CELESTINO CO & COMPANY vs. CIR (G.R. NO.

L-8506; August 31, 1956)

FACTS: Petitioner Celestino Co & Company had paid percentage taxes of 7 per cent on the gross receipts of its sash, door
and window factory, in accordance with section 186 of the National Revenue Code imposing taxes on sale of
manufactured articles. However, in 1952, it contended that it is engage service contracting, and it began to claim liability
only to the contractor's 3 per cent tax (instead of 7 per cent) under section 191 of the same Code.
ISSUE: Whether Celestino Co & Company's business transactions and activities constitute contracts for a piece of work,
and not contracts of sale, under article 1467 of the New Civil Code.
RULING: Celestino Co & Company's transactions are NOT contracts for a piece of work, BUT contracts of sale under
article 1467 of the New Civil Code. This is so because it sold materials ordinarily manufactured by it – such as sash,
panels, mouldings, etc. – to its customers, although in such form or combination as suited the fancy of its customers.
A contract for a piece of work necessitates that the goods are to be manufactured specially for the customer and upon
his special order; in the case at bar, the orders exhibited were ordinary orders for work, which does not require
extraordinary or additional equipment, nor involves services not generally performed by Celestino Co & Company.

CIR vs ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY COMPANY (G.R. NO. L-27044; June 30, 1975)

FACTS: ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLY COMPANY (ENGINEERING) was charged for tax evasion for misdeclaring
its imported articles and failing to pay the correct percentage taxes due thereon in connivance with its foreign suppliers.
Subsequently, the Commissioner assessed against, and demanded upon, Engineering payment of the sales tax on the
theory that it misdeclared its importation of air conditioning units, parts and accessories, which are subject to tax under
the Tax Code.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Engineering is engaged in a contract of sale or contract for a piece of work.
RULING: Respondent Company, Engineering, is engaged in a contract for a piece of work and NOT a contract of sale. This
is so because Engineering did not manufacture air conditioning units for sale to the general public, but imported some
items which were used in executing contracts entered into by it. In fact, Engineering undertook negotiations and
execution of individual contracts for the design, supply and installation of central air conditioning units. The word
"contractor" has come to be used with special reference to a person who, in the pursuit of the independent business,
undertakes to do a specific job or piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods without submitting
himself to control as to the petty details.

PAB vs CA, 165 SCRA 112

FACTS: Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board on
the ground that the former was denied due process and that the degree of threat required for the said Order is remiss.
Petitioner reasoned that under PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC.
ISSUE: Whether a contract for the fabrication and installation of a central air-conditioning system in a building, one of
"sale" or "for a piece of work".
RULING: The contract in question is one for a piece of work. It is not petitioner's line of business to manufacture air-
conditioning systems to be sold "off-the-shelf." Its business and particular field of expertise is the fabrication and
installation of such systems as ordered by customers and in accordance with the particular plans and specifications
provided by the customers.
G.R. 93891
Pollution Adjudication board vs. Court of Appeal and Solar Textile Finishing Corp.
March 11, 1991

Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board on the ground
that the former was denied due process and that the degree of threat required for the said Order is remiss. Petitioner
reasoned that under PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or
wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner.

The Court held that the Board may issue the ex parte cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that the
respondent corporation has waste discharge beyond the allowable standards set by the NPCC (Sec5, Effluent Regulations
of 1982 and Sec7(a),PD 984). If it has not yet been subject to the allowable standard, the Board may still issue ex parte
cease and desist order upon prima facie evidence that the effluent pose an "immediate threat to life, public health,
safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life. The court held that the Board, as the government entity tasked to determine
whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory
and regulatory provisions, has the authority to issue the order as it may see fit. This is, after all, allowed by law to
address relevant pollution issues as an immediate recourse.