Fear of Foreigners: Recession and Racism in Europe

Author(s): Jayati Ghosh

Source: Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts , Vol. 4, No. 2, Reworking Race
and Labor (Winter 2011), pp. 183-190
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2979/racethmulglocon.4.2.183

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Fear of Foreigners:
Recession and Racism
in Europe

Jayati Ghosh

A decade-plus-long European economic recession has fostered and hard-

ened racist and xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants. As immigrants
often occupy the very bottom of the economic ladder, their labor contri-
bution is rarely acknowledged, and their very unpopularity is routinely
exploited by politicians seeking re-election.

O f the many undesirable effects of the ongoing—and

increasingly policy-induced—recession in Europe,
is one that has received relatively little public atten-
tion: the resurgence of racist and xenophobic attitudes. This has
already been a problem in Europe over the past decade (Pet-
tigrew 1998), as right-wing political forces demanded major
restrictions on immigration, and sporadic episodes of violence
broke out against migrant and Roma groups. As the economic
crisis bites deeper and as the “austerity measures” enforced by
governments cause more unemployment
and more failure of small family-run busi- As the economic crisis bites deeper and as
nesses, bitterness and anger among the
population will inevitably grow. The dan- the “austerity measures” enforced by gov-
ger is that it will be directed not at power- ernments cause more unemployment and
ful financial interests or even against gov- more failure of small family-run businesses,
ernments that seem to bend like willows bitterness and anger among the population
to every dictate of the market, but against
more vulnerable targets that can be more will inevitably grow. The danger is that it
easily attacked. The most obvious targets, will be directed not at powerful financial
of course, are the migrants, who often stand interests or even against governments that
out also because of their perceived racial
seem to bend like willows to every dictate
differences.
This is a much larger problem than is of the market, but against more vulnerable
generally appreciated. The recent European targets that can be more easily attacked.

winter 2011 183 © 2011 The Ohio State University/Office of

Diversity and Inclusion/The Kirwan Institute

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 Jayati Ghosh

model of capitalist accumulation and economic growth has

relied more and more on migrant labor, which until recently
was more typical of the U.S. economy. The economic booms of
the 1990s and from 2002 until 2007, combined with the demo-
graphic pressures of an aging population, created demand for
all kinds of workers: on farms, in manufacturing, in construc-
tion, and in services. As a result, men and women workers
have come from less-developed countries in Asia and Africa,
as well as from the former socialist countries of Eastern and
Central Europe. They came legally and illegally, often tolerat-
ing very low wages, poor living and working conditions, and
constant insecurity in the hope of somehow raising their own
living standards and remitting something to households back
home.
Europe’s economic boom was fueled by and supported by
cheap labor, which not only helped generate higher profits for
employers but also increased the consumption of goods and
services by the local population through cheaper sourcing. And
the productive role of these migrants is pervasive, in a very
wide range of seen and unseen activities. This has had many
positive economic consequences for the local population, which
are not adequately recognized, but also has led to social, politi-
cal, and cultural tensions.

The Case of Italy

When it rains in the charming lakeside town of Como in
northern Italy, young Bangladeshi men are ready on nearly
every street corner with their supply of cheap umbrellas to meet
the needs of unprepared tourists. In the stately open piazzas
of Milan and Turin, their compatriots approach couples while
brandishing roses, hoping to sell them singly or in bunches.
Meanwhile, fake designer bags are hawked on the pavements
of Florence and Venice by young Moroccans, who also offer
“ethnic” jewelry and craft items. Food vendors on the streets of
Rome, busy dishing out Italian favorites like pizza or gelato or
newer food crazes like falafel, come from countries as far apart
as Ecuador, Tunisia, and Sri Lanka.
Agriculture in Italy, from the fields in its north to the or-
chards of Calabria, relies mostly on migrant workers, usually
from Africa. There are also more than 120,000 recorded Chi-
nese—and possibly many more unrecorded—working in fac-
tories near Florence and Bologna. They work alongside even
larger numbers of workers from countries in Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe, such as Albania, Ukraine, Romania, and the con-
stituents of the former Yugoslavia. The handling of livestock,
transporting of goods, dealing with sanitation and waste dis-
posal, and many other “3D” (dirty, difficult, or dangerous) jobs
are largely carried out by migrants.
But these are among the more visible forms of migrant em-
ployment. Some less visible forms may be just as significant, if
not more so. A major employer of women migrants is the care

race /ethnicity vol. 4 / no. 2 184

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Fear of Foreigners: Recession and Racism in Europe

economy, particularly for domestic work. In many Italian towns and cities, migrant
In many Italian towns and cities, migrant
wom­en workers (often from the Philippines,
women workers (often from the Philippines,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) perform the Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) perform the
labor involved in social reproduction that is labor involved in social reproduction that is
typically allocated to women, such as child typically allocated to women, such as child
care, care of the old and sick, and house-
work, thereby freeing local women for more
care, care of the old and sick, and housework,
active participation in the paid labor mar- thereby freeing local women for more active
ket. There are many problems associated participation in the paid labor market.
with this system, including the growing
phenomenon of “displaced motherhood,” as migrant women
may have to leave their own children behind to be cared for
by others at home. This issue has become an important factor
driving the economic boom, even if its role is not as explicitly
evident as it is in the cases where export-oriented manufactur-
ing has been dominated by women workers.
As the demand for migrant labor grew, it became associated
with a much greater influx of workers into a wider range of ac-
tivities, as well as with those seeking to find work somehow or
other. In the southern cities, both the regular and parallel econ-
omies depend heavily upon migrant workers, a significant pro-
portion of them still “illegal.” The same economic pressures that
make the northern factories use more and more foreign labor
also push the drug rings, the arms trade, and other illegal or
quasi-legal activities to rely on cheaper and more easily con-
trolled migrants.
Not so long ago, Italy was a nation of out-migration. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Italy provided
more migrants to the United States than any other European
country. Various cities in the United States contained “Little
Italy” neighborhoods, and Italians made their presence felt in
American cuisine and culture through strands as diverse as
pizza and the Mafia. Even as recently as the 1970s, there were
more people moving out of Italy than coming in. And in any
case, the numbers of both were relatively small and did not in-
crease much until the mid-1980s. In 1985, out of a population
of some 60 million, the number of foreign-born people in Italy
holding a residence permit was estimated at only 423,000 (Cam-
pani 1993).
These factors may have explained the rather relaxed attitude
of most Italians toward immigrants, often a sharp contrast to
the concerns expressed by their neighbors in northern Europe.
Certainly migration was not a political issue until quite recently,
and the flexible attitude to legality that was common especially
in southern Italy made people there much more tolerant about
even illegal migration.
But the late 1980s saw a sudden expansion in the pace of im-
migration, with a doubling in the number of official immigrants
in just five years and apparently also a sharp increase in un-
recorded in-migration. In the 1990s this was driven mainly by
movements from Central and Eastern Europe, especially from

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 Jayati Ghosh

neighboring Albania and Romania, followed by labor migration

from North Africa and Asia.
Official estimates suggest that the number of “resident for-
eigners,” who have not received Italian citizenship, increased
from less than 600,000 in 1992 to 2.67 million in 2005, or around
5 percent of the population. Unofficial estimates suggest that
including illegal or unrecorded migration would bring the
numbers to more than 4 million. Certainly there has been a sig-
nificant increase in immigration into Italy in the past decade
and a half.
A survey by Caritas Europa (2006) found that for every ten
immigrants in Italy, five are from other European countries,
two are African, two are Asian, and one is from Latin America.
Nearly 60 percent of the immigrant community was found to
live in northern Italy, with the rest divided between central and
southern Italy.
Some of this increase in immigration is explained simply by
demographics. Italy is one of the oldest societies in the world,
and it has a falling population. Despite the declared faith of the
resident population, which is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic,
it has the lowest birth rate in Europe. And longer life expectancy
means that its declining population is aging rapidly. In 2005, the
resident population of Italian citizens decreased by 62,120; in
contrast, 48,838 children were born to resident foreigners that
year (Migration Policy Institute 2008).
But some argue that Italy currently is more attractive for il-
legal migrants than most other West European countries, for in-
stitutional reasons. There is the obvious difficulty of controlling
its borders, given the long expanse of coastline, and so “boat
people” from various parts of the world regularly arrive at its
shores, despite the risks and dangers involved. Italy also has a
significant informal economy, consisting not only of small en-
terprises, private care, and domestic services, but also of paral-
lel and extralegal activities. This encourages the use of unreg-
istered workers who can be denied minimum wages and other
legal benefits, and allows such workers to be more easily hidden
from the authorities.
Still others argue that public policies have been responsible
for encouraging more illegal migration, by exhibiting greater
leniency at time of entry and then periodically providing am-
nesties or regularization of earlier entrants. It is true that re-
cent immigration laws in Italy, even as they have announced
greater controls on inflows and restrictions on migrants within
the country, have also been aimed at regularizing the status of
some employed migrants already residing in Italy illegally.
Thus, between 1990 and 2002, various Italian governments
passed four regularization acts. In 1990 the so-called Martelli
Law posited a number of restrictions on entry but also regular-
ized more than 200,000 unauthorized migrants. Subsequent pub-
lic action went further in terms of punitive action. The 1998 Im-
migration Act for the first time separated humanitarian and refu-
gee issues from immigration policy and provided for tougher ac-

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Fear of Foreigners: Recession and Racism in Europe

tion on illegal immigration, including deportation. This brought

Italy in line with the Schengen Agreement, introduced in 1985
in some European countries, that allows free
movement between signatory states. The 1998 Immigration Act for the first time
The Bossi-Fini Law of 2002, brought by separated humanitarian and refugee issues
the second Berlusconi government, intro-
duced immigrant quotas, mandatory em-
from immigration policy and provided for
ployer–immigrant contracts, and stricter il- tougher action on illegal immigration, in-
legal immigration deportation practices. But cluding deportation.
even this law provided for an amnesty for
illegal immigrants who had worked and lived in the country for
more than three months; it also allowed for the legalization of
irregular immigrants employed either as domestic workers and
home helpers or as dependent workers.
In the past few years, however, the sociopolitical climate
seems to have hardened further with respect to migrants. One
of the first actions of the conservative political coalition govern-
ment, elected in 2008, which includes not only Silvio Berlus-
coni’s own party but also the openly anti-immigration North-
ern League, was to approve a tough package of new measures
aimed at countering illegal immigration and crime. It is signifi-
cant that the two were clubbed together, unlike previous poli-
cies that were more implicitly sympathetic to immigration. Sen-
tences for illegal immigrants found guilty of a crime were in-
creased, with automatic expulsion for those sentenced to more
than two years of imprisonment. Those promoting illegal im-
migration can be jailed or fined up to €50,000, and the property
of anyone caught renting accommodation unlawfully to illegal
immigrants can be confiscated. One of the more controversial
features of the decree was to make illegal immigration itself a
more serious criminal offense. Certainly, the uncertain mate-
rial conditions of migrant status, combined with various forms
of social exclusion and discrimination, can encourage a shift to
“criminality,” especially among younger male migrants without
fixed incomes. A study of Algerian migrants in Milan (Colombo
1997) found that for the young men who had been convicted
of various crimes, living in a marginalized situation between
economic crisis in Algeria and identity crisis in Italy became a
major incentive to commit crime.
Critics have argued that there is a strong racist tinge to the
measures, which appear to be targeted especially against im-
migrants in developing countries. But they suggest a deep social
conservatism rather than racism per se. Thus, some of the provi-
sions target Romanian immigrants and ethnic Roma from other
EU countries. This is highly problematic, not only because since
January 2008 Bulgarian and Romanian citizens (including the
Roma) are allowed to live legally in Italy without any permit,
but also because many ethnic Roma hold Italian citizenship.
Nevertheless, on several occasions in the past few years the gov-
ernment declared a state of emergency in Roma encampments
in different cities, with special powers for prefects to evict and
arrest residents.

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 Jayati Ghosh

This government has justified this aggression by citing pop-

ular mood. According to the Northern League’s Umberto Bossi,
now a government minister, “the anti-immigrant sweep was a
positive thing, because that’s what people want” (Open Society
Institute, 2009).
Such official rhetoric may even have fueled periodic waves
of violence against both Roma and immigrants. For example, in
May 2008 a crowd of several hundred attacked a Roma camp on
the eastern outskirts of Naples, brandishing sticks and throw-
ing firebombs, after a sixteen-year-old Roma girl was accused
of trying to steal a baby. A few days later, shops run by Bangla-
deshi immigrants were attacked in a part of Rome heavily pop-
ulated by foreigners, with windows smashed and goods dam-
aged. Vigilante groups are on the prowl in some cities, threaten-
ing those who obviously look like foreigners.
More recently, in early 2010, riots broke out in Calabria
among (mainly African) migrant workers after a legal immi-
grant from Togo was wounded in a pellet-gun attack in a nearby
city—an attack for which the local mafia, the ‘Ndrangheta, has
been blamed (Donadio 2010). Some of the migrants rioted, and
were swiftly quelled, and were forced to flee into camps. Local
responses echoed some of the more familiar prejudices against
migrants from other countries or ethnic communities that have
been reported in Italy since the 1990s (Kirchler and Zani 1995)—
“we are not racist but. . . .”
Yet such reactions, and indeed more stringent action again
legal and illegal migrants by the government, seem likely to get
caught up in the contradictions of current Italian reality. The de-
mographics mean that Italy must continue to rely on migrant
labor, possibly even to an increasing extent in the near future.
And the history of Italian emigration is too recent for the society
as a whole to adopt an aggressively isolationist position. Indeed,
most ordinary Italians seem to be appalled by recent expres-
sions of xenophobia.

Recent Social and Political Developments in Europe

The complex and highly charged issue of migration in Italy
provides in encapsulated form the problem confronting much
of Western Europe, with its rich and aging societies that seem to
be unable to come to terms with the implications of either stag-
nation or dynamism.
With the collapse of the boom, however, local perceptions
about migrants are undergoing rapid changes even among
those who are not driven by explicitly racist ideologies. In fact,
it is not the case that such migrant labor is now expendable, as
they continue to be critical for many activities. But they are in-
creasingly seen as threats, not only to local culture, but also to
the employability of local workers. They are accused of driving
down wages, of creating unsanitary conditions, of making pub-
lic spaces insecure, and of much else.

race /ethnicity vol. 4 / no. 2 188

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Fear of Foreigners: Recession and Racism in Europe

This combination of forces may explain, at least partly, the

recent increase in incidents of violence with racial overtones,
as well as the growing popularity of explicitly racist political
forces. There were race riots in Barcelona in May 2010, as well
as an increased number of incidents in Greece (which already
has one of the worst records in Europe in terms of treatment of
migrants). Right-wing and anti-immigration political parties—
the Northern League in Italy, the Flemish Blok in Belgium, the
Danish People’s Party in Denmark, the National Front in France,
the British National Party in the UK, the Movimiento Social Re-
publicano (MSR) Español in Spain, the National Renewal Party
in Portugal, and so on—have increased their vote shares in all
recent elections in Europe. In Hungary, the far-right party Job-
bik entered Parliament for the first time in April 2010, after get-
ting 17 percent of the vote, just behind the former ruling party
the socialists, who received 19 percent. In France, regional elec-
tions in March 2010 saw electoral revival for the overtly racist
National Front. In the Netherlands, the anti-immigration Free-
dom Party performed very well in elections in June 2010, more
than tripling the number of seats it held.
Attacks on Roma settlements across different parts of Eu-
rope are now much more common. A study of the European
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009) found that an av-
erage Roma in the twenty-two EU member states ran the risk of
being discriminated against in various ways 4.6 times in a year,
with discrimination in employment, housing, education, health
care, and of course in the form of outright violence. The next-
most-likely targets were found to be Africans, nearly half of
whom experienced some form of discrimination, and had even
greater risk of physical attack and personal insecurity than the
Roma.
There is an uneasy and unresolved relationship in Europe
between the continuing economic need for migrant labor and
the growing social dissatisfaction with their
presence. The present downswing is likely Instead of addressing these problems di-
to make this conflict even more intense. rectly, governments are making the wrong
Instead of addressing these problems di-
responses: pandering to anti-immigration
rectly, governments are making the wrong
responses: pandering to anti-immigration sentiment while further reducing employ-
sentiment while further reducing employ- ment prospects for both local residents and
ment prospects for both local residents and migrants.
migrants. Economic strategies that focus on
generating employment and social strategies that stress enhanc-
ing social interaction and integration and fostering tolerance
make much more sense, even though they are not the strategies
that are currently being emphasized.

Works Cited
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