Holy Apostles College & Seminary

Thomism on Identity and Individuation

by
Dwight R. Stanislaw

Dr. Robert Delfino

PHS 741: St. Thomas Aquinas on Being and Nothingness

August 18, 2017

Introduction

The waters pertaining to the issue of identity and individuation are rather difficult to

navigate, yet the contribution by Thomas Aquinas sheds considerable light and provides a sturdy

vessel on which to travel to arrive at a thorough and satisfactory account. Where identity is

concerned, there exists the issue of what it means to possess identity and how—indeed, some

would say whether or not—a thing perdures throughout the entirety of its actual existence. In

addition to this, there is also the related, though unique, issue of individuation, that is, what

makes something to be an individual unity or thing in itself apart from all other things. The label

in the title, ‘Thomism,’ was chosen specifically because the following inquiry takes into

consideration some of the representatives of the varying spectrum of Thomists who have spoken

on these two issues. Because of the mostly unanimous views among Thomists as regards

identity, and the more contentious views with respect to individuation, I will provide a brief look

at the issue of identity while focusing the majority of the paper on that of individuation, while

ending with some concluding thoughts about both.

I. Identity

A straightforward and terse definition of identity is provided by Klubertanz thusly:

“Identity is sameness, oneness of a thing with itself.”1 Continuing with further clarification, he

writes, “We say that a thing is identical with itself when it is the same at two points of time, or

under several considerations, and so forth.”2 Identity, then, can be said to identify the same thing

as itself, or as the kind of thing it is essentially, at various times and as undergoing accidental

changes throughout the duration of its existence. Whether or not it makes a difference to the
1
1. George P. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2005),
80.
2

2. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 80.

1
investigation if one holds to a static or dynamic view of time will have to be left aside for our

present purposes. It should be noted that while Thomists may be somewhat divided on this issue,

it seems apparent that Aquinas himself held that real change and temporal becoming are true

features of the created world and, thus, a dynamic, presentist view of time is correct.

Before commenting any further on perdurance, or identity over time, and ignoring the

debate between endurantists and perdurantists—the debate involves what type of temporal parts

a thing possesses at the times in which it exists—it is important to note for the Thomist the

inherited Aristotelian notion of substance and independence as indicators of a thing’s identity.

So, for example, each substance or composition of essence (i.e. substantial form and prime

matter) and existence is therefore an individual thing. From this, and related to the role of

accidents and their determination of substance, is a thing’s independence from anything else as it

exists in itself. In other words, accidents exist only by inhering in a substance, as they do not

have existence in themselves. By contrast, substances are things in themselves and have no

further qualification or dependency save for their relation to the efficient cause from which they

have their origin. Using the example of a man, Owens highlights independence and comments,

“The man, on the contrary, does not belong to his size, his color, his relations to the things

around him, or his actions. He is not a modification of any of them. In this sense he has his being

in an independent way.”3 Thus, we see that if a thing is a substance, whether material or

immaterial, it is independent and possesses identity in the proper sense.

Where identity over time is concerned, and with respect to the changing of a thing in

general—time, it is to be recalled, is the numbering or measure of motion/change—there are

several important points and insights worth noting. To begin with, Oderberg situates identity

3
3. Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston, TX: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985),
144.

2
over time, correctly in my opinion, by observing that “…identity over time is primitive.”4

Qualifying his designation of identity over time as a primitive notion, he writes, “The right way

is to take the phenomenon of identity per se to be primitive. In other words, there is no way of

defining identity across time in other terms: it is a basic, unanalysable phenomenon.”5 This

notion of identity is primitive, then, in that it cannot be analyzed outside of itself without

presupposing those things which allow it to be analyzed in the first place. So, for example, when

one looks at the identity of Socrates throughout changes and at separate times, what has already

been assumed is the subject, identical with itself, namely Socrates. Oderberg is not saying that

we cannot cash out identity over time by employing certain self-evident principles and criteria,

but rather, asserts that the notion is known and evident to us intuitively without further recourse

to anything other than itself.

Related to identity over time is the self-sameness of a thing’s identity throughout its

duration qua changing thing. Here, Coffey is particularly insightful: “…since change is not

continuous annihilation and creation, the changing being must in some real and true sense persist

throughout the process of change…the concept of permanence or stability throughout change

gives us the notion of a real sameness or abiding self-identity which is compatible with real

change.”6 Thus, given that change is the motion of a thing from potency to act, and in this case

the coming into being of an accident previously in potency, and that we observe stability and

permanence in the thing itself (e.g. when Socrates gets a tan he remains Socrates), we maintain

as before that identity is the sameness of a thing with itself, even as it undergoes change. Indeed,

in unison with Oderberg’s comments above, and taking this sameness-throughout-change notion
4
4. David Oderberg, Real Essentialism (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 117.
5

5. Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 117.

6

6. Peter Coffey, Ontology or the Theory of Being: An Introduction to General Metaphysics (London: Forgotten
Books, 2012), 138-139.

3
into consideration, we arrive at the conclusion that it is a thing’s form, or whatness, which

provides this stability and is the principle to which we look for the appropriate criterion. To this

point, Coffey writes, “Such, for instance, is the identity of the human soul with itself….”7 Once

again, Oderberg proves quite helpful with his analysis: “…what emerges is that the criteria we

invoke all, whether directly or indirectly, refer back to the forms of things, and, pace the

nominalist, to those forms considered as universal entities instantiated in particular cases.”8 Thus,

form, as the principle providing the whatness of a substance or thing, is where the Thomist

locates identity and to what we should look when analyzing the identity of a thing both at various

moments in time and as it undergoes change.

II. Individuation

Now that we have a solid understanding of what the Thomist has in mind when it comes

to identity and the identity of a thing over time and throughout change, we need to survey what it

is that provides the basis for individuating one thing from another, i.e. what it is that serves to

distinguish one thing having its own identity from that of another. What seems to be clear among

Thomists is that there are four possible options to play the role of the principle of individuation.

According to Delfino, these are as follows: (1) accidents, (2) matter, (3) form, and (4) esse or the

act of existence.9 Given the Thomist commitment to the communicability of the universal—thus,

what is communicable to many is not itself capable of individuating—, and the understanding

that accidents are present in a thing already individuated and is not dependent on them for being

7
7. Coffey, Ontology, 139.
8

8. Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 118.

9

9. Robert Delfino, lecture 14 on St. Thomas Aquinas on Being and Nothingness (Cromwell, CT: Holy Apostles
College & Seminary, 2017), 4.

4
individuated, it would seem that both form and accidents are easily disqualified. Thus, we are left

with either matter or esse as the principle of individuation.

As Delfino rightly notes, “…Aquinas frequently says that designated matter, that is

matter with determinate dimensions such as being 6 feet tall or having a snub shaped nose, is

what individuates Socrates.”10 Indeed, this seems to be what most Thomists take Aquinas’s

position to be and many have defended this interpretation, specifically from the claims of other

Scholastic thinkers such as the notable John Duns Scotus. In any case, while this is the most

common interpretation among Thomists, Delfino, in harmony with Gracia and Owens, finds

esse, or the act of existence, to do the metaphysical lifting where individuation is concerned.

Thus, Delfino observes, “So, whereas our knowledge of determined dimensions might be how

we recognize different individuals, it is esse that is the metaphysical principle of individuation.”11

Likewise, Owens writes the following: “…existence as a unit in itself and its division from all

other things, remain the hallmark of individuality throughout the writings of Aquinas. But

existence itself is the actuality that brings this about. Existence can accordingly be called the

basic ‘cause of individuality’ in his philosophical thinking.”12

Given that each individual thing exists as such, and given that this existence, for example

the existence of Socrates, cannot be communicated to another, it would seem that esse is indeed a

prime candidate for the principle of individuation. Lending to these considerations are a few

textual citations from Owens that are highlighted by Delfino, namely paragraph 89 of Aquinas’s

De Ente et Essentia, and Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 3, Article 5. Beginning with the

De Ente, we read the following relevant portion: “…rather, it is the existence in these diverse
10
10. Delfino, lecture 14, 4.
11

11. Delfino, lecture 14, 9.

12

12. Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the
Counter-Reformation, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia, as quoted by Delfino, lecture 14, 9.

5
things which is diverse.”13 Here, Aquinas seems to be saying that the existence each individual

thing has is itself diverse. Next, we read, “…all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of

the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the

existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man….”14 Here, again,

the existence of each thing is said to differ, whether we have in mind separate species or distinct

individuals within the same species.

With these things in mind, let us return to what may be viewed as the consensus position

that it is matter which is to be understood as the principle of individuation. As will be shown by a

survey of Thomists who hold this view, matter as the principle is not prime matter—that is, non-

designated matter as a pure potency for receiving substantial form—but designated matter of

indeterminate quantity. To this point, Oderberg says thusly, “The traditional formula adopted by

medieval philosophers following Aquinas, which I call PDM, is that the principle of

individuation is ‘designated matter’ (materia signata), more exactly matter possessing quantity,

even more precisely matter possessing indeterminate quantity.”15 Providing additional helpful

commentary as regards individuation, Ashley writes, “…it is obvious that the common essence

that unites a species is somehow a consequence of form, while the individuation is a

consequence of their different matters.”16 This he believes follows from the two principles,

namely form and matter, which comprise a material substance, given that the former is universal

13
13. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, at Dominican House of Studies (1965), at
http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/DeEnte&Essentia.htm.
14

14. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 3, a. 5, at Dominican House of Studies (1947), at

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/summa/FP/FP003.html#FPQ3A5THEP1.
15

15. Oderberg, Real Essentialism, 112.

16
16. Benedict M. Ashley, The Way Toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to
Metaphysics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 87.

6
and communicable while the latter is individual and incommunicable as it is found in the actually

existing substance.

Rounding out our survey of Thomists who support matter, both Klubertanz and Coffey

offer their insights to the discussion. First, Coffey notes, “What individuates the material

individual, what marks it off as one in itself, distinct or divided from other individuals of the

same specific nature, and incommunicable in that condition, is the material factor of that

individual’s nature….”17 Similarly, Klubertanz comments thusly, “Hence, primary matter with

quantity or dimensions is that which is the principle of individuation of a material thing.”18

Concluding with another helpful remark from Klubertanz, we read: “The principle of

individuation is that in the particular thing by which that thing has its particular part or share of

the specific perfection and so is only one of many in the species.”19 Here, then, we see that there

is a general agreement between many Thomists that it is matter, and more precisely designated

matter of indeterminate dimension, which is the principle of individuation.

Conclusion

What conclusions, if any, has the foregoing inquiry led us to, and what sort of questions

remain to be asked? First, it should be noted that identity, while no easy issue to articulate, finds

far and wide agreement among Thomists of varying persuasions which boasts well in its favor

that those things looked at are without much dispute and rightly reflect Aquinas’s own views.

Second, and while ultimately disagreeing with Owens, I believe Dewan makes an important

point with respect to the disagreement as regards the principle of individuation: “…existence and
17

17. Coffey, Ontology, 127.

18

18. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 106.

19

19. Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 106, n. 15.

7
individuation stand and fall together.”20 Thus, while the respective sides of the debate differ in

their views, it seems rather apparent that the principle individuation, whatever it is, is intimately

connected to existence in some way, and that things do indeed require such a principle.

Questions which have been raised in my own mind from time spent in this study, and

which ought to be pursued further, are as follows. First, what, if any, changes to his own views

did Aquinas himself make throughout the duration of his writings, and should this play a role in

how we arrive at our conclusions? Second, should the principle of individuation properly be kept

to the realm of beings which are many individually yet one in species? In other words, when

investigating what the principle of individuation is, should we be concerned only with how

things with a common nature are individuated from one another, or should we take the principle

to be applicable across all categories of beings that possess individual identities? Finally, what

further criteria could be used for determining how we arrive conclusively at the principle in order

to solve the dispute?

What this study has demonstrated is that there is legwork to be done with respect to both

of these subjects, but particularly on individuation. It is here that there are several questions left

to be answered, and much more that can be researched throughout the works of Aquinas himself

in order to shed light on them. It also demonstrates that, among Thomists, disagreement may be

present, but the overall pursuit of truth in accordance with Aquinas’s views motivates each one.

Bibliography

Aquinas, Thomas. De Ente et Essentia. at Dominican House of Studies, 1965, at

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/DeEnte&Essentia.htm.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. at Dominican House of Studies, 1947, at

http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/summa/index.html

20
20. Lawrence Dewan, “The Individual as a Mode of Being According to Thomas Aquinas,” in Form and
Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 237.

8
Ashley, Benedict M. The Way Toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural
Introduction to Metaphysics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.

Coffey, Peter. Ontology or the Theory of Being: An Introduction to General Metaphysics.

London: Forgotten Books, 2012.

Dewan, Lawrence. Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics. Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2006.

Oderberg, David S. Real Essentialism. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007.

Owens, Joseph. An Elementary Christian Metaphysics. Houston, TX: Center for Thomistic
Studies, 1985.

Klubertanz, George P. Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, 2nd edition. Eugene, OR: Wipf &
Stock, 2005.