extent, philosophy
is distinguishable from science simply by virtue of .the tenacity with

' 15 '
which- its problems re s is t solution. The philosopher is not thereby
\obliged to resort to mysticism or.theology however. He continues to -
u tilis e the s c ie n tific method by weighing the evidence in favour of the

' f • • • :
various propositions before him. He may then take a stand on the. basis
■ of the present s c ie n tific evidence available and be prepared to revise
his position on the basis of-new evidence. This aspect of the s c ie n ti-
. f ic ’ method is ofûse^pXhe philosophical investigation of both 'the*
empirical and a p rio ri sciences and characterises the tentative manner
in which science, in- contrast to mysticism, proceeds.^
15
I take this to.be the meaning of Russell's remarks that "Science
is what you know, philosophy is what you don't know" and "Philosophy...
is something intermediate between theology and science...a No Man's
Land".; See Alan Wood: Op. c i t . , p. 276.
^'M ysticism and Logic', Mysticism and Logic, pp. 12 and 18. Joe
Park correctly describes the s c ie n tific flavour of Russell's educational
writings as follows: / -
> Russell's ideas, on education should b‘e treated as hypotheses,
formulated by a widely read and very wise man, which remain
to be substantiated by s c ie n tific investigation. His theory
i f i t may be called th a t, is not s c ie n tific . I t is a second-
order 'th e o ry ', the kind of thing sometimes one does eith er
before, or as one undertakes, a series of s c ie n tific observa
tions and experiments.
Bertrand Russell on Education, George,Allen and Unwin, London,
1964, p. 129. (My it a lic s .)
What are the implications of this analysis of Russell's concept of
philosophy for hi’s p o litic a l, social and,.educational philosophy?
F irs tly , this is a complex and sophisticated account that suggests that
an in terpretation th at considers these areas as non-philosophical, based^
on acceptance of the d istin ctio n between Russell's philosophical and

J0*
popular w ritin g s* may be s im p lis tic . Secondly, I wish, to claim that
Russell recommends the application of the same s c ie n tific method with
regard to p o litic a l arid educational philosophy as he does to other areas
of philosophy. Thirdly, i t is clear that the application of the scien-

* ' . ,
t i f i c method has not on the whole produced s c ie n tific knowledge in .
p o litic a l -and educational philosophy, though i t may be approaching f t .
Fourthly, the d iffic u ltie s encountered in reaching s c ie n tific knowledge
.in p o litic a l and educational philosophy may be related to. the nature of
the propositions comprising them. Russell is undecided as to whether
they constitute knowledge in the s t r ic t sense. I shall comment on the
la s t three points in order, since they illum inate th“e f i r s t .

i ,
F irs tly , as regards method, Russell re-emphasises the importance
of s c ie n tific method when w ritin g about the distinguishing features'of

4 *
liberalism in an essay e n title d 'Philosophy and P o litic s '. Like science.,
lib eralism uses a piecemeal approach

. . . . to establishing t the truth of p o li-
tic a l propositions:
The essence of the Liberal outlook lie s not in what

opinions are held, but in how they are held: instead
of being held dogmatically, they are held te n ta tiv e ly ,
and with a consciousness that new evidence may a t any-
28
moment lead t o t h e i r abandonment. This is the way

in which they are held in science, as opposed to
. the way in which they are held in theology J ?
* •
As a resu lt of a common method, Russell asserts that the s c ie n tific

^ ^
outlook is the in te lle c tu a l counterpart of liberalism and empiricism
the only philosophy to afford a theoretical ju s tific a tio n of democracy:

*
Science is em pirical, ten.tative, and undogmatic: . a ll
rinBiutable dogma is u n scien tific. The s c ie n tific out
look, accordingly, is the in te lle c tu a l counterpart of
what is , in the practical sphere, the outlook of
Liberalism .. ..The Pnly philosophy that affords a theo
re tic a l ju s tific a tio n of .democracy, and tfrat accords
with democracy in its temper of mind, is empiricism
Russell here clearly states that there is both a conceptual and a
psychological connection between his p o litic a l philosophy and s c ie n tific
philosophy. Just as s c ie n tific philosophy avoids the dogmatism of
^ re lig io n , so liberalism , by means of the same method, avoids the dogma
17 ^
'Philosophy and P o litic k ,', Unpopular Essays, Xjeorqe Allen and
Unwin, London, 1950,> p. 27 . A . Parris congests this Ylaim- o f Russell's
concerning method by poioitng out that he introducasp ertain a prio ri
assumptions about human nature in the course of esfapîstnng his p o li
tic a l philosophy. These assumptions are generated not by\nductive
generalisations (based on a mass of evidehce) as Russell suggests, but
by deductions made from the history o f liberalism . 'The Porktical *
Thought of Bertrand R ussell', Durham University Review,« Vp\. 2^4^965-
1966, p. 89 and Louis Greenspan: Oj). c i t . , p. 14. P arris'
observation underlines Russell's debt to the assumptions of the lib^Y
tra d itio n of which he is a part.
^ Ib id .„ pp. 28 and 25.
29
of le f t or rig h t wing fanaticism. I t is in this sense that Russell
suggests that em piricist philosophy alone offers a theoretical j u s t i f i -
. cation .of democracy (thus the conceptual connections). Democracy
depends, upon the a b ility of individaal-s to make rational choices by con
sidering the evidence supporting the various options with which they
are presented. Empiricism develops ju st such capacities in those that

a-
study i t . As a re s u lt, the two agreeîn th e ir temper of mind (the
psychological connection). Russell thereby links empiricism, liberalism
and democracy by th e ir cornmon distinguishing feature, namely the scien
t i f i c method.
And i t is by virtue' of this method that'he considers his
J *
19
' own philosophy as em piricist, lib e ra l and democratic.
Secondly, as regards the s c ie n tific status of p o litic a l and-educa
tional philosophy, much may s t i l l be in the 'No Man's Land1 between
theology and science, but not a l l . Two examples, illu s tr a te Russell's
hope that a correct understanding of the motive's of human behaviour may
produce a p o litic a l and educational philosophy t h | t j s s c ie n tific in
19
P hilip Stander-makes the same claim fo r Russell's educational
philosophy: ■ ’
- In the case of Russell, I wish, to argue that his views on
education'have a ll the characteristics of a philosophy of-
education.. This work is consequently offered as an-attempt
to present Russell’s view-s as a consistent, in terrelated
t o t a lit y , a philosophy o f education from which we obtain a
blueprint fo r the construction-of an educational system com
patible with hifs vision of the good l i f e , his philosophical
assumptions anti conclusions, and his affirm ation of a demo
c ratic society. • ;
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of- Education,- Unpublished Ed.D.
Thesis, Columbia University, 1968 (University Microfilms In c ., Ann
Arbor, Michigan, 1969), p. t v .
30
' ! nature. F irs t, the psychology that Russell introduces. ii^-Principles of
Social Reconstruction is designed to produce a precise-understanding o.f
. the willingness with which men-engage in the self-destru ctive, a c tiv ity
of war. He conceives of the mainspring of human a.ction as pre-conscious
| impulse rather than conscious desire. Impulses may be channelled along
constructive or destructive paths, according to the kind of opportunity
they are given to grow: In the competitive, m ilita r is tic environment
of modern Capitalism they are generally.given destructive and possessive
opportunities to flo u rish . Because the proces-s of*socialisatio n takes
place below the. level of consciousness, the a c tiv ity that itjspawns is.
both deep-rooted and at times ir r a tio n a l, as in the case of fighting

20
wars. Russell's debt to Freudian psycho-analytic theory, even though
' h e may have been unfam iliar with the work of Freud himself, is clear and.
:• 'a measure o f the regard that he had for its s c ie n tific status. Once he
i questioned this status because of the metaphysical overtones of much of
the theory, Russell modified his account of human action by introducing,
behaviourist theory that is more in lin e with the methods of'science.

i ‘
Thus in On Education, Russell conceives of the mainsprings of human
action as in s tin c t and re fle x , which are quickly overlaid in the child's
.. . development by habits. ' The s c ie n tific approach to chi Id-rearing takes
this into account in the. following manner. Provided that habit-formation
starts early enough to develop a sense-of discipline in the young child

. . . . v ’ ■-* ‘ ‘ 5
. ** > ' ___________
• ' * t .■ . ‘
20 . .
Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 13-14,-148-151.
i' ' '* * V

i .' ' ’' ■ ■ • ■ ■.
i .
i1. • ^ .
'
31
concerning such matters as eating and sleeping, he w ill develop into a

21
sglf-d iscip lin ed individual. , The fearless freedom that Russell wishes
the child also.to show is based upon the inner control resulting from •
the early establishment of the correct habits. Their fa m ilia rity give
the child a sense of spontaneity, in which he feels his instincts are
not thwarted. Russell now articu lates an educational philosophy that .

\
incorporates some of the less speculative aspects of Freudianism with
the s c ie n tific , chi ld-rearifig'methods of behaviourism^ To this extent,
i t is based upon the most recent s c ie n tific knowledge from which in time
i t may become indistinguishable.
Thirdly, as regards, the nature of the propositions of p o litic a l and
educational philosophy, Russell regards them as normative and expresses
skepticism about the relation of normative‘statements to knowledge. This

iT**
skepticism, which is revealed in three d iffe re n t meta-ethical theories
• - 22
in the course of^Russell's career. , apparently undermines the preceding
21
On Education, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1926, pp. 70-71,
80, 246-247.
09
. The in tu itio n is .t, emotivist and u t ilit a r ia n meta-ethical theories
that Russell, espoused in turn are well analysed in D.H. Munro's 'Russell's
Moral Theories' in D.F. Pears (e d .): Bertrand Russell: A Collection of
C ritic a l Essays, Doubleday and Co., Garden C ity, New York, 1972, esp.
$p. 328-329. Only in his in tu itio n is t theory does Russell assert that
ethical propositions constitute objective knowledge, apprehended by a
moral sense, or in tu itio n .
32
arguments that his p o litic a l and educational philosophy is an integral

a - *"*
part of his overall philosophy. Yet this point can.be over-emphasised,
since at the same time that Russell advocates a skepticism about the'
truth or falsehood of ethical propositions, he nevertheless advocates
normative positions with an ardour‘that he believes to be ju s tifie d on
the basis of the s c ie n tific understanding of human a ffa irs . S c ie n tific
philosophy fin a lly leads Russell- to be both skeptical about the scien
t i f i c status of ethical propositions, since they are (according to his^

i i . . .
emotivist theory) expressions of the speaker's approval, and ardent in.
a rtic u la tin g moral viewpoints, based upon a respect both for the scien -'
t i f i c a ttitu d e and a humanistic understanding of mankind. As D.H.
Munro puts i t : ~ ~'--C ^ • •>

f i r ___ ’ '* * * '
Even in his most popular works, Russell'never loses sight

of the philosophical problems in his concern-'fo r the
p o litic a l or' psychological ones, and he certainly has
views on meta-morals and m eta-politics as well as on
morals and po litrcs.. Indeed, his attempts to reconcile,
the two are highly illum inating; fo r they show one of
the clearest minds of our time faced with one of the
central problems of our time: how to ju s tify passionately-
held moral convictions when a ll the evidence seems.to lead
to moral scepticism.^3 " •
Thus Russell may be seen as a moral philosopher who expresses both
•a skepticism.about the ultimate ju s tific a tio n of ethical propositions
and a fundamental b e lie f that certain.values (science, freedom e tc .)

24
are worth defending. These,values are based-upon certain convictions
'■ « V - *
23Ib id ., p. 325.
'" 2 4 ^ ' • * '
^ Bertrand Russell and Mortimer. Ad,ler: 'Debate:- Are there absolute
principles on which education should be founded?1, Sinai Temple Forum,
1941.
; /
I #'
1 ‘
: »
' of Russell's that he wishes .to see realised both in himself and .in
the population- as a whole. -They result from h is'visio n of what man-
kind might become givg^ the correct set of p o litic a l, social'and
educational in s titu tio n s . At the same time, the p o litic a l and edu- "
cational philosophy that Russell articulates ;is based a s 'fa r as
possible, upon a s c ie n tific understanding of human beings and the

« *
ways in which they, can best realise th e ir po ten tial* To this extent, -
Russell's p o litic a l, social and educational philosophy is consistent
w ith-his advocacy of the s c ie n tific method. For the. s c ie n tific

• * -
method may be essential in discovering the means to the construe-

i * - .
-tion of the good society but the end to which i t leads, namely the
type of society this is to be, can only bedetermined by what human
beings want. On this point, Russell consistently agrees with Hume

, ,
that reason can only determine the means to an end while passion <
- ‘ 25
determines the end it s e lf and is the cause of action.
£
In jnclusion, I wish to make four points. F ir s tly , to re ite ra te
that th is a conceptual connection between Russell's p o litic a l,
social and educational philosophy and his s c ie n tific philosophy. Both
^See Human Society in Ethics and P o litic s , pp. v i - v i i . Cf.

Principles of Social Reconstruction,, pp. 12-14. A.J. Ayer states that
Russell assimilates ethics to science in Human Society-in Ethics and
P o litics by defining- the ethical term 'good', as descriptive-of an
occurrence that both ..satisfies desire and is approved of by either one
individual or the m ajority of mankind. See A.J. Ayer: Russell-,
Fontana/Collins, London, 1972, p. 124.
'■ the s c ie n tific method and some of the empirical evidence resulting from
■ «■V < "
’ /.- its, use (e.g. the necessity of early habit-formation fo r leading a

V *
'/"fiealthy l i f e ) are in evidence in .his p o litic a l and educational ph.ilo—
. 'sophy.* Secondly, at the very le a s t, Russell is engaged in doing pol i t i -
. ' CaT .and educational theory in his 'popular w ritin g s '. It.makes sense,
'there-fore, that he should use some of the methodology and concepts
^ . integ’r al to his philosophical outlook in the construction of this theory,
.even i f they- do not receive the e x p lic it c la rific a tio n one would expect
in the 'technical w ritings' comprising his s c ie n tific , philosophy.

. * ’ >*
Thirdly, Russell's educational theory is in fact .an integral part of *
' ‘his-general philosophical outlook and may ju s tifia b ly be referred to as
+ an 'educational philosophy'. ' ' .
(
F in a lly , ,it is illum inating to re fe r to Russell's philosophical .
psychology in order to .clarify some of the concepts used in his educa
tional philosophy ('e .g /th e concept, of in stin c t in the mechanical in d iv i
dual becomes clearer in the lig h t of his examination of i t in The
Analysis of Mind).. Throughout this thesis I shall therefore refer to
Russell's ' technicaV "toritings in order to better understand his
'popular' ones. . ,
■ ^ ■ *
! ■ ■
CHAPTER TWO ^ ,
T * *‘ ' ‘ . . .
.
THE STANDARD INTERPRETATION OF RUSSELL'S '
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY - "
In th'is .chapter'I shall ’g iv e a b rie f survey of the views of those
writers concerned,with analysing Russell's social and educational'^philo- -

*
sophy.. I shall sho,w that-only ope of them considers ‘Russell's concept

•# 1 ‘ *
of the individual to have/undergone the fundamental changes that I h'ave '
indicated. The rest consider the individual as a key concept that .

«r
remains, essentially unchanged^throughout Russell's' educational philosophy.
They thereby overlooks^both the fundamental transitions in the concept of

■ ' 5 ' * " * . '! -
the individual i t s e l f and the effects which they have upon the rest of '
this philosophy, especially his decreasing emphasis upon individual
freedom. i •
*
\
4 ' Joe Park considers. Russell-S defence of the individual against the
influence of therstate and the church .to be one of the underlying 'themes
of his educational phiTos’ophyJ Moreover, he emphasises Russell's
attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of the individual and sociaJ'

2 •• '
conformity, c ritic is in g him fo r fa ilin g to emphasise the importance of
3
the la t t e r . Park's analysis of the individual is lim ite d 'to considera-
‘4/
tion of the concept articulated in Education and' the Social Order (what
•__________________ I ;__________________ ;______________________________________ ' • ■
i • ■'
Joe Park: 0£. c i t . , . p . 15. Park denies that Russell ever formu
lates an educational philosophy,, preferring to re fe r to his work as
'educational theory': Ib id . ,- pp. 16 and 128.
2Ib id . , pp. 16, 61, 73, 80-81.. <
3Ib id ., pp. 133-134. - '
^ Ib id . , pp. 70-73. {■ . • >
. ' 35 • '
36
I call 'the asocial in d iv id u a l'). He does point out however th a t, under
the influence of the behaviourism of J.B. Watson,'fiussell is tempted to
replace the-concept of in s tin c t with that of emotion, but never does so

5
because of a refusal to to ta lly accept behaviourist psychology. Park
seems aware that there is.some kind of development in Russell's concept
of the in divid ual, but fa ils to analyse this development. In contrast,
I shall show that where§s in stin c t comprises one of the foundational
\ elements of the organic and mechanical in divid ual, i t ' i s replaced by
emotion in the la te r asocial individual.
Like Park, Boyd H. Bode is only concerned with the concept of the
' individual in Education and the Social Order^(the asocial in d iv id u a l)..
Thrt precludes any consideration of the changes that occur in the course *
, of the development of "Russell's educational philosophy. His criticism
of Russell's fa ilu re to resolve the antithesis between the individual

7
and the c itizen is thereby weakened: a point which. Russell emphasises
8
in* his 'Reply, to C ritic is m s'. •
- Noam Chomsky is prim arily concerned with Russell's 'humanistic
conception of education' and the' concept' of the individual contained
• , ' 5 .
- Ib id . , pp. 47-49. \
6
Boyd H. Bode: 0£. c i t ., pp. 621-642.
' 7 • ■'
Ib id . , pp. 628 and 630. '
8
Bertrand Russell: 'Reply to C ritic is m s', 0£. c i t . / p. 731.
9 * '
within i t (the organic in d iv id u a l). This lim its his analysis to con
sideration of Principles of Social Reconstruction and. other works
w ritten " a t about the tim e'of World War 1 " . ^ However, .Xhomsky (unlike
Bode) does claim that Rilssell's "humanistic conception of man" is con-

\ '
tained in the social and p o litic a l thought expressed "in the la s t years
of his l i f e " . ^
He quotes Russell’ s account of the task of a lib e ra l
■— — ■ 12
education in Power in support of this thesis, thereby implying no
fundamental changes in the concept of the individual between the analysis
given during the F irs t World War (the organic individual) and that during
the years leading up to the Second (the asocial in d iv id u a l). Chomsky's
excellent analysis of the former is offset by his overlooking the

13 . . . O ' . ,
la t t e r . '' - , ,, __
Christian Bay, on the-other hand, correctly suggests a s h ift in
Russell’s early and " la te r approach" to the question of individual free
dom of expression-.^ The early account (the organic individual) is
9 '
Noam Chomsky: Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, esp. pp.. 49-58
and 'Toward a Humanistic' Conception of Education' in Walter Feinberg
and Henry Rosemont Jr. (e d s .): Work Technology and Education: Dis
senting Essays in the In te lle c tu a l Foundations of American Education,
University of Illin o is Press, Urbana, 1975, pp. 204-220.
^ Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, pp. x and 54n.
^ I b i d . , p. x.- '
12
Ib id ., p. v i i .
13
Greenspan: Ojd. c i t . , p. 7. . • *
14
Christian Bay: The Structure of Freedom, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, C alifo rn ia, 1958, pp. 127-130.
based upon a psychology that distinguishes between.creative and-posses
sive impulses and regards the la t t e r , which are the resu lt of stunted
v it a lit y and growth, as the cause of social disharmony. The la te r
account (the asocial individual) abandons the dichotomy between creative
and possessive impulses and locates'the source of,social c o n flic t in

15
men's desires, p a rtic u la rly th e ir desires to possess~and t'o exert power
(the asocial in d iv id u a l). Thus Bay recognises a fundamental change in
the concept of the individual and the implications'which this has upon
the notion o f freedom in Russell's’ social and educational philosophy.
He argues that the la te r approach is more adequate because i t allows for
a comprehensive, in terd isc ip lin a ry account__of the problem of allocating
freedoms of expression.^ I shall argue that this approach is based
upon a mistaken accoqnt of the individual, and that the freedom of the
t -' 1 ''
asocial individual is severely curtailed by the world s ta te .
Of the unpublished theses on Russell's educational philosophy in
the Bertrand Russell Archives, none analyses the concept of the in d iv i
dual in the manner that ,1 have suggested. Robert C. Marsh claims that
Russell's views on educational psychology are an amalgamation of the '
following: . — ,
t> . . .
1. The in stin c t psychology of William McDougall.
2. The behaviourism of J.B. Watson.
15Ib id .,: p . 129.
16Ib id . , pp. 129-130.
/
\
39
3. The conditioned reflex investigations of Pavlov.
4. The 'less offensive' aspects of Freudianism.
5. The modified Freudianism of Alfred Adler's 'individual psychology'.^
Rufsell's attempts to synthesise these various positions into a consis
tent whole f a il because of th e ir fundamental incom patibility., Russell's
d iffe re n t accounts of the education of in s tin c t in Principles of Social
Reconstruction (the organic individual) and On Education (the mechanical
individual) simply re fle c t the conflicting, influences of McDougall and

18 '
Adler. However, they do not imply any fundamental change in Russell’ s
concept of the in d iv id u a l, simply a change in emphasis.
Sidney Siskin claims that the psychology of On Education (the
mechanical individual) is an attempted synthesis of the views of Watson •
and Freud, coupled'with an account o f the w ill to power that is "essen-

19
t ia ll y Adlerian" rather than Nietzschean. Moreover, she claims that:
Adler's view of the dynamics of power links Russell's

conception of education, as seen' in On Education, with
his la te r view of p o litic s and in s titu tio n s . Both have
roots in Principles [o f Social Reconstruction] and,..even
‘A Free Man's Worship' .20 rr“
17 P
Robert C. Marsh: Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Education,
Unpublished Ed;D. Thesis, Harvard University, 1951, pp. 109-110:
^ I b i d . , pp. 118-119.
19 *
Sidney Sheffield Siskin: The Skeptical Educator: Bertrand
Russell's Educational Views in th F L ig h t of His In te lle c tu a l Develop
ment, Unpublished D. P hil. Thesis, Cornell University, August 1974,
pp. 165-.169 and 189.
t 20t | i d . , < 1711
Thus Siskin manages to conflate a ll three accounts of education and the
individual (the organic individual of Principles of Social Reconstruc-
tio n , the mechanical individual of On Education and the asocial .in d iv i
dual contained in "his la te r view of p o litic s and in s titu tio n s ", in -
eluding Education and the Social Order) . She does so by attempting to -
explain Russell's account of power ais the fundamental principle of
social analysis'in terms of the psychology articu lated in his early,
organic concept of th e 'in d iv id u a l. In contrast, I shall argue that
Russell's conception of power as the fundamental principle of social
science stems from a concept of the individual as possessing a dicta-
to ria l w i ll. This is radically, d iffe re n t from the organic concept of
the in divid ual. Moreover, I> shall argue.that the w ill to power is
certainly Nietzschean in orig in.
Philip Stander writes o f Russell's concept of in d iv id u a lity .in On
Education (the mechanical individual) as though i t were his .comprehen-

21 - — .
sive view. Moreover, he claim? th a t in attempting to redefine the
notion of in d iv id u a lity in the context o f.th e 'large herd' of mass

* ►
22 •
society, Russell is in fundamental agreement with John Stuart M ill.
In contrast, I shall argue that while the organic concept of the in d iv i
dual is s im ilar to M il l's , the asocial concept of the- individual is
quite d iffe re n t and contains e x p lic it disavowals of M ill's concept both
o f the individual .and his freedom.
21
P hilip Stander: Op. ,c it. , pp. 46-62:
22Ib id ., pp. 52-55. _ . .
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
41
F in a lly , A. Dorothy Kinrade addresses tf})e question o f the educa- v -
tion of the child as a cooperative citizen by simply considering
Russell's account in Education and the Social Order .(the asocial indivi:
23 I ■
dual). — This is understandable, since the, work contains•his most
complete analysis of the question: However,-as I point o u t/in the
Introduction, this is the fundamental dilenma to which Russell's whole

■f /
educational philosophy is addressed; namely, whether educatioi} should
aim at the development of the individual or the c itiz e n . I t is a
dilemma that he fa ils to' reconcile. ■ • ;
The standard in terpretation q f Russell’s educational jihi losophy.;
as expressed by these w rite rs , conceives of Wie individual as a uniform-
concept that undergoes no changes, in the course of the development of
Russell's thought. This view overlooks the fundamental transitions in
Russell's concept of the individual which i t is the task of th is'th e s is
to analyse. #
\
'■ i'J
Dorothy Kinrade: Discipline and Freedom in Education: A

Son of the Theories o f John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, Unpub-
ish£#f€d.D. Thesis, University of Toronto* 1963, pp. 95-99.
CHAPTER THREE -
THE ORGANIC INDIVIDUAL.
In this chapter I shall analyse the organic concept o f the in d iv i
dual th a t Russell espouses in Principles o f Social Reconstruction and,
other works o f the same period. Here’; Russell conceives_.of the in d iv i
dual as a tria d of in stin c t* mincf, and s p ir it , and of personal and social

,» •* * * ' *
development as an integrated harmony of the three. I shall thus analyse
each of these three elements, emphasising the-JTitegrating role that
s p ir it , pi ays in both, personal and social development and the re la tiv e ly
minor role accorded to the w i l l , except in-the development o f s e lf-
discip lin e. I shall then o ffe r some comparisons and criticism s of
Russell’s f i r s t concept of the individual.
B asically, Russell‘s concept is'organic by virtue of the iqnate
principle of growth which is endowed to each individual as an in s tin c tiv e
basis: a ll v ita l impulses and patterns of self-development stem from i t .
The freedom necessary for the fu ll development of the principle< is, .
likened by Russell to the plenitude of soil and lig h t required fo r the
c u ltiva tio n of (Slants. Moreover, the nature of the relationship between
adult and ch ild is.captured fo r him in the metaphor of the gardener and
his plants.^ This relationship prerequisites that the gardener show
both care fo r the plant as i t is and constant regard fo r the fu lly deve
loped organism that the plant is to become. Such care and regard are
^Bertrand and Dora Russell: The Prospects o f Industrial C iv ilis a

tio n , The- Century Co., New Yorfc, 1923, pp. 274-275.
V 42 - . "r -‘"
43
x )
lik e w is e necessary fo r'th e Jadult engaged in educating the child into
idie fu ll development that constitutes his or her potential.-^
Russell's organic concept of the individual is very close to John __
Stuart M ill's . . The individual is an organic being, imbued with a
prin cipie"bf growth, which leads him naturally .along the path of s e lf-
development. On this basis, Russell, lik e M ill, constructs a social >
and p o litic a l philosophy' in which social institution ^ enhance personal
growth or development. .One'major difference is that Russell conceives
of individuals as motivated by impulses rather than desires. Unlike

* *
desires, impulsesare. pre-rational and not directed towards an end but

' '/ ^ •
towards an a c tiv ity ^ n ts e lf. They are gonstructive or destructive, .
4
according to the extent to which the p rin cip le o f growth is granted
its development. Provided that s u ffic ie n t freedom, is given to the
in d ivid u al, his principle of growth w ill produce constructive impulses

*
which are directed towards non-material goods ( a r t , science, poetry)
3
not involving conf.lict with other, individuals: This general-picture '
of mankind is that of growing and creative, individuals exerting th e ir

» • •
autonomy.within in stitu tio n s that encourage them to do so. ^
From this concept o f the individual stems a form o f 1 iberalisnr which
— --------- - T — r ------- :-------:--------------- — -----------^ ^ ----------

■2 v : *
Richard Wollheim argues that Russell's break with M ill is more"
fundamental, since-'Russell, artioylates a notion o f the good-society's
stimulating creative impulses., thereby providing p o litic a l theory with >
a standard with .which; to measure the good society. 'Bertrand Russell
and the Liberal T ra d itio n ' . in George Nakjinikian ( ed.) : o£. c i t . ,
pp. 209-221.. Cf. Louis Greenspan: 0£. cvt.’ , p p .-37-38.
“ ... - : ■y. j .i>
^P o litic a l Id eals, Chapt. 1. . ' .v
44
goes beyond M ill's in\ a number of important respects. As I have
pointed out, i t viewsVthe individual as prim arily motivated by impulses
not desires', i t insists upon the central role o f education in developing
creative rather than destructive impulses within the"in dividual and"

' \
• ■
upon education as an integral part of p o litic a l theory: a po/int which
other lib e ra l theorists overlook, according-to Russell, because of an

' * \ 4
un fam iliarity with children or children's rights. Moreover, Russell
■ \ ’
conceives of a prin cip le, which he calls reverence, as guiding the '
private and. public a ffa irs of mankind, including education. The prin
ciple o f reverence supplements that of negative'freedojjf and emphasises
the rights <?f a ll persons to grow in the directions moat suited to

5 •
th e ir own natures. I t is a sine qua non for the teacher and parent
who wish to use th e ir authority in a manner consistent with the nur-

* 6 *
. turin.g o f the child's principle of growth.
i ■J J >
As regards society, Russell's theory might best be described as
lib e ra l fundamentalism or, more accurately* lib e rta ria n or guild

7 ^
socialism. • Russell's vision .is that o f free individuals pursuing

• •• o' _____
4 .*

5Ib id ., pp. 227-228. ' ,
6Ib id ., pp. 146-148. .
^ -■
Like his Whig forbears, Russell maintains a .passion fo r individual
lib e rty , which, integrated with his critiqu e of capitalism , results in a
form Of,anarchism or libertarianism in his writings during.and imme
d iately a fte r the F irs t World War. Guild Socialism, as an alternative
to state Socialism existed as an aspiration in England in the early
twentieth century and was a movement which argued fo r.th e decentralisa
tion o f power in a ll social in s titu tio n s . These would be autonomous,
controlled by "the workers and loosely joined together in a short of. con
federation. Rfissell believes that in a society of this type, the
individual would regain much o f the control which he had lost in modern
45
creative a c tiv itie s in a society based upon equal rights. He goes

*
beyond M ill in arguing fo r the decentralisation of power in a ll social
in s titu tio n s . Those who do the work in a p a rticu lar in s titu tio n are
to have the power to make decisions governing that in s titu tio n .^ Thus/**
workers, n o t.c a p ita lis ts , w ill run steel plants and teachers, not
g '
bureaucrats, w ill run schools. The aim of a ll p o litic a l,a n d social
in stitu tio n s is to enhance the self-development of the majority of
individuals. Where they f a il to do so they have usually become out
moded and are to be discarded lik e constricting clothing..^
i
U ltim ately, Russell conceives of the individual as a H ria d , com
bining the three' elements of which he is composed: in s tin c t, mind and
s p ir it . The good of the individual comprises an integrated harmony of
the th re e .^ In s tin c t is the source of a ll v it a lit y and combines both

* -
. the central principle of growth and. a ll the impulses necessary fo r l i f e .
' • The satisfaction of instincts (such^fs’ self-preservation and reproduc
tion) is necessary fo r a f u ll .life tb u t to ta l pursuit of instinctual
satisfaction produces a subjectivism which conceives of no higher pur-

12
poses than i t s e lf . The l i f e of^the mind comprises the pursuit of
mass spciety: P o litic a l Id eals, p. 27 and Principles of Social Recon

s tru c tio n , p. 43. The term lib e ra l fundamentalism is used by Louis
Greenspan to indicate the emphasis upon the individual which Russell's
socialism maintains. The ambiguities of this attempted synthesis are*
also outlined by Greenspan: 0£. c i t . , pp. 38-44. Perhaps the clearest
a rtic u la tio n o f Russell's place in the anarchist trad itio n is Noam
Chomsky's Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, Chapt. 2.
• . O*
^ P o litic a l IdeaTs-w .
9Ib id V , p. 59L
—Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 42. .
11 IM d ., p. 208.
12Ib id . , pp. 205-206, 216-217.
46
knowledge (based upon childish curiosity) and expands the person's

1 13
horizons by leading him to consider .objects in an impersonal manner.
The in tellectual- aim o f education is to develop this a ttitu d e by means,
of a s e lf-d is c ip lin e enabling the person to subordinate minor impulses
to the w ill and.the desire for en^s not immediately attainable. This
type of discipline springs from within but at the higher le v e ls 'o f in
struction must be supplemented with work habits induced by external

14 -
pressure. However, the l i f e of the mind is inadequate fo r the task
of integrating -the individual since i t is predominantly c r it ic a l and . '
lik e ly to be destructive of in s tin c t. Thus th£ th ird element, s p ir it ,
counterbalances the diemands of the other two by univ.ersalising the

15
instincts and thereby, making them impervious to c ritic is m . The l i f e
of the s p ir it is'foased upon impersonal feeling and is revealed in both

X
religion and a r t . ^ A rt, fo r example,
imp*e, springs from the in stin c ts, which
the a r tis t attempts to universalise -through the production of an object
which is s ig n ific a n t fo r humanity as a whole. ■ Reverence fo r mankind
(the necessary p o litic a l and educational .principle fo r the good society)
stems from the s p ir it and is revealed in universal love. Education can
foster such love, only i f i t is based upon mutual respect and care,
which the principle of reverence im plies .^7
13Ib id . , pp. 206-207.

14Ibid.,~ pp.' 158-161. .• .
15Ib id . , p. 209-210.
16Ib id ,, p. 207. ,
17Ib id ., pp. 221-223.
«
1 '
47
In sum, in Principles of. Social - Reconstruction,' Russel 1 advances
a concept of the individual which im plies both'a general theory o'f
mankind as' constructiv^beings, imbued*with art in.nat'e principle o'f

• . ,■ •'
growth, and ,of society as an environment fo r nouris'hing'constructive
or creative impulses. 'Tê individual is a triad, of in s tin c t, mind and
s p ir it and the good of the individual comprises^'a harmony pf the .three.

• ' • ; { • ; / .
This can. only be developed through an educational-system based upon a

• , •» .t '■... .
reverence fo r the individual as a unique,/orgafiic, .instinctfiye, impul
sive, in te lle c tu a l," creative and'spiritual being. 11.is wi.thin this
context that Russell a rtic u la te s the f i r s t account of the individual •

• f
in his educational philosophy.
I. In s tin c t , . ,
Russell conceives of in s tin c t as the in divid u al's source of v ita
l i t y and his basis fo r achieving a deep sense of union with other
individuals. The l i f e of in s tin c t therefore is to be promoted becauset -
i t provides the individual with the energy necessary fo r his own organic
development and fo r'th e p o s s ib ility of his-.-sense'of community with

18 * 7
others. -
Ir> this section I shall proceed by distinguishing between the
1 8 *
j. 48 ■
van'ous aspects of Russell's conception of instinctual lif e :

*
(A) the in stincts which human beings share with animals, (B) the
\ '
principle of growth, which is the d is tin c tiv e ly human J n s tin c tiv e
basis, and (C) the impulses which proceed from the p rin c ip le of
growth. '
s'
j ' A. Instincts
9 . ■ - . ' ‘ *
x- .. .In this firs .t sub-section, ’ In s tin c ts 1, I shall ou tlin e the
potential type of satisfactio n to be gained from in s tin c tiv e cycles,
the nature o f mankind's base in s tin c ts , th e ir relationship to the
,• principle of growth and the s im ila rity between Russell and Freud's
account of in stin c ts.

i
. >■ ; >«■
As I have pointed out, Russell considers in stin c t to be the
source of both the in divid ual's v it a lit y and his sense of union
' w ith, and lik in g fo r, the rest of mankind. -When, however, le f t
unregulated by e ith e r of the other elements, mind or s p ir it , the l i f e
of insti-nct consists only of in stin c tiv e cycles prompted by pre-conscious

* 19
(and not necessarily constructive) impulses for d e fin ite acts. In
modern society, fo r example, in s tin c tiv e cycles proceeding from these
19
Ib id . , pp. 210-211. Russell believes that impulse is fa r more
often the source of human a c tiv ity than conscious desire: ib id . ,
pp. 12-14. I shall analyse impulse la te r in this section.
49
v ita l impulses aê often interrupted by economic necessity thereby
precluding any profound sense of in stinctual satisfactio n ; the
in d iv id u a l's .life gives way to isolated moments in the pursuit of
pleasure, but on the whole to feelings of fatigue and discourage-

20 * • ' .
ment. Isolated both from his own in s tin c tiv e being and from the
general, l i f e of mankind - - ' the in s tin c tiv e link between himse-lf and
21
others having been broken — the individual is le f t powerless.
• Russell thus shrinks from advocating a l i f e to ta lly dominated
by in s tin c t. For i f so dominated, the individual is l e f t powerless
to control-the forces of Nature e ith e r in himself or his natural

22
and social environment. As regards himself, he w ill be subject •
to in stin c tiv e forces over which he has fa ile d to exercise conscious
purpose. This state Russell disparagingly refers to as 'subjec-

23
tiv is m ', a to ta l in a b ility to think beyond one's own in stin c ts.
F- ■
As regards the environment, .the in s tin c tu a lly dominated individual
w ill simply be subject to the laws of Nature, in a position of
renunciation that precludes his own freedom. In its stead, Russell
20Ib .ld \, pp. 213-214.
21 Ib id ., p. 212
Ib id . , pp. 240-241. See 'A Free Man's Worship', Mysticism and

Logic, p .t 57.
thus recommends the development of a defiance .which while fostering
the acceptance of the in e v ita b ility of natural laws, endeavors .also

' . *
to defy them: through the a c tiv ity of mind and s p ir it in con-
24
- structing ideal objects based on tru th , beauty and goodness. This
*
development of the basis of what is tru ly human - - man's freedom

25
through mind and s p ir it in the face of an indifferent,universe
constitutes fo r Russell not the repression of the instinctual l i f e
but rather its strengthening.
For Russell in s tin c t also links the l i f e of mankind to that of
the animal kingdom'; herein lies the source of many of the aggres
sive impulses, which he seeks to modify in the organic individual:
The l i f e of in stin c t includes.all that man shares'

with the lower animals, a ll that is concerned
with self-preservation and reproduction and the I
desires and impulses derivative from these. I t : .
includes vanity and love of possessions, love of
family and even much of what makes’ love of
country. I t includes a ll the impulses that are "
essentially concerned with the biological success
of oneself or one's group - fo r among gregarious
animal^ the l i f e of in s tin c t includes the group.
The impulses which i t includes may not in fact
make fo r success, and may often in fa c t m ilita te
against i t , but are nevertheless those of which
success is the raison d 'e tre , those which express
the-animal nature of man and his position among a
world of competitors.2°
24Ib id ., pp. 55-56.

25
Principles o f Social Reconstruction, pp. 208, 210.
26Ib id ., pp. 205-206.
51
For Russell, then, in s tin c t subsumes both categories of basic
impulses fo r self-preservation, and reproduction, fo r social co
operation and competitiveness. While these conflicting),instincts
can be integrated into a harmonious whole through the l i f e of s p ir it ,
there_Js a further aspect of human instinctual l i f e which lends- it s e lf

✓
to the achievement of the healthy development of in s tin c t, namely,
the principle of growth.
Russell, believes that the principle of growth is the unifying
instinctual force within the individual. He describes i t as "an instinc
tive.urgency" leading the individual in a certain direction, ju s t as a

27
tree seeks the lig h t. In that the principle of growth is largely pre
social in nature ( i t is only to some extent modifiable, by external

28
circumstances) , i t exerts a more.or less constant force from within
the individual upon h is ,in s tin c tu a l development. That the source of
in s tin c tu ^ U a e tiv ity is thus centred within the individual generates the
po ss ib ility of the” distinction.between actions based upon a response (or
set or responses.), to external’ stim uli and those in te rn a lly stimulated:
the la tte r comprise the structured basis of the in divid ual. This, how
ever, does not imply that instinctual development is pre-determined in
27 **
. I b i d : , p. 24.
28Ib id ., pp. 19-20.
)
52
that the individual s ti 1-1 has to learn by experience how to gain in stin c
tual satisfactio n . Whereas the process of learning to s a tis fy in stin c
tual demands may b'e more complex than that of learning how to respond to
external s tim u li, the individual is s t i l l capable in principle of

29
learning such mastery._______________________________________
2Q
Although Russell was unaware of psycho-analytic theory when
w riting Principles of Social Reconstruction, he la te r acknowledges the
s im ila rity of his view on instincts .to Freud's: •
'Aj though I did not see anything lik e the f u ll disaster

■of the War* I foresaw a. great deal-more than most
t people d i d . . . I had to revise my views on human nature.
A t that.tim e I.was wholly:ignorant of psycho-analysis
but I arrived fo r myself at a view of human passions
not unlike that of the'psycho-analysts.
(The Autobiography of Bertrand, Russell, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto,

1958, Vol. I I , p. 17). Freud distinguishes in stin c t both by its origin
and by- the force which i t exerts upon the human organism:’
F irs t,-a stimulus of instinctual origin does not arise

in the outside world but from w ithin the organism i t
s e lf. For this reason i t has a d iffe re n t mental e ffe c t
and d iffe re n t actions are necessary in order to remove
• i t . ' Further, a ll that is essential in an external
stimulus is contained in the assumption that i t acts as
a single impact, so th at i t can be discharged by a
single appropriate action - a typical.''instance being
that o f motor f lig h t from the source o f s tim u la tio n ...
A n!instinct, on the other hand, never acts as a momen
ta tary impact but always as a constant force. ' *
(Freud, Collected Papers, (Edited by Ernest Jon^s), Basic Books, New

York, Vol. 4, p. 62). Freud also believes in the in divid ual's capacity
to gain'instinctual g ra tific a tio n , where they have been inhibited ■
( ib id . , pp. 62-65). The aim of instinctual g ra tific a tio n is to remove
the stim ulation w ithin the instinctual l i f e of the in d ivid u al. The
actions which he is required to perform here are more complicated than
those necessary to avoid p a in fu l. stim uli which he receives from the
environment. Simple flig h t is not appropriate because of th e ir internal
origin and the force which they exert.
53
B. The Principle of Growth > '
Ir) this second sub-section, I shall analyse the principle of
growth: its s im ila rity to the development of other^non-human
organisms as well as its d is tin c tiv e ly human fe'atures; its ' unifying
.n a tu re as the source of a ll impulses; its apprehension in other .
persons through in tu itio n and' imagination; and the necessity of
social in stitu tio n s allowing its free development in order to

*r
realise human lib e ra tio n .
. • X
The core o f’ Russell's organic concept of the individual.-'is

• " 1
the principle o f growth. Recognising the importance of- impulse
and desire in the determination of individual action, Russel 1 writes:
The impulses and. desires of men and women,* in so fa r

as they are of real importance in th e ir liv e s , are
not detached one from another, but proceed from a
central principle of growth, an in stin c tiv e urgency
leading them fn a certain direction, as trees seek
the lig h t. So long as this in stin c tiv e movement
is not thwarted, whatever misfortunes may occur are
not fundamental disasters, and do not produce those
distortions which resu lt from interference with
natural growth. This intimate centre in each'human •
being is what imagination must apprehend i f we are
to understand him in tu itiv e ly . I t d iffe rs from man
to man, and determines fo r each man the type of
excellence of which he is capable. The uimosTr^that
social in stitu tio n s can do fo rjjn a rK fS ^ to make his
own growth free and vigojâuev^they cannot force him
to grow according^to^fnepattern of another man.30
3Q-*
\ T^ k ~ as?,
t
I
- ^ _ . ,
f
Js-
-
54
Here, Russell has begun the construction of the organic individual:-
1) In comparing the growth of'"human beings to the natural growth
• of organisms, he places human development within biological development.
2) In defining the principle of growth as the unifying source .of '
impulse and desire, .he is able to formulate individual misfortunes as
inessential, provided that they do not thwart the prin ciple's development
3) In conceiving in tu itio n and imagination only as capable .of
apprehending the intim ate centre of each individual, he calls for; the
necessity of caring and sensitive educational relations.
4) F in a lly , in stating that this centre d iffe rs from person to'
person, he is able to recommend that the task of social in stitu tio n s is

I *
the lib eratio n of the in d iv id u a l’ s potential fo r excellence rather than
the inculcation of fixed and pre-determined patterns.
Russell thus a rticu lates a concept of the individual which is

31
grounded in both the species'nature of mankind (rooted in a universal
principle) and in the uniqueness of each person (rooted in d is tin c tiv e
instinctual growth pattern s).
31 r • 1 \ ’
The notion of man as'a species<-being is th^t>gf the young Marx. .
In realising his species-character, man, unlike an.imaTs^jriakes of him
s e lf and his productive l i f e ‘ "an object o f his w ill and consciousness"
and is capable o f "free conscious a c tiv ity " . In other words, man "is
only a self-conscious being,' i . e . , his own l i f e is an object fo r him,
because he is a species-being". Karl. Marx: Early Writings (Translated
and edited by T,B. Bottomore), McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963, p. 127. In
Noam Chomsky: o£. c i t . , p. 54 he indicates that Russell's humanistic
conception of man bears certain s im ila ritie s to that of the young Marx,
especially in its emphasis upon the free development-of the in divid ual.
55
Whereas a ir , nourishment, and exercise aid healthy physical, deve
lopment, Russell recognises that the external conditions which enhance
healthy emotional and in te lle c tu a l growth are more complex:
y
Men, lik e trees, require for th e ir growth the^righ't
soil and*a s u ffic ie n t freedom from oppression. T h ese’ ,
can be helped or hindered by p o litic a l in s titu tio n s .
But the soil and the freedom required fo r a man's
growth are immeasurably more d if f ic u lt to discover
and to obtain than the soil and the freedom required
fo r the growth o f a tre e . And the f u ll growth which ,
may be hoped for cannot be defined or demonstrated;
i t is subtle and complex, i t can onlybe f e l t by a .
and dimly apprehended by imagina-
As well as emphasising the need fo r subtlety and s e n s itiv ity in drawing
out the in d iv id u a l’ s p o te n tia l, Russell also stresses the need fo r free-
dom from oppression. In circumstances of fe a r, o f overt force, of a rb i
trary discipline or o f the s tu ltify in g labour so prevalent in the modem
world the individual is not lik e ly to realise-h is potential . As .Russell
puts i t : #
The outside influences th at help [mental growth] are'

those th a t merely provide encouragement or mental food
or opportunities for exercising mental fa c u ltie s . The
influences that hinder are those that in terfe re with
growth by applying any kind of force, whether discip
line or authority or fe a r or the tyranny of public
opinion or the necessi.ty^f engaging in some to ta lly
incongenial occupation. Worst-of a ll influences are .
those that thwart or tw ist a man’s fundamental impulse, ,
which is what shows i t s e l f as conscience in the moral
sphere; such influences are lik e ly to do a man an in
ward damage from which he w ill never r e c o v e r . 33
32 •
Principles o f Social Reconstruction, p. 25.
^ P o litic a l Id eals, p. 13. . , •
C learly, Russell finds p a rtic u la rly ha'rmful those influences which deo^
the individual his moral autonomy and thereby s t if le one fundamental
aspect o f the principle of growth: the freedom to exercise individual
judgement in the in te lle c tu a l and moral spheres. .
C. Impulse —- r' •’
■ . -■ '
In this third.sub-section, I shall analyse the concept o f impulse
■ < ‘ * , • . • •
Tn several mini-sections. ' I shall f i r s t consider Russell’s critiqu e of

- 7 • ’ '■ ' ' " ' / •
the concept o f desire as the basis of human motivation. I shall then ^
consider his account o f the development of impulse, his distinctiori^bey-
ween constructive and destructive impulses and its correspondence X^rL
further distinction between creative a.nd possessive impulses. F in a lly ,1
I shall l i s t the distinguishing characteristics o f impulse. This w ill
'conclude the section on in s tin c t. »
i. Russell‘s Critique o f Desire
’• ' . ■■ 0
In order to r e a lis tic a lly ground both his concept o f the developing-'
individual and his recommendation for progressive in s titu tio n a l change,

* •• •
.
Russell realises the necessity of understanding the mainsprings o f human

V -• '
3 ~ y, 1
action: he suggests that previous attempts have stopped short o f this
understanding in th e ir fa ilu re to recognise the importance of impulse:
My aim is to suggest* a philosophy of p o litic s , based

upon the bielief that impulse has more e ffe c t than
conscious desire in moulding men's liv e s ...A ll human
r
57.
7-
a c tiv ity springs fiîm two sources: impulse and

desire. The1part played by desire has always l)een
s u ffic ie n tly recognised.^
Russell's refusal to a c c e p t^ ie primacy of desire in human motivation r
places him at odds, with lib e ra l p o litic a l tra d itio n : According to the
-liberal view, human beings,'when desiring a p a rtic u la r object, i n i t i a l l y

y ' “■
l imagine both the existence and the effects o f*th a t object upon them, and
•then Will-ingly pursues course of,action which w ill realise what they
. .. have imagined. Where necessary,' they,subject themselves to long and
painful courses of action with the purpose o f gaining th e ir object o f ,
desire and the satisfactio n which they expect i t to,bring them. This
' view, which ,Russell belie.ves recognises only one source of human action,'
thus .depends upon the force of rational intention and conscious w ill in
' K
in tffe movement o f desire: .human beings conceive th e ir purposes before
engaging in a c tiv itie s and continue to act in relation to them over an
extende.d period o f time. - The lib e ra l tra d itio n has fa ile d to recognise-
the pre-consciousa nature o f th.e motivation o f much human action by cpn-
\ centrating upon the te+eology of human desire. Russell reinstates te le o
logy in his analysis of the l i f e o f s p ir it , in s is tin g , however, on the

v
-p ri 4nacy of
Q non-teleological
♦ in s tin c t and impulse in determining human
1 <r
action. .. .
■ / i i . * The Development o f Impulse
Russell w rites:
/
• 34
• Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 5 and 12. .
•? ' ' ■ i - ■ " '•■■■

58
In a ll the m ore-jqstinctive part of our nature we are

dominated by impulses to certain kinds of a c tiv itie s ,
not by desires fo r certain ends. Children,run and
shout, not because of any good which they expect to re alis e ,
but because of a d irect impulse to running and shouting...
I t is not any purpose but merely an impulse, 1that-prompts '
such actions as eating, drinking, love-making, q u arre llin g ,,
boasting.35
Thus Russell-conceives o f the most basic actions of children and'adults
as prompted by concrete impulses .to partake in p a rtic u la r a c tiv itie s .
• For example, i t is the spontaneous pleasure experienced by the ch'ild in
running and shat/ting which motivates" his a c tiv ity ; i t is not his regard
fo r a future reward which prompts him, but rather the joy which he ex-.’
periences irrmediately and in trin s ic a lly in doing them. I t is precisely

\
th is , in.R ussell's view, which distinguishes actions bas^d upon impulse
'f ' . I # '
from thos.e based on desire: "The direct impulse toward a- kind of a c ti-
" . •.
vity. fo r its own sake must be distinguished from the desire fo r the ex-
’ OC '
pected effects Of the a c t iv it y ." Having |©rmulated impulse as the main
. .. , ’ f- ’ '-A
source o f human action, Russell then conchies the. task ofêducation (and
a ll p o litic a l in s titu tio n s ) to b e .its development and strengthening.
This follows because in Russell’ s view: an unindulged sexual impulse,
fo r example, may result in an individual desiring the prestige o f a
relationship a'pd even’ actively seeking such prestige; but he or she finds
^ . .
’ * .
!**
that i t brings l i t t l e satisfaction because .the true unrecognised motive-
* has been along a sexual impulse: " ...d ir e c t impulse is what moves us.
■3R
Ib id . , pp. 13-14.
Of f
P o litic a l Id eals, p . ' 69. •
.. . / ;.
59
and the desires which we.think we have are a mere garment fo r the im-
37
■ pulse". Desire is a garment for impulse in the sense that i t disguises
■' and distorts true motivation: as long as. an in divid ual's awareness re
mains obscured by the outer clothing of desire, he w ill be unable t o ’
satisfy ’the primary impulse which underlies i t .
Russell believes that the concealment and the distortion o f impulse
• . - - through the obscured seif-undens tan ding of desire — has become the
norm o.f madern society. The majority o f people go to work, for example,
with the aim o)t monetary reward. Any p o ss ib ility for the concrete~s^tis-
fac’tiori o f impulse has usually long since been s t u lt if ie d by the /authori
tarian regulation of the work process and the boredom of media/task’s
: which characterises factory production. Such a system deprives in d iv i- '
* duals of a n y 'in trin s ic reward they might derive from th e ir/jo b s ; the
^ p o ss ib ility of work^.performed out of a joy fo r a task in/and of i t s e l f
- is precluded. Russell thus recognises that-where work is done for ex-
’ trin s ic monetary reward ( i . e . , where its object.has become a ra tio n a lly
conceived desire, rather than the^satis-faction of impulse), a control
mechanism;has been set into motion.

■? ■ .•/ '
; • o'-;' ' ■ ■ ■ ' . , ■' ”
Impulse is e rra tic and anarchical, not easily fitte d
into a well-regulated/system; i t may be tolerated in
children and a r tis ts ,'b u t i‘t is not thought, proper to
- men who hope to be.taken s e r i o u s l y . 38
. A f*
. ' .
* > ■ *
37 - '
Principles of Social* Reconstruction, p . , 16.
Ib id ., pp. 16-17. t ■
■ V
^ '■ i 60.
Russell’ s p o litic a l and educational theory thus addresses-itself to
strengthening the l i f e of impulse. Largely provoked by his experience
of World War I and by his observations of modern society, Russell’s 'aim
is the channelling of impulses along constructive paths; again this con-

* ‘ '
s titu te s neither th e ir weakening nor the simple appeal to reason:
I t is not by reason alone that wars can be prevented, but

by a positive l i f e of impulses and passions antagonistic
to those that lead to war. I t is. the l i f e o f impulse
that needs to be changed, not. only the l i f e of conscious
thought.. .Blind impulse is 'th e source of war, but i t is
. * also the source of science and a rt and love. I t is not
the weakening of impulse th a t.is to be desired, but the ' .
direction of impulses tow ards'life and growth rather than
towards death and decay.39
*3Q ' ’
' Ib id . , pp. 12 and 17-18. Education within Russell’ s p o litic a l
theory derives its importance from being the primary'means for re
fashioning and strengthening human impulses.' The direction of impulses
towards a c tiv itie s manifesting l i f e and growth, rather than death and
•decay, is the. major task o f education and can only be achieved in an
environment fostered by love and the principle o f reverence. This implies
not. a denigration of the development of in te lle c t and reason, .but a
recognition th at in te lle c tu a l interests are rooted in the fundamental
impulse of c u rio s ity . Moreover, Russell's, theory invites a s h ift of
emphasis in educational practise towards stim ulating the c h ild ’ s curio
•v s ity impulse and valuing a ll in te lle c tu a l a c tiv ity which springs from i t
1' fo r its own sake, rather than for the benefits which i t may bring to the
indi vi dual:
The. only thought which is genuine is that which springs
out of the in te lle c tu a l impulse o f c u rio s ity , leading to
the desire to know and understand. But most of what
passes fo r thought is inspired by some non-intellectual
impulse, and is merely a means of persuading ourselves
that we shall be disappointed,or do harm i f we indulge -
this impulse.
(Russell, Principles o f Social Reconstruction, p. 15). Thus, the capacity
for'knowledge, which expresses it s e lf in a desire to seek the tru th , is
based upon-the impulse of curiosity which is possessed by each c h ild .
The impulse of curiosity can be expressed in a number of a c tiv itie s , such •
as art-, science, lite r a tu r e and history and the purpose o f education is
to.allow in terest for such, disciplines to flo u ris h . Since the capacity
j
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ir r
,61
iii. Constructive and Destructive Impulses-'-

* * «
I t is not surprising-that Russell‘ is optim istic about the possi
b ilit ie s for realising his educational system., given-his conviction in
both the principle of growth and in the natural curiosity of the child.
The strengthening of these natural characteristics, through the provi
sion' of the correct environment, is a- re la tiv e ly straightforward task.
Provided that the adult possesses an imaginative understanding of the
child - - 'provided that he does not thwart" by excessive external discip-

li *
1ine’ the child's in stin ctive endowment - - he w ill be able'to foster the
c h ild 's growth in a healthy d ire c tio n .. Consequently, tshe impulses'

*- ’ * * 40
; which proceed from sue,h an education,W ill,be constructive.
■ !, g * .
' ■ »
The important, point h'dre is ,that the core of the individual' (his
principle of growth) provides a na'tdral and healthy basis for the im-
pulses which spring from i t ; the individual has an innate tendency to
■ grow in a healthy and vigorous direction such that where this tendency
> is not re alised one: may begin to locate the fauj t in external conditions.
Thus Russell suggests - that self-destru ctive impulses (e.g.., the -impulse
and desi/'e for drugs) do not, on the whole, stem from the principle of
41 ' . . ’ ' ' ' , ■
growth; they are not thus fundamental disasters and so carr be redirec
'towards Other acti vi.ties without great d iffic u lty .. Further, when these
for knowledge is natural and the .desire for* knowledge springs' from i t ,
the task of education is to, provide the correct, envi ronment fo r the ex
pression of th e c h ild 's impulses in suitable work. ~
40
Ib id ., p. 24.
41 Ib id ., pp. 24-25. *. , ‘ .
62
xt.
impulses,and th e ir attendant desires become strong and well entrenched,
they can be checked through the use of. s e lf-d is c ip lin e , and so in trin s ic
desire to ..resist one impulse in favour of another. A lte rn a tiv e ly , im-

42
pulses which are harmful to-others resu lt mainly from thwarted growth
and uni ik e 's e lf-d e s tru c tiv e impulses they present a m o re -d iffic u lt problem
to be.overcome: they have to be checked in order to protect the safety
of others and require a more thorough refashioning oftthd conditions
which influence the in stin ctive development of the in dividual.
Whereas i t is clear that Russell‘ cannot hold to an environmental -
determinism, (th is would violate the concept of an innate growth p rin c ip le ),
the provision of an. environment which ay-pws for the development of the
•individual's natural growth is c ru cial; i t is thi.s which w ill free the
individual's innate potential for constructive a c tiv ity . The. correct
social formula thus focusses upon the principle of ^growth; its care and
•nurturance by-those mindful of its delicate nature’and its requirement
for freedom. In this environment the impulses proceeding from the prin
c ip le of growth are lik e ly to be constructive:
A man's impulses are not fixed from the beginning by .

his native, disposition: w ithin certain wide lim its ,
they aire profoundly modified by his circumstances and
his way of l i f e . 43
no
H Ib id . , p. 25.
43Ib id ., p. 19.
o
63 /
I t is Russell's formulation of the interaction between impulse and
environment which thus .deeply grounds his criticism ; of present social
structures. Since they are founded upon domination and in ju s tic e , the
in stitu tio n s of modern capitalism prevent the emergence of the very
principles which give rise to the f u l f i ll e d individual - - lib e rty ,

44
^reverence and ju s tic e . As we have seen, the factory system devised
for the purpose and p r o fit of ownership denies the v it a lit y of its
45
labourers, necessary fo r th e ir s e lf-c re a tiv e re a liz a tio n . Excessive
disc ip lin e , imposed from without, while appropriate to the maintenance
— of present economic structure, results in individuals who a r e 'lik e ly to
indulge th e ir destructive impulses. This, in fa c t, is how Russell ac
counts for the cruelty and the violence of the war. For the overall
e ffec t o f controlling a society through discipline and the demand fo r •
conformity is as follows: "All these things destroy the vigour of. the
community, the expansive affections of individuals, and the power of
viewing the world generously.
Although Russell's concept of impulse is essentially n e u tra l, a
• distinction between constructive and destructive impulse's emerges f o r .
him in the practical consideration of war:
44
Ib id . , p. 23.
45
Ib id . , p. 23.
4fi
Ib id . , pp. 23-24'.
64
. Impulses may be divided into those that make for l i f e

and those that make fo r death. The impulses embodied __
in the war are among those jthat make fo r .death. Any
one of the impulses that malke fo r l i f e , i f i t i s '
strong enough, w ill lead a man to stand rout against
the war.4' ?
Indeed, the distinction.emerges in Russell's e ffo r t to explain.the F irs t
World War, an e ffo rt which animates the Principles of Sofcial Reconstruc-
tio n . As a p a c ifis t, he sought to understand the dynamic in human moti
vation which generated wholesale carnage as- its cour.se of action: he
firids himself compelled to lo cate.in human nature-two destructive im
pulses: an impulse of aggression and an impulse of^'resis'tance to aggres-

48 ;
sion , which lik e other impulses bring with them attendant desires and
* * ■
b e lie fs . The impulse to aggression results in a conviction in the
superiority of one's "own group whose manifest destiny is to dominate the
world, for the good of mankind. ;In the modern world such an a ttitu d e is
found in the domination of European im p e ria list powers over A frica and
Asia. The impulse of resistance to aggression results in" a conviction
in the special wickedness of the. aggressors such that th e ir victory would
be the destruction of. the great value and of the go-od endowed in one's,
national culture.- Many English and French reactionaries berated the
threat to democracy posed-by Germany in ttie F irs t World War, although ,
they had l i t t l e regard for democracy until this point. In Russell's
view, i t is those who have not been dominated by e ith e r impulse who lead
the .'pacifist cause. S t il l , on the whole, Russell wishes to encourage
47
Ib id . , p. 22. .
v . :.‘ . .
' ... r
•* v 48Ib id . , pp. 1.9-20. ■
65
the l i f e of impulse, -not repress i t and he recognises th a t:- "The very

" 1 AO
same v ita l energy which produces a ll that is best also produces w a r ." ^
The destructive impulses,of aggression and resistance to aggression re
quire the control of external, force, but this does not entail that all.
impulses which lead to destructive behaviour are to t>e dealt with in
this way; th e ir re-channelling into other a c tiv itie s is often e ffe c tiv e ly
empldyed.^ Russell’ s further del ineation of the distinction between
constructive and destructive impulses; provides deeper grounding fo r the
positive'wgrk of reconstruction and fo r the successful employment o f
re-channelling strategies:
Man’s impulses and desires may be divided into those

that are creative and those that are possessive. Some
of our a c tiv itie s are directed to creating what would
not otherwise e x is t, others are directed towards ac
quiring or retaining what exists already. .The typical
creative impulse is that of the a r tis t; the typical
possessive impulse is that of property. The best l i f e
is, that in which creative impulses play the largest part
and possessive impulses the smallest. The best in s titu
tions are those which produce the greatest possible
creativeness and the least possessiveness compatible
with s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n .. .The supreme p rin cip le , .both in
p o litic s and in private l i f e should be to promote a ll
that is creative and so to diminish the impulses that
centre round possession. 5T- "
Russel’l conceives of constructive impulses in terms o f the creation of
something fnew and destructive impulses as the acquisition or possession
49
Principles of Social Reconstruction,, p. 95.
50 Ib id ., pp. 18-19.
51 Ib id ., pp. 234 and 236.
of something that' already exists. The paradigm case of the former is
' 1
the a r tis t and of the la t t e r the property owner. In elucidating the
fundamental principle of personal and p o litic a l l i f e as the promotion of
creative impulses Russell is thus reaffirm ing his.commitment to the

■. #
*
growth of the individual and to the social .co-operation between in d iv i
duals: unlike possessive impulses which.involve co n flic t:
~The creative impulses in d iffe re n t men are essentially

harmonious, since what one man creates cannot be a
hindrance to what another is wishing to create. I t is
the possessive impulses that involve c o n flic t.52
The reason fo r this is that creative impulses'are directed towards a c ti
v itie s in which there is an unT invited'supply. Neither the a r tis t engaged
in producing new work nor the s c ie n tis t involved in advancing the present
state of knowledge is depriving others of the opportunity to do the same.
Indeed, th e ir work may aid others to pursue s im ilar work. ’ Neither a r tis -
tic a c tiv ity nor knowledge is a quantifiable commodity; creative impulses,
therefore, are beneficial both to the individual and to society as a
whole since they maximise the potential of a ll members o f society and

• 53
the harmony between them. Possessive impulses, on the otfter hand, gain’
satisfactio n from a c tiv itie s in which there is a lim ited , quantifiable
52Ib id ., p. 237. •
53
Ib id . , p. 237. Chr.istian Bay takes issue with Russell's claim
that creative impulses tend to, be harmonious and points out*th§t ifassell
himself la te r conceived of two sources of c o n flic t between persons^
’ . ■“J.
th e ir desire to possess and th e ir desire to 'e x e rt power. The'dichotomy
between creative and pqssessive impulses was now discarded. The Struc
ture of Freedom, p. 129. In the next chapter, I shall examine the
t
't importance of the c h ild ’ s 'w ill to power' in Russell's educational-
j. philosophy. '
5
i ■ ' • *
67
amount of the object to be shared- (fo r example, property or c a p ita l).
Hence they lead to c o n flic t situatio ns, in which there is competition
for the goods in question.
iv . • Creative and Possessive Impulses
' - • ' % ' '• t t ’
Russell . further refines the distinction between creative and
possessive impgljes^-in P o litic a l Id eals, published a year a fte r Principles
of Social Reconstruction:
. S — — ------ --— r - 7--------------- .
■ *. *
We may distinguish two sorts o f goods, and two corres-

, ponding sorts o f impulses.. There are goods in regard
to which individual possession is possible, and there
0 are goods in which a ll can share a lik e There.are
two kinds of impulses, corresponding to the two kinds o f.
. goods. There are possessive impulses, which aim at ac
q u irin g 'o r maintaining private goods-that cannot be
shared; these centre in 'th e impulse.of property? And t .
there are creative or constructive impulses, which aim
1 at bringing into the world or making a.vailable fo r .use
the kind of goods in which there is no privacy and no
possession.
'' /
Here he links destructive impulses even more c le a rly than'before with
y 1
the dominant tendency in capitalism towards the possession of private
• ’ 55 ■”
property. Thus, he refers to these impulses as possessive ; ithey orient
. towards the acquisition of material goods, such as food, clothing and

* #'
• housing which, under conditions of scarcity, can-only be acquired a t the

i ,
expense o f others. Russell's point is not that such impulses are a
^ prio ri Unhealthy (obviously, possession of a certain amount of these

•v ' -
5V it i c a l Id eals, pp. 11-12.

• 55
%
>. ^ I t may be that the difference in emphasis is due to the fact that
the f i r s t chapter of P o litic a l-Id e a ls was w ritten to be read to the
Miners' Federation in Glasgow.
’ .f
68
goods is necessary fo r human beings to liv e at a l l ) , but that as. a matter
of fact w ithin the present economic system indulgence' in them often en-
56- ' •
ta ils that others go without. Creative impulses, oh the other hand,
are attracted towards goods o f a mental and s p iritu a l natur^Sjj^which •.
there is no private possession. Science, a r t, the pursuit o f k'nowleclge ^
and goodwill to others are offered as candidates: "In such matters there
is no possession, because there, is not a definite'amount to be shared; .
any increase anywhere tends to produce an increase everywhere."9^
Russell recognises that creative impulses may be 'shadowed1 by possessive

' gg
ones, such as envy or jealousy or the desire to obtain prestige. , but"
maintains the d istinction by placing th e ir goods upon a higher level than
material ones; th e ir largesse and expansiveness do not negate but enhance
the creative p o s s ib ilitie s of a ll concerned.. •
The problem of controlling or retraining possessive'impulses now
becomes more straightforward, sipce they can be îdentified by the types
of goods to which they are attracted. The principle which Russell pro
poses in this regard is that in the name of lib e rty and ju stice posses
sive impulses be subject to the.control of public authority.
The whole realm of the possessive impulses and of the

use of force to which they give ris e , stands in need
of control by a public neutral autho rity, in the .
interests o f lib e rty no less than o f ju s tic e .59
56
Ib id ., p. 11.
58Ib id . , pp. 12-13. •
59Ib id ., p. 73.
>
69
K.
In the case of an individual nation, this authority would be the state;

• ?
in international affairs^Russell suggests the establishment of an in te r
national parliament supported by v irtu a lly ir r e s is tib le force.^9 Since
the free expression of possessive impulses leads to the domination of
the poor and weak by the rich and powerful, Russell’ s recommendation for
state interference is not ty ra n n ic a l^ ; indeed, a social structure based
on private property which uses force against those who have no property
requires in the name of ju s tic e arid lib e rty such' opposition. In p a r ti
cular, Russell suggests state ownership of la n d in order to redress the-

62
balance. In general, Russell suggests ^hat the coercive apparatus’ o f
s ta te be-transmitted as the responsibility. to those presently oppressed’
under capitalism / This would be to begin the redressal.

f 4
As regards creative impulses, Russell suggests individual freedom
• and not public control. This is because the goods towards which they
are attracted neither derive from possession nor depend upon force:
• ■ „ ~n‘ • •
'j For' these reasons the creative part of-?,-man's

• ' ^ a c tiv ity ought to be as free as. pps^Jjbile from
a ll public control, in order that i t may-remain
r spontaneous and fu ll of vigour.63
Russell's conception of education as a progressive in s titu tio n is thus
6° Ib id ., pp. 72-73.
- • 61Ib id ., p. 72.
• 62Ib id ., p. 73. - '. ’ .
63Ib id ., p! 74.
.......... . . ■ , . ;__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ • X
70
' ,4*
' \
v grounded: its aim is to stimulate creative impulses and to foster the
in d iv id u a lity of those in whom they reside. In a world increasingly
dominated by,vast organis-ations,.he holds to this task as a d if f ic u lt
but important one:

« ‘
The problem which faces the modern world, is ,th e combina
tion of individual, in it ia t iv e with the increase in the
scope and size of organisations. Unless i t is solved,
individuals w ill grow less and less fu ll of l i f e and
vigour, and more and more passively submissive^to con
ditions imposed upon th.em.°4
v. The Characteristics of Impulse
The characteristics of Russell‘s notion of-impulse can be lis te d
in a straightforward manner:
1. An impulse is a spontaneous expression of the individual towards
performing a p a rticu lar a c tiv ity such as eating, playing or shouting.
The impulse is a strong momentary feeling towards such actions which,- i f
unindulged, can result in .a deadening of the impulsive l i f e o f'th e
in d ivid u al.
2. Like: in s tin e ts , impulses proceed from the principle of growth in
which the mo.st fundamental among them are, un ified. Unlike in stin cts,
which exert a f a ir ly constant influence upon the in divid ual, impulses are
momentary attractions towards a c tiv itie s in which the individual finds

' i 0
immediate pleasure. , 0 ' ,
t ___ . ''
3. Because they, opehate on. a-fundamental le v e l, impulses are
64 -
• Ibi_d.» p. 75.
distinguishable from conscious human ,desires. Uni ike desires, impulses '
■ are often not pursued with the directing agency of consciouSness^br the
w ill. • . '
4. The motivation for the action in which an impulse expresses' it s e lf
is in trin s ic to tflfe a c tiv ity i t s e l f . ‘ Thus the person gains satisfactio n
from the very performance of an action done on impulse and not from any
further reward which, may accrue to him as a result of the action. Again
this distinguishes impulse from desire which may be directed to the
attainment of a p a rtic u la r end\which the person expects to bring him
future satisfactio n . . : •; -
t
.1 a *
• 4 * * -
5. Impulses can be,modified, by the environment and channelled towards

< «• ' r ' i -• ' O
>; constructive a c tiv itie s , which promote growth and 1 iffe or destructive
*.
i a c tiv itie s whidr'promote death and .decay'!.. The general ^ c rite ria which *•
i /
K"
distinguish constructive and destructive impulses! are •contingent upon
7
'the notion, of growth as the fu lle s t possible development o‘f •the individual
■> ;v , ' " ;V- '■ ' ' ^ i ' . ’ - v . - ■ '/•

6. *. Creative *and possessive impulses are distinguishable by the dvffe-
*
’,'re rrt goods t*o which they are attracted.; Creative impulses are attracted
^to- tfie pursuit'ofvicnowledge and the development--of"goodwill .to others. in-
Twhfchllbere^s no possession since there is ho def i ni te .arnount to b e /
shared. They enhance the development of the lVidivfdutfT and stimulate ! .f*
social harmony and,co-operation. Possessive impulses are benjred'around
the im||ii!se -to property,' which can only be acquired unler present c^ndi-
. ! t ions-by depri v in ^ th e ^ ;V p f ^ t e r i a l goods. . Possess iveîmpul.ses gene-
f .rate-'S9C.i;aL..co^fN'!ct by.involving competition for a-TTrhfted gmount pf^.
■ r .o
l'.
•-^
t■ *J»s
.••X '
V "-'V-
’ ' • • J
material .goods. The distinction between creative and .possessive impulses'
corresponds to that between constructive and destructive impulses.
Russell uses the two interchangeably according to 'th e context and
-emphasis which he wishes to make.
In conclusion, in stin c t (including-'both the principle o f growth
and the v ita l 'impulses 'springing from i t ) constitutes the core of the
■ ' •" V. • ,
organic in divid ual. In stin c t and impulse provide the motor fo r the
w *
in divid ual's a c tiv ity . These are. rodted in the in divid ual's biological
structure arid at-the same time are modifiable by the .environment.
Russell's emphasis- is to encourage the self-development of the organic
individual and the flourishing of his instinctual and impulsive l i f e .
This c^n be done only by-allowing the free-development of the l i f e of
in s tin c t w ithin education and a li social and p o litic a l in s titu tio n s .

■. ' ‘ ‘ tf- .
Only in an atmosphere of freedom can the individual achieve the fu ll
growth and development which comprise his individual good.
Th^ l i f e of in stin c t of the organic individual has two d is tin c tiv e
features. On thVone hand, its pattern of development is determined by
the innate principle of growth, unique to each individual and exerting a
constant pressure from w ithin. On the other.hand, i t has a d is tin c tly
anarchic character due to the spontaneous nature o f impulse. These fea-

31 ■ * ’ • ' ' V .
tures-distinguish the l i f e of in s tin c t o f the organic individual from

% ■
the la te r, mechanical and asocial individuals.. The instincts of-the
.mechariical.-individual are almost to ta lly malleable by the environment.

'* \ '
The.aim;of education. is to integrate them with the correct habits as-
^ f soon'as::t-he in f |a t leaves the^.womb'. The instincts of the asocial

* 'V . / . : B
;..a r - r- • '
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73
Individual are of lesser importance than his emotions. Emotions replace.
instincts as a constituent element of the individual and are best deve
loped through the cul tiv a tio r]-o f correct habits.
This b r ie f encapsulation indicates that^the character of in s tin c t
changes and. its importance declines in the three conceptions'erf the
individual that I consider. In s tin c t in the organic individual embodies
both determ inistic and anarchical tendencies fused into an organic whole.
In stin c t in' the mechanical individual is completely modifiable by habit
and in the asocial individual i t is almost completely replaced1by .emotion,
II. Mind
The second element in the tria d constituting the organic individual
is mind. .Russell conceives of mind as the source\of impersonal, objec-

* I
tiv e thought in the in divid ual, a capacity which raises him above the
animal kingdom. Mental or in te lle c tu a l development stems from the

- *«•
in stin c t of c u rio s ity , which ‘i t ‘transcends once capable of objective
thought. Unlike in s tin c t, th is faculty tends to separate the individual
from the rest of mankind and to produce a sense of is o la tio n . At the
same time, tfte l i f e of the mind is to be promoted because i t enables the
individual to gorbeyond the 1imits"imposed by in s tin c t and realise one
aspect of .what is d is tin c tiv e ly human, namely, the capacity to think
objectively and s c ie n tific a lly .
In this section, I shall consider Russell's conception of the l i f e
of the'mind and in te lle c tu a l development.Âlthough.the l i f e o f free
74
. inquiry and open-mindedness which Russell conceives of as the aim of
in te lle c tu a l education cain only be developed through what he calls
reverence, I shall consider this in the following section only on 'S p i r i t '.
Here, I shall be concerned with: (A) the c ritic a l, role of mind" v is -a -
v is -in s tin c t, (B) s e lf-d is c ip lin e and (C) the w i ll.
A. The C ritic a l Role of Mind
4
For Russell, in te lle c tu a l a c tiv ity begins w ithin instinctual l i f e
* i f
as curio sity, and develops towards maturity into the pursuit of imper
sonal knowledge: v * ■. .
The l i f e of the mind is the l i f e of pu rsu it.o f knowledge,

from more childish curiosity up to the greatest efforts
Qf thought. ...T h e impulse to acquire knowledge and the
a c tiv itie s which centre round i t constitute what I mean
by the l i f e of the mind. The l i f e o.f"the~-mind-consists
of thought which is wholly o rvparti a lly impersonal, in
the sense that i t concerns it s e lf with objects on th e ir
own account, and not merely on account of th e ir bearing
upon our in s tin c tiv e l i f e . 6-5
S c ie n tific knowledge thus constitutes the s tan d ard fo r the l i f e o f the
mind; i t presupposes, however, the capability o f directing a primary

t _ ■
curiosity towards impersonal objects. This requires d isc ip lin e , or the
a b ility to regulate one's impulses for .the sake o f tru th . Such i s <
Russell's ideal fo r in te lle c tu a l education:

; *
65 •
Ib id . , pp. 206-207.
.!
I
i
. i.
t. .
The kernel of th e -s c ie n tific outrtCok-is' the r e f u e l to
, regard our own desires, tastes and interests as affording
•' J a key to the understanding of the world. .'..The s c ie n tific
* attitude of mind invoives a sweeping away of a ll other de
sires in the interest of the desire to know - i t involves
» suppression of hopes and fears, loves and hates, and the
'whole subjective, emotional l i f e , u n til we become subdued
to the material, able to see i t frankly, without precon
ceptions, without bias, without any wish except to.see i t
f. . / as i t i s . . . 6 6 ■ ,
While the s c ie h tific outlook embodies the primary impulses of the indi
v id u a l i t releases them from th e ir preoccupation with the purely per-

* • a '■
sonal. ■aNatural science, mathematics,'and .logic, for example, open the

" •$ \ '
‘ individual's horizon to realms in'which he can only proceed objectively
* >?
and undogmatically. Têse disciplines do not counter basic instincts
■ and impulses; they simply integrate them into pursuits of an enduring
and objective nature. In this manner; the individual is .led to a deeper

•> ■'
kind of instinctual satisfaction:

I ' ' " . ' ■ I
The purpose of education, therefore, cannot be to create
any primary impulse'whjch is lacking in the uneducated;
the purpose can only be to enlarge the scope of those
. that human nature provides, by increasing the number and
variety of attendant thoughts., and by showing where the
most permanent satisfaction i ^ t o be f o u n d . 6 7 -
While Russell perhaps idealises the transformation of the 'crudity'
:\ of in stin c t into the higher form of curiosity, he yet recognises a fun
damental opposition: the l i f e of instinct is necessarily personal and
\
a "— - - ■ ■ - ■ ■ - — - 1 - ......................... 1 ■ 1- ’ ■— — - - - ■ . i i
; CfT
'The Place of Science in a Liberal Education', o£. c i t . ,
; .’* • pp. 42 and 44. ^
67
76
tied to particular circumstances; the l i f e of mind is essentially de-

. 68,- -
tached and impersonal^"""^ The a b il it y to transcend the purely personal
and to think in objective terms is that which distinguishes men froorfi

69
animals , and yet Russell realises that the transcendence i t s e l f en
genders a separation between the individual and his particular existence
and the particular existences of others; i t separates' him from the con-
'ven.ti.ons which collect his existence with others. The l i f e of the mind
thus tends to he s t r i c t ly c r it ic a l towards the l i f e (both immediate and
conventional) of instinct.
' f•
-B. Self-D iscipline - ,
t '
Russel*) ’ s concept of s e lf-d is c ip lin e is only meaningful in rela
tion to the aim he advances for education: aoîwkyidual capable of
concentrating on tasks^having no immediate appeal. WlKle placing the

W )
instinctual l i f e as primary in the^determination of humana^yion,.
Russell's educational program' thus requires an adaptation of raw impulse:
instinctual g ra tific a tio n ’- - the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure^— caniiot
suffice. Russell recognises the need for the conscious direction of,
impulses, v i z . , s e lf-d is c ip lin e . This he distinguishes from externally
imposed discipline, to which he is in principle opposed (though we shall-
see that he regards i t as necessary at the higher levels of instruction).

» I ' (s£**
68
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 214.,
69 I b id . , pp. 214-215.
:V
reover, i t is in the development of s e lf-d is c ip lin e .th a t the w ill becomes
>:'•'împortant; i t enables the individual to-exercise control over errant

' . * . .
impulses to overcome d if fic u lt ie s encountered on the path to knowledge.
In this sub-section I shall analyse the concept of s e lf-d is c ip lin e

*
and the role of the w ill in its development in several mini-sections:
I shall f i r s t consider Russell’ s concept of self-d is c ip lin e at the . .

v /
elementary level and its s im ila rity to Maria Montessori’s ; I shall then
analyse Russell’s concept of s e lf-d is c ip lin e at the higher levels of

s \
education, its departure from Montessori, and f in a lly cohsider.bis notion
of moral s e lf-d is c ip lin e . • i
i. Self-D iscipline At the Elementary Level
The in te lle c tu a l aim of education for Russell is the child's,

4* ■ ‘ „
advancement to free inquiry and open-mindedness, coupled with tin
development of habits which make for a constructive l i f e :
■. ^ Education ought to foster the wish for tru th , not the

. - conviction that some particular creed is the truth.
S "-\ Instead of obedience and discipline, we ought to aim'at
preserving independence and impulse. Instead of ruth-
1 less ness;, education shoul d try to develop justice in
. thought. Instead of contempt, i t ought to i n s t i l l res-
■ .pi- pect, and the attempt at understanding; towards the
' , opinions o f others i t ought to produce, not necessarily
. acquiescence, but only such opposition .as is combined
withr imaginative apprehension and a clear realization
N ■* of the grounds for opposition.. Instead of credulity,
the object should be to stim ulate’ constructive doubt,
• the love of mental adventure, the sense of worlds to
: ! conquer by'enterprise and boldness in thought . '0 .
•a‘:
r • 70Ib id . , PP'. 154 and 155-156.
78
These habits, then, embody an independence of thought and an imaginative
understanding of other persons; they suggest a reverential attitude to
wards the world which yet isrigorous and healthy. Russell's.educated
individual is stimulated by constructive doubt and a love of mental . '

* *
adventure; generous to the opinions of others, he possesses a clear
realisation of the reasons for his own. Essential to the possibility
of developing this individual is s e lf-d is c ip lin e .
Russell, opposes the standard notion of discipline — the compliance
o*f the child's w ill to external direction— on p o litic a l grounds: . i t
presupposes.an inequitable relationship i-n which the subservient partner
(the child) is denied his autonomy and his a b ilit y to choose the ends
'<■ «
of his actions: '
.Obedience, the yielding of one's w ill to outside direc-

. tio n, is the counterpoint of authority. Both may be
necessary in certain cases. Refractory children, luna
N tics. and criminals may require authority, and may need

to be forced to obey. But in so fa r as this is necessary
i t is a misfortune: what is to be desired is the free
choice-of ends with which i t is not necessary to in te r-
. f e r e .71
I t is for this reason'that Russell condones the Montessori approach at

> • •c
the elementary le v e l. He b e l/fe y ^ th a t its approach to discipline
culti verges and does not negale‘rthe. c h ild ’s a b ilit y to choose.72 Essen-^
tia illy , the Montessori teacher structures the environment by placing a
71Ib id . , pp. 156-157.

72 ^
. Ib id . , pp. 143n and 157n.
79
series of learning devices at the child's disposal. The child is at
lib e rty to choose to work with any of these devices with two important
provisos. He is to use building blocks, for example, for the purpose
o f discovery and not for play. Play is understood as an a c tiv ity which
the child engages in spontaneously but which has l i t t l e to do with formal
education. In school, St le a s t, building blocks are-to be used as-a
tool to aid elementary mathematics and not simply in order to construct
imaginary houses. Secondly, the child learns social cooperation by
waiting until othefs have finished with the device which he wishes to
use. Inevitably,-more than one child wishes to use a piece of apparatus
at*the same time and part of the learning experience is for the in d iv i
dual to adjust his wishes to* the r e a lity of this situation,-using his
i
time profitably while-he is obliged, to*wait.
By basing the child's motivation for learning on his own interests,
ôntessori aids the process of s e lf-d ire c tio n . Both the. desire for.*
learning and the discipline necessary for i t to occur come from within.
•; 4
ii. Self-Discipline At the Higher Levels of Education

* * •
The importance of the role of the teacher within Russell's educa-

%(►
tional philosophy cannot be overemphasised. While the child's freedom
in learning is to be preserved, i t is to be limited by the authority of
the teacher, whose task is to' guide his interests, along avenues which
are truly instructive. Enjoyment and the child's natural curiosity form
the basis of education but are in su ffic ie n t for the more complex tasks'
80
along the road to knowledge. They are to'be integrated with a s e lf-
dis'cipline which supplies a unity of purpose to the pursuit of knowledge.

•*
This becomes clear when Russell writes of the s e lf-d is c ip lin e necessary
for the higher levels of education. At this point Russell apparently
‘ parts company with the Montessori approach and reverts to one in which,
there is greater emphasis upon external authority:
.Success in producing mental discipline is the chief

merit of traditional higher education. I doubt whether 4
i t can be achieved except by compelling or persuading
active attention to a prescribed task. I t is^for this -
reason chiefly that I do not believe methods such as
Madame Montessori's applicable when th& age of child
hood has been passed.73 ‘
The*reason for his disagreement with the Montessori method is as follows:
. . . . i t is d i f f i c u l t to see how this method can lead to

control of attention by the w i l l . ...The power of .
giving prolonged attention is very important, and i t
* is hardly to be widely acquired except as a h a b it ’in -
duced o rig in a lly by outside pressu r e j * y
Given that Russell writes of the importance of self-dire c tion as a
necessary condition for the enhancement of individual grbwth, i t appears
inconsistent that he emphasises external pressure as an integral part of
advanced instruction. A fter a l l , external pressure might well result in
individuals who accept traditional accounts .of knowledge rather than

• t
4 '
73
Ib id . , c f / p . N 3 . A..N.^Whitehead makes a sim ilar criticism of'
Montessori in The Aims of Education;A and Other Essays,1 The Macmillan Co.,
N6w York, 1929, .p.- 22. t_
. 7V i nciples of Social Reconstruction, p. 143. .
81
those who are w illin g to question.authority and embark on new and crea
tiv e searches for truth. Russell's position only makes sense in re la
tion to his conception of the aim of advanced education and the type of
discipline i t is to produce.
We recall that a feature of Russell's conception' of higher educa
tion is that i t results in an in telle c tu a l discipline which enables an

Jr
individual to concentrate on tasks which may have no immediate appeal.
.For, since in telle c tu a l work often requires the a b il it y to endure tedium
-and routine, its successful realisation requires more than the student's
attraction to i t ; his immediate interests may indeed but^lead him to
perform pleasant but s u p e rfic ia l. tasks. Unless the student has acquired
■ » ° *
discipline he w ill be easily distracted from the pursuit of knowledge:
The kind [of-menta.l discipline] I mean is that which

enables a man to concentrate his thoughts a t w ill upon
any matter that he has occasion to consider, regardless
of preoccupations or boredom or in tellectual d i f fi c u lt y .
This quality, though-ft has no important in trin s ic ex
cellence, greatly enhances the efficiency of the mintfas
an instrument.
By developing in tellectual discipline the individual learns to apply
himself to problems requiring increasingly sharp in telle c tu a l s k ill s .

/■
He acquires the a b ilit y to perform rigorous and demanding tasks such .-as
logical reasoning, and analytic problem solviTig. . \

\
' '■ ' \
In genera-l, the student only acquires work habits which produce. .
75I b i d . , p. 159. ' V
82
in tellectual discipline by external pressure; the teacher must play an
active interventionist role. In the c,ase of talented pupils, i t i s ,
however; possible to allow strong in telle c tu a l desires to'be the basis
for th e ir own freely chosen in tellectual work. External pressure can
be limited to advice from the teacher about the student's interests:
Some few pupils, i t is true, have s u ffic ie n tly strong

in tellectual desires to be w illin g to undergo a ll that
is necessary by th e ir own i n it ia t iv e and f r e e w i l l . . .
mental 'discip lin e...can be preserved by mere advice
without external compulsion whenever a boy's in telle c tu a l
interest and ambition can be s u ffic ie n tly stimulated.. .In
this way so long as the importance of mental discipline
is realized, i t can probably be' attained, whenever i t is
attainable, by appealing to the pupil'^consciousness of
his own needs. 1 "
For Russell, then, while the child's- curiosity and joy in mental
+ *
adventure may be cultivated in the early years, and in certain excep-
A‘
tional case-s, by means of a re la tiv e ly la is s e z-fa ire approach ( i . e . , the
Montessori method), they can only be developed to th e ir f u l l potential
by a s t r i c t use of authority. This does not im p ly th a t the child's
i n i t i a l curiosity i s ‘ to be deadened, but that as spontaneous curiosity
i t must be — i f i t is to be a resource / o r knowledge — integrated with
externally enforced discipline. The a b ilit y to u tilis e e ffe c tiv e ly the
organisational principles of knowledge requires f i r s t that the individual

•:■£->. • r * .
submit to th e ir authority; only when they have been mastered can the
individual proceed to usfe them in novel and creativeâys. S im ilarly,
^ Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 160-161
..,o
83
in order to acquire these principles of knowledge, the student must sub
mit ( p r o v is io n a lly ,^ t least) to the authority of the teacher. Russell
would thus lim it the truth of Rousseau’s dictum to chiIdhoo.d education:'
. . a il the lesson's of the young [should] take the form of doing rather
than talking: l e t them learn nothing from-books.which they can learn
from experience". - J. • ...
' ’ . . ■ ' v ; . .. . ■
M .. •
iii.< Moral Self-DiscipTyne ' '
Russell’s conception of moral self-dis.cipl ine derives from his
^ , interest in producing self-directed individuals, capable of decisiyeness
vis-a -vis the ends they have chosen to pursue. Only a person who has
been educated according to the principle o f reverence and who has
êarned to trust in his a b il it y to make independent"*judgements is lik e ly
‘ to develop what Russell calls "the moral discipline of consistent s e lf-
« d ir e c t io n " .^ For what this raJral character demands is pot the simple
pursuit of every impulse, but the a b ilit y to disdern which impulses are
• important and to pursue them, even when fhey are not experienced as
’■ •*
• ' v i v i d l y a liv e . Individuals are'only capable of such discipline when
. Rousseau: Emile, Dutton arid Co., London, 1972, p. 214. Rousseau’,

aversion to theory.is shared by modern exponents of the.romantic school
of education such as A.S. N eill who. writes of his .own work: "I have
not spent the last forty years writing down theories about children.
Most of what I have written has been- based on observing children'[and]
living with them." Summerhil1, Hart Publishing Co., New York, I960,,
p. 89. .
78 ••
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p 159.
. they possess creative and expansive desires., for objects which, are not
i m e d ia te ly -a tta in a b le :; .
, The desirable kind of discipline is the kind that comes

T from within,, which consists in the power o f pursuing a
distant object s te ad ily, foregoing'and suffering.many
things on the way. This involves the subordination of.
minor impulses to w i l l , the power of a directing action'
by large creative desires even’ a t moments when they are
not vividly a liv e . Without this, no sferious ambition,
good or bad, can be realized, no consistent'purpose.can
• dominate. This kind o f d isc ip lin e .is very necessary, •
but can only result from strong desires fo r ends not
. ’ 9 immediately attainable, and can.only be produced'by
education i f education fosters such desires, which i t
^ seldom does a t present. Such discipline springs from
j one's own w i l l , not from o u ts i(^ a u th o rity .79
Thus, self-disciplirte through the direetiive agency of w ill integ^tes
‘the in divid ual’ s impulses fo r objects immediately attainable with his
creative desires for more distant objects which require a delay in
g ra tific a tio n . ‘ ’ .
C. Self-Discipline and the Role of the WillI • '
As regards the w i l l , we have seen that Russell makes a distinction

v ■ .
between outward w i l l * which is desirable because directed towards d i f f i -
cult tasks and.hence part of s e lf-d is c ip lin e , and inward w i l l , which is
. undesirable because directedtowards the.control of impulses. In this
subrsection,, in addition to looking a t the role of the w ill in the

- _x 1
development of s e lf-d is c ip lin e , I-s h a ll point to the differences between
- ■ ' : - ' a ' . '• ' -

•. 79" * ' .'
Principles of .Social Reconstruction, pp. 158-159.
thi£ role arid the one given to i t in Russell’ s la te r asocial conception
of the individual.
■ < ’ '
^ In general, Russell ( lik e Freud) is opposed to the total control
. . of in stinct by w i l l ; in his view, the repression of basic impulses ad-
’ -vocated by traditional morality results in either the destruction of
the in d ivid ual’s instinctive v i t a l i t y or the re-emergence of new,- more

•‘ • on
destructive instinctual forms.
*
Where fundamental impulses are s t if le d and vital .growth crushed,
the result is a feeling of impotence in the individual: "The things

* \
that crush growth are those that producer ’sense of impotence im the
81
i directions in which the v ita l impulse wishes, to be e ffe c tiv e ." . P a rti
cularly destructive are instances* where the-indi vi dual ’ s- wi 11 is seduced
• . by a c tiv itie s which counter his fundamental impulses. has. in Russell

... ■ o .
mind cases where v ita l impulses leacf an .individual toward some creative
activity, (such as being a w r ite r ) , which is ’given up for'the safety of
■ .. a conventional career (such £s being a "journalistic hack)". If thisîs

• " r> ’. " *
done w illin g ly , it. suggests to'Russell that the individual has beense-
‘ .- duped by the rewards expected to accrue to him as a hack, that he has
• ' been driven by a-fear of the risks expected to befall him as a writer'.
•The problem is -not, however, resolved: either his fundamental. impulses

! ' -- 82 ' ■
w ill suffer frustration in the conventional’ career , or they w ill cease
>80
. • \ . Ibifo, , p. 239. I's h a ll consider in detail Russell's account of
..." . repression fn" Chapter 4. • - ' . .
- 81 • • •
• . •■ I b i d . , p. 230.
i 82Ib id . , p. 16a. . . . -
, ' " ■ '-t- . _ • '• -■ '
86
83 - >
to b ^ a pqwerful motive altogether. In .the*..former case, the re s u l t . ;
will&be an unending search, fo r objects o f sat is fa ct io n, unending because,
as long as the individual is mistaken about the nature of his impulsive

*' ' ■ j
motivation, he w i l l f a i l to find lasting sat isfaction. In the second
case, the result w il l be a complete crushing of his vi ta l .growth and a.
subsequent, total loss of v i t a l i t y . In Russell's view., this indeed is

84
'the present lot of the majority of mankind • - - lives bere ft of s a t i s
faction and potency.
.. Despite the personal, and social costs engendered by the .domination
of w i l l over i n s t in c t , Russell acknowledges that the w il l does have a '
ro le .to play in the-development of an integrated in d iv id u a l , even i f i t
is a r e l a t i v e l y minor’ one. His distinction-'between 'outward1 and
ward' w i l l allows him to develop a positive formulation o f this nole.
Outward w il l i s directed towards tasks in-which the individual me^ts
opposition o r - d i f f i c u l t y ; for example,' i n te lle ct ua l pursuits in which-

’• ’ ' -‘ • ' - ' '■ ■>-.
the confrontation with boredom and complexity are inevitable as they .
inhere.in the l i f e of the min’d. The discipline .required to persevere is
essentially that of an' act j f w i l l . Outward w i l l , moreover, is present
'in*v^l those who lead a vigorous l i f e , who are capable of consistent

■j ' ’ ■ ]-» ■
. s e l f - d i r e c t io n , who embody a central purpose; i t . is, the sine qua non- of
the integrated in di v id u a l ;
' * - * - • * ' - '
R3 ■ ' *‘ . ’ •
. I b i d . , p. 212.
84 '
Ibid . , p. 23-2.
t 87
The f i r s t [kind of w i l l ] , which is directed outward, is

called intto play by external obstacles, e ith er the oppo
s i ti o n of others or the technical d i f f i c u l t i e s of an
undertaking. This kind of w i l l is an expression of
strong impulse or desire* whenever instant*success is
impossible; i t e x i s t s . in al l whose l i f e is.vigorous,-and
only decays where t h e i r vital force is enfeebled. I t is
necessary to success in'.any d i f f i c u l t enterprise, and
without i t great achievement is very r a r e . 85 .
/ ? ' , : ■ ■' ' ' '.....

A lt er na tiv e ly , inward w i l l is coercive and deceptive; its'operation
generally pre-requisites a lack of self-knowledge:
Often, chiefly, from f a i l u r e of self-knowledge, a man's

w|Jl is'on a lower level than his impulse: his impulse
is towards some kind of creation, while his w i l l is t o
wards a conventional career, .with a su f f ic ie n t income
and the respect of his contemporaries
' Unlike, then; .the vita l and constructive character of outward w il l which
allows an individual to realise s e lf -d ir ec t ed tasks ( i' .e .Y tasks of an
in te lle ct ua l and s p i r i t u a l nature), the repressive and externally im
posed character, of inward w i l l at the most provides the individual with
a mechanism to cope with inner c on fli c t - ( i . e . , between the impulse,
c r e a t i v i t y ’ and the need-for s ec ur ity ).. As such, i t is to be avoided
except in those instances where the individual is paralysed by inner
c o n f l ic t . . '
S'uch c o n f l i c t , however, w il l be rare for the harmonious individual

* 87
and as such the e x e r ti o n ' o f inward w i l l is not .a necessary capacity.
85 Ibid. / p. 238..
86 I b i d . ,. p. -230.
87
/ Ibid,. , ' p . . 238.
Lest this seem too utopian,: Russell reminds us that total inner harmony
is an ideal approaching realisation gi yen' onl.y the correct social con
ditions : ' ' j

“ • *
The power to exert inward w i 11 when the 'occasion arises

' _ must always be needed by those who .wish t h e i r lives to-
embody some central purpose, but with' better inst itut ions
the occasions when inward w i l l is necessary might be made
fewer and less important.®^
Thus,.the integrated or'harmonious individual is one who w i l l experience
fewer conflicts between his impulses and desires ( e . g . , an impulse to
run outside and go swimming and a desire to finish the essay.which he’ is
w ri t i n g ) , since his l i f e w i l l i ncreas ingly embody his central impulses
• in a un>îed form. Given the unity of his l i f e , in par ticular the purr
su i t of spir itual goals based on.a universal' feeling o f love, he w il l
find lasting satisfaction in purposes which he has consciously considered.
The spontaneity of his impulsive or instinctual l i f e is integrated on a'

*h- * *V ‘ -
higher level with his s p i r i t u a l ' goals, thereby re-emerging in a new,
more mature, less fragmentary form. He now w i l l i n g l y pursues tas kt, the
importaince of which he perce-ives with greater c l a r i t y . Since his de-
sires are based d i r e c t ly on his ins tin c ts , inward w i l l , or the control
of one for the realisation of the other, is a faculty he rarely needs
to u s e v '
” *" •. * * "• *.
In conclusion,' I wish to emphasise one pa r t ic u la r point with re-
gard to Russell1s account of. the w i l l . In the. organic concept of the
DC j
•. - Ibid.., pp. 238-239. •.
89
^ i-ndividual, the importance of the w i l l in achieving inner harmony is f a r
less than in the l a t e r asocial' concept of the individual. In the former,
the role of tlVe-will -is* primarily directed outward towards the overcoming •
of d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered on the road to knowledge and in l i f e in ,

* ‘ ' ‘^ ■.
general.. Inward wil 1, the control of impulses, may prove neces'sary at ’
times i n t h e development of, sel f-disci.pi ine, but w il l l i k e l y become less
frequent with the ;a‘dvent'of equitabl e social ins tit ut io ns -.. In the l a t t e r ,
asocial concept, the w i l l is one. of th.e'constituent elements of the in-
dlvi.dualv Russell now conceives of the w i l l as the di ct a to ri a l source
of power within the individual,' by means of.which he both achieves an
internal harmony wi-th i n t e l l e c t and emotion and becomes "an effe cti ve
member of the community. At the same time, the individual must learn to
co-operate as a citi zen in order to .achieve an external harmony with

. 89 • ~ —
the w il ls of others.' These conflicting demands’ can only be realised
within social in s t it u t io n s , based'upon the absolute power.and authority

90 . •
of the world state. The state has the righ t to l i m i t the freedom of
the individual in both thought and action i n o r d e r to maintain the sur-

91 ’ •
‘ Viva! of c i v i l i s a t i o n . Given RuSsell's new st ar tin g point o f the dic
t a t o r i a l w i l l as the source of power within the i n d iv id u a l , i t is logical

i
that he should conceive of a world state with absolute power, as the only
; ' • v- '‘. ■ -.
* ‘ ' < • -
89 * ’ ' .
Education and the Social Order, pp. 11-12. _ .
90 Ibi d . , p. 27. ■ . ;
9~* I b i d . , pp. 27 and 243. v , *
type of i n s t it u t io n capable of preventing the w i l l from running loos'e
and-threatening modern c i v i l i s a t i o n . •'

. f a * _; , - .• : i
We have, then, two'qui te di ffe re nt co'nceptions of the individual •
and society. On the-one hand, Russell conceives of the individual as, an
organic being whose growtbr and inner spiritual

' • * . ,
freedom comprise his
. . . . . .
* * ^
foundation and well-rbeing. ."Th^sq; can ( ^ r e a l i s e d in* egal i t a r i a n , d e - ’
centralised, social i n s t it u t io n s . On the other hand, Russell conceives
of the individual as an asocial being whose wil l is the-“source-.of.both
^ hi.S individual and social-well'-being-but is d i c ta to ri al in i t s dejpdnds. ,.
In order to. convert the-competitive w il l of the individual in to/the co-

• »*
operative w i l l of the c i tiz en social ins-titutions'must be basard op the

^ ^ \ '•
a bs ol v e power of the state; which pi aces vs t r i c t lim its on personal freedom
‘The differences in these conceptions of the individual and society

" • .v '1
stem from an opposing emphasis which they at tr i b u t e to the w i l l . In the
organic ind iv id u al , w il l is important only with regard to the.development
of 5elf-disci.pl ine and the control of impulses fo r the sake o.f'an over-'
, riding central purpose,’^'uch as 1earning mathematics. Only at the highier
levels of. education does the wil 1 require coercion-by external authority.
In the asocial individual, wplV-is both his source of power arid hisMink
- 92 '/ '
with. the community.■ • The development of the w i l l is therefore an im-
. ■’ . ■ v- - - ■ .
portant aspect of self-development vis-a-vis both the.individual and his
’ relations with society. »At the same'time,' i t requires’ the coercion of
92
Ib id *, pp. 11-12.
external authority from an ea'rjy age in order to develop in co-operative
i " ' 93
rather than competitive, asocial.ways^ ' This'is because of its funda
mentally d i c t a t o r i a l ,nature. • / •
:'' i "' * ' ' / " ' * '
; The influence of coercive^ external \ u th o0 * ty results in limitations
• * ' ‘ \ \ • i ■\ ' .' / ■ ■- v -.
placed upon th e- in d iy i d u a l ’s idiner relat-ionship between his constituent
'■ . : VV . I ' • ■■ :
elements and his external relations with others^' .To take two, of-Rus'sell1
examples: in order for\ the child to behave in socially acceptable ways
by. being bpth clean^Tnd ' pu nc tu al he w i l -1: have to learn to check his
w ill when i t leads him in\ opposite directions and conform to the demands
placed by authority in'his, relations to%th.ers.. S i g n i fi c a n tl y , this en
t a i l s that he turn his d i c ta to ri al w i l l inward to control the.emotions
prompting him to be di rty and '1 ate. This process of control 1ing the
emotions by means of the w il l is ju s t what Russell objects to in t r a d i
tional morality because i t leads to repression in the freudian sense..
While some type of self-control is undoubtedly necessary in the i n d i v i
dual's relations with others, i t is unclear that this is the case w.ith
these pa rt ic ul ar examples*, at least not at the young*age that Russell
suggests, ’More importantly, the problem of. the control of instincts and
emotions by the w il l is more profound once Russell adopts the view that
the d i c t a t o r i a l - w i l l is a constituent element of the in d iv id u a l . A
di ct at o ria l w il l is l i k e l y to be constantly running counter to authority,
and therefore requiring external -coercion tq be turned inward to control
93I b i d . , pp. 36-38.
*
■Ui ■ ■ ■
I!/':/'- - '
i il,!
'■ I
92.
the emotions. The-necessity of the regular control of the instincts
and emotions ,is therefore almost b u i l t ' i n t o Russell's concept of the
asocial individual because of the d i ff e r e n t view that he now takes of
• the role and nature of the' w,i\1. ' •
I I I . ’ Spi r i t , •
The th ird element in the t ria d constituting the o r g a n i ^ g ^ i v i d u a l
is s p i r i t . / ' Russell conceives of s p i r i t as the. harmonising force between
. the other-two elements, ins tinc t and mind. Whereas instinct provides \
‘ ‘ ' ‘ ' A
. the -individual with a vi ta l and concrete sense "of belonging with others,-,
spirit, takes these instinctual feelings, and, by channelling them into • '
such a c t i v i t i e s as a r t , philosophy, and science, uni versaTises them. In
becoming universal, they cease to be open to the c r i t i c i s m ' o f mind, to
which they are prone as mere in st in c t; subjective and ci rcumstant.ial,

*
instinctual feelings in v i te the impersonal and objective -critique of
min'd: The spi'ritual transformation of i ns tin c t produces; however, a ' j
.universal regard for mankind'-- a universal l o v e - - - which combines the
v i t a l i t y o*f in st -i n c t u a / fe e li n g and the obj ect iv ity of mind. This is -
the base of Russell’ s. humanism and the en’d he conceives for the organic
\
individual's- development. . ’ r
. In this th ird section I shall consider (A) the type of understanding to
which Russell's concept of s p i r i t gives rise and {B) its rel ation through
the principle of reverence to education. j
. A. Spiritual Understanding
In this sub-section, ‘ Spiritual Understanding:, I shall f i r s t
\ address the relation between Russell's mystical experience of 1901, and .

• ' ■ ••
the humane ethic he advocates- in both ‘A Free Man's Worship’ and Prin-
ciples of Social .Reconstruction. I shall then consider the unity of
cons is tent-purpose provided through the pursuit of'transcendent objects
and the role of this pursuit in developing both personal.’eqtiil ibrium and
an'outlook based upon universal love. F in al ly , I shaTl consider the
Platonic elements within Russell‘s concept oV spir itu al understanding,
as reveal ed^fn hi-s insistence'upon the pursuit of goodness, truth and
beauty: - .-.
i. " Russell ‘s Spiritual Experience .
In 1901, Russell experienced a mystical illumination, which he
claims transformed his outlook on the world, his relationships with
others and the direction of his po l it i c a l a c t iv ity .- In-a bri ef moment,
while with A.-N.'Whitehead's wife, who.was-suffering from heart seizures,
Russell apprehended a vision of humanity which changed his whole l i f e ;
She seemed cut o f f from everyone and everything by <Walls

of agony, and the sens? of the solitude of each human.,
soul suddenly overwhelmed me. Ever since my marriage,
my emotional l i f e , had been calm and superficial . I had
forgotten all* the deeper issues, and had been, content
with fli ppant cleverness. Suddenly the ground s e e m e d ' ;
to give way beneath me,' and I found myself in quite
another region. Within five minutes I went through some
such reflections as the f o llo w in g : -. the lonel ineSs of '
the human soul is unendurable; nothing can pe n et ra te i t
except the highest intensity of the sort of loye that
religious teachers have preached; whatever does not
94
spring from this motive is'harmful,..or at best useless;

■ i t follows that w'ar is wrong,, that a, public school edu-
-V- cation Is abominable, tha t th,e use-of force is -to be' -
. deprecated, ana that in'human'relations one should pene-
■ t ra te to the core o f loneliness 'in each person and.speak
to that. ..'.The mystic insight which' I then imagined
myself 'to possess has largely faded, and the habit of .
' Analysis .has' reasserted' itsel f . But' something of- what I
thought I saw - in that moment has remained always with me,
• causing my at ti t u d e during the f i r s t w„ar, 'my in terest in
children, my indifference to minor misfortunes, and a .
•certain emotional tone in a l l my human relations..^
•* . ' "
■; V ..... ' ■ . ■. /; : .
This sp ir itu al experi^hce, then, had profound repercussions on' Russell1s
l i f e , most especially in his concern to help relieve the; suffering which
each member of the human species experierices.
Man's loneliness in an i n d if f e r e n t univeiê and the polit ic s of
■ pacifism are themes- that reappear in Russell's essay, 'A Free Man's
World1 . Here he advocate’s an ethos.for l i f e which combines renunciation
and defiance;I'Defiance is to take the;form of constructing objects/based
on tru th, beauty and goodness, since thesefcfiaracterise the universal,
and d i s t in c t i v e l y human aspects of existence. . A r t p h i l o s o p h y and
science are paradigm examples. But t h e i r purpose is not to-dominate
nature in the manner pf s c i e n t i f i c technique, f o r this would be to ac
knowledge the primacy. <of power and-force1 in the relationship between man
and nature.^® Their.aim, rather, is to produce a deeper, sp ir itu al

97
understanding of the universe and of objects having an i n t r i n s i c value.
V '~ ■■ ' ’ -V "■ ...
94.
The Autobiograph Bertrand, Russell \ George Allen and l/nwin, ,
London, 1967, Vol. 1, p. 146.
95 y
A Free Man's W o r s h i p o p . . c i t / , p..51 .
96
Ibidv, 'pp.:49-50.
^ Th i rl . n -51
Renunciation," which echoes Russell's p a cifist s tra in , is revealed in
man's rel ation'shipfwith others; i t is predicated upon care for a species

■ ", ■'..I/;
united' in a common)^te,. namely, death. Through this care - - ûniversal
•love - - the individual is capable of contemplating the eternal and of'
relieving through jurrderstanding some of the suffering in the liyes o f
others. I t is the. s p i r i t of the individual embodying this ethos.:’
. . . t o abandon the 'struggle for private happiness, to expel

\ a l l ; eagerness of temporary d e s ire /'to burn with pass'ioh
’ for eternal things - this is emancipation, and this is the
free man's worship. • And this liberation is .effected by a
contemplation of Fate; for Fate is subdued by.'the mjnd
whichxleaves nothing to be purged by the purifying f ir e of ■
Time-..A, : ' ■ ' ' . . - - •
In th,e face/of Fate and Time, -then, the individual/finds solace in.the .
s p iY it u a l/a c tiv jtie s .o f \ a r t ’ and philosophy, both predicated upon, good?
ness., and an impersonal feeVing for mankind, predicated upon love. These
comprise the individual's n nner. freedom.
The .type of objective understanding whi.ch s p ir it produces is ■
fharacteristi c of great religions and science. Both result in an 'under-'
/standing of the world which attempts to sweep away the particulamities
of personal desire in order to achieve an appreciation of the universal
and the objective, . While RusseTl consistently supports'the methodp of. ;./
science in fayour .of the i ntpi t i ve method typical' of rel igion, he, recog
nises the s im ila rity between \hejj^respective visions of re a lity :
98t . .
Ib id : , pp. 55-56. y f. Principles of Social Reconstruction,
p. 246..
Tryadvpcating the s c ie n tific restraint, and balance, as ' '
■^gainst the self-assertion of a confident reliance'upon “ •
^ /in tu itio n *-w e are'only urging'in the sphere of .know!edge,..
. ■ / that largeness of contemplation, that impersonal' dis-
/ interestedness, and' that freedom from practical preoccu-
/ pations which have‘been inculcated by a ll the..great
. / .. religions of the world. Thus our conclusion, however i t
'/ , may conflict with" the .expl icit; be! iiefs of many' mystics, -
/ . . i s i n essence, not contrary: to' the s p ir it which inspires
’ » tho.se beli‘ e fs , 'but rather, the outcow o f this very s p i r i t
as applied in the realm of thought.?? % ~ •
At the same time,- s p ir it. a.lso produces a Tove both f o r the world, and for
mankind; the individual re-experiences his instinctual bond with p a r t i
cular others as a universal love for the human race. ”
ii. The* Un.ity o.f Consistent' Purpose . ; • '■ ■”
"The consistent pursuit of objects transcending the instinctual ’ j
level provides for-Rus,sell the po ssibility of l i f e ' s unity. Such objects
are of an i n te lle c tu a l 1o r spiri tual nature, and thei r pursuit is typified.
, 'in the work of. the .a r t i st and - the' soi e n tis t: ' • •'
'What integrates an indi vidual 1i fe i s- ,a consistent crea

tiv e purpose or unconscious -direction*. Instinet:.alone': ■
wil l not suffice to give unity to. th e : l i f e of a ci vilispd
man or woman: there, must, be’ some dominant object, an
ambition, a desire' for s c ie n tific or a r t i s t ic creation,.-^qq
a religious principle, or strong andblasting affections v
Russell believes that, teleological .actions both, realise the highest
.aspirations and bring the.deepest forms 9f satisfaction. ...,ff
^ 'Mysti cism and Logic1, op,' c i t . , p. ,18. r'v
• ' -^ Principl es of Social Reconstruction, p. 229.
97
’ *v . ■ ■ 4.
. Instinct and impulse alone are non-teleological.; the 'actions they .
generate - - eating, drinking, love-making - - embody no conscious pur
pose , and are but p'rfmftivea*expressions.f«f need and preference, directed
• ; toward the a c tiv ity in question. .As important'as they are- for'the
• -development of constructive impulses, they are lim ited in th e ir scope;
an individual who performs- only in stin c tu a l' behaviour ■is incapable of
achieving fu ll internal harmony and total personal'integration; he is
one-sided. . ,Not the s t if li n g of instinct but its elevated-and exptfnSive
- expression is the aim o f the l i f e of i n t e l l e c t a n d ' s p i r i t . Its reward

♦ * ' '- ' '
• is the real isation of personal, inward freedom: "Inward freedo’m is in- ,
■ f in it e ly precious#•'and a society which w ill preserve i t is immeasurably

'* ... , . -O'
101
to be desired." Freedom, growth, .c re a tiv ity , harmony, integration .all
combine-’in the u n i t o f instinet,'mind and s p ir it : •

-• •\ - *' ■ .- * .*
‘ In stinct, mind, and s p i r i t are al l essential to; a foil

., *1if e ;
each has its own excellence and its own -corruption. ■
> v Each can.attain a spurious excellence at the expense of
the others; each-has a tendency to encroach upon the * .
others; but in the 1if e which is to be sought a ll three
. • w ill be developed in co-ordination, and intimately blended
' in a single harmonious whole J 02 r
But,- how is this unity td be achieved? As discussed, the main 1imita-
' tio n 'to the 1ife of the mind is that its aim is predominantly c r i t i c a l .
. The s.cientific. outlook requires* that- .the indi'vidual subject ’a 11. be 1fefs .
to skeptical scrutiny. The commitment to the. principie of evidence is-
' 101lbid.% p. 230. - -'V-'.' C v "
" ' 102I b id ., p. 208.
counter-balanced by the risk /of total cynicism. S p irit must be nurtured
to prevent mind's tendency to.destructiveness: • j1

•~v &Z
?■ " 4,
...mind, in its dealings w.ith 'in stinct, .i s .merely .
cri t i c a l: so ..far as in stinct is concerned the unchecked
a c tiv ity of the mind is apt to be destructive and to
generate cynicism. S p ir it is an antidote to the cynicism
of'mind: i t universalizes the emotions-that spring from.
' in s tin c t, and by universalizing them'makes thfenf impervious .
to mental c r it ic is m .^03 ’ .
The universalisatioh of emotion that- Russell has in mind is displayed
by the creative a r t i s t who expresses'certain, instincts which, through
his work,'become not simply his own but. those of mankind in general. •
Thus , the a r t i s t gi ves vent to feel ir^gs-which speak to an important as
pect in a ll of us: • .v
* 4 - ‘ ‘ .
• The l i f e . of. the s p i r i t centres round impersonal feeling,.
' as the l i f e 'of the mind centres round impersonal thought.: .
In this sense, a ll a rt belongs to t h e . l i f e of the' s p i r i t ,
though its greatness is derived f-rom i t s also, being i n t i - •;
• mately bound up with t h e - l i f e . o f in s tin c t. Art starts* . •
frcmi in stinct and ri.sesTinto the; region of the .s p ir it : ■
, religion starts from the s p i r i t arid.endeavours to'.dominate - ..
and inform the l i f e of in s tin c t. •* '. . ■,.' - -T
.Russell believes that bothâr.tistic and s c ie n tific work are genuinely •
s p iritu a l in a way that traditional religion &nd morality are not becaus<
•the la t t e r begin w'ith a conception o f man and. then, attempt to mould him
into unnatural, pre-conceived forms. Too; often this-has required the
repression o f in s t in e t ‘ for the sake of abstract ends. The l i f e o f the
' ■ - - t- . ; - - . i . - ' -. - - - ■
103Ibid.', pp.t 209-210.. ' . ' /. . . ^ ' v " . ' ' •
104Ib id . , p. 207. . ,
99
s p i r i t , in Russellvs sense, aims to bring instinctual satisfaction through
the realis ation of-c er ta in universal ends, part icu larly ’ the love,of
* ' -3 . '*
humanity. ‘
In general, i t is the balancing of the lives, of i n s t in c t ’ and mind /
which the s p i r it u a l l i f e can achieve'^within the individual. I t does so.
by directing instinctual love to..ends of a universal nature, namely, the

' •' * ■. •
impersonal love of mankind: • „' ’ ’
In order that human l i f e should have vigour, i t is

•• . . necessary fo r the instinctive, impulses, to.be stronjg
ancTdf-rect; but 1n order that human l i f e should.be -. V
good, these impulses.must-be dominated and controlled .
' " - - by desires, less personal-and.ruthless, less- l ia b le to -
lead to confl ic t,t ha n xhose -that are inspired by in - ‘
. ’ sti'nct alone. Something impersonal and universal
needed over, and above wha,t s.prings out of t-he principle - ■.
. of individual growth. I t is this that is given by the'
J i f e of the s p i r i t . 105 •. , . .
•’ • - • • * ’
• In-an analogous manner to that in which wisdom overcomes the demands of
confl i.cting impulse's., s p i r i t directs the individual"'s inst i nets- away .
' from the-constricting f e t t e r s ' of personal love towards a. universal con-.-. .

" r-
cern fo r -mankind. For example, patriotism or pa^ nt al -love, both cap
> - ’
become destructive when intensely personal; y e t , when integrated with.
the s p i r i t , patriotism can develop into love of a ll countries and parental

. . . *106 .. * .
love into reverence towards a ll children. , -Similarly, erotic love '
between man and woman can develop into a s p iritu al love, for all.humanity,
105
- I b i d . , pp, 216-217. .-
. 106 f * '
- Ib id . , pp. 217-218 and 221.
to ■
*.
■ . ' V
100.
thereby achieving a higher form of union:
The man who has the l if e - o f the s p i r i t within- him

views the love of man and woman, both in himself and
in others, qtiite d iffe re n tly from the man who is
exclusively dominated by-mind. He sees, in his
moments of insight,- that in all human beings there
is something deserving of love, something mysterious, .
•something appealing, a cry out of the night, a groping
..journey, and a possible-victory. ...H.is s p i r i t divines-
in a ll men what his instinct shows him in the object,
of his love.107 .
In this way s p i r i t creates out of erotic love a reverential attitude

• * f '
towards mankind; i t broadens the domain of intimacy-from. the particular
loved one' to the who!e o f humanity. Russell's conception of spiritual
humanism thus fin d s .its root in the Tife of individual instincts. His
universal theory is. thus ,r e a lis t ic because i t is based upon instinctive
tendencies already latent in the individual: -
The constructive function of spiritVenabl.es the individual to re-,
late to others in a joyous, loving manner: ' - .
, The l i f e of the s p i r i t . . .is in its essence as positive •

and as capable of enriching individual existence as mind
and instinct are. I t brings with i t the joy of vision-, V
of the mystery and profundi ty of the world, of the con
templation of 1i f e , and above all the joy of universal ' '
' love’J08 . . . ■ ;. * . •. , .
The impersonal feeling which distinguishes, the l i f e o f-s p irit-fro m the.
l i f e of in s tin c t opens. the ;individual'; to a sense of wonder towards
107 Ibid., P . . 221. •. - ’■V ,vV-; : ;

.. 108ibid., p. 222. ' ‘ i i ’v 'v .
101
the ‘profound mysteries- of organic life-; from this’'sense of wonder the
'spiritual’ individual experiences thewhole - - he feels at one both with .
his fellow man and with the universe. . ’
1 : V
The internal integration of in stin c t, mind, and s p i r i t realises .-
the potential’ of the organic individual : he., is rriotivated -to actions by
in stin c t, guided by in t e lle c t .in the manner in which he. performs them. '
and informed by s p i r i t concerning:the ultimate goals.which he is attempt
ing to achieve.' In the harmonious individual, these goals w ill be pre

- V * '-XT,
dicated .upon the universal love of mankind.
i i i . . Platonic Elements.Within Spiritual Understanding; / “
The integrated or harmonious person does- not suppress'his casual
desires-for amusement and play, but incorporates them into his v ital
’■■•V' "• ' '109 ’’ ' ■ ' ’ ’ ■
activi tie s . , In tellectual wonder, a fte r a ll , begins, with, the child's.
impulse of curiosity. Russell's critique of the insular and-disconti-
nuous l i f e of subjectivity requires, however, that amusement and play be
disciplined as a.source-for action: - , , ’ . -t T r
Subjectivism, the habit of directing thought'and "desire - ..

to our own states of mind rather than-to something ob- - '
je c tiv e , inevitably makes l i f e fragmentary and unpro- •
gressive. ...Amusement consists in a series of moments
without.any essential continuity; a purpose which unifies
l i f e is one which requires some prolonged a c tiv ity , and
is lik e building a monument rather than a child's castle
in the sand.1^0 -
.r ~' -
109 1 V >' ;. 1 f ,.■=■•-

Ib id ., p, 239. . \
114- •''
Ib id ., p. 240. : I T : .
I t w ill be" remembered that-Russel 1's main disagreement with the romantic
school of education'is his b e lie f that since a ll learning cannot be. fun,
i t cannot be based simply on the child's own impulses -and desires.' The
child must. learn to suffer boredom.and d if fic u lt y i f h.e wishes 'to deve
lop his in te lle c t; he-.must be forced through' intellectual discipline and
the' authority, o f .the tea chef to work* beyond tl\e pleasure principle. In
genera Tv Russel lib e l i eves- that subjectivism is the'outcome of the s e lf-
indulgent' l i f e which in th'e absence of concern for other persons and for
knowledge transcending the, relevancies .of s e lf separates thought from
action: such a l i f e produces an individual who acquires in ert knowledge
Subjectivism is a nat*yra1 outcome of a l i f e in which '•

there is- much more thought than action:" white outer
•things are being remembered or desired, not -actually
experienced,'they seem to become mere id e a s 3 J V
For Russell, thought is to inform action through the consideration of

.v ; ' ' '
objective ends and action is to -revitalise thought by giving i t an imme
diacy, otherwise absent: In this way, impulse and thought achieve th e ir
integration:'' : . t:.:
What is heeded is t o . kee_p ’thought in intimate union'

with impulses’ and desires, making-it always i t s e l f
an a c tiv ity with an objective purpose. Otherwise,
•thought and impulse become enemies', to the great ,
detriment of both .112
111
Ib id ., p. 241.
' 112
Ib id ; , .p . 242.
. \
103
The o b jective‘ends that Russell has In'min'd are Platonic, in'
nature: • God, truth and beauty.- Only "a l i f e devoted'to thei r.pursui t
promotes its own fu lfillm e n t; i t is this which Russell articulates as
his philosophical viewpoint:- ' . .:
• • 'The world has need of a philosophy, or.a religion, which

w ill promote l i f e . ..-..If l i f e is. to be fu lly human i t
must serve some end which seems, in some sense,.outside
human l i f e -., such as God or truth or beauty. Those, who
■ best promote l i f e do not have l i f e for.'their purpose.
They- aim at what ..seems like a--gradual incarnation, a
■ V- bringing. into our human existence of--something-eternal,
something that appears to imagination to liv e in a heaven -
remote from s t r i f e and fa;ilure and the devouring jaws of^ ,
Time. Contact with this eternal world - even, i f i t be
only a world of .our-imagining-- ‘brings a strength and a
fundamental, peace which cannot be wholly destroyed.by the
struggles and apparent failures of ouT’temporal l i f e . It
. is this h.appy contemplation of what is eternal that .
Spinoza c a l l s ’ the intellectual love of God. To those who
. have .once knq^n i tV .i t is the key of wisdomJ ^
, Russell thus commits himself to a b e lie f in an 'eternal world 1 and pre-
dicates the possibility of a tru ly creative and s p iritu al l i f e upon its

■- ' •* ■*: ' — — — - -
understanding. Only through opening himself to this world, can the ' :
■' ‘ individual free himself from the limitations of material existence (and •
its ultimate purpose which, is death); only through attuning himself to .
elements of the eternal, can the individual transcend the lim its of his
. human; being and achieve the s p iritu al understanding which unit-es uni-
*
- versa! love and objective "knowledge.
Russell's PTatonism inheres most clearly in this emphasis upon
113Ib id . , pp. 245-246. ! * . ; / :S
... ' objective goals'provided through ,the indi v id u a l’ s’ s’ pirit-ual under
standing. These objective goals (the universal love of mankind, the •
pursuit o f tru th , beauty, and goodness) constitute the final-''causes of
' . human action.1* In s tin c t and impulse--prov-ftie "the i n i t i a l , non-teleological

• - < , ’i ■ ■ - ■ ■
. causes o f action which s p iri t uni versa! ises, thereby gi ving^to the organic
individual objective ends'-to his actions. Tel eoTogi cal action consti-
-tutes the highest form of, human a c t i v i t y fo r the organic in d iv id u al. It
transcends both non-purposiVe instinctual behaviour-and any s c i e n t i f i c
explanation th at excludes reference to teleology by l i m i t i n g - i t s e l f simply
to .th e e f f i c i e n t causes of human action (such as feelings of .discomfort,
hunger, pain, e t c . ) . .
A teleological explanation of human action' presupposes th at there
is a subject or s e l f who formulates goals and purposes, decides which
are the most p ro fita b le to fo llo w and acts with reference to the goals
'. .he has 'chosen.- I t presupposes therefore both a subject of consciousness

; — — ‘— r— ■______________________ ________________ • r • ' •
-
■ aJid an agent united together.as const'1~ttreitts-of---theîamebJTidividual.
. . . .
There is a unity to such an individual, capable of the self-consciousness
« • • ' ,
' *. and r e fle c tio n that give rise to purposive action. I t is in te re stin g
: . t h a t ‘the presuppositions th a t Russell makes concerning the organic in d i-
vidua-1 are .precisely those th at he a rtic u la te s in the epis.temology of
The.Problems o f Philosophy. While he- argues th at self-consciousness is
only possible during momentary acts o f consciousness in which the s e l f
■ is acquainted with material objects,- there is nevertheless ah ego that

'• i.
does the. thinking: •
, When I am" acquainted with, ’my seeing the sun 1 i t
plain t h a t - I am acquainted with, two d iff e r e n t thin_
■ ' in relatio n to each other. On the one hand there is
' the spnse-datum which represents the.sun to me, on the
other hand there is th a t which sees this sensevdatum. All
acquaintance, such as my acquaintance with the sense-
datum which represents the sun, seems .obviously a re la.-,
tion between the person acquainted and the object with
which the person is acquainted. When a case o f acquain- \
tance is one with which I can-be acquainted,(as I am -
acquainted with my acquaintance with-the sense-datum're--
' presenting'the sun )-, i t is plain that the person a’c - ,
quaintedlis myself. .Thus, when I am acquainted with'my
. seeing the sun, "the whole fa.ct-with which I am acquainted
is . 'self-acquainted-wi-th-sense-d'atum’ J ^ '
I- am suggesting, then, th at there is a symmetry between the organic in
dividual capable o f ‘ thought and action embodying objective, f i n a l goals
and the metaphysical self- that Russell proposes in his e a rly r e a l i s t i c

■‘ . . - 1 n 5-
Platonic epistemology. , Both individuals constitute organic e n titie s
t h a t make teleoTogical action possible. Once Russel.T abandons the notion
o f an ego, or subject of consciousness^ in his la te r neutral moni-sm, he
adopts a s c i e n t i f i c explanation of human action in terms of e f f i c i e n t
causes only. This- is precisely the step that Russell takes in adopting
a mechanical concept o f the in d iv id u a l, which is d ir e c tly influenced by
neutral monism and his acceptance*of the methodology of behaviourism in
the explanation of human action. ■
'114 .. -•
v; The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1967 ( f i r s t
published Home U n ive rs ity.L ib ra ry , 1912), pp. 27-28. /' ,
• . 115 . ‘ . - v .
The symmetry between Russell’ s "religious and metaphysical s e lf"

is -noted by Ronald Jager: 'Russell and ,Rel ig io n ' in J.E. Thomas and K.
Blackwell: Russell in Review, p. 111. .
B. ~TlTe~P7ThcTpTe oT Reverence
In this sub-section, I emphasise that fo r Russell• the .
' acquisition of reverence is i t s e l f ’ a pre-condition fo r education:, f o r . .
.. . 1 both'the adu lt, who wishes to'nu rture the growth of the young c h ild , and .
^ for the maturing childjyvho is- to be s e l f - d i r e c t iv e . I shall f i r s t
analyse tb ^ various aspects of reverence and the relationship-bfetween
reverence and a u th o rity . I shall then point to the joy of mental adven
ture th at reverence inspires and f i n a l l y consider its relatio n s h ip to
both love and knowledge. ’As a conclusion, I shall consider the p rinciple
of reverence as providing Russel.l with a revised basis fo r lib e ra lism
and the individual with the potential for realis in g his growth.
'I ' ' •
1 ■. . • • . ■ • :
: y
i. Aspects of Reverence . . .
. . .
Reverence is essential for the adult concerned with education in
• t .........
that only a reverential atmosphere w il l enhance the c h ild 's constructive
■' development o f impulses. Moreover, reverence is a c h a ra c te ris tic which
the child needs to in te rn a lis e "rtr.order to acquire the in te lle c t u a l habits
to pursue knowledge, the moral hatfcfts to be s e l f - d i r e c t iv e and respect-

'■• . /•••••* '
ful of' the r i ghts. of others, and the capacity, fo enjoy l i.f e . Without
reverence, education becomes no more than a p o lit ic a l tool fo r the mani
pulation of the. opinions of the young: . •
Education as .a p o lit ic a l weapon could; not e x is t i f we

respected the rights o f ch ild ren .. I f we respected the
rights o f children, we should educate them so as to
■. . give them the knowledge and the mental habits required
/ i .
1071
fo r formihg independent" opinions; but education a's a . ..

p o l it i c a l institution'endeavours;.to:form tiabft’s and
to circumscribe knowledge in such a way as to make ;
' ' ' one set of opinions in e v ita b le .H 6 ..
The .teacher who e.xemplifi.esT the.princ iple of reverence i n h i s
interaction; with chiIdren .eannot;v''however, abuse .his authority:
'.'XV:;, . The man who has reverence w i l l not think i t his duty^ to •
'mould' the young. He feels i n ' a l l t h a t liv e s , but "
especially in human beings, and most o f .a! 1 in children, . X -
...' ....T -..- . something sacred, indefinable, unlimited^ .something ... •
ind-uwdual and strangely precious, the growing principie ' ';
of l i f e , an embodied fragment o f the dumb s tr iv in g of •’
the world. In the presence of a child he feels an un- :
■ account abl e hum ility - a. hum ility not easily defensible. - -
■ on any. ratipnal ground, and y e t somehow nearer to w.isdom X
than the. easy sel f-confidence of many parents and" .
.- teachers. 117 X ' ' . "
• • . . . . ’ ''' - v. ,
F i r s t l y , then, the teacher who has learned the ways.-of reverence respects'
the p rin c ip le o f l i f e embodied in the child as.something unique and a l - .
most sacred. Secondly, he feels a humi1i t y towards the chi Id which -js
not j u s t i f i a b l e simply on rational grounds, but. rather based.upon av
sympathetic understanding o f . t h e ;c h iId 's r e l a t i v e weakness,• coupled with
a realisation that the authority invested in him through the child's- :
trus t is his -res pons ibi 1i t y . Thi rd ly ,' s uch a teache r \is .:capable of .
an imaginative understanding of the child's potential and is inspired by
. 116
.
; - ■. Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 144-1.45. '

• 117 ■ T' 'V .
! ■■ Ib-idf, p. 147.
J b ^ . ; IGf . .R..S. Peters' 'Moral Development and Moral Learni ng', .

in which he w rites:• In other words I am adopting a position in morals
sim ilar to that of David Hume who argued for some kind of shared response
.amongst human beings, connected- with sympathy, which he at times called
, 108 \ S'
w' i
a desi re- to see. ,i - t . develop egl i n the • most const rue t i ve manner. • Fourthly,
/ this teacher'resists the impulse to mdu.l d- the- chil d as he .sees f i t , - b u t .
rather- endeavours to aid the- cfvild in realising his own natural develop
ment: -
;..h e would equip and strengthen i t [the c h ild ] not for

some outside end -proposed-by the State or by any other
impersonal au thority but -for the ends.which the chri-ld’ s •
own'-'spirit -is obscurely seeking., The ma,n who feels this I •
can w'ield th e-au th o rity of an educator without infringirig
the pri nciple -of l i b e r t y .120 ■'
Finally, the reverential -teacher sustains avspiritual respect for the..
chi Id in his care; he sees in the chil d. the unfolding of the human spi r.it
in the process, of growth. Such a teachef thus possesses the s p ir it u a l*
understanding of th.e world which allows him.to 1o-ve the chil d both for
his p a rtic u la rity and for his' place in the universal’: . *
^ The man who has the 'lif e of the s p i r i t within him...

; -" 1 - sees, in his'moments of insight, that in a ll human beings
there is something deserving of love, something mysterious,.
' i . ' V ’.: something appealing, a cry out of the night, a groping • ■
journey, and a- possible victory. When his instinct loves,
. -■ he welcomes its help in seeing-and feeling the value of
the human being he loves. Instinet becomes a reinforcement
- ; to, spiri tual i n s i g h t . J21 , - \
the 'sentiment for humanity'. Perhaps neither concern for ethers, nor
concern for onesel f can be demonstrated1as necessary, for the application
o f reasoning to interpersonal conduct. But I am assuming them as pre- .
conditions in my system of rational morality. The Monist, Vol. 58,
No. 4, October 1974, p. 545, v •
119 “•
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. ]47.. T '
120 -;V:' '■!'
- Ib id ., pp. -147-148. . ^
121 V v /\:
Ib id ., p. 221:. ' -V.v.;;,.- - ■'
As mentioned e a r lie r , the metaphor'.Russell uses to.'.'capture the
nature of the relationship between a reverential teacher and'the child
is that .of the gardener and the pi ants for' whrich he cares. For -the
teacher’s major aimVis to nurture the chilcUs innate growth po te n tia l;
• in cultural and historical terms, this requires the nurturaiice of the
child's capacity for s e lf-d ire c tio n , v iz ., th e .s e lf-re fle c tio n upon
' ra tio n a lity which defines intentions.and the w ill which realizes' them.
Such nur-turance requires of the teacher the s e n s itiv ity of the a r tis t
rather than the instrumentality of the s c ientist. The environment
. whjch fa c ilita te s the chi I d ’s growth is based upon an imaginative: ;
understanding of the"potential within the chiI'd and a sympathy for his
. struggle on the path towards his sel f-rea l isa'tion:. ”Reverence requires
. V ' imagination and v ita l warmth;'it requires most imagination in respect
of those who have least actual achievement or power." The teacher's
> active intervention in the child's development is non-instrumental in -
that i t does not intend to classify, measure, and predict^with a view
- to controlling the child's behaviour; rather, i t intends the comprehen
sion of the child as a unique, self-determining -being.
; I.n contrast to the nurturance metaphor with its evocation Of each
child's unique potential, a teacher may regard the child as a machine
having no d istin c t features>of its own and requiring simply to be plugged
o'nto.a pre-deteritin'ed system. .Russell bel ieves'this to be the ima'de of
'■•TV V::V.,;, 122 VI;:V

Ib id . , p; 146. . . . . ' — :1 : M . / ’.
ry > h : -' ; ^ ii o . . : ;•:; /
*. ' the individual" informing those who advocate oppressive pol i t i cal. systems
such as- " . ...mil ita-fism, capitalism, Fabian s c ie n tific organisation, and •
. .a ll the otfier prisons into which reformers and reactionaries try to
' force, the human-spiri t " .. In veducational terms, the analogue ..is a
• centralised bureaucracy,- demanding conformity and mediocri ty in both
> v. ’J ’ • . conduct-andicurriculurn. . .A,variation on the mechanistic metaphor is
^ ' provided'by a potter in relation to his clay. Here.' the teacher.’V r o l e
. r; v, as. realised 'in moulding the child into the shape which he -sees f i t : ; '■>;
a ' ■"■■■■ ' . ■ • ' • / ■ " ' I ■ J : . ; ” '. ■. ' ' T '
1. And so he gives to the child some’ unnatural shape which '. '
• . . .hardens with age,, producing strains; and s p iritu al dis- _ ‘
,; ' satisfactions, out of-which groW cruelty, and envy, and' . -
. I ;.... ■ the b e lie f that o+hers must'be compelled to undergo the
' ‘ same;distortions.125 ■ ■ ; ■
‘ Whil,e the potter is engaged in an ar t is t ic 'r a t h e r than scienti fife; acti
v it^, the mould'^Which jie uses is more or less of a uniform nature, Hi.s
; • .task i s ' to sha'pe the .chil d,. hot to enfiance self-development . o ‘Again, the
•analogue in education is a school-system which attempts to reduce each /
./* •
‘; child to a- common' denomi nator, anonymously manilfactured by the person
i '
in authorityt . / ; r ■; '."V-
/.Russell Vs resistance to the-metaphors of machinery and c la y 'in the
. 'practice of education is info-rmed by his b e lie f in the in trin s ic value.
123 Ib
t k'id
w ..
124
• Ibid.
'125 : - '
■77. I b id . , p . ' 147.
- of; each indi.yidua] , re'gardTess o f how he may adapt to the prevailyi.g
•. ' p o li t i c a l . and: social order.r I t is, his, commitment ..to' the :-|oncept oV the
• organic ,individual - - a being endowed with a unique and sacred growth
potential - - which grounds h-is preference for-the metaphor, of nurturance
and his ad vocation.-of reverence as a pedagogical principle.-
ii. Reverence and Authori ty '
When he comes to consider the question of authority in education -
Slid its relation to the pri'nci pies ‘ of justice and 1iberty, RTisSeil,
writes'-as follows:
'; _ The 'two .principles of jus-tice and 1ib e rty , which coyer a
great deal of the-social reconstruction required, are not .
by themselves suffic ie nt where education is concerned. ' v
... - Justice, in the l i t e r a l sense of eq-ual rights,vis ob- f .
• ° • viously not-possible as regards children. . And as for • ’ , r T
lib e rty ,' i t is.j to begin with,- essentially negative: -it
, ^ : condemns a ll avoidable interference w ith ' freedom, without
giving a positive,principle of construction. . But educa- -
tion is essential Ty. constructive, and requires some ' ..
positi.ve coh'ception of what constitutes a good 1i f e .126 ' ..
I f the child's principle of growth*is to be enhanced! he needs both to -
be free from the'interference of others' and free to pursue hi.s creative>
impulses w ithin'certain 1imits . THpwe-ver, -1iberty -is i nadequate- i n
Russell's terms as. a principle for education — particularly formal ’
education --''.sinee.i t .prescribes non-interference:but conceives o f no
• Ib id .-, p. 145. Russell l's .point is taken up'in a s lig h tly d if -

■ ferent way by contemporary philosophers of education as.'fol 1ows: . In
whatever sense,; i f a ny,,chiTdrep may be said’jto ha.ve-. right's of lib e r ty ,
i t seems that some, form of education i.s necessary i f they are to satisfy
■ ■' * *•■/''' ' T? 7 ■
positive aim towards which education is to-advance. The.principle
- . o f’ ju stice is likewise inadequate since, the possession o.f'equal rights '
is impossible --in.jthe context'of chi]drenârid-adults; the ^t-ild is to
some extent' dependent on adults for his wel-l-bein’g; in'formal. education
; he is the.charge of the teacher. What; then, does this imply concerning

... : ,V ' ' V ' ^
the relationship.between the. teacher and the child? • * ‘
I ri Russell's schpme, the. resporisitil i t y ' o f a teacher is twofold:
he hps' authority over the young because his task: .is to instruct; at the
same time, he ]i as respect for his ’pupils' freedom to grow towards 'thei r
own- self-directed ness,-That i s , the authority of the teacher is supple
mented by the principle-of'reverence:* “ • .
.C " v "■■■'■..' -.T"' v : ,y:. ' M v \ ' . v '"'V

Authority .‘in .education i,%- to some extent-unavoidable, and
those who educate have to find a way of exercising autho-
r i t y in accordance with the s p i r i t . of 1ib e rty . ^
. Where authority is unavoidable, what is needed is ’
- * reverence. A man who is to educate*really well, and is to
make the young grow into th e ir fu ll stature, must be f i l l e d \
- through and1.through with the s p i r i t ' o f reverenceJ 2S .
, Russell's general antipathy to authority as the antithesis of freedom =•
-X - W : '. :: - 1 'V
the-minimal conditions• of maturity for the- fu ll possession of'such
- rights ..; -Bpian 'Crittenden: Education .and' Social Ideals, Longman,
' Canada, Don M ills , 1973,»p. 77. ; \
, 127 ~ ■ '* ' •■- '■ ''. ■■■■'* ■ - •■■■'■
■ This is in'contrast to Rpusseau whp conceives of early moral
- education as purely' ’ negative 1 in the sense of .only exposing the child
to ideas which he perceives as useful to .the satisfaction of his needs.
Russell c ritic is e s Rousseau's theory in Education and the Sociail Order,
Chapter ’2. . .
■-v' ‘ ’■:■ • •' ■ v."
. Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 146. v: f -
/ ■ 113
f. . . .
arid of social justice is tempered-by a realisation t h a t A r t h e c o n t e x t
of educa'ti.on a* certain inequality is necessary. The stycretur^ of know
ledge- and learning,requires that 'the teacher be an authdrity.;" he: must_
d isp layau thoritative knowledge; in\his subject-matters,.and he must dis-
cipline his students 1 interests i.f he is to help them acquire know!edge.
The, teacher’s authority is a necessary condition for. 1earning• to . take, '
This i$;. o;nee>r.easdh for the great responsibil i t y which

. rests upon teachers: the children must, necessarily,
be'more or less at the. mercy of th e ir eldersând
cannot make themselves guardians of their own
interests .129' ■
■x.
•Russell ‘-s insistence upon .the importance of the-priheipie of reverence
. in-education is thus grounded i.n his concern that' the. teacher 1s necessary
authority become tyrannical, that i t degenerate into sheer power. For " '
in maintaining his authority as a: know!edgable individual, the teacher j
is in a position to exert i t over,the.student-as a way to make him be-
. come the type.of person he ( i .e .y .th e cteacher) sees f i t . • The teacher-
who lacks reverence may use his authority for. the purpose of controlling
>. the child's behaviour, rather than f o r enhancing the child's growth to-
t ’-' wards knowledge. . ' • • ' '.
- ;. r 129- .■ t ■
, . .. Ib id . , pp. 145-146
’ . ' V. 130 . ; ■ ' .
;• Similar dtst'inctiqns between -authority .aS authoritative know-
. ledge-worthy of respect and authority as power to control behaviour is
made in Bruce Freed's. Education and the Limits of Authority, The Univer-
sity of Western. Ontario Press, 1975, ppvy5 2 * 6 4 . . . .
‘ V v C x s , •. . : y ..•: V
• : ' '.A S A ' i ' . . I... I..;.' I . ^ A.
- c--
114
V A '
A /:
- iii. Reverence and the Joy- o f Mental Adventure'
a Reverence develops a respect in the child no,t only for himself and
other persons but also for the in trin s ic value of knowledge, tr u th , jus-
tice and the joy of-mental adventured ; he comes-to seek knowledge not
for any u tilita r ia n , benefit lik e ly to accrue to him as a ftesult (such as
.. the means' to a-livelihood or the exercise of power over others) but for
. the opportunity it.presents for the exercise, of his mental and s piritual
faculties (e .g ., imagination,'mental -adventure, self-expression^ d'ia-
. Vogue). Further, once the individual learns to u t ilis e these fa culties,
he becomes intolerant of those insti tutions-whi ch impinge upon them, •
v iz ., those which rest solely on authority:
• Thought,is subversive ,and revolutionary, destructive

' and te r r ib le ; thought is merciless to privilege, estab-
• lished in s titu tio n s , and comfortable habits;. thought is
,' anarchic and, lawless, in differen t to authority, care-
' . 1 les's of the w e ll-trie d wisdom of the a g e s .'^
Russell believes that the joy of mental adventure — the pieasure in the
free exercise of mind V- is common in the young and rare in adults be-
cause i t is presently s t i f l e d by education. The task of the reveren-
"• t ia l teacher is' to counteract this trend and f a c i l i t a t e the^blossoming :
of natural curiosi ty- along .creative paths: ' »
‘ ' 7 1 3 1 Ib id .; pp. 162-165,. ''f

■ 132
Ib id ., p. 165. ' —
133. . . . ; ; ' -a ■ i - ^
Ibid. . . c : ... .
■X
115
.w 1
»\ " .
The; same loveof\adyenture Which takes men to the South

Pole, the same pas.ston. *for a conclusive t r i a l ,of .strength
whi ch 1eads some men tp wel come war, can f i nd :in creattve' >\
thought an outlet which is neither.wasteful nor cruel,. . .
but increases, the digjvi ty ;.of .man by incarnating in l i f e " -
some of that shining Splendour which the human s p i r i t is
N»cinainQ down out of the unknown. To give this joy, in
4 greate r or yess measure, to a l l who are, capable of i t ,
is the supreme end for which education of the mind is to
■ ' be valued. 134 : ,
Only individuals who have overcome fe a jv however, .are;able to pursue
free in tellectual inquiry in Russell’s sense. , I f they are stil.1 haunted :
by fears about th e ir own. capabi l i ty and of th e ir right to question autho-
r it y they w ill- be'prevented from the enjoyment which marks fu ll p a r tic i
pation in the pursuit of knowledge: .. ,
But if*-thought is to become the possession of^many, not

the privilege of the few, we must have done w ith 'fe a r. •
I t is fear that holds men back - fear lest th e ir cherished
b eliefs’ should prove delusions, fear- lest the'institutions
by whi ch th ey Ti ve should pro ve ha rmful, fear 1es t they -
themselves should .prove less worthy of respect' tha‘h they •
hav&supposed themselves to be. 13.5 :
The work of social reconstruction demands then that fear be replaced f
with joy: "No ijhstitution inspired by fear can further l i f e . Hope, not
136
fear, is the cjfeative principie in human affai r s ." Education, in
particular, mus^ be imbued with joy i f i t is to produce'self-diêcted
134
Ibi d. » pp.. 154-165.
135
I bi d. p . 166.
- 136 - * * ' ’
Ib id ., p. 139. In On Education, p. 248. Russell writes of the
. need for education tp produce "fearlessly freej" individuals-. I shall
examine this claim in the lig h t of the manner with which he dealt with
the fears qf his own children in Chapter 3.
116 ••
- • 137.
and'reverential indi viduals . ‘
iv. Reverence., Love and Knowledge'
The individual educated in reverence embodies true self-di.rected-
' ness.:." ; .'';
So far.a's i t lies in a'man ’s power, his l i f e w ill realize U

its best possibilities i f i t has three .things: creative
rather than possessive impulses,- reverence for others and'
respect ;for the fundamental impulse in himself.136 / :
■ ■■ . ^
Where education awakens thejoy. of mental adventure, where i t intends .to ;
enhance the free pursuit of knowledge i t provides the opportunity fo r v
children to develop-creative impulses- fo r t h e i r adult l i v e s . In such • .
individuals, there is 1i t t l e
desire to interfere with the affairs of *
. . . ■ 13Q
others, to forcefu lly prevent others from-.pursuing'their own purposes ;
s e lf-re a lis e d j they exhibit a generosity of; s p i r i t , ,
Secondly, the reverential individual exhibits both abstract love
(a concern for other individuals as in trin s ic a lly Versus instrumentally
valuable) and a comprehensive, objective outlook or^ the world. This "
love, lik e Russell's la t e r concept of sympathy (On- Education) , is deve-
•loped.-from the child's instinctive concern for his brothers, sis te rs , /
companions when, for example, he hears them crying to a generalized
■ 137 ’ ’ ’ • '
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p., 167. .
.. 138 ■■ .■.-A. a :'.:V v •'" ■" A '
. J .'Pol i t i c a l 1Ideals, p. 14'. • ■■ ‘ • *
139 Ib id .', p. 24. . , • ' -v-
./
' ■ / ; ^ :■ ;
concern for others with'whom he is: not.acquainted;. i t distinguishes the
' ■ individual who acts.a.ccording to the principle of reverence.. This -ob-
■ : jectiv e outlook is developed from the c h ild ’s instinctive desire to
- knowjyis openness to. the whole of re a lity : • ^
' . . . t h e foundatipn of reverence .is this perception that

the present holds wi'thin i t s e l f the complete sum of
existence, backwards and \forwards, that whole a m p litu d e /
■■ of time,, which is e te rn ity .14-0 ■ /. . v ■• ••■
The. third characteristic of the reverential -individual is what
. .. • Russell calls 'respect for th'e fundamental impulse in himself'. By this
I take him to.mean a 'respect for one's own .capacity for independent
.// growth1, juch that one seeks out an environment in ..-which' the satisfaction-,
/• ' of creative impulses and the exercise of in telle c tu a l powers w ill not
■ . be curtailed. ■
v. Reverence and the Release of the. Principle of Growth
/ I t remains, unclear why Russell is so insistent in his emphasis
upon the principle of reverence unti 1 we understand that his purpose is
to.provide liberal .p o litic a l theory with' an enlarged basis upon which to
con^tcuct ap. adequate conception of the social and p o litic a l good. He ^
‘ makes this, clear in the- opening paragraph of Principles of Social Recon
struction, written as-a response to the breakdown of the social, oi^der
^Â.#.-Whitehead: Op. c i t . , ^ . / T 4 . The l i f e of the mind con

sists of thought which is wholly or p a r tia lly impersonal, in the sense
. that i t conoerris. i t s e 1f with objects on th e ir own account, and not'
merely on account of th e ir bearing upon our instinctive l i f e . Prin
ciples' of Social Reconstruction, pp. 206-207.
.118
brought aSout by the F irs t World War: ’
. 'n Jo me, the chief thing to be learnt through tjie war has
.✓'ên. a certain view of the springs of human action, what
they are, and what we may legitimately hope that they
V .. w ill become. This view, i f i t is true, seems to afford
a basis'for p o litic a l philosophy more capable of standing :-
■ erect in a time of crisis, than the philosophy of tra d i- ■
tio,naT lib e ra l ism-has shown i t s e l f to b e 'J ^
Thus Russell's b e lie f in the primary importance pf impulses in the moti-
vation of human action and the need ..for a new spi r i t of reverence, with
in which the public process .of education and p o litics and the general'
‘ relationships- between persons are- to be'conducted,-are closely in te r- •
connected. Creative, as opposed to destructive, impulses w ill only deve-'
lop in the young in an a’tmosphere in which the principle of reverence .
is dominant.. : vv;V;":
The realization of this principie requires '.more than simple non-
v.interference on the part of adults in' the process of maturation; i t
requires active care and Concern for the well-being and freedom of the
young, v i z . , the. provision of an Environment s u ita b le ‘for channelling
the c h ild ’s impulses in constructive a c tiv itie s . Not only is the chi 1d ^
, to be free from the interference of others, but he is to be free to.. .
pursue those interests to which nfc is lead by the natural development -
of both his growth and impulses; he is not to be conceived of as a pas
sive receptacle into 'which lean pe poured both the established customs
of his society and the'general^body of knowledge accepted by that ^ .
,-'U 141 Ib id ., p . 9. /f:.' "■ . .-
J ' society, .but rather as a unique being, endowed'with capacities, some of .
which he shares with the rest of mankind and some which are peculiar to
himself. These capacities can on.ly be forged into a cohesive whole '
.- • through an ’active process of developing the' child's principle o f growth.'
; Herein, lie s the child's deep, inner freedom which requires expression
in a c tiv itie s of his Own ohoosing,’ Such inh'erVfreedom can be mairitained
only where institutiqns are based upon respect for the v i t a l i t y and ..
1 growth potential of each individual. . v .... ' 'V '
: The ;pol it i c a l principl e.of 1iberty — freedom from coercion by ~ /
others - - a n d the educational principle of reverence — freedom to deter-
; •, ' mine the ends of one's own action - - are thus essential-aspects of per
sonal' freedom, both of which need to be respected i f the underlying
principle of growth is to attain its fu ll potential.
Russell' s introduction of the principle of reverendyis of greatest
(significance in relation to formal' education and the release of the .-.
child's principle of growth. His aim is to propose a theoretical f-rame-
work, which gives the fu lle s t .possible scope to the principle of growth ’
within the child. The p o litic a l theory of traditional 1iberalism has
fa ile d in this regard on two counts. F irs tly , i t has been largely in
d ifferent to education as-ari integral part of p o litic a l theory and of
. p o litic a l practice: "No p o litical- theory is adequate unless i t is .
' applicable to children as well as to men and wom'en.". •
142I b id . , p . : 143.
120
; Secondly, lib e ra l ism has fa ile d to articulate a positive .principle- con-
' sistent with th'e constructive task of educating the child. • The principle
.. of reverence, which is to colour the private and public a ffa irs of men,
is of the greatest importance jn the relationship between adul t and
child, in general, and teacher and child, in particular. • •
; • ' • The greatest'damage to growth occurs when the individual w ill ingly-
v assents.to purposes which are in fact at odds- with his own impulsive -
V' development: : v
' ^ : The things that crush growth are those that produce", a
’‘ - sense, of impotence in the directions in which the v ita l
. : . ■ imp'ulse wishes to be effective. The worst things are
those to which the w ill assents.^3 : \
_' y. The capitulation to pressures which seduce the w ill and lead the in d iv i
dual along conventional paths ultimately destroys much of the in divid ual‘s.
: potential for growth: "When the .fundamental impulse is opposed by w i l l , ;
:. . it is made to - fee] helpless: . i t hasvno longer enough hope to be power-
* ful as a mot i ve, ‘y A heal thy individual whose principle of growth has
been allowed to develop in an expansive manner w ill be. capable of inte-
.^ grating his,impulses with his instinct and w i l l . The development of
' this capacity, coupled with an a b il it y to unify the liv e s 'o f individuals
: with the communal demands of society without thereby fo rfe itin g in d iv i-
t duality is the aim of Russell's p o litica l theory. .The ultimate aim•

‘ • , . -'f 1 ■ '. . a - • * - •
~7.-------------------- 1 r_l T“ ; ■1 1 r , .--------- f ■
— "7 — 7 :— ------------ 1 ■ “ ---------------------------------- . . ’■ , 1.— 7" “ • -"r
■ 143Ib id . , ..p. 230. / ‘ - ■ ., ' ' . / ■ : •' T
/ • 14-4i b i d . , p. 232. ; ■
. ' J 145Ib id . , p. 227.
.121: ' : ' V •
of this theory is to maintain a harmony between the interests ' of tbe
•individual and those of society as a whole. In order to realise this
aim, .two pol it ic a l princi pi es must be appl ied in structuring the every
day l i f e of society:
1. the growth and v i t a l i t y of individuals and communities '

is to be promoted as fa r as possible.
2. the growth of one individual or one community is' to be
as 1i t t l e as, possible at the expense of another.14®
Russel 1 conceives of th'e second of these pri nci pies as appl icabl e
both in the private and pub!ic a ffa irs of men and:women.] When applied
by an individual in his personal relationships. with others, i t is ' the
principle of reverence upon which h is rfactions are based. Anyone who
utilises the principle regards the Tife of another as having equal im-
. 147 V v ' - i v . : ". - . y- . v — .
Rortance to his own. In respecting the lib e rty of a ll men, one thus
upholds the right of non-interference: the right of a ll men to pursue
th e ir own endsV provided that they do not thereby'interfere With the >
pursuits o-f others. This conception, which forms the basis of t r a d i
tional liberalism, refers-to negative freedom, or freedom- from oppres-
sion, poverty, and cberc.ion in both thought and action.. I t implies,
most importantly for Russell, the' uni versa! .-right to freedom of ex-
'pression: • ■■ _
■ 146 Ib id ., pp. 228-229. y
. I b i d . ■ .
• 148 - • ■■ -V- . - J;''--- ' - v . - r . yi
•The distinction between negative and positive freedom is made
by Isaiah Berlin--in 'Two Concepts of Liberty' .in Anthoriy Quinton (ed.jl: ;
PoT.itica 1 Philbsophy, Oxford .Un-i vers it y Press-, 1967. RusselT refers tg
the importance of not.placing any obstacle in the way of the expression
of thought in 'P o litic a l Ideals, pp. 63-64. ■
. . The'whole realm of thought and opinion is u tte rly
: uns'uited to public control:i t ought to be as free,
and as spontaneous as is possible to those who know
what/others have believed. 1^9 ‘ -
I t is , however, the principle of reverence in its affirmation of
universal and realizable good - - the harmony between in stinct, mind.and
s p ir it — that-copstitutes the basis' for a positive freedom. Such, then,
is thetask Russell sets out fo r s p i r i t ; : only s p i r i t is capable of
.. bringingboth the fu lle s t satisfaction and the inner harmony to the
: individual. Without s p i r i t and 'the universal love i t engenders, the
lives of instinct and mind rema’in in fundamental ~opposition and the in -
dividual in consequent inner discord. Instinct proceeds by cycles' •
capable of enslaving the individual with an intensity of:feeling beyond
which he cannot see. Mind is capable.Of objective thought that is c r i
tical of in stinctan d tends to cause the individual's instinctive v i t a l i t y
to atrophy. S p ir it universalises instinctive fe e li ng and .'objectifies-,
i t "Is a love for.mankind th a t is impervious: to the criticism o f mind. ^
Reverence colours the outlook of the organic individual, giving him the
means to achieve both an internal and external harmony by a ll owing the" >
fu lle s t scope to the-principle of growth both in himself and others.
As/Russell suggests.,' institutions based simply on the principle
of lib e rty are inadequate for the education of the young and the posi
tive reconstruction of society; they lack a theoretical principle, by
which to determine what type o f growth, and hence any standard by which
. 149 . ;i • - •
■: Pol it ic a l Ideals, p. . 66. C-f. Christian Bay: „ The Structure of
-Freedom, pp. 127-128.
to judge their own worth or to recomm'end change. Reverence towards the
child, fo r example, w ill provide the correct atmosphere for the develop-,
■merit of creative impulses and not those impulses which proceed from a
thwarted principle df growth and result in war, the 'unending desire1for
property'and the.use of the coercive apparatus of the state. .
rBoth the principle>-of growth and the i-nner .freedom stemming from
i t are pre-social in nature*. They -can be realised and developed within;
the social context, but both are a- function ..of the i8ndi vi dual's in trin s ic
nature,, ratherj than characteristics wfiich he internalises from.environ- ■
mental stim uli. .-.Certainly the child learns much from his contacts with
society, but- society- does not simply mould his nature'into any forms .
which ' i t s.ees f i t . Learning is a two-way process, in which the child
. "is both•influenced by and influences his environment. This is the reason
why reverence' and the .positive aspect of freedom are. so important in. . -
. Russell's account. In learning to be a subject, whodetermines what he
wants, -the child learns to^xercise. his p o ten tiality for growth by '
making decisions.about themends of his own actions. The.more sk illed .
he becomes_at pursuing a c tiv itie s which stem from his own impulses and
applying both intelligence a n d w ill in their performance, the greater
• the expansivenessôf his principle, of growth. Moreover, in the course ,
' -of this process, the--greater the respect that he acquires both for himr
I
. . ■ s e lf and for others
;'v . V ____— -___ "■
> ’ .' '
. , : -: - 150 Ibid.;,'pp. 5-6. . _
•' ^ I b i d . , pp. 39, 146-147 and c f. Political Ideals, p. 14.’
124
The realisation of Russell's two fundamental po litica l' principles
[v iz . the promotion o f individual and communal growth and the prevention

- ,! " 1 j Yc'o
of such growth impinging on the -rights of others ] presupposes two
further conditions. They are the/ fu ll integration of the' various ele- •
. ments comprising .the individual, on the one hand, and the integration,
'of-the individual'", with. his society on the other:
• In order that both' principles may be capable of being

satis fie d ; what is - needed, i s a. unifying or integration,
f i r s t o f dur individual -^1Ives, then of the' 1if e of the
community and; of the world, without sacrifice o f 'i n d i v i
dual i ty .153- .’ : - . . '/• •
Russell's conception of the individual is of a-fcerso'n free..to pursue his

^ °
“ own growth in. a self-directed'manner and capable of co-operat.ing with
• other members of society°who are likewise engaged in v ita l and'.growth-
oriented occupations.
• ' •* . .
Russell also .refers to this -twofold process of integration as .the
establishment of an internal harmony wfthinând art external harmony
between persons. External harmony results from creative, impulses, which
by th e ir non-possessive nature do not invol ve'"conflict with othgr per- •

(> .
154 . ' . ■ ' ' • ■ ' . -
sons. The co-operative nature of such impulses is to be reinforced
" ' ./ ■ : '
by a social 'structure in which men and women work together for the-same
• ' : 155 ' :
common purpose. ' . As we 'have seen, Russell outlines the nature-of
152 _ v.
Principles o f ,Social Reconstruction., pp. -227-228.
- 153Ib id . ,’ pp. ,228-229. . v

154 : .
, Ib id . , p . 237v . .
155 1■’ ' • ''
Ib id ., pp. 232-233. V "
1
125
. such a society in Which growth and .‘-creative-impulses are .fo rtifie d by
means of a political'and. social theory •which suggests''fundamental .
changes in traditional liberalism. ' ' 1
IV. .A Re-evaluation of Growth and S p irit .. ' '' ' I' . ■
-I have now analysed Russell's Organic concept of the individual
by considering its three elements: in stin c t, mind and s p ir it . I have
•v also considered the interrelationship between the three elements and
.-■the manner in which the individual achieves both an internal harmony
•. , • between'them and an external hafmony with other’ individuals. The
v i t a l i t y of ins'tinct is. integrated with th e la b ility of mind to think
' J- objectively by..the s p i r i t , which universalises instincts, and makes them' :.
fmReriti|)us to the -criticism of mind.
'In this section I.^hal 1 recorisider "'and re-evaluate two aspects'of
the organic individual that nre in.tegr^r to fits harmony and set
development. They are aspects of the l i f e rof instinct. ( growth Jytirhian
aspect of the l i f e o.f s p i r i t (it s role in producing h.arjnony); I shaV
, analyse them in the following three sub-sections. .F ir s tly , I shal-l
compare Russell’ s conception of growth with that of A.N. Whitehead and
; John Dewey. Secondly', I shall consider and’resolve, two problems in •
Russell1s account of growth. Thirdly, I s h a ll re-emphasise the role
* • played by s p ir it in harmonising the lives of in stin c t and mind within
. ' the organic individual. •

i
My aim in this section is twofold. F ir s t ly ,' I shall, show the
place that Russell's conception of growth holds within the liberal
tradition, by comparing i . t ^ t h - t h a t .of other prominent educational
philosophers in the same tra d itio n . Secondly, I shall place the
organic concept.of the individual in perspective'.vis-a-vis the.changes
. that .occur in the-concept Of the* individual in Russell's la te r educa
tional philosophy. \ ..
A. A'Comparison- of the Concepts of Growth in ttfe Works of Whitehead,
Dewey and Russell \
In this sub-section, I shall show that Russell's theory of §rowth_..
is imprecise in comparison with tho.se of John Dewey .and A. N. Whitehead...
Having b rie fly analysed each,- I shall in fe r that Russell 'is m'ore con
cerned with the general manner in which education is conducted (namely,
ope that stimulates growth) than-with the exact-methods"of"instruction :
. required to do so. - -
The concepts of growth and development are not.peculiarTtp. Russell 1
educational philosophy. Indeed, they are integral to the Tiberal t r a
dition o£ .which Russell \s work is a part-.. The stress'upon the f u ll .
development of the. capacities of the individual implies concern with his
development an^growth. These concepts are prominent in the educational
philosophy of two of Russell's contemporaries: Dewey and Whitehead.
In contrast to both, Russell i-s iojirecise- about the stages o f develop-
ment through which the chi Id .is - t o proceed.on the road to autonomy. J
■ v
■■■■■■■■■. • ' . ■.
Whitehead is in agreement that the i n i t i a l stage of education is that -
of' romance, in which the child's innate- curiosity is to be given 'the.
..fullest possible leeway. But he s'upp'-lements- t-his with two further. , \
stages: the stage of precision and .the stage of generalisation.
Each synthesises elements of .the previous stage and builds upon the
mental and emotional development of the child without destroying the'”
instinctive curiosity which provides-the motivation for education.
Like Russell, -Whitehead contrasts mechanical and human development as
follows: .
In the production' of. a mechanism the constructive

energy’ lies outside i t , and adds discrete parts to
■discrete parts. The case is far d ifferent for a
Tiving organism which grows■by its own impulse'
towards self-development. . This impulse can be',
stimulated and guided from outside the organism,
.and i t can also be k ille d . But for a ll your-stimu- ;
.. lation and' guidance the creative impulse towards
’ . , growth5comes from within, and-is 'Intensely charac
t e r i s t ic of the individual.157' • \ '
Whitehead recognises the conflicting, rhythmic demands- of free^bm and
. d i s c i p l i n e , relating them to the d ifferent stages of development and

• ' ■ - . ' \ - •
• • ’* ' .- *
offering a more comprehensive account than Russell's.
While both men concur on the^crucial .importance of s e lf-d is c ip lin e
and .its interdependence on the notion of 'freedom within l i m i t s ^ , .
^Whitehead explains how such-discipline meshes w.ith the cnild's own
^ A . N . Whitehead: Op. c>t., pp.- 17-19. .
. . 157Ibid. , pp! 38-39. .

158 "
cf. Ib id ., p. 35 and Principles of- Social Reconstruction,
pp. 158-159. , , ■ . , •
* * V
development.-Once the child has emerged from the stage of romance, in
•. e *
which he has been âllowed the opportunity to pursue his innate
curiosity to the f u l l , he seeks more precise knowledge, capable of ex
plaining the hitherto unrelated phenomena which have met his eye. The
• child pushes on. in his inquiry: " . . .getting to ;kriow the fundamental
'd e ta ils and the main exact generalisations,- and.. .acquiring an easy
159 - '
mastery of technique". While romance is in the background,.it is
not dead, simp-ly subservient to the demands of acquiring precise know- <
.ledge. Curiosity ..re-emerges in the fin al stage of development in which
. the student u tilis e s precise knowledge for his own ends. He is now<
_ capable of generalising upon the basis of his findings, determining the*
principles of organisation of fields of inquiry and relating such know- '
ledge to his own specific needs and interests: "The stage of generali
sations is the stage of shedding-details in favour of the a c tive-app li-:
cation of principles, the details retreating into sub-conscious habits."^
• Much of what Whitehead writes is certainly in keeping with the tone

y •*
of Russel 1's theory. Yet none of i t is e x p lic it in that-theory. This '
may be because Russell was more concerned with the ^spirit in which edu-
N ation is to be conducted than with detailed accounts of educational

j - ■ ■■
theory and. psychological development. Moreover, he1only spends one
chapter of Principles of Social Reconstruction e x p lic itly on education
a •
159 ’
The Aims of Education, p. 34.
150 Ib id . , p. 37.
T L 4 J _. , 7
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and one other on growth. Both are integral aspects of a ,fu ll-fle d g e d .
p o litic a l theory. I t is therefore perhaps unfair to compare his educa-^
: tional judgements with those:;made in a book devoted e n tire ly to educa-
tional philosophy. I t is hardly surprising that the comparison should
be unfavourable to Russell. I t is not until several years la te r that
he devoted two entire books to the problems, peculiar to education, in
which psychological development is e x p lic it ly , i f somewhat' differently,'
considered. . -V •
’ ' P
The point, is brought home by b r ie fly contrasting Russell‘ s account ..
. of growth with-that, of. Dewey. Dewey, lik e Russell, bel-ieved.that °-
.intellectual development could only proceed ;_o.n. the basis., of instinctive

.
curiosity:. ; '~ ,. ' •
.. Unless the a c tiv ity lays hold on the emotions and

. ’ desires,'unless i t offers an outlet for energy that
means something.to the individual himself, his mind '
• . . w i l l turn in aversion from i t , ‘ even-though he keeps ' •.
• at i t . 161 . ■•
Moreover, the notion of growth occupies a. central position in Dewey's
theory, since i t is Conceived as the'only legitimate and co-terminous
■ aim o-f education. For Dewey,' growth and education, are one and the same
process
. John Dewey: How He Think, :Heath Co., Boston, 1933, p\ 109.
130 ••
1 • /
Our .net conclusion is that l i f e is development, and

that developing, growing is- li f e . ' TransTated in-to
its'educational equivalents, that means ( i ) t h a t
t.he educational process has no end beyond i t s e l f ;
it" is', its-own end; anrf that ( i i ) . the educational
process ..is one of continually reorganisingrecon
structing, transforming Since in re a lity 'there
is-nothing to'whtch growth, is re la tiv e save more
growth, there "is nothing to which education is sub
ordinate save more education.162 " ,
Only where education- stimulates the'child's capacity to grow, can i t
be considered a Success. As the.-.Child develops, his growth enables
him to undertake tasks of- increasing d if f ic u lt y and to reorganise and
'restructure his experience. . The task of the school, curriculum is less
that of imparting to him.the accumulated knowledge.of past generations
than of developing in him the s k ills necessary'to u tilis e such knowledge

• 1 6 3
for his own purposes and needs.^, . Again, "the child's mind is to be
considered as an active, organism, capable of.manipulating the tools at
i t s disposal, integrating them with past experience, and changing it?
patterns -of thinkilfc, rather than,as a passive receptacle of in ert,
facts.
Thus Dewey conceived of growth not only as the founding principle
of the individual, but also as identical with the educational process
its e lf. For Dewey, growth provided the aim of education-. Like other
progressivists, Dewey analysed the stages of its development in some
t d e ta il. The -process of growth is dynamic, and requires c la rific a tio n

' /
concerning the various stages through which the growing child passes.
162
John Dewey: Democracy and Education, MacMillan'Paperbacks- Ed.,-;
New York, 1961, pp. 49-50 and 51.
163I b i d . , pp. 79-80. ■
m
131
• ■ As- an educational ideology, progressivism holds that

■:r, education should nourish the child's natural - in te r- .
' / âction with a developing society or enviroriment. . ;
• ' ‘ Unlike the romantics, the progressives do not assume
■s . -• • tlât development is the unfolding of an innate . . ' -
■. ' • pattern or that "tfje primary aim of education is. to
create an unconflicted environment* able to foster J
healthy development. Instead,' they-define.develop-
■ment as a progression through invariant ordered
sequential stages. The educational goal is the
eventual attainment of a higher level, or stage of
, development, in adulthood, not merely the healthy. ■.
. ■ functioning of the child at a present le v e l : ! 64 ”
Dewey's concern was to enable the.child to solve problems of increasing

f * . • ^ \ '■ 4 ■ ■
d if fic u lt y and, by integrating d iffe \e n t aspects of his experience, to
develop cognitive capacities of greaterxcomplexity. In' this manner,

i ■ ■■ ■ - \ ‘
the-ch rid advanced towards maturity. As he-^put i t : , -
l - - -4 , \ '
- Only knowledge of the-order and eonnettion of the

• stages in the’ development of the psychical functions ■
can insure .the full, maturing of the-psychical, powers.
Education'is the work of supplying the conditions
, which w ill, enable the psychical functions, as they succes
sively arise, to mature'and pass into higher functions
in the freest and fullest,manner J 6 5 - V
• Thus Dewey gave, analytic- consideration to the stages of growth in a
is- manner that is. absent from Russell's account. Each has a d iffe re n t •
conception both of what,comprises such growth and the manner i-n'which
its healthy development-'is best secured. For Russell growth is in an
/ ■ innate pattern whose unique development is to be respected by education.
'" ^Lawr ence KoJj/berg and Rochelle Mayer: . 1Development as the Alin
. of Education1, Harvard Educational Review, Vol . 42, No. 4,--November
^ 1972, p. 454. .
1
John Dewey and J. McLellan:' The Psychology of Number in R.. •
Archambault (-ed.): John Dewey on Education: Selected Writings, Random
House, New .York, 1964, p. 207.
For Dewey, growth and development are,the only legitimate aims of e'du-.
'cation and must be understood in their sequential stages i f education
is to be successful.
In conclusion, ^Russell's emphasis up^n the'spi.rit in which :ear TV •
childhood education is to be conducted is legitimate and consistent,with
■t he aims_of his p o litic a l theofy. Russ-e^ll is fa r less concerned with
the d e ta ils .o f individual development thah with the general principles
and human‘climate which give fu lle s t expression to .autonomy. Provided
that these are carefullyôbserved, the exact manner in which education
proceeds w ill take care of i t s e l f . The important'thing is to ensure'
that the fra g ile being of the child is not destroyed before i t has a ■
chance to bloom. I believe that Russell would have agreed-with the
‘ ' following: .
Growth and social interaction are more important than .

education.. . . In order to see th is , we must notice that
♦ i t is j in the whole, much more d i f f i c u l t to repair the
negative e ffe c ts 'o f unfortunate social”-interaction i‘n
childhood than to repair the negative effects of in-*
-s u ffic ie n t‘transfer of knowledge or information, a l- --
though they may be serious enough. .But whereas we carl, ;
in principle, catch, up with our neglected education,
i t is much harder, and sdmetimes impossible, to. rehabi
l i t a t e unsuccessful growthJ 66
*| Cf .
Harold Ofs.tad: 1Education, versus Growth in Moral Development1,1

!
The Mon 1st, Vol. 58, No. 4, October 1972, p. 599.
Ur*
• . ■ . . ' %,
133
■c ■ '■ • • : ' ■
B. ■Two Problems .in Russell's Account-of the Principle of Growth
■
■ ’ ; In this- subrsection, I shall consider two questions: firs tly ,
• how the'notion of 'an in trin s ic human nature is consistent with
Russell .yS emphas'is. upon changing the; psychological structure of..man-
kind; secondly, how l i t e r a l Russell's analogy is between biological'
and human growth. In each case, Ltshall suggest an answer consistent
with Russell's p r ^ ^ ^ s . The questions arise from the notion of
-..changing-human nature and the methods whi ch Russell, recommends for this
purpose*. I have-just pointed out that Russell regar.ds the principle
. of growth as an innate structure, or permanent,basis, upon which the
child's psychological development is based. As he puts i t elsewhere:
. .'.The humanistic conception regards a child as a '

gardener regards a young tree, i . e . as something
. V iK
; with a certain in trin s ic nature, which w ill develop
> into an admirable form, given proper soil and a ir
and ‘Tight.167 - .'
This, conception iiiiplies educational practice oriented towards the' free
dom. and development of the individual. T h e 'firs t question then, presents
i t s e l f as- to the possibility of enhancing free development given =a s t a tic
innate structure to the individual. ' . .. f... ■ 1
The inconsistency between Russell's b e lie f in human beings .
possessing an innate structure, which determines th e ir development, and-
his.'insistence upon radical change in "this.'instinctual structure is more
t / " ^ B e r tr a n d and Dora Russell: The Prospects of Industrial C i v i l i

sation,' pp. .274-275. .
I . ' .134 ' > .. .-
v - ' . ■ .. / apparent than real. Russell certainly believes that human nature can
be changed by environmentaj factors. He regards such factors of,major
' . • importance in determining whether the paths along which instinctive ■
r .. .-impulses develop, are construfctive or destructive. At the same time,
his emphasis upon the prin cip le 'o f growth indicates that he does not
■regard the constructive channelling of impulses as simply a matter of
allowing an unstructured 'tabula rasa 1 to thrash about in a random
•' I • manner in order to determine whfch avenues allowed i t the fu lle s t auto-
j nomy. This latter.conception of personal freedom is_based upon a view .
! "ofindividuals as- selecting th e ir own paths of development.without any
. prior constraints placed upon them. The process is a matter of chance
in which the individual forges his malleable and incomplete nature by
. . making his own private.choices. For Russell, individual freedomonly .
' h a s meaning ih relation to.an a priori structure which 'places constraints
upon such decisions and the {5aths of development which result from them. -
Thus there are organisational forms, whose origin is to be found in. the
shared character of human beings, within which the drive for human
freedom and knowledge takes place. As Chomsky puts it:.
The principles of mind provide the scope as well, as

the limits of human c re a tiv ity . Without such
: \ principles, s c ie n tific understanding and creative'
v. . acts would not be possible.. . .One who abandons all
forms, a ll conditions and constraints', and merely
- , acts in some random and entirely w illf u l manner is
surely not engaged in a r t i s t ic creation, whatever
■ else he may be d o i n g J 68
1fift
. Chomsky, 0£, c i t . , p, 50.
135
Chomsky asserts, that Russell conceives 6 f knowledge and freedom as a

-'J.-.'
■' v ■:■■■
function of in trin s ic principles of mental. organisation, which place
■absolute limits upon what can be known'. Given such a view., .freedom
has meaning only in relation to such.'constraints and is only tru ly
enjoyed when i t stems from the internal core of the individual, rather
■than from some external factors. As Wilhelm von Humboldt put i t :
. . . a l l moral culture springs solely and immediately .'

from the inner l i f e of the soul, and can only be
stimulated in human nature, and never produced by
. • -external and a r t i f i c i a l , contrivances. ...Whatever
• does not :sprihg from a man's free choice, or is only ;
the res.ult of instruction jind guidance, does not
.... enter into his true nature; he does not perform i t ' .
with t r u l y human energies, but merely with mechanical
exactness J 7^. ■ ." . : ■ ■■
■ - •' ;• <t t '• •
This leads us naturally into consideration of the second question
.posed above. The analogy between the cultivation of the young tree and
the young child is just that: ;an analogy which points to several •
silhi la r i ties between the growth of the two organisms, but which does
not mean that the two processes a re -id e n tic a l. The'key difference
between the two is that human beings, unlike trees, a.re both natural
and. cultu ra l, or h is to ric a l, beings., While man is a biological organism
^determined by. his genetic structure and environment, the moral culture
of which.von Humboldt writes stems from the unique manner in which man
interacts with his-environment. Unlike other animals, whose behaviour '
169 '.- ' ! • ■■■-' ' ■■■■•'•

I b i d . , .p. 49'.
Wilhelm von Humboldt: The Limits of State Action, Cambridge
University Press, 1969, pp.. 76, 63, 28, quoted in Chomsky: op. c i t . ,
pp. 54-55.
K . '■ f •
; . . .
; : 136' r '■
k
'is determined by instinct-and reflex and who simply adapt to their
environment, man changes.his material.circumstances through active mani
pulation... Men.and women-are, capable of determining th e ir own lives
and th e ir relationship both to nature and to each other by means of '
reflection and.action. In this manner, they are beings who transcend
the s t r i c t ly biological realm,.which they share with the re s t'o f nature
including plants and animals. In Order for the process, of education
to be successful, therefore, it,must respect this active aspect.of the
'. human mind and not simply, teach children to adapt in a pass-ive manner
to the particular social order in which they find themselves,. As Marx
put i t , in arguing against the materialism of Feuerbach:
The m a terialistic doctrine concerning the changing of

circumstances and education forgets that circumstances ' .
are changed bv men 'and that the educator himself must
be educatedJ'I
Thus Russell's analogy between..education and gardening is not to be
interpreted lit e r a lly ,- s in c e to do so would overlook the distinctive^"
features of human development.
As a result, when-Russell writes of the need to provide the child
with the 'proper soil and a ir and l i g h t ' , he is recommending that edu-
, cators and parents both provide for'the physical needs of the child.;
i
• anf approach th e ir task wit,h the kindness and care appropriate to the
subtle process of human growth. Only in an atmosphere of warmth and
11 \ v. ; •- , ■ ■ '
Karl Marx: . 'Theses on Feuerbach' in Karl Marx and Frederick
H, .Engels: 'The German Ideoloqy, International Publishers, New York, 1947,
: pp. 197-198. .■
. 137
freedom w ill the human sapling grow to realise its' fu ll potential.
Freedom, in particular,- is a necessary condition,for the maturation.”
process to unfold without the distortions of stuhted growth. Without
j t , the child w ill bend in the-directions suggested by the desires, of-
others and thwart his- own d istinctive principle of growth,, constantly
seeking the lig h t and a i r ' o f its own choosing.
C. The Role of S p irit r *■ .. . >■'
In /this sub-section I shall re-emphasise the role played by s p ir it
in harmonising the c o n flicting 'lives of instinct and. mind within the-"
organic individual.. I shall consider the implications of. Russell's
abandoning'the concept of s p ir it in his la te r concepts,of the i-jndividua 1
upon instinctual and mental development. ",I shall .also suggest that the
removal of the concept of s p i r i t minimises- the likelihood of-both
internal and external harmony, at least within the structures with
which Russel 1 replaces i t . ' .■ / V
The, importance of the l i f e . o f the'.'spirit to the organic individual
cannot be over-emphasised. In the .fully developed, harmonious individual
the s p i r i t initegrates'
1 the lives of instinct and.rhind, thereby ensuring
an inner freedom, and shines forth towards others in the form of uni- •
ve sal love. S p irit objectifies the! in stincts, focussing th e ir energy
upon objects of lasting value ( a r t , philosophy, mathematics) and enabling
them to transcend the. level of the subjective. Thus s p i r i t expresses •'
what is eternal in human experience, transforming the l i f e of in stinct,
without denying its fundamental character. It«also reconciles i t with
138
the l i f e of mind hy, transforming i t into' the realm of the objective.
■The result of this process is twofold.-'.On the one hand, the
individual achieves, an inner freedom, whereby'he is able to express
his. instincts in a manner that transcends’ the purely personal.-' .To this
extent, he is able to escape his own situation and speak to the eternal,
■ both in. himself and others. The vision that s p ir it gives to the* ' "'■]
individual enables him to balance the demands /of instinct;and mind and '
achieve, an internal, harmony between them.. On the.other hand;’ the \
■individual projefcts. his instinctual feelings'onto-‘the'whole o f mankind '
and*feels an objective love f o r . a l l other'individuals. This love •results,
in :.a. reverence-,fo.r the potential in a ll human beings, to grow in undis-
' torte'd ways,, essential, both to education and social reconstruction..' In
• this manner, s p i r i t gives to the individual a vision of’ what humanity • •
could becomeand the ToVe necessary for achieving an external harmony

* ’.ef* .
with others. ■ ..
The .utopian flavour of Russell’ s account, should not blind us from
recognising the 'implications upon instinctual and mental development of
the removal of s p i r i t as a constituent element of the?ih'di vidua]. The
implications in b r ie f are as follows: \
1. The la te n t conflict beMf'een in s tin c t and'mind in the organic con-

■■ .
eept;*®f^the '^^..vi.dCaP'B.6q6mes an open one. i,n his la te r concepts of the
- /
i n d i y i d u S i : ! p r o d u c e s an internal discord between them.

**». ’
‘ . . , In the meoh^ljgcal concept of' the individual, habits reinforce the

■" -' '■ • \ 'I . ■J &
fee ling of sponta\ie i ty stemming from instincts, pro.vided -that they are
■ '■ ^ ’ ■* * •" •
taught early and in a s c ie n tific manner. In te lle c tu a l development
." , proceeds' on the basis of correct habits. Habit now'perfo'rms -the task ;
‘ * ** . *.
■ of .integrating in stinct and mind. • Yet i t requires,'two-'additional fea-- •
' tures to, ensure its success,: infernal will-power and external'coercion
: by others. The-internal control o f'in s tin c ts by the w ill begins at- a
. fa r -e a r lie r age fo r.th e mechanical than for the organic i n d i v i d u a l , i t
‘ is reqyired-.at the lowerjevels of both i-ntel lertual and moral educa-':-

■,, ' • •♦ • " , » •
. tion. External coercion is not required at the lower levels of in t e l-
lectual education but for some moral education. In the cases of over-.
coming both instinctive and learnqd-fears■Ra§’se'll recommends-the use of
external coercion,.which results in the repression of strong feelings.
' ' •; > . I n th'e asocial concept of the individual the wilT-now occupies the
- ...I !. central-role of harmonising the other constituent elements, in t e lle c t
and emotion. The development-of emotions required th e ir free expression
• . • in,order to flourish in an-expansive manner. The development of
. ° . in te lle c t Yequires" a ‘simi la r freedom to search for objective truth and
r develop the s c ie n tific attitude.- Yet.the development of the w ill is
problematical* because o f ‘its d ic ta to ria l nature in the individual. In -
-- order to become the co-operative w ill of, the c itiz e n , there is. need of
. ■ • a strong external authority to control this dicta to ria l character. The
•• power of the world state to perform this task is absolute. The result
is increased state'control- over individual psychology, producing both
an external control of the w i l l , .in te lle c t and emotions and an internal
control by the w ill of the other two elemep.ts. ■ Thus the dominant'role
■' of the w i l l re s u lts dn a fuhdartentaldntefnaT\dVscord between the

/. ? t V V
elements comprising the, in d iv id u a l/. The dangers of the; wiTl over-
stepping its bounds 'require- control' ov/r^the individual i by the world -
state. ■' .w ' /
2. The-inner freedom, of the organic individual provided by the s p ir it
• is no longer possible once s p i r i t is removed. •
With the disappearance of s p i r i t there is- no’ longer an internal-

% \ : «
source within the individual capable of the objectification, of the,
'instincts upon objects of lasting value. The individual’ s alyft^ty to
.escape the p a rtic u la ritie s of his own existence is .thereby greatly
. diminished. In the mechanical individual hat^t might produce such an
abiTity but its source lies in t /e environment, no.t the individual's

' . : > . ’ • , * / . ' • /
internal structures In the asociaT individual, th'e, individual’ s s.ource
of power resides in his w i l l , which requires the s t r i c t limits placed
upon’ i t that I have mentioned. Lack o f such control produces the very
type of worship of force a n d s c ie n tific technique to which Russell’ is
opposed... A
•' •‘ * m'
3. The universal, objective love of the organic-individual for mankind
• likewise, .has no source within the individual, once s p i r i t is removed.
This implies that i t ‘w ill be a more d i f f i c u l t capacity to’ c u lt i v a t e ‘and
' that the external, harmony with others developing from i t less lik e ly to .
■ occur. • ■- 1 , "
* . • » ' " ' ] • • a '
With the’ disappearance o f spirit-th ere >is no longer an internal
source^c^pable of the objectification of the individual's .instincts upon
141
mankind. The indivi<ûa

individual's capacity for the consequent s p iritu a l love
of his fellow humans is thereby diminished. In the mechanical in d iv id u a l//
abstract sympathy fo r others is based upon the child's,physical sympathy
for the suffering of siblings. This; however, requires an-imaginative
leap frorq the particular, to the universal, which was precisely the
—-'role performed by s p i r i t . In the asocial individual, a sympathy and
universal love is called upon which contras^ drastically with the base,
nature of the rest o f h is ’ in s tin c ts . . Furthermore, the w ill cannot be
relied Upon to develop this love, since Russell is fearful lest i t t
' become too dominant in i'ts relationship with others and wish to'cont|'ol
/them. The external harmony with others resulting from uniyersal love
therefore, becomes more problemmatical.
in suin, the implications of Russell's abandoning the concept of
the s p ir it as a■constituent/element of-the individual are profound.
. They adversely affect .the in d iv id u a ls a b il it y td'achieve an internal . ••
harmony,, a realiSation of his inner freedom, a universal love for man
k i n d and a, consequent external' harmohy with'others. . -
V. Gonclusion ;
In this chapter-I have analysed Russell’ s.conception of.the '
organic individual with a view to understanding .its place within his ■„
•educational-philosophy.'“ The'organic individual possesses a fundamental
in trin s ic principle of growth which di.rects his development.along healthy
-paths of self-development. From this principle stem the individual'.s
142
impulses which, provided.that the principle of growth is allowed to,
develop free ly, are constructive.* The task of alT'social in stitution s,
. including education, is to enhance individual freedom, thereby encou-

' '
raging growth and ;the development of constructive impulses. I have
■ indicated that this criterion o.f the good society provides Russell with
a standard fo.r his social theory that taJces i t beyond the liberalism.
of M il l. In ’ surri, the criterion affords a central place to the full,
development of individual capacities in Russell'.s educational. and
social philosophy. Only institutions that active-1 y promote the growth
and c reativity of the m a jo r ity o f individuals are ju s t if ie d -in their
existence. •' ^ *
I have *aTso considered mind and s p ir it which together constitute
the other, two aspects of the organic individual. The development of
mind allows the individual to engage in objective, thought, enabling him.
to rise beyond the confines of-experience. S elf-discipline and the

■ .. 1 ' . ■ ■ ■ ■ • . ■
strengthening of outer-directed-will are necessary for the full-develop-
■merit of mind.. Despite its 'importance, the role of mind is essentially..
.* c r it ic a l vis-a-vis in stin c t. In order to prevent mind from s tu ltify in g
in s tin c t, the s p i r i t of the organic individual must be developed.
S p irit universalises instinct,'focusses its .attention upon, objects
of permanent value ( a r t , science, philosophy) and places i t beyond the
criticism of mind. Spirit-.harmonises the^conflicting* demands of instinct
and mind. I t transforms the instinctive ufge for community into a

’ ' •>*
universal love for mankind, andp^cognises the.importance of<going
beyond the subjective pursuit" of pleasure to which the individual is .
143
led by in stin c t alone.
■ . S p i r i t also furnishes Ryssell's educational philosophy with-a >
principle that enlarges its scope beyond that" of trad itio nal 1iberalism:
•' . . .. . 4 9 .-
the principle of reverence. Reverence enables the adult to nurture the
growth and freedom Of the. Chi Id without abusing his authority. The
/ ' ■ ' ! *
principle is an active one both for the teacher/parent and' the child.
I t implies an active engagement by'the adult in the process of growth
and an active development of the child's capacities to become a subject,
capable of determining- the ends of his own action.
Finally, I have considered two problems in Russell's conception
£>f growth.. By comparing i t with th a t'o f Dewey and Whitehead, I have
found i t to be'imprecise. By ex&mining -the’apparent inconsistency

4 * .&
between Russell's b e lie f in the permanent foundation of. the individual
and his desire for change in the individual's psychological/structure,-
I have found, that they are in fact complementary. Furthermore,Î have
emphasised the importance of s p i r i t within the organic individual as
the element that harmonises in stinct and mind. This contrasts with the
A
la te r mechanical and asocial conceptions of the individual, in which
habit and w.ill perform the task respectively.
In'sum-, my argument has been.that the organic individual .provides
Russell's educational and social philosophy with a basis consistent
with his -concern fo r reform-and the maximisation of growth and freedom.•
His proposals for libe rta ria n socialism find, th e ir jscot in his conceptiori
of the individual as a growing-being capable.of self-direction.. -The
'V
144 . ' ' '
f ' *• .* #
remarkable transitions that occur. i,n his la te r conceptions of the
individual .both determine and re fle c t fundamental.changes in his con-
' cerns about the relation between "the individual .and society. They
characterise a s h ift away from an emphasis-upon growth and freedom to
. an.-emphasis upon the necessity of authority and organisation. The
individual is no longer an' organic self-directing being but one.whose
■instincts are readily malleable and require the early integration t)f
habits learned from adults (the mechanical individual^.. Subsequently,
R ussell'sindividual possesses .a d icta to ria l w ill wishing to dominate

j 1
others. (the asocial individual). The individual's self-development is
° ' potentially at odds with the w ills of those around him-in society.
* ’ ♦. * ’*
• Education must therefore.transform his dictatorial w ill into a co
operative one through a stern process of socialisation. In:the
following chapters I shall trace these profound changes in Russell’ s
conception, of the individual. I-s h a ll argue' that Russell's emphasis
upon authority, organisation and citizensh ip‘ produces an erosion o f
. individual freedom and growth.
- CHAPTER, FOUR • • \
THE MECHANICAL INDIVIDUAL
-In this chapter I shall analyse the mechanical concept of the
individual in Russell *-s educational philosophy. .'The contrast with'the

' \ ‘ ■■■' ' . ' ' •
e a rlie r organic concept of the individual is p a rtic u la rly .s trik in g .
Before outlining the structure of the chapter, I shall b rie fly describe
the major features Of the mechanical individual, underlining th e 'd iff e -
rences between them and those of the organic îndividual. : -
.There is now no mention by Russell of the principle of growth nor.
Off the l i f e of the s p i r i t and only a few references to constructive and
destruc/tive impulses. These fundamental aspects of the previous con
cept o/f the individual are replaced by others. The individual is again
conceived of as a triad but now combining the thrê elements Of in s tin c t,
reflex and habit. The harmonis-ing element of the three is habit. The
I V ; ■ ' - ■' ' ' •• ■ . \ •; ■■■
task'of education,, p a r tic u la r ly early education, is to develop the
correct set of habits giving the child a sense of its enhancing hts
• in s tin c ts J ' Instincts,, however, are no longer grounded in the'innate
' principle of growth. _ Consequent; upon-the changes in the concept* of. t h e .
individual are changes ;in the nature of education. Russell nowhere -
.refers to' reverence as the principle guiding the .relationshi p between
adult and child. Moreover, he. dismisses the image of gardener to plant,
which characterised thi s reverential relations hi p i n Pri nci pies of
- On Education,- pp. 246-247.
.145.. . y , . ■■■■'■ • /
p. ^ ■' - ' ' ' ■ ' ■ 8 ’ .
•': •; " 146' .
- 2 ' ■■
Social Reconstruction. . Re ô longer refers to self-development in
terms of personal growth but rather as a process of acquiring the,

* ' ^ • }!'• . ,
correct habits, enabling the person to perform particular skillsiW ith
3 "
ease.Habits are Tess a matter of building onto the personVs developing
1 * / -*
•nature but of building into him or her the set of habi.ts deemed correct
by adults. The aim of education is the harmonious integration of
re fle x , in s tin c t and habit.
The desired integration of the ^constituent elements of the child
is to be achieved through the development of the correct set of habits.
Correct habits result in a. balanced and harmonio.us individual whose 1
. reflexes and instincts can find outlets whi.ch bring him satisfaction
and produce an affectionate, constructiye, courageous, frank and irite l-

4 .. • ’■• • . ' ■ •
... lig e n t person. In tellectual education, fo r example, is largely a
' • .. . . .
, matter of developing those work habits which produce the self-discipli-ne
to pursue increasingly d i f f i c u l t tasks. The process of habit formation
-in early education carries'over into the more advanced, stages. I t is .
• aided by the fact that the dominant in stinct in the child, the w ill to
power, ..gains satisfaction from tasks which become gradually more
d iffic u lt. But i t i s through the correct habit formation that this
•Compare, for example, the image of education in Principles of

Social Reconstruction,1 p. 147 with Russell's criticism of i t in On
Education, pp. 115-116. ■
: . . Îb id . , -pp. 33 and 98. •
4Ib id . , p. 246. .
5I b i d . , p. 109. . ’ • . '
development proceeds in a constructive manner.
What has happened here is a fundamental, almost com'plete, replace-
. ment of the concept of the individual as an organic being with that of.
the individual as a mechanism,' having a nature "... .a t f i r s t almost
incredibly malleable".® The concept of the individual- as a machine,
albeit«a complex one, is consistent with the methodology of the be--
; - haviqurism of J.B. ,Watson, which Russell, now accepts. One. major point
,> of disagreement with Watson is Russell's maintenance'of-the concept of
human instincts.^ And i t is this which prevents Russell's account from
being to ta lly mechanistic, since he thereby maintains a notion of
; natural, innate characteristics of the individual. Nevertheless, the
overall tendency of Russell's revised concept of the individual gives
' ^the impression that the young child may'be given a sense'of freedom. -
' through the early acquisition of hdbits, but ultimately his behaviour •
, is to be controlled by the authority of adults.
One further point of difference deserves mention. The main work
in which Russell advances, the mechanical concept of the individual is
On Education. The purpose of the book is to instruct parents and
' ... 6Ib id . , p. 33. V '' '

. ^ Ib i d ., and The Analysis of Mind, pp. 56-57.
O
In contrast to Freud, Russell maintains that the 'w ill to power'
or ' love of power', not sex, is the most powerful in s tin c t'in the
child: On Education, p. 9.8. This is an important observation to which
I shall return. >
. V : '. ; ■ ■
148
teasers about the education;of young children. Russell’ s views are^.
based upon theoretical principles and his own experience of educat/ing
his.two children, John and Kait. Unlike Principles, of Social Reconstruc-
tio n ,^Russell is concerned primarily with education per se rather than

•dK'
its placp-with'in a fu lly articulated p o litic a l and social philosophy.-
His focus is. upon the development of the young child and the manner in
'which education can-foster ;the correct habits'for a healthy adult l i f e .

y
• The structure of this chapter is as follows. I shall f i r s t analyse
' the const.ituent elements of the mechanical individual (r e fle x , instinct
and habit) and show th e ir interrelationship. I shal]- point out that
habi t-performs the roie of integrating the other two* so as to produce a'
’ "fearlessly free" individual capable of combining intelligence wj’th a
•happy and construfeti ve disposition, in the-course of clarifying
Russell’ s 'terminology I s.hal 1 refer to elements, of behaviourist and
Freudian psychology which.influence his analysis.
• I shall show that' in,.the course of'inculcating-'certain habits,
.notably the self-d is c ip lin e necessary for the control of childhood -
fears, Russell believes that other instincts require repression. At

■' ■ #•' -■ ’ ' - . ■
the same timei he understands'the damaging effect's which repression in
general can have upon the child. This ambivalence over the need for
repression is unresolved in 'e ith e r Russel 1’ s. educational theory or

l c
■v ... ■»••-
p r a c t ic e . The thedreticaT-basis for i t lies in'the predominantly
behaviourist methodology he uses to analyse the mechanical concept of
the individual. The practical implications of the necessity of repres
sion are made clear in the proposals which he makes with regard to
149 •
d iffic u ltie s experienced; in educating his own 'children. Fin a lly , - I ‘.
shall, discuss the'significance of Russell1s dropping the concept of the
principle of growth upon the freedom available to the mechanical
individual .• -"
In sum, my argument throughout w ill be as follows. Russell now
advances a concept.of the individual which is behaviourist in tone-and
implies a general theory of mankind as complex mechanisms, whose original
nature can easily be .moulded in a desirable manner by^the correct pro
cess of habit-formation. The repressive aspects of developing such
habits cannot be overcome even i f , as Russell suggests, the process
starts at an early/age when .the young child quickly learns the correct
habits. I t is within this context that Russell advances .the mechanical
concept of the individual in his educational philosophy.
I. Reflex "
In this sect-ion, I shall consider Russell's conception of refle x.
As i;he simplest unit of behaviour* reflexes are genetically determined
■ and require the formation of habi t to become part"of the basis for the •
c h ild ’s moral' and intfi&lectual development, . "
The notion of a reflex•action is commonly understood to mean: the
simplest unit of behaviour e lic ite d as a response to a stimulus, the

‘ ■- ■ Q
origin of which may be either external or internal to the organism.
J.B. Watson: Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist.

. J.B. Lipp-incott Go., Philadelphia, 1919, p. 233: In physiology we
• speak Of the r e f in e s connected with-circulation, respiration, digestion,
150
- ' f . The salivation which occurs in both'animal's and human beings presented ,
wi th fo^d and/the knee-jerk response in humans to -a sharp'rap just

' ■ ■ ' • , .’T.
below the knee are commonly cited examples. Russell believes that the
child was born with few, i f any, visual reflexes, such as blinking
which develops la te r . The .child's. movement of his toe?s is i n i t i a l l y
a re fle x -u n til he realises that he can move them at' w i l l .."'0 His crying, .
which is at f i r s t purely reflexive, soon changes in character:: "A. ■
. child's crying, is partly'a reflex connected with pain, partly an-.act
; ; . performed in the pursuit of p l e a s u r e ; C r y i n g , then, provides a clear. <
example of how a child learns to integrate aspects of behaviour-acquir.ed ^
from interaction w.ith the environment with, those aspects with which', he -
is ^dowed. '' ‘? .
. In general, the physical'elements of the'human body involved in
reflex action are the receptors or sense-organs,' and neural conductors \--:
passing impulses from the sense-organs to an effector, which may be a
muscle or gland. In this manner responses are e lic ite d -to stimuli
through the excitation of the n.ervous system. '<■ " .$.?■

, ; ■ . I*
" ; .v " '-
A child's sense impressions are not i n i t i a l l y ofÔbje.ctS t>ut simply
of various s tim u li. Only through regular association does the.child
e t c ., we mean by reflex-when used in this way that action takes place

under appropriate'.stimulation in some f a i r l y circumscribed glandular
or muscular tissue.' I t is an abstraction because reflex action -in the
eye, the leg, hand or foot can never take place in isolation. Action
is altered in other parts of the body- as w ell. a,
OiivEducation/ 1p. 76.

* 11Ib id . i p. 74. : .
—v " A - ^ ; 1 : - A
151
come to recognise physical objects as such, by integrating stimuli of
sight, touch and hearing into a complex whole.which he- identifies as an
object. ."Recurrent experiences are necessary for recognition, and
recognition is necessary before the conception of an 'object' can arise.
At this early stage, habit formation is based.primarily on the associa
tion of stimuli with either pleasure or pain. Those-stimuli which
, excite pleasure are pursued by the child and tfiose which cause pain
• ■J • -. . . ’ s • >
*• \
avoided... Pleasures are predominantly physical, lik e warmth and'food. .
^ .
I n i t i a l l y the child does not distinguish between physical objects.and
persons which excite pleasurable responses in him. As Russell, puts i t :
.. • - \ V " ■ . V•
' . . . f o r a.timej there is hardly-any feeling for the
". difference between persons and things', a baby which
is partly breast-fed and partly bottle-fed w i l l , for ■*.
a time, have similar feelings towards mother and
; b o ttle ’ ^ : v ' : '
In sum, reflexes comprise.part of the basis for the child's moral
and in telle c tu a l development and hence his knowledge of the external
world.’ They are not learned but part of the child's genetic inheritance
they require the 'formation of habit through the association of repeated
êxperiences in or'ler for the child to .id e n tify the stimuli effecting
the reflex as avrecognisable object. Such learning alb-first develops
through the'child's attraction “towards pleasure and aversion to pain.
Only la te r do moral precepts based upon the praise and blame ,o f parents
12 Ibid.
13Ibid.
enter into the picture. These I shall considerwhen analysing the
*. "•' *■
notion of habit. ' *' . T
II. Instinct '
; In this section I shall consider Russell's* more complex con cep.-.
ticfn of in stin c t in several sub-sections. I shall consider Russell's
account of the wi 1.1 to^power as the strongestînstinct in the young
child and then identify the sources'of satisfaction which Russell recom-
• rriends both for i t and o|her in s tin c ts .- I shall . consider Russell's diEx
tinction between constructive and destructive a c tiv ity and f in a lly .
define the notion of in stinct more precisely.
A. • The M ill to Power: : ,
In 'th is sub-sectton, I shall consider RusselT's disagreement with
Freud over the main instinctive urge of childhood. Russell believes i t
/• to.be the w ill to power, not sexuality.:-’ I shall poÛ to s im ila ritie s
- between his- conception of the w ill to power and that o f H.C. Cameron
-and Friedrich Nietzsche. /

^ V '
.RusselVs conception of in stinct is more complex than that of
^ x re fle x . We have seen^that visual reflexes develop some time a fte r b irth .
•This is likewise true o f'c e rta in .in s tin c ts . -Sexuality is a strong -
* instinctive urge which develops f u lly only during puberty and onward.’ i
through adolescence into adulthood. While the child manifests aspects
of.the sex in s tin c t, these are quite d iffe re n t from those of the adult
;both because, they are weaker and becauseit is physically impc^s'^le
' 14 . *
for the child to indulge in them. Other childhood instincts inoTude
the following: the well-developed'instinct of sucking,' whi chyenab l[es
the hew-born infant to feel at home in the .unfamiliar environment ^ u t-.

15 ' u / /
side the womb ; natural curiosity, which forms the instinctiver basils
of in tellectual development and is of crucial, importance to Russel 1.1
educational-theory^; fear of loud noises and of being dropped,- which
may be absent at birth but arise from the performance of c e rta in -a c ti-
vities at a. la te r stage of development and are in stinctive. A child •.
who is learning to walk, for' example, fears fa llin g . The fear arises
V " . . • ' • 1Q
front a need to avoid in jury, experienced frequently, during tjiis period.
Unlike.the irrational fear, of the dark- , learned from the applehen-f
sions of his elders-, fear of fa llin g protects the child-from harm and
arises spontaneously in new situations;

.■. .■ • • • v.
• The Freudian interpretation of children's play as a. symbolic ex-
pressionjof. sexuality, Russell calls "utter moonshine". Psychoanalysts
•' 14Ib id ., p. 167. ' S ' . .
. ' 15lb id ., p. 70. . ^
l 6Ib id ., p. 59. . ‘ •; ' . . "' ■ ' ■
^ Ib id . , pp. 50 and 81.

18 . ’
• Ib id . , p. 82. The la te development of certain instinctive fears
is analogous t o t h e latency period o f sexuality. ■'
, 19Ib id . , pp. 83-84. ■'• .
Vj ' 20Ib id ., p. 98. • \ . V -
-
. «•
* V
# ■f - 4m
\ * • 154 , : .V . . - ' ,, -
misinterpret the dominant in stinct in chi’!dren; "• - ‘
’ The. main instinctive urge of childhood is. not sex, -

. . but the desire to become adult, or, perhaps more . -
correctly, the w ill to power. The .child is im- . ' . •
’ . ;V ' . Rressed-by, his own weakness in comparison with •
■... * ' • older people, and he wishes t^become. th e ir equal. •
■ v;:- . ; 'r ' ^ '• / ; ' ;: f'■ , V
•The a c tiv ity of play is impoftant because i t mamfest-s- two forms of'the
* • ,. w ill to power. * F irs t, the child acquires certain s k ills in the process ».
' . of playing;, he learns to do thing§_, like skipping, jumping, and play-
v acting, and thereby channel the instinctive xirge aitong avenues which • - •
^ V ....,v! e n a b l e him'to overcome his' re lative weakness’ vis-a-vis adults. Russell
: concurs with the idea, that children’s play serves the bid^rrgical funcy
: ; “• ti.on of rehearsing a c tiv itie s which they w ill be required t o ‘perform:-in
■^ ■ la te r lisfe.^^ . This function they share with other species of the animal
. kin^Som.. Second, play enables children to indulge in fantasy arid act
out th e ir desire to be. adult. Through the make-believe off-, play they are i
. '*■ ■■■:.-. able to compensate f o r t h e i r actual weakness by becoming powerful :
■' v '.I figures of the imagination. This joy in pretence may indeed be an •ex-..
‘ .■. pression of the w ill to power as well as of other instinctive impulses.

. ..y . ^ - ■. 1 ■' , ■
• ^ J o y intirama and natural curiosity, are sim ilarly instinctive elements r
in play: MI t^ rr^ e v e ry strong impulse in the child's l i f e is reflected
in play; power Ts only dominaht in his ^Tay in proportion a s , i t is-
dominant in his desires." Thus-, Russell acknowledges the importance
^ Ib id . The doncept of the w ill to power o r the desire for s e lf-

. -assertion is used in the same sense;by Alfred Adler: Practice and
> Theory of Individual Psychology, London, 19.24, especially p. 59ff.
On Education, p. 97. . . ■ .v'/-
.v . ** - ?3I b id . , p. , 100.
155
of the w ill to'p&wer but does not wish to reduce the childhood a c tiv ity
of pi ay to an expressi on of thisJone i nstinctl :
'""'When introducing_the notion of. the. w ill to power, Russell, refers
to rR.C. Camerori's-The Nervous. Child . Cameron in fact calls the ins
tin c t 'the love of power1, which he defines, as follows: •
Perhaps -it would be better to call i t his love of being

• in the centre of the picture. I t is h,is constant de-:
■. sire to make his, environment revol ve aroun'd; him and to. , •
a ttra c t all. attention to himself .25
■Camerons lik-'e V v ' :vV

Russell, claims that
. -
"children are .past masters in
. .
•:
. p f. ••
attracting attention" andbeTieves that the love of power is the
strongest force operant in the child who refuses food. Despite th e ir
agreement over the motivation of much Of the child's behaviour, ■Russell
extends the meaning-o.f th& concept and changes its. t i t l e '1 .Taking these
j o i n t s in turn, he conceives of the instinctual, urge not only as the...
; child's, desire to. controfîls environment and 'attraptâ$tention, but '
also, to imitate adults a/ncfbecome th e ir equal.. By- v i^ ^ e of th e ir
‘ strength and s k i l l , a‘c wlts%re capable-of realising th e ir po ten tialities

■ \V . . ■ "... : " 'T v • ; .' :
quite simply. This impresses the child who-seeks to-overcome his own
■■"'■■* v' ' ■;28 ''
weakness by exerting his capacity for power.
• • Ib id .,. p. 98n. V. • " >

• H.C. Cameron: The Nervous Child. Oxford University Press,
191.9, p.. .32. . • •■
26I b i d . , p. 33.
27Ib id ., p. 76. ' . V
pQ ;; / ’ :
I shall examine Russell's. conceptions of p.dwen and the w ill and
th e ir place in chil^ development in the •■fetl owing chapter on the asocial
individual. 1, • .
’ 156
Russell's use of the term 'w ill to power' indicates two things.
F irs t, a disagreement with Cameron, who insists that negative behaviour
in the young child' does not imply that he possesses a strong w ill to be
V .. •• ■ ■" ‘ ■
opposed and resisted. Cameron asser-ts that strength o f’ w ill is one of
the last powers, to develop in human beings and that the child's behaviour
sifoply exhibits a desire to produce fam iliar tones o f reproof from his
parents, thereby attracting attention.. Russell, on the pther hand, ‘
implies that children at an early age perceive the difference in power
between adults and themselves and desire to exercise such power. The
,■child in stinctively desires to exercise his w ill in the performance.of
. adult a c tiv ity from.an earlyâge. - '
Second, there are obvious Nietzschean overtones to the term 'w ill
A r t
to power'. Russell was undoubtedly aware of Nietzsche's work. Des

/ pite differences between the two philosophers th e ir views of the main .
in stinctive drive ,1of human beings are not.at a ll dissimilar. For
Nietzsche, thewil.l to power reveals i t s e l f . i n the universe as a whole,'
not simpTy »in human beings.. He defines i t as: ■

* •' * . I
;; y ..'.an inner w ill ...which I designate a h '‘w ill to

* power', i . e . as an insatiable desire to manifest
power; or as the ^jnployment and exercise of power,
f as a creative drive, e tc . 3-1 ^
Ib id ., pp. 34-35.
30 .
Russell refers to Nietzsche to 'A Free Man's Worship', OR- c i t . ,
p. 50 as a thinker'who wishes to maximise* the use of power, which he
wishes to minimise. • ■. * , ’ -
31 ' '■ ,
Friedrich Nietzsche: The Will to Power (Walter,Kaufmann, ed.)
Weidenfeld and Nicplson, London, 1967, p. 333, .
(. ;
' In human beings, the: difference between a strong and weak willed.
• ’■
individual lies in' the a b ilit y of the former to unify his impulses
. under one dominant impulse,‘not in some abstract capacity called 'the ‘
' w ill.': ~ •
The multitude and'disgregation o f impulses and the

lack.of any systematic order among-them result in ^
- 'weak wi l l ' : their coordination under a single pre
dominant impulse results in a 'strong wi l l ' : in the
f i r s t -case i»t is the oscillation and the lack of
gravity; in the la t t e r , the precision and c la r it y of
the dire c tio n .32
.Nietzsche believes that the w ill to power finds pleasure in the. constant
resistance i t meets from' others who oppose i t . The struggle for mastery
gives pleasure to the:individual, but i t is the exercise of power which

. ' . . 33 •’ ’
is its primary aim. Nietzsche believes that the dominant in stinct ■
governing human actions is the w ill to power, which seeks satisfaction
in the a c tiv itie s which the individual chooses. 'According to Russell,
a the exasperated child screams out in the night primarily out of a
desire to a ttra c t attention from his parents, thereby'exercising power •
over them. Desire for the satisfaction of.his appetite for food is
, .. ■ quiteJ:d e fin ite ly secondary, arid possibly absent. Unlike Nietzsche,' -
however, Russell
♦ does not reduce
. a ll human
* a c tiv ity* to manifestations
. . ‘i
• . of the w ill to power but believes that other types of motivation-are .
l' - . '
■ 34 ’
present in human beings. . Nor does he believe that i t is a,- governing
^ , 32Ib id . , pp. 28-29. ... V - ‘

33I b i d . , p. 370. . \ • . . .
. 34
Later Russell adopts the view that power.is the fundamental con-'
cept -iri social science and the chief motivation of human action: I
*" shall be concerned to prove that the fundamental• concept in isocial
, ' 35
principle; operant in nature as a whole.
B. Sources of Satisfaction for the Will to Power

*
In this sub-section I shall outline the forms of'satisfaction open
to the instincts using the w ill tc^lpower as a paradigm. In general,
the development of constructive s k ills leads to the useful employment
of in stin c ts . •
The aini.of Russell's educational philosophy is to.teach the child
s k ills which enable him to pursue interests stemming from; his instincts:
v
Education consists in the cultivation of instincts;

■ ' not in th e ir suppression. Human instincts are very
vague, and can be satisfied in a great variety .of
ways. Most of them requirey/for th e ir g ra tific a tio n ,
some kind•of s k i l l . Cricket and\baseball satisfy
the same in stin c t, but ^boy w ill play whichever he
. has learnt'.. Thus the&ecret of instruction, in so
fa r as i t bears upon dnara.cter, is to give a man such
kinds of ski 11 as shall lead to his employing his
in s tin c ts .u s e fu lly .36
The problem of the employment of instincts in useful and gratifying .
tasks, is precisely the one Russell faced in the development of the
organic individual.. There the individual's, principle of growth provides
the instinctive basis for the f u ll and constructive development of his
science is Power in the same sense in which.Energy is the fundamental

concept in Physics.... .Love of power, [ is ] ...o n e of the strongest of
human motives. IPower: A New Social*Analysis,' pp. 12 and 14.
^ ' A Free Man's Worship', 0£. c i t . , pp. 50-51..

Ôn Education, p. 102. ,
instinctive impulses. Now the vague nature of human instincts is no •
longer grounded on this principle but allows fo r a diversity in the
manner in which instinct, can be satis fie d . Consideration o f the methods
that Russell suggests for the cultivation of the instinct of the w ill
' to power c la r ifie s this notion.; :r ^ .
, At an early age the child indulges his w ill to power, iid games where
he imagines himse’l f to' be stronger than he is . Such fantasy is both .■■■'
normal and healthy. • Moreover, Russell encourages these pursuits even
when they appeal to the darker si.de of the child's imagination. Id en ti-
fh'cation with the villainous Bluebeard cutting o ff his wives 1 heads or
enjoyment at some of the more cruel and bizarre children .1s fairy tales -
is not per se destructive. * Stimulation of the child's imagination is .
a necessity for a fu ll'a n d active l i f e . Suppression of this instinct •
by parental authority w ill re s u lt;in an emotionally stunted child in-
capable of feeling or acting strongly. Russell- is not advocating* the
practical indulgence of savage and cruel instincts but acknowledging'
th e ir existence and suggesting that they be encouraged in specific"ways.
Provided that the child acquires. the. s k i l l s f o r u tilis in g instincts in
waysôther.than fighting,, g ra tific a tio n of the w i l 1 to power is achieved
in constructive a c tiv itie s : • - ”
The in s tin c t of power, which , in the child is/.crudely V*v:

satisfied by id entification,w ith Bluebeard-/ca!n find
in la te r l i f e refined satisfaction by s c ie n t if ic -
*- ■■ •’ ■"
, L,; •— ------ : ..----- -7— ;— ——:----------------------- ——--- -—----- ;--------— ------- "
-
; 37Ib id . , p. 103. *
■ discovery, or a r t i s t ic creation,., or the creation and *
' education of splendid children, or any one of a thou7 . .
. sand useful a c t i v i t i e s . 38
The transition from childhood fantasy to constructive a c tiv ity is,
.. f a c ilita t e d by the nature of the w ill to’ power. -The child imitates
adults'and: wishes to become one by translating'his imaginative- asptra-
tio.ns into fact. -He recognises the superior strength and knowledge
. of adults and desires to acquire.these capacities. Moreover, his wil'T
tb-power gains satisfaction from a c tiv itie s that he. finds increasingly
d iffic u lt.' •• ' '■ , : • " .
. ■ What we can do eas.ily.no longer gives us a-sense of

. power; i t is the newly-acquired sk ill., or t h e .s k ill \
v , - about which we are doubtful, that gives us the t h r i l l
of success. 'That is why the w ill to power is so
.. immeasurably adapatable according to the type o f ' i
s k ill which is. taught .40 . , '
I f the c h ild .is exposed to t h e - s k ill s 'o f hunting and k illin g then he is
lik e ly to develop a taste for blood and gore in which he w ill conti-nue
to satisfy his w ill to power as he matures. The competitive games of
the B ritish Public Schools, supposedly played for reasons, of health,
. character and cooperation,-.expose the child to the competition appro
priate to fighting wars, not to the maintenance of healthy social
're la tio n s .41.. Crude, ..untrained instincts unaccompanied by. concomitant
constructive s k ills are alsb li k e l y to produce thoughtless cruelty.
f ^ ^ . I b i d i , pp. .102-103'. Cf. -Bruno BettVeheim: Tht Uses of Enchant-

r ment, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, .1975, pp. 299-303.
: 3Q ^
On. Education, p. 101. . . .

40I b i d . , p .-109. >. .:■/
41T b ld. , p. 104.
42
Ib id ; , p. I l l , ' ■
-O . ■*
' •. • ' ",
4 ‘
161
I f , on the.other hand, the child learns gardening and produces
something of "value through the exertion of his own labour, then 'grati
fication w ill be achieved in a d iffe re n t manner. Russell doi£s not
suggest the total elimination of games, since some degree of competi
tion is-natural to human beings, but a new emphasis in the type, and
purpose of the sports played. Cooperative a c tiv itie s , in which nature/
rather than other persons are considered as 'the enemy', would deve
lop Skills appropriate to.an economic, order based oh -international .

’ 43 , •
cooperation rather than im perialist war. Gardening, swimming,'
fishing, -elementary farming are a l l a c tiv itie s which develop s ^ T ls
for the dominance and c ultivation of nature. •Furthermore^ they.re--
.quire patience, persistence and observation which are more d i f f i c u l t
's k ills to learn than those necessary;for destructive a c t iv it ie s . This
. fa c ilita te s the channelling of the. w ill to power"in th e ir direction
since i t finds satisfaction in no,Vel tasks of increasing d if fic u lt y .
As long as young children are provided with opportunities to actively
apply themselves they are lik e ly to develop the- types of s k ill appro-
priate to constructive a c tiv ity . They w ill find- destruction unsatisfy
ing since i t fa ils .to challenge th e ir w ill to power. . ^
C. Constructive and Destructive A ctivity
;, Ih .this sub-section, I shall analyse Russell's distinction
H - ' / " 43Ib id ., .p. 104:

■' . "
■r v-" - •
between constructive and destructive activity., r shall point out that
h is -c rite ria fo r the distinction are vague. \ '
Russell's analysis of in s tin c t presupposes a distinction'between
constructive and destructive a c tiv ity . He writes of this as follows:
' ' ; 1 ^ '•
I suppose, roughly speaking, we construct when we. ^ .

increase the potential energy of the system in which
we are interested, and we destroy when we diminish
its potential energy. , 0r , ‘ in more psychological ^ .
.terms, .we construct'when we produce a ppe-designed, • i
‘structure, and we destroy when we lib e ra te n a tu ra l':
• forces to -a lte r an existing structure,- .without being
. interested in the resulting new s tru c tu re .^
" ^ - V " ■; "v„;
.• ;.ir . \ : ’. , . *• *■ *• ■
Concentrating on. the psychological d e fin itio n , an a c tiv ity is construe- •
tnye i f in the course of its performance the agent has in mind a d e fi
nite end result which he intends to produce. Only if ^ he has^rais.ed the
object of his action in iris imagination prYcfr to its existence in ’ actua-
1i ty can a person be constructing something. Thus a chi Id who .paints a
p ic tu re 'o f a tree which he has seen on his way to school is behaving
constructively. I f , on the other hand, he tears up the painting in
disgust at his own ineptitude with no 'intention Of a further attempt at
the task, h^s behaviour is destructive. We can now appreciate Russel 1‘ s
wariness in curbing the child's imagination when he delights in cruel
fa iry ta le s , fo r the capacity of imagination is an integral part of cori-’
structive; a c tiv ity . Without i t the child w ill tend to engage in des
truction fo r lack of .interest in what is pot immediately, present to him.
44Ib id . , p,. 109.
I'; v ' . ■- ' ;, i _; - , ; 7 . ’ • ■: • *

j . - ' - . .
163
Destructive behaviour is unconcerned with what w il1 replace the object
at which i t is aimed, since no conception o f what such a structure
could be is envisaged. : The lib e ra tio n o f forces within the.agent is
unaccompanied by any such;imaginative performance.
■Russell appeals to everyday practice as a'guide to supplement the
distinction . Only where We suspect the s in cerity of a person who claims.
to -be. destroying an object ‘in order to rebuild i t , does the d istin ctio n
. .. ■■ 4 5
become problematical in practice. In other cases, the distinction is
clear.. Moreover, Russell. Wishes to apply i t not only to physical a c ti-
. v ity but to a ll areas of human a c tiv ity enabling him to id e n tify a r tis
t ic , m.usical, th e atrical and in te lle c tu a l pursuits as .constructive and
necessary to a healthy education.4® With regard to this he makes a 8
— case fo r s c ie n tific rather'than classical education; Whereas the'
/ la tte r s t r e s s ^ t h ^ ie e d for.exactitude in style and language, on the
basis* o f a s ta tic authority for- correct Latin or Greek, the subject
■ matter of science is dynamic and open-ended,, thereby in viting engagement
:orv the part of the learner:
;4 ' y '" ' \-* \ . \ ■

’ ' .■ Correct science i§-: continually.changing, .and an. able ...
youth may look forward to helping in thi.s process.':
Consequently the attitude produced by a .s c ie n tific
' education is lik e ly to be more constructive than
that produced by the study pf dea-d languages
45Ib id . , pp.' 109-110.
— Ib id ., p. 11 3. ,
y r . 4Îb id . Cf. ‘The Place of Science in a lib e ra l Education*, Op.

'’ ' " ' a t . , pp.-40-43. ■ . | /
: 164,
; I t is interesting to note'that s c ie n tific advance is often'-des-
,4 tructive in precisely Russell‘s sense. - In.advancing the frontiers of
* . knowledge, scientists, often- lead an attack upon fa m ilia r symbolic .
. structures or paradigms with no,guarantee of replacing them. Physicists
:: . in the 19201si f o r example, were engaged in the rejection of the
’ ..Newtonian account of the structure o f the at-onj and’the -.search fo r a new
conceptual framework. As 'Niels Bohr describes i t :
We are much in the same position, as a s a ilo r, marooned

on a remote island where conditions d iffe r radicall-y
from.anything ..he has known and where, to'make things .
worse., trie natives speak a completely alien tongue.., ,
[experimentation continues in the hope th a t] in due
•course, dew concepts w ill emerge which may; spmehow
help us to, grasp these inexpressible processes in the
:v-"; atom .48 ■■ .. . ./•
* While an imaginative leap o f the type by-which Russell distinguishes
constructive action may have been involved, the immediate .effect of
such- work was to throw' the s c ie n tific community into chaos'. In the .
midst of such chaos, i t is unci ear that 1the potential energy of the ;
system1 in which they were‘interested was ‘ increased1, although this may-
. well have been the case in the long run. Moreover, there was clearly no'
• 'pre-designed structure' with which they intended to replace 'the old-
^Werner Heisenberg: Physics and Beyond, Harper & Row, New York,
1971-, p., 40. The-notion of s c ie n tific paradigm is that of Thomas Kuhn
who defines it,as .A c c e p te d examples of actua.1 s c ie n tific practice - - / ..
examples which include law, theory, application, and .instrumentation,
together — [which] provide models from.which spring p a rticu lar coherent
- traditions of scienfcîc ..research." The Structure' of S c ie n tific Revolu
tion^, 2nd e d ., University of Chicago Press, International Encyclopedia
of 'Unified Science, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1970, p. 10.
165
framework. Someone using Russell's distinction might; a t the time,
have accused modern physicists of destructive behaviour. The force o f
the d istin c tio n , then, is not as great as Russell supposes. While it.
. ■ is meaningful to: distinguish between constructive.and. destructive-a'cti-1.
v ity , i t is' unclear that the c r ite ria which■Russell uses to do so are
correct. ■ -v'- '•
_:i . D. D efinition of InstinG t- '
■ ’ l\ ‘ 1 ’ * •. ♦ ‘ * ’ • . ■
.; . ' In this sub-section, I shall consider Russell's 1conception Of
^ .instinct in a more precise manner. In, order to do so,' I shall re fe r to
his account in The Analysis.of Mind.! Two points emerge: f i r s t , lik e
... Freud, Russell distinguishes between'instincts, which are rooted in the
person's psycho-somatic structure, and simple responses'to external
/...: stim u li, which are not; second, unlike Watson, Russell maintains'the
notion o f; in s tin c t, despite his-acceptance of behaviourist methodology \
in the stddy.of child psychology. F in a lly , I. shall distinguish between
: ‘ ■ the notions of in s tin c t and impulse by showing that the former is both
primary and more amenable to habit formation. This w ill conclude the
section on in stin c t.
A *
A consideration of Russel 1's notion of in stin ct would be incomplete
' without a more pr'ecise d e fin itio n of the term. Unfortunately, he gives
none in On Education, so i t is necessary-to turn elsewhere tn order to
apprehend its meaning. In the Analysis of .Min'd^.'.wrftten several :years
' . e a rlie r , Russell summarises bis conception of in s tin c t as. follow^:
i, - ... . - . . V
f 1- That.-instinct requires no "prevision of the
' •. * . biological end which i f serves';/
• 2. That in s tin c t is only adapted to achieve this
end in the usual circumstance^ o/f the animal
- ' in question-, and has no more precision than
f ' ' is-necessary fo r success as a ru le ;
3. That processes in itia te d by instinct- often. .
_ - come'to be.performed better after'experience;
. 4. That in stin ct supplies the impulses to f
experimental movements which are required for
: the process of learning;
5- That in s tin c ts .in th e ir nascent stages are
- easily modifiable,.'and. capable-of being attached
to various sorts of objects.49 ,
" . s® . * /
There is a -d is tin c t resemblance between this analysis and the one given
. - ■ in On Education1-'.; Taking the. la s t-th re e points f i r s t , Russell emphasises-

•4 ~ ** ‘ ' ■: ■ - ■■■ ■ so -
that instinct-both supplies the driving .force for learning and is ■ •
. refined by the-experiences acquired in learning. Indeed his fin a l point
is that the, instinc.ts^ of the young are modifiable and can be attached to
d iffe re n t types..of object? a thesis which he is at.pains to maintain.in
On Education.- Turning now'to his e a rlie r remarks,- Russell believes that
an in stin c tiv e act is non^teleological.. Thus a baby may be quite/unaware

, • •
that by sucking he...wil 1 gain, the'sustenance of-his mother's millj. jq'st
./ . ' . .
as a bird engaged .in building a nest is una’ware of the fact that i t isV
'thereby preserving We- species. Both acts "are undertaken simply...bn .the
, •' - basis of in s tin c tiv e impulses not because of-the goal which they-fu j.fi 11:
"We must, suppose that the stimulus to. the performance of each act is ah
impulsion’ fjom b%hind, not an attractio n from-the f u t u r e ; " ^ - Indeed
Aq '* .- •
The Analysis of .-Mind, pp. 56-57..- ' ; . ! .
/' 5QIb id ., p. 54.- ' ■ ' ’

. -' • 1 51Ib id ., p. 66. / • • : ' . :
I/ ., .. ' V.
'' ' ' V ' ‘ “

r one of.the major theses of The Analysis of Mind is that there is a
continuum between the a c tiv itie s of animals and men'.which'confirms,the

52
v a lid ity of the behaviourist approach to psychology.
Russell also asserts that the a b ility of .an organism to adapt to .
its environment, by means of in stin c tiv e behaviour, is only as refined
as is necessary for the usual circumstances in which i t fin d s 'its d lf.
Thus the apparent precision o f'in d ivid u al in stin c tiv e actions is a '
function of the fa m ilia rity of the stimuli which e l i c i t them. Two
related pointSz-emerge from this.. F irs tly , instincts are not ■simple.,
responses ^êxternal s tim u li, On this point-Russel'l agrees with
Freud-s: distinction between in stin ctive behaviour and behaviour.-of thq
stimulus-response type: •
* • **
• • V. ’>
- By an in s tin c t is-provisionally to be understood th e.
.. r psychical, representation of an'endosomatic, continuously
* ■' flowing source'of stimuTation as contrasted w ithPa i
'stimulus' which is S-qt;up by single excitations coming^'
from without.. The concept of in s tin c t is thus dne of *
those lying-on the fro n tie r between the mental and-; the
physical . . .-.The sburce o f an i iSs.finet „is a process of
excitation occurring -inân organ'arid the immediate aim
'• of the in s tin c t lie s in the re'moval '.of this ,organic . '. .
■.stimulus
(. .53 •. . . */' 'O
52 - ’ • •
. Human and animal desire, for example-; are both composed of
'behaviour cycles', stimulated by an aversion to an object and termi
nated by a .condition of temporary quiescence, during which the indiî^
dual may.be said to have s a tisfied his desire-. Ibid.., pp. 66- 68.
Sigmund Freud: Gesammel te Werke, ..Vol. 5, Frankfurt/Mai:n, 1967,
pp. 6 7 ff, quoted in' Mi-chaeT;Schneider-f. ffeurosis and C iv ilis a tio n , The
Seabury Press, New York, 1975', p. 12. ' - . * . -
Instincts are thus- strongly .rooted.within the psycho-somatic structure
of .the individual .; $hey issue from within and. are an integral part of
that structure, in a way that responses alone are not. As a re s u lt,
in stincts are q u a lita tiv e ly different-from behavio.ur e lic ite d in the ; -
•stimulus-response pattern by virtue of a f a ir ly constant in ternal rea
l i t y which "they fiave fo r the ^nd.ivi dual t .The •influence which they .
exert is correspondingly greater than that of. responses to external .
s tim u li. -In sum; they are fundamental, d istin c tiv e and not reducible
to any othe/' type of a c tiv ity . ;. , .
. Secondly, Russell' s analysis of in stin e t- is at odds with that of;.
:th:e behaw ouri^s.^ The very distinctions he makes between in s tin c t,
reTTe* end habit- are-prgblembtical,..within a behayiouristic framework', ■
,whicfyattempts to încorporate a ll behaviour under the single banner of
Reflex': . . . the c e n tra l:pri n.c.i p ie . of behaviorism - viz: that a l l com- .

... . 5 4 •. -
•plex behavior‘ is a growth or development out. of simp!e responses.",
I n i t i a l l y , Wats on vi ns i s'ted lipon distinctions between emotion in s ti nc.tr
and re fle x , sipce'as theoretica 1 abstractions they'enabled th e 's c ie n tis t
to fu lly understand.each, facto r. Indeed he defined in s tin c t as
hereditary mode of action in which: .
V. ' . . . .the’ 'radius of action is extended in such a way th a t' :

•a
-.-.f.' the i pdivi dual as a whole may make adjustment to objects' /

y in hisenvironm ent.. .[through] e x p lic it, def i ni t i zed 'Sncfe*1
JoGalised a c tio n .56. \c - . J
, 54j,B . Watson:;A,B;ehaviorism,:^W.W.Norton Publishinq'Co., New YoM;

1924, p. 137. ■V V ,
’ cc. .' a ,-.v. : "" ,. . . • ''
: V- J.B. Watson: Psychology- from the Standpoint of .a B eh aviorist^
p. 233.
561bid. i .p. <231ij . jf.
ion of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

. However, not only, are a ll in s tin c tiv e actions q.f t'tie reflex type, but
they are overlaid,and integrated wiJJj, habits from* the e a rlie s t .age: 'As
,a re s u lt, the concept is vacuous-and can be dispensed with.
* , /flow, le t us turn back to James' l i s t of in s tin c ts .: . or ^

.. v tu rn 'to some otber-*list of in stin c ts. The in fan t is a '
.: 1^ graduate student in the subject of learned responses
• . (he is multitudinously 'conditioned) by the time behavior .
such as James describes - im ita tio n , riv a lry ,, c le a n li
ness and the other .forms he lis ts - can be observed.
ActuaT observation ^thus makes i t impossible for us any
.longer to entertain.the concept of in s tin e t.5'
Watson concludes th a t s c ie n tific procedure demands the study of the l i f e

* '■ •- ' .
history of each'particular action with the purpose o f recording and ‘
analysing i t . No reference to the notion of in s tin c t is required in-
this task. ... .
, The point I am making is that* Russell* does not concur with Watson's
' r e j e c t i o n of the notion o f in s tin c t. The fact that he maintains the
distinctions between in s tin c t, habit and re fle x and.xontinties to w rite
of the importance of such instinpts as the w ill to power indicates' that
• he did not Wish to aôpt a- reductionist theory. His acceptance o f '
behaviourism-as the "only vaiid method fo r the study o f animal and' •

-7' gQ' ‘ ‘
’ child psycho!ogyu .is always tempered by a tentative adoption of its
% methodology;vcoypled With an understanding that Freudianism contains

• ■ ' . '. ' ' \ • ~- ’■
' important-qnsighi^ into,^he development o f the child. At the same time,
'
v,.;. ■'■■ ■ ' - ■■
'Behaviorism, p. 136.. * A;
■ 58
• 'The Training of Young Children1, Harper's Magazine, CIV,
^-August 1987, p. 314, * .
: " V ;'
he agrees with .Watson th'at instincts become overlaid with habits very
early in the course of such development. . v. • .

. •v *.1 _ . '‘
S ig nifican tly absent from Russell’ s account of instinc.t in 'th e ^
.mechanical individual is the principle of growth. As the basic ins;tinc-,
,..tiv e urge of.th e organic in divid ual, the principle formed the unifying
basis of in s tin c t. Furthermore, i t directed instincts and impulses
• naturally along constructive paths of development,'in which the indf&ir('

- • • .. j'
dual could exer't\his capacities* to the f u l l . With the disappearance of
the, principle of growth, tfi? organic foundation of the individual drops
>away and the likelihood o.f achiev-ing fu ll self-dev§lopment in a climate
of freedom is diminished. In place of the principle of growth1, the
p ia s tic ity and m a lle a b ility of instihcts moves into the foreground. As
Russell puts i t , in arguing against both the Christian notionôf orjginal
sin and Rousseau's b e lie f th a ^ c h ild re n l;are naturally virtuous: ■
• \ . > •
’ ‘ The fa c t\is that chiljoren are not naturally e ith e r 'good'
or 'bad'.’ They are born with only reflexes and a few
in stincts; out. of th e\e, by the action of theênviron- /
ment, habits are produced^Whjch-may be either healthy. <■
or morbid. Which they are’ to be* depends c h iefly upon
the-wisdom of mothers or nurses, the child's nature
being, at f i r s t , almost incredibly m a lle a b le ;^
The individual is le f t with base in stin c ts, the strongest of which is
the w ill.t o power, which have no internal principle of organisation to
lim it th e ir a c tiv ity . Rather, they require integra-tion with habits
59 -
On, Education, p. 33. ■ . . • v ■•
' 6 • X • ' ■
from the e a rlie s t age to produce a healthy, constructive, -individual. I
shall examine the implications of the dropping of the principle o f'
■growth in -a la te r section o f-th is chapter.

\ , 1 •
■•-.• .
• ‘
* * .
Finally., I think i t important to c la r ify the relationship of '
Russell's notions of in s tin c t and impulse.. At f i r s t blush, they appear
to be id entical in meaning^ However, I take 'in stinct to be a more
basic concept’,** since "instin ct supplies the impulses'to experimental-*
movements which are required for the process of le a rn in g ".^ Impulses
. are physical or neurological patterns which proceed from an instinctual
basis ( i t s e l f a response on the part of the organism to external stim uli)
and re s u lt in the d iffe re n t types of-motor a c tiv ity necessary fo r

* ’ ■ ‘ ' *■** ■
\ learning. Instincts themselves are to a great extent malleable and
A t.'s
thus overlaid with habits from, almost th e ir e a rlie s t expression. Im-
pulse?, on the other hand, are fa r cruder and less (susceptible to int'e-'
gration with the habits and s k ills lik e ly to resu lt fn constructive
acti v ity : ' „. ■
• A proper education would-make i t possible to liv e in

r accord with in s tin c t,» b u t i t would be a,trained and
cultivated in s tin e t,J not the crude, unformed impulse
which is a l l ’ that nature provides. The great cultiv'a-
to r of in stin ct is s k i l l : , s k ill which provides certain
kinds of s a tis fac tio n , but not others. 6 *
• * ^
■ : - ^ The Analysis of Mind, p. 56. ;
*^0n Education, p. 108.
. *
f; . ‘ ', fc* **'■'. .•
■I ■ ■. ' ; ■* ’ . ^ • »\ '■ *V
The anarchic tendency of impulses.is best "controlled by instincts in te
grated w i t l ^ i f i 11s . Such a combination-will produce g ra tific a tio n of

• '*■ ' - *
the type which Russell suggests v is -a -vis the w ill to power.

■ ■ ' u ....
Are a ll instincts impulses and, conversely, are a ll impulses -
instinctual? I f my interpretation is correct, there is always an impul-
*sive component to in s tin c t, since i t supplies the impulses Which result
in Teaming.. Impulses are less well defined than in stin cts, having an
.• _e anarchical character which makes them more d if f ic u lt to integrate with
habits. In this manner, we are. able, ^ d is tin g u is h them from in stin cts.
Because of their, indeterminate-character, Russell de-emphasises the

, V t
importance" of impulses, in his mechanical concept of the in divid ual. In
the organic individual, impulses play a crucial role in learning, but
; "th eir spasmodic character is firm ly grounded irhthe innate principle
of growth which leads them naturally along healthy paths of- development.
Now ‘i n stin et i t s e l f is more malleable, having no founding principle of

*■ ', " .i **v *
growth, and is to be integrated with ha.bit from the e a rlie s t age in
order \to promote healthy development. The process requires a. greater .
. moulding influence from the environment'a/id less inner direction from

.. •. :■ - v : .■ -
... spasmodic and fragmentary impulses.
III. Habit *
In this section I shall consider Russell’s. concept of habit in
several sub^sections. I .s h a ll: point, to the relationship of the c u lt i
vation of habits to early s e lf-d is c ip lin e and moral education, consider
• ""i
1/3
* bothy the moral and in.felleclual virtues Russell recommends and the - -
emphasis that be pâces-on knowledge and fin a lly - define his notion of
habit. \ ■ . * ' ■ ' • ‘ 1•
A constantyême funs throughout R e s e ll's account o f habit fonna-f^C
- — tTofn -Mqdenfpsycho!ogyihas paved the way for the reduction of.external
coercion and the fear of punishment In the education of the child.
Old-fashioried d isc ip lin e , exehted, on- the- basis of ,adult, authority-,
proved both in e ffe c tiv e and- repressive'because i t demanded control of
; the instincts through the exercise of w i l l I t can be,-replaced by‘ a:
s e lf-d is c ip lin e , based upon correct hab.its, which can be easily learned .
in early childhood. Slich discipline has a. dual advantage over previous
forms:, while i t exerts the same profound grip upon- the individual as
■^do the instincts j i t avoids repression by developi ngîfatterns .o.f>

'• . .. :-.V
’ behaviour to which the individual$Jrilli,ng.ly assents.
The ra p id ity with whioh. infants acquire habits is . ...

amazing.' Every bad habit acquired is a b a rrie r to* * , H? :
better habits la te r; that is why the f i r s t formation .- ■
of habits in eai'rly infancy is so important. I f the
* ; f i r s t habits are^good, endless trouble is saved la te r. '
>• . Moreover, habits acquired very early f e e l, in la te r ... *
„y l i f e , ju st lik e in stincts; they have the same profound
. .grip.;; New contrary habits acquired afterwards cannot
have the same force; for this reason, also, the f i r s t
. habits should be.a niatter o f g r a v e c o n c e r n . 62
■ ' ■; ; ■ y .T, -/ ' . . y,:<=5» ; ;

The formation of early habits is crucial because they act as a bridge .
to e ith e r a healthy or an unhealthy la te r l i f e .
62Ib id ., pp. 70-71.,
•■■■■ ■■■ ■ ■■ y - . y - - y . y , y - ' . y , y y y - v - j

i ■ ■ - •■■■-. : ■ j. ’v-.-.."-";'"
• ' V'- '" x ■ 1 V '. '' . -
•,;V
' By following the precepts of this.'new doctrine, parents and-teachers

' ; ' ■"
.can educa;t 6 i.ndi viduals, capable of exercising th e ir freedom in a fe a r -.'
1 ess manner. - Since the'modern.world is in. heed of such'individuals and
since the scientific.methods are readily available they can now be put :
into.^practice. Russell writes in anticipation of the results os follows:
. young people freed from fear arid inhibitions and

^rebellions or thwarted. in stincts: .for w.hom we shall be
•able to open.. .the world of knowledge, fre e ly and
completely,: without dart hidden corners; and i f
instruction is; wisely given, i t wil 1 be .a joy..'rather
•than a task to those-who recdfê! i t .
The role of. habit in integrating the other elements‘ of the mechani-
cal individual cannot- be over-emphasised. The early cultivation of. the
correct set of habits enables the child to develop in healthy directions'
without feeling th a t his, instincts are being thwarted. The source of
corredt habits is* twofold: i t l i e s , . f i r s t l y , in the individual's
apparent native a b il it y to incorporate.into h is ’behaviour previous
aspects of his experience in order to learn new tasks; secondly, i t .1ies

‘* ! ■’
in^the- environment, which may stimulate or retard the individual's ,
a b ility . for,;habit-formation. Ideally., then, habits integrate the
individual ’ s innate a b ilit y wi-th. environmental factors that stimulate
his development. . Russell sets out with this theoryj p f habit formation
to construct a s c ie n tific account of chi Id development." '
:%
<■
s . - - A;' Habit and S elf-D iscipline in the F irs t Year o f Life .•
•ti
In this sub-section I shall analyse the habits and s e lf-d is c ip lin e
I ' .,1:: " 63Ib id ., p. 2481 , 'i:

f.
' • 1.75-
* . »
that Russell. advocates in the very young child. In general, Russell
recommends an approach, base'd'on a balance between neglect and indul
gence, that observes s c ie n tific o b je c tiv ity . Two- aspects of s e lf- •
discipline emerge: f i r s t , the creation of correct habits which lead-

te . •
automatically to the performance of virtue; second, the conscious sup
pression -of- immediate pleasure in favour of performing a worthwhile.
' ' a c tiv ity : This second aspect develops somewhat;later than the f ir s t
v . ; year of l i f e . .. r . ., v
* '.There are three ..main-stages in the acquisition of habits according
to'R ussell, which I shall-analyse in t u r n .T h e fir s t, year of l i f e com
prises the i n it ia l stage, in-which-the establishment of routines in
- eating and sleeping is the. primary task. The.second stage begins with
the'second year of l i f e and lasts u n til the child' is six. During this
period the. "chi l d learns to walk, ta lk and acquire the moral virtues
' necgsâry-. foV interaction with’ other humans and fo r his'own-development.
■ A fter the age of s ix, the habits and virtues of in te lle c tu a l education .
are to be foremost-in the education of the child. I t is clear that"
; 'R u s s e ll believes that the inculcation of correct habits should begin
- before the child enters nursery school, indeed he emphasises that the
• f i r s t year of li f e n s crucial in this process. . -I "
Russell emphasises two elements of character graining in the f i r s t ■
- year .which are especially important both Tn themselves and fo r the

* ‘ - -
influence which they exert a t a la te r stage. These are the establish--'
* - ment.of the correct habits in eating andsleeping. As-fundamental

• it - • '
'J ■ *' * *
' .V ■ • y • > . .• ' ' r .
176
acti v itie s in. the in fa n t's l i f e they provide paradigms fo r the forma-,
« ■ ji ■ ■ j , ,
tion of-the correct type, of habits.- As regards sleep, the chi 1d' s
attempts to a ttra c t attention to it s e lf when lying awake should not be
. pandered to. Such behaviour can be minimised by establishing the
• association-of/bed wityi the pleasurable experience of sleep:
The great thing'here-is-the formation of habit: the

association of the. cot with sleep. . I f this associa- '
' . tion :has \been adequately produced the child w ill no-t ..
• l i e awake\unless i t is i l l or in pain.- B,ut the:pro-
' "•duction.l of the association requires.a certai.n: amount
of discixn-fne; i t is not to.be achieved by mere indul-
'v T- gence,y^rnce that .causes pleasurable associations with 1
lying/aw ake,: Sim ilar 'considerations apply to the fo r -
mation of.other, good and bad h a b its.64
Thus, good habits in sleeping are produced by the combination of the

*
correct set of associations and discip lin e. Russell contrasts the
notion of disci piine with indu 1genee, or over-attention on the part of
parents, which results in .the c h ild 's lying-awake. Clearly the child
is too. young to discipline himself, arid Bussell urges parents to refrain
‘ .from spoiling the child le s t bad habits \set in . Thd basis of s e lf-
disci' piine 1ies in the establishment of- a s t r ic t routirie in the course
of which the ch ild learns both to sleep .and to refrain fVom acting up
. '• when he does not want to sleep. Provide'd that parents .consistently
apply the rule of not catering'to the child's every whim, the correct
habits w ill be established.’ They are aided in this task by the compara
tive. f a c ilit y with which the mother learns to distinguish betweeVthe
cries of her child- in distress and.those designed simply to a ttra c t

: — * \ — — -
64Ib id ., p. 36.
attention. . Rather than .pieking up the child in order to get.him to
sleep and then staying near him',. Russell suggests simply making him
comfortable, speaking to him qu ietly and then leaving un til any crying
■. Stop. . 66 - .Ay . - :■ •■■■• Y p v '- ;
Sim ilar methods are to be applied when teaching the child the
appropriate habits for eating. Respec.t fo r the child's health at such a
tender age is necessary and a ll effo rts should be^made to feed him at '
regular in te rv a ls ; I f he refuses food at sugh times, tolerance is to .;
be shown. I f this practice continues, withdrawal of the mother's- '
breast or the milk bo ttle may'be the best strategy •'fn getting theinfant
to feed. •The feeling of hunger w ill soon persuade him of his f o l ly . .
• Russell reports an incident with his son, John, who refused, to eat a t a
somewhat ol dey age
p boy had been csaxed into eating/by his* nurse, arfd

[ad grown more anymore d i f f i c i l e . *t One day wh’eivwe .
id him for his miaddy meal he refused to eat his .
pudding, so we sent Tt out. After_ai.^ytt^’eJiexdeinan'ded:
i t back, but .it turnedNout that the: cook had eaten i t .
He -was flabberqasted anaShever made -such pretences
with us again-.°7
.. .o \ ;
The use of such-direct method^/in establishing habits •persuades the
-eb+id-tor-eat o fJ e ^ ^ ru m rtc c o rd .
*
65Ib jd ., p. 75.
66Ib id .^ p p . 73-74.
67Ib id ., p! 137.’
178
‘ .The groundwork for correct habits and self-d'iscipl in e-in general
is established by a rigorous routine ..designed.to achieve "a delicate
. balance.between neglect and,indulgence'1 in dealing with the in fan t.
;:;;~,il!(hti.e'.eyery;t h i^ ;'ls : to.-.be':donje".to promote good healttv by picking the
child up when he is suffering from wind and keeping him dry and warm ,
the parent must be constantly aware of the child's cunning'in drawing
• attention to himself. I f this capacity is reinforced at an early age,
‘ i t is . 1i kely t o ' produce ego t i s.ti ca 1 ■character tr a i t s . 7^ For example:
. .... .. . i f . i t :[the child] cries when there is no adequate

' physical cause, i t must be le f t to cry; i f not i t
w i l l quickly .develop into a t-yrant.When i t is
attended to, there shouldnot be too much fuss: what %
is.necessary must be- done, but without excessive ex
pressions of sympathy.^ . .
Russel 1 admits that such precepts may. appear harsh, but "experience
shows that they jpake fo r the child's health and happiness": . •
The purpose of not stimulating too emotional a bond.between parent
and child is tdf prevent the child from imagining^that the purpose of
his performing certain actions is to bring joy, to his parents and a t t e n -.
f ; .t io n to himself. .The only real motivation fo r learning must come from
.the child an'd a ll th'at'parents can do is to provide the appropriate
68Ib id ., pi 72. v
^ Ib i d . .
70 Ibid., p. 71.
71 I b i d p . 7£>'
72Ibid., p. 75.
opportunities for such learning to 'take'-place. , In this context,-
• Russell recommends a de-emphasis, upon games'which.involve the child 1
".. playing with his parents and a minimum.of occasions upon which parents
"amuse an in fa n t by dandling i t or- singing to it " , 74 Too much.of the
la tte r interferes w-ith sleep, which is to "occupy most of the in fan t 's
day. . /•,• . • v.,'
In p la c e o f such amusements,, parents should encourage spontaneous
a c tiv itie s in which^the child achieves success independently. The
freedom to kick and move'his muscles should thus be granted from .the
. e a rlie s t age' by‘getting, r i d ;of old fashioned swajddling clothes.. When
he learns to focus upon moving'objects,, this a c tiv ity provides the
: . child with agreat deal of pleasure, a t does the exercise of grasping
ôbjects.' Both a c tiv itie s are to .be encouraged, provided that in the
.la t t e r case such objects are not po te n tia lly dangerous.7^ *
The overall aim of this process is to develop a sense of discipline
•:in the young child, upon which he can draw as he matures and the
learning process becomes more complex:
■' * • Our aim,în modern education,-is to reduce external

discipline to a minimum-;, but this requires an internal
s e lf-d is c ip lin e which is much more easily acquifed in
the f i r s t year of l i f e than a t any other time
• Ib id . , p. 77. : ■
74Ib id ., p. 75.
75I b i d . p p . .75-76.
76Ib id . , p. 73.
The formation of good-habits enables parents to refrain from the old-
fashioned methods o f coaxing the child to eat and sleep and si itip.ly-allow
» ’ 77 ° "' ' - '"'Vi ‘
him to do so spqntaneously. ' The performance o f easing arid sleeping
sthereby ceases to be a g if t which the young chi-Id bestows upon the
parent and becomes'something Which he’does w illin g ly with the mi.nimum '
of ,'fbss .• The process i§. fa c il ita te d once the chi Id has reached the age
o f about three months arid.learned to distinguish between animate and
inanimate objects.. The-child now has d iffe re n t feelings'towards the-
. mother and the b o ttle with which she feeds him. These-feelings prompt,.
the beginnings of ar social. relationship between'parent and child. »As a-

». / * ! .
*' ;;. ' <* o
re s illt, parents. now'possess tw'o invaluable tools of praise and blame,
*' ■‘ 7g ‘ o
which are to be used w ith,great caution. Blame can be p a rtic u la rly --
harmful to a c h ild oand is not to be used during the f i r s t year and only
sparingly th e re afte r. Praisei Whilst p o ten tially less harmful, should
not be used to excess since i t w ill spoil " th e .c h ild .. I t should be
reserved for the successful performance c^f those tasks which the child
performs- independently, and which require a sustained e ffo r t on- his

‘’ . 79 • ... 'V •
part, such as talking and walking.
* "
V. - Russell singles out the methods of Mgria Montessori’ as p a rtic u la rly '
’ ‘ i 6.
i ' *"
K .
e fficacious-in the development.of s e lf-d is c ip lin e .. His praise 1s based
both upon a theoretical appreciation o f her work and the experience of

...
■ —■ — ■ — ; : : ——. — - - *
77Ib id .,.' p. 199. *' :

78Ib id :, p. 77. . ■: ' . f . . •
• 79Ib id . V
his'son, Johnr,' who, "qui.ckly. rhe<fcame a _more; disci pi fried human being"'®®
~
, .upon attending the A lbert Bridge nursed school which wasrun according
V • * • <3 • 4
to her principles^. - Montessori repdgnis-es .the importance o f. di viding-.
subject-matter appropriate to th£ normal sterges o f child development'.
When th is -is done, the learning experience becomes enjoyable and ■
•• natural curiosity flourisheSv. In addition, the children, soon learn to
. observe rules, necessary .for the functioning of the school conmunity.

/\
. . Twd'simp!e rules-form th ^ b a s is 'o f this contnunity: non-interference
with other children and_restriction of the child to the use of one

81 • T " ' ■ » • •' ' '
• apparatus at a time, (Montessori incorporates the use of several
'. • * ' ■/;' % * ‘
apparati, such as the**abacus, in the teaching of mathematics, e tc .)
Russell defines' the.overall effec t of the Montessori method in the
following manner: • * ' • ..
.The child thus acquires s e lf-d is c ip lin e , which consists

partly of good, habits, pa'rtly of the :reaTization, .ut
• ■ concrete instances, that i t is sometimes worth whrre to ' ..
resist an impulse for the. sake of some ultimate g a in ....
■„ The fundamental idea is’ simpjg: • that the right, disc ip - ,
lin e consists, jf a t 'in exienfal compulsion, but in
hrihits flf-rnrrmr ,vhirh leaifl spontaneously to desirable ’/
■ T• rather than u n d e s ira b le /a c tiv itie s .^
Two aspects to sel f-d is c i p lj ne" now emerge. F irs tly , habits aire created
in the .-young chil d'which lead spontaneously. t.o the perfonmsince of

• .. • o * . -
' . * . .■ I * ° ; ■* . '* ■<>*

desirable*or constructive a c tiv itie s . Russell goes as fa r as to say
' V
80Ib id ., p . ' 29.

811bid. * .# /
82Ib id ., pp.; 29-30. /
i ..
V" _■ '' -
- l:
that once such habits have been created, the performance-of virtue-
becomes'almost automatic. In contrast, the second aspect to s e lf-
discipline consists in the conscious re a lis a tio n , on the part.of. the

' r *
c h ild , that some impulses are worth' resisting in favour.of others.. For
instance, the child may be tempted to indulge in the immediate pleasure
afforded by funning q u ts id e to play on a sunny day, and yet defer such
g ra tific a tio n in favour of continuing at his school work because of a
re a lis a tio n -th a t in the long run i t is worth his while to do so..
Suppression of immediate pleasure Russell considers to be an integral
part of s e lf-,d is cip lin e . This second"aspect of s e lf-d is c ip lin e is the.
same as that advocated for the organic individual* '. ;
B. Habit and Moral Educatiort n •
In this sub-section I shall analyse Bussell’s account of mojâl
education based on the cultivation of. habit. Until the age of s ix , the
. • child's moral education consists of the development o f correct habits -
and appropriate virtues. T shall point to th e .s im ila ritie s and d if fe -
(v - rences between Russell's conception o f habit in the moral- domain and .
that of R.S. Peters, and contrast both with Lawrence Kohlberg's theory
.A. ^
o f moral development. The question central to Russell’s account is to
: what extent the cu ltivatio n of habits is consistent with the development
of autonomous and knowledgeable persons.
; / ■ ;. ; .y
* ’ ^ .■
Ib id ., p. 35.
04. ;
183
. Given that, his methods are followed during the f i r s t year of l i f e

• " 85
Russell believes that the child emerges-as "a disciplined character"
equipped to deal with the next stages of education. These too stress
the importance of discipline along the lines suggested by Montessori.
Until theiVage of s ix , the child's education is to be prim arily concerned
with moral education or the education, o f character: This consists of
the development of correct habits and appropriate virtues:. A fter the
age-of s ix , education can concentrate upon-intellectual pursuits, or
the development of knowledge. Russell considers the distinction

-* ■ 87'
between moral and/i-ntel lectual education useful but not absolute.
Its u t i l i t y lie s in the emphasis which modern psychology places upon
the early stages of habit fprniation. While psycho-analysts over
emphasise th e ir claim, that, character is irrevocably moulded by the age

- -tC oo • •
of three , th e ir emphasis upon early childhood development provides
a healthy focus for s c ie n tific investigation. The subsequent tasks of
in te lle c tu a l education are greatly fa c ilita te d i f early education
attends to the establishment of habits and moral virtues:
By the time ’the child is six years old, moral education

ought to be nearly-complete; that is to say, the „ '
. . further virtues which'.will be required in la te r years
S& : ought'to .be developed-by the boy or g ir l spontaneously,
as a resu lt of good habits already existing and ambi
tions already s t i m u l a t e d . ...... . ■
— ------------------------------------. .. — ij . ;-. -----------------------. . . . . . --------- :— ; ;— — — — — — —
880n Education, p. 80. • ,

86Ib id ., pp. 189-190. ' ■' r ' -:r
8Îb id . , p. 12. .-
^ Ib id . , p. 36. ■■ ;
89Ib id ., p. 80.
I
184
Moreover, many of the moral virtues acquired par^y in l i f e are necessary
: for the pursuit of knowledge, and aid the spontaneous development o f'
in te lle c tu a l virtues. Conversely, knowledge is a neMjeary condition

90 ■
fo r the practice of v irtu e . Thus the fie ld s of moral and in telle c tu a l
education overlap. . . . .
Many contemporary philosophers have addressed this question of
moral education and the- relationship of habit, knowledge.and v irtu e .
R.S. Peters is in general agreement with Russell’ s stress upon the;
importance of habit in early moral trainin g.
What then is the paradox of moral education as I con-. •

ceive it? I t is this:, given that i t . i s desirable to ,
develop people who conduct themselves ra tio n a lly ,
; in te llig e n tly and With a f a i r degree of spontaneity,
the brute facts of child development reveal, that a t
the most formative years of a Child's development he
is incapable of this form of l i f e and impervious to ■
the proper manner of passing i t o n . ;
Peters believes that, the paradox is -overcome once a conceptual confu
sion over the notion of habit is c la r ifie d and certain empirical condi
tions are met. . . , .

* * '■ . . . .
When an actio'n is labelled as a 'h a b it1, the implication^ is that i t
is done autom atically. Actions of this type are necessary.to enable
persons to concentrate on the important and interesting aspects of l i f e .
90Ib id ., p. 12.
9^R.S. Peters: 'Reason and Habit: The Paradox of Moral Education'
in William K. F ra n k e n a ( e d .) : Philosophy of Education, The/Macmi1Ian
Co., New Y®rk, 19*65, p. 107. * -- -
185
Provided that the force of, habit, does not m ilita te a g a in s t.in te llig e n t
'action.tiy making behaviour.compulsive, habitual action is to be con-

“ 92
sidered an integral part of a ll education. Moreover, the possession
of a s k ill: presupposes ~a_number of component habits, which enabl'e .the
person to perform a task in a fle x ib le and adaptive manner rather than

! ' go
rig id ly and mechanically. Peters suggests that the notion of 'habi
tual action' can be distinguished from an action performed 'out of

' * - 'i
habit'- dr 'through force of h a b it'. Actions of the la tte r type are
those performed for reasons extrinsic to the desires .of the agent or
94
having no connection with his enjoyment or pleasure. These may.
clearly v itia te his development as a moral agent. Peters rules them

9
out as having no proper place in moral education: ' t
Now the type of habits which would count as moral

habits must be exhibited in a wide range of actions
- ■ in so fa r as actions, are thought to be constituted .
by the. sorts of movements of the J^dy th a t are .
usually associated with s k ills .95 .
Thus moral habits necessitate s k ills involving intelligence/and insight
Actirig upon moral rules, forbidding such acts as th e ft, presupposes an

■ . - •\ - - ■ " •*, .
appreciation; o f the-vastly d iffe rin g circumstances under which they may
be applied. D rillin g a child to acrt in accordance with a rule is ’.quite‘

•: ■■■ - 96 * : .
d iffe re n t from the child's learning t ^ a c t on^ a ru le . The; la t t e r
93Ib ld . , pp. I l l and .113.

93Ib id ., p. 111. . V ; ./ '.
94Ib id ., p. 113. 4
95Ib id ., p. 11 1,. ; ; ' ,■ • .
9 6 Ib id . , p. 112. - : “
invokes not simple compliance but an active and, continuous considera
tion the child of the a p p lic a b ility .o f-th e rule and- the reasons fo r'
following i t . . ^ f
The question remains as to whether Russell's notion of habit and
his approach' to moral education avoids the conceptual and practical
p itfa lls to which Peters draws attention." -In the^following sections’ I
shall suggest that when dealing with the fears of his son, Russell does ::
' -n o t. But in general he is in agreement with Peters' account of moral
and in te lle c tu a l .development and the e x te n t’to which they presuppose
/ the establishment of habit. In. order; for th£ chi Id to b e capablejof. ;
rational- thought, i t is necessary that tre in tern a H se the correct

■ 3 ■ ‘ • ..
habits at an early age. Such preparation is a necessary conditign. for •^

.; • ■ / ■; & k~' ... w '/ ''/* ••- f .-fc V".
V. the development of autonomous and knowl%dgable-individuals. ' Hhen »,
Russell^states, that any further habits th£ chi Id may-require w ill deve-
lop spontaneously, (be means that given the correct basis in early
childhood, the task of s t im u la t e Such habits w i l l ‘ be re la tiv e ly
” straightforward, since the child himself W ill see the‘ necessity for.them.
:In contrast to"Russell and Peters, Lawrence Kohlberg argues that
moral development is only possible through introducing the0child t.o the

' ■--3. ■■■'. V" . ...
•'>1 .I
-■ “ •. ' • ;. . . . . :
aform. o f'‘’reasoning, •underlying moral discourse. The .a b ility to u tilis e
moral’ reasoning and act on moral principles is stimulated by presenting .
■» *. „ ’ the child with moral dilemmas which..produce-cognitive dissonance and a
consequent development along ordered, sequential stages. The attempt
■ ■ q*7 - ■■ ■
. Lawrence Kohlberg: 'The Child as a Moral Philosopher1, Psychology
'Today Magazine,; September 1968, pp. 25-30.
. to impose p articular moral beliefs through .'a bag of virtues' that are
recommended as desirable,, prevents the c h ild 's deveYo^nent and is un
successful in e lic itin g the desired behaviour. A constant stress upon
habits- may retard moral development, which is distinguished by the
a b ilit y to analyse moral .questions in terms of underlying, universal,
moral principles^
* • ■ v ■■ \ • ■ ■ •. .' ■- •, : -■ ■■■ ■ . . • '
C. Moral Virtues: V it a lit y , Courage,.Sensitiveness ■. :.
In this subsection I shall analyse Russell‘ s account-of moral
v ."... virtues and the manner in which they can be developed. /
. The moral virtues which Rpssel1 wishes the c h ild to develop are
- : -A"' "
four in number: v it a li t y , courage, sensitiveness' and in tellig en ce.
In tellig en c e, which:acts as a bridge between moral and 'in te lle c tu a l
' 98 ' . ••
Lawrence Kohlberg: ’ Education’ for Justice: A Modern Statement
of the Platonic View* v.in N.F. and.T.R. Sizer (e d s .): Moral Education:
Five Lectures, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, esp.
pp. 60-^65. Kohlberg*s approach, p a rtic u la rly that of the divorce of
»form ai|d content in moral education, is 'c ritic is e d in R.S. Peters’
1Mgral^vDevftlopment and Moral Learning1, The Monist, Vol. 5.8, No. 4,
October 1974, pp. 547-549 and- 560-554. oSee also Edmund Sullivan:
. - Kohl berg1s Structural1sm, The Ontario In s titu te fo r Studies in Educa-
- tio n , Toronto, 1977* fo r a more general c ritiq u e .
For.another, approach to. moral education which adapts Kohlberg's
typologv y of moral development, see C live Beck: Moral - Education in the
Schools, O .I.S .E . Publications, Toronto, 1972 and Perspectives in
-Moral and Values Education, The Ontario In s titu te for. Studies in Educa
tio n , Toronto, J976*. See also Becjc's 'The R eflective, Ultimate L ife -
Goals' Approach to’ Values Education' in John R. Meyer (e d .): Reflec
tions on Values -Education, Wilfred Laurier University Press, Waterloo,
• ',1976 and John Gibbs, Lawrence Kohlberg, Anne Colby, Betsy Speicher-
> ; Dubin:- 'The Domain and Development of Moral Judgement: A Theory and
Method of A ssessm en t'ib id . , fo r a-mature statement of Kohlberg's
theory. Peter Scharf analyses the Kohlbergian approach in detail in
,,^ Moral Education, Responsible Action, Dayis, C a lifo rn ia , 1978.
development^ requires a number of other virtues which I shall consider
la te r . The purpose- o f moral education is to develop universal quali
ties in men and women which w ill enable them to transform the world
into a happier place. Provided that children are educated in an atmos
phere of love, combined with knowledge, they w ill be capable o f the
fearless freedom necessary fo r this task. This synthesis o f love and
knowledge can be stimulated in the child by developing the correct moral
virtues. They encourage a disposition combining both concern fo r s elf
and others and an impersonal outlook on re a lity .
V it a lit y is a physiological rather than a mental characteristic
which promotes interest in the outside world.- V ita l individuals arte
able to experience pleasure and work hard since the in ten sity of th e ir
actions is great. Since the satisfaction gained from a c tiv ity is
s im ila rly great, Russell considers v it a lit y a safeguard against envy,
which is a great source of human m i s e r y . H e warns o f the dangers of
excessive v it a li t y , which border on barbarism. A fter a l l , a healthy
tig e r exhibits v it a lit y to a degree which is dangerous to: weaker animals,
The educator should s triv e fo r a mid^po'int on the continuum between \ ;
in a c tiv ity and barbarism.
^ Courage can take a number of d iffe re n t forms. An individual may
feel no fear or he may have learned to control his fe a r. Russell post
pones discussion of the methods fo r controlling fe a r, save fo r the
99
. On Education, p p .,65-66.
100Ib id ., p. 49.
. — • V
% v
observation that repressive methods are lik e ly to be harmful to the
. child> In order toâvoid these'a. number* of factors are necessary.'
The physical c h a r a c te r is tic s ^ health and v it a lit y , which are stressed
in early education, are desirable, as, are practice and s k ill in dangerous
situations. These can only be learned from experience. None of these
factors, however', are the fundamental c r ite ria of universal courage.
■Russell believes that a combination o f sel f-respect with an impersonal
outlook on l i f e are the defining characteristics of courage. Taking
these in turn, self-respect is not learned through the a ttitu d e of
hum ility or ,the unquestioning submission to authority. In th e ir place
Russell wishes to stimulate rational forms' of authority ilPjPnch the
child undertakes responsibilities on the basis of a voluntary acceptance
of communal tasks. For this purpose he proposes cooperative enter-
prises in which children ‘are not divided Tnto leaders and obedient,
followers. Any authority which accrues to an individual is to be based
upon the common purpose which all' participants share. Russell draws an
analogy between such authority and that of the. captain of a football

1*Q3 V " , *
team. Members of the team accept such authority not out of fear of
retri-butforft but because of the 'Captain's competence and th e ir shared.

*' ■ 104 ' ' ’• ' ■;
’ desire to’ perform /well as' a un it.
^01 Ib id ., pp. 51-52. -. ^ ^

V ; >102Ib id . , p. 53.
V -r 103 I b i d .
^ E r i c h Fromm makes clear a distinction between rational and puni
tiv e authority in Wan_for^Himse^, Fawcett Publications, Greenwich, *
Connecticut, 1947, pp. 19-20,
with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
190
t ' -
An impersonal outlook on l i f e is only possible in an outward-
looking character who is not preoccupied with his own hopes and fears. -
An individual who is inward-looking is u n likely to view his pwn death
with equanimity and w ill therefore lack courage. The broadening’ and
development of natural desires arfd in stincts can be stimulated through
such a c tiv itie s as love, p a rtic u la rly parental love, knowledge and a r t,
^ .■
a ll of which take :the individual beyond himself. Indeed every in terest
which the individual' takes in something outside himself w ill stimulate
a courageous outlook:
’ Thus the perfection of courage is found in the man of

many interests who feels his ego to be but a small
part o f the world,, not through despising himself but
through valuing much th a t,is not himself. This can
hardly happen except where in s tin c t is free and in -
■ , . telli.gence -is active. "From thp union of the two
grows a comprehensivenes-s of ou-tl ook. .r,Such courage ■
is positive and in s tin c tiv e , not negative and re-
" pressive.105 . /
This conception c le a rly embraces in te lle c tu a l and*moral courage, in
addition to courage o f the purely physical type. Thus Russell stresses
the importance of truthfulness in both parent and child in order to .
stimulate openness and an a b ility to uphold opinions even when these
may lead both.to personal unpopularity and- feelings of contempt fo r a
society predicated upon h y p o c r i s y . ^ .
Russell reconperids the virtue of sensitiveness as a counterbalance
^ O n Education, p."55.
106I b i d . , p . 131.. '^
to courage, which may be foolhardy or based upon ignorance. He is
particularly concerned with the development of affective sensitiveness/
which he defines in terms of both the intensi ty and the “appropriateness
of a person's emotional response tb a vafiety o f stimuli . V'57 Piit
simply,- he wishes, individuals to /be sensiti ve to tfte right ithings. -This

. j '■• ’ \
can be achieved by understanding the developmental stages through which
. ■ .- * -/ •“ f . *.v ;
• • . • ;•« t ; ‘ * _ ■-
. ,the child passes. Until the age of fiv e months the child merely exv ■
• ■ ' V ■V. , 4
periences the pleasures of sensation." As we,have seen, after this age
he ragidly learns the pleasure of social approbation, which can be used
-as a powerful stimulus to constructive behaviour. ' In addition, sympathy
provides a further basis for the stimulation of sensitiveness. While-
i t is impossible to compel a child tb;;feel sympathy or a ffe c tio n ,.it iS'
. possible to observe the conditions under which such feelings arise

108 ' ' v -
spontaneously and recreate them. Physi cal sympathy, which is in- -
stinctual'arid manifested in a child's crying wheij a hrothervor sister *
is in pain, opens the door to a broadening of thb.child's sensitive * 7 •

109: ' ’ * ' ■•••
awareness. This process requires two steps. F irs tly , the child
comes to feel sympathy.even when the sufferer is not an*object of %
special affection. Secondly, he feels an abstract sympathy towards
those suffering even When they are not sensibly present^This a b ility
• /' .V. .V '* ••• ' '■
is closely related^ to the intellectual process' of making’ an imaginative
leap from one's own experience to that of othehs^. I f education were to
- 107 Ib id ., p. 55. ' ^

~ 108 Ib id ., pp. 159-160. ' v / 1 ^ - 7 . '
109 ib id ., p . .56. ? >. ~ ;V -: -
■V - ^ . "• ..
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
stress sensitiveness to such abstract stimuli as the misery caused by .
large scale foreign investment, such exploitation wo.uld disappear.
fin a lly , Russell mentions' the notion of cognitive sensitiveness, whicfT^
is better considered as a habit necessary for the development of
intelligence.
D. Intellectual Virtues: The Scientific Attitude and*Self-Discipline
In this si)b-section I shall anaTyse Russel 1*s concept of intellec-
. tual virtues (ithe scientific^'attituide and Isdif-discipline) and .the

¥ '
manner in which they can-be developed.
-I .v. * \ > — - ■ . • - ’v.'
The cultivation of intelligence is necessary for the healthy ' * ,
development o.f both the individual and modern society. The development
V of. a ,heal thy emotional l i f e i s important but insufficient for the tasks
which modern education is capable of f u lfillin g . Russel 1 considers
intelligence as the aptitude fo r acquiring knowledge.rather than the
‘ store of knowledge which a person possesses. .As"a resu lt, he*interests
himself i n ^ e mental habits necessary for the acquisition of knowledge.^
Curiosity provides the instinctive'W S is*to the development o f i n i e lli-
gence. which in its primitive formyh^pan beings share with animals..
The p lasticity o f the raw inst‘inct*of curiosity is to,be channelled •
through the development of techniques and habits appropriate to learning.
^ ° Ib id ., p. .47. ... v ; . ' :

1 1 1 Ib id ., p. 59. ‘ • ‘ '
112 ' ■' : ■■ ' '' '*
: : r Ib id , ■
193
These are.analogous to the s k ills advocated in the development of- the
w ill to power: v '
I f curiosity is to be fr u it fu l, i t must be associated

with a certain technique for the acquisition of know
ledge. There must be habits of observation, b e lief
in the. possibility of knowledge, patience and industry.
These things w ill develop of themselves, given the -
• original fund of curiosity and the. proper intellectual
education.*13
Individuals cling tenaciously to those beliefs which are merely .
habitual or foster their self-esteem. I t is crucial therefore to deve-
lop such intellectual virtues as open-mindedness, concentration and
e x a c tn e s s .C o g n itiv e sensitiveness (the a b ility to appreciate con- .
flic tirig hypdtheses) plays an important role in enabling the individual
to transcend the dictates of his passions. The aim of-:intellectual
education is the Scientific attitude in which the individual seeks the

115
truth and examines the evidence for each of his beliefs: The c r i
terion of the ratio nal, educated man is his acceptance of pnly those
beliefs for which the evidence, is substantial."^®
The scien tific attitude requires both courage.and independence of
mind for the individual to take unpopular stands against social conven
tions. While these may co n flict with the ch ild’ s need toicogperate,
1 1 3 Ib id ., p. 61.
^ Ib id . , pp. 61 and 192.
1 1 5 Ib ld .,
p. 225. ,
^®Of. 'The Place of Science in a Liberal Education3, 0 £. c i t . ,
■p. 42. v . .• • I; ';:
- * .' " V ■ . '■ ... .... *s .. . . . . . . .
■ 194 ’ " ' ' •
there should be a,sphere of his lif e in which he develops special com
petence and learns to emancipate hiiyself from "the herd-instinct". -In
those areas in-which the maturing child acquires expertise he should be
- , ’capable of maintaining intellectual positions without regard for peer
approval and the strong feeling of standing well with those with whom
he cooperates on other occasions. 1 1 7 Russell acknowledges there to-be^
a tension between the need for social cooperation and the need for
. individuals to speak the truth and oppose the Stream. I f education
were to.emphasise moral-and intellectual courage however, dissidents
would not inspire fear in others who would recognise the right of a ll
1 T O
« to differing, viewpoints. A synthesis of individual freedom of

* . w
opinion with sdcial cooperation could be achieved.
This aim raises the question of the methods necessary for,.its
implementation.- Russell’s answer follows d ire c tly from the principles
which he emphasises!, in ea¥ly childhood education. The routines and
"habits in s tille d in the infant for the ^purpose of developing regular
. eating and sleeping patterns provide a bridge between vegetative and
intellectual a c tiv itie s : '
. This psychology is obviously applicable in-great

; measure to instruction. I f you in sist upon teaching
a child, he w ill conclude' that, he is being asked to
-do something disagreeable to please you, and he w ill
^ On Education, pp. 62-64.

1 U Ib id ., pp. 64-65.
195
- ' ' .. • .. / . . > .
. . . have a^ psychoTogicaT resistance,.. . I f ; on the '

• contrary, yotf can f ir s t stimulate the child‘ s. .
desire to. know, and then, as a favour, give him
the knowledge he wants, the whole situation is
-d iffe re n t. Very much less external-disci pi ine
is required, and attention is secured without
d iffic u lty . 119 1 # .
Qnce the correct sleeping and eating habits ‘are established with the /
' r. "■■■'■•, ■
■■ . ■' '
minimum o f fiiss, the young child w ill eat or sleep because he wants to,
., . . .. ■ . . '■■■ . ' i 2o
notbecause he is allaying his parents' anxieties. In sim ilar
fashion,, provided that the in itia l desire for instruction 6 omes from
the child (wh'ich is lik e ly , since curiosity -provid’e ^-its instinctive
■•basis) , the tools required for-the acquisition:of"knowledge wi.l 1 be
regarded as the means to a pleasurable end. The traditional problem of
discipline w ill be minimised, si nee the motivation for learning stems .
from the child. This’ implies not a total rejection of discipline and
authority, but a reformulation" of i t in terms which "give place to a
new discipline, more internal and psychological than the old external
authority". . Self-determination and self-discipline replace outmoded
conception!’ requiring the child'svsuhmission to punitive aOthority.
This is only, half of the story. Intellectual work is often tedious.,
and requires the individual to endure' apparently boring and demandfng
■ study that affords no immediate g ratificatio n. Concentration necessi-
. tates the control of other impulses, except the desire to learn, by-the
will.* "v-
* 119 Ibid. * P- 20°- ‘ ' '

- * 1 2 0 Ib id ., pp. 199-200.
. 1 2 1 .Ib id., p. 197. <•
196
To be really valuable, the concentration must also

be Within the; control of the w ill. . By this I mean
that, even where some piece of knowledge is unin2’'-
teres ting in its e lf, a man' can force himself to
acquire i t i f he has an adequate motive for doing
so. I think that i t is above a ll'th e control ofv
the attention by the w ill that is conferred by :
higher education* In this one respect an old- '
fashioned education is admirable: I doub£*whether
.modern methods are as successful in teaching a man
to endure voluntary boredomJ 2 2
At a young age the Montessori methods stimulate an interest in
instruction. The exclusion of other pleasant ac tivities from the child
.and the example of children at a more advanced stage engaged in study,

' 123
produce an environment conducive .to work. As-the child matures, he
does not demand that every aspect of learning be pleasurable. Hits own
development 1 ends its e lf to an intreasinfêmphasi s upon study; provided

■:* •••'•{•■> ■
that “the impulse to learn stems from within and the alternative is
boredom and is o la t io n .^ Where the tasks of learning are themselves
dull, an additional weapon is the use of praise and blame

\ •
' * Initially,;/Russelôpppses, ^he notion that moral virtue results
■i' ; from the control of des ires by actssof the. wi 1 1 . It 1 eads to a- re-
" \ press.ive Upbringing, overly re lia n t upon external authority and the
' negation of the child's freedom!. The way around this problem lie s in
;, • . .' the early cul tivation of correct habits and ah internalised" discipline.
Ib id . , pp. 194-195. Cf, Principles of Social Reconstruction,

pp. 160-161. ,
On Education, pp. 200-201;
’ 1 2 4 Ib id ., p. 2 0 1 '.; *■
^ I b i d . , p. 202, "and cf. p. 138. - '
126 Ib id ., pp. 34-35.
Once the child develops the correct moral habits and embarks upon
•intellectual matters of substance, the habits which he finds necessary
for progress require s k ills of concentration :and exactitude in which
the exercise o f volition is an integral part. Self-discipline in the
intellectual realm is only possible'where the individual uses w ill
power in the.pursuit of knowledge:
I t should be part of education to fir e pupils with

desires not easily gratified ...A b le boys and girls
> wil l go through'endless tedium and submit w illin g ly-
tosevere discipline in order to acquire some
coveted knowl edge or ski 1 1 .127 A ;
Knowledge is to*be .valued*in its e lf and the desire to pursue such an - •
end can be stimulated in both the gifted and the less talented by the
correct combination of intrinsic motivation and the introduction, of
gradually more d iffic u lt and specialised subject matter. Intellectual
excellence can be learned*by a ll pupils whose teachers -are enamoured
o f knowledge.
E. Knowledge: A Distinctive Feature of Russell's Theory v. :
In this sub-section I shall consider the important place that
knowledge occupies in Rtiss.ell.'sêducational theory by contrasting i t
with "that of other educational th e o ris ts :. A.S. N e ill and Maria
•: • . 1 2 7 Ib id ., p. 196. .
128 Ib id ., . p p 196,'205 and 218. -
1 2 9 Ibid.., p. 197. ... . -W. ■ •• > ■ - V - '
v ■ •■ 7 v'Vl'V'- V , . ' -
, !■ 'i - . .. •■■■}. ' ' '. ■ \ .' ......
' ' ■ - ; ‘ / _ 7 . ■ 7 . 7 - I ■■
' V 1 - ; ■■- • I - V ■■■ '■ ” ■■ - 7 " • >"■

^ ' .. ' ' %
' , '* i '
Montessori. Russell's emphasis upon knowledge resu jts from.a regard
both fo r it s in tr in s ic value and re latio n s h ip to in d ivid u al l i b e r t y . •
Russel 1 ' s stress upon knowledge as an.end in ” i t s e l f distinguishes
him from modern representatives of the Romantic school o f education,
such as A.S. N e ill. In te lle c tu a l education forms the core o f the
curriculum a f t e r the age of six because i t gives to the ch ild the oppor-
' tu n ity to appreciate the o b je c tiv e nature of knowledge.. Once he has
acquired the in te lle c tu a l virtues necessary fo r the acq u is itio n of know
ledge, the ch ild is able to enlarge his own .horizons. He-channels his
c u rio s ity to new fie ld s o f inquiry and attunes his in s tin c ts to the
demands o f pursuing objective tru th . Russell 's views coirld not be
fu rth e r from those o f N e i l l . He expressed this d ifferen ce in a le t t e r
to U.G. Wells: . X ..J,

. n _ 1.. . •
You w ill, re a lis e th a t hardly any other educational re

formers .lay much stress upon in te llig e n c e . A.S. N e ill,
, fo r example, who is in many ways an a'dmirable man,
allows such complete lib e r t y th a t his children f a i l to
' get the necessary tra in in g and are always going to the
cinema, when they might otherwise be inte re ste d in
things of more v a lu e J 30
Neil 1 regards the acquisition o f knowledge as unimportant in comparison
to. the emotional health o f the c h ild . I t is a m atter o f in d iffe re n c e
to him whether the students a t Summerhill are knowledgable in a sp e c ific
^ ^ Autobiography, V o l. I I , p. 181.
fie ld . H is ‘ concern is with t h e ir emotioria] development; i f t h is ,is
taken care o f, the re s t follow s: , . • '
I hold th a t the aim of l i f e is to fin d happiness, '

Which means to fin d in te r e s t I t is time th a t we
were challenging the sch ools notion o f work. I t is
taken fo r granted th a t every ch ild should learn • •
mathematics, h is to ry , geography’, some science, a l i t t l e ? ’ -- .
a r t , and c e rta in ly lit e r a t u r e .. I t is time we re alis ed
th a t the average young ch ild is not much interested in •
any of these subjects . . . , 1 am not decrying learn in g .
But leaiHHiTg^hould come a fte r play. And .le a rn in g -
should not be d e lib e ra te ly seasoned with play, to make •
i t pal a tab -1e J 31 - - • .
Russell regards the 'negative theory of education1-, whtch simply
provides opportunities fo r growth and removes hampering influences as’-’

x & 132
inadequate as a theory of in te lle c tu a l and technical tra in in g . y It
f a ils to develop an appreciation of abstract knowledge, a ‘cornerstone
of c iv ilis e d l i f e :
...a b s tr a c t knowledge is loved by very few, and y e t

i t is abstract knowledge th a t makes a c iv ilis e d
community possible. Preservation o f a c iv ilis e d
. community demands, th e re fo re , seme method o f causing
children to behave in a manner which is not natural
to them J33
Russell does not mention any modern-educator by name, but he id e n tifie s
Rousseau as the source of the theory . ^ 4 I t seems lik e ly th a t he has
l-ji ......
A .5. N e i l l : Summerhil1 , pp. 24 and 26.
139 ■
Education and the Social Order, pp. 29 and 44. I shall consider
the 'negative theory of education' in g reater d e ta il i n ‘the chapter on
'th e asocial in d iv id u a l' and N e ill in the la s t section o f th is chapter.
- 133t . n V „ - .* • - ' *
Ib id . , p. 43. k
13^ Ib id . , p. 30.
NeiD1 in mind as a modern .exponent of the theory.
The -s c ie n tific approach to development and pedagogy, the impor-
tance of establishing habits fo r the purpose of s e lf-d is c ip lin e and her
stress upon in te lle c tu a l.e d u c a tio n set'M aria Montessori apart from the,
educational romantics. ' Unlike N e il l, who disapproves of Montessori':
desire to d ire c t c h ild re n > , Russell agrees th a t the child requires

tk' , . f
e x p lic it guidance on the .road to'knowledge: "Dr. Montessori is no .
apostle of licen ce, At every step, the l i t t l e ch ild is .p a tie n tly and .
' 137
lovingly directed u n til through knowledge he can d ire c t h im self."
The d id actic apparati which Montessori makes a v a ila b le to the ch ild are
to beused s t r ic t l y fo r learning purposes and hot fo r play. The child
J s not to play with the apparati in order to act out his own fantasies:
Dr. Montessori forbids the use o f the d id actic apparatus

except fo r the purposes fo r which i t is designed. The
child.iii^y work w ith i t ; he may not play with i t ------ The
vjj'idactic apparatus is a s c ie n tific apparatus designed to
give l i t t l e children c le a r, fundamental ideas of the
nature o f our worldr i t may, be compared to the m icro-
scopiRor the telesco p e.^ ®
: This contrasts w ith Russel 11s b e lie f in the importance of pi ay as a
'medium fo r the rehearsal o f a c t iv it ie s fo r la t e r l i f e and as an expres
sion o f.in s tin c tu a l fe e lin g s . The ch ild is to be given many
^ O n . Education, p p .'29-30. >. . .

"I - . /
/ I n a l e t t e r to Russell in Autobiography, V o l. I I , p. 182.
.• 13.7 ■...
Margaret Drummond in The New Era, Vol. 2 , No 7, 'July 1921.
• ' ,3 W >
I
•' I . '
' ' ’a
/ • 201 \ ‘ .
' ,■ f * *'
• ‘ ' -■ '
• 139
opportunities to play. This indicates one point of disagreement
between his approach and Montessori‘ s to ea rly childhood education.
By v irtu e o f both its in trin s ic - value and re la tio n s h ip to in d iv i
dual lib e r ty , knowledge comprises one o f the cornerstones o f 1R ussell's
educational theory.. Only when ih d i.v id u a l/’ are able to 1 pursue the tru th
can they act ra tio n a lly 'a n d recognise th e ir in te re s ts in an o bjective
fashion. Knowledge is a nece.s^ry condition fo r the re a lis a tio n o f

V 5 ■ ’ 1• . . ■v 140
personaF-freedom and a t r u ly democratic society. Knowledge opens up
a new s e t of p o te n tia litie s to individu als emancipatecC^rom destructive
passions: . .
Knowledge is the 1 ib e ra to r’ from the empire of natural

. forces and/destructive passions; without knowledge the
world o f our hopes cannot be b u i l t . ’ A generation edu
cated in fearle ss freedom w ill have wider and bolder
hopes than are possible to us, who s t i l l have to
struggle, with the superstitious fears th a t l i e in w ait
fo r us below the level p f con sciousness.^
V ■ ";V.'V ' ,;
I t fs not the deadening o f in s tin c t fo r which Russell aims in the . v
development o f knowledge,' but the stim ulation o f constructive channels
along which in s tin c t can flo w , in conjunction w ith in te lle c t :-
• T3Q ■
"On Education, pp. 97-98 and 103.
140 Ib id ., p. 225. ^
^ Ib id . , p. 248. The notion of fear and its relation to uncon

scious motivation w ill be considered in the following section..
Passion too often k i l l s in t e lle c t ; in in te lle c tu a ls , .
on the contrary, i n t e lle c t not in freq u en tly k i l l s ' -
passion. My aim would be to avoid both these mis
fortunes. Passionate fe e lin g is d esirab le, provided
i t is not destru ctive; in t e lle c t is d e s irab le, w ith - '
the.same proviso. I should wish; the fundamental
p o litic a l passions’to b | constructive, and I should *‘
try to make the i n t e lle c t serve these passions. But
i t must serve them genuinely, .o b je c tiv e ly , not only
in the world o f dreams.142
By developing an awareness'of the manner in which he can achieve his
goals and the lim its which r e a lit y places upon them, the ch ild learns -
to l ive o b je c tiv e ly . He. develops emotions appropriate to the nature of -- ’
external r e a lit y , not thosd' which give ris e to fru s tr a tio n , hysteria
or dogmatism and th e ir p o lit ic a l expression in the form o f n a tio n a lis t,

f . T4 3 - '
. theological and class myths. In th is manner education can develop
healthy individu als capable o f producing healthy p o litic a l in s titu tio n s .
■-i F. D e fin itio n of Hffi/ifr .

* > .
In t h is ‘ sub-section I shall consider R u ssell’ s concept of hab it in.

: . i •
a more precise manner by considering his account in The Analysis o.f~
Mind. Three c h a ra cteristics emerge: ‘ f ir s t ,'h a b it s are examples o f ^
mnemic phenomena, whose occurrence is dependent upon the past experience
o f the organism; second, the basis o f mnemic causation is physiological;
th ir d , Russell does riot)redl)Ce habits to conditioned reflexes because
o f his emphasis upon mnemic causation and sense experience. This w ill
- •„ ■ - .... . ■■ _ ■■■■■■ ' -■ ' — ‘ * '•‘ •

142I b i d . , p. 222. C f. Human Society in Ethics and P o litic s ,
pp. v i - v i i .
^ O n Education, p. 22£. ‘ '
203
conclude the section o n 'h a b it. ■ , '

■ , . . . . . . . ; • ■
Russell does-’not define the concept o f hab it in On Education. The
purpose o f his analysis however is to show th a t habits are patterns o f
behaviour which the child learns from the moment of b ir th , i f not

' ir" ■ -. - : ■■' . - . ; ■&. . ■.
144 -—- • •• . • . rK,.:
..beforehand in the womb. They.are distinguishable from both reflexes
and in s tin c ts j, both of which contain a large genetic component even
though they may remain la te n t fo r lengthy periods of" tim e. The d is tin c
tion is as'fo llo w s: . '
We may say th a t an 'in s tin c tiv e ' movement is -av ita l

movement performed by an animal the f i r s t time th at -
i t finds i t s e l f in a novel s itu a tio n ; o r, more cor- .
r e c tly , one which i t would perform i f the s itu a tio n
were novel -On the other hand, a movement is.' ^
'le a r n t' or embodies a 'h a b it ', i f i t is .du&^tg/pu^?-/
vious experience of s im ila r s itu a tio n s , and is not
what it.w o u ld be i f the animal had had no such. -
e x p e rie n c e d ^ .
Thus a hab it is dependent fo r it s successful, performance upon the past
experience o f the animal or the c h ild , afnd the building blocks o f which
i t is composed is a series of past associations of the organism* fused
in to a pattern o f behaviou^which•i t now e x h ib its . Were, the past.asso-
ciatio n s of the animal or child d iffe r e n t, the present h ab it would be
d iffe r e n t or possibly absent. This feature o f learning (namely th a t
1 4 4 Ib id ., pp. 70-71. •
145 ’ '
The Analysis of Mind, p. 50. Russell acknowledges that the
distinction between instincts and habits is blurred in practice because
of the;genetic component to instinct and also because instinctual be
haviour is not articulated in a-clear, manner at f ir s t and is dependent,
to some extent upon past experience: Ib id .
past experience" influences acquired habits) makes the c h ild 's character
re a d ily m alleable and amenable to -th e influence o f education.
H abit, lik e memory and thought, is an example of what Russell c a lls

- ■ 146-
a ‘jnnemic phenomenon’ . Mnemic phenomena are those aspects of an
organism's behaviour evoked by a conjunction o f present stimulus and
past experience: ^
V ' » ■■■■■ \ ~ -
f V. - ■■
...w e w ill give the name of 'mnemic'phenomena'to
those responses of an organism which, so fa r as .
y h ith e rto observed/facts are concerned, can only be- .
brought under causal laws by including past occur
rences in the hi story of the organism as part o f
the causes o f the present response.. . [ i . e . ] in
attempting to sta te the proximate cause o f the
present event, some past event or events must be
included, unless we take refuge in hypothetical ‘
m odification o f brain s tru c tu re .™ 7 '
, . - ■ ; .. ' .. ' ’■
Sense-experience i t s e l f is modified by the association of images and
sensations with the*appearance of phenomena, which acquire s u ffic ie n t
fam il i a r i t y taJbe-recognised as o b je c ts $ e rs is tin g through tim e. In
Other words, the percip ien t brings to his experience of the world a
structure (p a rt in s tin c tiv e , part acquired) by means of which he

- - '148
fleshes out his images o f r e a lit y . • As such, sense-experience em
bodies habits and to th is extent is mnemic in nature.
Russell introduces the notion of mnemic phenomena in- order to
ju s t if y his b e lie f th a t cau sality is operative in both the m aterial and
146
Ib id . , p. 308
Ib id . , p. 78.
205
the mental world. Without i t , mental phenomena appear fa r too.complex
to be brought under causal laws, and teleological explanations of human
behaviour acquire greater s c ie n tific respectability. In particular,
mnemic phenomena enable Russell to discredit Henri Bergson's thesis -
that human spontaneity distinguishes mind from the rest of nature. If
Berg§on were correct, the behaviourist approach to psychological explana-
tiofi would be u tterly misconceived, since ] t treats the mental and the
physical realms as no different in kind. In Matter a-nd-tjemory, Bergson
distinguishes two types of memory: that which consists of habit and
that which consists of, independent recollection. The independent re
collection of a unique event cannot be reduced to habit and constitutes
true memory. This is an instance pf the general thesis that there are
"v:,- 149
no causal laws in psychology and no repetition in the mental world.
Russell acknowledges that a ll memory cannot be reduced to habit, but
asserts that Bergson’ s account confuses the image and prototype ( or

■ 1 5 Q
sensation which i t copies) in true memory. Moreover, Bergson's
theoretical distinction between true-and habit-memory is d iffic u lt to
• . maintain in practice:
Habit is a very intrusive feature of our mental lif e ,

. and is often present, where a t f ir s t sight i t seems
not to be. There is , for example, a habit of remem
bering a unique event. When we have once described
the event, the words become habitual. We may even
have used words to' describe i t to ourselves while i t
was happening; in that case the habit of these words'
may f u l f i l the function of Bergson's true memory, while
in re a lity i t is.nothing but habit-memory. ^ 1
1 4 9 Ib id ., pp. 166 and 172.

1 5 0 Ib id ., pp. 179-180.
151 Ib id ., p. 166. - . '-.V: ;
.Âlljnhemic phenomena can be brought under the following single
law: " I f a complex stimulus A has caused a complex reaction B in an
organism, the occurrence of a part of A on a future occasion tends to
cause the whole reaction B.” Russell believes that the law encapsu-
•t
lates the key characteristics of mnemic phenomena.v Conditioned responses

• fc‘-
of the Pavlovian kind fo r example are instances of i t : a^dog presented
with the complex stimulus of a ringing bell and the appearance of food
responds by salivating. Through operant conditioning, he learns to

153
salivate when only one stimulus is present ( i . e . the ringing b e ll).
Mnemic phenomena provide a link between psychology and physiology_
by virtue of having physical causes. Mnemic causation is to be found
in plant l i f e , and habit is as much a characteristic of the body as i t

154 '
is of the mind. As regards mental phenomena, there may be physio
logical brain differences between individuals possessing different
knowledge (between English- and French-speaking persons fo r example). /
As a working hypothesis this is accepted in the following form; "I am
myself inclined, as a working hypothesis,- to adopt the b elief in ques- .
tion, and to hold that past experience only affects present behaviour
.* 155 ■ *•
through modifications of physiological structure."
. 1 5 2 lb id '. , p . 8 6 .
. See B.F. Skinner: Science and Htpan Behavior, The Free Press,
New.York, 1953, pp. 76-77.
154The Analysis of Mind, p. 90..
155Ib id ., p. 92.
7
207
' ^ l ^ '
The overall significance of this account of mnemic phenomena in

V ■ j , ■ ’> /
Russel l ’ s philosophical psychology- cannot be over-emphasised. In The
Analysis; of Hind Russell gdDpts a. neutral mqnism, according to which
the traditional vnind-bpdy problem is .resolved by viewing neitherjmind
nor matter as primary. Each is a construct from a more primitive and
neutral ’ s tu ff ' . ; . 9 8 This stuff is composed of sensations. Unlike
images, which are^peculiarly mental and governed by mnemic laws^97-, f
sensations provide tKe point of intersection between mind and mattef
and are the source of numan knowledge:
i
The essence of. sensation, according to the view I am
advocating, is i« v independence of past experience. ?
* I t is a core in ourv actual experiences, never existing
. in isolation exceptppssibly in very young infants.
I t is not its e lf kngîedge, but i t supplies the data
ifor our knowledge^ the physical world, including our
own bodies j
When sensation^ are held’together-by physical relations and sub
ject to physical laws they fonri matter. Sensations can also be classi
fied according to psychological laws, by virtue of the psychological
relations holding between them. In conjunction with images they then
form mind. Both mind-and matter are logical constructions, from the
particulars of which they £re composed. There are two sets of laws
Ib id . , pp. -6 , 10-11. Russell acknowledges the influence of both

William James' m aterialist methodology in psychology and the an ti-
m aterialist tendency of modern^physics. He sees neutral monism as a
synthesis of both approaches: -Ib fd ., pp. 5-6 and 36.
1 5 7 Ib id ., pp. 149-150. . ■ y
* 5 8 l 6 | d . , p. 144. ' / ' " / .
1 5 9 Ib id .; p. 307. •
governing the same human organism and an underlying link between then,
namely sensation^. According to the type of Taws one uses to understand
the h^n-oifâWism,1^ is either a physical or r mentpl"ehti by. While^
the distinction between these two modes o f understanding is fundamental,
i t is'not absoluteJ6^ '

• y l ' r "■ : ,y ■;■' , t ■/ \ ;
I shall novr summarise,Russell’s conception of habit:.
1' - ,1 ■ «■ .
1} Habits are examples of mnemic phenomena, whose occurrence is depen-
dent upon the past experience of the individual. Put d ifferen tly, '
habits are the types of behaviour which the child learns on' the basis .
of past experience. •• - . ,;v -
2) ; The basis of mnemic causation may be physiological. Even images,
‘which are the cfistinguishihg feature. of mental phenomena, may be redu
cible to sensations of a peculiar k i n d Y e t sensations, themselves .
are the core of our‘Sense-experience and ngt governed by mnemic laws.
3) Habits are not simply conditioned reflexes^ Watson is mis
conceived! He believes that habit is: . .
. . . a complex system of reflexes which functions in a •

serial order when the' child or adult is Confronted
■ by the appropriate stimulus, provided that we add the
. statement that in habit the pattern and order are
acquired, whereas in instinct they are-thberited.163
*^For Russell’ s analysis of the different modes of classification

in physics and psychology, see Ib id . , pp. 100.-106 and 130-132.
:■ 161 Ib id ., p. 156. ...
162Ib id ., pp. 131, 139 and 144. ; ‘
Watson: Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist,
p. 273. v ;; ■'
p
f Two points o f d ifference emerge w ith Russell's.account o f h a b it.
F ir s t ly , there .is no mention o f mnemic cagsation; fo r W a ts o n h a b it is
a ‘simple, learned response to 'a straightforw ard stimulus.^ Secondly,
' Russell’ denies th a t a l l the. mnemic aspects o f s.ense-.experiehce §re of
the reflex i've ty p e .. Some mnemic phenomena are not reducible to condi-
•9»
*. ' tioned reflexes in Watson's sense. V r ■>'/
- "As long as Russell maintains both the notions o f 'experience' and
V 'im age', his account o f human b eh avio u r-is'# modified form o f behaviourism
• While he is in sympathy with the behavioursts' assim ilation o f psycho-'
-• v . 'lo g ic a l method w ith the methodd o f p h y sic s^ ^, he maintains th a t >sense-
•— • experience is something to which the percip ien t hasr priviTeged access...
, :i: ' . As^Befits the s c ie n tific attitu d e;; R ussell's acceptance o.f behaviourism
is te n ta tiv e and undogmatic.- ' - •
4) Habit performs th e k e y r o le o f in te g ratin g the elements, o f which
the mechanfcpl individual is composed,. Its; importance to health^ child
development is-fundam ental. rUnl.ike s p i r i t , which performed the har
monising ro le jn the organic in d iv id u a l, the source o f h a b it.is not
in te r n a l.' Correct habits are produced by an in te ra c tio n between the
• ’ innate aspects of the in d iv id u al ( r e fle x and in s tin c t) -and the environ-
ment (adul-ts w h o .in itia te , h atitrfo rm a tio n a t b i r t h ) . Habits are thus
> b u ilt onto the c h ild 's character, n o t;io te g ra l to i t . They may give
the in d iv id u al a sense o f freedbm^^ th at is not t o t a lly his otfn.
‘ - ^ The Analysis o f Mind, p^ 5.. -T

• ^ O n Education, pp. •246-247. ----- \ .
Freedom is. no.longer a m atter o f pursuing s p ir itu a l a c t iv it ie s th a t «
synthesise the liv e s o f in s tin c t and mind, hence in te g ra tin g the sub
je c tiv e viith the objective' aspects o f the in d iv id u a l's l i f e . Freedom
how consists o f adapting with" the minimum of fuss to an environment
controlled by powerful ad u lts, who use both^the techniques of modern
psychology and fo rce, .where necessary. I f the process of h a b it- -
formation is successful, the ch ild acquires a sense o f spontaneity and
• freedom. I f ‘i t - is not, the resu lts are problematical to his develop
ment and produce a c o n flic t between his wants 'and the demands of his
environment. This is precisely what occurs in the case of R u ssell’ s
education o f his son, John. I sh a ll examine' th is process end the re
pression th a t i t produces, in the two follow ing sections. . •
IV. Repression in the Mechanical In d iv id u a l: A Description v
' In the previous sections I analysed Russell's concept o f the
mechanical in d iv id u a l. . I t w ill be remembered th a t the mechanical
indrvidual comprises a tr ia d o f r e fle x , in s tin c t and h a b it. Reflex con-
. sists of the sim plest u n it of behaviour," e lic it e d as a response to a
s p e c ific stim ulus. In s tin c t is rooted* w ith in the in d iv id u a l's psychd-
somatic structure and exerts a more profound e ffe c t upon the in d ivid u al
>.
than responses to external s tim u li. The strongest in s tin c t is the w ill
to power.. Habit consists of learned patterns o f behaviour which, when
drbperly integrated with- the in d iv id u a l‘s^ in s tin c ts , produce a sense o f
spontaneity- and freedom wi thin him. The source of h a h it 1ies in both

,.v;
the in d iv id u a l’s innate capacity to learn and the environment which ......
. s .
encourages him to do so. The development of the correct -habits per
forms the important task o f integrating^the elements of .the individu al
; so th a t he fe e ls no sense of s tra in between his in s tin c tiv e patterns o f
. * ■ development and those which he is" taught. Habit is to f u l f i l l the role
of achieving both" an in te rn a l in teg ratio n o f these elements and an
external in te g ra tio n w ith other in d iv id u als .
‘ ^ *
In th is section I sh a ll consider the repressive aspects of. Russell
• concept of the mechanical individual in thr'ee sub-sections, I shall

',4 ' 4. \ . ■ fr ■V
point to Russell’ s d is tin c tio n between in s tin c tiv e and learned fears
and the repressive methods he advocates with regard to both. I shall
concentrate on a description of these methods and postpone any explana-

■ " l f i f i ' "■ • '
tion u n til the follow ing section;
‘ ’+ .
Some o f the methods which Russell suggests fo r the.purpose o f con-
t r o llin g fe a r in the education o f the young chi Id are repressive. They
are lik e ly to produce an individual who has overcome his fears by means
o f s e lf-c o n tro l which s t if le s many of his in s tin c ts . Since one Of the
p rin cip al aims o f Russell 's educational theory is the-development of
individu als capable, o f exercising "fearless,freedom " , th is indicates
a p a rtic u la rly important problem in the theory. The establishment of
" ' I CC :
These two sections are an expanded version o f a paper, e n title d
, ’ Repression in Bertrand Russell’ s On Education1, delivered to the
Bertrand Russell Society a t the American Pht+tsophical Association
• .- Conference, December 27-29, 1978 in Washington", D.C. and published'in
; -'P roceedi ngs o f the Bertrand Russell S ociety, U niversity o f Chicago,
V ' 1979 . •
■j67 - ' . ' * : ’ 1
; I b id . , p. 248.
with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
good habits a t an ea rly age provides the-basis for/jthe-.-'ino-rfel ..and'-intel-
^lectual q u a litie s oiSê.< m aturing’- indtV tdual. Courage, combined w ith •
an i n t e l l e c t open to thê methods and new d is c o v e rie s 'o f science, are
but two aspects o f character which Russell emphasises.
I t is the business o f e a rly education to tr a in the

in s tin c ts so th at they may produce a harmonious
• .. character, constructive rath er than d e s tr u c tiv e ,- • . .
K a ffe c tio n a te rath er than- su llen , courageous, frank
and i n t e l l i g e n t . . . .By creating the rig h t habits and
the rig h t s k i l l , we cause the c h ild 's in s tin c ts
themselves to prompt d e s ira b le -a c tio n s . There is
no sense o f s tr a in , because there is no need to re * , . „
■ ./ s is t tem ptation. There is no thw arting, and the
• ch ild has a sense of unfettered'spontaneity.
Yet an individu al is u n lik e ly to possess an in t e lle c t freed of. the
in h ib itio n s which have previously hindered the establishment .of a more •
open society i f he has merely learned to repress his fears from;,an
ea rly age. I wish to claim th a t th is is p recisely the position which /
Russell\advocates. in dealing with certain c h iId h o o d -fe a rs .^ Ih the
fo llo w in g section I shall suggest th eo retical reasons why Russell adopts
th is position ; before doing so I shall analyse his suggested methods in
d e ta iU ”. ’ - ' 'r *
■ A. Fear: In s tin c tiv e and Learned
In this sub-section I shall o u tlin e Russell's d istin ctfo n s between
in s tin c tiv e and learned, ra tio n a l and ir r a t io n a l fears and ffis s c ie n ti-
f i e approach to each.
168I b id . , pp. 246-247-.
Russell makes two important d istin c tio n s concerning thef
nature o f fe a r. .F ir s t, he distinguishes between in s tin c tiv e fears and
those which are learned. Many of the fears which were t r a d itio n a lly
regarded as- in s tin c tiv e prove not to be so-in the lig h t of new s c ie n ti
f i c evidence.' For example "there .isj usually-'no in h e rite d in s tin c t, of
fear, in young animals.". Moreover, in the early months .of l i f e the
human in fa n t him self appears to display no in s tin c tiv e fe a r o f animals J 70
On the basis o f such examples, Russell in fe rs th at: "There are c e rta in ly
very strong grounds fo r the view th a t most o f the .fears which we used
to regard as in s tin c tiv e are acquired, and would not a ris e i f groWn-up /
^ *q7*1 ' • - 7 ■'* ' *'
people did not create them". In support, of th is conclusion, he
cites the case o f-h is owit child ren , esp ecially John, who in the f i r s t
,-j>^'& ',years'pf.-life''exhibited, almost no fe a r .o f animals. Upon the in tr o
duction o f a new and tim id nurse, however, he becjan to be a fra id o f the
. dark, fle e from cats and dogs and even show, fe a r of his-youqger s is te r:
• * . . . %
" ...th in k in g , appa'rently, th a t she was‘ a strange animal o f some, unknown
species". - With the remo.val of .the nurse, the fears subsided. . 7
. Russel l-b e ! ieves that instances such -.as these bear out the Watsonian
'thesis th a t fe a r of animals may be a conditioned r e fle x , which the child

* .................... w • e v. 1 T 1V73
leaVns ,from the association o f two.environmental s tim u li- (in th is
case, the appearance.of a new phenomenon, such'as an animal or a strange
* 1169Ib id ! , p. 82. ' ' ' - ‘

170Ib id . '
.171
\ . ' ib id . , - p . 83. -•'*
•1?2ib id .‘ • • r
173I b id : ; pp. 82-83,
< ? ■ 214
c h ild , and the apprehension of the nurse which the ch ild in te r n a lis e s ).,
■■ '*1 : '.
Certain fears are in s tin c tiv e . In the case o f animals, these are
a biological necessity fo r the preservation o f the species:. "Fear o f .
the unaccustomed seems to be more a p art o f p rim itiv e nature-than fe a r
of a known d a n g e r . I n children generally they are directed towards
'objects which no adu lt would fin d alarming'and in the p a rtic u la r case
o f his' son, they were presjent before the a r r iv a l o f the nurse (fe a r of >
• •: 175 *
shadows and mechanical to y s ,\fo r example).
Considerations such as these lead Russell to make a second di'stino
tion between ir r a tio n a l and ratio n al fe a r. Irra tio n a l fears are those
fo r which there are no reasonable grounds afforded by external r e a lit y .
They are, d e a lt w ith quite e a s ily by fam iliarisi-n g the ch ild w ith the
cause of the fe a r. Once the child has come to understand the nature of
'th e object in question, he is less lik e ly to be a fra id o f i t . Russell's
method o f curing John's fe a r o f moving shadows in hfs room wa;s to make,
shadows-on the flo o r.an d w alls wi-th his fingers and get his son to
im ita te him/ John was cured o‘f his fe a r o f mechanical toys in a s im ila r
, ; fashion:
The same p rin c ip le applied to mechanical toys; when he

'had seen the mechanism he was no longer frig h ten ed . ,
- But when the mechanism was in v is ib le the process was
s lo w .. .we produced gradual fam i1i a n t y ; and we persisted
.^ W illia m Stern: Psychology o f Early Childhood,, p. 494-quoted

by Ru'ssell: 0£ . c i t . , p. 84. \
" 175Ib id . - •.
i .
t i l l the fe a r completely ceased. Generally the
same mysterious q u a lity which caused fe a r a t f i r s t
produced d e lig h t when the fe a r had been overcome.
I think an ir r a tio n a l fe a r should'never be simply -
* ' l e t alone, but should be gradually overcome by .
f a m ilia r it y w ith it s fa in te r f o r m s . ] -
Both of these ir r a tio n a l fears are- in s tin c tiv e . However, some
ra tio n a l fears may be in s tin c tiv e also. Russell advocates s im ila r
methods to deal w ith these. Yet the aim is precisely the opposite: ,^
namely, to create, an awareness o f a harmful o b ject which was not pre
viously present in the c h ild . For example, i t is ra tio n a l fo r in d iv i
duals to be aware of the danger o f heights.' Yet John was quite oblivious
to the danger o f running o f f a- c l i f f into the sea. Russell- and h is -
:w ife , Dora, approached th is problem in the follow ing manneV: " ...w e
explained to him quietly^ as a-merely s c ie n tific fa c t, th a t i f he went .

- ' ■■ . 177 . - '.
o v e rth e edge he would f a l l ahd break lik e a p late"* This produced
no general fe a r in him, since he continued to jump from heights of six
f e e t, but i t had the desired e ffe c t w ith g rea te r'h e ig h ts . Russell con
cludes from th is success as-follow s: -
Thus the in s tru c tio n in apprehension c e rta in ly aid not

. produce excessive re s u lts , t a t tr ib u t e - th is to the
fa c t th a t i t was in s tru c tio n , not suggestion: n eith er
of us was fe e l i n / fe a r when the in s tru c tio n was given, ~
I regard th is as very important in education. Rational
apprehension 0/ dangers is necessary; fe a r is .n o t.* '° ~
176Ib id ., p; 85.,
' 177Ib id .
178Ib id ., p. 8 6 ,
216
The underlying p rin c ip le which RusseTJ^âdtfocates v is -a -v is b o th .ra tio n a l
and irr a tio n a l fe a r is a s c ie n tific and o b jective explanation o f-th e
nature o f the object in question. By means o f such an approach i t is
possible to appeal to the c h ild 's own developing awareness w ithout
e lic it in g fe a r from him. Provided th at the parent or- teacher is not
a fra id o f the object him self, the c h ild .w ill not intern alsse any fe e lin g
of fe a r suggested to him by the a ttitu d e of the a d u lt. -
•. Russell recognises the importance of the d is tin c tio n between i.n-
■ s tin c tiv e and learned fears fo r educational p ra c tic e .
I f a ll fears a ris e from suggestion, they can be

prevented by the-sim ple expedient o f not showing
fe a r or aversion before the c h ild . I f , on the
/ other hand, some of them are in s tin c tiv e , more -
elaborate methods w ill be required.180
We have seen th a t Russell's method o f dealing w ith certain in s tin c tiv e
fears (both ratio n al and ir r a t io n a l) anctwith certain learned fears in
P ^ t iis own children was successful. .What is'm ore, s c ie n t ific exp! anation
w ithout any suggestion o f fe a r by parents does n o y re q u ire repression
onth e -p a rt o f the c h ild . On the contrary, i t entourages the ch ild in
a f u ll e r understanding o f external r e a lit y and of him self. 11 is when
Russel 1 turns to th e /e la b o r a te methods’ necessary fo r dealing with
more obstinate and well-entrenched fears in the ch ild th a t .he advocates
repression. - • ,
179Ib id ..i p. 96. ‘ ' . ' : ,

• . 18QI b id . , p. 82.
217
■
B. In s tin c tiv e Fear and'-Repressive Methods
n
■i
In; "'this sub-section I. shall consider R ussell‘ s repressive t r e a t
ment o f his son's in s tin c tiv e fe a r of the sea. . It is repressive fo r
two reasons: f i r s t , Russell attempts to estab lish a habit which runs
counter to John's in s tin c tiv e fe a r; second,, he uses force to i n s t i l l

?
the hab it o f bathing. ” f
At the age of two and a h a lf , the Russells attempted to take th e ir
son John in to the sea and-he refused. Apparently a fr a id o f both the
temperature o f the water and the noise ,of; the.waves, John was encouraged
to play in rockpbols, -thereby gradually creating f a m ilia r it y w ith the
sea. He became s u ffic ie n tly brave to play near the waves when other ;
children and adults were around. .Russell in fe rs that the fe a r was in -
, s tin c tiv e since there had been.no suggestion to cause i t . The

.* ■- • . _ ' ' ■•. . . -‘•
follow ing summer Russell toolj the bu ll by the horns when his son co n ti-.
nued in his>refusal to bathe:
A fte r sdfce unsuccessful' coaxing, combined w ith the

spectacle o f everybody else bathing, we adopted o ld - :
fashioned methods. When he showed cowardice, we made
him fe e l th a t we were ashamed o f him; when he showed
courage wel praised him warmly. Every day fo r about a
fo r tn ig h t, we plunged'him up to the neck.in the sea,
in s p ite o f his struggles and c rie s . Every day they
grew' less;Ybefore* they ceased’ he began, to ask to be v t
put in . At the end o f a fo r tn ig h t, the desired re s u lt
had been achieved; he no longer feared the s e a .‘ °2
181I b i d . , p. 87L |
182I b id . , pp. 87-88.
u
Russell evaluates tlie apparent success o f th is approach in the follow ing
terms: "Fear had not ceased a lto g e th e r, but tiad been p a rtly repressed
by p rid e . F a m ilia r ity , however, made the fe a r grow ra p id ly le s s , and

. ': 183- ’
i t has now ceased a lto g e th e r."
There are three distinguishing,-features to th is approach which
m ake-it q u ite unlike-those previously considered: ;
• 1) The e x p lic it use o f praise and blame, which Russell recognises as' ,
184
p o te n tia lly destructive .and which he recommends only sparingly.
2) The use o f.fo rc e against the c h ild , to which Russell is generally
averse, but which he favours in instances where the c h ild 's f e a r -is both
/ irr a tio n a l and strong. L e ft to him self, the child w il l not gain the
experience necessary to show him t h a t his fears are groundless.
•-S ufficient f a m ilia r it y w ith the i n i t i a l l y 'f e a r f u l experience w ill k i l l ...
the fe a r - hence the d a ily re p e titio n o f John's dunking.
3) Repression o f in s tin c t by p ride. Until th^ experience o f the waiter •
was fa m ilia r , John continued to.be a fra id o f i t and the fe e lin g of
.p rid e and the need fo r social approval was necessary fo r hijn to control
his fe a r .. This explains why Russell made use o f praise and blame in
order to encourage his son to be brave. A fu rth e r aspect o f th is pro
cess is the development o f s e lf-c o n tr o l, which Russe.ll believes neces
sary fo r physical courage: " I th in k , th e re fo re , th a t the .early

- ; ■
_______________________ i______ ^________ _ _ _
^88 Ib id . , p. 88 (my i t a l i c s ) .
184Ibid.-» p. 77. ,
185Ib id . j p. 88.
219
acq uisition o f s e lf-c o n tr o l in the niatter o f -f e a r , and the ea rly •
teaching of physical en te rp ris e , are o f s u ffic ie n t importance to war-
rant somewhat d ra s tic methods." This type o f s e lf-c o n tro l is re -
pressive since i t requires the elim in atio n o f fear, fo r a purpose contrary
to the c h ild 's w i l l . • The -child only agrees because' he is forced to by
a physically strong a d u lt. ■. V’- '
There are two main reasons fo r -la b e llin g R ussell’s method of * *
dealing w ith John's fe a r o f the sea 're p re s s iv e '. F ir s t ly , Russell
attempts to e s ta b lis h ^ ha&it which runs counter to the c h ild 's own
in s tin c tiv e fe a r . In order fo r the h ab it to be successfully established,
the fe a r has to be blocked b y the chi l d . . The' immediate- o u tle t f o r ex
pression of the fe a r is cryihg and screaming, which in time becomes
subdued and supposedly ceases, to- e x is t. Jhe C h ild's in s tin c tu a l l i f e
is disrupted i n ^ d ra s tic manner in order to make bim "adapt to 'th e sea;
Secondly, the screaming child, is picked tip and plunged in to the water
by an a d u lt. The ch ild does not w illin g ly accede to bathe in the sea,.
' ' ' v . ‘
r - ' „
but is forced t o ’ do so. In other words, his external behaviour is
controlled by the power and strength o f'a n o th er person in the faceôf
vigorous p ro test.
•_ v '. . _ - . - • '• ’ ' - '' ■— - - ' - ’ ' ' ■ ■ ^j - ‘ • .
> 186I b id . , p. 89. • , • .

187 *
This.aspect of repression is s im ila r to forms o f p o lit ic a l re
pression w here"individuals are coerced by the state into accepting it s
d ic ta te s : an e v il vyhich Russell c le a rly opposed in P rinciples of
*. fe c ia l Reconstruction, ,p. 62. -
'jThe Principal source o f the harm done by the S tate is the fa c t th a t
/power is it s ch ie f end. This, is not the case in America, because
j America is safe against aggression; but in a l l other nations the
/ c h ie f aim o f the S tate is to- possess the greatest possible amount o f
external force. To th is end, the lib e r t y o f the c itize n s js .
While Russell's aim in encouraging John to bathe in the sea was
prima facie correct, upon closer*analysis i t appears problematical. .
One wonders fo r example whether a fu lle r account o f instinctual and
emotional ^development would have led Russell to question the Worth of
forcing John %6 bathe against his w ill. This in turn would have raised
' doubts about the wisdom o f his constant stress upop correct habits.
A fter a l l , many children i n i t i a l l y fear the sea, but pome to be good
swimmers in la te r l i f e . They may require time before developing good
swimming habits- and even i f they.don't, the in a b ility to swim may be
'far less damaging than the traumas resulting from the forced dunking qf
the- type to which John was subjected. Simply because Russell himself
survived more severe treatment does not guarantee that s im ilarly
drastic methods are appropriate with a ll children.

• . ;. ^ ■■
Russell’ s reliance upon old-fashioned methods in cases where scien
t i f i c explanation has fa ile d is a reversal to an approach in which the

■' •* ]89 '
child controls h is 'in s tin c ts and "emotions by means of the w ill" .
' As Russell himself points out,o the problem with such methods is that
, - ■190' ' ■ ■ ■ ■ '
they demand the control o f unhealthy desires, not th e ir elim ination.
curtailed , and a n ti-m ilita r is t propaganda is severely punished. This

a ttitu d e is rooted in pride and fear: pride, which refuses to b.e con
c ilia to r y , and fe a r, which dreads the results o f’ foreign pride, con
f lic t in g ftith our own pride."
On Education, p. 88n. i
189 Ib ld . , p. 35. The terms 'old fashiohed' and 'tr a d itio n a l'
methods, in this context, imply a reliance upon the external control
o f tfte adult in the development o f a disciplined c h ild . I t is the
adult who f i r s t establishes tHe habits which the child internalises in
order to become s e lf-d is c ip lin e d . *
190Ib id ., p». 34r35, 5U52.
The re s u lt is that these desires simpTy re-emerge tn a new, contorted
form; '; ’ ■ /;■ ■" v. .
...t h e older type of v irtu e , which le f t bad desires

i ; rampant, andmerely used will-power to check th e ir ^
manifestations, has been found to afford a f a r from :
satisfactory method o f. control!ing bad conduct. The. ••
bad desires, lik e a riv e r which has been dammed, f i n i
. some other ou tlet whicii has escaped the watchful eye
of the w i l l ! . . .The control of bad desires by the wil l , .
therefore, though necessary on occasion, is inadequate
as a technique o f" v irtu e . 1*1
The occasions on which willpower is to be stressed in the development,
o f correct.habits a re 'ju s t those on which he u tilis e d them w ith.his

V ‘ .... - . l ’-
' * ’ . • ; ‘ ■- * ■ '' •• - *
son. The development of physical courage is*a case in point:
.1 do not mean to suggest .th a t self-control can .be

dispensed with en tirely;*o n the contrary, ho man can
liv e a consistent I j f ^ without i t . What I do mean
, is , that s e lf-c o n tro l ought ’only to be needed in un
foreseen situations, fo r which education has not *
• provided in advanceJ92 '•
The courage which /John learned from his experiences with the sea would
supposedly stand him.in good stead fo r future situations in which
: courage was necessary. Russell .wants physical courage to bq directed
not towards other human beings, but u tilis e d in manipulative s k ills
such as mountaineering, sailing,end fly in g where nature is considered
the enemy. y ■
191
Ib id . , p. 35. ,
192Ib id ., p. 91. '
193Ib id .,: pp. 91-92.
•V ’-r '.•
'< • . v'
The problem I arc pointing |to in Russell's theory is th is . The
creation of correct habits in the tr a ilin g o f instincts requires that
the child submit to the authority o f another. I t is this other person -
be he parent or teacher - who deems certain a c tiv itie s acceptable. As
a result the instincts which give ris e to unacceptable a c tiv itie s are
blocked aM *th e actipns of the child become those acceptable to his
authority figures. Russell writes of this, as follows: .
By creating the rig h t habits and the rig h t s k ill , we

cause the c h ild 's instincts, themselves to prompt de
sirable actions. There is no sense of s tra in , because
there is ;ho need to re s is t temptation. There is no
thwarting and the chi 1d has a sense of unfettered
Spontaneity. >*4 ' ^ ^ ’
This sense of unfettered spontaneity is no more than iîe successful
in ternalisation o f habits which parents and teachers have sanctioned.
I t *is distinguishable, in principle a t le a s t, from the ch ild 's own
spontaneous wishes and desires. The type of instinctual spontaneity
whioh Russell recpmends is to be overlaid with the habits and s k ills
which the child .learns from his parents. I t is these which Russell
considers desirable and not th.e crude and unformed impulses, with which
' 'I-' r, ' •
the child himself is endowed, nor the actions which stem d ire c tly from
• 195 * ■' ■ ■’ • ’ . ’, .
them. Moreover,the meaning which Russell ascribes to ’ unfettered s
spontaneity’ is closer to th a t-o f-^ u to m a tic ’ or ‘h a b i t u a l ^ - A
• 194Ib ld ^ pp. 246r247. My it a lic s .

195Ib id ., pp; 30 and 108.
196
Russell in fa c t writes that exposure to the correct habi
an early-age makes the practice of virtue "almost automatic-. Ib f
p. 35. ~ -^
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
child is .free to follow his instinets provided -that he has Been ex-
posed to the appropriate habits and internalised these s u ffic ie n tly

■ ■ '/ ■ '• V ' f • . 'VV-
- well as to no longer.feel fi sense of Strain when performing habitual,
actions.- This is a lim ited sense- of freedom and spontaneity, fo r per
sonal freedom hds l i t t l e meaning i f an in d iv id u a l’s actions are. guided
by an internalised authority from which there is no escape. This does
. not allow fd r freedom from an internalised set of habits established j
during the eat*ly.proces's.of child re a rin g .*■.Nor is it ; consistentw ith v;
Russell’ s earlier.adoption of lib e rta ria n educational ideals which were
•> to serve as the basis fo r a. radical -reconstruction of society:
* I t is not only more material goods that.men need, but

- more freedom,'more s e lf-d ire c tio n , more o u tle t fo r ■.-,v
V creativeness, more opportunity fo r the joy of l i f e ,
more volurftary cooperation, and less involuntary sub
servience to purposes not th e ir own.197 '
Thus i t does not allow the individual the’ freedom to determine fo r him-
s e lf the courses of action which he wishes td pursue. Moreover i t
raises questions about the notion.of repression and its re la tio n to
emotional development. I shall return to this topic a fte r considering...'
another instance of repressive instruction in Russell*s education of

v
. 'y'
.- >■ * ’ *.*
his S o n . ; ;
197 ...
:r Principies of Social Reconstruction, p. 43; and c f. Joel Spring:
A -Primer"of Libertarian Education, Black Rose Books, Montreal 1975,
pp. 33-34. The distinction between positive (* freedom t o ‘ ) and negative
- ( ’ freedom from’ ) freedom is made by Isaiah Berlin: ’Two Concepts of
Freedom1 op. c i t . ^ ;;v .:
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
- C. learned- Fear, and Repressive Methods « •' . ^ '
. In this sub-section I shall consider Russell's repressive t r e a t- .
ment of John's learned fear of the dark. At no'point does RuSsell
acknowledge the inner l i f e o f the child as a.possible cause of this fear
Unlike John's f.ear of the sea, Russell believed his fe a r of the
dark was*learned by suggestion from a timid nurse. At the age of two
and a h a lf John was moved to a room where he slept on his own. Until
this time he was unafraid of the dark, but was awakened one night by .
the crash of a piece o f .furniture blown over by a gale. He cri.ed'out
in te rro r and RusselT spent some time in soothing him, leaving a night-
ligh"^ burning .in order to a lla y his lingering fear of the dark. John
now made a nightly habit of crying out, which Russell came to recognise
as an attempt to gain pleasure from adult attention. Determined to

''-198
avoid "the snares of over-indulgence" , the RusselIs acted accordingly
: - . ' v ; ' . ■ ■ ‘ - '
y. So we talked to' him very c a refu lly about the absence of

danger in the dark, and told him that i f he woke he was
to turn over and go to sleep again, as we should not ,
come to him .unless, there was something serious the mat-
V te r. He listened a tte n tiv e ly and neve.r cried out again
except .for grave cause, on rare occasions. Of course the-
night-1ight was discontinued. I f we had been more in -
dulgent., we should probably have made him sleep badly
fo r a long t'ime,. perhaps ^for li f e J 9 9 ^
TQQ
On Education, p. 89.
199Ib id . , .pp. 89-90.
Russell's method is consistent with the behaviourist principles of
cultivating good sleeping habits. The establishment of a regular
sleeping routine takes precedence over a ll else in the child's early
, education.2^ Moreover, the child is le f t to Gry in the^dark since its

201
vmain purposeîs to gain attention from doting parents. Avoidance of
physical contact guarantees that the child wills not become over-demanding
in its search fo r a ffectio n . Children are not to be picked up and

■■ ■202 •
caressed before being put to sleep. The apparent harshness of these
• methods is compensated fo r by "experience [which] shows that they make

r' ■203- " ” •• " '
; fo r the child's health and happiness".
- One distinguishing-feature of Russell's approach to the nocturnal
fears of his son is the b e lie f—that they could-only be caused by a» mis
apprehension about the nature of re ali.ty , .or by a physical defect. '
200Ib id t, p. 78. ' ..

201 *
. Ib id ., pp. 73-75.
, 202Ib id ., p. 73. . ••
' 203 1
Ib id . , p. 75. Recent psychological theory does not support \
Russell's approach. In a longitudinal study-of twenty-six infant-,
mother pairs, i t has been shown that: ".^..consistency and promptness
of maternal-response is associated with decline in frequency and dura
tion of infant c r y in g ..." . While maternal responsiveness is an impor
tant factor: "Nevertheless, maternal effectiveness in terminating
crying was found to be less powerful than promptness of response in
reducing coying in subsequent months. Evidence suggests-that’ whereas '
crying is expressive a t f i r s t , i t can la te r be a mode of communication
directed s p e c ific a lly toward the mother. The development o f noncrying
modes of communication, as well as a decline in crying, is associated
with maternal responsiveness to in fan t signals. The findings are dis
cussed in an evolutionary context, and with reference to the popular
b e lie f that to respond to his cries 's p o ils ’ a-baby".■ S ilv ia M. Bell
and Mary D. S alter Ainsworth: 'In fa n t Crying and Maternal Responsive
ness' , Child ftevelopment, V ol. 43, September/December, 1972,- p. 1171.
226
Taking these in turn: once Russell had carefu lly explained that there
was no rational basis for fear of the dark* any misapprehension in
John about its dangers would supposedly disappear. The .second alterna
tiv e is dealt with by ensuring the correct feeding habits and an'objec
tiv e approach to nervousness in the child. Provided that he was not
i l l or in pain, John's persistent crying could only have been caused by
nervous excitation: "I think such sensitiveness generally Has its source
in mistakes during infancy* which have upset the c h ild 's digestion or
■' 204 • ‘ . . . -
its nerves
Significantly>absent from this account is an appreciation of the
inner l i f e of the child. John's'fear of the dark may well have stenmed
from an emotional upheaval connected with the recent b irth of a s is te r
and the resultant emotional and physical dislocation which this meant
for hitii. Russell f a ils to consider such an explanation. As his
daughter puts i t :
v
I t is ju st possible that- they [John's fears of the ..
dark] derived from loss of an old nurse combined’with
the departure of his mother to have a new baby, but
that goes too deep for my fath er's theory. In his
view, fears were e ith e r in stin c tiv e or learned, whether
from example pr from unpleasant experience. He did
not regard them as manifestations o f psychological
• distress unable to express it s e lf in .other ways. I t
” was as though the child had no internal l i f e of its
own, only an external surface to be molded according \
to the parent's d e s ire .205 ~
- 04Ib id ., p. 149. ;
1 ^ K a th e rin e T a it: My Father 'Bertrand Russell, HarcouVt, Brace,
Jovanov.ich, New York and London, 1975, p. 64. ■ , v , ‘
Regularity and routine take the place of old-fashionedl, sentimental \
approaches to chil d-rearing, since they are based on "the‘methods of
modern science and not the haphazard practice of mothers involved in ' -
*“ * T '
OW , • . . * •*.
chiTd-rearing. I f the child c rie s, there must be something'wrong
with the habits that.pare'nts have established, not w ith 'th e jtfiilc f's
emotional l i f e . The solution is therefore.obvious: change.the habits.
and .the problem w ill disappear. Yet being le f t to cry in a c rib , o r .

1.'. ' 207 " • '
but. in a room on one’s own to cry , is unlikely to provide the atmos
phere of warmth which the child is seeking i f his behaviour, is indeed
the result of psychological distress. Russell only considers such ’

' 208
behaviour an attempt to a ttra c t attention. The p o s s ib ility fhat
there might be other, more subtle factors a t work’ is apparently lost on
him.; Even where he Attempts a theoretical analysis of emotions, he is
concerned-primarily with th e ir physiological causation, not with the

v 209 '
underlying psychological-disturbances that emotions reveal. These,
a fte r a l l , are not amenable to the behaviourist method which Russell
advocates. Afhile this approach may succeed in establishing good habits,
i t does so f t the cost of other elements of the child's personality.
In the caseHf his .son:
206
207Ib id ., p. 134.
208Ib id ., p. 36.
288The’ Analysis of Mind, p. 279.
Behaviorist method triumphed and good sleeping habits
were assured. But the fears remained. They grew and
■ gr*6w, s e cre tly , in John as in me, festering quietly
and sapping our v i t a l i t y . 2)0 .
' ' ‘ . ' .1
One can only question the truth o f Russell's assertion that experience
shows ttiat his methods lead to the health and happiness of the child.
211 ' r. -
The case of his son and daughter appears to be a counter-example.
V. Repression in the Mechanical Individual: An Explanation
- I I-wish-now to turn from a description

: ' of
: the methods
<■■ which
'■ Russell
•
uses to deal wi,th the fears in his own children to a theoretical explana-
tion of why he adopts such methods. I bel ieve .that the reasoif is to be
found in a conceptual tension, within his theory o f the mechanical
in dividual. Two d is tin c t psychological approaches are to be found in

.-4. . ." .
the theory which Russell attempts to synthesise. The dominant one is
behaviourist. Rus-sell emphasises behaviourist principles'when he is
concerned w ith the inculcation o f habits and the establishment of rou
tines in the a c tiv itie s of the young c h ild . When, on the other hand,
Russell writes o f the need to stimulate emotional and in te lle c tu a l
freedom, he u tilis e s Freudian concepts in order to broaden his theore
tic a l framework. Prima facie this enables him to accommodate a fu lle r

■t . . ■
notion of individual freedom than might otherwise be possible, according
^ (C atherine T a it: 0£.' c i t . , p‘. 66.
211Cf. Ib id . , p. 6 0 .: ;
<:
- •- »■*.------- - - - — IML
212
to s tr ic tly behaviourist'krin.ciples. . As a resu lt of. his attempted
\ synthesis both approaches are modified. His behaviourism,, unlike

* • • i
‘ ""
Watson's, .allows room fo r the notions of experience, cognition and
213' •
• feeling . ^*His -Freudianism has a very restricted conception of
212 - ■ -
.For example, when.whiting of the needfor a comprehensive.out
look fostered by courage, Russell e x p lic itly refers to the need to avoid
repression and open the in d iv id u a l1s ego to the many aspects of re a lity :
"Thus the perfection of courage is found in the man of many in terests,
■ who fe^ls his ego to be but a small part of the worldv not through des
pising himself, but through valuing/much that is not himself. This can
hardly happen except where in stin c t is free and in tellig en ce is active.
From the union of the two^grows a comprehensiveness of outlook Such
dourage is positive, and, in s tin c tiv e , not negative and repressive."
• On Education, p. 55: Marx Wantofsky pointed out in his comnents on my
paper ‘ Repression in Bertrand Russell‘s On Education1 that Freudian *
. theory is. it s e lf mechanistic because i t adopts a- simple, hydraulic model
- in order to explain psychical processes-. The workings of the mind are
explained in neurological/terms rewritten in psychological language:
repression, for example, i.nvolves the damming up of energy, seeking to
be released in the same manner as water under pressure within a hydrau
li c system. The same poirjt is made by Alasdair MacIntyre in The
Unconscious, Rout!edge arrd Kegah Paul, London, 1$58, pp. 1 7 ff: "The
mind'ts to take its place among the inhabitants of the ‘ b illia r d -b a ll ■
universe’ pf Newtonian-mechanics".. Categories such-as te n s io n ,’dis
charge, stim ulation, and in h ib itio n are applied to the distrib utio n of
energy in the nervous system and the paths of conduction connecting
neurons, conceived of in accordance' with the mechanics of solids: c f.
Jurgen Habermas: Knowledge and Human In terests, Beacon Press, Boston,
' 1971, p. 248.. • ■
Freud himself writes of the s c ie n tific statu s.of psychoanalysis as '
■* fol lows: • :
The hypothesis we have adopted of a psychical apparatus extended
in space,- expediently put. together, developed by the exigencies
• .. of l i f e , which gives ris e to the phenomena of consciousness •
only at one p a rtic u la r point and. under certain conditions -
. this hypothesis has put us. in a position to'establish psycho
logy on foundations sim ilar to those o f any other science,‘ .such,
for instance, as physics.. ..The future may teach us to exercise
a direct influence, by means of p a rtic u la r chemical substances,
' on the amounts of energy and tfoeir.d istrib u tio n in the mental
apparatus. . . .But fo r the moment we have’ nothing better: at our
disposal than the technique of psycho-analysis.^.,.
Sigmund Freud: ‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis', The Complete Psycho
logical Works o f Sigmund Freud (ed... James Strachey), The Hogarth Press’,
230'
^ re p re s s io n , which gives secondary importance to the notion of uhcons-
cious^motivation. - Indeed we shall see that Russel 1 ’s ,concepts of
■ repression and the'unconscious are divested'of th e ir meaning within the .
‘ framework by-being rewritten Tn behaviourist t e r n is .^ The,
impact of this reformulation is to rob them o f the s e lf-re fle c tio n 'b y
V.' ' '' :■ • ■ . ,>■ * •
means of which the individual- comes to understand the forces at play
determining his actions. Russell reduces the notion of repression to a

. . . . . 215 -
matter of conflicting habits._ The notions of 'the unconscious' and
'repression' provide the key to understanding the repressive methods
which Russell advocates v is -a -v is fe a r in the young child.

■' ft ■ ■ •.
In this section, I shall analyse Freud's theory.of the unconscious
. v ^ ’
and contrast i t with Russell's behaviourist theory o f the unconscious
; and.repression. I shall devote a sub-section to each. I shall then ^
contrast Russell and N e ill's conflicting views of fe a r, concluding fh a t
N e ill's is more•Adequate.
London, 1967, Volume 23, pp. 196 and 182. Freud's physiological ex
planation of mental phenomena reduces his conception of the human
being to a physical one and is a t odds with his subsequent attempt to
develop a model o f psycho-analysis that stresses conscious s e lf-re fle c
tion as the means to overcoming the blocking of mental energy.that
takes place in the process of repression. Freud;, 'Remembering, Re
peating and Working Through', o£. c i t . , Volume 12, pp. 155-156. Freud's
physiological model results in what Habermas calls a 's c ie n tis tic s e lf-
misunderstanding of meta-psycho logy'» namely that the explanation of .
behaviour is based on the methods of natural ( i . e . physical) science: ' ‘
op. c i t . , pp, 246-273.
On Education, pp. 74-75.
^ The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 38-39.
^ 5Ibid-.-, p. 39, where Russell agrees with Watson's account o f
repression.
. A. Freud1s Theory of the Unôpscious
> *
In th is sub-section, I shpll emphasise Freud's distinction'between
•the conscious and unconscious ^nd the importance of feeling -states in
the explanation and treatment o f repression g iv in g 'ris e to neuroses-.

. - \ -' . - ; .
The unconscious comprises, on the one hand,.processes
. which are merely latentv, temporarily unconscious, but
’•h ich d iffe r in no other respect from conscious ones
d, on the other hand, '(processed such as those which
f >e undergone repression, which i f they come into
consciousness must stand.out in the crudest contrast
to the rest of the conscious mind.216 ’
In order to analyse the relationship..between consciousness and the
unconscious, Freud distinguishes between the descriptive and systematic
senses o f t&e two terms. The la t t e r s ig n ifies a p a rtic u la r system of

~ . •' 217
mental organisation possessing certain defining characteristics. The
system o f the unconscious he denotes by using the abbreviation Ucs. Its
distinguishing features are as follows:
The kernel o f the system Ucs consists of in s tin c t-

* presentations whose aim .is to discharge th e ir cathexis;
that is- to say, they.are wish-impulses. These in stin c
tual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist
independently side by side, and are exempt from mutual
contradiction.218
The ideas representing the instinctual impulses residing in the Ucs
have been repressed by means of censorship and prevented from entering
2^Sigmund Freud: 'The Unconscious’ , Collected Papers- (ed. Ernest

Jones), Volume 4, Basic Books, In c ., New York, 1959, pp. 104-105.
217Ib id ., p. 105. : :
218Ib id ., pp. 118-119. r
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
232
thesystem of consciousness (C s.). Thus the Ucs. is the realm of re
pressedmemories and emotions, or more precisely, of the ideas repre-

219
senting such memories and emotions. The process of repression i t
s e lf is a-continual and motile one:

-v
...repression demands asconstant expenditure of energy,

. and i.f this were discontinued«»the success of the re
pression would be jeopardised, so th.at a fresh act of
a repression would be necessary. We may imagine that,
what is repressed exercises a continuous straining in
the direction of consciousness, so that the balance
, has to be kept by means of a steady counter-pressure.
A constant expenditure of energy, therefore, is en
ta ile d in maintaining a repression, and economically
. its abrogation denotes a saving .220 ,
As a result of this process, the contents of the Ucs. are not normally
amenable to Cs.. (what we are aware of in either slnse-experience or
thought) and are .therefore distinguishable from the system of the Pre-
conscious (Pcs.)', whose contents «£n, be brought to the leVel of con-,
sciousness by means of ordinary introspective methods.
"Further distinguishing features of the Ucs. are that its processes

- ? ■ 221 .
are timeless and unaltered by the -passage of time. S im ila rly, they
are* unrelated to re a lity and are subject only to the pleasure-principle;

■ r 222'
they conform simply to regulation by pleasure and pain. F in a lly ,
they are aspects of what Freud calls the .'primary processes1 of the. mind
pig
- Alasdair MacIntyre: -Og. c i t . , p. 11.
•• 220
Freud: 'Repression', op. c i t . , pp. 89-JML
221 - , W
Freud: 'The Unconscious', op. c i t . , p. F19..
222Ibid.- • .
— ' ■■ . • (
because of the f a c ili t y with which th e ir cathexis can be transferred
223
from one set of ideas in the Ucs. to another. JJnlike secondary
processes, primary processes are not inhibited or redirected, but:
.. .simply flow in such a. way as to procure discharge

from the neurones and the consequent satisfactio n to
the personality which Freud already id e n tifie s wftfi'
Pleasure.. . . 'Primary processes! are basic to Freud's
neurological explanation and they are conceived of as
determinate physical processes, as the transactions '
of id e n tifia b le physical e n titie s which can; be accu-
■* ra te ly located.224
'In distinguishing between conscious and unconscious ideas Freud rejects
both the notion that each- is a d iffe re n t record of the same content,
situated in separate parts of the mind, and"that the two are functional
states of cathexis in the same' part. Instead he makes the distinction
by meansof language Which attaches it s e lf to an idea once i t becomes
conscious: " . . .the conscious idea comprises the concrete idea plus.the
verbal idea corresponding to i t , w hilst the unconscious- idea is that of

225
the thing alone". The manner in which the Cs. u tilis e s language in
the expression of ideas is a function of higher, mental organisation.
Moreover, i t enables Freud to give, a refined account of the process of

• / ' ........................... f -
repression. •
Now, too, we are in a position to state precisely what

i t is that repression denies to the rejected idea in the
transference neurosis - namely translation of the idea
— ........ , ,y ., ... , V""* " - ~ - . i l -I- -■ ‘
223Ib id ., pp. 119-120.

'224
MacIntyre: 0£. c i t . , pp. 2U22.
225Freud: Pp.* c i t . , p. 134. ;
234
into words which are to remain attached to the object.

The idea which is .not put into words, or.the mental
act which has not received hyper-cathexis then re -
mains in the unconscious in a state of repression,
Repression prevents consciousness (Cs.). from expressing an idea in
words, thereby forcing i t to remain in the in divid ual's unconscious
(U cs.). ■ 1 . ■‘ .
■•*
Repression involves blocking of the flow of neurological messages
and has both physical and psychical aspects. In order for there to be
a re-release of energy repressed by the nervous system, i t is necessary

’ ' * ’A ' ■
fo r.th e individual to confront the emotional blocks which caused the

' ’ f .
process in the f i r s t place.’ In psycho-analysis, this may necessitate
remembering and re-liv.ing childhood traumas with the aid of the thera-
227
p is t. Through the process of transference, this is made possible. .
The method used does not tre a t the problem as purely physiological. By
means of dialogue with the-.therapist,-the paxient is able to'discuss
and'eventually come :.to terms with the emotional trdumas which li e a t
the core of' his neurotic behaviour. The feeling-states which accompany
such behaviour and the repressed wishes which d is to rt the individual's
awareness of the true motivation of his behaviour, are the data upon
which both patient and therapist concentrate th e ir combined attention.
While the therapist has a t his disposal only tbe patient's be
haviour as a guide to what he is fe e lin g , he* does not deny e ith e r the
226iM d .
.. .-227' .
Jurgen Habermas: 0£. c i t . , p. 231.
235
existence or the importance of the other's fe e lin g -sta te s . The dis
torted nature of the patien t's language is it s e lf a sigh o f his confused

22ft ■ ■* ■
and conflicting" emotions. At the same time i t is a tool which he
cam use to communicate these feelings to the therapist. The patient
learns about his emotions prim arily through subjective awareness, how
ever distorted this may be. The therapist, on the other hand, in te r
prets the patient's*behaviour as having a specific emotional cause.
Through the dSe of language each is able to corarnnicate his perception
of the process: the patient may>have d iffic u lty communicating present
feelings and wants; and the therapist can in terp ret this d iffic u lty 'a s
having an underlying cause, rooted in the patient's past, and presently-
repressed into the .arena of the unconscious. Through an ongoing process
of mutual feedback, each learns more about the underlying causes of the V
patien t's present abnormal behaviour. The ultim ate aim of the process
is a f u l l awareness and a b ilit y fo r undistorted communication of his

' • '229 . v. ■
emotional states by the patient. In this manrter, he:becomes more
fu lly aware o f the unconscious motivation exerting a continual causal
influence upon both his conscious thought and behaviour.
f - - '•
i• '. •
B. Russell *s Behaviourist Theory of the Uoconscious
J • J"'■ ■. ’ '' ' - •' '•
In this sub-section"I shall consider Russell's theory of the uncon
scious, in which the concepts of, conscious and unconscious desire are
, ., - . , _ j —~t- ; : • : 3“ : : : : ~
228
Freud: -'tin e s o f Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ in James
Strachey (e d .): 0f>. c i t . , Vol. 17, p. 161; and ‘ The Unconscious', oj>.
c i t . , pp. T29 aria 135-136. ■ ;
^Habermas: Op^ c i t . , pp. 227-228*'
rew ritten in behaviourist terms. I shall show that this leads him to
assim ilate unconscious with preconscious desire.
The b r ie f excursioninto Freud's notion of the unconscious in the

. 7. o ' . ' , r • • • ■. '
previous sub-section helps to underline differences between his account
and Russell's. I n it ia ll y these seem.to be of minor importance." When
w ritin g o f the development, of the v irtu e of courage, Russell e x p lic itly
refers to the need to avoid repression, in apparently ju s t the same
sense as Freud: * ' Q
Fear should be overcome not only in action, but in ,

feelin g ; anti not only in conscious fe e lin g , but in
the unconscious as w e ll. The purely external v ic
tory over fe a r, which s a tis fie s the a ris to c ra tic code,
leaves the impulse underground, and produces e v il *
twisted reactions which are not recognised as the
offspring of te rro r.230 , ^
/
Yet I Have pointed to occasions on which Russell advocates repressive
methods fo r controlling fear which resulted in 'twisted reactions', in
his own children. How is one to explain this? One might .claim that i t
was simply because o f.a lapse in his a b ilitie s as*a f a th e r ;,or because
he maintained ao a ris to c ra tic approach to chi Id -re a rin g , which stressc
the rigburs o f physical and moral courage and the need fo r In aloofness
on the part of parents. This la t t e r explanation is p a rtic u la rly per-
sUasive in the lig h t e f RusSell's own austere upbringing. Yet I believe
that i t is secondai^ to his adoption of a mechanical concept o f the
^^ 0 n Education, p. 52. Cf. Ib id . , pp. 34-35 and p. 51, where

Russell writes o f the e v ils of repressive methods. ' -
Vndivi'ckiaT.' .Despitfe eoncessions-^to the.''Freudian model, his. practical,
recommendations- follow d ire c tly and consistently from his mechanical,
behaviodristic account of child development.
t. Katherine f a i t provides evidence in support,of this position. She
. claims..that her fa th e r was: ■. '■
. . .mesmerised by the a u th o ritie s .. . of that early

behaviorism whose clQckwork efficiency em^-tterec
the infancy of so many o f my generation:?
, Irr the education o f his: childreni Russell adopts, a s c ie n tific approach,
which .downplays the importance, o f the development o f emotional bonds
between father and chili
Having studied the problem, and^ developed a theory, he ; v i i

r endeavoured to put i t into practice, - apparently be
lieving that, a parent could always behave correctly .'
in the presence of his children and conceal from them ^
any undesirable feelings he might possesis. I f he had
- had fulVrtime care of us, he might Have been less ' * ,
confident. Or. i f he-had pajd a l i t t l e more attention -
to the theories of Freud arfd less to those o f the'
American behaviorist John B. Watson.23?
• • ' . r .' , ‘ . •’*. "■ ' . » .
... - ... • . .• - .. . ■- ..
In the place of a developmental theory of the child maturing by relating
-to others on an I-Thou basis, P ussell's emphasis is upon an individualis>
t ie m orality of correct habits. Given the correct envitonment;hy •• 1
parentsi the child develops s e lf-d is c ip lin e and responsibility through =
1 a sense o f independence from the e a rlie s t age. The e ffe c t is to 1eave.

!—; — . - ■■■-> .
. ■ ^ ■■ '■ . 7 ' ■
Katherine T a i t : O p . c i t . , pp. 61 and 59.
\ .• . .... V .
Ib id ., p. 63. . v :: : .".V ./
■ ..
238
the child feeling-responsible fo r his own failu res and fears, while ’
*, .• - . • - .....
any successes are attrib u ta b le .'to the correct habits in s tille d by
parents. At. times', this feeling o f responsibility fo r oneself as an
atom in is o la tio n from others was-too much fo r Russell’ s own children

233
to bear.
Y Russell’ s disagreement with Freud over the potion of the unconscious
centers on a number of issues. F ir s tly , he objects to the metaphysical’
•status which Freud affords to trie unconscious. While Russell agrees '1
with the notion of unconscious1desire, he does not believe that the
unconscious it s e lf has ah ontological status~ This is hardly surprising’,
given his attack in Tfre Analysis of Mind On th e 'd u a lis t conception of
mind as an e n tity d is tin c t from the material world. Russell's attack
is prim arily on the notions of the ego and consciousness; yet having
abandoned these as^needless metaphysical baggage, i t is consistent that

. ‘ , j. ■ ”•'•*•. 234 . *
he view the unconscious in the same lig h t.
From this conclusion, Russell makes several inferences of a more
_ dubious nature. He wishes to rew rite the Freudian accounts of desire
(both conscious and unconscious) and of repression in behaviourist .
terms. His purpose is to divest Freudianism of its mysterious and meta-
physical overtones. He defines .desire as a behaviour cycle,r e lic ite d
by a disagreeable-Sensation ,0 which puts the person i’nto a state of

. - - g- — ------ / — — ~ :------- :--- — ---— — --------
233 ■ " - •
• Ib id . , pp. 35-36. Cf. Andrew Brink; ' Her Own Woman' , Russell,
23-24, Autumn/Winter 1976, p. 51. .'
234.
The Analysis of Mind, pp, 9, 17-19, 22-23 and 3fi-38.
235
Ib id ., p. 59. ; •;
239
disquiet and is s a tisfied When the person is once again in a state of
re st. A .hungry animal, fo r example, becomes restless u n til i t finds
food. Once s a tis fie d , the animal returns to a relaxed and pleasurable
state of equilibrium . The basic feature of desire in both animals and
humans is that "desire, lik e force in mechanics, is of the nature of- a A

■■. ■' 237
convenient fic tio n fo r describing shortly.certain laws of behaviour".
Russell is at odds here with both the Freudian and commonsense notions
of desire, fto.nnat.ly;we conceive of an individual-desiring an object
when he directs an element o f feeling upon that object and acts accor-
dingly.' The intent of his action is -to realise a conscious purpose

’' . • " p38 ‘* ' ’
which he has entertained. The essential non-cognitive element of
desire f o r Russell, on the other hand, is an impulsion away from the
actual ( the sensation stimulating the d e s ire ),-n o t an attractio n towards

■ ■■*.* . 239 '
a future possible state of a ffa irs (the purpose o f the action).
- ' The notion of purpose he defines in terms o f .observable bodily
behaviour: . ' ■ ; ,, .
The ’ purpose"’- of a bdhfcviour-cycle is the result which

brings i t to an end, normally by a condition of tempo
ra ry quiescence- provided there is no interruption. .
An animal is said to 'desire' the purpose .of a behaviour-
- * cycle while a tiehaviou.r-cycle is in progress. I believe
■ . ■
■■■- ■- ■ ' / ■
■ .. . I. ■-■■■■■. — 1 ■
■ ■ ■>
-: ■
■■- V "v* ; 1 ' " T \ " ~ 'f—* 111
236Ib id ., p.;.67.
Ib id ., p. 32.
2 3 7 » .
OOO : " - • *
£-JOSee Ib id ’ , .pp. 58-59. .This is the view which Russell himself
holds in 'The Philosophy of .Logical Antomism" and.which he is a t pains
to re je c t In the opening paragraphs o f Chapter I I I of The Analysis o f
Mind. "
23Îb id . , pp< .6$ ah(p58.
these defin itio ns to be adequate to human purposes-
. and desires'... .1 am very anxious that no ideas *
should be attached to. the words 'purpose' arid 'de- 24'n •
s ire ' beyond those included in .th e above defin itio n s.
In humans, unconscious desire- "is the natural prim itive fornj'of'

241 ■l’ . ■ •"
.desire" , from which conscious desire develops:
I t is not'necessary to suppose, as Freud seems to do, .

that every-unconscious wish was,once1conscious, and , . .
- was then, in his.terminology, 'repressed' because we '
disapproved of i t . On the contrary, we .shall suppose
th a t, although Freudian 1repression 1 undoubtedly
occurs and is important, i t >is not the usual reason
/ fo r uriconsciousriess of our wishes. The usual reason' ,
is merely that wishes are a l l , to begin w ith, uncon
scious, and only become known when they are actively .
. noticed. 2A£ — .
Repression, in the Freudian sense, is therefore an anomaly. The nature
of human desire is unconscious u n til the individual learns to notice i t .
.Individuals learn about th e ir own wants-and desires in precisely the
same way in which they learn about.those of others, namely through o b - :
, serving behaviour and in ferring from this evidence the desire which
243-
prompts i t . When they do so co rrectly, they become conscious of
th e ir own desires.
‘Conscious desire is a combination of a behaviour cycle, set in
motion by a sensationof discomfort, coupled with a true b e lie f as' to
240Ib id . , pp. 65-66.

241Ib id ., p. 39. ' ‘
■ 242 ■ " .y
- Ib id . My it a lic s . . •
243Ib id ., p. 31.
241
• yqa
the object which w ill bring satisfactio n . Since human beings some
times make, mistakes in th e ir theorising about these objects, they

245
generate a whole set of secondary desires based upon false b e lie fs .
I f an individual believes fa ls e ly fo r long enough that-he desires a
certain -state of a ffairs', he can. convince him self.that he in fa c t desires
•it. In this way a secondary desire may influence action:
But i t has not the same power_as a primary desire of

bringing thorough satisfaction when i t is realised;
so long as the primary desire remains unsatisfied,
restlessness continues in spite of the secondary ,
desire's .success.' Hence arises a b e lie f in the
vanity of human wishes: the vain wishes are those
that are-secondary, but mistaken beliefs prevent us
1 ^from realising, th at they are s e c o n d a r y . .
The source-of self-deception lie s in. a desire fo r beliefs which an
individual is incapable of realising (being universally popular or con
sidered' as a genius, fo r example) but which he nevertheless strives to
a tta in : The wish brings him only a lim ited satisfaction since i t is ,
based on a /a ls e b e lie f. Desire fo r b e lie fs , as opposed to desire for
actual fa c ts , is an important sub-species of desire, since i t manifests
it s e lf both individually and socially in vanity, optimism and re lig io n .
The common element underlying these phenomena is that they spring from
primary desires whose nature has been disguised by theoretical mistakes
the individual makes concerning the object of his desire.
• 244Ib id ., p. 72. ' v : - V

245Ib id ., p. 32. “ .
246Ib id ., p. 74.
247Ib id ., pp. 74-75.
The importance o f education is that the individual can learn from
the study of his own behaviour to distinguish between primary and secon
dary desires. From experience he can learn which objects in fa c t bring

248
quiescence and satisfactio n . Most of the mistakes that individuals'
make about-their own desires stem from laziness, lackof experience or

249 •’
,ja fa u lty education. These mistakes are.not the resu lt of repression
and are readily amenable to correction by means o f educatfon. In te lle c
tual e ffo rt alone enables the individual to recall his unconscious
desire and match i t with a true b e lie f. In this manner, he can divest
hims-elf of any,dogma or vanity to which he has previously subscribed
because of a theoretical mistake about the actual object of his desire.
With s u ffic ie n t practice in observing th*e actions-stemming from.his*un-
conscious desires, the individual w ill rid him self.of secondary desires
UnfortQ nately^fcivilisatiqn often.demands the in h ib itio n o f the very
impulses which would set this educational process in motion: .

■■ ■ #
i The practice of in h ib itin g impulses, which is to a
- .great extent necessary tq. c iv ilis e d .lif e , makes mis-
. , takes easier, by preventing experience o f the actions
" to-which a desire would otherwise lead, and by often
.causing the in h ib ited impulses themselves to be un
noticed or quickly forgotten.250
. ■Y . . ■ ~.;Y.
One problem in this account is Russell's assimilation of uncons-
V.
>•.- cions .and preconsciou^ desire, in. the Freudian sense.’ The examples he
:v
V .gives,'of motivated.self-deception (such as the vain need to. think well
•/of..oneself) a re oai;l on the level of f a ir ly superficial self-deception
’ and 'are re.latiV ely Mmple problems to resolve. They merely require
recalling''the ‘desire in question, not overcoming an emot>iona|l block

v \ 1 4' ’ "
impeding-'extressfpn of. that desire: *

■- .1
?
■ The vs.ew which Russell takes of "all such mistakes is a.
. • ra tio n a lis t's view,-, which, exaggerates’ the power /of the
in te lle c t. I f its Operations are disturbed by the emo
tions, it.c a n easily reassert i t s e lf . The exaggeration •
is-part'ly *tjie resu lt of his assimilation of unconscious ,v
■, desires to simple unrecognised needs-.. But i t is also,
the resu lt of his assimilation of unconscious desires V
- to preconscious- desires, which is an independent'arrpr.'
„ An unconscious desire, according to Freud's theory, is
one Which has been repressed by a- powerful--emotional
1 force, operating without the intervention o f conscious
ness and which is , therefore, impossible fo r the person ■ ’/
to recover.unaided or by purely in te lle c tu a l means.251 .
Russell has l i ’t t le to say about this process of emotional repression,
since he regards i t as atypical and is only concerned with Freud's theory
’ of instincts to the extent that i t can be rewritten in behaviourist
terms. Yet can it? Moreover, is his account- of unconscious desire
' correct?
. OCT • ’
D.F. Pears: ‘ Russell‘s Theory of Desire 1 in J.E. Thomas and-
Kenneth Blackwell (ed s.): Russell in Review, p. 230. The assim ilation
of unconscious-desires to unrecognised needs* which Pears mentions as
an independent problem, results ih.R ussell's failu're to distinguish
those wants whi ch are autonomous or not dependent on. needs. The dis
tinction im plies, not an autonomy of the w ill in the Kantian sense, but
places desires on* a higher level than needs. See Ib id . , p.. 228.
-I
C. Russell's. Behaviourist Account of Repression
In this sub-section I shall consider Russell's account of repress
sion, which he rewrites in behaviourist terms.' This robs his. account.,
of the notion of emotional.'conflict and the psychological dynamism of
Freud's theory.
The assimilation pf unconscious to preconscious desire results in

^ ■■■■■■ ■ *-■ . 252'' '
oversights on Russell's part concerning.the process o f repression:
.“ An unconscious desire in the full-blown sense does not leave a ll other
desires in complete control of consciousness. On the contrary, i t •
causes a d iffe re n t conscious desire to emerge 'behind the back1 of the
person, as i t were. The process is again a resu lt of the i n i t i a l act
. of .repression, and'is absent when a desire has simply siipgpd intfi the'
preconscious. The new desire, which is the representative of unconscious-
desire, acquires some of the power -of its originate** and hence in
fluences the person's actions^. The relationship of a precons cious. . .
desire to consciousness .is’ quite d iffe re n t, since i t has no powerful
representative and, i f obscured from consciousness by another desire,

253'" ■
can be recalled re la tiv e ly easily by means of introspection. ,
Russell, on the other hand, reduces repression to a matter of con-
.flic tin g habits, and be quotes J.B. Watson in support o f this view:
252Ib id . , p. 234.
253Ib id ., pp; 39 and 72.
with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
245
Many of us do not believe in a world of the unconscious

(a few of us even have grave doubts about the useful
ness of the^term consciousness), hence we try to explain
censorship*along ordinary biological lin e s . We belieye
that one group of habits .can 'down' another group of- -:;r
habits - or in stin c ts. In this case our ordinary system
; of habits — those which we c all expressive o f our 'i
* 9 selves! - in h ib it or quench (keep.inactive or p a r tia lly
inactive) those habits and inistinctive tendenciesfwjijdh
belong largely in the past.254
Thus when an individual 'tensors' an impulse the process is biological
ahd a matter o f maintaining those habits expressive of his present s e lf
over past habits or conflicting in stin cts. S im ila rly, when an individual
in h ib its an impulse unacceptable to c iv ilis e d adult l i f e , the"impulse
does not -constitute a wish once conscious and repressed into the uncon
scious. I t is simply a tendency to behave in a manner a t odds with the

' '255'
.. habits of the community at large. - '
Whatever the ’s c ie n t if ic ’ advantages of Russell's theory, any
notions of emotional- c o n flic t and psychological dynamism are absent.
The important question becomes that of establishing correct habits.
While the role of consciousness is important, i t too is prim arily a

V -• ■ ■>' ■ 256 ’ ;
.matter of acquiring the correct lin g u is tic habits. The correction
o f secondary desires by, matching-ra true b e lie f with the sensation i n i
tia tin g a behaviour cycle, is an educational processi fo r correct habits.
Any increase in emotional and in te lle c tu a l awareness resulting from the
process is. incidental to the establishment of such habits. A ffective
^ J . B ; Watson: ‘The Psychology of Wish F u lfillm e n t1, The S c ie n tific

Monthly," November 1916, p. 483, quoted in Russell: op. c i t . , p. 39.
“ "555
^55j "
. -
_
-
Ib id . , p. 485, quoted in 0£ . c i t . , p . '40.
256"
Ib id ., pp. 40 and 31. .
c o n flic t, in the Freudian sense K ra rely occurs and is of minor impor
tance. . As a re s u lt, when confronted with .the practical problem of
dealing with a strongly rooted in s tin c tiv e fear in the ch ild , Russell
concerns himself witht Its cpntrol through th e ’establishment o f habit
rather than with understanding the innerVtrauma, which constitutes its

’•*> ' .
root cause, y "
~ There is a further iâson why Russei.,1 stresses the importance of
controlling fear. The strongest in stin c tiv e urge in the child is his
w ill to power, or the desire tq become an adult. This again stands in

' p ■! ' ^
contrast to the Freudian notion that sexuality dominates human a c tiv ity :
The main in stin c tiv e urge of childhood is not sex, but

the desire to become ad u lt, or, perhaps,more c o rrectly,
the w ill to power. The child is impressed by his own
weakness in comparison with older people, and he wishes
. to become t h e ir e q u a l.257
Since the child naturally desires adulthood he is lik e ly to accept the
;V control of other instincts as a necessity for participation in the
adult;community. Evenwhere these.conflicting instincts are strong
(such as is the case with fear)" the penalty for controlling them Ts
consistent with the child's own strongest in s tin c t, constantly attempting
to im itate those adults who impress him by th e ir fo rtitu d e . Any repres-
- sion involved in the control o f fear w ill be minimal since the child
"if/ r •
constantly s triv e s .fo r the power inherenferin adults. One aspect of

• ■■■■.•' ■• -
' 0K7 *■'

•* such power is the a b ility VT control fear fo r the sake of pursuing an
a c tiv ity demanding courage. In general, the control of impulses neces-
• sary for c iv ilis e d l i f e , w ill be readily accepted by a child in whom-
the w ill to power is strong, since self-control w ill, tend to enhance
rathep than thwart it s development.
I t seems unfortunate that When dealing with the fears of his own
children Russell forgets what he had w ritten in Principles of Social
Reconstruction concerning the destructiveness o f fear in the establish
ment of social in s titu tio n s : “No in s titu tio n inspired by. fe a r can
■ . ** ft '
further l i f e . Hope, not fe a r, is the creative principle in human
•V- ' 258
a ffa ir s ." His tendency to in teg rate the instincts of the child with
those habits approved of by adults is so strong that the in s titu tio n of
his own family was, in certain instances, based d ire c tly on fe a r'/ The
major reason fo r this change in a ttitu d e is the increasing tru s t which
Russell places in“ behaviorist psychology as the "only v a lid method for
the study of. animal and child psychology” .
D. C onflicting Views p f Fear: Russell and N e ill C •
In this sub-section I shall examine the conflicting Views of. fear
given by Russell and N e ill and suggest th at N e ill's method is more con
sistent with the aim of developing 'fe a rle s s ly fre e ’ individuals.

--------- ---- — ----- _ L —— ------ ,-------- :— i'-— - - --------- —— :------------- '
258
■ • ‘?CQ """ '
'The Training of Young C hildren ', Toe. c i t . , p. 314. v
248
Russell's methods in dealing with fear contrast starkly with those
of A.S. N e ill. N e ill both recognises the dangers of coercing children
against th e ir w ill and suggests methods which allow them to choose what
they tru ly want. Unlike Russell, he de-emphasises th e•importance of
s e lf-d is c ip lin e , believing i t to be rooted in an unhealthy fear of
authority: v , . :” • % .
Many people believe down deep: I f children have nothing

to fe a r, how can they be good? Goodness that depends
on hope of reward or nope of praise or hope of heaven
depends on. bribery. Present-day m orality makes children
cowards for i t makes them fear l i f e . And that is what_
the goodness of disciplined pupils re a lly amounts to.
Discipline simply produces a conforming c h ild , fearful of transgressing'
the lim its placed'upon him by adult authority. The use .of praise and
blame is recognised as a potent method fo r in s tillin g fe a r. The outward
goodness' of the disciplined child is contingent upon the inward re
pression o f emotions, which re-emerge*in an anti-social form. The child
learns more e ffe c tiv e ly when the constricting lim its enforced by adults
are lif t e d . ■
. N e ill's conception of the"child's freedom is consistent wiih an
attempt to,base human a c tiv ity upon 'the creative principle of hope'
which inspired Russell's organic concept of the in divid ual. Education
is an act Of s e lf-c re a tio n in which the child learns to liv e his own
-— 1 •' " ..— :-----------'" - r -------- - ~--------- " “ .— i-r ------------ — ’ :: ;— •
260A.S. Neil l: O p .'c it ., pp. 129-130.' .
life . The c r ite ria for it s success are not the e x trin sic rewards of
■V ' . a
good marks, a good job apd correct habits, but th e 'a b ility of the child
to d ire c t his own a c tiv ity and* a jpy in doing so. Provided -that the
child does not encroach upon the freedom of others, his own freedq® is
to be respected by society. The task o f the adult is fa r less that of •
exercising -authority over chi 1dren than “asking at What points he rig h t
safely c u rta il his authority by giving the children a measure of free-
cor'.262' ; :y r ' ;av .

Nei-ll 's approach to* fear in. the child stems from his concept of
raising him in an atmosphere df freedom and happin’ess. The source of

&
irra tio n a l fear ('an xiety* or ‘‘phobia'), lia s in the authoritarian.up-
bringing by parents Who tifejnand th e ir chiIdren to beha've in ways that"
. require repression* A child who is disciplined about his curiosity
in sex comes to fear the consequences of ifesturbation and may transfer
his fear to an object which is quite harmless. The object becomes a
symbol of the object .which he has been .taught to fear:
Phobias of te h occur in quite youn9 children. The.

son of a stern father may develop a jhobia of horses
or lions or policemen. The phobia becomes attached.to
• these or aW .other obvious father symbols. Here again
•w e see the aWful danger of introducing fear of authority
' into a c h i p ’s l i f e .264 . '
?fel
* •• v .. . *' ^
Ray Hemminas: Children's Freedom, Schocken. Books, New York,
1973, pp. 74-75. ‘ ' T “ '
262Ib id .,
p. 81* J — ' •
MO W -S' .
’ Summerhi.il.. p. 127. Russell agrees with N e ill that tê source

of cruel educational doctrines is fear>-on the part o f adults: On
Education, pp. 247-2*8.
* 64Summerhill. P* 128.
N e ill a t t e s t s to understand.the orig inal source of fear in the young
child and allow,him the freedjom to express i t . ' The aim is to enable .
■hi® to understand 4nd overcome the fe a r. He does not attempt to control
... the fear by forcing the child to behave in a particu lar way, provided
9 that the c h ild 's behaviour is not a threat to the l i f e or lib e rty of
’ ' ' ' ■ » « ...
others. Coercion and moralising simply reinforce anxiety: ■

v • • ■*
In his well-known work, Character Analysis, Wilhelm

Reich pointed out that a m o ralistic training not only .
warps the thinking process, but enters .structurally
into the body i t s e l f , armoring i t l i t e r a l l y with
<■ stiffness in posture and contraction of the pelvis.
• I agree with Reich. I have observed, dtrring many J
years p f dealing with a variety of children a t
•v Sucmerhi11, that when fear has not stiffened the /
’ musculature, the young walk, run, jump and play with
a wonderful grace: *65
. As regards fear o f the sea,.Neil 1 is p a rtic u la rly c r itic a l of the
• manner in ’ which Russell deals with this in his son: • ^

* . '■ ,V" % ■ -
, Neil 1 disliked this and suggested that the daily

• irtfersiofi might have made a more introverted boy.
think that 'Daddy #ants to. drown m e '.,. . N e ill .
thought i t quite unimportant whether or not a child
1 overcame a fear of the sea.' 'One of my best frie n d s ',
he wrote to Russel 1, 'old Dauvit in my native. ; ^ . -
v illa g e , is 89.and never had a bath in his l i f e . '
^ Dauvit appears frequently in the Dominie bboks, an
endearing figure o f native wisdom and unschooled
■h independence, and in c itin g ’ him in this context
N e ill seems to be trying to deflate Russell'S exalted
conditions fg r human excellence.266
^ 265Ib id ., p. 207. - ' ^
. Ray Hewmings: 0£. c it.’v, p. 78. The le tte r fromN e ill to

* Russell is quoted in the Autobiography, Vol. I I , p. 181.
Swirrapi ng lessons should’only be given to a child once he has seen the
need fo r "them htfhseTf and expressed ah in terest in learning to swim..
Provided that the educator stays with the f e l t needs.of the child and
does net attempt to build a sjtstem of instruction upon what he believes
the chil d . shoeld need,' he avojids coercion and the destructive effects
of ..'repression^. S im ila rly, regular bathing or showering, wh^ch appear. ■
to be necessary, conditions fo r health, should hot be forcediupon th e -
chil d.Sum rrierhill 's health fecord is particu larly, good despite the :
-fact- that rules concerning bed-.times and washing are kept to a minimum. 267
As regards fear;'of the dark, N e ill d iffe rs from Russell by stead
fa s tly maintaining th e 0beTief in the 'fearless freedom' o f the child in
practice..' He recognises th at fear of the dark may be the res u lt of a
displaced -fear of .something else (sex, or death, for example _). The
solution is to avoid imposing such feats upon the child in the f i r s t
place: ■■.''""■■y; ^ -'iv?'-','
I' find hardly any fear of thunder among our sm all'

„ children. They w ill sleep out in small tents through
theVfribst violent storm. Nor do I find much fear of
the dark. Sometimes.a boy of eight w ill pitch his
: tent righ t at the fa r end Of the f ie ld , and he w ill
sleep there .alone for nights. Freedom encourages
fear!esspesS. I: h^ve often seen timid l i t t l e - chaps
grow into sturdy, fearless youths. But to generalise
. Would be wrong, fo r there are introverted chi1dren •
who never become brawe. Some folks keep th e ir ghosis
t>67;
Hentnings.: ; O p ' c i t . , p. ‘§1
26JB
SummerhilT, p. 131. V.:,
‘P
> *' • ■
252
fo r l i f e I t is comparatively easy fo r parents to

rear a child without giving him complexes.* The
child must never be made a fra id , must never be made
to feel g u ilt y .: One cannot eliminate a ll reactions
.of fear: one may s ta rt suddenly i f a door.bangs.
Put you “can elim inate the unhealthy fear .that is ^ :
- ‘ superimposed on a child: fe a r of punishment, fe a r
o f an angry God, fear of an angry parent.269, . .
, . . , j >, .. • ■ • ’ • •:
In sum, N e ill's account of fe a r in the child is more adequate than
Russell !s fo r the following reasons: .. V 1
4. Fear, in the .sense of an anxiejty or phobia, is the re su lt o f .the
pro^ss of repression. Repression results from a c o n flic t between th e "
c h ild 's own wants and the demands placed upon him by overbearing adults
attempting to impose th e ir values upon him. ^ /
2. The method of dealing with a c h ild 's fear is to allow him the
freedom to express i t , with a view to understanding an/overcoming i t .
I f the principle of freedom were followed in the f i r s t place, th e & h iId
would not experience anxiety about harmless objects.

v ■ .. • \ .
■'■■■■ ■■■ ■•.-/ v-. ; - -
3. In the case a f John’s fe a r o f the seaSê should have bfeen- le f t
alone and granted the freedom not to go in.to the water until; he ex
pressed an in terest in do.ing so. The., forced dunking which Russell uses
is lik e ly to produce the subsequent' fears th a t Russell's daughter refers
, 4. Fear o f.th e dark is often the resu lt o f a displaced fear of another
'Object and i s cauaejJ by authoritarian chi Id -re a rin g . The young child
* 69Ib id ., pp. 131-132. 'TN s • ^ '

270 ■ -•
, Katherine T a it: Op. c i t . , p. 66.
normally experiences no such.fear. WhgVe he does, the way to overcome
i t is to allow the child the freedom'to express i t . ' The coercion th at
Russell practised with his son only reififorces fe a r. ’ ’
5. The aim of education is not.the in cu lcatio n .o f-th e ’ correct' ( i . e .
•socially approved) habits but*the stimulation pf the child's own
, impulse to; grow and “expnes.s himself in a spontaneous, jo y fu l and free

■ • •• ' ' • . -• -* "K
-manner. • '■ 1: 'w . . ■
VI. Conflicting Views of Freedom: The Organic and Mechanical

' Individuals .. ‘ '
- - . . ,j- ’ . ■' ■ v V V.'';
In this section I shall contrast Russell's conceptions of freedom

• j . 1>. ■• * ' i f
in the organic-and mechanical individuals. I shall show that the fre e
dom stemming from the organic principle of growth is more fu lly deve
loped than that based on correct habit formation. Habit formation is
based prim arily,on a d u lt5authority which•'■controls' the individual's
development, by means of external .coercion. As a re s u lt, RusselI1s

•27]' •
conception o f ’h generation educated in fearless freedom" is o f
individuals whose freedom stems from habits based bh external, compul-

’ '* i ‘ ’ •• *
; -V*
sion and the control of his instincts by the w i l l . Again this contrasts
with the freedom pf the l i f e of the s p ir it in the organic in d ivid u al. '
Moreover f t .implies a s h ift away from the notion o f the aim p f education
as the .free development of the individual to that o f the development o f
th e -c itiz e n . \
■
— :_f.--------:— — ------- — — ; ------- :——— ------— ^ ”
271 ‘ ' •' ' * V ' ■
On Education, p. 248. ■ .
■1' ■
' i •
.I
■ 254
. There is a -profound difference in the types of freedom available*
. to the organic and mechanical individuals. The lim its to freedom and
t
organisational principles th at structure the creative ' 1development of
the organic individual are determined by his innate principle of growth
This is unique and a product of his innate pattern o f development. On

■. *— - ■ * - ' ’
•' the other hand,-the lim its to freedom of the mechanical individual are
provided by the habits b u ilt onto his innate, in s tin c tiv e structure. •
. ; Freedom is only possible for,in d ivid u als who have internalised the
correct habits and perform the concomitant tasks autom atically. The
habfts are not unique but a product of routines based upon adult autho
r it y . -I.s h a ll flesh out the.differences between these two notions of
freedom more fu lly . . ' *
Russell*s concept o f the organic individual implies that freedom
only has meaning in re latio n to an a p r io ri structure Which places con
strain ts upon his development. The organisational forms that determine
the development o f human freedom and knowledge, originate in the. innate

• * ■. ' - •
structure of the human being. The use o f .language is one example of
human development which.combines the fre e , creative-use of 1inguistic
; ^ symbols with a structure governed by s t r ic t organisational rules:
. There is an in terp lay , a complex relationship between

.constraints and rules and creative behaviour. I f
there is no system o f ruies, no system o f Constraints*
no set of. forms, then creative behavior is quite un-
, thinkable. Someone who is throwing paints a t a wall
; in an a rb itra ry fashion is not acting creatively,.as an
a r tis t . •Similarly some system.of constraints and
- forms and principles and'rules is presupposed as a
basis for any ki-nd of creative a c tio n . 2/2 ,
On this view, both freedom and knowledge‘have meaning only in relation
to in trin s ic principles of mental organisation that place absolute

1 ' • 273
lim its upon what can be known. Freedom is only tru ly enjoyed when
■ 272 ■1 ^
Noam Chomsky:; T‘:Toward a‘ Humanisitic Conception -of Education1,
op. c i t . , pp. 210-211. The point about language i s ‘developed more fu lly
in Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, pp..3-51.
.■ 273
Ib id ., p. 49. In .On Education Russell contrasts three concep- •
tions of society ahd^their implications for education and'human a ffa irs
( Ib id . , p.. 115). Tbe f i r s t conceives of the social system as a machine
. and has:been dominant since the time of Newton and the industrial revolu-
. tio n . I t leads to a mechetnical conception of society, according to
which human beings can be scrapped and replaced in the same way as out
moded machines. The second is of society as a mould. . Individuals are
to f i t into the mould designed fo r them by those in powfer. Education
consists of f i l l i n g the child with the knowledge and values established
by adult authority. The th ird conceives’ of society as composed of.
growing organisms such as. trees, each of which has a specific nature to
be developed through interaction w ith.the social environment. This
conception is inadequate because i t - f a i l s to take into account the
findings of s c ie n tific psychology: .
The' conception of society as a tree is better than the mould
or the machine, but i t is s t i l l defective. I t is to psycho
logy that we must look to supply the. deficiency. Psychologi
cal constructiveness is a new and special kind, very l i t t l e
understood as yet. I t is essential1, to a rig h t theory of
education', p o litic s and a ll purely human a ffa ir s . And i t -
should dominate-the imaginations"of c itize n s , i f they are not
- - to be misled by.false analogies. Some*people dread con-r
. structiv.eness in-human a ffa ir s , because they fe a r that i t •:
must be mechanical; they therefore believe in anarchism and
' - the ’ return to nature'. I am trying in this book to show,
in concrete instances how^-psychological construction d iffe rs
from the construction of a machine. ( Ib id . , pp. 115-116)
One distinguishing feature of psychological constructiveness, is
abstract sympathy fo r other human beings. Its development is stimulated
■ by. exposing the child to the c u ltiva tio n of other liv in g things. Appre
ciation of the delicacy of nature fa c ilita te s a sympathetic understanding
of mankind. Yet this is only lik e ly to succeed i f men and women are;
considered as natural organisms. In order fo r the distinction between
psychological and mechanical constmctiveness to be fleshed out, Russell
256'
■%
* •1 ‘ • •
i t stems from theînternal core of the in dividual, rather than from
external factors. More .precisely, fre e , creative action is the re su lt.
of interaction between the in trin s ic nature of the individual and his
environment. The la tte r promotes Or retards the unique pattern of
development whose source Ties in the innate principle of growth. The
principle of growth imposes s t r ic t lim its upon the creative action of
the in d iv id u a l. • ••
By contrast, Russell's concept of .the mechanical individual implie's
■ th a t freedom only has meaning in re la tio n to a learned set of habits
that place constraints upon his development; Freedom and knowledge only;
develop in a disciplined individual who has learned to perform basic

274 ' • ■' ■
tasks automatically. Their automatic performance results from the
establ ishrrie'nt of correct habits. Free, creative behaviour is only
possible on the basis of the building blocks produced by habit formation.
The organisational principles that lim it human knowledge and freedom no
needs to a rtic u la te a conception of what i t means to be a human being

quite d is tin c t from the mechanical world. Yet i t is not clear that he
does so. Many of the "concrete instances” Which Russell uses to under
line^ the differences between psychological and mechani ca‘l construction - ,
f a il; t o do ju s t th is . (e .g . the methods fo r dealing with childhood . •
f eSrs) . ; ~‘ 1
274
• For example, I am only free to play a musical instrument once ^
I have learne,d to perform certain s k ills automatically. The fingering',
bowing technique and vibrato etc. must be performed automatically
before I can s ta rt to play the v io lin " in a creative manner.
longer originate in the innate structure of the njind. - There is no
longer any permanent principle of growth to expert this function, simply
instincts that are in fin ite ly malleable by the-environment. The origin
< of the lim its to human action lie s .in the environment; more precisely,
in the e ffe c t that the-environment has. upon the innate characteristics
of the. in dividual. The greater the efficacy of the formation o f habits
the more lik e ly is the individual, to pursue paths of ‘development en
hancing his freedom. Because the structure of this development is
determined by habits learned from sources external to him, the scope of
fre e , creative action open to the individual is fa r more limited.- In
order to be fre e , the In divid ual's behaviour must f i r s t be controlled
—by the environment of adults. This*environment conditions the in d iv i-
• dual in such a way that f t builds habits onto his character that are
not integral to i t . The interaction between the individual and his
." ' . environment is a matter of-passively acquiring correct habits...* Habits
give the inidividual a sense of freedom that is not to ta lly his own
-because the lim its to that freedom do not proceed from his innate p rin
ciple of growth. Freedom consists o f adapting, with the minimum St
fuss, to In environment controlled by powerful adults who use both.the
techniques of modern psychology and force, where necessary. I f the
process is successful, the child acquires "a sense o f unfettered

. ' -275' "*
spontaneity".. I f i t is not, the resul ts are problematical to his
• . - ■ ^
275 -
258
development and produce a profound c o n flic t between his tânts, and the
demands of his environment, resulting in repression and neurosis. v

9 *'
Whether successful or not, the sense o f-in d iv id u a l freedom stemming
from the in tern alisatio n jof correct habits is. severely lim ited.
\ I \0 , ■ . ,
,-V ' "... . . > ; • .
The implications of this conception of freedom upon Russell's
account of education is profound. The "fearless freedom" that in d iv i
duals develop is a \(H tte r o f Adaptation to the habits sanctioned by
adult authority. Individual freedom is not based upon organic develop
ment but upon adaptation-to the patterns of development sanctioned by .
others. I t is in this sense th a t Russell writes of freedom in education
►..'/N ' % 9enerat.ion educated in fearless freedom w ill have jtfilder and bolder
hopes than are possible to us, who s t i l l have ,to struggle with the
superstitious fears that l i e in wait for us below the level of conscious
ness."27^ However, the individual is unlikely to free himself from
fears lurking in the unconscious' by simply in ternalising patterns of
behaviour 1earned from others. This process s tifle s his freedom by
demanding the control of in stinctual development both by others and the
w ill. The internal control o f the instincts by the w ill begins a t an
early age and is required fo r the subsequent success ‘o f moral and
in te lle c tu a l education. -Without i t , the disciplined habits that form ;
the basis of such education w ill neither be present in the child nor be
276Ib id . , p. 248.
. •: - - . - • ** / " . .•••*
4-4' v
259
lik e ly to develop without the loss of much time and e f f o r t . 277
' 1‘ ■,
... By contrast, the role Of the s p ir it in integrating the elements
of the organic individual (in s tin c t and mind) is less dependent upon
e ith e r the internal control of instincts by the w ill or the external
control of the individual by others, Russell emphasises that the
effects of inner-directed w i l l and external control o f the self-develop
ment of the individual are dangerous to his.healthy growth.278 In the
f u l ly developed, harmonious individual the s p ir it integrates the lives
of in s tin c t and mind, and shines forth upon others in ' the form of. uni
versal love. S p irit o b je c tifie s the in stin c ts, focussing th e ir energy
upon objects* of lasting value (a r t , philosophy,-mathematics) and en- *.
abling themsto transcend the level o f the subjective. S p irit expresses
what is universal in human experience., transforming the l i f e of .in s tin c t
without denying its fundamental.character. Moreover,- i t reconciles
in s tin c t with the l i f e of the mind by transforming i t into the realm of
the objective. |
The resu lt of this process in the organic individual is twofold.
F ir s tly , the i^ iy id u a l achieves an inner freedom, whereby he expresses
his; in stincts in a way that transcends the purelyfcsubjective. Thus. he
is able to escape his own p a rtia l perspective and speak to the eternal.
7 11
s On Education, p. 80,
'278' ' *
Princi pies o f Social Reconstruct!on., pp. 24 and 238-239.
The vision that s p ir it gives to the individual enables him to balance
the demands of in s tin c t and mind and achieve an internal harmony between
them. Secondly, the.individual projects his instinctual feelings onto
the whole of mankind and feels an objective love fo r the human race.
This love produces a reverence fo r the potential in a ll human beings to '
grow in constructive ways, essential to both education and social re
construction. In th is manner, s p ir it gives to the .individual a vision
of what"humanity could become and the loVe necessary fo r bringing that
•. potential in to being. v‘
In the introduction to this thesis I suggested a fundamental
; dilemma in Russell's educational philosophy between the education of i

the. individual and the education of £he c itiz e n .. When Russell upholds
the organic concept of the individual he regards-the education of the
in d iv id u a l, în the form of growth and self-development, as primary.
•. External harmony with other individuals proceeds d ire c tly from the ‘
healthy development of the lives of s p ir it and in s tin c t, grounded in
the prin cip le of growth.
The adoption' of the mechanical concept of th e ‘individual impl ies a
s h ift in Russell’s emphasis from the f i r s t to the second*horn of the
dilemma. He now regards the socialisation o f ' the individual (the..
■development of the 'c o rre c t 1'h a b its ) as a necessary condition for the
development of "fearless freedom" in the in dividual. Russell does not
w rite o f Citizenship per se, but the habits he wishes to inculcate are .
p o te n tia lly a t odds with the fu ll* development o f the in d ivid u al's
V : .-v : . ' ■' '

: - ■ . v, . . 'tJ V
rife
261
*»
..capacities. The mechanical individual is moulded by the s c ie n tific
approach to habit-formation which pays l i t t l e attention to the in stinc
tual and S piritual claims of his inner l i f e . Full self-development * !
structured by the organisational principles of the innate prin cip le of
growth which seeks freedom in order to flo u ris h , is now secondary to

f- . . . . ■ ■ • • . . '' 1
the.formation of correct habits. The following passage could have been •
w ritten by Russell in support’ of his new position:
.. .‘;the gardening metaphor.. .is a ra d ically misleading

image of the way human beings develop as persons, and
of education as a whole Unlike the physical aspects
of.growth, the peculiarly human features (mind and the
rest) have no inherent, predetermined end toward/which
th e ir development is moving. They are actively fashioned
• . by the society and culture which the individual e x -.
, periences. Because education is a special agency of
this process, i t probably should be .seen more, as a
- b u ild in g -in , however this may b£ done, than as a natural
y unfolding or even-a drawing o u t.279
Th'is’ view o f oeducation conceives of the child as a passive e n tity ,to be
moulded a,long the lines which society s e es..fit. I t ignores the active,
ro le which the individual' pi ays in determining which aspects of his
culture he w ill- accept as consonant with his own wishes and the courses
of action he w ill, take on the basis of these wishes. While.Russell is
clear about the incom patibility between those who regard education as a
means of in s t illin g d e fin ite b eliefs and those who conceive of it. as
producing the power of independent judgement , the underlying mechanical
279
Brian Crittenden: ‘ Slogans- handle with care* in Brian,
- (£pittenden (e d .): • Means and Ends in Education, The Ontario In s titu te
for Studies in Education, Toronto, 1969,.pp. 29-30.
^ 9pn Education, p. 10.
concept of the individual suggests that he is a, member of the former
> »
camp. . .' ;V
-. ' ' '. *- .* ' v 1
V II. Conclusion •
In this chapter I. have analysed the. mechanical concept of the
individual in *Russell 's educational philosophy,* with a view to con- *
trasting i t with the e a rlie r organic concept. On the basis of this
comparison I .have "criticised-the methods used to educate the mechanical
individual as repressive. ■*'
I have analysed each of the constituent elements (re fle x , in s tin c t
and habit) of the individual in turn. Reflex is the simplest uhit o f
behaviour e lic ite d as a response to a stimulus. 'Like in s tin c t, i t is
part of the in d iv id u a l’ s genetic endowment. The strongest in s tin c t in v
‘the child is his w ill to power, or his desire to become an adult. The
w ill to power can be channelled towards constructive a c tiv ity re la tiv e ly
easily because i t finds satisfaction in tasks o f increasing d iffic u lty .

-- . ‘ -' - > ' •*.
Unlike the organic in d ivid u al, in s tin c t has no underlying in trin s ic
prin ciple of growth that directs its healthy development along construc
tive: paths. The instincts, of the mechanical individual af*e readily .
malleable and the task of education is ter d ire c t them toward construc
tiv e a c tiv ity by establishing correct habits. Instincts become over
la id with habits a t the e a rlie s t age. Like the concept of in s tin c t/in
Russell's philosophical psychology, in s tin c t does not involve the notibn
o f intention and performs its t^jks more e ffic ie n tly on the basis of
experience.
v Habits integrate the in stincts O f the young c h ild with the demands
o f his environment. The psychology of habit-forjw tion renders unneces
sary, the emphasis upon d is c ip lin e , characteristic o f previous education
I f habits are established early in the course of child deveToppent they
produce a s e lf-d is c ip lin e which, a fte r an i n i t i a l period of compulsion,
issues from within’ the individual'. S e lf-d is c ip lin e can to established -
in the in fan t by means o f a s tr ic t routine in the matters o f sleeping
and eating. Habits established in the f ir s t year o f the c h ild 's l i f e
form the basis fo r his subsequent moral and in te lle c tu a l development.
U ntil the age of s ix , moral education is the primary concern. I t s aip
is to promote the habits necessary fo r the moral virtues of v i t a li t y ,
sensitiveness, courage and in tellig en c e. The la t t e r can*only be fu lly
developed a fte r the age of six when the focus of education shifts to
in te l 1ectual development. The in te lle c tu a l virtues of the s c ie n tific
.a ttitu d e and s e lf-d is c ip lin e f a c ilit a t e such development;. At this
s ta g e jis e lf-d is c ip lin e involves an awareness by the individual that he
is suppressing certain wishes in favour of the in te lle c tu a l goals that
he entertains. . ..The value of these goals is in trin s ic to 'the pursuit of
knowledge and not due to any subsequent u t ilit a r ia n value that accrues;
to- him. F in a lly , habits are examples of mneraic phenomena, whose
occurrence is dependent upon. the past experience o f the in diyid ual.
..This .distinguishes them from simple reflexes. Moreover, th e ir ro\e is
central to the in teg ra tio n of the constituent elements of the mechani
cal' individual., a ro l» previously performed by the 1if e of the s p ir it
in the orgapic individuals . ,:r\
■ r I then turn to c ritic is m of the repressive methods used in ‘the
education of the mechanical in dividual. A description of these methods
cefntr.es upon the manner In which Russell deals with his-son's fears of
the sea and the dart. The former is in stin ctive and Russell's methods
are repressive because-they require both the,use of physical fonoe
against the child-'and the repression o f fear by pride in,him. ‘ The * 4
w la t t e r is learned and Russell’ s methods are repressive'because they f a il
to take into account the inner, emotional l i f e of the child. „

. - * ■ O; ■ : • * .
^ The reason fo r Russell's advocation of repressive methods lie s in
j||conceptual tension between behaviourist principles, that stress the*
establishment of routines in the c h ild 's a c tiv itie s , and a Freudianism
that broadens, Russel1'V conceptual framework, enabling- him £0 w rite of
developing the c h ild ’ s in te lle c tu a l and emotional freedom. .Behaviourist
methodology is dominant and re s tric ts Russell's conceptions.of repres
sion (which he reduces to conflicting habits) and unconsciûs^d^jire
•y.'fiwhich'toe- assim ilates..topreconsc ious,'ides'ire)l - The reformulation o f.,
these concepts in behaviourist terms robs them of- the s e lf-re fle c tio n „-
by means o f which the individual comes to understand the forc-es a t play
determining his actions. The re s u lt of this reformulation i,s to lim it •
Russell’ s conception of individual freedom to a matter o f'th e interna- 4
lis a tio n of habit without due regard to the unique, internal 1ife of
the in divid ual. F in a lly , I compare Russell and N e ill's approaches to
childhood fears and suggest that N e ill's is more adequate.
In the fin a l section o f the chapter ! contrast the conceptions' of

; .
freedom in the organic and mechanical individuals. The fornier, stemming
from .the lim its of the organic principle of growth, is more fu lly
* developed than the latter,-based on the lim its established by correct
habit formation. Russell's lim ited conception of freedom implies a
^ s h ift away from a notion of. education as the ful.lêyelopment o f t h e
individuaFs capacities towards that of education .as. devel oping citizens-.
vCHAPTER FIVE :
THE ASOCIAL INDIVIDUAL
; At f i r s t blush,, the asocial concept of the individual which ■
Russell articu lates in Education and the Social Order apppa rs to be a
reversion to his orig inal lib e ra l model .:in which iself-develbpment .and
growth are the fundamental aspects o f the individual . The behaviourist'
analysis o f the individual as a tria d of r e fle x , .instinct and habit is*
replaced by a new one in which in t e lle c t , emotion and w ill are. his’ funda
mental, elements! Yet, upon closer scrutiny, i t becomes clear^ th a t the !
context within which Russell now views the, individual to be educated ■'?
has changed again. In terms of the impbrtant dilemma mentioned e a r lie r ,

' .■* ■•: , •*
Russell conceives of'education not prim arily a% a means of f a c ilita tin g
individual freedom but as a means of integrating the in divid ual, so a s .
to function as a responsible c itize n of the world state.. His emphasis
has sh ifted , in other words, from the f i r s t to,the second horn pf the
dilemma posed in 'his educational philosophy; That is , he now believes
that education should aim prim arily a t th e ’development,of good citizen s.

'•;* .' ‘ • - ' v* ‘ . '• •
In Russell'-s own words: t 1 ,
Considered sub specie a e te r n ita tis , the education ’

of the individual is to my jnind a fin e r thing than
the education of th e ;c itiz e n ; but considered .
p o litic a lly in relatio n to the needs of the tim e,•
the education of the c itize n must, I. fe a r, take-the
f i r s t place-.' . '
1
Education and the. Social Order , pp. 27-28.
•' : 266 ' ' * . ■
'267
The 'p o litic a l needs of the time' stem from the primary need to secure
the Survival of modern s c ie n tific c iv ilis a tio n . For, this purpose
Russell Woposes the education of the c itize n within a world state.
•The s h ift away from education as a means to the f.ul’l development,
of the in divid ual's capacities to education as a means to develop
cooperative citizens is made clear in Russell's consideration of three
d iffe re n t educational theories:
Three divergent theories of education a ll have th e ir

advocates in the present day.' Of these the f i r s t
considers that the sole purpose of education is to
provide opportunities of growth and to remove hampering
influences. The second holds that the purpose of
education is to give culture to the individual and to •
develop his capacities- to the utmost. The th ird holds
th a t education is to be considered rather in relation
vto the community than in relation to the in d iv id u a l,
that its business is to tra in useful c itiz e n s . . .No
ac u'a.l education proceeds wholly and completely on any
Jthe three theories. A ll three in varying pro-
porti on are found in every ‘system that actually exists,
I t is , I think, f a ir ly clear .that np one of the three
is adeqi ate by* i t s e l f , and that the choice of a -rig h t
system jf education depends in great measure upon the.
adoption' f a due proportion between the'three
theqri es
Ib id . , p. 29. The f i r s t 'negative theory of. education 1 RUssell

links to the liberalism of Rousseau'and .his followers, believing i t to
be open to the same criticism as '-laisser f a ir e 1*economics, namely that
: there is some need of ordered planning through.the intervention of the
state (Trr economics) or the adult teacher or.parent (in education),
... ib id . , pp. 30-32. The second theory is closest to Russell's e a rlie r
conception of th-p organic individual* since i t emphasises s e lf-
development .as the aim of education. However, he regards i t as inade-
q u a te fo r the twentieth century^since there is a greater need for th e .
state to ’ lim it indi vidual, freedorrNin both education and psychology in
order to create a collective id e n tity : • Ib id . , p. 243. The th ird
theory I shall consider in detail in this chapter. Each theory is • •
.discussed in the introduction to this thesis.
Reproduced with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
268
Whild granting a general v a lid ity to each-theory,*Russell, emphasises
‘ the necessity''of education fo r citizenship. The growth of m ilita n t
nationalism in post F irs t World.War-society demands the s ta b ilis in g .
. Influence of a world 'state in order to-secure the survival of. modem /

•. ■ ■ - o - . •
.s c ie n tific c iv ilis a tio n . I t is not sjrapty that the social and ; . y
p o litic a l good has acquired increasing importance.over the individual '
. good .fo r Russel 1. I t is the specific form that the social and p o litic a l
• good now takes that makes i t problematical. .The world state is to perform
: the repressive role of controlling a ll a°spects o f individual culture,
that i t considers subversive. *His aim is to develop a sense of '
lo y a lty to a centralised authority and a cohesion among the c itiz e n ry .
The aim o f the s ta te , education and p o litic s is no longer the develop- 4

ment of individual capacities but th e ir control through propaganda and •
force. . l. - •
The reason fo r Russell's s h ift in emphasis is the conception o f .
the individual that he has now adopted.. The asocial individual
-possesses a ,d ic ta to ria l w ill that constantly seeks power over others^ ‘
Self-develppment in the form of strengthening the w ill is thus a t odds ,
‘with social harmo.ny. This constitutes a problem since the w fll is a t
the same time a positive source of power within the individual* the
3Ib id . , p. 2 7 / "
°4Ib id . , pp. 27, 226, 243.
5Ib id . , p. 12. •
means by which he effects change in society. As such i t has to be .
' developed in a specific manner.^ The task of education is to transform
in divid ual, dictatorial- w ill, into the co-operative w ill of the
c itiz e n , Russell conceives.of a,world state as the only means to pre
vent the destructive expression of the w ill.
In sum, Russell posits a fundamental opposition between the asocial
d ic ta to ria lv w ill of the individual- and the co-operative w ill o f the ;
c itize n .^ In order to develop the la tte r from the\former he suggests
the'establishment of a world state with absolute power to control

' ■ •• *
^pcation and a ll social in s titu tio n s .

■' & '
In this chapter I shall f i r s t examine Russell’ s concept of the
asocial individual as a tria d composed o f in te lle c t, emotion and w ill.
. I shall consider his notion o f the individual good" as an in te rn a l
harmony between the three and the crucial role afforded to the w ill in
6Ib id . , pp., 11-13.

^Boyd H. Bode regards the c o n flic t as fundamental: „
The antithesis is clear. On the one hand we have the
god-like w ill which says ' l e t such things be' , On the
other hand we have the w ill of the c itiz e n , which
emerges from the process of bringing harmony out of
conflicting w ills How are these two kinds of w ill to
. • be reconciled? Apparently Mr. Russell, regards the
problem as insoluble. The best that can be hoped fo r .........
is that the co-operation which is demanded- of the c itiz e n ,
'should.be secured without too great a d4|ijnution of
individual judgement and. in itia tiv e ,,.
'Russell's Educational Philosophy', op. c i t . , p. 628. However, Bode,
f a ils ’ to notice the importance that Russel V attributes to the world
' state. He accuses Russell of regarding the principle of individual
development as primary. As a re s u lt, Bode views Russell as holding
the doctrine of the state as a ctively promoting growth and development.
This doctrine .Russell in fa c t abandoned with the notion o f'th e organic
individual; Ib id ., p. 631.
■ 270 / • V ,
achieving this task. I shall then analyse Russell's conception o f the
c itiz e n , s p e c ific a lly his view of the shortcomings of the c itize n within
the nation state and the ways in which nationalism encourages the des
tructive aspects of both herd in s tin c t and the d ic ta to ria l w i l l . I shall
turn to an analysis of Russell's conception of the world statie examining
his proposals fo r the separa^Ton of its c iv il and m ilita ry functions and
the reasons he gives for believing that the citizen of the world state
• w ill overcome the shortcomings Of the national c itiz e n . I shall proceed
to c r itic is e Russell's conception of the world state on two. counts: its
propagation o f science as power in the administration of the state and
its Hobbesian* absolute character; I shall also c r itic is e Russell4s
presuppositions concerning'the asocial character o f the individual w i ll.
In sutn* my argument w ill be that Russell fa ils to reconcile the
fundamentally conflicting demands o f the ijadl^TdualNand the c itiz e n . He
abandons the notion of education as a means to developrtw th& individual'
'capacities. In 'it s place he posits education as a means towievel oping
the cooperative w ill of the c itize n which makes fo r social harmony. This
requires suppression of the development of the individual ‘-srâpacities,
and a curtailment o f individual lib e r ty . v
I. The Individual
In this section I shall -consider Russell's concgpt of the asocial
' individual in three sub-sections.

.* -
I shall be concerned. witfi analysing 4)
' • * ' .
with permission o fth e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the various elements of *he in divid ual: in te lle c t, emotion and w i l l ,
and the type of internal harmony between them that comprises the good
^ f the in divid ual- In general this good consists in the satisfaction
the demands made by each of the constituents of the in divid ual:

h
^ in te lle c t, emotion and w ill
A. In te lle c t
In the f i r s t sub-section, 'In t e l le c t 1,. I shall analyse Russell’ s
concept o f the in te lle c t in two mini-sections. In the f i r s t of these,
'Knowledge and Solipsism ', I shall consider the aim of in t e l1ectual
development, namely the pursuit' of. knowledge, in lig h t of the s o lip s is ti
implications of modem physics, and Russell’ s own epistemology.
i. Knowledge and Solipsism . -

v • ■ '
■ * . ■ - • • . y-
What, then,' comprises the good of the individual fo r Russell? Not
surprisingly, he affirms in te lle c tu a l development as one important f
factor: ■■
F irs t and foremost,'the in d ivid u al, lik e Leibniz’s f„.r

monads, should mirror the world". Why? I. cannot say
why, except that knowledge and comprehensiveness
appear* to me glorious a ttrib u te s , in virtue of which
I prefer Newton to an oyster. The man who holds con-
7 centrated and sparkling w ithjn his own mind, as.
within a camera obscura, the depths of space, the -
A evolution of the sun and planets, the geological .
. ) > . *■ »■
272 ,<
ages of the earth,*and the b rie f history of Humanity,

' appears to me to be doing what is d is tin c tiv e ly human
and what adds most to the d ive rs ifie d spectacle" of •
.'nature.® . — .> ^ :
' V- l ~ ■ — j. —- •“ ' ! ’ ! r‘
. M * ’ I *. ♦ I • ' • - f ..
i O
Ib id . , pp. 10-11. In his book on Leibniz, Russell takes the
following quotation as representative o f Leibniz's account of monads:
Since the world is a plenum a ll' things are connected
together, and evei^ -body acts upon-every other, more
+ or less, according to 'their':distance, ’and ;4s affected
by the other through reaction. Hence i t follows th at
each Monad is aO iving m irror, or a m irror endowed
with inner a c tiv ity , representative o f die universe
- according to its point of view. ^
/. A C ritic a l Exposition; pf the Philosophy of Leibniz,
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1900, p. 131.
..-For Leibniz; the universe is composed o f monads, which are the only real.
, substances. Each monad is an in d iv is ib le point of force, combining both°
an active and a passive principle called 'entelechy' (a capability to '
become perfect) and 'primary m a tte r'. The monad is generally described
• * in s p iritu a l terms' and i t may be fo r this reason that Russell compares
the’ individual 's"'m irroring the world 1 to that of a monad:
The monad...is lik e a ' s e i f in its essential unity
i t has no material extensions, and its a c tiv ity
.consists in an’ unending series of impressions and *
ideas that succeed one another according to-laws of .
\appetition or desire. • \ " * '■
John Hostler: Leibniz's Moral Philosophy, Gerald
;r . • Duckworth & Co., London, .1975, pp. 10-11.
Each monad is thus a 'substance', containing within i t , actually

or p o te n tia lly , a ll the predicates of the universe. While monads are ^
. ^mutually independent, they are related to each other through pre- ;
:: established harmony; This doctrine states that there is a perfect-and
regular correspondence between .all monads. As Russell ,puts i t :
, ‘ Each monad always represents the whole.universe, and
" ■* therefore the states of a ll monads at every Instant .
, "correspond, in that / i t is the same'universe they
s , represent. ■ ’
.• Op. c i t . , p. 138. 'f :' " ; " ’
I t is unsurprising that Russell should makejreferenceto Leibniz

■ in 'w ri ting of the individual in his educational philosophy, since the
■ aim of education fo r Russell is to develop a comprehensiveness, of mind
" 1C”
The fa m ilia r theme that knowledge of the cosmos constitutes what is
most tru ly human is re-emphasisedby Russell. However, i t is given a
s lig h tly d iffe re n t tw is t, deflecting i change in his theory of know
ledge. For Russell in sis ts that he would continue to hoicith is view '
>7,.,, v* ■
. ■
even i f the claims of mocerrt physics were found to be true, namely that
v -,r' : - ^ ■
£ apparently ■objective phenomena (such as the depths'of space) were no

.* • .
9
more than constructs from- mathematical coefficients."
For in that case man'becomes even more remarkable

as the inventor of the starry heavens and the ages
o f cosmic antiq uity: what he loses in knowledge
he gains in imagination ; *0 •
v Despite the optimism o f this passage, Russell was deeply di sturbed
by the account of knowledge given by modef-n physics, since i t implies
that r e a lity is a construct, and-opened the door to solipsism. Russell
in which each person- is -a re f1ection of the whole* Moreover, Leibniz's

account precludes Solipsism through the. doctrine of pre-established
7 harmony,- without which there would seem to be l i t t l e chance o f corres
pondence between the impressions of d iffe re n t monads. Solipsism, as I
point out, is a pressing concern of>-Russell's also. F in a lly , lik e
• Leibniz, Russell in his neutral monist theory dobs not conceive of
mind and matter as two d iffe re n t substances, but composed of the funda-
\m ental neutral ';s t u f f 1 of sensations. In general, then, he agrees with
Leibniz that:
• The relation of mind and body, in f a c t ,’ is a relation

between many monads, not between two ra d ically
■ d iffe re n t substances, mind and body.
* Ib id . , p. 135. ; v .
g ■- ■■
Education,and the Social Order, p. 11. >
10Ib id . ‘ v ‘: ■ ■■■*■■■
was open to the solipsists', c ritiq u e o f knowledge once he abandoned
the Platonic view that mathematical tru th , lik e a ll a p rio ri truths
was true of a ll possible worlds because i t dealt exclusively with the
relations o fu n i versa!s. ^ Universal^ subsisted, according to Russell V

' ■ * 12 - ^ *
in an unchanging world beyond space and time. This view of universals
he abandoned under the influence o f W ittgenstein, who asserted that,
.mathematical truth was composed of a series, o f tautologies, which made
no reference to a îgher r e a lity . The anguish which Russell experienced
as a 're s u lt o f accepting Wittgenstein!s account, i s p a rtic u la rly under
standable given that he had spent so much time and*intellectual e ffo r t
in Principaa MathematiCa attempting to show the indubitable basis b f
mathematics'’ as resting upon logic. Once each d isc ip lin e was reduced to
a set of lin g u is tic conventions, Russell could no longer f a ll back upon.
mathematical.truth as the only .firm bedrock o f knowledge in a world of

: 13
change and f lu * .
>•. . * */ V /
^^See The Problems of Philosophy ,x pp. 78 and 103.

^ I b i d . , pp. 100 and 98. . : v
This sometimes led to a mood of .despair during unhappy periods"
pf Kts 1 if e . In the Autobiography,' fo r example/he writes of modern
physicsîn fa r less optijpistic terms: , ^
Formerly, the c ru e lty , the meanness, the dusty fre tfu l
passion of human l i f e seemed to.me a l i t t l e thing, set,
lik e some resolved discard in music, amid the splendour
o,f the stars- and the s ta te ly procession, o f geological • .
ages. Wha"Ti<the universe was' to end in universal
• • death? I t was nbne_±he less unruffled and magnificent.
But a ll this has shrunlT\o be no- more th’an my own ‘
- re fle ctio n in the windows of the soul through which I
look out upon the night of nothingness. The revolutions
of' neb'uTae, the Birth and d ^ jl& M . s ta rs , are no more
than convenient fic tio n s i p ^ ^ t r H i a l w o rk ^ f-lin ld n g —-r—
together my-‘own sensations, and perhaps those of other
men not much better than myself. No gungeon was ever
275
constructed so dark and narrow as that in which the

shadow physics of our tijne imprisons us, fo r every ,
-prisoner has believed that-outside his walls a free world
existed; but now the prison has become the whole universe.
There is darkness without and when I die there w ill be
darkness w ith in . There is no splendour, no vastness any
where; only t r i v i a l i t y fo r a moment, and then nothing. '
Why liv e in such a world? Why even die.
-The Autobiography, Vol. I I , p. 231.-
The contrast between th is and the passage quoted from-Education

and J;he Social Order is p a rtic u la rly striking*' given that it,w as w ritten
in SBB3, only one year before the. publication of that work. Each
pass|pe refers to the vastness of the universe, the stars and planets
which comprise i t and the geological ages of the planet earth in quite
d iffe re n t terms. În the second, Russell is obsessed by the "haunting-
nightmare" ( ib id ) that none Of these apparently magnificent phenomena’
constitute an external'w orld, but are constructs, from sensations which
lin k together his own mind and possibly the' minds of others. The con
ception of mind and matter; as composed o f the neutral 's t u f f 1 of "
sensations, linked together by psychological and physical lawsrespeC-,
tiv e ly , is precisely his own in The Analysis of Mind,- pp. 105-106. In
this work Russell states that his adoption of neutral monism is a resu lt
:o f two influences in modern science, namely behaviourist psychology and
modern physics; ib id . , p. 5. In My Philosophical Development, George : ,
Allen and Unwin, London, 1959, p. 130, Russell re-emphasises his
ph'ysicalist, tendency to assimilate the science of human behaviour, with
physical science: /
- Along with the prejudice in favour of behaviourist
methods there went another, prejudice in favour of
explanations in terms of physics wherever possible.
Knowledge of the external world becomes less direct in his theory of '
neutral monism since i t requires an inference from the sensations which
one experiences in order to ju s tify b e lie f in its contipued existence.
This is compounded by the fa c t that self-knowledge, even in a momentary,
act of consciousness, is impossible because the subject o f the act of
consciousness does not e x is t. The subject is a fic tio n , or logical
construct, shaved o ff by Occam's Razor. The' Analysis of Mind, pp. .17- ■
18. • The contrasting view of sacknowledge was Russell's own in The
Problems of Philosophy, pp..'50-51. Any direct link between the subject'
and ob ject.of sense experience is destroyed, since each element in the
relation is a logical construction’. 'I believe that i t is fo r.th is
reason that-Russell refers to "the dungeon" and “prfson" of the universe,
as conceived by modern physics, and the "darkness" both within and .
without, which physics implies. Had Russell s t i l l adhered to his e a rlie r
re a lis t account of the relationship between mind and matter in an act
of consciousness, i t . i s unlikely that he wouJd have beep so.troubled .
by solipsi sm. This view he expressed cl early in The Problems of
Philosophy: ••
* •' ' ‘ ' ■ ■ • • ' • »
■• - " . ■’ ■
276
In Education and the Social Order, however, Russell sloughs o f f :
any s o lip s is tic doubts about the p o s s ib ility o f knowledge when he
articu lates the importance o f in te lle c tu a l developments What;mankind
loses in knowledge, he gains in imagination. I t may well be that i
Russell's less skeptical approach to the problem o.f knowledge is a
resu lt of his dealing with tb^ subject-matter of education. Russell,
the educational philosopher and p ra c titio n e r, assumes that knowledge is
possible in order to mafee sense o f the educational process. Put
d iffe re n tly , education only has meaning g>ven the aim of knowledge; i f .
knowledge is impossible then the process of education becomes a mockery.
As a re su lt, Russell lays aside skepticism in his educational theory
'• -and practice: V- . -

. . ■o • V . ' •” • • . .V-
f? ■
. ■■ . ■■■ - i _.—■
— ■' 1”" V 1 1 ;-----—-—- .. _
5: ; The faculty of being acquainted with things other than

v\ it s e lf is the main characteristic of .a mind. Acquain
tance with objects essentially consists in a relation
between a mind and. something other than the mind; i t
is this th a t constitutes the mind's power of knowing -, ,
• things.. '-'y'
•Ibid. , p. 42.
Knowledge by acquaintance (the (j-irect experience of sense-data without

any intermediary inference or knowledge of truths ( ib id . , p. 46)) which
V . constitutes one of the bases of a ll know!edge in Russell is early epis-.
■ temology is abandoned, as is the notion that sensations ate re la tio n a l
e n titie s between a subject and object of experience. Russell is "now
required to redefine such terms as 'awareness1, 'acquaintance' and
'experience' in a, non-relational manner: My Philosophical Development,
pp. 134, 137. The upshot of a ll this is that there is a fa r less ~
direct relationship with the external world in sense-perception in , '
. Russell's theory of. neutral monism than in his previous theories: 1 Ib id . ,
p. 1.40. : ■■■
. .
•• * ' • " . ■•••/■• r ' • ■ / - ’ s V ' •
\ . .... ‘ • / •
I have endeavourw, by concerning myself with the* .
education of nynenildren. and with making money for
• : th e ir benefit, ao shut out from my thoughts th V
impersonal despairs which tend to s e ttle upon me.
Thus, the task of being a parent and educator served ,.the purpose of
• allaying many of Russell's doubts about the p o ss ib ility o f objective
knowledge;- a t lea^t fo r a while. ■_
ii . Knowledge: Contemplative and Instrumental- .
In thisi mini‘- section I shall analyse Russell 's' account of knowledge
.as the s c ie n tific pursuit of tru th . The s c ie n tific method enaibles th e "
individual to pursue objective truth in a te n ta tiv e , undogmatic manner.'
This contrasts with the view of science as instrumental or a technique
with which to dominate human and non-human nature. \ -
The type o f knowledge which'Russell considers worthwhile is con-
: tempTative rather than instrum ental/ On this point there is l i t t l e
difference between the in te lle c tu a l development which he recommends in
his accounts of the asocial and organic individuals. In^the la t t e r , i t
w ill be. remembered, he advocates 1the pursuit of o b jectivev-truth fo r its

-* ' ■ ■' *--« ^ ■' *Jg
own sake, not fo r any power or cqntrol which, i t affords to the knower.
Moreover, he advocates the s c ie n tific method as affording the te n ta tiv e ,
undogmatic approach to truth which distinguishes science from,mysticism
yv
^ The Autobiography, Vol.' I I , p. 232. - /
^Principles of Social R eco n stru ctio n pp. 154, 156, 162-165. :
and fanaticism. In Education and the Social Order, Russell reaffirms
his b e lie f In 'th e correspondence theory of truth and claims that true
beliefs are generally more useful to -the individual than false ones
since they afford him an understanding o f re a lity :
I have assumed that opinions can be true, or fa ls e , noi

merely useful or ham ful; | have assumed th a tv it is , ais .
a- r*ule,0at any rate where matters of .fact are Concerned,
easier to know whether an opinicyi is. true-than whether •
i t is useful; land f i n a l l y , I have assumed th a t,.a s a
.; - -general rule, i t is n»re useful to believe what is true
than what is false.'TIS . •’ • ‘ ’ ' ,
'■■■■„ - , * A/.;. ;•*,.......................;
In opposition to both the pragmatist and the dialectical m a te ria lis t,
Russell claims that the maintenance of the b e lie f in .truth' and fals.e-
* .. - .. - ... . . ... ' . ».. " - 18
hood is the only approach consistent with th e ;s c ie n tific method. ; For
example, t ^ a s s e r t that beliefs' a*He neither true nor false but Simply
serve, the in te re s ts ^ p f^ particularVclass, which is the d ia le c tic a l
material i s t approach to the questi-orfof tfu t h ^ ? , is both inconsistent .
and unscientific: ’ ‘ v" ' . ‘

• — -- • -- — **' . ' -[■ - - - -- - - • - - -
>; Êducation and the_ SociaT Order, p. 23 and /The Place of Science ;
in a Liberal Education1’,Top. c i t ,, i . p 7 42. ; '
Education and the Social Order,;p,. 228. ^ .
■.IQ' _1 ~ ~ ~ : .• ■; v a ’" ■ •
Russell maintains b e lie f in the correspondence theory of tru th ,
throughout a ll the other; changes in his'epistemol ogy , My Philosophical
Development, p. 132. ' *
. •1 g .--a ■ "
- Ib id . , pp. 229-230. A rather diffe re n t dialectical m a terialist
account of, tru th , consonant with Russell's concern fo r the s c ie n tific
method, is taken by Frank Cunningham and Daniel GoIdstick in th e ir
'Marxism and Epistemological Relativism4. (Unpublished). Cunningham and
Goldstick argue fo r a r e a lis t position which maintains the notion of '
objective truth. Their' paper begins with a.quotation from Lenin:
The m ate ria lis t dialectics of Marx and-Engels certainly
doe% contain qrelat.iv.ism, but is not’reducible to
relativism , that is , it.'recognises the r e la t iv it y of
" a l t knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective
279
. This view is , of course, a negation of the

s c ie n t if ic a ttit u d e , which is th a t, oê*' a large
< region, i t is possible to discover app^ximate
tru th , and that where this is .n o t possible
suspense of judgement is the only ra ti°h a l
a t t i t u d e . 20
*■.T h e 's c ie n tific a ttitu d e demands that the individual uphold the notion
of objective truth and falsehood and an open mind t 0 propositions.for
which the evidence is .inconclusive, deferring judgment u n til s c ie n t ific
■inquiry has furnished new,evidence. In this manner the nature of free,
inquiry into objective matters of fa c t is promote ap.d the influence

I ■ 21
o f propaganda, endemic to modern nation states, lessened.
: The s c i e n t i f i c atVitude is doubly important because I t carries,
over onto the in d iv id u al's politica.1- b e lie fs . The p o l it i c a l outlook
of liberalism and democracy is based on the same te n ta tiv e approach ■

: O'
■’ . • * C} '
to the analysis of social questions as science br ings to the in v e s ti-
9.
gation of physical objects. Provided that education encourages the
one i t w il l l ik e l y develop 'the other:
Science .is em pirical, te n ta tiv e and ud^°gmatic:

a l l immutable dogma is u n s c ie n tific . The s c ie n t if ic
outlook, accordingly, is the i n t e l l e c t 1^ ! counterpart '
tru th , but in the sense that the l i m i t s of

approximation of our knowledge of this truth are. k
h i s t o r i c a l l y conditional.
T ‘ Materialism and Em pirio-Criticism , CglJL^cted Works,
Volv. 14, (Moscow, 1962), p. 137. •
20 '•
Education and the Social Order, p. 230. .
> 21 I b i d . , pp. 230-231. :
. *
280
of what is , in the practical sphere, the outlook

of Liberalism The only, philosophy'.that affords
a theoretical j u s t if ic a t i o n of democracy, and
./■>r that accords'with democracy in its temper of
mind, is empiricism.22
The l in k between empiricism, liberalism and democracy lie s in t h e ir
common distinguishing feature, =namely the s c ie n tific , method which examines
the evidence fo r a l l b eliefs and-only,hoids them in a te n ta tiv e manner,
. recognising that they are constantly open to 're v is io n . In this manner,
just as the s c i e n t i f i c method teaches the individual to avoid mysti'cism
so lib e ra lis m enables himô avoid the dogmas of l e f t or right-wing
fanaticism. .
Russell's conception of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry is,' as I have pointed
out, non-instrumental. He considers the value o fs c ie n c e to l i e in its
a b i l i t y to produce an opennessôf mind and understanding of objective
fa c t rather than an a b i l i t y to control r e a l i t y . S c ie n tific technique,
which has accompanied the development of natural science and given man
kind ah unprecedented a b i l i t y to u t i l i s e nature to f u l f i l l his needs, is
an aspect of.progress which Russell recognises as a double-edged /
sword. On' the one hand, technological advance can be used as a tool to
promofijj^human emancipation. On the other, i t may be used to fu rth e r
enslave and control human beings. Russell acknowledges that in many^
instances technology has been used f o f this second, anti-humanist pur-
pose and that an underlying cause is-'the c a p it a l is t social structure
22 y:
'Philosophy and P o l/x ic s ', Unpopular. Essays, pp. 28 and 25.
Cf. Education, and the Sana! Order, pp. 23 and 243.
23
which is based upon exploitation and the pursuit of private wealth.
In The S c ie n tific -.Outlook Russell paints a -p ictu re of a fu tu re ,
s c i e n t i f i c society which is the scenario ,of a nightmare world. His
purpose is to outline the dangers of concentrating .soleiy upon
• s c ie n tific technique, or the means, fo r securing apparent benefits fo r
society, in iso latio n from the ends.which one is attempting to secure.
Russel 1 considers such an approach inadequate because science' i t s e l f
cannot determine which ends are’ worth pursuing. Without a ’clear con
ception o.f these ends,, the use of s c i e n t i f i c technique develops i t s *,'
own logic by becoming sel f-servihg. Yet many such task's may _be used
fo r inhumane purposes (genetic engineering, nuclear research and the
development of nerve gas in warfare, fo r example). Science, when unde
stood in a narrow■instrumental sense as enhancing control over nature,
both human and non-human, may f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of tyranny
on an unprecedented scale: .
The tendency of s c i e n t i f i c technique is -t o cause;

everything to be"regarded as not ju s t a brute datum,
but as raw material fo r the carrying out of some
human purpose,. The c h ild , and even the embryo, w ill
come to be viewed more and more in this way as.-the
m entality connected with s c ie n tffi.c technique becomes
more dominant. In th is , as in a ll other forms of
s c i e n t i f i c ’ power, there are; possibil i t i e s of'good and.'
p o s s ib ilit ie s of e v i l . Science alone w ill not decide
which is to p re v a il. 24 ■
• i
23 ‘' • •
Principles o f ■Social Reconstruction, pp. 41-42.
'24 * •
The S c ie rttific Outlook, p. '177. ’
C - -
282 ;
, In contrast, the s c i e n t i f i c temper of mind which Russell upholds aijns

. A ■• ■
' ■. • ■ . . *■■’, ■
at t'he development o f awe and respect fo r the universe:, which he con-
• siders to be integral to th e - s c ie n t if ic method. Crude pragmatist
■ ‘ theories of truth are a n tith e tic a l to the s c i e n t i f i c method because ■.
they abandon the notion of objective fa c t. Unless a theory of truth
' recognises that thehe are objective facts with which no amount of human,
ingenuity can dispense-, then Russell believes the theory f a i l s to , .
... develop, the hum ility of mind and disinterestedness of inquiry which
’ . ■ ■ ■ ■ ' ' 25 % ’’ '
constitute the s c i e n t i f i c outlook. \
'" ' , • ■■■,•■ / , .... tV

Humility towards the world of objective facts is- strengthened by ■
the process of s c i e n t i f i c endeavour and exerts both an in te lle c t u a l and
moral influence' upon the in d iv id u a l. Without it, the individual is led
’ to believe that there is no l i m i t to the scope of human manipulation
of r e a l i t y . This, according to Russell, is the problerp with such ’power
philosophies' as the pragmatism of John Dewey which attempts to sub
s t it u t e the notion o f 'warranted assertab'i'lity‘ fo r the notion of truth
as correspondence to f a c t. Warranted a s s e r ta b iiity measures the -
correctness of b e!iefs about the past, for example, by means of the •
future effects they.have upon the in d iv id u a l, not th e ir-r e la tio n s with
the causes of those b e lie fs : ■ .
‘v’ l b id . , p. 152 and Power, p; 259.
I . . v . _ . .
-But i f truth or 'warranted ass'ertabi 1 i t y 1 depends upon .
the future, then, in so fa r as i t is in .pUr power to
a ite r the future, i t is in our power to a lte r what should
be asserted. This enlarges the scope of human'power and
freedom.. . . I f I find the belief that Caesar crossed the
7 Rubicon/very.distasteful, I need ,not s it down in dull
despair; :I can, i f -1 have enough' ski 11 and power,.•arrange t 7
a social environment in which the statement. t h a t ,he did
not cross the Rubican will^have.’warranted, a s s e rta b ility 1.
- ;! :. ; ■. \ . ; — " / ; ^7. '
By reducing the notion bf a truth claim:_to the manner in which a propo
sition is establishedof disproven, Dewey eliminates any reference to
• the ontological realm of facts by means, of which a proposition is . •
v e rifie d . By doing so, he f a ils to provide a-bra,ke'to,-the 'Godlike'
individual will seeking tp manipulate the physical and' social environ-

'/ ' ■* ■' :
ment through s c ie n tific technique. Russell, on the other hand, pre
serves a conception of s c ie n tific knowledge by means of which individuals
learn the.lim its to human a c tiv ity . Whether this conception of know-
. ledge and fact is capable of bearing this burden is not my concern. I
simply wish to point out that i t is the means by which he distinguishes ,

.V . . p7
science as the means to truth from science as power. .. V
Th.e result of such a theory is the instrumentalism, which views

0' . ,
every object
* as a means to the extension of personal power,
«f rather than
,* .
as having in trin s ic value: - . . ‘
“^ History of Western Philosophy, p. 760. Cf. Education and the

Social Order, pp. 24, 228, 230-231 and Power, p. 2597 •
27 '
Cf. Greenspan: o£. c i t ., p. 48 and Howard Woodhouse: -'On a-
Suggested Contradiction in Russell's Educational Philosophy', Russell,
No. 13, Autumn 1974, p. 8 and Education and the Social Order, pp. 21-
23. - , ' ,. ' •' “
;• To the typical- modern mind nothing .i s , interesting- on
; . account of what i t is, but only on account of what i t
■ • ‘‘ may be made to become. The important characteristic
• of things '-from this point of view is not their- ’ f
: in trin s ic q u a litie s , but their uses . Everything-.is .
, .• an "in'strume'fi'tl t-If-you ' ask what i t is an instrument
..to, the answer; wiW be an instrument .for the making
... • olf’ instruments, anq so on ad in f ini turn! \ In psycho--
. •; logical.'terms-,- t h i s ’means that'the- love p f ’power has
. thrust'alside alT the other impulses that \make the
’ complet! huma.n l i f e . £8;- ' \
. ' ..The tendency of modern’ -science,, according .to Russell, is more'and more
■* v :. / -' - ■" ■ , ' ,. . ■ . • •'
in this, direction, substituting the love .of power for the-love of the
universe as; the determinant ’o f ; scientific; i’nqui ry 7 ^ The result is '

" ,* r “ * ' * •' t ' \ ' v-
■ disastrous for mankind since i t giy.es' r i l e to'forms of sadistic activ ity

' '•* . ' ; ' ’ . ,
. . ... the sadistic dfmqulses whicb .the asceticism [o f’ the ■

... t ..
'scientific;-■society] w ill generate wi ] 1 find th e ir out-* .. ,
c . 9■ le t in s6c ie n tific experiment.. The’'advancement of “
., : knowledge w ill .be held to ju s tify much' torture of
,V *'• individuals by surgeons, biochemists and experimental
1 psychoiogi&ts. • As time goes on, the amount of added
:■ ■ i’ ■'.. ..khowledge required to ju s tify a given amount of paift.
" ,r .(• ' w.ill diminish...3!!.' - . »
« --J 7
* \ ' \ ' ; '' ' ' ' ^ t ' ’ ’
:. , In“ b r ie f , ^ s o c ie ty -r u l ed by scientists , imbued with an instrumental

. ■■■/ ;v ■ :1 - *.'■'■ ; *■' ■- * ;
„ . viejv cf man, knowledge and society, w.i 11 be based upo/t conceptions
* ' antagonistic to -human development: ”. . . the power confe-rre'd by science
9# . as .a’ technique is only obtainable by something .analogous to the worship

£ , ' «
: - : * .. , . ■; . * 3i
•' of Satan,.-that is to say- ^ the renunciation of love. ' • Russell
■' • . . * # ■ . - *
." -0C .; . ■. . —- : —— - ■ :
. 7 ' ^The Scientific Otftlook* p. 156; cf. My Philosophical Development,
'P . 179. - . . - . '.'■,■7^,1.. ■ - ' * .. T
' ■I::. ^ The Scientific Outlook,'p p , 27-0 and 272. , : ■■- • - I ^
r : 7 ' 301bicf., p.-. 267*. ^ •
It 1 ‘ • ■• .
" > Ibid.-, p. 272.
»*•>
therefore stands firm ly opposed to both the s c ie n t ific outlook and the
* s c i e n t i f i c society in the narrow sense of technical domination of
^nature, since i t is l i k e l y to.maximise oppression, while minimising
human freedom'and 'individual development. , ’

• * . * .
Russell acknowledges that the love of power is fundamental to the
individual but denies that i t alone can lead to a harmonious, well. .
integrated l i f e . There are. a number of reasons fo r th is . F irstly., i t •

• - • g
is opposed to the- impulse of love which Russell believes to.be the basis
of a l l such constructive a c t i v it y as a r t , education and the pursuit of
knowledge. Knowledge wielded by power -rather than'love cannot give rise

32
to a b e tte r society. . Secondly, i f regarded as an- in s tin c t or impulse,
power needs to be integrated with other instincts in order to produce a
harmonious personality. In a number o f places Russell describes the

33
, love of power in this.way and emphasises the importance both of
• •• * • ' : . •
developing and harmonising i t with other’ human in s t in c ts . Thirdly, i f
power is regarded as originating in the w i l l , as is suggested in

■ 34 . . . .
Education and the Social Order , i t needs to be integrated with the
other elements of the in d iv id u a l, i n t e l l e c t and emotion, in order to
produce internal harmony. Fourthly, as an exercise of w i l l , power needs
to develop in harmony with the w il l of others, producing external harmony
- ^ On Education, pp. 247 and 138.
Education and the Social Order, p. 12.
it'
and co-operation, not a constant tendency to compete with other^ for ‘
35 • ; • : / *
the purpose of control. For these reasons Russell believes'that
intellectual development, motivated by power alone, is lik e ly to be
dysfunctional in developing a well"integrated, harmonious individual.
This is an , important claim to which 11.shall return when analysing the
concept of the w i l l . . v'
B. Emotion ] *
In addition t o ‘developing the in t e l le c t , "education should enhance
the emotions.. Emotion.is one of the. components comprising the
individuals. An’ educatTon which;, does not take emotion into account f a il
. to devel.op a l l - o f the. individual's capacities:
. ..But while the'.cognitive part of man is the basis of

his excellence, i t is far from being the whole of
it. I t is not enough to mirror the world. I t
- "should’be mirrored with emotion: a specificoemption
appropriate to the object, and a general joy "in the
mere .act of knowing.36 . •
*
■ ■ • » ■' 'C f.;'.'. '
Education is to develop the individual‘ s emotions and allow him to
’mirror the world"1 (r e fle c t its objective properties) by means of those
emotions which are appropriate to their objects. The aim of education
is,also to develop a joy within the individual at his knowledge of the
world. Such joy is in trin s ic to the act of knowing, hence independent
35Ib id . , p. 244.
36 I_b_id., p. 11. '
of any ut-i 1i tari am-value which may accrue to him as a result. The view
of education expressed here is' fami l i a r , .yet Russel 1 introduces/the
terra- '.emotion' to refer to human sentiments, indicating a departure
from.his’ previous accounts of man' s instinctive nature.
9 I
' In this sub-section I shall consider Russell's concept of'emotion
- in several mini-sections! . In the f i r s t mini-section, 'Emotion, Instinct
and Impulse', I shall consider the.concept of emotion anti the manner in
. which i t is distinguishable from both Impulse and'-instinct.
• i. Emotion,-Insti.net and Impulse
: ’ -s - ■ • " v ■ ■’ v
One’ important task of education is to develop those,emotions
which produce constructive a c tiv itie s . Russell believes that th is 'is a
.*■' s c ie n tific problem in emotional psychology, araeiiable to a-straight-. '
: forward solution:
To make human beings who w ill create a better world is

*a problem in emotional psychology: i t is the problem
of making human beings who have -a.free intelligence
v combined'with a happy disposition.-' This pVoblem is
not beyond the powers of science; i t is th e ,w ill, not
the power, that is lacking.37
Science, coupled with the love that produces a sympathetic environment
to the growing chi Id, is'capable of producing human beings who possess'
constructive emotions. For this purpose,; emotions are' to.be channelled
37 • i
Education and''the Social Order, p. 64..
7 T :
-jf
288
'in constructive rather than destructive ways:
Arid i t should-.be a touch-stone of the good society ..

• that in i t , the useful emotions w ill be. those that
are 'kindly, friendly and constructive, rather than • y
those that are angry and' destructive.3,8
The successful education of the.emotions produces healthy, habits and ■
the correct intellectual and moral virtues. In contrast to the- moral

’ ■ -.> *'
training which produces conflict and wary Russell recommends one which
"sub.stitute[s] for these elements in,-the moral education of the present -
day intelligence, sanity, kind!iness and a sense o f j u s t ic e " . This.

- £*• *
■. , • t
change in moral education requires the development of constructive
emotions': ; ;■ , . ’. ' ‘
I t lies in our passions.; i t lies in our emotvdnal

habits; 'i t . l i e s in the sentiments in s t ille d in ,
. youth, and. in the phobias created in infancy. The
cure for our problem is to.make men*sane, and to
make men sane they must be. educated sanely/^
Through the .creation of heal thy emotional habits education W e tlita te s
the development of the individual's-capacities -by channelling his emo-
tions towards constructive a c tiv itie s . They enhancethe individual's
intellectual a b ilit ie s (intelligence and sanity), his moral virtues
( ju s tic e ), in addition to his emotional capacities (kindliness). In
this manner the education of the emotions is a step towards the- establish
ment of an internal harmony distinctive of a well integrated individual.
38Ib id . , p. 159.-
' - 39Ib id», p. 248, . ) - v . ■
40Ib r d ., p. 247.
_ ■ •' i y : • . . -
' --'V: Y "r .

-:V
r ' V ,1
289
At only a few ppints does Russell• mention the notions of in s tin c t

- * , •
or impulse.in Education and' the Social Order. The most obvious is his
analysis of 'herd fueling'-, which he defines as "a certain in s tin c tiv e 1

- i 4■
) ' • ■ ■■■1 . . .
• uniformity of .behavijour". ' The herd i n s t i n c t is p a r tic u la r ly strong .
'in the young and therefore of great importance in education.43 I t _i.s .
clear that Russell maintains a b e lie f in the existence of instincts in
general, since he argues against Watson' s.-attempt to dispense with them.
.in favour of unconditioned'reflexes:
The argument is that human beings do. .not have

in s tin c ts , and that therefore the njind o'f a chi.Id
has no. character independent of e x p e r ie n c e . L e t
i t .be granted, fo r the sake of argument, that un
conditioned reflexes (which>have.replaced in stin c ts )
are the same, in a ll new-born infants. Does i t
follow that there can be no. congenital mental
differences? Surely not. Take the learning of
conditioned reflexes: some w i11 learn more -quickly
than others, some w ill 1earn yno re ..effectively to
discriminate between stimuli that only d i f f e r •
s l ig h t l y . Even i f we grant that a l l .education con
sists in the formation of conditioned refle x e s ,
which is a disputable proposition, i t s t i l l does,
not follow that .all children are equally. educable.4. •
f Thus Russell advocates the §ame position v is -a -v is the existence of
•y - instincts as he took-in relatio n to the mechanical individual,. While
. - sympathetic to the s c i e n t i f i c approach of Watsonian behaviourism, he '•

f .
maintains the .notion, of in s tin c t as irred u cib le . Some of the differences

• 44
between individuals are genetic, not learned. . r
' .• .• 1 ' ■ « ♦
4 ^ Ib id ., p, 89 and cf. p . J56. • ' ' . ■

■ " •’ ' 49 - ' • - ‘
I b i d . , p. 96. I shall analyse the notion of. herd feeling in the
section on '.The Citizen'.- : ■
-:4 3 l'bid. t pp. 50-51'/ . ' .V f ' /. /
440n Education-, pp. 3^, 70-84, 98, 102. ' :
290
Russell'also mentions the notion, of ’ impulse1 at several points.

' "". ' 1 • ■' • 45 : ’
For example, he refers -to the c h ild ’ s "impulse to paint" as worthy
of.education. Furthermore, there are "the, insane and .destructive,
.• impulses which lurk 'in the unconscious of those who have been unwisely
handled in infancy, childhood';and'adolescence". - In general, he holds
the same view of impulses as spasmodic and' momentary internal motivations
. ' of action as in the e a r lie r analysis of the organic individual. More
over, he argues,for the same concept of self-d i sci pi ine which subjects
impulses to control by the w i ll: 1
Complete ^freedom throughout childhood does'not teach • ; ,

him to resist the solicitations of a momentary
impulse: he does' not acquire the capacity of con
centrating upon one matter when he is interested in ;
another, or of resisting pleasures because they w ill
.' cause fatigue that w ill interfere with subsequent
■' r ... work..47 .
r Thus.Russe.il makes-distinctions between emotion, in stin c t, and
impulse and considers emotion to be the constituent element of the
, individual. I t is possible that he uses the term as an umbrella toncept
in which to capture al 1 the others:- a general term, used’ to re fe r to
all of the affective parts of the individual,- including sentiments,

• ’ 4'8 ’
passions, desires etc. ^
45' ,
Education, and the Social Order, p. 163.
: 45Ib id ., pp. 246-2471 ‘ ____ . ' '•
47Jbid., p. 40. /
48 -
.He certainly~5uggests this in Human Society in Ethics and
P o litic s , p. v i i .
• 291
■ii. 'Emotions and t'he Environment
A n this mini-section, I shall consider5'Russell's proposals for the',
correct type of- environment for developin.g‘ the individual 's emotions.
He distinguishes his approach from that.o f the, behaviourists who i n s i s t 1
up'on conditioning. His advocacy of. the free-development, of the-emotions
apparently brings him close-r to the-school of'.edu-cational romantics who
advance the-negative theory of education. I sha.ll point out that his
„ , agreement with them is limited. "Russell's app'roach is .designed'to lay
hold on the individual's emotions which will' then prompt healthy and
constructive behaviour. " • •. f ■ ' ' ‘
Russell writes of two main ways of changing a child's behaviour:
We may, on the one hand, by means, of rewards and .

punishments ’cause the child or animal to perform'or .
abstain from certain precise acts; ..or we may,■on the
other hand, seek to produce in the child or animal
such emotions as w ill lead; on the whole to acts of
the kind desired.4-9- . ^
The power of the -former method for purposes of social* control-is' ■
counteracted by the - dangers of repression. Russel l restates .the
Freudian argument that repressed impulses are lik e ly to re-emerge in

;r • S 1 ‘
new and .destructive forms.50 To this fam iliar point he adds that in
• the case'of such habits as bed-wetting and kleptomania, punishment
49
Education and the Social -Order, p. 57,
50-------------------: :— — -------------------------------------------------------
Ib id ., p.p. 58-59 and 60.
' 51 • •
" clearly fa ils on its own terms. The reason- is equally clear. In -
each case where the habit persists i t is due to a deep-seated,
unconscious psycho!ogic^l-disturbance of an emotional type.
Behaviourists pay l i t t l e attention to this," since their method dismisses
consideration of such internal events. Russell concludes that:
I t is therefore necessary to pay more attention to “

emotion, as opposed to overt behaviour, than is done
by those who advocate conditioning as alone suffic ie n t
in the .training of character.53 ■ ; C-
All these considerations, in. addition to "the sympathetic observation
of chi ldren",* suggest ira quite** d ifferent method' -is required for
character training.
.The negative theory of education, of-which Russell is generally 15
c r i t i c a l , he regards as valid wi,th regard to the'education of the
emotions:. . The. theory states "that the sole purpose of education is
to provide opportunities-of growth and to remove hampering influences",
ft-allo w s the'greatest possible freedom to the individual in order that
he may*fu lly develop his capacities., Tt implies that the education of
- ’the emotions is to take place in'an atmosphere t-hat removes, any;
51Ib id ., 59, • : ,
52Ibid. \
53Ib id ., PP.. 58-59
“^ Ib id ., P- 60. 1
55Ibi-d., P- 44.
;56M d . ; P.r 29.
f;
*
restrictions from th e ir f u l l and free" expression. The tone of this
/°r. • ' " *■. ' •
education'is in agreement with the-revolt of the educational romantics
against the emphasis upon the w i l l , characteristic of much educational

57
theory and practice. ' Control of the emotions by the w ill results in
'repression and-the emergence of cruel and,.destructive emotions harmful
to both'the individual and others.. Like Freud, Russell is in agreement

ft ; ./ ;• '•• • ' .. - .
with the Romantics that expression of^the emotions in the..young child
should be unhampered. For'example, the young child should be.free not

- 58
to attend lessons i f he so-chooses and.the who.le area of'sex education
v •• - 59 .
should be conducted in a fy~ee and open manner. . '
. '
Yet Russell's endorsement of the free education of the emotions is
more limited than i t appears. Russell insists^pn compulsion '.in such
matters as cleanliness, punctuality', respect for property, routine and
learning th e .three R‘s . . Development .of the capacity, for s e lf-
direction and the hecess^ty^to cooperate with others requires that the
••: f ■'.■ 't--' ' 61-
child'learn, to do things that he may not want to do. v I. shall examine
Russell‘ s own proposals^cqncerhing self-direction and cooperation’ in -
the sub-section ori'-.the w i l l . Were I wish to point out that he regards
the v a lid ity of the .negative"theory of education as limited by the
57Ib id . , p. 31. '. ,j

58Ib id . , pp. 3 2 -3 4 .. . ‘
59Ib id ., pp. 34, 120 and. 129.
6° Ib id . , pp, 34-39. \ ..
I b i d . , pp. 40 and 43 w
. . . .. .^ ■ '. ‘ *
‘ . . . ' ' : •
requirements placed uppn ,the individual by modern c iv ilis a tio n : s e lf-
•a* ■' *
discipline, that produces the abstract knowledge necessary for the
healthy functioning of this c iv ilis a tio n , .and cooperation that prevents
its . destruction.: Elsewhere he writes of the negative theory in just
this vein: •' . ; ■ ■
I cannot agree with this school, which seems to me

■:t . too in d iv id u a lis tic , and unduly in differen t to the
importance ‘of knowledge. We liv e in comnunities
which require cooperation, and i t would beutopian
to expect al> the necessary cooperation to result
from spontaneous, i mpul se. 62 ' .
The limits upon freedom are greater in the modern world where theâejions
of one individual can adversely affect a great number apart from hirgself.
Russell's new approach is designed to create an environment in
which tbe child grows up guided by the love and safety of his parents
which are neither too doting nor re s tric tiv e of his freedom. Russell
acknowledges that . .in te llig e n t affection without science can arr-iye
at the right r e s u lt .. This is an apparent departure .from his '■
previous admonishment of the unscientific approach of loving mothers-,

, . * . ' 65 .. I \
too mindful of their chiIdren's crying. • Yet the aim is- precisely the
same as that of On Education: to produce fearlessly free individuals
capable of exerting th e ir intelligence and realising personal happiness:
CO
‘ Education and D iscipline 1 in:,In Praise of Idleness, George
Allen and Unwin, London, 1935, pp. 203-204.
/TO.;.
Education and the Social -Order, p. 62. . V. ii
64Ib i d . , p:. . 61. : . I 5 ' • -> : , ■
55 ■, : TV, \
On Education, pp. 3 6 7 1 -74. ;
295
•Given such conditions, children may grow up fearless

and fundamentally happy, without th'e resentment that
comes of thwarting or the excessive demands th a t ate
produced by "the atmosphere of hdthouse a ffe c tio n . ;
Their in te llig e n c e w i l l be untrammelled, and t h e i r j
Viefts on human a f fa ir s w i l l have the kindliness thajt
comes of contentment.66 ... >.;*
The appropriate condi tions. synthesise the young-child’s need for.

#
■safety, kindness and routine with a growing desire for" .free'donj.^* The .
( types of. freedom recommended include no taboo'on swearing or sexual
^ i :
"matters, an openness of mind by the’ adult in matters of religion,
" -- . ■ ■ 1.
.. CO \
politics and morals, and tolerance of a- child's disrespect ‘f o r a d u l t s ’.
Their aim is to secure the happy combination' of open intelligence and
v ita l emotion. j
- Russell insists that his recommendations produce an environment in
which, the child's emotions themselves’,* not simply his outward behaviour,
are affected and li k e ly to become .desi rable. The, c r ite ria of desirable
■emotions are. those which " . . .make them [children] happy, successful,
and useful', rather than those that' lead to unhappiness, fa ilu re and ■
£Q 'It--'.’''.
' ma.levolence.. .''; Again they are aspects of the fearlessly free
. individual, capable of using his intelligence: without the constrictions
resulting from s tifle d impulses and emotions. Such an individual w ill '
be more lik e ly to acquire the virtues of "intelligence, sanity,
' • '
. ' • ; “^ _ ~ : t : '
^Êducation and the Social Order, p. 6 3 .v

• 67I b i d . , pp. 61-62.
' 68I b i d . , pp. 62-63.
69 Ibid.', p. 61.
■’ ' . , ;v . . . -1
70 than those educated in' the Ichool
kindliness and a sense of justice
* ' i
systemsôf.nation-states, which impart, the moral virtues, necessary for
a competitive, m ili t a r i s t i c and nationalist'social structure.; The result
is disastrous both in terms of developing t h e ’external harmony among
• individuals necessary for peaceful co-existence and the-.internal hlrmony
characteristic of an integrated individual. The unhappiness of thd
modern, world-is 4ue largely to the emotional habits which give risel to
the prevalent 'v ir tu e s ’ of "insanity, stupidity, readiness for homicide,
economic injustice, and r u t h le s s n e s s " .W e r e schools to give due
^ attention to emotional development, individuals would be more f u l f i l l e d
and the world a happier place.
iii. Emotions and:Bodily Responses ;

1'.'-*r; " 'V’'" '■ • .
In this minirsection I shall summarise the main features of
Russell' s concept of emotion in order to determine whether he succeeds
in distinguishing i t from a bodily response. In referring to Russel

■■ ■ V-.y. " I
s c ie n tific analysis of emotion in The Analysis' of Mind, I shall point
out that here he e x p lic itly excludes- the notion of consciousness as a .
y constituent of emotion.. Despite reservations, iiis analysis "of emotions
■ is predominantly behaviourist.
The major points in Russell’ s account Of emotion are as follows: !
70
Ib id . , p. 248.
71
Ibid.
V-
>
a
297 -r .
• : ' ■ I
1. • Russell disagrees with .Watson'sjrejection of the noti-oi o f-in s tin c t,
since some of the differences-betweep individuals.are inherited as part
of th e ir innate structure. Some emotions' are also in stinctive, such as
the infant-s. rage $t any.constriction of his limbs;
-2. Russell maintains'the notion of emotion as .an internal psychological
state which stimulates behaviour and is- distinguishable from overt : ‘
bodily movements. Behaviourist theory f a ils to take thisTdistinction
into account. .:•'
3.' Russell maintains that the manner in which the/child channels his
feelings into a c tiv itie s which are useful and creative is of major
importance. -For.this reason he stresses the creation of'an environ- r ;; v
ment in whjch the child develops those emotional habits that enable him : '
to act constructively. ■
V. v - ‘ , ; ■
4. Russell c ritic is e s his. previous behafiouristic approach as. advocating
74 - v ■ ... ■ Q ■ .
".unduly harsh" methods with very young children but declaresYthat:
"The affection given by adults.'should.. .n o t ,. .arouse a deep emotional

" t '' 7.7
. 75 •'
response in the ch fld . 1
1 He- is s t i l l skeptical of developing top wanjp-
. 72 .-
Ib id . , *p. 63. In fact Watson agrees that rage, fear and love- are
; • members of a " .. .group of emotional reactions. . .belonging. to the Original
and-fundamental nature of.man.11' Psychology From, the Standpoint of a
Behaviourist, p. 199.
. - ■■ 1— * 1
— •- r v
' 70
Education and/'the Social Order, pp. 57-59. ‘
^The Autobiography, Vcrlume‘ II-, p. *221.
yc \ .'■■ • - -■l' ■■ ''
Education and\the^Soci-:al Order, p. 62. ; M
*r
v/% ■.
a • relationship between adult' and'child Test this create an-over-
dependency in th e-.la tte r making the re a lis a tio n of autonomy d i f f i c u l t .
•5.. Russell .writes of the emotions of child anjPanimal <as ' i f there.
•, o • 7 C
were no difference..between the two. This is consistent with ffhe view "■*'
expressed in The Analysjs of Mind that there is no qu alitative d iffe -
? rence between humans and animals arid hence no difference in the methodo-
logy of. the s c ie n tific study of animal andrhuman behaviour. ^~j I f we .
• take into account-Russel1 's analysis of emotions in this work, we find
r that'he regards them as processes consisting of sensations, images, •
bodily movements plus the following:; .."An emotion in its entirety con
tains dynamic elements, such as motor impulses, desires, pleasures and

70
pains." These are s u ffic ie n t to distinguish emotions from other types-
of perceptiê^--tiTjreev^Svsnone of the elements that Russell mentions
■require him to include 'consciousness' as' a constituerf^bf emotion. .. •
This, a f t e r - a l l , is the fundamental hypothesis of,neutral monism: that
''consciousness1 is not an ingredient of mental events and is unrequired.

V •' ' ' 7n ^ ’ ■ ..
in a 's c ie n tific analysis of human behaviour. . . '
6. There is no fundamental principle, comparable to the organic
principle of growth, in which emotion is groundefr. Unlike the instincts
of the organic individual there is no .1imit ^placed upon th e ir develop^\^
ment by the innate structure o f the individual. Epiotions can be mani- ■
pulated into any form that.the educator conceives as f i t . This implies

------ :-------- n-p-------1------------------ c........... — ~ 1— ;--------- ------ ;------------- :------
78Education and the Social Order, p. 57.

77 . - • ,
; The Analysis -of Mind, pp.’ 40-43. Gf. 'The training of young
; children1, loc. c i t ., p.'~3T4.
78I b i d . , p. .2.84/ ■ '
7Îbid.:, C h ap t. ’ 1.
299
i--
A-
that Russell has abandoned the view of human freedom as determined in
its scope and limits by. the structure of the human mind. Th'e conception
of freedom, with regards to the emotions, that has-replaced i t , is of

- \ ■ ■
th e .individual, programmed 1argely by' the environment, acting in a
random and w i llf u l manner. ^ “

‘ ... . _ ;5 v
“Russell f a lls between two stools in his analysis of emotion.
V , On the one. hand, he suggests-that there is a cognitive aspect to

i * l ■ ■............................
* OQ . '
emotion by writing of the "appropriate" object to a "specific emotion" .
This implies thbt the correct education w ill develop in. the individual
\ v
emotions which correspond more or lessr accu'p0te ly with the objective
nature of r e a lity . The individual w ill not get carried away by the tide
* of emotion which he experiences at a particular moment but w ill be
capable of evaluating the object of his emotion in order to determine
the Vinds of effects which i t might have upon him. To- this extent,
„ * i
" • p _ . ; y '..................................................................................................................... «
cognition is involved botlr in understanding the object of his emotion
and in the act of s e lf-re fle c tio n , by means of which he ascertains the
nature; strength and appropriateness of the emotions themselves. This
is wh’eft I take Russell to Tne^n by '"mirroring the world w it h ’dmotion"^.
On this view education would develop a greater awareness of one's emo
tions and an a b ility to choose to act in ways that are appropriate to

, 11
th e ir objects. The process is f a c ilita te d by the presence of cognition
and the intervention of-reason in emotional experiences:
80
Education and the Social Order1, p. 11-.
I t is not, in fa c t, the case that .strong passions
prevent a just estimate of means.: . .The world'’ that- I
. ■ should wish to see is one where -emotions are*strong but
not destructive, and where, because'they are acknow
ledged, they lead to no deception of oneself or of
** others. Sucfy-a world would include love-*and friendship
I •^ and the pursuit of a rt and know!edge.81
-■ ■> ■
The role of reason is.-to determine the best means for achieving, the
ends of human action; "ends, which emotipn determines:
' * ‘ ’ . * '
'Reason1 has a perfectly clear and precise meaning.

I t signifies the chqice of the right means to.an end
that you*wish to achieve. I t has nothing whatever
to do with the choice of ends.. ..Desires, emotions,
, passions (you can choose whichever word you w i l l ) , ' •
J v' are the only possible opuses of action. Reason is , . .
; not a‘ cause of ‘action but only, a regulator.82
‘ • • •* - . . - 1- . . v ’ ;
» '■ ' ' ■'
As aregulator' of action, reasorn has the important task- of enabling the
individual to choose between the various options open to him in' the
realisation of his goals. I f Tier held consistently to this view, Russell
would argue that education concern i t s e l f with‘ developing, refining and

83
stimulating the cognitive element-of emotions.
81 •> . •.
Human Society in Ethics.and P olitic s , pp. x -x i. .
QO „
. Ib id . , pp. v t - v i i . George Grant suggests an inconsistency in

Russell's account of ra tio n a lity in human affairs in 'Pursuit of a-n
Illusion: A Commentary on Bertrand Russell", Dalhou.sie Review, 32(2),
Summer .1952. . _ \ ~~
83See, for examplej Daniel‘ R. DefTicola: ' 'Theîducation of the
Emotions'. Philosophy of Education Society, Annual- Conference, April
1979 (forthcoming). DeNicola claims that emotions are primarily cogni
tiv e , ib id . , p. 12. William P. Alston argues against William James'
analysis of emotion in 'Emotion and Feeling' in Paul Edwards (e d .):
The- Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Collier-MacMillan, London, 1967, Volume
2, p. 485.“ A subtle .account of emotions and th e ir ra tio n a lity is given
by..Ronald De Sousa ^n 'The Rationality of Emotions', Dialogue,. Vol. X V III,
No. 1,- 1979. ' ’
On the other hand, Russell is s t i l l very much influenced by be
haviourist psychology and wishes to dispense .entirely w it t f t h e notions
of^consciousness'and cognition. As a result,-.his s c ie n tific analysis' •

"* *
of emotioff makes reference only to internal images,- bodily sensations
and responses. ■ Moreover, Russell agrees with Watson that emotions^
become overlaid with habits at an eaf^-y age , and that i t is the : M
c u ltiv a tio n of the correct "emotional habits" th at forms the basis of
the set of virtues that he" regards as d e s i r a b l e . ^ His reluctance to
abandon the notions of in s tin c t and emotion indicate-the te n ta tiv e
nature of Russell1s support fo r Watsonian behaviourism and an agreement.
w ith . ^ jllia m James that both concepts are necessary in order to account
fo r the genetic d iffe re n c e s ‘between individuals. I t is James' l i s t / o f
instincts and emotions th a t Watson wishes to reduce to a set of res-

8fi
ponses. At the same time, i t is James (in addition to Watson) whom
- *7. 87
Russell cites- as a major influence in his adoption of neutral monism.
" ^ .. . ■&■■■■■■-. •. .
I t is hardly-surprising, then, .that he should maintain James concept
o f emotion in his own philosophical psychology.
On the whole, Russell accepts the phy sic alist methodology of .

T
behaviourism and conceives of emo-tion in terms of images, sensaflons
' ... ... - ' . ' y '
and bodily movements,.requiring no reference to the cognitive aspect of
psychology From the Standpoint qf a Behaviourist, p. 194.

•86 * ■
\Ediication and the Social Order, p. 247.
^^Behaviorism, pp. 110, 136, 142 and 164.
^ yie Analysis of Mind, pp. 22-26, 50-51. •
the individual. He does this despite suggestions at various points of
.• ' *
p
V ■ 1 *
a richer conception of emotion, which includes cognition, as an
ingredient of emotionaêx^îence. While c r it ic a l of .the behaviourists
■' . ’ emphasis upon the control of behaviour, Russell fa ils to develop a con-
* ' * * ,
ception that is radically different from theirs. '. V- .
c- The Will _'

4 . . . .
x--~> " p -
The w ill is the third and finalêlement constituting the asocial
individual. UMike in t e l le c t and emotion, which are aspects of the
individual considered in isolation, the w ill provides a link between
the individual and society.

t ,
* ' i
In this sub-section I shall be concerned with an.analysis of the
w i l l , its d ictatorial nature and role in achieving internal harmony.
■ I shall proceed in this task in a 'number of mini-sections.^ In the
f i r s t of these I shall point to the dictatorial character of the w i l l
• and the contrast between this :and the cooperative wi 11 of the citizen.
' . ’ ' I
; ■' Id e a lly , the w ill provides a sense o f purpose to both in te lle c t and
emotion by developing and integrating, their respective capacities. The
w ill performs the key roleôf harmonising in te lle c t and emotion., I
shall argue that its dictatorial nature makes this role problematical.
■ I t stands in an a ntithetical relationship both with the elements .
comprising the individual and with other individuals. I t is therefore
' . an unlikely candidate to produce either internal or external harmony.
I shall contrast the w i l l ' s role with that of the s p ir it in the organic
- ® individual with a view toûnderlining this d i f fic u lt y .

r ' * ...
•• « '
* ’ V; ..
In the second mini-section I shabll cons.ider the a c tiv itie s in:
*
which the w ill engages and the lim its which Russell places upon them.
These limits upon-both inner- and outer-directed w ill heavily constrain

- ‘ ■ ■ A V
i ts acti vi t i es. ,0uter-di rected wi 11 col ou rs §:ci e n t if ic i pfqui ry tin th" ai
dete ruination -to control the physical world. Sim ilarly, i t leads the
individual to dominate others in his social relationships. Thus, the
a c tiv itie s of the w ill are to be curtailed lest they lead to chaos and
the destruction of c iv ilis a tio n .

: ’ V ■
In the third mini-section I shall\define the notion of the w ill
more precisely by referring to Russell's conception in The Analysis of
Mind. I shall point to both the continuities and discontinuities
' between Russell's philosophical analysis Of■the w ill and( his notion of
the d i c t a t o r i a l . w i l l . ' * .•
This will, conclude my analysis-of the asocial concept.of the indifyi
dual as a triad composed of in te lle c t , emotion and w i l l . ;•
i, Internal Harmony and:the Will
- t The w ill of the individual, considered in is o la tio n ,1 is that of a
dictator, according to Russell: "The w ill of the individual considered

. ' .
; i QO
in isolation is the god- 1ike wi 11 which says ’ l.et such things be'." ,
■J'*.
As'such i t is anti-social-, sel f-subsistent and strives for domination
88 *
Education and the Social Order,-p . 12..
and, power over others. The w i l l . of the c itiz e n , however, is quite
) ■ ' ' ■ ' ' '
di f f er ent and aims for'co-operation:
He [the .citizen] is aw.are that, his w i l l is not the

only one m tb,e world, and ’he is concerned, in one
way or another, to bring harmony out of the con
f lic t i n g w ills that exist within his*community. . . .
Xhe fundamental char.acteristi c of the citizen is _
that.he co-operates, in intention i f not in f a c t .83
As such, the w ill of the citizen is s'ocial^ co-operative and strives
for harmony with the w ills of others. There is a parallel here between
sel f-developffient and social development in Russell's theory . - The.
former, comprises an internal harmony'between the three ' exponents consti
tuting' theVndividual, while thevTatter,comprises an external harmony

. ,. • ■ ' ■ gn
with the w ills of.other individuals. • Yet this parallel in no way
solves the problem of how'education is to turn a dictatorial w ill into
a co-operative one. I t may do so a’t the expense of individual s e lf-

' ■•■.*■ : * . *■ ■■>’
sufficiency and freedom;for, ,as Russell recognises, the -individual'will
is not wholly bad:
. . . i t may be held that we shall ultimately be better

cit'izens i f we are f i r s t aware of a ll our p o te n tia li- .
' ties as.individuals before we descend to the compro
mises and practical acguiescences. of the p o litic a l '
l i f e .31 • ” \JV-—\ •
89Ib id ., pp. 12-13. , • '

33Ib id . , p. 244. ■' ,
9 ^ Ib id ., p. 12. • ■ /-• • -
305
" \ - 7 ‘ V .C;- . ‘ " - . ••

In sum-’, Russell s argument runs as follows: the means to creating
greater awareness of others is the education of the individual as a

' S ': ■
c itize n . The success of such education depends- upon transforming the
\ i d ic ta to ria l w ill of the individual into the cooperative w ill of the

' " ./ ^ *
citizen without thereby destroyfng self-development and individual
92 - - ■« •
i n it ia t iv e . The aim of education for citizenship is social coopera-
1■ "> '’ .
t-ion and an external harmony among the vari'ous w ills of citizens. At .
■•/ the same time, successful education achieves both an ’i nternal harmony •
between the three elements comprising the individual and an external-
harmony between the individual and others: . ■
. I f a man's l i f e ' i s to be satisfactory, whether from . ‘

.his own point of view or from that of the world at • ,T '
large, i t -requires two kinds o.f harmony: an internal :
harmony of intelligence, emotion'and-wi 11, and an-
external harmony with the w ills .p f others.^3
The ideal is a ful 1 ’integration of individual and social development by
means of an education tha<fc balances the confl icting-demands of internal
and external harmony./The d i f fi c u lt y of ttiis task is appreciable.
In order, to effect an internal harmony with in te lle c t and emotion,.

: ' I . . a ' ■
the will; provides a sense of purpose ajsid unity to the other two. The
pursuit of objective truth can onlyê realised in-an individual who
has the discipline and w ill to overcome the obstacles in his. path on
QA
the road to knowledge. Sim ilarly, the development of expansive
92I b i d . , 'p. 244. . • . , •

■' 93Ib id : -
94Ib id . , pp.’ 39-40.
'
:^v• . ... V
'• ' ■'
1*
" ' emotions and healthy emotional habits isj fa c ilita te d where the''.
. individual- has a strong-will that expresses them through action.
Happy individuals are those able to us’e 'the sense of- power stemming..
’ - * ’ r. \ 1 * . » ■ •
.’ from th e ir w ill to achieve thegoalS that they‘ choose. In cases where
.» y there is a 'c o n flic t between twd-_emotiohs, the wi 11^ can resol ve i t by
enabling the individual to deliberate between them, and decide which
' amotion constitutes the basis for action.
* . Thev/ill produces an internal harmony within the.individual by •

y >" ■ 'V , ■ a- ■- V v. *'• •
if * giving him the a b i l i t y to put into- practice both the search for objec-
tive truth and the expression o f ; h.is emotionst. Ihrcases where the two
c o n flic t, the wi.ll .again■perfpnns a synthesising, integrating role. :
I- " For example,"the w i l l m,ay exert control over an errant emotion “in order
to pursue truth and knowledge, thereby f a c ili t a t i n g achievement of -the
goal of the- individual's activity-; Present moral and religious educa-
'tion tend to produce a vacillatin g w ill that fa ils to integrate-the.-

95
conflicting demands of in te lle c t and emotion: The superstitious
beliefs developed by such education exert a grip over the emotions even
when rejected -by t h e i n t e l l e c t ; i n la te r 1 if e . I f early moral education
. were freed .from superstition, adult in tel 1igence coul d..accept its:
r principles. ' The resu lt would be a minimisation.of the conflicts between
■ in te lle c t and.emotion. In this-manner the power generated by the
individual w i ll can be,used in a healthy manner in the process :of s e lf -
develop'ment and.the achievement of internal harmony. ' v ;.
95Ib id ., pp. 244-245.

- ..vV
'-l ' ^• T
r.,
:. '. V
307
There are two main, reasons ^ o r considering the w i l l as the key
element th a t produces an in te rn a l -harmony com prisingthe. in d ivid u a l
good. F i r s t , the w i l l ’ is the source/of power w ith in the i n d iv id u a l.
The ambiguous character o f power does not d e tra c t from i.ts importance
in developing the in d iv id u a l's ca pacities. Without a sense o f power ^
• the in d iv id u a l .is unable to make decisions about what-he considers of

' ■• :■ i . ; v ‘ : ?
. fundamental worth- or'choose the best mdans fo r achieving these ends.
He <is less l i k e l y to develop an id e n t it y as a r e f le c t iv e and a ctive
being capable o f definin g .himself through independent thought and
a ctio n . Full self-development re.qtiires that he learn to d ir e c t his
energies in a harmonious and co nstructive manner. ■ ‘
Second, the w i l l is t h e . lin k between the in d iv id u a l, and so cie ty.
Only, through the exercise o f power does, the in d iv id u a l become an e ffe c
t i v e member o f his socie ty and learn to p a rtic ip a te as a f u l l member o f
his c u ltu re . His in d iv id u a l i d e n t i t y acquires an added.dimension

v. . ■■■■•■ - : v . . . . . , ' - ;
.... through p a r tic ip a tio n in th.e social realm and steps forth; as a being
engaged in social a f f a i r s . Through the exercise o f his w i l l the ind ividu a l;
becomes aware o f his r e s p o n s ib ilitie s towards others, in p a r tic u la r the
need to cooperate with them in ways th a t e ffe c t an external harmony. ,
Bdth, these reasons, underline-a major problematic in Russell 's
.programme f o r the education o f the asocial in d iv id u a l. The in d iv id u a l
w i l l is to be developed, but in. a way th a t does not strengthen i t s : v
.‘d ic t a t o r ia l character. Id e a lly , the w i l l harmonises in te l- le c t and
emotion in the manner th a t I have o u tlin e d . But th is is by no means
«. '*
' ce rta in since its . la t e n t d ic t a t o r ia l nature may lead it'a lo n g .p a th s of
disharmonious development. Since i t occupies a key ro le in developing
the in d iv id u a l's capacities and> enhancing his social i d e n t it y the
co rrect'education o f th e . w ill is doubly important. The d ic t a t o r ia l
nature o f the. w i l l ' r e q u i r e s - s t r i c t external controls in order to transc-
form i t in to the cooperative w i l l o f the c itiz e n . In i t s e l f the w i l l
stands in an a n ta g o n is tic re la tio n s h ip both w ith the elements^comprising
the in d iv id u a l and w ith other in d iv id u a ls .

I.t~tends to control and
* r » V
dominate both?’ This contrasts profoundly w ith the organic .in d iv id u a l
■whose in te rn a l s tru c tu re and r e la tio n s h ip 'w ith society is by no means
a n tagonistic?- '
In t h e . f u l l y developed organic in d iv id u a l the s p i r i t integrates
the liv e s o f i n s t in c t and mind and shines fo r th towards others in the

• v. - .
r
form o f u n iv e rs a l love. S.pir;it o b je c t if ie s the. i n s t i n c t s , focussing

*, *
t h e i r energy upon objects o f la s tin g value and enables them to transcend
' the le v e l o f 't h e s u b je c t iv e . Thus s p i r i t expresses what is external in
human experience, transforming the l i f e o f i n s t i n c t w ith o u t denying i t s
fundamental character. I t also harmoni-ses- i n s t i n c t w ith the l i f e of
mind by transforming in to the realm of the o b je c tiv e , making i t impervious
to t h e 'c r i t i c is m o f mi,nd. S p i r i t stands in a nonrantagonistic r e la t io n
ship w ith the-o th e r elements .comprising the organic in d iv id u a l. The
fundamental character o f the organic i n d iv id u a l is to grow and develop

^ ■ . , ■:
in constru ctive and harmonious ways. The i n t r i n s i c p r in c ip le o f growth ;
leads him n a tu r a lly in such d ire c tio n s and requires the greatest possible
freedom to develop in a healthy manner. S p i r i t simply enhances the
-< - \
; /: ' . ... ■■■. A
p r in c ip le o f growth by g u i d i ^ M t in d ire c tio n s in which i t finds f u l l
and free expression. ■X V
*• ■ ' ‘ "
Furth%rmore, the s p i r i t provides a source .within the in d iv id u a l
f o r the u n iv e rs a l,■ o b je ctiv e love o f mankind. I t stands, th e re fo re , in
a non-antagonistic re la tio n s h ip with others. Once the s p i r i t disappears
there .is no longer an in te rn a l source capable o f the o b je c t if ic a t io n o f
the in d iv id u a l's in s t in c t s upon mankind.'• The in d i v i d u a l ' s capacity fo r
universal love o f his fe llo w humans i.s thereby dim inished.' Indeedf in
the asocial* in d iv id u a l there is a stark contrast between such love, and ■
the d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l Constantly seeking power over others. The-will
cannot be r e lie d upon to develop th is love, since Russell is fe a r fu l
le s t i t become too dominant in i t s re la tio n s h ip with others and wish to
contro.l them. The external harmony w ith others re s u ltin g from.universal
love th erefore becomes p ro ble m atica l. Indeed i t is u n l i k e ly w i t h o u t
the draconian measures to l i m i t the in d iv id u a l w i l l th a t R u s se ll,:.

V
envisages in the world s ta te . The most th a t can be hoped f o r is an
external ^harmony w ith others th a t requires both propaganda and coercion..
to ensure i t s continuance.
The w i l l is an u n lik e ly vehicle f o r achieving an in te rn a l harmony
between the elements o f the in d iv id u a l. ..Russell's hopes in th is regard
contrast w ith i t s s ta rk , d ic t a t o r ia l nature. The aim o f a l i b e r a l •
education to fin d o u tle ts f o r mankind's capacities other th in -the
__ . ‘ ■. ■ * ~ "
ib id . , - pp. 27 and 226. This p o in t w i l l be developed in a la t e r
section oT th is chapter.
p u rs u it of power remains constant.' But, the fundamental nature o f the
in d ivid u a l to be educated has.changed profoundly. The d ic t a t o r ia l .
w i l l now occupies a central place in the s t r u c tu r e .o f the in d iv id u a l ‘
and i / - t o perform a harmonising ro le th a t b e lie s ..its nature. Russell's
. hopes-for' the success' of a lib e r a l education, as expressed below,
theraby^dimini.sh r a p id ly : ' .
-1 ' r
V " To give a sense o f the value of things other than

domination, to help to create wise c itiz e n s o f a
• free communitV. and through the combination o f .
c itiz e n s h ip with l i b e r t y in in d iv id u a l creativeness »
- ' ' , . to enable men to give to human, l i f e that splendour
. ' which some few have shown th a t i t can achieve.9?
Since power is the m otivational force o f t h e * V i l l , and domination .over

. ■ ' 1 ■ ' •/ ' ■ T' }- ' . ' . -
■;the a c t i v it ie s of, both the in d iv id u a l and others is i t s tendency, the
.task o f fin d in g o u tle ts f o r the w i l l other than control is a pressingly

•■ ’ 98 •
d i f f i c u l t one. ■ I sh a ll examine these o u tle ts and the lim it s th a t,.
Russell places upon them in the fo llo w in g m in i-se ctio n .
if. The A c t i v i t i e s o f the Wi 1 1

V*'
■ '%
I t remains to be as.ked what kinds o f a c t i v i t i e s Russell would,
allow the in d iv id u a l w i n to perform. I t w ilV b e remembered th a t in ’
-P rinciples o f S o cial Reconstruction Russell makes a d is t in c t io n between
97
Power,.: A New Social A n a lysis, p. 305.
98Bode c o rr e c tly poirits-o u t th a t : . In other words, .the ’g o d -lik e

w i l l 1 is not' the answer. This kind o f w i l l is no more social than
knowledge and emotions; a t any rate i t is not obviously^so. Op. c l t . ,
P. 627, ., •
^ ■ 3- ■-
^ inner and outer d ire c te d w i l 17 He c r i t i c is e s the*form er, which" aims
‘ • •''■■■ . ; y ' • W ' '
at the co n tro l o f impulses arid" in s tin c t's , since i t . i s , l i k e l y *to r.esult
. ’ in repression. 'He supports the development o f th§ l a t t e r , however,

:* !* ... . 'SJ‘ • r-‘ ®
s 'in c e 'it forms part .of t h e " s e lf - d is c t p lin e necessary*for overcoming the
- r '-' , • •• I , '• ■ g9
^ • ' d i f f i c u l t i e s . encountered in b o th -in te lle c tu a l work affctl i.fe in general . . . '
V ' ■' ‘ ■ ,
. . . . .
... '/ - j |
.< Of
i
This d is tin c tio n ' is maintained i n . On .Education and -Russel 1 cont-inues to„ •
, .- ‘ support o u te r -d ir e c te d -w ill as a .pa'rt o f the s e lf - d is c i p li n e produced-’-

« .* **. 1 i nn v ■* 1 /
■ ' ; by-the corre’ct habits. . Moreover., he regards inner d ire c te d w i l l as °j,
. t
necessary to oVercome fe a r, f o r example. .Instances of i r r a t io n a l fear
■ ' • :• • -■ ■ ’ - * • ■
may require the use./rr force by adults to develop the* w i l l power and 7 -..‘T
• • J ® •*„ i ■-.* -
c o u rs e .in .the c h ild to over&pme t h e m . ^ As’ regards the^ d is t in c t io n . ... ;
i-n-Êducati'on. and the Social Order ftussell ,s’t i l l . beratesi th.e. dangers./of^ > "
"- • 7 .- V i 02 •
inner directed 'Wid-l--.to control the emotions', t At the same time how-
103*
ever he advocates greater control o f/^ n d iv id u a l psychology, - and,the "
; \4
r i g h t .of the s.tate to prevent an .in d iv id u a l 1 s actions even, when they do-' .
* *- i. ' , V’- 1 1«
*1Q4 ’’ •'-* ' ♦ ;
hot a ffe c t others. ,-Both o^ these recommendations ;sugg‘est th a t
repression, in the Freudian, sense, w i l l have'to be to le ra te d by the

. .* ' ^ f' * 4 '» ' . '
in d iv id u a l in order t o ‘adSpt to th k w o r ld s ta te . ' •• * V
.* - * V . V
QQ ‘*4' - - •. -.1
P rincip les Qf Social Reconstruction, pp. 237-238.
^ On Education, pp. .30, 36 and 90.
101 Ib id . , . pp.. 9 0 -9 1 .; '
^ Education.and the Social Order, pp. 58-59. {
1 03 I b i d ., p. 243.
^ T h e S c i e n t if ic Outlook, p. 225
.;?• ' .•Morebvef,- even o u te r-d ire cte d w i l l now becomes p ro b le m a tic a l.fo r-v '
: • theVe aire; to ; be s t r i. c t - lim it s ' placed ion. i t . ' -'-'Since the w i l l provides •
v^ ‘ ' . .• • J • ;
theTn-pk-; between the- individual.-and-h'is community and the means by
which tie .exerts power, i t is; to. be ..developed, but t h is development can
! only proceed; in s o fa r as th e - d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l does not become t o t a l l y

{<
«•; i'-':’ / domirvant: as fa motive f o r his. behaviour.. If--it-'.becomes' dominant ;in-' th is
^manner, then:;the in d iv id u a l may well want to control both the physical
: ; v enyijrpnijieht'and other human,tbeings f o r his own purposes. . This'poses a
prpb-1 em for; the. ,stabi 1 i t y , social cohesion and safety o f-'c iv iT is a tio n .
.' ■' As-’ a; result^; Outer-directed w i l l must .also be r e s t r a in e d - in 'i t s a c t i v i -
:- r T >;tie s le s t ;it..ov.erstep: i t s e l f , and impose upon others. Put s u c c in c tly ,
;i rp a world-where ;in d iv id u a l persons s t r iv e 'to e xe rt what Russell, in

+ ’j 1 *• ; 5* ■■■ : ^ ' ' ! ’ ' ' ' 1 0 6
- • .d iffe r e n t ['places j -calls''the-i-r.-"dictatorial w i l l , t h e i r " w i l l to power"

. 1. i • • • • . ■1 1 .
X- -or -their.-boundless "impul se, to- p o w e r t h e r e . * i s need' for-, a strong,'
f Central iz £ d :a u th o n ty to prevent th is from re s u ltin g in disorganised

•'« V *‘ i * ‘ *‘• ; -
'. : I * T :• '• ✓
; i. anarchy;. • The a n tith e s is , which Russell :poses'between the anarchy o f
v .unrestrained power-seeking in d iv id u a ls ,'on the one hand and an a u th o ri-
■; ly organised. C ijfiT is a tib n on the o th e r stems from.
. . hi-s’ conception'Of the in d iv id u a l i s p o te n tia lly motivated only by love
■r & -
" • if) 5
This, a f t e r a l l , is the purpose o f the f i n a l chapter o f .
Education and the Social-O rder: ' toysuggest a r e c o n c ilia tio n between
the- in d iv id u a l arid social w i l l s .
^ Ôn Education, p. 98. ^
^•^Power, pp. 9, h i. ' (
108
of power. Let me explain th is problem in re la tio n to two o f the
a c t i v i t i e s which o u te r-d ire c te d w i l 1 . engages in , namely understanding

» ...........
the physical world and seeking harmony in the social world.
v.' 1: . ->■
j .. .
F i r s t l y , the physical world. S in c e 'is one o f ’ the main ways in
which the person comes to understand the physical world. Science is
distinguished by i t s method, which is. te n ta tiv e , hypothetical and un-
dogmatic. The afm o f science is to proceed towards o b je c tiv e tr u th by
means of th is method. The in d iv id u a l who fo llo w s both i t s aim and
.metho'd is- capable o f m irro rin g the world.

Tpe physical world which
* *
science reveals, according-to R usse ll, is one in which there is..no
place fo r s p ir i t u a l values, except those which man fr e e fy makes f o r

1 09 -
h im s e lf. -The universe' i t s e l f is i n d i f f e r e n t to m an 's'fa te ,> which
*1no i °
The dangers o f the w i l l apd power which Russell anal/ses are
more p re c ise ly expressed by the je fis tin c tio n between a "powerxmotive"
(the capacity f o r s e lf-e x p re s s io n ), and a "power d rive " (the)need to
dominate others, which necessarily raises the question o f t h e i r social
-freedom) made by C hristian Bay:_ The Structure o f Freedom, pp. 298-299.
In these terms, Russell conceives o f the in d iv id u a l's w i l l as lik e ly . ..
to change from a power motive, which is a necessary condition fo r
ind ividu a l development, to a power d riv e , which t'hefi becomes a th re a t
to the l i b e r t y o f others and ul tim a te ly to the w ell-being o f c i v i l i s a -
tio n . . .■ y
109 . 1
‘ A Free Man's Worship', Mysticism and Logic, p. 48. This
r e la t iv e l y e a rly essay'of Russ'ell's, w r itte n a t the beginning of; the
twentieth century, is a clea r statement concerning the dangers o f
power which his l a t e r work confronts. Russell's-values o f resigna
tio n and defiance towards a meaningless universe arejdescribed as
part o f the Newtonian heritage by Ian Winchester: 'A-WorVd View
Shattered: Newton No More? U n iv e rs ity College Symposium, Toronto,
January 23-26, 1979 (unpubli shed). 0 . v .,
consists of struggle proceeding u ltim a te ly to death. In l i g h t o f th is
. fa te , the in d iv id u a l is rfconfronted w ith the a lte rn a tiv e s o f resignation
o r defiance. Resignation is a c a p itu la tio n to the awesome power o f
nature, while the defiance which Russell recommends, consists of an
acceptance of- mankind's fa te together w ith an attempt to construct an
ideal realm of beauty.and t r u t h . By means of t h e - a c t i v it ie s of science
philosophy and a r t , the in d iv id u a l plucks, v ic to ry from defeat in the
sense o f constructing-something o f value in the face o f an i n d if f e r e n t
u n iv e r s e .^ The in d iv id u a l w i l l p itc h e s . i t s e l f against the in e v it a
b i l i t y o f fa te by f i r s t , accepting and then, overcoming i t through
doing what is d i s t i n c t i v e l y Human, namely the p u rs u it of goodness and.
tr u th . The type o f defiance which Russell condemns consists of
exerting the Faust^n, w i l l ' which lie s at the basis of science, fo r. the
purpose o f in d iv id u a l power and c o n tr o l .4 These are an anathema to the
search f o r o b je c tiv e tru th and indeed,a c a p itu la tio n to the acceptance

• HI
o f power as the dominant force n
-in
*
both pature
9
and human a f f a i r s . In
'\ . 0 .
th is ..context,* Russel 1 m ention ^th e worship o f force, advocated by
Nietzsche as ty p ic a l pf-:'the desire to impose the ‘w i l l to poyyer1 upon
the universe in order to make i t c a p itu la te to the personal desires of

’ 112
the in d iy id u a l. Russell, then, condemns the worship o f power both
^ B . o d e : . o]3. ci t ; , p. 629 and 'A Free Man's Worship', p. 51.

/- 11x1 I b i d . s pp. 49-50. ” .
r : . 1 1 2 ib id . ; -
■\
/\
4 *?
315
. 113
in i t s human and non-human forms. When science i t s e l f is motivated
by power ra th e r than love ( o f the universe) i t becomes an e f f i c i e n t .
means fo r manipulating both nature and mankind in order to'dominate
both. Science is then reduced to technique, or the worship o f .techno
lo g ica l advance f o r making nature m in is te r to human desires:
As soon as the f a i lu r e o f science considered as meta

physics is re a lis e d , the power conferred by. science
as a technique. i.s only obtainable by something
analogous to th e w orsh ip o f Satan, that' is to say,
by the renunciation o f l o v e / ^ 4
This, then, comprises the danger o f science as one means by which the
in d iv id u a l w i l l confronts the physical world: th a t i t s i g n i f i c a n t ly .
enhances his power to control th a t w o r ld , i f he becomes mdtivated by

■’ 115 -
power alone. The Faustian w i l l , which gives r is e to science, can
P'. * V.
• be used f o r the purpose o f e ith e r goodness or force according to the
choite o f the in d i v i d u a l . ^ I t is th is danger w ith which Russell is
. concerned in Education and the Social Order when he advocates the
'establishment o f a world sta te to .c o n tr o l the in d iv id u a l, d ic t a t o r ia l
w i l l .' . -
":11 -.Ibid.,..^ppT 50-51 , 53-55.

V II4 r-
■■ The S c i e n t if ic Outlook, p. 273. ■ ,
/ ; . 1 1 5 I b i d . , p. 269. , ■ ,
• ^ ' A Free Man's Worship1, pp. 46-47, 49-50. As Winchester points
. out, Russell's e th ic o f renunciation apd acceptance o f fa te is s im ila r
•to Nietzsche's amor f a t i , or the w i l l i n g love o f the eternal recurrence
(the doctrine th a t " . . . a l l of the possible Combinations o f . . .matter w i l l
. not only occur, but w i l l recur: and not only recur, but recur endlessly,
op. c i t . , p\ 14"). Winchester casts both Nietzsche and Russell as
modern characters dominated by an i n s t in c t iv e Newtonian world view:
i b i d . , pp. 12-18 and 23.
7
316
There is an analogous danger in the. re la tio n s h ip o f the in d ivid u a l '
w i l l to the social world. I t too can be used fo r purposes o f goodness
(the type o f self-development which does not in te rfe re , with the l i b e r t y
of others) or force (the manipulation and control o f others through the
exercise o f power)! In terms o f R ussell’ s e a r li e r d is t in c t io n , the
development of the w i l l , and the ,ôwer which i t confers upon the
in d iv id u a l, may be used c o n s tru c tiv e ly o r d e s t r u c t i v e l y . ^ As a r e s u lt ,
i t may produce social harmony or social chaos.
The constructive aspects o f th e ^ w ill are revealed in the a b i l i t y
o f the young c h ild to^playând thereby perform both new tasks and
indulge in fantasy. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , which.the c h ild makes between
himself and such figures of fantasy as Bluebeard a n d 'th e ir a b i l i t y to .
do unusual and even s a d is tic th in g s, is healthy and motivated not by

* 118 '
sex but by power, according to Russell. S im ila r ly , the performance
o f new tasks is a constru ctive m anifestation of-power, in the fo llo w in g
, In fa c t , as Bay points out, Russell drops th is d is tin c tio n ' in

his l a t e r work*and suggests th a t 'power impulses' (in. the sense o f power
motives) may fin d o u tle ts compatible w ith social freedom: The Structure
of Freedom, p. 129. The means to providing such o u tle ts " . . . i s a
problem o f in d iv id u a l psychology, p a r tly o f education, and p a r tly of
o p p o r tu n ity .. . . I f freedom is to besecure, i t is essential both th a t,
useful careers should be open to energetic men, and that"harmful careers
‘ shall be closed to them. I t is important also th a t education should
develop useful forms o f technical s k i l l , and th a t the circumstances o f
childhood and youth should not be'such as to generate f e r o c i t y . "
Bertrand Russell: 'Freedom and Government', in Roth Nanda Anshen (E d.):
Freedom: It s Meaning, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1940,. p. 259. As Bay
points out in quoting t h is passage, Russell's suggestions are both
•"v e ry general'" and "ra th e r vague": 0£_. c i t . , pp. 129-130.
^^Qn Education, p. 99.
317
, 119
sense: "Power may be defined as the production o f intended e f f e c t s . "
The abjJ44;y to achieve what one sets out to do is the source o f the '
in d iv id u a l's harmonious re la tio n s h ip with his social environment. The
prdblem th a t Russell confronts in Education and. the Social Order is

■^'•Sr ,
that i t is also the p o te n tia l source o f a chaotic and d ic t a t o r ia l .
r e la tio n s h ip w it h 't h a t environment.

■#y.
The d e stru ctive aspects of the w i l l can be prevented by a c e rta in

' * \
amount o f coercion o f the young c h ild in the in te re s ts both of s e l f
development and social harmony. The d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l requires such
forms o f e x te rn a lly imposed d is c ip lin e as clea n lin e ss, p u n c tu a lity ,

120
. respect f o r property, ro u tin e , and., learning the. three R's. In
r
general, Russell recommends a combination o f freedom and coercion as the
c o rre c t means to overcome the d e s tru c tive tendencies o f the w i l l :
The capacity fo r consistent s e lf - d ir e c t io n is one o f

the most valuable th a t a human,being can possess. I t
is p r a c t ic a lly unknown, in young c h ild re n,, and i's never
developed .either by a very r i g i d d is c ip lin e or. by
complete freedom___ The strengthening o f the w i l l
demands, th e re fo re , a somewhat subtle mixture o f fre e
dom and-.discipline, and is destroyed by an excess o f
e it h e r . /'2^ .
At f i r s t blush, th is again appears-sim ilar to Russel V s p o s itio n on

* *
s e lf - d is c ip lin e - in P rincip les o f Social Reconstruction, namely th a t
11 q .
Power, p. 35.
^ Ê ducation and the Social Order, pp. 34-44.
1 21 I b i d . , pp. 39-40.
318
mental d is c ip lin e may require^, external compulsion at the h igher level s

* 122 ■ ■ -
of in s t r u c tio n . However, Russell, .is now f a r more in s is te n t upon
routine and external.ly imposed lim i-ts upon th e ; a c t i v i t i e s o f the young
c h ild .than in his theory o f the education o f the organic in d iv id u a l. ■
.■ He w r it e s : - '• ‘ ■ .
I t seems unavoidable th e re fo re , that-young people

should b,e subjected t o 't h e necessity o f doing c e rta in
things at c e rta in times i f they are to be f i t t e d to
take any ordinary p a rt in modern l i f e " . ^ 3
The reason fo r th is is c le a r: the c h ild is to be prepared f o r l i f e in-
a complex s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i s a t i o n ’ by means- o f an education th a t empha-

■' ■ • ' • ; • ,T:
. ’
svses ro u tin e and the d ire c tio n o f his w i l l toward cooperative a c t r v i -
tie s.. Control o f the chi Id by a d u lt a u th o rity prepares him f o r l i f e ’
as a c itiz e n o f the world sta te . The l-imits placed upon the in d iv id u a l
w i l l ! by the power o f the world sta te to crush in d iv id u a l re b e llio n s o r ’

■
' v• 124
control; propaganda are now s t r i c t l y defined. The-danger to social
cohesion and haj^nony o f a d ic t a t o r ia l, w i l l th a t id e n t if ie s too close ly
with Bluebeard by p u ttin g his fantasies in to p ra ctice as an a d u lt is
f a r t o o great to be allowed free development. The power o f the '
in d iv id u a l w i l l to produce intended e ffe c ts is now circumscribed by the

125 ' •;
overwhelming power o f the world s ta te . I f the in d ivid u a l chooses to
^ P r i n c i p l e s o f Social Reconstruction, pp. 159-161

123
Education and the Social Order, pp. 36-37.
, 2 4 I b i d . . ' p. 27. -—
, 2 5 Ib id . ■
319
■/M-
confront that power, he rjiust s u ffe r the consequences o f almost ce rta in
defeat. The in d iv id u a l w i l l must learn (by force i f necessary) to co-
operate as a-good c itiz e n should. The price to in d iv id u a l freedom may
be great but is preferable to - in te rn a tio n a l anarchy-and the destruction

126
o f c iv i T isa tio n. f
i i i ^ :. D e fin itio n o f the Will
In The Analysis of Mind Russell advances a tw o -tie re d analysis, of

v. • * *•
t h e , w i l l . In the' f i r s t he establishes a ’d e f i n i t i o n o f voluntary move
ment; i n th e ’ second an account o f emphatic v o li t io n . In order to' ^
3 . define a voluntary movement, R u sse ll'distin g uish e s i t from an involun
ta ry one., Many v i t a l movements, such as the beating o f the heart, are

** •, '
involuntaijy since they are not susceptible to causationôf our own,
- .except in d i r e c t l y by the use o f drugs. Other V i t a l movements, such as

*
. b r e a t h i n g , 'f a l l between the two, since normally they occur w ithout the
in te rv e n tio n o f the w i11, but can be aTtgfed ’o r stopped i f we choose to .
Other movements, such as our going to'Wdrk, are sabject to deci's

127
and hence voluntary. Following William James, Russell maintains th a t
* • ■
the only d is tin g u is h in g feature, p f a voluntary movement " is th a t i t -
involves an idea o f the movement to be performed, made up of the memory-
images o f the kina e sth e tic sensations which we had when the'same move^
■" '" '1 2 8 ' 1
ment occurred on some former occasion."
126 ’ *
Cf. Park: 0£ 4 c i t ., p. 73. Park points out th a t Russell over
looks t h e . d i f f i c u l t i e s o f developing education on an in te rn a tio n a l scale.
127 v- > .
The Analysis o f Mind, pp. 284-285.

1 28 I b i d . , p. 285.
On James' view no movement can* be made v o lu n ta rily .u n le s s i t has
occurred in v o l u n t a r il y .
Yet the commonsense d is t in c t io n between the
729 ’
two types o f movement is to be maintained. Thus Russell defines a
! ’ voluntary movement as one th a t is accompanied by kina e sth e tic sensations

rr~ - 130
. and tends to be caused'by the images o f Jthose sensations. ,
- , This appears o f l i t t l e help in c l a r i f y i n g the meaning o f the
d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l in the asocial in d iv id u a l. But Russell exterWs-JwS^
philosophical analysis to cover the concept o f v o li t i o n in- the emphatic
sense.- By th is he means the.process o f decision-making fo llo w in g upon
a period o f d e lib e ra tio n . In the course o f such a process there
i s , in a d d itio n to voluntary movement, a judgement to the e ffe c t t h a t : " '
‘ 'This is what I sh a ll do*. D.uring the period of d e lib e ra tio n there
is a sensation o f tension, which is followed by a d if f e r e n t sensation
once the decision is made. The tension is caused by a c o n f l i c t o f
desires, experienced both as sensations and k in a e s th e tic images o f .
. . incompatible movements. Upon making the decision* the exclusive .image -
o f the movement which is w ille d replaces the images .of c o n f lic t in g -'■ ■
movements. Irj. th is way, Russell reduces the conception o f the w i l l to
sensations, images, t h e i r re la tio n s and "causal laws, in the same way as
he does f o r the -o th e r aspects o f consciousness. *

X "
1 2 9 i b i d ., p. 245.
1 30 I b f d . , p. 285.°
1 3 1 I b i d . , pp. 285-286.
J
\f£ -
321
Russell's neutral ironist analysis o f the w i l l i n ’ the v o li t i o n a l

/ ' i:'
. sense corresponds in some ways to the vJi 1 1 o f the asocial in d iv id u a ls -
The process o f deliberation*, during which there is an experience o f

a U. • * •
c o n flic t in g desires f i n a l l y resolved in .fa v o u r o f the image o f one.
■ voluntary a ct, is the'same process th a t takes place in the asocial

'v , ■- ■; ' . ' ■ . . /■
in d iv id u a l. The w i l l thereby brings harmony out o f c o n flic t in g desires.
The re so lu tio n to act on t\ye basis of one p a r tic u la r d e sire, coupled
with a judgement th a t i,t is the c o r r e c t ’ course o f action to fo llo w ,
b rin g y ’f o ^the in d iv id u a l a sense o f unifyin g the. c o n f lic t in g elements
o f which he is composed. However, the-re is. no suggestion in R usse ll’ s
philosophical analys’is* th a t the w i l l can usurp4i t s harmonising ro le by:
asserting its. d ic t a t o r ia l nature. Indeed,' there is-no suggestion th a t
i t is d i c t a t o r i a l a t a l l , , simply a means fo r in te g ra tin g c o n flic t in g

• j ■ •. ' ' - 1...
; desires. Furthermore, i t does not.occupy the central place a ff o r d e d . -
to th.e d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l . Russell's analysis o f the w i l l occupies only
four paragraphs towards the end o f his philosophical to u r o f the contents
o f consciousness. His aim is to show th a t i t can be reduced to sensa
tions -and images in thef same way as a l l mental phenomena. While he
d if f e r s from the behaviourists i,n 'in s is tin g on the d is t in c t io n between
. . voluntary and involuntary movementP'this does not e n ta il an assumption

’. . ■' , * s.
th a t the mind possesses .a higher.capacity whose existence is incommen-
133
surable with the methodology o f neutral monism. The emphatic sense .
1321b id . , p. 284.
y' 1 3 3 I b i d . , pp. 244-245.
■■ I ,>
. 322
1 ■ '
o f v o l i t i o n combines sensations, images, t h e i r causal laws and no more.
*■ * \
II. The Citizen . - v %'
Analysis o f Russell's conception o f the w i l l demonstrates the
inadequacy o f considering the in d iv id u a l good in is o la tio n from' the good
o f the c i t i z e n . ; The w i l l o f the in d iv id u a l is to be .developed since

■4-r
i t ’ i s . i n the course o f exercising power that he "becomes an e ffe c tiv e
' 134
member o f the community". I t is -the w f l l i n d e e d , th a t serves as a
■V ,
bridge between the in d iv id u a l and the community. Yet the development ■
o f the w i l l indicates very c le a r ly the central problem o f education
which Russell is addressing: namely, whether i t should aim ,at in d ivid u a l
development or the"development o f the’ c itiz e n . .
Unlike the in d iv id u a l w i l l which is d i c t a t o r i a l , s e lf-s u b s is te n t
and s tr iv e s fo r domination and power over others, the w i l l o f the c itiz e n

- "»V
•aims for. GO-operation:
•-v
He [the c it iz e n ] is aware th a t his w i l l is not the only
one in the world, and he is concerned, ,in one,way or
another, to bnng harmony o u t-o f th e 'c o n fl i c t in g wi l l s
v , th a t e x is t w ith in his community The fundamental
c h a r a c te r is tic o f the c itiz e n is th a t he co-operates., in
- ■ in te n tio n i f ' n o t in f a c t J 35
: ft•—;—:----: : ;---
134 *
Education and the Social Order, p. .12. ,
135 I b i d ., pp. 12-13.
.A s such, the w i l l o f t h e citizen , is s o c ia l, co-operative and s triv e s
f o r harmony with the w i l l s o f others.. There is a p a ra lle l here be.tween
self-development and social development in R ussell's’ -theory. The .former,
comprises an in te rn a l Harmony between the three elements c o n s t i t u t i n g .
the in d iv id u a l, while the l a t t e r comprises an external harmony with the

I n/- ‘
w i l l s o f Other in d iv id u a ls . Education o f the citizejn conducted by
•. nation -sta tes fa ils , to achieve e ith e r the: in te rn a l harmony necessary

.•* '■ •*
• f o r self-development or the-external harmony in te g ra l to s o c ia l develop-
ment. Such education emphasises the greater importance o f social _
development but, in subjugating- the in d iv id u a l to the ideals p f the
n a tio n -s ta te , imposes upon him a nationalism conducive to war and
social c o n f l i c t , ‘
In t h i s section I shall consider the concept o f the c i t i z e n , , pre
valent in modern n a tio n -s ta te s ,^ th a t Russell re je c ts , < I shall concen
tr a te upon the fa ilu r e s o f such e d u c a tio n w ith regard to developing
the co-operative a ttitu d e o f t h e c it iz e n . I shall do so in several . *
sub-sections in which I analyse in tu rn the main’ aspects o f the c itiz e n
in the n a tio n -s ta te , the herd i n s t i n c t , the effects, of nationalism and
: i the re la tio n s h ip between nationalism and the 'individual w i l l . My argu
ment w i l l be th a t R usse ll! s re je c tio n o f the concept o f c itiz e n s h ip
developed by n a tion -sta tes is based p rim a rily .u p o n . his-View o f nationalism
as developing the d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l o f the in d iv id u a l, thereby heightening .
social c o n f l i c t .
136 I b i d . , p. 244. ' ' "
r ■ - - . ■
rt
324
:A .' The. National C itizen “> \■

•; ^ ■ * "
In th is sub-section I shall analyse the conception o f c itiz e n s h ip
developed by the n a tio n -s ta te . This'conception is in s t r u c tiv e both' f o r

- *. ' ■ ‘ . ' •,> *r
the c ritic is m s .Russell levels at i t and f o r evaluating the extent to
which his own account succeeds in overcoming these d e fic ie n c ie s .
* *
Education f a i l s to harmonise the c o n flic t in g demands o f the
in d iv id u a l and the c itiz e n p rim a rily because i t is conducted by nation
states. Their aim is to develop a narrow view of c itiz e n s h ip th a t
breeds conformity, m i l i t a n t nationalism and the aggressive emotions
conducive to warr-"" ' ‘ .
Citizens as conceived by governments are^persons who

admire the statu? quo and are' prepared tB exert them
selves f o r i t s p re se rv a tio n s.. .What is emphasised most
o f a ll is p a trio tis m in a somewhat m i l i t a n t form:, th a t
is to say, a narrow d e v o tio n 'to the persons l iv i n g in ia
c e rta in area, as opposed to those l i v i n g elsewhere, and
w illin g n e s s t o . f u r t h e r the in te re s ts o f the chosen area
by the use o f JKi 1 it a r y fo rc e J 3 7
Underlying R ussell's c r i j j c i s m is the f a i l u r e o f education conducted by
the n a tion -sta te to encourage the development o f ■in d iv id u a l c u ltu re .
By making the in d ivid u a l a manipulable tool f o r the sta te , i t destroys
.what is worthwhile in in d iv id u a l c u ltu re , p a r t ic u la r ly as regards the

jog
development o f both, his i n t e l l e c t and emotions. With regard to the
i n t e l l e c t , education produces a dogmatic assurance th a t the interests>
^3 7 1 b id . , pp. 13 and 19.

.. 1 ‘- I b i d . ,. pp. 17-18.
■ ’ •• ' - ■ • 4. ‘
/ . ' ' ;v '

: ^ o^. the nation state are j u s t i f i e d beyond reproach. Such dogma is a
th re a t both to the s c i e n t if ic , a ttitu d e and the p u rs u it o f objective
tru th :- :/ .
* \ ' A well-educated c itiz e n is l i k e l y to be incapable o f

discovery, since' he w i l l respect his elders and
b e tte rs , reverence the great men o f the past genera.-"
v t io n , and look w ith horror upon a l l subversive
d o c trin e s .‘^39
Thus the i n t e lle c tu a l development and anarchic sta te o f mind required
■ f o r s c i e n t i f i c advance are in h ib ite d byêducation f o r c itiz e n s h ip .
Moreover, i t is d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible to reconcile the demands fo r

140
lo y a lty and the p u rs u it o f o b je ctiv e t r u th . A ll educational systems
suppress fa<fts and opinions contrary to the national in te re s t.
• With regard to the emotions, education f o r c itiz e n s h ip inculcates
su p e rs titio n s in the in d iv id u a l's conscious and unconscious which are.

141 \ -
• i n h i b i t i n g and d e stru c tive . Russell ffgain points to the fa m ilia r
potion th a t fears lu rk in g in the unconscious prevent the in d iv id u a l

/ 142
from re a lis in g his- f u l l p o te n tia l and freedom. In a d d itio n , Russell
yjnentions a fu rth e r emotionally c o n s tric tin g aspect o f education f o r
- c itiz e n s h ip in the narrow sense: the c u lt iv a t io n o f 'herd i n s t i n c t ' .
1 39 I b i d . , p. 2 2 .
1 40 I b i d . , pp. 24, 228.
141 I b i d . , p. 236.
142 I b i d . , pp. 63-64, 247. *
B. Herd Instinct * ■ '
In t h is sub-section I shall examine R ussell’ s conception o f .herd
i n s t i n c t and the manner in which i t is channelled in harmful ways by
the education o f the c itiz e n w ith in the n a tio n -s ta te : ■■

V •'
Herd i n s t i n c t is a c o lle c tiv e desire f o r u n ifo rm ity among members
o f a group th a t feel themselves bounded together by a consensus o f

■ I'!#.-
* , ■ \
ideals and values. As the name suggests, i t is a base i n s t i n c t th a t
mankind has in h e ri fed from his b io lo g ic a l ancestors. Russell o ffe rs no
em pirical evidence f o r i t s existence but-assumes a p r io r i th a t much of

■ . 143
•
an in d iv id u a l ’ s behaviour is governed ;$ay the herd i n s t i n c t . More
over, i t s expression is encouraged .when the c o l l e c t i v i t y is based-, on
the nation s ta te . Russell describes the herd i n s t in c t as fo llo w s:

•s f
Every c o lle c tio n o f . human beings in habitual close
\ p roxim ity develops aherd .feeling which is shown in a
.......c e r t a in / ! n s t in c t iv e u n ifo rm ity o f behaviour, and in
h o s t i l i t y to any in d iv id u a l having the same proxim ity
but not f e l t as one o f the g ro u p .‘44
Thus herd i n s t i n c t operates in two related ways. In d iv id u a ls feel an
in s t in c t iv e aversion to others who are not considered membe-rs o f t h e ir

4
group (e.g.,- in d iv id u a ls o f d i f f e r e n t n a t i o n a l it y ) . Moreover, they feel
a s im ila r aversion to members o f t h e i r own group who do not show cpmmit-
ment t-o the same ideals (e.g. dissidents o f any type). Education fo r
143
The a p r io r i nature o f many o f R usse ll’ s assumptions is discussed
by 'H. Parris in ‘ The P o l it ic a l Thought o f Bertrand R usse ll’ , Durham
U n iv e rs ity Journal, V o l..-28, 1963-1966, pp. 86-94.
1 44
327 •
1 ■/. ;
c itiz e n s h ip in .the harrow sense encourages both these types o f i n s t in c
t iv e avers thereby-generates h o s t i l i t y towards c itiz e n s of
other nation s ta te s , heightening the tensions th a t co n trib u te to war; at
the'same time creati ng 'tension among c itiz e n s of the same nation by
o s tra c is in g those th a t o bject to the ideal? of the herd. A prime

■ .. . # ' ' j • -7 %
'example o f the l a t t e r was th e punishment i n f l i c t e d upon Russell' as a -
p a c i f i s t during the F ir s t World War. ^ '

■ /-
In educational terms th is second aspect of herd i n s t i n c t directed
towards non-conforming in d iv id u a ls is p a r t ic u la r ly destructive? It

.r
may prevent the emergence o f great in d iv id u a ls capable of making s ig n i-
f i c a n t i n t e lle c t u a l discoveries and" a unique c o n trib u tio n t o c i v i l i s a
tio n .^ ^ . Such in d iv id u a ls (Socrates, Jesus, E in ste in , Gandhi e tc .) are
l i k e l y to be a t odds with the dominant values of the herd by vir'tue o f
t h e i r unique v is io n . I f the influence o f the herd i n s t i n c t is strong
enough to suppress t h e i r genius then the loss to c i v i l i s a t i o n is very
I b i d . , pp. 83 and 94. Russell^makes a d is t in c t io n between the

'g re a t herd1, or the cu ltu re to w h ic h an in d iv id u a l belongs (English,
American, Jewish) and-the 'small herd' o f the school, a student's peer
group. I f the values o f the two c o n f l i c t (e.g. an immigrant to the
U.S.A.) then discord w ith in the in d iv id u a l a'nd'the social fa b r ic may
r e s u lt again increasing tension: Ib r d . , pp. 88-95. Elsewhere Russell T
.points out th a t p o litic s .* is concerned with herds ra th e r than individuals.-
I t s aim is to d ir e c t the herd i n s t i n c t in to co-operat'ion w ith in the
hercr and h o s t i l i t y towards other herds. A wise herd w i l l to le r a te
both eccentrics and s.ub-numerates: Human Society in Ethics and P o l it ic s ,
p. 156.
328
gt;eat. . Russell mentions th is as one o f the dangers of the. democratisa-'

/ *• 1
tio n o f /he educational system: th a t i t tends to act as.a le v e l l e r o f,
•*.' '' &
in d iv id u a l c a p a c itie s . Since modern c i v i l i s a t i o n requires in d iv id u a ls
^ g r e a t a b i l i t y both to comprehend and control i t s operation, there

• \ -
i 146
should be a coneerted-attempt to educate them apart from the herd.
’ '&■
On the whole, the in flu e n c e 'o f herd i n s t in c t is d e s tru ctiv e to
in d iv id u a ls and RusselT recommends minimising i t s influence in the.form
Of peer pressure (the small berd) in the educational system J 4 7 At the
same time, i t can be used c o n s tru c tiv e ly in the development o f co-
operative a c t i v i t i e s (such as plays and sports, provided these are not
too:,.competitive).where the in d ivid u a l learns to use-his ta le n ts in

- ~ ' i 48
‘ conjunction w ith others f o r a non-oppressive purpose. . .
In the context of education’ f o r c itiz e n s h ip w ith in the n ation
state ‘however, the influence o f the herd i n s t in c t is d e stru c tive because ■
i t contributes to h o s t i l i t y , both w ith in the same state and between
states. Education f o r c itiz e n s h ip in th is harrow sensemagnifies the
d e stru ctive aspects o f the herd i n s t in c t by demanding conform ity^to the
■ . 146 •
Education and the Social -Order, pp. 84. and 97. On t h is point
Russell is in agreement with T.S. E l io t : Notes Towards the D e fin itio n
,,of C ultu re , Faber and Faber, London, 1948, pp. 100-101. Russell
v\ regards opposition to the herd as valuable because an in d iv id u a l over
comes easy conformity in the p u rs u it o f ju s t ic e and the advance of
mankind: Education and the Social Order, pp. 99-100. . •
147 I b i d . , p. 96. . . '
148 I b i d . , pp. ’ 97-98...
greajt herd based on the nation sta te . Instead o f developing a sense o f
s o li d a r it y and co-operation with a ll mankind, education channels the
herd' i n s t in c t in to aggressive fe e lin g s towards c itiz e n s o f other nation-

* „
states.- I t heightens co-operatioh w ith in the n a tio n -s ta te only by
demanding th a t a l l members o f the herd conform to the ideals o f the
sta te . The ycftfng are deprived of the o pportunity fo r expressing them
selves and are lea st l i k e l y to stand out against the herd in the name
149 * .
o f ju s t ic e and e q u a lity . In this, manner education f o r c itiz e n s h ip •
w ith in the n a tio n -s ta te d ire c ts the h e r d ^ n s tin c t in to a c t i v i t i e s th a t -
defend the status quo and deprive the c itiz e n o f o p po rtu n ities f o r co- .
operating with others.
C. Nationalism -
Educatign f o r c itiz e n s h ip conducted by"nation states u n su rp risin g ly
emphasises
*
nationalism. 4The v i t r i o;yl th a t Russell pours
'
upon nationalism
is unsurpassed. Nationalism magnifies the h o s t i l i t y generated towards
others by the h e r d . in s tin c t to the point th a t it-poses a th re a t to the
• su rviva l ,of s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i s a t i o n . R ussell's c r itiq u e o f nationalism^
is the f i r s t step towards i t s replacement by the in te rn a tio n a lism d is -

\
tf n c t iv e of the education o f the c itiz e n o f the world state.
♦ • • •
In th is sub-section "I sha ll analyse some o f the reasons fo r
R ussell's b e lie f th a t nationalism, is a d e stru ctiv e force and his pror
■posals fo r replacing i t in the education o f the c i t i z e n . '
149 I b i d . , pp. 99-100.
9
\
330
The fe e lin g o f p a trio tis m in the individual}, upon which nationalism

150 •
is based, is both natural and healthy. Indeed, the fe e lin g s o f
f a m i l i a r i t y with the people and places of one's homeland and the pride
towards.i;the accompl ishments o f one's country are rooted in something'
l ik e the herd i n s t i n c t . Provided that these feeTings are channelled-
in a non-aggressive, manner towards producing a sense o f cohesion and
co-operation w ith in the great herd c o n s titu tin g the nation they serve
a constru ctive ro le . -The problem is th a t education f o r c itiz e n s h ip
transforms these fe e lin g s in to h o s tile and aggressive a c t i v i t i e s .
4 " " }
One aspect o f the education of the c itiz e n jsnT the nation sta te is
his in d o c trin a tio n w ith a set o f false b e lie fs about’ the h is to ry ,

r T51
p o l i t i c s and economicsVf his nation. He learns th a t the wars in
v^hioh i t has engaged have always -been j u s t i f i e d in the face o f the

\ '.V'
aggression o f other nations. The d e s tru ctiv e e ffe c ts o f such teaching
upon the c itiz e n are f e l t both i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and em otionally.
I n t e l l e c t u a l l y , he believes in a series o f fa ls e propositions th a t may
act as an obstacle to the development o f the s c i e n t i f i c a ttitu d e and a

4 ' 15?
respect f o r the o b je c tiv e nature of tr u th . Furthermore, his emotions
a re ,tw iste d in to the aggressive forms th a t give ris e to war. The aim
o f m i l i t a n t nationalism is indeed to provide a generation of loyal and
T , 0 I b i d . , pp. 135-136,
1 5 1 I b i d . , pp. 139-140.
1 52 I b i d . , pp. 223-228, 230-231.
] 53
w i l l i n g k i l l e r s in the event o f war. Education is the primary means
by which the n a tio n -s ta te achieves t h is end. I t turns natural s e n ti
ments l ik e the herd 'i n s t i n c t in to v ir u le n t and barbaric c e le b ra tio n s /o f
slaughter .
Russell suggests c e rta in methods to overcome the teaching o f *
nationalism in the education of' the c itiz e n . All are u ltim a te ly con
tin g e n t upon the establishment o f the World state and the subsequent
triumph o f in te rn a tio n a lis m . The f i r s t ns f a m ilia r and consists o f the

- ’ 155
u n iv e rs a lis a tio h o f h is to ry texts used in-schools. In t h is way d is
to r t io n o f h is t o r ic a l fa cts could be avoided. This recommendation
requires an in te rn a tio n a l body to oversee i t s enforcement. In 'th e
in te rim , before the establishment o f the-world sta te , the-League o f
Nations could. perform th is fu n c tio n . The second consists in changing
the a t t i t u d e s ’o f c itiz e n s towards nationalism by persuading them to /

' 156 ,/
regard i t as a kind o f disease or mass*hysteria. I t is unclearynow
th is could be achieved a t present. Russell lin k s the teaching of'
m i l i t a n t nationalism t o 't h e - i m p e r i a li s t e x p lo ita tio n o f underdeveloped

157
countries and the manufacture, o f armaments. Since these presently
exert an inordinate influence upon the education o f the c it iz e n , a
153' • -•
I b i d . , rp. 138.
-------- ,
' ft
1 5 4 I b i d ., p. 223.
155
• I b i d . , p. 140. Russell mentions t h is in P rincip les o f Social
Reconstruction, pp. 149-151.
l^ E d u c a tio n and the Social OrdeVv p. 138. •
1 5 7 I b i d . , pp. 141-142, 143-144. .
fundamental reorganisation of a l l in s t it u t i o n s is required f d r m i l i t a n t
nationalism to be eschewed.* Nevertheless; R ussell's aim in having i t
regarded as a sickness is clea r: the creation o f a fe e lin g o f coopera
tio n and s o l i d a r i t y with the c itiz e n s o f a l l n a t i o n s . ^ This would
enlarge the co-operative-aspect o f the herd i n s t i n c t towards al l members
of the human- race. . . ■
M i l i t a n t nationalism is not only a sickness but a menace to the'
survival of. s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i s a t i o n . Within a few pages Russell d is
misses i t in the fo llo w in g terms: -
Nationalism is undoubtedly the most dangerous vice o f

our tim e . A ll who are capable o f a survey o't the-
modern world are aware th a t, owing to nationalism , the
* „ continuance o f a c i v i l i s e d way of l i f e is in jeopardy
Unless the virule n ce o f nationalism can be abated,
c i v i l i s a t i o n cannot c o n tin u e ..-. .Nationalism is the
c h ie f force im pelling our c i v i l i s a t i o n to i t s doom.'5 9 ’
■ ■
Nationalism is 'th e .m a jo r obstacle to the establishment of social harmony
both.between c itiz e n s and nation sta te s. I t is a d iv is iv e force th a t
impedes the establishment Of a worl d s ta te , thereby heightening the
lik e lih o o d o f war and -the destruction o f s c ie n tific , c i v i l i s a t i o n . In
• order b e s t'to understand R u sse ll’ s c r i t i c a l view of nationalism I shall,
r e la te i t to h'is conce.p.tiori o f the in d iv id u a l, d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l in
fo llo w in g sub-se'ctipn. ,
158
159
K : ' . 3 3 3
\ ^
“• , V -
D. Nationalism and. t h ^ W i l l
">■ J' - .
A’ <• '‘ ‘
The dangers th a t Russetl ascribes to nationalism are*best explained
when they are related to his, concept,of the asocial in d iv id u a l. In
sub-section I sh a ll argue th a t nationalism strengthens the d ic ta -

’ * *' '
t o r i a l nature o f the in d ivid u a l w i l l . As a key element in the education
o f the c itiz e n it^ s tim u la te s - th e competitive and disharmonious aspects
o f theJ w i l l in the i n d i v i d u a l 1s s o cia l r e la tio n s h ip s . Nationalism
heightens t^rfsions in the modern world by developing the. power-seeking

i
tendencies o f the in d iv id u a l w i l l . . . .
•Russell links, m i l i t a n t nationalism with Imperialism a n d th § econpmic

"’ J ** 8 160
e x p lo ita tio n of'developing countries by. in d u s tr ia lis e d nation -sta tes .
The main i n s t it u t i o n a l , source o f such nationalism is the s c h o o l . T h e

■Q... '
■type o f education most appropriate to the development o f n a tio n a lis m .is
’ a r is t o c r a t ic education’ or the education o f an o lig a rchy whose source
o f power i s based on p riv a te property and whose ro le is to govern the
empire. In the context o f .Great B r ita in th is f u n c t io n 'is performed by

■ 162
the Public .Schools. The social mores o f the Public Schools s t i f l e !
the development o f in t e l 1 igence and the fre e expression of the emotions,'

163
e s p e c ia lly in the area s e x u a lity .
The one aspect o f in d ivid u a l
** I-a
c u ltu re .that is developed, however, is the power-seekirrg tendency o f
1 6 0 i b i d . , p. 142. ' .^ ^ r
' 161 . I b i d . , pp. 142-143-. ‘ .//
' 1 6 2 I b i d . , p. 78. \ i; >*
1 6 3 1 b id . , pp. 80-81. ;\
“ _ . j •^
the in d iv id u a l w i l l . The repression of open sexual re la tio n s h ip s V
between a man and a woman‘ d ire c ts the in d iv id u a l's energy into a search
ff o r power: ■I ' ' . . :
The unhappiness re s u ltin g from t h i s psychological

tangle tends to cause cru e lty,, and to make power-
the only a va ila b le source o f happiness. The -
m e n ta lity o f the im p e r ia lis t is thus reinforced
by the complexes o f the sexually starved.
Thus the sthool achieves an in te g ra tio n o f the in d i v i d u a l 1s psycho-

• ■. ^ ^
lo g ic a l development w ith ''h is social ro le as a member o f the ru lin g
*
’■ ' ‘ i
Class. The execution o f power which co n stitu te s his task as a member
>’
o f th is class, gives the in d iv id u a l the s a tis fa c tio n normally achieved
through sexual a c t i v i t y . As a r e s u lt the. w ie ld in g 'o f power.becomes an
end in i t s e l f bo.th f o r the in d iv id u a l aird f o r th e -ru l ing class o f which

» ■* V'
he is a member. The educational systeTn serves this.end by tempering
the w i l l : .
■ ■ . . . ' }
Such a class wi 11 aim at the power.of coirmand;

i t w i l l therefore c u lt iv a t e the w i l l rather than
in te llig e n c e or s e n s i b i l i t y , a n d w i l l include in'
i t s tra in in g such elements o f asceticism, as are *:
useful in givin g w ill-p o w e r *
There is therefore a d ir e c t link^fetween nationalism and the
development o f the d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l . Schools are .the main medium f o r
the transmission o f nationalism . For iftembers o f the ru lin g class-
1 64 I b i d . , p. 82.
^ 1 65 Ibid<.
n a t io n a lis t education j u s t i f i e s t h e i r e x p lo ita tiv e r e la tio n s h ip w ith
, poorer nations, prepares‘them fo r the execution o f power by strengthening
t h e i r w i l l and brings th'em psychological, s a tis fa c tio n from 'the p u rsu it
o f power. For the re s t o f the herd not educated if) the e l i t e Public
• f schools, n a t io n a lis t education develops co-operation between c itiz e n s
o f the same n a tio n -s ta te but strengthens competition and disharmony
v . between c itiz e n s of d if f e r e n t s t a t e s . I t teaches c itiz e n s to die
f o r t h e i r c o u n try -rig h t or.wrong-,* thereby f a c i l i t a t i n g the development '
of.war between n a tio n -s ta te s . The i n s t it u t i o n a l o u tle ts f o r the d ic t a - ..
' - t o r i a l w i l l s o f the herd are fhose th a t give r is e to war. Dedication
to the ideals of the n a tio n -s ta te makes in d iv id u a ls mad, The h ysteria
- o f nationalism and the madness i t brings to the modern w o r l d ^ , stem

• 9
fro m - its - q u a s i-r e lig io u s nature th a t demands continuing blood feuds:
"Devotion to the nation is perhaps the most widespread r e lig io n o f the
- present age. Like the ancient r e lig io n s i t demands i t s persecutions, -
i t s l u r i d heroic c r u e lt ie s ; lik e > th e m -it is n o b le , 'p r im it iv e , brutal

168 *
and mad." The ifiodern c itiz e n becomes a fa n a tic as a r e s u lt o f a ^
nationalism th a t channels his source o f power in to a c t i v i t i e s th a t
* bring him s a tis fa c tio n from ki-Tling toembers .o f a’ d if f e r e n t n a tio n -s ta te .
, National ism thereby develops his w fll. r in ways th a t stim u la te i t s
d ic t a t o r ia l nature, to the p o in t th a t he becomes a w i l l i n g k i l l e r .

t • •
1 6 6 I b i d . , p. 19. %
. ' 1 6 7 1bid. , pp. 138, 246-243.
168 •
Principles o f Social Reconstruction, p. 110.
336
° / * ' '* ■
III. The State . -
The a n tith e s is between.the in d iv id u a l and the. c itiz e n can only be
resolved in a society where the interest's and capacities of the two
coincide. . In such a .society the in d iv id u a l could realise, both the
in te rn a l harmony c o n s titu tin g his in d iv id u a l good and the external

169 ’
harmony th a t co n stitu te s the social good. He would maintain his
i n d i v i d u a l it y w hile w i l l i n g l y cooperating with others in the manner o’-f
the c it iz e n . For th is purpose Russell proposes the establishment o f
a world sta te whose, in te re s ts coincide^with 'the in d i v i d u a l ’ s: "We

i • •
have, th e re fo re , to in q u ire whether there is any p o s s ib i li t y o f a State
whose in te r e s ts , where education is concerned, w i l l be approximately
id e n tic a l w ith those of the c h ild . In a manner reminiscent o f
Hegel, Russell lays the.framework f o r aw o rld -sta te in .which the ■
in d iv id u a l and common good are i d e n t i c a l . ^ '
The fundamental reorganisation th a t Russell beliey.es necessary
hinges upon a complete re v is io n o f the p o l i t i c a l . This reorganisation
takes the form o f a world sta te whose powers in the areas o f the
m i l i t a r y and the le g is la t io n o f in te rn a tio n a l agreements t o t a l l y re-

\ 172
place those o f the nation sfl^te. In other areas, such as'education
and the establishment o f in te rn a l p o lic ie s , in d iv id u a l nation states .
i fro
Education and the.Social Order, pp. 244-245.
1 7 0 I b i d ., p. 233. -
171 I b i d . , pp. 9-10. • *
172 -I b i d . , pp. 19, 27, 243 and 246.
337
would maintain a ce rta in autonomy but only insofar- as i t does not-

• ■ ‘ 17-3
contravene the in te rn a tio n a lism o f the world s ta te . Russell's'
' v isio n is o f a world federation of sta te s, having a -lim ite d autonomy
in national and educational a f f a i r s , .but united by a central a u th o rity
with a monopoly o f arms and .capable o f enforcing in te rn a tio n a l agree
ments upon nation states considered' to be a th re a t to world peaceand
the su rviva l o f c i v i l i s a t i o n . ’' 7 4 The aim o f Russell's world sta te is

175
'the prevention o f war between-both nations and classes, . the des
tru c tio n o f n a tio n a lis t propaganda and o£her subversive doctrines giving
r is e to w a r ^ , and the replacement o f in d iv id u a l n a tio n -s ta te s w ith
the notion o f a " s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i z a t i o n . . . a s a single economic and

*/ 177 ' - '
/ p o l i t i c a l u nit"-.. The means to t h is e nd.lies .in the establishment.
•• of a world s ta te w ith a. monopoly.of. arms to be us.ed to cru-sh re b e llio u s

178
n ation-states and an executive and ju d ic ia r y w ith the power to enact 0
170 \
the laws of international'agreements,. The sta te would produce
s u f f i c i e n t lo y a lty in i t s c itiz e n s to prevent the development o f

• • V *
180
in d ivid u a l c u ltu re f o r one or two centuries.-
1 7 3 1 b id . , p. 243. 1
1 74 1bid. , p. 234.
1 7 5 1 b id . , p. 245. ^ - '
176 I b i d . , p > r-« a -1 44 and 243. /
p.- 246.
I b i d . , p. 27.
338
: ' In Education and the Social Order there is a suggestion th a t i t is
'v r through.the triumph o f Soviet propaganda th a t the world state w i l l come

181 r
. in to being. In the l i k e l y c o n f l i c t between Soviet .Communifs.ru and
American Capitalism, whijch could-destroy c i v i l i s a t i o n , Russell appears.
45 to support the id e o lo g ica l means of conquest used by the Soviets. In
an e a r lie r essay, Russell was more frank about the establishment o f a
' world government: "Owing to man’ s f o l l y world government w i l l only be

182 ■•<-
' / e s ta b lis h e d /b y -fo rc e ." As the t h i r t i e s , wore on Russell“.shifted his
allegiance, from the Soviets to the Americans as the one socie ty which
had both the m i l i t a r y and economic power and the p o l i t i c a l ^ w i l l to
establish a world s ta te . In. e ith e r case i t is ir o n ic a l to note th a t

‘I ' - ' ' --
Russel 1, the defender o f in d iv id u a l freedom, supports the establishment
o f a world-wide system o f o rganisation; based upon the propaganda and
force o f the strongest sin g le n a tio n -s ta te in order to protect the'-

184 ^
in d iv id u a l from his own d e stru ctive tendencies. R ussell's view i s / ' *
o f the in d iv id u a l- to r n by anarchical tendencies that require the control

• ■
of-a strong external force to prevent them from destroying both himself
and, when organised p o l i t i c a l l y on the basis o f in d iv id u a l nation,
•states, c i v i l i s a t i o n as a whole. •
181 I b i d . , pp. 234-235. . ' ' " '. ! .

-132
'The E ffe ct gf Science on Social I n s titu t io n s '- , Survey, A p r il ;
1924, r e p rin te d .in Sceptical Essays, George Alle n and Unwin, London,
■ 1928. . . ' • • ' ' -
183 '
Louis Greenspan: op. c i t . , p. 60. :
^ Education andsthe Social Order, pp. 246-247. I
In th is section 1 shall consider R ussell's conceptions o f the-
world sta te and in te rn a tio n a l c itiz e n s h ipr in s e v e r a l sub-sections.

4
I
sha ll analyse in turn the functions o f the s ta te , R ussell's proposal
f o r the separation of i t s m i l i t a r y and c i v i l functions ir v th e world
sta te and his conceptions o f the in te rn a tio n a l c itiz e n and in te rn a tio n a l
bureaucrat. I shall show th a t the world state s t i f l e s the development
o f in d iv id u a l cu ltu re except f o r the bureaucratic e l i t e who execute ■
power. .
'A. The Functions o f the State: M i li t a r y and C iv il
Before we can understand the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s o f R ussell's proposals
i t is necessary to understand his analysis o f the functions of the s ta te
This is in s t r u c tiv e f o r comprehending both the C r itiq u e th a t he '

•' ■ . 4
le v e ls at the n a tio n -s ta te and the re so lu tio n o f i t s shortcomings in
* . Sir. ■ ■ ' .
the form o f the w o riS 's ta te . In th is sub-section I s h a ll consider
.Russell's, analysis o f the state*and his proposal f o r separating i t s
m i l i t a r y and c i v i l functions by re fe rr in g to his accounts both in

1 !
Education and the Social Order and P rincip les o f Social Reconstruction
Russell makes a d is t in c t io n between the in te rn a l and external

1 ftfi '
functions of. the n a tio n -s ta te . The in te rn a l functions are those
rudimentary tasks performed by various agepcies to keep the in te rn a l
1QC
■ The c h ie f d iffe re n c e 'between the two works is th a t in the l a t t e r
Russell regards the world state as a remote p o s s i b i l i t y w hile in the
former i t i s . a ■p o l i t i c a l necessity. I t is to be established on the
basis o f the hegemony o f the strongest nation sta te in the w orld ,,
whether the*U.S.A. o r the Soviet Union. The suggestion in th is work is
th a t the Soviet Union w i l l form the basis o f the world s ta te : I b i d . ,
pp. 2-34-235.
. 1 8 6 I b i d . , p. 133.
a f f a i r s o f a society running smoothly. In the context o f the modern
world these are q u ite diverse and include the bureaucracies necessary8-' '
to keep the roads i n t a c t , education funded, e l e c t r i c i t y flo w in g , the
courts fu n c tio n in g properly, the courts protecting property ancfthe post
o f f ic e d e liv e rin g m ail. They include a l l the c i v i l functions of the
modern s ta te : i t s executive , which in a lib e r a l democracy is some*^
kind o f parliamentary system; i t s a d m in istra tio n , which includes the

1 87
c i v i l service; and i t s j u d i c i a r y - the legal system and the police.
Russell finds these aspects o f the state unobjectionable because they
enable a smooth functio n in g o f socie ty and encourage a form o f Cohesion

. * 1 OO >v
and co-operation among the c i t i z e n r y . f ‘
• ■ '
I t is the external functions o f the s ta te 't o which Russell objects
because they are concerned with.waging war. S p e c if ic a lly , t h e i r dual
fun ctio n is‘ defence against aggression and support f o r foreign, e x p lo ita -
’ - 189
tio n by national citizens... For these purposes the state expands the
m i li t a r y in order to promote i t s positio n r e la t iv e to other armed
sta te s, involves i t s e l f in the p r o li f e r a t i o n o f arms and develops' i t s
m i l i t a r y operations abroad in oijder to protect foreign investments. As
I have pointed out, Russell lin k s these a c t i v i t i e s to nationalism which
threatens the s t a b i l i t y and su rviva l o f modern c i v i l i s a t i o n . '
187 >
P rincip les o f Social Reconstruction, ' p. 102.
1 ftft ' >
Education and the Social Order, pp. 134, 26.
1 8 9 I M d . , pp. 134-135.
*■' .Russell proposes a to ta l separation o f i t s c i v i l and m i li t a r y
/
, powers as a re so lu tio n to the problems posed by.the n a tio n -s ta te . The
.. former are to remain the r e s p o n s ib ility o f n a tio n -sta te s. The l a t t e r
are to become the r e s p o n s ib ility o f the world sta te enforced in the
in te re s ts o f pro te cting c i v i l i s a t i o n as a whole. Russell describes
th is separation o f powers as fo llo w s:

o ‘ ^
There i s , in fa c t, every reason why the c i v i l s ta te and

the m i li t a r y state should be d if f e r e n t . The greater
modern states are already too large f o r most c iv il
purposes, but f o r m i li t a r y purposes they are not large
- enough, since they are not world-wide. 150
Two c o n flic t in g tendencies, would be resolved by Russell's scheme: on
the one. hand, the tendency towards the d e ce n tra lisa tio n o f the c iv il^ .
powers o f the s ta te , such as education,and on the other, the c e n t r a li-

A
sation o f m i l i t a r y power. Russell supports the f i r s t trend suggesting
191
a devolution, o f ad m in istra tive power in educatiorj-. He s tip u la te s
one important proviso.. Nation-states should be prevented from propa
gating n a t io n a lis t propaganda and other subversive doctrines in t h e i r

192
educational systems.’ In general, however, they would exercise
autonomy over in te rn a l a f f a i r s .
Russell c le a r ly supports the second tendency towards the c e n t r a l i
sation o f m i l i t a r y power' in to the hands o f .a worl d -s ta te . The p rotection
190
P rincip les o f'S o c ia l Reconstruction, p. 102.
191
1 92 Ib id .
342
o f world êace requires th a t the armed forces of nation -sta tes be d is
banded and th a t an in te rn a tio n a l trib u n a l be established to enforce ,

1 9 3 , 1 ' .
in te rn a tio n a l agreements. I:f In instances where the trib u n a l judges
th a t there have been v io la tio n s o f in te rn a tio n a l r e la tio n s , the world-
state j.s“j u s t i f i e d in using force to quell the dispute:
In order to prevent war and at the same time preserve

i; l i b e r t y i t is n-ecessary th a t there shoul d be- only one
m i l i t a r y state in the world, and that.y/hen disputes
between d if f e r e n t countries a ris e , i t should act
according to the decision .'of a central a u th o rity .
■This is what would n a tu ra lly r e s u lt from a federation
o f the world, i f such a thing ever came a b o u tJ 94 ^
. / ■ .
, In th is way organised m i l i t a r y competition between n ation-states would

r'": y
be replaced by in te rn a tio n a l cohesion. The'sense of in te rn a tio n a l
s o li d a r it y and co-operation produced would enhance the development of
s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i s a t i o n and enable in d u s tria lis m to expand pn a world

195 *'■'
-..scale. . The human race would become one sin g le u n it working under a..
single government f o r the good o f a l l . Such is the visio n encapsulated
in R ussell’ s world s ta te . '
B. The In te rn a tio n a l C itizen
One o f- th e c i v i l r e s p o n s ib ilitie s o f the^na^Ton-state is the
education o f the in te rn a tio n a l c itiz e n capable o f developing in harmonious
193
I b i d . , pp. 245-246 and c f . P rin c ip le s o f Social Reconstruction,
pp. 101-108.
194 v.
■ I b i d . , p. 105.
195
343
and cooperative ways w ith others. In th is sub-sectio n »I 's h a l l examine

' **" '' A
the c h a ra c te ris tic s of the in te rn a tio n a l c itiz e n and evaluate the ex
te n t to which he overcomes the defects of the c itiz e n educated by
previous n a tio n -s ta te s . My argument w i l l be th a t Russell f a i l s to"
adequately overcome the main defects of the n a t i o ^ l c itiz e n in his
account o f the in te rn a tio n a l c it iz e n . F i r s t l y , the herd i n s t in c t is
developed in co-operative ways th a t produce too great a degree o f con
fo rm ity . Secondly, education f o r in te rn a tio n a l c i t i z e n s h i p . s t i f l e s the .
development of in d iv id u a l culture, i n ’the m a jo rity o f the hqrd. T h ird ly ,
in te rn a tio n a l c itiz e n s h ip may indeed overcome the nationalism that

f '• **]
, V stimaTaftes the d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l o f the m a jo rity o f tjie herd, but not
m. *
• th a t o f the bureaucratic e l i t e . Detailed consideration o f th is la s t
point w i l l be postponed to the fo llo w in g sectio n.
lb .•
' • There are three main aspects of the national c itiz e n o f which
Russell is c r i t i c a l f i r s t , allegiance to the n a tio n -s ta te strengthens
. the competitive aspects o f his herd i n s t i n c t ; second, as a c itiz e n he
is. unable to co n tribu te constructive aspects o f in d ivid u a l c u ltu re ;

- ’ P
t h i r d , nationalism strengthens his d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l . I sha ll consider
in .turn the contrast between these and the c h a ra c te ris tic s o f the inter-___
■ <fc
' national c itiz e n .
* ' '
F i r s t l y , herd in s .tin c t in -th e in te rn a tio n a l c itiz e n can be developed
in ways th a t prpduce a sense- o f cohesion among the c itiz e n s o f the
e n tir e world s ta te . I f the in d iv id u a l is educated as a member o f the
great herd comprising mankind, he is less l i k e l y to feel h p s t i l i t y
1
344 .
towards foreign states and t h e i r c itiz e n s . Id e a lly , he w i l l learn to
id e n t if y with' the human race, not simply w ith those.members o f i t with
fthom he is p h ysica lly clo se s t. Moreover, tolerance o f non-conformists
in his own nation may increase since 'the c itiz e n acquires a greater
s e n s ib i li t y to d if f e r e n t cu ltu res and ways o f th in kin g . The problem
however is no longer the development, of the competitive'aspects o f herd
i n s t in c t but such complete id e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith ,th e herd th a t cooperation
is achieved through to ta l conformity.
The herd demands too great a love of u n ifo rm ity among ,its members
■ 196
and poses a th reat to any in d iv id u a ls who stand out against i t s ideals.
As a. me^s o f resistance to th is trend Russell proposes th a t education
encourage in d iv id u a l opposition to tfie herd where t h is re s u lts from an''

• < 197
attem pt-to implement social ju s t ic e . In a d d itio n , the general
s p i r i t in which e a rly education is conducted should be as free as
possible. The in d ivid u a l learns to conform s o c ia lly very e a sily i f he
has been educated in a s p i r i t . t h a t encourages the i n i t i a l development

198
o f his ca pacities. Despite these recommendations, the general aim
o f education-is to channel the herd i n s t in c t o f the in te rn a tio n a l
c itiz e n in ways th a t encourage cooperative a c t i v i t i e s , allegiance to
the world state and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w ith mankind as a whole. I f educa-

t * '
tio n should also develop the capacities o f the in d iv id u a l th is is an
1 9 8 I b i d ., pp. 83, 84, 96. . . .

1 9 7 I b i d . , pp. 99-jOO.
• 1 9 8 I b i d . , p. 99.
...
c
345
added advantage but not S primary concern. In instances where>there is.
a c o n f l i c t between the two, education should stimulate. cooperation w ith

199
. the herd ra th e r than opposition, to i t . This brings me to the second
aspect o f the c it iz e n , the r e la tio n s h ip o f in d iv id u a l c u ltu re to i n t e r
national c itiz e n s h ip . ■
. ... Russell argues th a t the wisest ty p e .o f c itiz e n s h ip w i l l incorporate
j the best aspects, of in d iv id u a l c u ltu re 2^ but admits th a t c itiz e n s h ip
in the world sta te w i ] 1 p ro v is io n a lly s t i f l e the development of

V ' '
in d iv id u a l c u ltu re . R e s trictio n .of the free development' o f the i n d i v i
d u a l's capacities is an unfortunate but necessary consequence o f the
vast powers invested in the world state to prevent the destruction of
c iv ilis a tio n :
I th in k t h is survival w i l l demand, as a minimum condi- •

t io n , the establishment o f a world state and .the sub
sequent i n s t i t u t i o n ' o f ‘a-world-wide system o f education
designed -to produce lo y a lty to the world s ta te . No
doubt such a system o f "education w i l l e n t a il , at any
rate fo r a century or two, ce rta in c ru d itie s which w i l l
m i l i t a t e against the development o f the in d iv id u a l. But
i f the a lte rn a tiv e is chaos and the death o f c i v i l i s a - ■
t io n , the price w i l l be worth paying. 2 0 . 1
The main p o l i t i c a l meed o f the time is the development o f the co-

202
operative c it i z e n . Supervision o f each n a tio n 's educational system
by the world sta te coincides w ith t h is need. The task o f • education is
1 9 9 I b i d . , p. 244.
2 0 0 I b i d . , p. 18: ; . -
201 I b i d . , p. 27.
2 0 2 I b i d . , pp. 27-28.
to transform the d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l of the in d iv id u a l in to the'cooperative
w i l l of'j the c itiz e n in order to avert social chaos. The problem however
is th a t education may succeed in t h is task by t o t a l l y destroying-
in d ivid u a l s e lf - s u f f ic ie n c y and freedom. The in d iv id u a l w il l a fte r .
a l l , is not wholly bad fo r the fo llo w in g reason: • ■ • ‘
. . . . i t may be held th a t we shall u ltim a te ly be. b e tte r

c itiz e n s i f we are f i r s t aware o f a l l o u r ‘p o te n tia - ' -
l i t i e s as in d iv id u a ls before we descend to the com-
promisesand p ra c tic a l acquiescences o f the p o l i t i c a l . -
l if e . 2 0 3 !
The compromises to which. Russel 1 alludes require the in d iv id u a l to give
up much‘ o f '£he free developmeht. of his own capacities in t e g r a l' to
in d ivid u a l c u ltu re . I shall b r i e f l y consider these capacities and t h e i r
antagonism-to citiz e n s h ip .. ^ . v ‘. $ . ''

: %
Russell is only too aware th a t the development o f co-operation ' .
between c itiz e n s may produce conformity a t the expense of in d i v i d u a l it y :
•'Nevertheless, s t r i c t e r l im it s on personal b-ehaviour are the p rice tha't
must be paf-d f o V l i f e in modern in d u s tr ia l society. As he put's’ i t : '

** • '
In d ivid u a lism , although i t is important not to fo’rget
i t s claims, needs, in a.densely populated in d u s tr ia l
w orld, to be more c o n tro lle d , even.in in<JTv.idual .
psychology', than in previous tim e s.20.5
’ This remark is evidehce o f Russell's general d is s a tis fa c tio n w ith the.
emphasis th a t is placed upon individual"freedom by the t r a d it io n a l
2 0 3 I b i d . , p. 1 2 .
2 0 4 I b i d . , pp. 244-245. •
2 ^ 3 I b i d . , p. 243.^
— — ✓ . .
347 •
lib e ra lis m o f Mil l and others. I have-already mentioned th a t he regards f
M i l l ' s lib e ra lis m as an outmoded p o l i t i c a l philosophy f a r the twentieth
century. But the remark .also reveals th a t Russel 1 i s now. wHli'ng to
endorse a• form o f control over the in d iv id u a l, which is-b o th e x te rn a lly
imposed and d ir e c t ly influence's the in d iv id u a l's way o f th in kin g and

^ 206 " '
a c tin g . This is inco n siste n t w ith the objections which Russell.
him self advances-against-propaganda in education as d e s tru c tiv e -o f the

207 " '
s c i e n t i f i c - temper o f mind. ' I t is hard to reconcile w ith 'h is 'o w n
c emphasis .upon the respect fo r - o b je c tiv e tru th ,, which comprises the basis
®f t h e ^ s c ie n t jf ic a ttitude-arid the co g niti ve-w ell-beingôf the i n d i v i -

„ 3
208 * . • - •
dual. . Moreover, i t seems inconsistent w ith his objections to the
v. manner in which propaganda i n s t i l l s s u ita b le emotions in the young,
preventing the development o f fe a rle s s ly fre e , emotionally happy .. * 5 -
209
in d iv id u a ls who wish to create a b e tte r world. . -External control" o f . .
-1 ^ . > v * \ '
208* " ' *
Elsewhere Russell attacks M i l l ' s p r in c ip le th a t the state has
the r i g h t to in t e r fe r e only dnltfeose actions- where in d iv id u a ls harm one
another a^ obsolete because^'lAs society becomes more organic the e ffe c ts
o f men upon each other becom^more and more numerous and im portant."
• He goes on.to argue th a t: . " I f we are to j u s t i f y any p a r tic u la r form o f
in d iv id ju a l'j’ib e rty in the s c i e n t i f i c society o f the fu tu r e , we shall
• haye0to do i t on the ground' th a t the for„m o f l i b e r t y is f o r the" good of
society asa whole, but not in mos,t cases on the ground th a t the acts-
concerned a f f e c t nobody but the agent." The S c i e n t if ic Outlook, pp'.) 224-225.
207 : ' ■ / “ -
He nevertheless condones the use o f,a mild propaganda, or the
i n s t i l l i n g o f b e lie fd fo r which the-êvidence is uncert<^n..or'inadequate:
" I t must, I think be admitted th a t a certain amount o? uncompensate^
propaganda is necessary f o r ther minimum o f social cohesion." Education
and the Social Order, p. 226. *
. ~ I bi d. , pp. 22-25. - - s
• 2 0 9 I b i d . , 'p p . 56, 64 and 222-225. -^
individual. psychology may w ell prevent-the very emotions which Russell •
wishes education to enhance in the i n d iv id u a l. • Moreover, such control r
is l i k e l y to crush the .individual,'s' w i l l l e a v i n g him with a sense o f
8powerlessness and apathy. Anâpathetic, l i s ^ e s s indi vi'dualfc is u n lik e ly
.to engage in-^he c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y o f s c i e n t if ic ; ’ endeavour, have the v •
wilIpoweif to/m aintain unpopular b e !ie fs in the name ,o f tr u th or express
happy, expansive emotions. / . , ■
* ■• * * . '
„ The only glimmer o f hope th a t .Russell o ffe rs as a ffo rd in g ip r o te c - ;
tio n to the in d iv id u a l is_ the experimental or s c r e n tifi'c method: "It
is to the growth o f the experimental s p i r i t th a t we must look f o r the •

■ • ‘210
to le r a tio n o f loopholes and exceptioTis^fn-the s c i e n t i f i c s ta te . " •
. f , ' ■■■.:■ V . ■
’ The spread o f the s c i e n t i f i c method teaches both the a d m in istra to r and
the c i t i f k n the te n ta tiv e nature o f a'll b e lie fs an<^ the necessity o f the
' ' .s - : *' • '. 211
' *' need fo r innovation in the search f o r o b je c tiv e .t r u t h . >The problem
*;• • r . - : ■ ■ ■ ■■ ** •• >
■y* , • .• •• -
is th a t adm inistrators, are r a re ly imbued w ith -th e .. s c ie n tific s p ir i t'a n d .
'the pressures upon the c itiz e n are l i k e l y to be so strong fh a t he w i l l .
have great d i f f i c u l t y in upholding re s p e c t'fo r 'o b je c tiv e tr u th in. the

, ■ ; t; :-V.
. \ ,fa>s^-of the'; power and propaganda o f-th e world s ta te . Russel l grants
both o f these p o in ts . Nevertheless he dpes not lose s ig h t o f the
: ; p o l i t i c a l necessity“ o f developing*the cooperative aspects o f the c itiz e n
even whe're these’ preclude the development o f in d iv id u a l c u ltu re .
•B r i e f ly , to recap,"his r a tio n a le - is twofold. F i r s t l y Russell believes

_J —-------- —----------- :———:--->------- ;------------------------ —--- ; : —■•
•' 2 1 0 I b i d . , pp. 246-247. • - ’ • ",

I b i d . , p.. 87.
* 12 Ib id . , pp. .243 and 22-23.
•V
349
th a t the development of cooperation and cohesion between c itiz e n s o f the
same n a tio n -sta te is required f o r the e f f i c i e n t operation o f modern

213
in d u s try . Secondly, he believes th a t the development o f cooperation
between,the citizens' o f d if f e r e n t nation-states requires t h e ‘e s ta b lis h -

0
ment o f a world government in order to secure the su rviv a l o f c i v i l i s a -
214 ■
tio m In terms o f his educational philosophy, Russell does not so
much abandon the view th a t in theory the education o f the in d iv id u a l
f o r the free development o f his capacitie s is a worthwhile a c t i v i t y .
I t is ra th e r t h a t ^ n p ra ctice th is ideal mast be s a c rific e d to the
O ve rrid in g necessity; of. educating the c itiz e n f o r cooperation w ith in
the context o f the world s ta te . " .
In th is context the realm o f in d iv id u a l c u ltu re i s to be subordi
nate to the demands o f c itiz e n s h ip . The realm in which the in d iv id u a l
fre e ly develops his capacities becomes secondary to the .social realm in
which he functions as' a member o f the s ta te . The demands o f c itiz e n -

:' ' ' ’ --r3 '
ship, to' cooperate as a member o f the:world sta te and mode&jaîndustrial
society impinge upon the realm o f in d iv id u a l cu ltu re in Which the .
in d ivid u a l is alone capable o f re a lis in g his freedom. As a re s u lt , the
c o n f l i c t between the in d iv id u a l and society takes on a new meaning:
On one side appeared ’ s o c ie ty 1 - the c a p i t a l i s t economy,

i , the state,, the fixe d social core th a t has no space in i t
■f o r the in d iv id u a l; on the other, the personal id e n t it y
2 1 3 I b i d . , p. 26. “ V
214
I b i d . , pp. 2J5-27.
350
X .
[ 'in d iv id u a l c u l t u r e '] , no longer defined b y - it s place
in the social d iv is io n o f labour This sense o f an
• iso la te d in d iv id u a l ranged against a society he o r she
cannot a f f e c t , d istinguishes social l i f e in developed
c a p i t a l i s t 's o c i e t y . 215 4
. i
The C o n flic t between the 'i n d i v i d u a l ' and 'th e c i t i z e n ' is' portrayed as
part o f the human condition. The antagonism between the two is under-
**» ■
stood t o be ir re c o n c ila b le . Thus the in d ivid u a l must learn to acquiesce
maturely to the demands^placed upon hipi by the sta te and the economy.
In Rus.sell's world state the educational'system has both the respon
s i b i l i t y ; and-power to- persuade the in d iv id u a l to abandon the^ 'd i c t a
t o r i a l ' demands o f his W ill f o r the 'cooperative' and 'cohesive' demands
of the ' c i t i z e n ' . The schools now persuade and coerce in d iv id u a ls

216 v"
to get along w ith each other. Should they re’sis-t, the considerable
powers o f propaganda and force invested, in the state may be used âgainst
them. 2 1 7 ^
215' - '' .
,. E li Zaretsky: Capitalism, The Family and Personal L i f e , Harper
and Row, New York, 1976, pp. 57-58.
- 216See I b i d . , pp. 58, 72 and 119.
217 '
Antonio Gramsci analyses th is coercive fu n c tio n o f the state and
the expanded ideological ro le o f the law in c i v i l society as fo llo w s :
Educative and formative ro le o f the State. : I t s a im .is always
th a t o f creating new and higher types o f c i v i l i s a t i o n ; o f
adapting the ‘ c i v i l i s a t i o n 1 and the m o ra lity o^ the broadest
popular masses to the necessities o f the continuous development
o f the economic apparatus o f production; hence o f evolving even
p h y s ic a lly new types o f humanity. But how w i l l each sin g le i n
d ivid u a l succeed in incorporating h im self in to the c o lle c tiv e ,
man', and how w i l l educative pressure be applied tO y & il^ l^ i n d i v i - ..
duals so as to obtain t h e i r consent and t h e i r co lla b o ra tio n .f
tu rn ing necessity and coercion in to ‘ freedom’ ? Question o f the
'Law1: th is concept w i l l have to. be extended to include those
! a c t i v i t i e s which are at present c la s s ifie d as 'l e g a l ly n e u t r a l' ,
and which belong to the domain o f c i v i l s o c ie ty ; the 1 a t t e r .
operates w ithout 'sa n ctio n s' o r compulsory 'o b lig a t io n s ' , but
nevertheless exerts -a c o lle c tiv e pressure and obtains o b je ctive
re s u lts in the form of an e volution o f customs., ways o f th in k in g
and a c tin g , m o ra lity e tc .
- 351' •
'fc r--
v. i • ' 1 ■
There is a t h ir d and f i n a l aspect o f the in te rn a tio n a l c i t i z e n ,*
namely the overcbming o f natfonalism th a t stimulates the d ic t a t o r ia l
nature o f the in d iv id u a l wi-11. For the reasons th a t I have considered,
i t is .clear th a t f o r the m a jo rity o f the herd nationalism w i l l -not be
.ta u g h t in the educational, system. Any attempt to re su rre ct i t '. w i l 1 be

1 ' ■ 218
s t i f l e d by the world state because o f i t s subversive n a tu re . The
•education o f the bureaucrat w i l l replace nationalism with the i n t e r
nationalism c h a r a c te r is tic of,.a broad c u ltu re . I shall turn to a
consideration o f the broad c u ltu re o f . the bureaucrat in the next sub-
section. However, those chosen to occupy positions o f executive and
bureaucratic power are in d iv id u a ls w ith the strongest w i l l s . Thus they
arel i k e l y to gain great s a tis fa c tio n from the p u rs u it of powerdespite
th e ir i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t perspective. I sha ll make th is point in d e ta il
■ in the fo llo w in g section.
• • " , v • . ■■■■ .
C. The In te rn a tio na l Bureaucrat
; . In th is sub-section I s h a ll conclude analysis o f the re la tio n s h ip
■* ' ; ■
’ State and C iv il S ociety’ in Selections. from the Prison Notebooks

(edited and tra n slated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith),
in te rn a tio n a l Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 242.A cle a r analysis o f
Gramsci’ s views o f the sta te is contained in Perry Anderson’ s ’ The
Antinomies o f Antonio Gramsci1, New L e ft Review, No. 100, November
1976-January 1977. A comparison o f Russell and Gramsci’ s p o l i t i c a l
theories is made by V.G. Kiernan: ’ The Socialism o f Antonio Gramsci’
in Ken Coates ( e d .): Essays o n .S o c ia lis t Humanism, Spokesman Books,
London, T972, p. 65. —
218 ■■ ' ' *
Education and the Social Order, p. 243. / »
between in d iv id u a l c u ltu re and ,c itiz e n s h ip by considering the case of
the bureaucrat in R usse ll's world s ta te . Unlike th a t o f the ordinary
member o f the herd, education f o r c itiz e n s h ip encourages the free
development o f the capacities o f the bureaucrat in order th a t he may
administer power w isely in the world s ta te . I shall argue th a t Russe 11
overlooks the coercive power exerted by sta te bureaucracies and the
manner in which they r e s t r i c t the in d iv id u a l freedom o f the ordinary

• * .
c itiz e n .
As a r e s u lt , education of the bureaucrat in a broad culture
' © . ,
is an inadequate s o lu tio n to the i n s t it u t i o n a l problem o f.th e coercio
i n t r i n s i c to bureaucracy.
- k: .
There is one set of in d iv id u a ls, in :the world sta te whose education
Is
f o r c itiz e n s h ip sets them apart from the herd. Education o f the
bureaucrat encourages the free development o f his capacities in te g ra l \
to in d iv id u a l c u ltu re . .The purpose o f th is development sis to allow
the bureaucrat to co n trib u te the broadest aspects o f cu ltu re to his
job as an in te rn a tio n a l c it iz e n , namely the w ielding o f power in the
world sta te . 'The development o f in d iv id u a l capacities and consequent

' <
acquaintance w ith the t r a d i t i o n o f knowledge stimulates a broad per
spective th a t enables the bureaucrat to perform his c it i z e n 's 'role
o f w ielding power w is e ly : ... _
C l . .
353
The education o f the bureaucrat w i l l be an education

f o r a special type o f c itiz e n s h ip Genuine cu ltu re
c o n s is t s in being a c itiz e n of the universe, not only
o f one or two a r b it r a r y fragments o f space-time; i t
helps men to understand human society as a whole, to
, estimate w isely the ends th a t communities should pur
sue, and to see th e 'p r e s e n t- in .'its .r e la tio n .to ; past,
and fu tu re . Genuine c u ltu re is th e r e fo r e 'o f great
value to i.hose whs are to wield power, to whom i t is
a t le a s t as useful as deta ile d information. The way
•to make men useful is to make them wise, and an essen
t i a l part of wisdom is a comprehensive mind.^ 9
I t - i s an in e v ita b le consequence o f science and technology th a t 1 the

220
. bureaucrat acquire increasing power and importance in the world s ta te .
Furthermore, i t is in e v ita b le th a t power should be d is trib u te d unevenly

221
in the s ta te . As a r e s u lt , the educational system must be s tru c
tured so as to tr a in the most competent in d iv id u a ls to occupy these. •

•*!*
p ositions o f bureaucratic and a d m in istra tiv e power. This requires
avoiding the p i t f a l l s o f both a r is t o c r a t ic and democratic education.
The former, as we have seen, develops a n - e lite consumed w ith the passion
o f exercising power and educated in a nationalism th a t strengthens

222
oppressive relations;:between n a tio n -s ta te s . Democracy, on the other
aCy. ;'‘ :. ■
■ ' . . .
hand, reduces a l l to the level o f the herd and f a i l s in the most

v 223
pressing task of educating ablfe in d iv id u a ls to exercise power : "We
"thusT a r riv e a t bureaucracy as the p ra ctical, a lte r n a tiv e t o ’a ris to c ra c y

224 ' '
and p lu to cra c y." Russell considers bureaucratic education as most
219
220 I b i d . , pp. 85-86. .
' 221 I b i d . , p. 85.
• 2 2 2 I b i d . , pp. 78-83. .* . *
! 2 2 3 I b i d . , pp. 83-84.
2 2 4 I b i d . , p. 85.
354
s u ita b le f o r the development o f in d iv id u a ls who w i l l wield power in the
world s ta te . Unlike the re s t o f the herd, whose,education f o r c i t i z e n
ship -shrinks the realm o f in d iv id u a l c u ltu re , t h e i r education f u l l y
develops in d iv id u a l ca pacities. The purpose is to endow them w i t h a
Vision o f ju s t ic e th a t provides a c r i t e r io n f o r the adm in istra tion o f
power. In th is way the genuine cu ltu re th a t they .inbibe w i l l act as a
brake upon the vast power th a t they command. S p e c if ic a lly , i t w i l l
prevent the use o f the d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l f o r the sole purpose o f power ,

. v -
and develop i t in ways o f greatest b e n e fit to mankind. In the manner
o f P la to 's philosopher-king, R ussell's bureaucrat w i l l exercise power
j u s t l y as a r e s u lt o f the philosophic understanding he has gained from
• a broad c u ltu re .
Russell takes a p a r t ic u la r ly benign view .of bureaucracy as both
necessary and neutral ip the a d m in istra tion o f power.. As regards the
a d m in is tra tiv e personnel, he admits th a t bureaucrats are r a re ly imbued
w ith a breadth o f understanding but believes th is to be an educational

• 225’
problem to which he has found a solution-. As regards the i n s t i t u
tio n s themselves, having-distinguished between the m i l i t a r y and c iv il-
' functions o f the s ta te , Russell solves., the problem o f the former by
granting the world sta te a monopoly o f arms. The m i l i t a r y function o f
the s ta te is only problematical when i t is performed by competing,
b e llic o s e n a tio n -s ta te s . The c i v i l functions o f the sta te are in
2 2 5 I b i d . , pp. 85-87. ‘ "

. 2 2 6 I b i d . , pp. 134-135,. , '.
a)
355
themselves unobjectionable and are to be aS decentralised as .possible
in the world s ta te . Russell c o n s is te n tly downplays the coercive
nature o f the c i v i l functions o f the sta te and o f the bureaucracies

p
responsible f o r them. He regards them as providing technical solutions
to technical problems but in no way impinging upop .the freedom-of the .

227 '
in d iv id u a l. Only in the case o f education does he accept th a t i t s
concentration upon the development o f c itiz e n s h ip w i l l impede the

228 ’
development o f in d iv id u a l cuHurer.
I f we consider f o r a-moment the kind o f tasks th a t bureau- ,
cracie> involved in the c i v i l fu n ctio n s 1 o f the state perform we see.
th a t t h i s /is a s u p e r fic ia l view. For example, the adm in istra tion of
ju s t ic e through the legal system is not neutral but tends to favour
those wi.th wealth and power, able to gain access to the most competent
lawyers, the cost o f whose services are beyoncT the reach o f the poor.
More im po rta n tly, in the event o f c o n f lic t s between d if f e r e n t groups
and classes, the repressive function o f the state is p a rtisan . As a ’
class s ta te , i t intervenes f o r the purpose o f maintaining the e x is tin g
system o f domination, even in cases w here-its in te rve n tio n is designed

229
to m itig a te the harshness o f t h is system o f domination. The legal
•and repressive functions o f the sta te are f a r from neutral but defend
the in te re s ts o f the dominant classes (though these may a t times be in
c o n f l i c t th.emselves)'and uphold the present system o f domination
throughout so cie ty. '■
rP 7 I b i d / , pp. 133-134. ' •

■“ ■Z28I l =id > ,- p> 27> .
229
Ralph Miliband: Marxism and P o l i t i c s , Oxford U n iv e rs ity Press,
" . . . V.-
'<■
'• ,-r.
356
Other bureaucracies l ik e sta te c o n tro lle d energy corporations,
such as' Ontario Hydro, are h ig h ljj c e n tra lis e d in t h e i r mode o f
operation, secretive about technical information and unresponsive to
c itiz e n s exercising t h e i r democratic- r i g h t to challenge fu tu re energy

230
decisions. Russell overlooks these general problems associated w ith
bureaucracies. Provided that bureaucrats are men o f broad culture', the

. 'T ■ *
m i l i t a r y and c i v i l functions of the sta te separated and the powers o f
the sta te divided between le g is la t u r e , ju d ic ia ry "a n d executive th e n ;
the coercive power o f s ta te ”"bureaucracies w i l l be minimised. This,
however, is not borne o u t 't jy a deeper analysis:
Essential importance o f the separation o f powers f o r

''- ''^ p o litic a l and economic l i b e r a l i s m the e n tire lib e r a l
ideology, with i t s strengths and i t s weaknesses, can
be encapsulated in the p r in c ip le o f the separation of
powers', and the source o f l ib e r a lis m 's weakness .then
becomes apparent: i t is the bureaucracy - i . e . the
c r y s t a l li s a t i o n o f the leading personnel r^which exer
cises coercive power, and a t a c e rta in point i t becomes
a ca ste .231
1977, pp. 90-91. This is .not to imply th a t the state is a simple'

. epiphenomenon o f the class re la tio n s in so c ie ty. Rather, the state
enjoys a 'r e la t iv e autonomy' in the fo llo w in g sense: What t h is r e la
t i v e autonomy means has already been in d ic a te d : . i t simply consists in
the degree o f freedom which the- sta te (normally meaning in th is context
the executive power) has in determining how best to serve what those
who hold power conceive to be the 'n a tio n a l i n t e r e s t ', and which in
f a c t involves the service o f the in te re s ts o f the r u lin g class. . I b i d . ,
p. 83.
230
C.A. Hdoker and R. van Hulst: 'I n s t i t u t i o n s , C o u n te r-In s titu
tio n s and the Conceptual Framework of Energy Policy Making in O n ta rio 1',
_ A Study Prepared f o r the RoyaT Commission on E le c tr ic Power Planning,
‘ May 1977; and C lif f o r d Alan Hooker: 'Th.e Socio-E'conomic S ignificance
o f Energy Power P o lic y ' in Our Energy Options, Ontario. Royal Commission
on E le c tr ic Power Planning, Toronto, 19/8.
231
Gramsci: 'S tate and C i v i l \ j o c i e t y ' , o£. c i t . , pp. 245-246.
|^ Russell underestimates the manner in which the?bureaucracies of the
sta te impinge upon the in d iv id u a l freedom of. the c it iz e n . He believes
th a t the problem o f .power executed by a ru lin g bureaucratic class w i l l
be overcome once they are educated properly and w isely.
Russell's account o f bureaucracy is determined by his b e li e f th a t
increased social organisation is necessary f o r the e f f i c i e n t operation
* . of s c ie n tific ,c iv ilis a tio n . The expertise to run the complex machinery

't „ ■
? . ' o f a h ig h ly advanced in d u s tr ia lis e d economy, welded together by a
world s ta te , requires the tr a in in g o f compe/tent and specia lise d -p er-

' ■■-si
sonnel. The education o f bureaucrats capable of these tasks is there-

' . \ 6
fo re a-primary requi rement 'in the school system. - I f they should con
s t i t u t e a ru lin g class th a t has both greater freedom and power than'
i the m a jo rity o f the herd, th is is a p rice th a t must be p a id -fo r the
continuation o f modern, s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i s a t i o n . S im ila r ly , the p r i
mary requirement o f the education o f the herd is to stress c itiz e n s h ip
and cooperation with th e -c i ti.zens o f other nations under the aegis o f
the world s ta te . The free development o f t h e i r c a p a citie s , s t i f l e d
by the world educational system w i l l have to await a renaissance u n t il
the survival o f c i v i l i s a t i o n is secured., v
® IV. Science as Power in the World State
' ' S
In th is section I sh a ll c r i t i c i s e R u s se ll’ s conception o f the
* yV . ♦
w o r l&• s ta te on two counts. Each c ri'tic is m w i l l occupy a sub-section.
. * They..are as fo llo w s:
F i r s t , there is an inconsistency between R ussell's fears con- •' •
cerning science as organisation and the key ro le th a t he confers upon
the adm in istra tion o f s c i e n t i f i c organisation in the world s ta te . .
Concerned w ith l im i t i n g the power o f the in d ivid u a l w i l l , RusseTl grants
vast powers in the administration, o f science and the state to those with
the strongest w i l l s . '
Second, the world sta te is Hobbesian in nature, having absolute

*■
a u th o rity and m i l i t a r y power to crush re b e llio n s and s t i f l e in d ivid u a l
freedom. I t is l i k e l y to increase oppression in i t s re la tio n s w ith

. *
in d iv id u a l n a tio n -s ta te s !
■' o J *
A. The Adm inistration o f ^Science*. • .

t •
•One o f the dangers o f science to which Russell co n s is te n tly draws
a tte n tio n is the devastating consequences upon society o f i t s being
motivated by love o f power. His .own view conceives.of science as m oti-
* vated by love and hence as a-means to human freedom. Russell fa ils ;,

- S ' ■ •■ v . '•
however,- to reconcile his. c r i t i c is m o f science as motivated by love o f
power and the .role, which he ascribes, to science in the world s ta te .
Science in the world s ta te w i l l be used to maximise the power o f '
^ a d m inistrators whose main concern is with power. When motivated by love,»

'.V-
^ science leads to a d is in te re s te d th e o re tic a l a c t i v i t y , concerned w ith
! the establishment o f o b je c tiv e tr u th by means of the te n ta tiv e , scien-
t i f i c - method;- The e th ic consistent w ith th is a c t i v i t y which Russell '*

v
upholds,. is an acceptance o f the inexorable laws o f the universe and
mankind’ s fate w ith in them, coupled with a defiance which aims a t the
construction o f goodness, beauty and t r u t h . When motivated by love of
power, science leads to a p r a c tic a l, -instrumental organisation o f
r e a lity ', concerned w ith imposing human desires upon an in d i f f e r e n t
universe by means o f s c i e n t i f i c technique. The dangers o f th is; scien
t i f i c praxis, to human freedom and spontaneity are only *too cle a r to
Russell, since i t leads to the adulation o f technological power. Never
theless, the e th ic , which Russell apparently advocates v is - a - v is scien
t i f i c organisation, is ah acceptance o f i t s i n e v i t a b i l i t y as an in te g ra l
part o f modern c i v i l i s a t i o n . A»£ the same time as: s c ie n tific - te c h n iq u e
produces organisation, both o f which adversely a ffe c t human freedom,
each is necessary and in e v ita b le . . ..»
There is an obvious p a r a lle l here between acceptance o f the in e v i
table laws o f the urfiverse and acceptance o f .’ the ihev.i table dominance
. . 232
o f s c i e n t i f i c technique and organisation. ■ Both ethics are based
t
upon an acceptance and defiance o f fa te . Yet the type o f defiance open •
to th e .in d iv id u a l in face o f the s c i e n t i f i c organisation 'of the world '
sta te is fa r more tenuous than the o th e r, as. Russell fra n k ly 'a d m its .
The s c i e n t i f i c temper o f mind, revealed in the undogmatic p u rs u it o f
knowledge, and the in d iv id u a l freedom, which re su lts from i t , " are both
threatened by the governmental orga technique, which Russell"
him self advocates:
232
See Greenspan: ojd. c i t . , pp. 48-49
«
This c o n f l i c t between the s c i e n t i f i c s p i r i t and the
governmental use o f science is l i k e l y u ltim a te ly to
bring s c i e n t i f i c progress to a s t a n d s t i l l , since
s c i e n t i f i c technique w i l l be .increasingly used to
i n s t i l orthodoxy and c r e d u l i t y . . ..No doubt such a
system o f education [organised by the world s ta te ]
w i l l e n t a il , at any rate f o r a century or two, cer
ta in c r u d itie s which w i l l m i l i t a t e against the . .
development o f the in d iv id u a l B u t - i f th e ia lte r n a -
V t i v e is chaos and the deajth o f c i v i l i s a t i o n , the *
- p rice w i l l be worth paying.233 *■
O
Russell cTearly believes th a t the deadening e ffe c t o f s c i e n t i f i c
planning and expertise -is a necessity to which the in d iv id u a l must sub-

. • . ,234
m it as a c itiz e n o f the world s ta te . .
• The type of in d iv id u a ls who are to control the d ire c tio n o f s c i e n t i f i c
organisation are executives or bureaucrats, p r o f ic ie n t in organisational
s k i l l s and in the.execution o f power.' They comprise the new o ligarchy
o f the world sta te .

9 / ' . . . v- * *
They are men whose p o sitio n has been achieved by a

powerful w i l l , and th e ir 1 capacity forejudging other *
men. Power is t h e i r ru lin g passion, organising is '
v> the a c t i v i t y in which they e xce l...w h e th er under
capitalism or under communism, i t is^.men o f th is
type who must u ltim a te ly dominate a n .in d u s tria l
c i v i l i s a t i o n , and the d iffe re n ce between t h e i r
m e n ta lity and th a t o f a r is to c ra ts o f former times
1 «‘ must have an important influence in making indus-*
t r i a l, cu ltu re d if f e r e n t from th a t o f feudal and
commercial ages.235
Education and the Social Order, pp. 2 3 'and 27.. . °-

234 " ’ ■ : ~ ~ •• * '
Cf. Power, p. 302 and Greenspan: o£. c i t . ,' pp. 19 and 6 6 . - .....
poc ■
Education and th e Social Order, pp. 155-156. Bay points out

tfja t the general level o f social freedom tends to be lower in s o c ie tie s
where those who w ield power do so in a coercive fashi.on: o£. c i t . , >
p. 299. ; • . . , \ ‘ .
The d is tin g u is h in g feature o f s c i e n t i f i c c i v i l i s a t i o n is i t s e f f i c i e n t
'* '
management o f the technical processes o f production, d is t r ib u t io n and
consumption. The a p p lic a tio n o f science as organisation or technique
■ to a l l aspects o f 1 ife^produces a ' t o t a l l y regulated s o c ie ty , such as
Russell describes :in The S c i e n t if ic Ol
•To the ty p ic a l mpdern mind nothing is in te re s tin g

on account o f w h a t . i t i s , but only on account o f
what i t may be made to become.. . . Everything is an
instrument; If.y o u ask what i t is a>n instrument to ,
• the answer w i l l be ad i n f in i t u m . In psychological ■
terms., th is means th a t the love o f ldwer has th ru s t
/ • " aside a l l the other impulses th a t make the complete
: human l i f e . 236
; The a d m in is tra to rs .o f the world sta te e x e m p lify 'th is psychological love

* • ' • / ' v, . ■ ‘ . : .■
o f power which dominates t h e i r outlooks Their view o f science is deter-
• ' t": ', .• . ; •
mfned by a lo v e 'o f poWqj®--that seeks to control a l l phenomena f o r t h e ir
own purposes. While they have been educated in the broadest c u ltu re to
O ' '
counterbalance the temptations o f the adm inistration o f power, one can
- only be skeptical of the e ffic a c y of.such education in the face of
t h e i r personal1, determination, o f w i l l , u n ifo rm ity o f outjook-and techni
cal expertise .
There i s , t h e n a profound irony to Russell 's suggestions con-
Cerning-’ the establishment o f a w o rld -sta te . I t s aim is to minimise
s o tia l c o n f l ic t by d e a lin g 'h a rsh ly with i t s in d iv id u a l and in s titu ti-o n a l

i' .
236
The S c i e n t if ic Outlook, p. d 56
k sources: the d i c t a t o r i a l . - w i l l , th a t gives r is e to lo ve o f power, and
the n a tio n -s ta te , th a t spawns m ilita n t- n a tio n a lis m . Yet who w i l l
occupy the positio n s o f power in .th is new social order? To whom are' the
.individual d ic t a t o r ia l w i l l and the R ation-state to re lin q u is h a u th o rity?

••• -X- ' -
; R ussell1s answer is the executives of modern in d u s tr ia l c i v i l i s a t i o n ,
. whose-distinguishing features are a strong w i l l and an ove rrid ing

' ^ . 237 .r. + *' *
- passion f o r power. The very- c lfc ra c te n s tie s th a t give r is e to- social
c o n f l i c t in the herd are most fo rc e fu l in those who are to control the ®\
d ire c tio n o f the world s ta te . ; ' 'r
The m a jo rity must submit to the a u th o rity of-a world state governed
by in d iv id u a ls whose expertise stems 'from a strong w i l l . . Only w ith in
this" context can science as a means o f o rg a n is in g s o c ie ty be used to

238
ensure the survival o f . c i v i l i s a t i o n :
• • ’ 237 ■ ' '

' ■*■-. The uneven distribution of power in*society Russell regards as
™ “ '.VI ~ • '’unavoidable"’: Education and the Socla 1 Order, p. 85. ’ V
* ' '1 ■ ■ - 238
Elsewhere Russell puts this as follows:.;
. ■ . e # " ' :
’- *•* \ In the modern worldj and s t i l l more., so fa r as can
- guetsed -in .the world' of the nearfuture, important
* achievement is and Wil.l . be almost, impossible-to an , '
. • .x" ; - .. individualîf he caianqt;.dominate some vast organiza- .
■4^ ' , /,'■ • tion. - I f . he can make "Himself head of a state lik e ’ - V
Lenin, er nxihopolist of. a great industry- lik e . f
‘ f:, gpckefeller, or a controller of cred it-!ike the elder'
fC / Pierponf Morgan, he can produce enormous effects in ’
V the world., Arid so tie can i f , being a man of science, ' v *
../*'•;' • helpers uadis some .tjbvehnment that his, work may be
useful in war, V * . ...
Authority and the Individual, Simon and Schuster, New York, A

’■' T 1949, p. 33.
- U--1 ■■
a) : '’
- - - ' ■■ . V^. \ $ -
'%■" --,V;- :Vr;
■ V '. : '- " • . V a ,
■«% For Russell, the only society in which, science could
, • become a means f o r the good society is a global one,
" a world sta te .Y . . S c i e n t i f i c technique can only pnce
again become a p o s s ib i li t y f o r good only a f t e r the
, nation sta te is abolished in favour o f one u n ifie d
'w o rld government.239
1 R usse ll's world s ta te is problematical because i t is governed’ by
‘ a ru lin g class whose love o f power, motivates t h e i r use o f science as
organisation. ‘Having; o u tlin e d the dangers o f t h is approach to science
in re la tio n to the in d iv id u a l psychology o f power, Russell recommends,
th a t society, be governed by a class p f in d iv id u a ls whose r u lin g passion
’ ‘ is power. Just a s', the in d iv id u a l membef- o f the herd may becomei n t o x i
cated w ith the asocial aspects o f power, so members o f the ru lin g class
may f a l l prey to p re c is e ly the same tendency. In t h e i r case, however,
the consequences are l i k e l y .to be more serious because the means at
‘ t h e i r disposal to s t i f l e opposition is v i r t u a l l y u n lim ite d. Concerned
: w ith 'p la c in g l i m i t s on the in d iv id u a l w i l l , Russell gives maximum scope
and p o l i t i c a l power to those whose in d iv id u a l w i l l s are the strongest.
.■ In conclusion, Russell f a i l s to reconcile, his b e l i e f in the neces-
;, s i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c techniqjje and the'draconian measures th a t i t e n ta ils
w ith h i^ b e li e f in in d iv id u a l, freedom'. Nor does he suggest any e ffe c-
, " t iv e means by which the in d iv id u a l member o f the herd can-defy the
. i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c technique, motivated by th e love o f povler •

. v v*; * * ^ ■* ' - . ( 240
i 4 >.tn? a d m in is tra tive r u lin g class o f the. world state-.
-M -
239
Gre,en&oan: op. p i t . , p. .62.
240'
: Cf. Power., p.. 302-.
■5>- ' .— ■' •■
Y*Y:
>t
... ■' \ • . ,.-y ; .
■’•'* :V y# Y Y Y? YY; Y , ;. ■ , ■' ■Y; . '.

■B. Tive Hobbesian Nature o f the'Morld State
i
R ussell's conception o f the world state is o f an absolute power,^ '
Hobbesian in character. The world state, is to perform the e x te rn a l, 0
m i li t a r y fu n c tio n f o r a l l n a tio n -s ta te s . I t possesses a monopoly of

241
arms which i t may use to prevent war between them. Ffer t h is purpose,
r* 242
-r i t has the r i g h t to crush r e c a lc it r a n t states by the use o f force and
; ' ». '■ i
ensure th a t in te rn a tio n a l agreements, passed by i t s j u d i c i a r y , are ob-
243
served. Thus, i t has the r i g h t to crush re b e llio n s w ithout f e a r so f •
opposition. .
The world state also obtrudes upon the internal, functions o f the
n a tio n -s ta te . I t may exert control over education and propaganda where
they become n a t io n a lis t ; subversive and considered a th re a t to "world

■ 244 '• * '
.peace. In the face o f such to ta l c o n tro l, how are n a tio n -sta te s to *
maintain any form of: autonomy? R ussell's view o f ^ c e n t r a l ised world
government, which loosely b in d s 'n a tio n -sta te s together in the form o f a
f l e x i b l e fe d e ra tio n , breaks down upon closer s c r u tin y . This reveals a
ce n tra lis e d s ta te tha£ controls both the externa.l m i l i t a r y functions of
n a tio n -s ta te s “and,"where necessary, t h e i r in t e r n a l, c i v i l functions
(education; propaganda, in d u s tr ia l development, e tc. ). , I ^
241
2421b id . , Jp. 234. ,
2 4 3 I b i d . , p. 226. .
2 4 4 I b i d . , pp. 226 and 243. '
2 4 5 I b i d . , p. 27. ' : .. \
; - . The conception o f a government.that crushes re b e llio n s and enforces
contracts is derived from the p o lit ic a l and so cia l thought o f Thomas

246 '
Hobbes. While Russell is in .general c r it ic a l o f Hobbes' concept o f
<*
' a Leviathan he believes th a t i t is e s s e n tia lly c o rre c t in terms o f the
in te rn a tio n a l a f fa ir s between n a tio n -s ta te s . In his la te r H isto ry o f
Western Philosophy, Russell makes p re c is e ly th is p o in t when discussing .
Hobbes' work: '' '
Every argument th a t he adduces in favour o f government,

in so fa r as i t is v a lid a t a l l , is v a lid in favour o f
, in te rn a tio n a l governmentr^vSo long as national States
e x is t and f ig h t each o th e r, o n ly in e ffic ie n c y can pre-
■ , serve the human ra ce .2^7
In the place of. in te rn a tio n a l anarchy Russell proposes a w orld s ta te
,,V,having absolute power to secure-w orld peace. This is c o n siste n t w ith
his assessment o f,th e ra tio n a le fo r Hobbes' Leviathan: "The reason th a t
, Hobbes gives fop-supporting, the S tate, namely th a t i t is the o n ly .a lte r - '

' • 248
native to anarchy, is in the main a va-lid orie". , But i t is in co n sis
te n t w it h h is own fe a r concerning governments and states paving absolute
power: " . . . t h e tendency o f every governmer^ôwards tyranny cannot be
kept in check unless governments have some fe a r o f re b e llio n " . Since i t
is p re c is e ly the. purpose o f-R u s s e ll’ s w orld government to prevent war
and s t if le 'r e b e llio n fo'r a couple o f centuries tyranny is an a ttr ib u te
246
T h is *p o in t is made most com pellingly by Louis Greenspan: oj>. ^
c i t . , pp. 63-64.
247 '
A H is to ry o f Western Philosophy, George A llen and Unwin, London,
1946, p. 579. ».
248
I b id . , p. 578. There should be the p o s s ib ilit y . o f re b e llio n on
occasion, and not only a blind.acquiescence produced by a r ig id education
in conform ity. Ib id . Cf. Education ahd the Social Order, p. 14.
* . *
. 4 ■
*
i t is lik e ly to acquire. In the course o f e s ta b lis h in g peace, R usse ll's
■ world s ta te .is. li^ j||fy to crush not only anarchy but the seeds -of any
\ie m o c r a tic opposition* ,t o i i ^ power. Russell is 'c e r t a in ly aware o f th is
problem but f a i ls to-deal adequafeTy'-'V/ith i t . He f a ils to re co n cile the
. need fo r greater co-oppration and. organi’s a tio n w ith a re s p e c U fo r in d i
vidual freedom. Freedom is to b e ;truncated in order th a t s c ie n t if ic
c iv ilis a t io n should su rvive .

. *
tThe strongest arguments against RusselVs world s ta te a;re his own._
; i V M
■f They stem from the e a r lie r period in h is 'w r itin g s when h'e upheld an
V:i organic concept o f the in d iv id u a l, an educational p h il osophy-that ■
stressed the f u l l development o f the in d iv id u a l's capacities and a
lib e r ta r ia n so cia lism . I n : P rin c ip le s o f Social Reconstruction Russell
considers t(ie remote p o s s ib ility o f a world s ta te established fo r ,th e
preservation o f mankind, possessing a monopoly o f arms and c o n tro llin g -

• ?49 w
the m ilita r y fu n c tio n o f a ll n a tio n -s ta te s . -The advantage o f such a
s ta te is th a t i t increases the area over which war is im possible, except

250
• by re v o lu tio n : the same p o in t th a t he makes la te r . However, it s
c h ie f disadvantage is th a t i f war werP to occur i t would do so over a
g re ater area, thus throwing the whole o f c iv ilis a t io n in to tu rm o il and

251 ’
s tr ife . Moreover, there w il l be an increase in oppression -in the
re la tio n s between s ta te s : - -
!________________ ’■.___ 'i_____ '_____

249
P rin c ip le s o f Social R econstruction, p. 101.
2 5 0 I b id . , p. 103. V '
I b id . , p. 104.
• . . r ^
Another disadvantage is th a t i t . f a c ilit a t e s oppression.
; 5 A large m ilita r y State is p r a c tic a lly omnipotent against
a small S ta te , and can impose i t s w i l l , as England and
Russia did in Persia and as A ustria-H ungary‘ has been
. doing in Serbia. I t is impossible to make sure o f
avoiding oppression by any .purely mechanical guarantees;*',
onlv a lib e r a l and humane . . s p ir it 1 can a ffo rd a -re a l pro
te c tio n . 252 ; ^
. . . . V- '
Democracy and re p re s e n ta tiv e government v iv if y the humane s p i r i t by
a llo w in g oppressed m in o ritie s to express th e ir, grievances. Moreover, .
democracy is to be preferred to o lig a rc h ic or bureaucratic governments
in which the ru lin g classes acquire a, s a tis fa c tio n from the p ra c tic e o f
253
'oppression
• . Taking these, o b je ctio n s in tu r n ,'th e .la te r Russell f a i ls to deal'-

'■; ' V ■ . . t s* . -i
w ith any o f them adequately. iThe f i r s t p o in t he counte’rs by attem pting
to ensure th a t war w il l n o t.o ccu r a t a ll.. There is , o f cou;
guarantee o f e lim in a tin g war but the various increases in power o f the
c e n tra lis e d w o rld -s ta te are designed ttrovereome it s lik e lih o o d . This,
however, sim ply lays him more open W the second o b je c tio n since the
increase in c e n tra lis e d poyer produces the very oppression between the
world s ta te and the various n a tio n -s ta te s th a t he e a r lie r decried'. The
u n lim ite d powers- o f the w orld s ta te could make the oppressive r e la tio n -
■ v " /; , .' ■ . ‘ - - *
ships between large and sm a ll,n a tio n -,sta te s th a t Russell c ite s pale b y ,
i .• ->' • 1
comparison. Moreover, i t / f s p re c is e ly .th e s u rv iv a l o f the lib e r a l and
252
I b id . , pp. 104-105.
253
I b id . , p. 105.'
humane s p i r i t th a t is-endangered in R usse ll's proposals fo r the world
s ta te . The su rvi v^l-Tof the s c ie n t if ic s p i r i t and the experimental method

k ■ ft- <•
254 *
. themselves are*endlnge'red and may become the exclusive property o f
the a d m in is tra tiv e and bureaucratic classes.; ¥ ■
F in a lly in R usse ll's la te r proposals fo r the w orld s ta te , bureau- .

• ■ '& , ' ' -1.
cra ticg o ve rn m e n t replaces democratic and representative government.’ "
Democratic' education f a i l s to develop the men oft strong in t e lle c t and

’ < ■ 255
w i l y necessary to govern the w orld s ta te . • Education o f bureaucrats
■■ and executives is the primary requirement o f the w orld’ educational

*
v system. ’ There is every lik e lih o o d th a t th is new* ru lin g class w ill enjoy
/ I t h e op po rtu n ity, th e ir p o sitio n s, p f power a ffo rd to oppress -weaker, nation*-
s ta te s . I t is naive o f Russell to:suppose th a t a fte r two centuries o f

*
sqch ru le a bureaucratic c la s s ‘would give up th e ir power to allow
in d iv id u a l freedom.'and c u ltu re to flo u r is h once again. As he him self
• .p o in ts o u t, the s a tis fa c tio n th a t they gain from oppression is too pro-
found. ]ji tu rn in g away from 'dem ocratic to bureaucrati c government and
education Russell, abandons-any fa it h in the m a jo rity o f in d iv id u a ls to
take co ntrol o f th e ir liv e s .- They have to be shown how to do so by a
- bureaucratic e li t e capable o f using force i f necessary.
In his e a rly work Russel 1 maintained a conception o f the good
•s o c ie ty as offa in which the s ta te enhances the. p rin c ip ie o f growth and
the development o f cre a tiv e impulses in -th e organic in d iv id u a l. This

- . V , ----------- ’------- . . ■ ■-L:------------- — ----- — ------------- ;------ - ~ .
• 2 ^ Education and the Social Order, pp, 22-23.

2 5 5 I b id . , pp. 84-85. ' ~ ; ’ •
. -t: ■ '
Vs
369
- provided a c r ite r io n by means o f .which he was able to measure the ...'
a ctio n o f any real s ta te . Only where the s ta te performed th is posi-
- tiv e task .o f"e n h a n c in g 'in d iv id u a l'g ro w th could . it s existence be..

■ ' ?56
ju s t if ie d . Otherwise i t wete simply an outmoded in s t it u t io n . By
contrast., in his la te r work the’ conception o f the gpod so cie ty is
one in which external harmony between in d iv id u a ls and nation-state's^
has been maximised and world peace secured. : This provides a newj:".
c r ite r io n o f the good so cie ty as one' in which the sta te transforms
. the d ic t a to r ia l w il l o f the asocial in d iv id u a l in to the co-operative
w ill of-^he
t.
c itiz e n ’. In order to succeed in th is task the ro le o f
the s ta te is e s s e n tia lly coercive. I t s aim is to co ntrol and ’
d ire c t the expression o f opinions and a ll aspects o f in d iv id u a l
c u ltu re th a t i t considers subversive:
In d iv id u a lis m , although i t is im portant not to fo rg e t

it s ju s t claims., needs, in a densely populated indus
t r i a l w o rld X to : be more c o n tro lle d , even in in d iv id u a l ■
v psychology, th^n in former time's..257 ^ .
Rather than enhancing the power and c a p a c itie s o f the in d iv id u a l,
the s ta te s t i f l e s them, increasing and c e n tra lis in g its . own power
a t the same tim e. I t d o e s s o because the w i l l o f ’the" in d iv id u a l,
which is the source o f his power^ can threaten the s t a b ilit y and
s u rviva l o f c iv ilis a tio r r T ^ The execution o f i f s m ilita r y and c i v il
256 "
P rin c ip le s o f Social R econstruction, p. 42.
#
257
Education and the Social Order, p. 243. .
. . C . / . ■' ■■ . ■
fu n c tio n s , w ith o u t regard fo r in d iv id u a l development, becomes-the aim
o f the world s ta te . In the process., the self-developm ent o f the in d iv i
dual. is a ll b u t^'fo rg o tte n .^ The w o rld -s ta te thereby f a l ls .prey to
R ussell's own c ritic is F n th a t "the p rin c ip a l source, o f the harm done by

258
• the S ta te 'is the fa c t th a t power is i t s c h ie f end".
; V. The Asocial In d iv id u a l Reconsidered ’*

. . . . ■- » ■ 1 "
•- In th is section I s h a ll reexamine R usse ll's concept o f the asocial

. • 1
■ ', t .
in d iv id u a l in two subsections. In 'th e firs ^ t sub-secti.ern , 7 I s h a ll analyse
.• his 'lo w .yie w ' o f human nature as dominated by love of'pow er. I s h a ll
/:V s .
consider the psychological concept-of. power,■i t s re la tio n to d e cisio n
making and the d is tin c tio n between a ipower m otive' and a -'poWer d r iv e '.
Russell believes th a t a power motive (h e alth y se lf-e xp re ssio n ) neces-
s a r ily becomes a power d riv e (unhealthy dominat’i'on o f o th e rs ): a view
/denied by some p sych olo g ists. . 13
In the second sub-section I s h a ll ra is e a fundamental c r itic is m o f
his account o f the asocial in d iv id u a l 4 namely: Is R usse ll's acco.unt o f.
the in d iv id u a l as motivated by power f i r s t l y tru e , and secondly consis
te n t w ith his b e lie f th a t universal love can bring about the lib e r a tio n
o f mankind? V
* n‘ -' * t
. -A. The Psychological Concept o f Power #

' * ’ ■' ' ' ” ' i V1
ivi I th in k i t f a i r to say th a t R usse ll's asocial concept o f the' in d i-
. vidual is a 'low view' o f human nature. That, is , he conceives o f the
in d iv id u a l as motivated by base passions, such -as the love o f power,

"pro” T-'T' ' T1
P rin c ip le s o f Social R econstruction, p. 62. R usse ll's account
o f th e,w orld s ta te is no d iffe r e n t from h is d e s c rip tio n o f the t o t a l i
ta ria n view: ‘
This is the e s s e n tia l-d iffe re n c e between the Liberal outlook
and th a t- o f the to ta lit a r ia n S ta te, th a t the former regards
*
■ . . »
, r-
.371
' .
* r ‘i
m ' .
which the n a tio n -s ta te tends to encourage. His hope is th a t w ith a re
s tru c tu rin g and new emphasis in education and p o lit ic s , the in d iv id u a l w ill
be able to re a lis e much'of the p o te n tia l' th a t is p resently s t if le d . In .
.p a r tic u la r , Russell believes th a t a re-education o f the passions w i l l . r e
s u lt in in t e llig e n t , sane, kind and ju s t in d iv id u a ls who w ill oppose the •

’«> ® 259
in s a n ity o f the contemporary w orld. Such in d iv id u a ls w i l l be capable
it- .
o f th e .u n iv e rs a l ,love, which Russell believes is "the motive power to a ll
-'3r1'
v w. > * pAn
th a t I desire as regards the w o rld ". I b e lie v e 'th a t Russell f a i ls .to
re co n cile his low conception o f the in d iv id u a l w ith his v is io n o f what the

v* * . . • '
in d iv id u a l could become. I t is d i f f i c u l t to see how universal love dan be
produced from an in d iv id u a l o f R usse ll's ty p e , except perhaps 'by fo rc e .
Following the F ir s t World War, Russell became in c re a s in g ly pessi
m is tic about the mainsprings o f humaa a c tio n . •.His pessimism was r e in
forced both by the growing m iT ifa r fs ir o f the Western world*and the
'ty ra n n y o f the Bolshevik regime in Russia. Despite his i n i t i a l support
o f the BolsHevik re v o lu tio n , he.became a ste rn c r i t i c o f the bureaucra-

' "'■ ' ' * 261
t is a tio n o f poWer which i t produced once, he had v is ite d .Russia Jjy-1920.
In The P ractice and Theory o f Bolshevism, Russell o u tlin e s a p o lit ic a l

■* 96 2 *
psychology which he believes tru e r than th a t o f Marx. This psycho
lo g y also contrasts w ith h is e a r lie r view o f the p o te n tia lly construc
tiv e nature o f impulses proceeding from the c e n tra l p rin c ip le o f growth.
the w elfare o f the State as re sid in g u ltim a te ly in the w elfare * ,

o f 'the in d iv id u a l, w hile the la t t e r regards the S tate'as the
end and in d iv id u a ls merely as indispensable in g re d ie n ts , whose
w elfa re must be subordinated to a m ystical to ta lity -w h ic h is a
cloak fo r the in te r e s t o f the ru le rs . ' * :
Power, pp. 302.-303. . •*
Education*and the Social Order, pp. 246-248.
2^ A H igtory. o f Western Phi-losophy, p. 739. . '
* 2 ^ The"i3ra c tic e and Theory o f ^Bolshevism, George A lle n and Unwin,
London, 1920, pp. 8 , 30-31
2 62 I b id . , p. 127.
Russell now distin g u ish e s, between primary desires ( fo r food, d rin k ,.S e x ,
*•> . c lo th in g and housing) and .secondary desires (a c q u is itiv e n e s s , v a n ity ,
r iv a lr y and love o f power), which are distinctiveTy~~human because con-
s ta n tly seeking s a tis fa c tio n . He w rite s o f these as fo llo w s : "These
fo u r passions - a c q u i's itiv e n e s s ,le n ity , r iv a lr y and lo v e /o f power - are,
a fte r th e basic in s tin c ts , the prime movers o f almost a ll th a t happens

264 • • <r\ ,
, in p o lit ic s . " This view, is - f a r clo se r to th a t o f Hobbes and Nietzsche
• J
than i t is to such proponents o f 1ib e ra lis m as Rousseau o r M i l l / More-
. over, i t is a view which Russell continues to m aintain during the
tw enties and t h ir t ie s when he f i n a ll y states th a t "o f the . in f in it e -

V . / . . .
. 0&^
desires o f man, the c h ie f are the desires fo r power and g lo ry ". In
the same work, he declares th a t:
.*• I shall be concerned to prove th a t the fundamental con

cept in so cia l science is Power, in the same s’ense in
which Energy is the fundamental concept in. physics.
■ Like energy, power has many' forms, such as wealth., arma
ments, c i v i l a u th o rity , in flu e n ce on o p in io n s .. .power,
lik e energy, must be regarded as c o n tin u a lly passing
from any one o f it s forms in to any o th e r, and i t should ,
be the business o f s o c ia l science to seek the laws o f '
such .transform ations.266 ,
" ■ ftV
■: f . Power, then, is both the c h ie f motive o f human behaviour and the key
concept in theories attem pting to explain th a t behaviour.
2 6 3 I b id . , pp. 128-129. '

264 Ib id . V
2 6 5 Power., p. 1 1 . ,• ‘
2 6 6 I b i d . , pp. 12-14.
T h e .w ill is the source o f power whereby the in d iv id u a l brings about ..
change. But what p re c is e ly is th is power? Of what does i t corfsTst and
why dobs Russell consider i t such a danger to c iv ilis a tio n ?
The idea o f power is clo s e ly re la ted , to both' making decisions and
a ffe c tin g the decisions o f others.,.; The in d iv id u a l who resolves to make
aydecision between d iffe r e n t options is in vo lve d *in a process whose o u t- -

* * .
come w ill a ffe c t the re a lis a tio n o f his purposes or d e sire s. In general,
these purposes embody the in d iv id u a l's 'values. The power o f the in d iv i
dual consists o f ,h is a b il i t y to re a lis e through a ctio n the values he
considers im portant. Because o f the so cia l context w ith in which he *
acts, the. a b i l i t y 1 o f the in d iv id u a l to re a lis e his own values also re--
fle c ts - h is a b il i t y to a ffe c t the behaviour o f other in d iv id u a ls or groups.

. . « •
The g re ater his capacity to i n f l uence -the behaviour o f o th e rs , the. more
power he is able to exercise. Thus we a rriv e a t the fo llo w in g d e fin i-
tio n : . ' . /
1 Power:V ( ' i n f l uence 1 j, i t an in d iv id u a l's capacity fo r

a tta in in g o r advancing values by way o f a ffe e tin g w ith • ■
his own behaviour the behaviour o f o thers. •E xercise 1
o f power ( 'in flu e n c e 1) is'th e ^p ro ce ss o f a tta in in g o r
advancing values by a ffe c tin g the behaviour o f o th e rs .26'
,, Involved in the ih ^ iv ic tu a l 1 s real.isat°ion o f power is the degree o f
2 ^ 7 Bay: Op. c i t . p . 258.;
* i■268 ' «•
c o n tro l he exerts over .his own s e c u r ity ! 'The more e ffe c tiv e ^h e is
. in extending the s e c u rity o f the values th a t he^shares or wishes to
promote, the more powerful the in d iv id u a l- is . Power becomes superfluous
tO the in d iv id u a l only to the e x te n t'th a t s e c u rity is p e rfe c t; th a t is ,
only where he is assured access to a ll the values to which he a sp ire s.
Conversely, ^the less sense o'f s e c u rity the. in d iv id u a l has, the g reater
his desire fo r power. Power ('in the sense o f 'power m o tive 1) may be
understood in both in fa n t and a d u lt as a compensation fo r fe e lin g s o f
.inadequacy and a general in s e c u rity .
- The d is tin g u is h in g fe a tu re o f power, s e t t in g . it apart from s e c u rity ,
is th a t i t "a ls p 'in v o lv e s the a b ilit y to produce e ffe c ts on other ^

-v- 'I’'"-, 271* - .
people's behaviour". .R ussell's d e fin itio n o f power- coincides pre
c is e ly w ith th is a b il i t y to bring about the goals o f one's a ctions by
a ffe c tin g other in d iv id u a ls and the environment: . "Power may be d e fin e d .

■- . ■ 272 ■■' '- '• ’
as the production o f intended e ffe c ts .." R ussell includes here the
impersonal e ffe c ts o f p o w e r,'h is f i r s t example o f' "forms o f power" being
the ambitious a r t i s t 's a b i l i t y to p a in t a good p ic tu re . He extends

' «> . '•
his analysis .to the power or in flu e n ce over Other .in dividuals th a t I
have been considering. Such pOwer may be exerted through d ir e c t physical ’
2 6 8 I b id . , pp. 19.and 163.

‘ 2 6 9 Ib id ., p. 258.
2 7 0 Ib id . , pp. 164 and 258. _ * .
271I b id . ; p. 258. . . ' 9 •
272“ .
. Power, p. 35. *
273 v ’
, I b id - This p o in t is. made by Bay, 0 £. c i t . , p. 250, who com
pares R u sse ll‘ s d e fin itio n to th a t o f Hobbes: ' .
375 .
274 • ■*-' •
fo rc e , th re a t o f punishment or.propaganda.
Th^ reasons fo r Russell.'s m is tru s t o f power are now c fe a rr On the
one hand, power is an in te g ra l p a rt o f the healthy development o f the.

• 9. \ " • ,/ ;
in d iv id u a lv His p b ij i t y fo r se lf-e xp re ssio n and the re a lis a tio n o f h is -
values through a c tio n fa re conjoined in the c a p a c ity .to .e x e rc is e power.
The re a lis a tio n o f his values >twolve’s the capacity o f the., in d iv id u a l
to in flu e n ce the behaviour o f o th e rs. This capacity f o r power is
n a tu ra l, "healthy and in te g ra l to the development o f the in d iv id u a l’ s .
. c a p a c itie s . On the o th e r hand, the w i l l , which is the in d iv id u a l’ s
source o f power, co n sta n tly s triv e s to dominate Others and a ssert i t
s e lf in a d ic ta to r ia l manner towards them. Where i t does so, the power
o'f the in d iv id u a l deprives others o f th e ir freedom; This tendency-is
unhealthy and requires th a t s t r i c t lim its be piaced upon it s a c t iv it y
le s t i t produce .social re la tio n s h ip s th a t threaten.the. freedom o f those

• iV :' . la
w ith weaker w ills . The love o f power is prevalent in the modern w orld -
atid so cie ty must fin d the means: to.harness its - energies in n o n -e xp lo ita -
■' ■ *■ X
tiv e ways: 17 . • . .
■w . The Jove of*power is a p a rt of.norm al human nature,

but power philosophies [ lik e pragmatism] are, in a
. c e rta in precise sense, insane I f so cia l 1 if e .is J.
- to s a tis fy socia’l d e sire s, i t must be based upon > ’
„ some' philosophy not derived from the love o f power. 2 7 5
~ " The Power o f a Man (to tcjke i t u n iv e rs a lly ) is

his present means-fo obtain sbme fu tu re apparent
Good.!' , J ^ ‘
Leviathan, Everyman^ L ib ra ry , London, 1914, p.
^ ^Power, p. 36, Bay re fe rs to 'c o e rc iv e 1 and 'm a n ip u la tiv e '

power: 0£. c i t . , p. 259. * •. ^ .
Power, pp.' 258 and 261.
_ ' • ' 'v . ;<L
1 376
This is the task th a t Russell s£ts fo r his own so cia l and educational
philosophy. —-
R u sse ll's d is tin c tio n between the healthy and unhealthy aspects o f
power has been re fe rre d to as a 'power m otive' and a 'power d r iv e '.
Russell regards the w il l as n e cessa rily s h iftin g from one to the o th e r.
P sychologists, who make the d is tin c tio n , do n o t. They tend to regard
the development o f a power d riv e as an e xp ressio n .o f fru s tra tio n ., in
s e c u rity and compensation fo r a fe e lin g o f powerlessness by the young
c h ild : '
A 'power d riv e ' in the narrow sense, re s u lts from the

th w a rting o f the expansive-biological s tr iv in g [which
S u lliv a n re fe rs to as the 'power m o tiv e '], and-the
fe e lin g o f the lack o f a b il i t y . In other words, a
'power d riv e ' is 1 earned,°'resulting from the e a rly
fr u s tr a tio n o f the need to be, and to fe e l, capable,
to have a b il i t y , to have power. A 'power d riv e ' deve
lops as a compensation where there is a deep, growing, •
inn e r sense o f powerlessness because o f e a rly fr u s tr a
tio n o f the expanding, developing la te n t p o te n tia li
tie s o f the organism. L a te r a c c u ltu ra tio n and ex-
perfence may,-and fre q u e n tly does, add to the e a rly
fr u s tr a tio n and sense o f powerlessness. A person who
has a fe e lin g o f a b il i t y and power does not need to
gain, and w il l not seek dominance o r power over some
■one. A person who manifests a 'power d riv e ' does seek
to dominate o th e rs.277
:s
• ^ B a y : Op. c i t . , pp. 298-299. See also A dler: Op. e f t . ,

p. 5 9 ff fo r th e jjo s s ib le source o f R u sse ll's account o f power.
■j^ ^ P a t r i c k M ullahy: 'A Theory o f Interpersonal R elations and the
•Evolution o f P e rs o n a lity ' in Harry Stack S u lliv a n : Conceptions o f
Modern P sych ia try,'N.M., Norton and Co., New York, 1953, pp. 242-243.
The passage is quoted by Bay: Op. c i t . , pp. 1.64 and 298.
377
This underlines two weaknesses in R usse ll's account. F i r s t l y ; the
n a tu ral * Organic development o f the in d iv id u a l is towards the expres
sion o f p o w e rtlH rh e n o n -d ic ta to ria l sense o f a power motive. Provided
th a t the in d iv id u a l is given a sense o f s e c u rity he develops the capa
c itie s o f s e lf-e xp re ssio n and power which do not impinge upon the fre e -
•dom o f others. The natural development o f the in d iv id u a l is s o c ia lly
harmonious, not co m p etitive . This conception o f development Russel 1
abandoned w ith h is f i r s t organic concept o f the in d iv id u a l. Secondly, .
the .in d ivid u a l only'develops a power d riv e where his organic develop
ment is fru s tra te d and a* subsequent fe e lin g o f inadequacy re s u lts . An
in d iv id u a l only seeks power over others where his ca p acitie s and sense
o f s e c u rity are not developed. This im plies th a t instead o f placing
s t r i c t lim its upon the ca pacities o f the in d iv id u a l by lim itin g the
a c t iv it y o f his w i l l , . education should aim a t the f u l l development o f
the in d iv id u a l. This is again rem iniscent o f R u sse ll's organic concept
o f the in d iv id u a l. ; - 1 .
.As a re s u lt o f a d ra s tic s h if t in his conception o f the in d iv id u a l,
Russell seeks to l i m i t the .very ca p acitie s which could produce the
healthy and c o n s tru c tiv e development necessary fo r so cia l reconstruc
tio n . * His o v e rrid in g concern to channel the power o f the in d iv id u a l
in to cooperative a c t iv it ie s stems from a conception o f the w il l as
n ecessarily asocial and lik e ly to destroy c iv ilis a t io n if.g iv e n a fre e
r e in .
2 7 8 I b id . , pp. 298-299.
378 .
R u sse ll’ s pessimism concerning the mainsprings, of■■human a c tio n ,
found some support from h is experience in running Beacon; H ill School.
There fo rc e fu l in te rv e n tio n o f a d u lt a u th o rity was necessary in order

"0 ■ . -. . . •
to 1 im it the 'free, devel opment o f the c h ild .- Free development coul d not
be pursued as long as the re s u lt was the tyranny and poyer o f the strong
over the weak:
To le t the ch ild re n go fre e was to e s ta b lis h a reign .

of. te r r o r , in which the strong kept the weak trem bling
.-and m iserable. A school is lik e the w orld: only
government can prevent b ru ta l violence. And so I
found m yself, when the ch ild re n were not at.-lessons, 2 7 g
obliged to supervise them c o n tin u a lly to stop c ru e lty .
The o rg an isa tion o f the school required fa r more supervision than
Russell had imagined in order, to prevent chaos and d e s tru c tio n .
Tree development might a llow the p u rs u it o f s in is te r impulses
harmful not only to the c h ild but to others in the school community.
One in c id e n t among many-convinced .Russell o f the need fo r the fo rc e fu l
use o f a u th o rity in c o n tro l!in g :a ctio n stemming from such impulses. A
g i r l student attempted to k i l l her younger brother by p u ttin g a hatpin .
in th e soup a t a midday meal. I t tra n sp ire d th a t the two had been
brought up by a doting mother who demanded th a t the two show each other
280
an unreasonable amount o f a ffe c tio n . 1 Repressed fe e lin g s f i l i a l l y
emerged in th is h o s tile a c t. R u s s e ll's conclusion is as fo llo w s :
279The Autobiography o f Bertrand Russel 1,- V ol. . I I , p. 154.
30 Ib id . , pp. 154-155..
In. th e ''sch o ol, I found a very d e fin ite and; fo rc e fu l
e kercise o f a u th o rity necessary i f the weak.were not
to be oppressed. Such instances as: the hatpin in the
, soup could not be l e f t to the slow operation o f a
good environment, since the.need -for a c tio n was \
immediate and im perative.?® , . ' V;
In fa c t Russell had never denied the necessity o f a c tiv e ..a d u lt in t e r
vention in .the education o f the young c h ild .. The .purpose o f the p r in
c ip le o f reverence in the education o f the. organic in d iv id u a l was to
base the a u th o rity o f the adult; upon.‘ a respect and-care fo r the growing
• c h ild . The need fo r a c tiv e parental c o n tro l in the education o f the
mechahipal in d iv id u a l was exempT-iffed by R usse ll's methods in teaching
.h is son t o swim. However, the key d iffe re n c e is th a t Russell now re - -
gards s tro n g 'a u th o rity in education as having paramount importance in
order to co ntrol the s in is te r and asocial character o f the i.ndividual
from emerging in t o t a lly d e s tru c tiv e forms. For th is reason he. w rite s
o f Jttie account o f e a rly childhood education th a t he gave in On Education,
p r io r to the Beacon H ill experience, as fo llo w s : " I t seems to me now..-
somewhat unduly o p tim is tic in it s psychology . 11 I f human beings *
possess a d ic ta to r ia l w il l co n sta n tly seeking power over o th e rs , the
methods o f behavioural c o n d itio n in g are inadequate unless buttressed by
fo rc e . Y ' • .-Y;, T r ■; -':Y . Y ' Y :.
281 Ib id ., p. 192. ’ *. • ' • Y

• ■ 282
Ib id . , p. 151. Russell’ s c r itic a l view of Beacon H ill School
seems less than ju s tifie d and coloured by the breakdown of his rnianpage
. f . to Dora: see David Harley: ‘ Beacon H ill School.’ , R u s s e llT h e Journat
• * of the Bertrand Russell Archives, 35-36, Autumn-Winter 1979-80, esp.
pp. 15-16 and Joe Park: -Op. c i t . , pp. 122-124. ' Russell’s own evalua-
• tion in ‘ In-Our School 1, New Republic, LXVI11 (September 9, 1931) is fa r
L- ; -more favourable. See also Dora Russell: ’Beacon H i l l ' - i n Trevor
B lew itt (e d .): The Modern Schools Handbook, Victor Gollancz, London,
1934, pp. 29-42. " ;
' .* i ' ■
■’ _ ■ . ■■.y-. ’ ■'
-■ 380 y y V...', ■;■■■•' :■'■...;
'; :;V :Vv ;':-v .' - v - - /•'': !
j? . ; B. Power and Universal Love :.' ■ r- • ,
. Y Upon examination, the ju s tific a tio n fo r Russel 1 's concept of the
pre-sbcial in d iv id u a l, as motivated fay a d ic ta to ria l w ill., is^ques-
tionable.' He gives the impression that his theory is based upon obser-
• vation of the f o llie s of men rushing w tllin g ly to war, coupled with .
; knowledge'of the theoretical principles of psychology and psyc-ho-
analysis. This would be the method of the empirical s c ie n tis t. It
y appears more lik e ly that Russel 1 proceeds as a mathematician with. * ’
’;y ■ ; certain a. p rio ri assumptions about human nature, generated, hot by. .
^ ; observation but by the history of liberalism and its -fa ilu re s .* • ..It
is d if f ic u lt to imagine what kind o f empirical evidence could -ju s tify .
j - the .foil ow'ing statement, "except an appeal/to the assumptions, of ’ common
y >■ • sense': " ■■ -> .y ' ' ■ "
' Every collection of human beings in habitual close

proximity develops a' herd feeling which is shown in *
; . a certain in stin ctive uniformity of behaviour, and v
" ^ ' i n hosti 1 it y to any individual having,the same. ►, ■■■>■
proximity but not f e l t as one of fhe group.285 . • ,
’’ . y .y' - ■ i y ! 'f ‘ . •
Not only does the notion of-•"’ herd fe e lin g 1 smack of e litis m but common
sense is an unreliable, guide for reaching s c ie n tific tru th . By a t t r i -
buting such notions ais. herd feeling and a d ic ta to ria l w ill to the
I in divid ual’ s .in s tin c tiv e apparatus Russell advocates a concept of 5
, y natural man as asocial. The evidence fo r this view Russell then presents
i ..-. . ' . 1 . _ -
^ T h e Autobiography, Vol. I I , p. 17.
• 284 " ■ ..
See H. Parris: Op: c i t . ,* pp. 56-94.-
285 ^
Education and the Social Order, pp. .88-89. Cf. P a rris : 0 £.
c i t . , p. 91V -
. \
n
,a£ i f it'w ere based on '.■observation' of men and women in society^'., in
•fa c t, ifm a y well.be.based upon a priori- deductions about*human nature.
In e ith e r case, Russell f a ils prey to Rousseau’ s criticism s of ^philo-’ .
sophical -accounts o f the state of nature:
\ . . . a l l of them', constantly speaking of need; a v id ity , .. *=';

^ 'oppression, desires, and pride \ ‘ have■transferred to
. the estate of nature ideas which they acquired in ' : ' ;
- society; they have spoken of savage man,- but depicted ' t
o' ” social man.286 : ‘ ' '• "■
Social man may-well be as Russell depicts/him ,;but this does- not .entail L-.-
. ■ that man's nature is o f the same type. . " -
Moreover, i f Russell’s account is correct then how does^ he (“propose
1 to educate men to manifest universal loVe to. th e ir fellows? In Education ’

* * t .'.’ S' , * • ,
. . and the Social Order, I t h in k 'it .is clear th a t hi's answer is toi develop
^®^Jean-Jacques ‘Rousseau: 'Discourse on Inequality Among Men'-, in

The Essential Rousseau (translated by'. Lowe\V B la ir) y. The êwÂmefiCan’ '
” Library,' New York, 1974, p. 144.' Throughout. his social andeducational
writings Russell expresses disagreement with Rousseau and his followers.
In The Autobiography, Vol. I , p. 209 he states his disagreement with
Rousseau1s>abandonment of discip lin e. In P rin cip les'o f Social Recon-t
stru ction, Chapter 5, he again c ritic is e s Rousseau's approach to s e lf- 7
disci piine. In On Education, p. 33, Russell contrasts his behaviourist- '
concept-of. the individual with- Rousseau‘ s. -In Education and the Social .
Order, pp. 3 0 -3 2 ,,he suggests that Roussedu's ’ negative,theory of edu
cation' is open to the'same arguments as la is s e r fa ir e liberalism in
p o litic s and economics. ' A recent, well a rticu lated c ritiq u e o f the ■
romanticism of Rousseau and Neil 1 fs-contained in Robin Barrow' s Radical
Education, Martin Robertson, ‘London, 1978,.Chapters. 1-4. A provocative
analysis and. defence of N e ill is made by F ri.th jo ff .Bergmann in On- Being *
Free, University of NotreDame Press, Notre Dame, 1977, Chapter 6 . Jon
Fennell defends Rousseau against the c ritic is m of John Dewey and other?
in 'Dewey on Rousseau: Natural Development'as the Aim of Education1,
The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol..'13, No. 2, August 1979,
pp. 113-114. * ■
•«
3ff2
the correct set of emotional habits in childhood and back this-up with
the absolute power of the vyoi>ld state le s t the process not be completely
iiccessf u l . The primacy of the individual, w ill is too great a risk to
isatTSft^pjrbe. allowed its .freedom. C ivil isation must therefore
control ‘the w i l \ where, f t cannot educate i t to becom^harHjionious and
universa 11y .,1o v in E ls e w h e r e , Russe 11 upholds the Buddhistic concern
with human suffering and knowledge against Nietzsche's philosophy of

j \.
power, which.he sees\as based oh the metaphysical and ethical, primacy of
} 287
, the w ill Yet ultim’ately he can only appeal to the emotions, in -the
form of a b e lie f in universal love,, as the ultim ate argument against

-‘i. ♦ pOQ *
Nietzsche. He expresses a vague hope that the world w ill no longer
continue to resemble Nietzsche's description of i t , but advances no
specific, proposals as to how this is to be achieved. Given Russell
1 - starting-po int of the dominance of the individual w i l l , i t is unsur-
prising that he advocates, the use of force by the wor|d state to control
289 . \ ,
the individual. In the meantime the freedom.bf the individual must
be controlled and await a renaissance fo r one or two centuries.
PP7 * . •
A History, of Western Philosophy, pp. 728 and 739.
2 8 8 Ib id ,, p. 739.
289
Indeed i t could be argued that while the key difference between
Russell and Nietzsche is that Russell's ethic is aimed a t.th e good and
preservation of, mankind and Nietzsche's is concerned with the good of
an a ris to c ra tic m inority, both advocate the establishment of an in te r
national ruling class as the means to th e ir respective ends: Ib id . ,
"■-I1 pp. 731 and 736. Both view the individual as motivated prim arily by.
power, which Nietzsche extolls and Russell sees'as the outcome of .fear;
Ib id . ,' pp. 734-735. Moreover, Russell's .description of Nietzsche as a
"passionate in d iv id u a lis t", an opponent o f the state who maintains an
"aris to c ra tic anarchism" and ,r. . .wants an international ruling race, who
are to be the'lords of the earth" ( Ib id : , pp. 729-731) is , with the
provisos ju s t mentioned, not so very d iffe re n t from his own case.
.In th-is chapter I have analysed the asocial concept o f the indiviv
dual, his constituent elements, the manner in which he is presently
educated as a citizen of the nation-state and Russell's proposals to
replace the nation-state with the world state. I have argued that
Russell fa ils to reconcile the conflicting demands of the education of
the individual and the education o f the»citizen whijaMBjp considers
fundamental. His emphasis is upon the education of the c itize n who •
learns to cooperate.as a member of the world state. The state deprives
the individual of the freedom to. develop his own capacities and hence
of the opportunity to establish those elements of individual c u ltu re -
't h a t constitute his well-being (s p e c ific a lly , an internal harmony bet-

* * V
-ween in te lle c t, emotion and w i l l ) . I have suggested that the reason for
Russell's emphasis upon the education of the c itize n is 'his view of the
individual, w ill as self-subsistent, God-like and d ic ta to ria l. Without-
s t r ic t lim its placed upon i t the individual w ill asserts it s e lf in
’* powe^-seeking, asocial. ways in its relationships with others. The
e. /d ic tato ria l w ill becomes a threat to the su rv iv a l-o f c iv ilis a tio n unless
•* *
the world state transforms i t into the cooperative w ill of the c i t i z e ^
F in a lly , I have questioned the truth of Russell's account of the d icta
to ria l w i ll, suggesting that i t . i s based upon u n ju s tifie d , a prio ri
assumptions about human nature.
The contrast between the good of the .individual and that of the
1 - -
c itize n is -s trik in g . The asocial individual comprises a tria d of
in te lle c t, emotion and w ill whose good consists of an internal harmony
between the three. This requires the f u ll development of his in te lle c t,
- educated in the s c ie n tific method, the fre e expression of his emotions
and the development of his w i ll, which is the source of his power to’
e ffe c t change. The harmonising element is the w i l l , which brings a
sense of order, unity and discipline to the individual *s a c tiv ity . This*,
however, is problematical because the w ill stands in an antagonistic
relationship with the other two elements. I t threatens to dominate
in te lle c tu a l development with a love of power and s t if le the emotions
completely. This antagonistic relationship between the constituent
elements of the individual becomes more pronounced,in the in d iv id u a l’ s
• relationship with others.
The good of th e 'c itiz e n consists of an external-harmony with the
w ills of others. In order to e ffe c t i t , the individual w ill must learn
to be cooperative.. Education, conducted by nation-states, fa ils in
this task. It"stim ulates the competitive aspects o f the w ill prim arily
through the propaganda of m ilita n t nationalism, the source of disharmony
and war. Nationalism constitutes the greatest threat to the survival
o f c iv ilis a tio n . The means to resolving the problem o f external harmony
consists in the establishment-of a world state. The resu lt w ill replace
nationalism with internationalism , which;vyi 1 1 create a sense o f unity
among -all members of the human race. The world s ta te , founded on the
power o f the strongest single nation-state, w ill possess a monopoly of
arms to be used against nation-statfes considered a th reat to world
peace. I t w ill also have a ju diciary and executive- to enforce
international agreements. I t has the rig h t to Intervene in the in te r
nal a ffa irs of nation-states where^tfjeir educational systems teach
nationalism or other subversive doctrines. The power of the world
state to coerce both nation-states and individuals is ir r e s is tib le :
" I f nations have no rig h t to consider themselves 'in is o la tio n ', the
■' . 290
same may be said- for the i n d i v i d u a l I n proposing this means to
establishscooperation and secure the survival of c iv ilis a tio n , Russell
suggests that the education o f the individual w ait a t least a century
for a renaissance.
Th^ irony of Russell's proposals fo r the world state is profound.
The in ten t is to place absolute lim its upon the individual w i l l , con
sidered a threat to the survival of c iv ilis a tio n . The resu lt is to
grant positions of power fo executives who possess the strongest of
w ills . Concerned with lim itin g the a c tiv itie s of the d ic ta to ria l w ill,:
"■Russell confers the/major positions o f economic and p o litic a l power
..upon individuals whose actions are largely determined by love of power.
The dangers o f ’this proposal ares magnified by the extent to which such
individuals use science as a means of organisation in the world s tate.
The s c ie n tific organisation of c iv ilis a tio n , integral to the world :
s ta te , deadens the free and humane s p ir it but is a necessity to which
the individual c itize n must learn to submit. The problem is that
s c ie n tific organisation, used by a ruling class whose main in te re s t is
: Op, c i t . , p. 627,
power, is lik e ly to re su lt in the omnipotence of technique or the
desire to?control‘ both human and non-human nature; This could produce
tyranny oh an unprecedented scale, p a rtic u la rly since the power o f the
world staê-. and its authority to crush rebellions is 'absolute.
In ium, Russell fa ils t o ‘resolve the dichotomy between the con- /
f lic t in g demands of the individual and the c itiz e n . He does not suggest
.any e ffe c tiv e means by which the "individual can defy the in e v ita b ility :
of s c ie n tific technique or the ir r e s is t it le power of the world state to
coerce and control his opinions. The free development of the individual
is abandoned In favour o f.th e necessity o f controlling both nationalism
and'the d ic ta to ria l w ill =in the name of world peace. Through-the con
ception of the world as one large p o litic a l and economic u n it, Russell
creates a structure which stands in to ta l opposition to the individual
and the fu ll development of his capacities.
. CHAPTER SIX '
CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have shown that the concept of the individual in
RusselTs educational philosophy underwent several profound changes.
The changes indicate a ,remarkable ^transition in his thought about the .
fundamental questions that have confronted social'and educational
•philosophers throughout the western^philosophical tra d itio n : What is
human nature?- What are the lim its to human freedom? How do. these
relate to the aims of education?v* And what kind of society should we
s triv e to build? Russell’ s answers to a ll these questions changed in
, the peri«d from the F irs t World War to the beginning of the Second
World War, during which he was intim ately concerned (among other things)
with the education of his own children, the running o f a ’ free school1
and the theoretical questions of educational philosophy.

' ■ . " J " ■. ; .
I t is unsurprising that world events should have affected Russell’ s
thinking since his aim throughout is to provide "a basjis fo r p o litic a l
philosophy more capable of standing erect in .a time of c ris is than the
philosophy of -traditional Liberalism has shbwn i t s e l f to'be" J As
Russell saw the society of his youth destroyed by the F irs t World War,
he concerned himself with the reconstruction of a new social order that
would release the energy o f human beings in constructive ways.
^Principles of Social Recohstruction, p. 9.
387
Subsequent disillusionment With the Bolsheviks' attempt.to establish
a s o c ia lis t society and increasing concern about a world war that would
destrby c iv ilis a tio fi, shattered RusseYlIs* hopes for a free society.that
actively promoted individual development. His overriding concern be
came. the •^stab'lis^Tient of a global economic, politicalnjnd-eûcational

'■' > V -- ' - ^
order that would pre'vere^’ civi lisat.ion from destroying i t s e l f .; Individual
freedom became subordinate tpjthe higher( good of maintaining the sur
vival of the human/race. Russell hoped that a fte r a long period of •
• decline, individual freedom, k e p t'alive by the s c ie n tific a ttitu d e of
• the bureaucrats of the world*state would undergo a renaissance.^ In

• *' > / i "
the'intertm , individual freedom and development must be kept firm ly in
. • " . X ■' ■
chedk. —
Concomitant: with Russell’s growing pessimism about modern society
is a pessimism about human nature. - His view of the mainsprings of human
action changes, from that of impulses, grounded in the innate principle
of growth, that directs them in constructive, harmonious directions to
that of a God-like d ic ta to ria l w ill jthat Seeks to dominate others and
deprive them of th e ir freedom. The former view is consistent with
Russell's conception of the role of society as prompting individual
development. The la t t e r coincides with his conception of the necessity
of the world state to c u rta il the power-seeking individual in order to
secure world peace. .
Êducation and the Social Order, pp. 27-28, 86 and 243.
points in Russell's changing analysis of the individual; I ;£ti4 l _3 recall
the fundamental dilemma to which his educational philosophy is. addressee
. ‘ .and analyse his increasingly restricted-conception o f freedom*and s e lf-:
development. I shall conclude with an argument for a society based on 1
, organic individual. • v ;. / . •
■i ■ • ' 3 ■ ■ V' "-;. ; v . ‘ • ■ ...
' In b r ie f,. Russell's concept o f'th e individual in his educational
. philosophy underwent the three following transitions: • s
• 1. The Organic In divid ual: In Principles of Social Reconstruction \
• y ; . Russell upholds a concept of the indi vidual as an organic being*endpwed
with a ce n tral, in nate'p rinciple o f growth,from which. Spring his v ita l
I ' impulses. He describes the principle of growth as "an in stin c tiv e
[• urgency leading them [men*and women] in a certain directio n , as trees
• seek, the lig h t" : The task of education, lik e that of a ll social iifc :
■. s titu tio n s , is to enhance and develop personal, growth and s'timklate
constructive impulses which make f o r - l i f e and interpersonal ha'rmony.

i V v .-I"''..; ■■■ ' .'V . : :-
. | ' ~2. .- The Mechanical Indi vidual: In 'On Education Russell adopts a
wj ' behaviourist .concep.tpf the-individual '(in this context, the child) in
. which reflexes and instinctjs are quickly overlaid with habits. He con-
•I siders the individual as basically.a complex kind of machine. The task
. o f education is .to develop the correct-set of habits, enabling<the chile
Principles o f SQcia 1 Reconstruction, p. 24. /
... ^
'' v ■’ ”r.. ..'■■■... „•&/.. . ■
:
■■/'.■ .. V 1-. .. .-t :
: 1 j -'' ‘ ■" A,;.- . • S-L A -v.\.:
390
to pursue constructive. activ.ities_without any sense of hi? instincts
being thwarted.
3'. The.Asocial In d iv/id

idual:
u a l: In Education and the Social Order Russell
proposes a concept of th,e i ndiividual

i as possessing in te lle c t, emotion
and-will as fundamental'elements. The indi vidual ’ s wi 11 is basically
self-subsistent" and asocial. The ta s k'o f education is twofold: to
integrate each of the elements into an internal harmony, a t the same
time producing an external harmony between his w ill and the w ills of
others as members of the community. -
This b rie f encapsulation of the transitions in R ussell's. concept
of the individual underlines an..important dilemma in his-educationa*’!

■■ ■■■■■■ \ ■■■ ■"*
philosophy. The. dilemma is this: given the two main, conflicting aims
o f ed u c a tio n ''-^ e ^ d u c a tio h of the individual and the education of the

■ ■_ ;*■ * ’ ■•4 -. *-• •
c itizen - how are they to he reconciled? Are;.we to-educate fo r the h
•free’ development of personal capacities? Or are we to educate in d iv i-
duals so.as to adapt to th e ir society and v m l i ingly

i accept th e ir role
\
as citizens? Russell 's temperament seems•to'favour the f i r s t of these
a ite rn a tii v e s ^• He 'prizes individual 1ib e rty , especially freedom of
thought, as a fundamental good.® Yet he recognises the danger,?., to
s ta b ility Which .this freedom may pose in the modern world. The com-
p lexity of>modern society, in which an in divid ual's actions may have a '
‘4This antithesis is s.tated most clearly in, Education and the Social
Order, Chapters 1 and 16. '
®Bode: ‘ Op. e f t . , p. 632.- •
^ P o litic a l Ideals, Cha'pter 5.
" • .. ■ — ! ' *21 •
391
direct e ffe c t on large numbers o f people unknown to him and in which
the 'uncontrolled anarchy o f international relations may result in war,'
which to ta lly destroys human c iv ilis a tio n , suggest the need fo r a new
emphasis in education. A new educational philosophy (indeed a new
social and p o litic a l philosophy) is' needed Which maintains, the truths,
contained in liberalism , at the-same. time"^dapting and modifying them
■ to the changed conditions" of twentieth'century society. The transitions
^ in Russell's concept of ,the individual chart the course of this .proposed
revision of liberalism . They point to a -gradual move away from an
- emphasis upon education as a means of enhancing individual freedom to
education conceived as a means o f .controlling individual behaviour. --
.They show an unmistakeable s h ift in emphasis in Russell^s^thought from
the f i r s t to the second horn of the dilemma which he confronts.
Russell's conceptions of individual freedom and self-development
become increasingly.restricted with the adoption Of each concept of the
individual. The freedom available to the individual shrinks from that /

:/T
of the ful 1 development of his capacities ( in the organic in divid ual)..
to the subordination of self-development to the maintenance o f a stable,
s c ie n tific c iv ilis a tio n (in the asocial in d iv id u a l). As Russell adopts
citizenship as the primary aim of education, he truncates the notion of
• individual freedom; Representing this move diagrammatically, we get
the /feT40wing: \. ■ ■
^ Org^nic In d iv id u a l: Principle of Growth V Freedom .
V M e c h W jo a fu id i Vi dua.l: •. * \ v‘ H a b it (Freedom)
’ ; ---v' Asocial In d iv id u a l: ;' W ill Fr&KQm
392
In each case the element to the le f t of the arrow represents the source
- - ... 's
of the individual's freedom.'. As this changes,, the lim its- to be placed
upon the individual become more re s tric tiv e and self-development ceases
to be the fundamental aim of education. I shall now examine the three
accounts of individual freedom represented above-. "
Russell's concept.of the organic individual implies that freedom
only has meaning in relation to an a p rio ri structure which places con
straints upon his development. The organisational forms that determine
the development of human freedom and knowledge originate in the. innate
structure of the human being. The use of language is one example of
human development which combines the fre e , creative use o f lin g u is tic
symbols with a structure governed by s t r ic t organisational rules:
There is an in terp lay, a complex relationship between'

constraints and rules and creative behavior. I f there
is no system of rules, no system o f constraints, no
set of forms, then creative behavior is quite un
thinkable. Someone who is throwing paints a t a wall
•
in an arb itra ry fashion is*not acting creatively as aji
a r t is t . S im ilarly some system of constraints and forms
and principles and rules is presupposed as a basis for
any kind of creative a c tio n .' .
On this view both freedom and knowledge have meaning only in relation
to in trin s ic principles of mental organisation that place absolute
lim its upon what can be known. Freedom is only tTuly enjoyed when i t
■X
7 \ ' .
Noam Chomsky: ‘Toward a Humanistic Conception o.f Education1,
op. c i t . , pp. 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 .
r .r -— . .■ ■ .
8 ,
Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, p. 49.
-393
stems from the internal core, of the in divid ual, rather than from ex- .
1 - ' .
♦
*
eternal factors:* More.precisely., free., creative action is the result of
interaction between the in trin s ic ' nature of the individual and his .
erfvironmentv The la tte r promotes or retards the unique pattern of
development whose source lie s in the innate principle of. growth. The
principle of growth imposes s t r ic t lim its upon the creative action of

* . . . .■•■■■■■ ■ •• ■■ « .
the -individual. ■ ‘ . ' . .
By contrast, Russell’s concept of the mechanical individual ’implies
■-'that freedom only has meaning in re la tio n 1 to a learned set of .habits
that place constraints upon his development. Freedom and knowledge only
develop in a disciplined individual who has learned to perform basic
tasks- automatically.' Their automatic performance results from the .
establishment of correct habits. Free, creative^Jehaviour is only pos
sible on the basis of the building blocks produced by habit formation.
The organisational principies that 1 im it human knowledge and freedom no
longer originate in the innate structure o f the mind.* There is no
’ longer any permanent principle of growth to exert this function, simply .
instincts that are in fin ite ly malleable by the environment. The origin
of<-the lim its *to human action lies in the environment; more precisely',
in the e ffe c t that the environment has upon the innate characteristics
of the in divid ual. The greater the e ffic a c y of the formation of habits,
the more lik e ly is the individual to pursue paths of development en
hancing his freedom. Because the structure o f this' development*is
determined by habits learned from sources e te rn a l to himv the scope of
fre e , creative action open to the individual is far.more lim ited . In
order to be.fpee, the individual's behaviour must f ir s t , be controlled
by the envfrfonmemt of. adults. This environment, conditions the in d iv i
dual in isuoh a way40at i t builds habits onto his character th at are
not integral to i t . The interaction -between the individual and his
environment is a m atter:of passively.acquiring correct habits. Habits
give theTndividual a'sense of freedom that is.n ot to ta lly his own be
cause the lim its to that freedom do not proceed from .his"innate principle
of growth. Freedom consists of adapting, with the minimum of fuss, to
an environment controlled by powerful adu1ts„who use both the techniques
• of modern psycho!ogy and force, where necessary. I f ’the process is
successful, the child acquires "a sense o f unfettered spontaneity.!1. ..
I f i t is not, the results are problematical to his development and pjrp=—
• duce.a profounchconflict be.tween his wants and the demands of his en
vironment, resulting in' repression and neurosis-. Whether successful or
not, the sense of individual freed.om stemming from the In ternalisation
of correct habits is severely lim ited .
The implications of this conception of freedom upon Russell's ;• 7
account o f education is profound. The" fearless freedom" that in d iv i
duals develop is ’ a matter of adaptation to tjne habits sanctioned by ;
adult a u th o fity . Individual freedom is. not based upon organic develop
ment but upon adaptation to the patterns of development sanctioned by
others, i t ' 5s .in this sense that Russell now writes of freedom in
'S~T • ■ . ....
education: ' ^ ,
Q . '
| - On Education, p. 247.
395
C, ' A generation educated in fearless freedom w ill have

v ■>. wilder and bolder hopes than are possible to us, who
s t i l l have to struggle w ith'the super$titious fears
that li e in w ait fo r us below the level of con-' r
sciousness JO f' T J •■■■'
V
Russell' s concept of the asocial individual impiies tha't freedom*
V " s t e m s from tt e individual w ill ‘ and requires s t r ic t lim its pt aced uôn i t
le s t i t asserVîtself in anti-social WayS.- On th^jm e hand, the w ill
of the individual is to be developed since i t is in the course of
exercising .power, that he "becomesvan e ffe c tiv e member of the community"^
I t is th e .w ill, indeed, that serves'âs a b rid g e ‘between the' individual
and the community*. ~OrT the other hand, the w ill of the individual ,r Con- .
sidered in is o la tio n , is that of a d icta to r: ' "The w ill of the in d iv i- ,
dual considered in isolation is the god-Tike w ill which says ' l e t -such
things b e '." As such i t is a n ti-s o c ia l, self-subsistent and strives
: > fo r domination and power over others. The wi 11 of the c itiz e h , however,’
îs quite d iffe re n t and aims fo r cooperation:
' "He [the c itiz e n ] is aware that his w ill is not the
. ■ only.one in the world, and he is concerned, in one
way or another, to bring harmony out of the conflicting ,
" •. w ills that exist within his community. ...T h e fundamental .
characteristic of the citizen is that he co-operates,
^ in intention i f not in fa c t J 3
J ° Ib i d ., p. 248.
Êducation and the Social Order, p. 12,

t 12
,1;" ' Ib id ... :
I r' * ..’ -i^ ;
F I b i d . , pp. 12-13,
As such, the w ill of the citizen .is social, cooperative and strives for
^harmony with the w ills of others. There is a parallel here between
self-development and Social development in the asocial individual.’
former comprises an internal harmony between the three elements consti
tu tin g , the in divid ual, while the la t t e r comprises an external harmony
with the w ills of other individuals .^4 Yet this p a ra lle l in noway ^
solves the problem of h.ow education is to tu r n a d ic ta to ria l w ill into
a cooperative one. I t m&y do so a t the expense o f individual, freedom
fo r, asRussell recognises, the individual w ill is not wholly bad:
. . . i t may be h’eld that w& ahall ultim ately be better

iV .citizens i f we are f i r s t avriare of a ll our p o te n tia li-
■v tie s as individuals before Ve descend to the comprb-
• mises and practical acquiescences of the p o litic a l
. V - ' i i f e ^ 15 . .... . •
The compromises to which Russell alludes require the individual to give
up much of the'freedom which constitutes his own good.
S tric te r lim its on individual behaviour are the price that must be
paid for l i f e in modern in dustrial’ society:
1. / ‘IndiviauaKs’rfi, although i t .is important not to

.• •' ‘ forget its claims, needs, in a densely populated .
industrial world, to be morecontrolled; even in
individual psychology, than in previous tim e s J 6
| . 14Ib id ., p, 244.
1- 15Ib id ., p. 12.
£_•••.. ' _
f . 16Ib id .,' p. 243.
This remark is inconsistent with the objections which Russell himself
* advances against propaganda in education as destructive o f the scien
t i f i c temper of mind. I t is hard to reconcile with^his own emphasis
upon the respect fo r objective tru th , which comprises the basis of. the
s c ie n tific a ttitu d e and the cognitive well-being of the individual.
Moreover, i t seems inconsistent with his objections to the manner in
which propaganda in s t ills suitable emotions in°the young, preventing
the development of fearlessly fre e , emotionally happy individuals, who

18
wish to c'reate a b e tte r world. External control of individual psycho
logy may well prevent the very emotions which Russell wishes education
to enhance in the in divid ual. Moreover, such control is lik e ly to crush
the in divid ual's w i ll, leaving him with a sense of powerlessness and
apathy. An apathetic, lis tle s s individual is unlikely to engage in the
c r itic a l a c tiv ity of s c ie n tific endeavour, have the-vwillpower to main
tain unpopular beliefs in the- name o f truth or express, happy, expansive'
emotions.
The absolute control of the individual exerted’ by the world state
(in the form of propaganda, overwhelming m ilita ry force and v ir tu a lly .
unlimited power) is clearly a n tith e tic a l to in dividual freedom and s e lf-
i development. Russell does not so much abandon the view that in theory
the education of the individual for individual freedom and*development
17Ib id . , pp. 22-25. T’
18Ib id ., pp. 56, 64 arid 222-225.
398
is a worthwhile a c tiv ity . . I t is rather that in practice this ideal
must be sacrificed to the overriding necessity of educating the citizen
.. within the context of a world state:
: ' t . Considered sub specie ae t e r n it a t is , the education of

the .individual i s . to my mind a fin e r thing than the
education of the c itiz e n ; but considered p o litic a lly ,
in. relation to the needs of the time, the education,
of the c itize n must, I fe a r, take the f i r s t place
There is a further reason for the increasingly re s tric tiv e concept
of freedom operant in Russel 1's. concept of the indi vidu al. He abandons '
the notion o f s p ir it which harmonises the lives o f in stin c t and ynind in
the organic in dividual. S p ir it, which is a constituent element pf the
organic in d ivid u al, transforms in stin c tiv e love into a universal love
for mankind. I t thereby o b je ctifie s and places i t beyond the criticism
of mind. S p irit s o lid ifie s the in divid ual's -freedom by placing the
objects to which the in stin c tiv e principle of growth attends on a uni
versal level (love of mankind, tru th , beauty, goodness). As the har-

♦ - •’ ^ •»
mpnising-element withirr the in d ivid u al, s p ir it universalises the instincts
I' stemming from his- principle of growth and enhances the free inquiry into
matters, of universal concern (mathema'tics,. philosophy, a rt e t c .) . In
the mechanical individual', habit harmonises in s tin c t and re fle x . But
habit is neither fu lly integral to the individual, (being learned from
the ^nvirohment from the e a rlie s t age) nor capable of uni versa l i sing
^ 19Ib id ., pp. 27-28.
,\
r
'• i f l
*8>
399-
the instincts in the manner of s p ir it . I t merely channels in stin c t"in
. , _ socially acceptable ways. S im ila rly, in th/a asocial in d ivid u al, the
w ill attempts to harmonise in te lle c t and emotion. Because of it s dic
ta to ria l character, it^stands in an antagonistic, po ten tially dominant
- relationship with them’both and requires the strong authority of the
' world-state to prevent i t from also dominating o th e rs ..T h e s t r ic t
lim ire p la c ed upon the development of the w ill prevent the free develpp-
j; ment that produces s p iritu a l understanding in the organic individual-.
, w In this way, the fre e , unique development of the organic individual,
rooted in his innate structure, is fu rth e r impeded by the dropping of
the s p ir it in Russell’ s la te r mechanical and asocial individuals.
i ' *
In sum, I:am arguing that Russell f a ils to reconcile the-conflicting
demands of individual development and citizenship in his educational
philosophy. As.his concept of the individual changes, Russell abandons
individual freedom and development in favour of citizenship o f the ;

' 20' '
world state as the aim of education.
The d iffic u lty of Russell’s task in reconciling the conflicting
claims, of individual freedom and citizenship as aims o f education should
20 / \
Greenspan makes the s.ame case with regard to Russell’ s p o litic a l
philosophy:
Russell as a lib e rta ria n and even an anarchist is p e r fe c tly
convincing, and some of his w ritings are among the1great
documents of that persuasion. Russell as a geopolitical
r e a lis t prepared to lay the foundations of a good world
with the forces of a super power is equally present. I- do
not believe, however, that he brought these themes together
j convincingly a t a l l .
0{>. c i t . , p. 7.
V 400
not blind us to/th e fa c t that there are a ltern ative answers th a t can be •
gitfen.to those questions. We are not obliged to accept Russel 1 1sr-world
state-as the only means, to .preserve the survival of mankind. Throughout
this thesis I have suggested that the organic concept o f the individual
is more adequate than the others fo r the following reasons:
1. I t articu lates a conception of the human, being as developing his .
capacities to the ful l on- the basis o f an organic principle o f growth
that is both unique and a lin k with the rest of, the human species. Man
is a creative being who develops his capacities to the utmost when
ac tively involved in free productive labour.
2. I t articu lates a conception o f the aims of education and society as
enhancing the development of the in d iv id u a l. Such a society actively
stimulates the in d iv id u a l’ s freedom, grounded in his principle of growth,
by means of democratic in stitu tio n s responsive to this task. Where they

■ ’ 21
f a i l , in stitu tio n s are to be discarded as so much re s tric tiv e clothing.
’ ■ ■■ ■ " •
3. ■ I t a rticu lates ar conception o f citizenship within 'a decentralised,
federal state that is consistent w ith.the aim of promoting individual
development. There is no necessary incom patibility between; citizenship
in a democratic state and the free, development of one's capacities. Each
is complementary where the state a c tively promotes individual growth
rather than Suppresses i t :
21
Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 42. Macpherson: 02.. c i t . ,
pp. 93-115 proposes a model o f participatory democracy along simiTar
lines to Russell .“
o
;; '^ .--v
The ultimate ju s tific a tio n o f a democratic society • •

* lie s in the (levelopment o f ...t h e independent . :^
individual, the unique person. We must in s is t on •
the rig h t not to be>un ified; upon the 1rig h t not. to
be integrated; upon'the rig h t to an independent vieW-
• point that is not. to ta lly famished, by a single ’ ;
organisation, state or lesser; on the right" to be
conscientious objecters within ,the state, the union,
and the corporation. _-2n a word, we must in s is t on
. th e -rig h t to privacy. 22- - ;v' . i
Russel’T's social and educational philosophy provides a vision o f such a
society, only to abandon i t ‘in favour of one in which freedom has become
obsol eti
Clark Kerr: 'What‘Became o f the Independent S p ir it ?1 Fortune

July 1953, p. 136 quoted in Bay: Op. c i t . , p; 64.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"I> Works By Russell
A.- Books. ’
A/C ritic a l:E x p o s itio n ‘of the Philosophy o fjL e ib n iz, Cambridge University
: .Press, M900; (Second Edition; George Allen and Unwin, London,
1937) \ v ; ■' : •
A History o f Western Philosophy: Its Connection w ith .P o litic a l and

Social Circumstances from the Earl ie s t Times'1to the Present Day,
George Allen and Unwin, London, 1945. ■" ~^ " •.
Afi Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, George Allen", and Unwin, London, 1940..
Authority and the In divid ual, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1949.
Education and the Social Order, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1 9 3 2 .'
Freedom and Organization 181^1914, George Allen and Unwin,-London, 1934
German Social Democracy, Longmans, Green and Company, London, 189*6.
f Human Knowledge: I t s Scope and Limits,. George Allen and Unwin, London,
r m a. - ' ~ '■ ♦
Human Society in Ethics and P o litic s * George Allen and Unwin, London,
~ 1954/ ' ■ — — ----------- ■
In Praise of Idleness and Other £s, "George'Allen and Unwin, London,

1935. • •... ■ '
Marriage and Morals, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1929.
My Phiiosophfcal Development, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1959,.

%■ ' , _r: X
Mysticism and Logic and OthetvEssays, Longman, Green and Company, London
' 1918.
On Education: Especially in Ekciy Childhood, George Allen and UnWin,

London, 1926. ” " . " ~
Our Knowledge of the External World, TGeorge Allen and Unwin, London,
1914. .
PhilosophicaL EsSays, Longmans, 6reen and Company, London,.1910.
P o litic a l Id eals, The Century Co., New York, 1917. (Reprinted by Unwin
. Books, London, 1963). .
r X X. ‘ 402 X ; ' .. : v -. • ■
Power: A New Social Analysis, W.W.. Norton Srvd Co..,-New York, 1938.‘ ‘
;V - - . ' ' ' ' ■V ." . ’ !■ * Y
i Principies j!>f^$dci aj- Reconstruction, George Allen and Unwin, London, ,
> •;■f, ... ■ 1916.
iI
■y
, F ' Boads to 'Freedom: Soci-alisnu Anarchism and Syndicalism, George Al len.
. ’ • and Unwin,. London, 1918..;,
i..-. v ’ ' ' ;■ ■ . ' V Y . ... ' ...........
Y - Sceptical E s s a y s George A11en and Unwin; London, 1928. ...
. ' I ' \ '/ '** Y . . ^ . . . . . ; v - v ;•
' ' The Analysis of Mind, George-Allen and Unwin, London, 1921.
y. The Autobiography, V olg.. f* and ;2,. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1967.
' :■ '■. ’ ~ ^ ~ ■. ■" '■y y ■’ - ‘ *. ■'
'S . The Conquest o f Happiness , George Alien and Unwin, London-, 1929.
The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, George Allen and Unwin, London,
■■. ... • - 1920. - • ; r~ : . . y ./;; r ;:,y;
:‘ V The Problems of Phi losophy, - Home University Library, 1912. -(Reprinted-

—• ;: ' by Oxford University Press,'1967). •
; The Prospects of Industrial Ci vi l.isation, (In Col laboration with Dora

1 . .. ' Bussell), The Century Co., New York, 1923. ■ :
~ The Scientl Outlook, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1931. y y . - y y
Unpopular Essaysy George Allen and Unwin, London, 1950. \
B. * A rticles ' 'Y\yY .'.-V
^ V 'A Bold Experiritent in Child Education', New York Times Magazine, 2 Octv
j .y • - ' Y;- 1.927,. pp. 8-9, 22. y Y y y y ;yY.yy^.v y \ ;;y . ,■ . _
f ’An Outline of P o litic a l Philosophy', Unpublished Manuscript of Lectures

delivered in the United States during the .Second Wdrld War, ■“*
Bertrand Russell Archives,.McMaster U niversity. v y
• f . ' . o ■ ■■■' : y v \ - . ' i ^ . Y ' ■■ .
I ; 1Are Parents Bad fo r Children?1 Parents Magazine, 5 May 1930, pp. 18-19.
■Bertrand Russell Explains the True Meahing of Education',- The Forward,

| . ’ ^ 1 August 1926, p* El. ... %y - . ' ■ .
'Bertrand Russell Tells How. He Was Educated As a C h ild ', The Forward;
9 March 1930, .pp. E l-2 . ' yy.-.
'Does Education Do Harm?' New York American, 17 February 1932, p. 15. v
■*-• v. « ..
'Education Without Sex Taboos.1, New Republic, 52(676): 16 November

1927, pp. 346-348.
'Freedom and Government', in Ruth Nanda Anshen (e d .)j Freedom: Its

Meaning, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1940.
'Freedom or. Authority in Education1,♦ Century Magazine, 109(2):

. December 1924, p p .'172-180.-
'Free Spe’ech in Childhood', New Statesman, 1(14): 30 May 1931, pp.

486-488, - -
'Free Speech in Childhood', New Statesman & Nation, 1<16):. 13 June

193.1, p; -575 and 1(18): 27 June 1931, p. 643 and 2( 19) : 4 July
■ i9 3 i, p. ii: 'r ?
'In Our -School', New Republic, .68(875), 9 September 1931, pp. 92-94,
'The Bertrand Russell School*, Time & Tide, 3 January 1930, p. 1 2 .° -
, 'The Congress of S c ie n tific PhilosophyV, Actes du Congres- International

de Philosophie S c ien tifiq u e, Paris, 1936, No; 1.
'The Training of Young C hildren', Harper's Magazine, 155(927): August

.1927, pp. 313-319. i '
‘What Shall We Educate For? An Inquiry Into Fundamentals,1, Harper's

Magazine, 152(911): A pril 1926, pp. 586-597.
II. Other Works
Alfred Adler: Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology, London,

1924. v ■« - - i - -
William P. Alston: !Emotion and Feeling' in Paul Edwards (e d .): The

■
” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Collier*MacMi 11an, London, 1967,
Volume 2. ^.; ;v -
Perry Arwierson: ’-The Antinomies of Antonio Grams.ci1, New Left Review,

No. 100; November 1976-January 1977,.
. A.J. Ayer: Russell, Fontana/Collins’, London, 1972.
Robin Barrow: Radical Educatlon, Martin Robertson, London, 1978.
T
t
■r.
John Dewey and J. McLellan: 'The Psychology of .Number', in R.
Archambault (e d .): John Dewey on Education: Selected W ritings,
Random House; New York, 1964. ■
James F. Doyle (e d .): Educational Judgements, Routt edge and Kegan Paul,
: '• London," 1973. • , •
. T.S. E lio t: Notes Towards the Definition ofCulture, Faber andFaber,

'■ London, 1948.
Jon- Fennell: 'Dewey on'Rousseau: Natural Development as the Aim of

Education',, The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol. 13, No., 2,
August 1979. • f '
• Walter Feinberg and- Henry Rosemont -Jr. (ed s.): Work, techno!ogy and.
■. Education: ... Pi ssenti ng Essays in the In tel ! ectual Foundati ons of •
American Education, University of Illin o is Press, Urbana, 1975.
William K. Frankena (e d .): Philosophy of Education, The'Macmillan Co.,

• New York, 1965. v
•Bruce Freed: Education and the Limits of Authority, The;University of

’ ; Western Ontario Press, London,. 1975,.
Sigmund Freud: 'Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy', The'

Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, (ed. James
'Strachey) ,' The Hogarth Press, London, 1967, Vol. 17.
Signiund Freud: 1Remembering, Repeating and Working Through *, The

Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud (ed. James Strachey),
The Hogarth Press, London, 1967, Vol. 12. •
Svgmund Freud: 'An Outline of Psycho-Analysis', The Complete Psycho-

. ' logical Works of Sigmund Freud, (ed. James Strachey), The Hogarth
Press, London, 1967, Vol . 2 3 . . ' ' .
Sigmund Freud:• 'Repression1, : Col 1ected Papers (ed. Ernest. Jones), Basic
Books In c ., New York, 1959, Vol. 4:. ... -
Sigmund F.reud: 'The Unconscious', Collected Papers (ed. Ernest Jones),

Basic Books In c ., New York, 1959, V ol. 4.
Erich Fromm: Man fo r HimselT, Fawcett Publications, Greenwich,.

Connecticut, 1947. • ' '/ ’ ”
— Antonio Gramsci: Selections from, the Prison Notebooks (edited and *

translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith), In te r- T
national Publishers, New York, 1971.
George Grant: ' Pursuit of an I! 1us ion: A .Commentary on Bertrand

Russell' , Dalhousde Review, 32(2), Summer 1952.
of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

■I A h
406
\\
/ ’• \ ■* ' ; .„■ *■' . V

Christian Bay:* The Structure o f Freedom, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, C alifornia,. 1958. ' N -
r " ■/' ■ ■" - ... - ■
Clive Beck: Moral Education in the Schools, 0 .1 .S.E. Publications, ...
.. Toronto. 1972. ~ ~ .■ • ^ . ■ . .
.* * ■* + '
Clive Beck:, perspectives in Moral and Values' Education, O .I.S .E .
Publications, Toronto, 1976. ~ —
S ilv ia M. Bell and Mary-D. Sal t e r Ainsworth: 'In fa n t Crying and

Maternal Responsiveness', .Child Development, Vol. 43, September/.
December, 1972. .•
F r ith jo ff Bergmann: On Being Free, University of Notreâme Press,

Notre Dame, 1977.
' ■:
Bruno Bettieheim: The Uses of Enchantment, Alfred A. Knopf, New York,
• ; - *• • .. '1975.- ■; • .. ■ . _...... . ■ ..
•‘
Andrew'Brink: 'Her Own Woman',, Russell, 23-24, Autumn/Wijter, 1976.
:■ 1.
I H.C. Cameron: ■The Nervous Child, Oxford University Press, 1 9 1 9 . .

' .-.i
. t
Noam Chomsky: Problems of Knowledge and Freedom: The Russell Lectures,
,y Random House, New York, 1971. ' ,
Ken Coates: Essays on S ocialist Humanism, Spokesman Books, London,

.19.72.- ■ ^ . ' ■'. - .. ,/ . -.' \
Brian Crittenden: Education and Social Ideals, Longman, Canada,’Don

M ills , 1973.
, . ..... ' , : -;rr.v ,.T. . . . . . . - ........................
Brian Crittenden (e d .): Means and Ends in Education, O .I'.S .E ., Toronto,

. 1969. — — — —
-' - ■ ■ - ' . '
Frank Cunningham and Daniel Goldstick: 'Marxism and Epistemological

Relativism*' (Unpublished).
: ;• . ■ ■
Daniel R. DeNicol a: ‘The Education of the Emotions', Philosophy of

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National Library Bibliotheque nationale...

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Title of Thesis— *Titre de la tbese^ ^ ^

* ' * . ' ' ‘ ’ ' V ^ ' * -

O . o v “ T o ' § E ^ V O ................................. '• ' '

\Q i& > \ . V ) \ ' A c v , e s s ,F'!E> • .

1 + National .Library of Canada Bibliotheque nationale du Canada

Canadian Theses on Service des th&ses canadiennes

! Ottawa, Canada ' .

HOWARD ROBERT WOODHOUSE

Department of Educational Theory

A Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirement's

Howard Robert Woodhouse 1980

PROGRAM OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION'

FOR THE DEGREE OF-DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

10:00 a.m.', Friday, September 26, 1980

Room 201, 65 St. George Street' ," . *

THE CONCEPT OF THE-INDIVIDUAL ..

IN BERTRAND RUSSELL*S. EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT

Professor S.D. Qlyan, Chairman

1947 Born,'Pinner, England

1968 B.A..,,University of Exeter

1971 M.A., McMaster University

1971-Present Doctoral Studies, University of

First Minor: Philosophy s.

Topice of Marxist Philosophy Professor F. Cunningham

Second Min^r: Phllosoph^

Credit granted on the basis of MyA.,"McMa^ter

' MANUSCRIPT THESIS

Author’s signature . .... Date

(b> Publication by the National Library is.tO' be. postponed until

Author's signature ...*.... Date

This restriction'is authorized foi^reasons which seem to me,, as Head of the

{Signature .of Graduate Department'Head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ?•.

'This thesis i s ’concerned w ith.the concept of the individual in

Bertrand Russell's educational philosophy. “I argue that thre concept

undergoes profound, changes which a.ffect his account of-the aims of

mer>tal dilemma o f ‘whethfeXpducatijjn .'should enhance individual develop

ment^or train useful citizens-. Russel-1 shifts around ^from th e f i rs t

to the second horn-of"this'.'dilemma. \ -V .

In Chapter’One I argue'that Russell's educational theory |is an'

Integral part o f .his general philosophy. In Chapter Two I show- that

th,e-standard.interpretation of Russell's concept of the'individual in

his educational philosophy'regards i t as a uniform-concept undergoing

rndividualr prominent in Principles of Social Reconstruction. The

individual is an organic being endowed with an innate principle of

of education is to develop, individual growth and stimulate those corir

In Chapter-Four I analyse the second 'mechanical' concept of the

..individual found mainly in On Education: *The individual i.s a complex

posed of in te lle c t, emotion a n d ,w ill. The individual w ill is s e lf- V

, subsistent and d ic ta to ria l.. The task of Education is to-transform i t

dominating-others and producing social disharmony. This can only be

done by an educational system based on the power o f a world s ta te .*

^ In Chapter.Six, I conclude that the transitions in Russell‘s con-

a stress upon citizenship within a repressive world state as.the primary

This thesis is dedicated to my father and mother.

I wish tp thank my supervisor, Ian Winchester, fo r the invaluable

this thesis. Here I shall simply point out that Russellre

individual freedom in both education and psychology because of the com