Inter Alia: Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

Oposa v.
factoran
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The
principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for
the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint2 was instituted as
a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the
Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in

his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or

approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio
of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential
loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one
billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in
marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of
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the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-
billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic
uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse
effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum

or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included
— the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's
generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a
matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof
are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the

natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
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15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with
a country that is desertified ( sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary

to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a

life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned

TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources ( sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
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Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of
action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves
the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter
in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in
natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of
E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than
what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted
Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did
not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a
class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
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several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous,
it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said
civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that
they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file
a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it ( sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
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The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation
and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner
Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against

all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful ( sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the
same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby

disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
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as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of
policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to
the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the
present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code
of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural
resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources

shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve
as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
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Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion
to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest
a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order.
The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is
the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial
power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second
part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.
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As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course,
is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that
can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers,
in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization

and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,

and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting
it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right,
nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court
held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
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. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified
entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [ See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No.
705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification
of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. this Court stated:
28
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In
other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is
that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may
at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal,
the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
10 | P a g e
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SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because
of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-
and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through
the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources;
loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the
Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
11 | P a g e
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formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy
in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying
that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering
the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
12 | P a g e
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defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government . (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be,
it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out
in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few
years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
13 | P a g e
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petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because
of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved — membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an
appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I
suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-
and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through
the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources;
loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the
Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy
in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the
other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely
wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
14 | P a g e
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(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code
which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency
charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each
of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does
not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored
in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at
here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal
right — a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of
the Constitution — that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all
or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying
that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering
the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government . (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology"
and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be,
it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection
and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
15 | P a g e
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in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly
assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek
to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful
acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out
in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
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MMDA v. CONCERNED CITIZENS OF MANILA BAY
GR NO. 171947, December 18, 2008
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained
the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill
effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental
destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by
itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the
voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their
respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the
first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most
of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry
the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier
attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad
commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation
activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official
indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several
government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of
the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below
the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed
from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or

commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public
health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for
which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B
waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. 3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of
petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
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(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the
Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular
inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management
Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from
50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No.
34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or
the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of
other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay
through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on
ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for
the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision 5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for
swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-
agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months
from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a
consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and
restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage]

treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct
and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate
and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated
wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to
the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate

sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other
alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
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Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the
marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic
animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of
cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct
the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes
which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass
of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of
fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education
the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs
the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with
this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002,
sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do
not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay
is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the
Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to
do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws. 7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the
following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY

THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER
SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
19 | P a g e
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I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC

POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT

OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general
or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can
petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay

Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. 8 A ministerial
duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment." 9 It connotes
an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by
law."10 Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste
and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment
on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate,
has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking
feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that
petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not
require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to
clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents
maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to
such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law,
on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different
concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-
making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be
done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice
Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of
ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and
desist from operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months
from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the
MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a
statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act
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No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s
waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It
shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and
related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to
reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and
Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall
maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of
RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity
of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and
disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in
the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting
up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act
officially according to their judgment or conscience. 13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a
person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 14 Any suggestion that
the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties
ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing
not to perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, 15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and
natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other
hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement
and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water
pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water
pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other
pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and
technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management
Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec.
19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency

responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise
provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from
the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or
revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12)

months following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12
months following the completion of the framework for each designated water
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management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management
area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework. 16 Within
twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it
under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with
the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government
organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action
plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases
should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under
existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control
over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of
Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary
for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System;
xxx
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts.
It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and
shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to
construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached
agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the
setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the
different parts of the country. 19 In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to
provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to
prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO
292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances
respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination
with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a
monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in
Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. 21 Likewise under
RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of
water quality standards in marine waters. 22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention
and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the
fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked
under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among
others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national
development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-
wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the
formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated
flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
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On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and
MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro
Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood
control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services
shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974,
and Sec. 6 of PD 979, 24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary
responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in
accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission
upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979.
It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or
any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or
manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown,

discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or
vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any
kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable
water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or
on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to
be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or
floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or
increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990
was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all
police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the
police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the
capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the
capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG
and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was
made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the
PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules,
and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within
the ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and
attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the
Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority
shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and
vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft. 27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL
73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception
facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the
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discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels
are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime
Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of
RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction. 29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated
are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning
of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable
or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open
dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or
demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such
as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with
the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws
along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater
directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to
implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the
DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked
to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect
the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of
RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall
formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and
the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not
considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system
shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec.
5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the
regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through
the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of
sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental
sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152),
is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all
levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on
Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide
educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use
of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other
hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula
at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles. 33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government
funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives. 34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in
a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh,
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brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among
others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of
pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality
management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from
concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality
of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on
pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble
objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical,
and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the
law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass
the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to

a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies
concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to

contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of
his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment,
removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be
charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152
continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26

hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the
applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up
any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have
been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event
emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately
undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies
concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses
incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused
such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the
cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other
funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than
real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the
designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern
themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to
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cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the
succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants

discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that
result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific
polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application
of said Sec. 20 is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding
containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the
aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill
condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or
accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting
the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental
spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even
expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152
may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the
bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in
fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the
water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow
reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of
the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the
cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup
operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As
pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec.
17, not even in the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires
them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to
stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures
as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is
properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to
clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall
undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to
perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and
the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is
quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code
comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no
pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind
Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends
on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect
to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate
court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection
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and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather
than limiting them to specific pollution incidents." 35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec.

20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of
such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific
and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution
incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by
polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16
of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or
pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the
land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up
in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless
and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution
incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so
undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the
Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay
polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to
contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it
behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA
9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup
situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the
long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation
process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from
reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise,
for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal
minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the
Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices
under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal
level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," 36 the Court may,
under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the
doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution. 37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures
which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital
Region (NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river
banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and
garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible
for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures
would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously
addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies
of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much. 38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD
1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along
banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas,
along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of
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recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be
allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing
along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But
while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments
undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment
facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters,
from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such
period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to
comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on
the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage
Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon
and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid
run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth
and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the
environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human
waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by
households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs
rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly
strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and
Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be
established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular
note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37,
reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste .––No open dumps
shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any
person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be
allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps
shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis
added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which
ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly
complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering,
dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open
dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have
proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that
ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins
the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels,
and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4
and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to
the aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters,
discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances
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[and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water,
land or air transport or other human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the
extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and
discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence,
there is a need to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of
them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark
cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its
former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But
the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with
the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks
and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in
the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend
their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand
becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in
cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides
that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it
is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. 41 Even assuming
the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay,
they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as
possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case
No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments
or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-

government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving,
and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call
regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure
the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated
completion schedules.
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(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, 42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in
their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River,
the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine
whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be
ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic
tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes
from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with
the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities
and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and
restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila,
Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979,
RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 46 and the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila.
The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in
the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in
coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater
into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
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apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective
penal provisions of RA 9003, 47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing
laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year
from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time
within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, 48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, 49 the
DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental
protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and
hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty
toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and
the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations
Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration,
and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation,
and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
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Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens
and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of
the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right
of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
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[G.R. No. 133250. May 6, 2003.]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI

COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
For resolution of the Court are the following motions: (1) Motion to Inhibit and for Re-
Deliberation filed by respondent Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation ("Amari" for
brevity) on September 13, 2002; (2) Motion to Set Case for Hearing on Oral Argument filed by
Amari on August 20, 2002; (3) Motion for Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Amari on July 26, 2002 and August 20, 2002, respectively; (4) Motion
for Reconsideration and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Public
Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) on July 26, 2002 and August 8, 2002, respectively; and (5)
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on July
25, 2002. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez filed on November 13, 2002 his Consolidated
Opposition to the main and supplemental motions for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
To recall, the Court’s decision of July 9, 2002 ("Decision" for brevity) on the instant. case states
in its summary:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is
contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the commerce of men," are "inexistent and void
from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
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Amari seeks the inhibition of Justice Antonio T. Carpio, ponente of the Decision, on the ground
that Justice Carpio, before his appointment to the Court, wrote in his Manila Times column of
July 1, 1997, "I have always maintained that the law requires the public bidding of reclamation
projects." Justice Carpio, then a private law practitioner, also stated in the same column, "The
Amari-PEA reclamation contract is legally flawed because it was not bid out by the PEA." Amari
claims that because of these statements Justice Carpio should inhibit himself "on the grounds of
bias and prejudgment" and that the instant case should be "re-deliberated" after being assigned
to a new ponente.
The motion to inhibit Justice Carpio must be denied for three reasons. First, the motion to
inhibit came after Justice Carpio had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case.
The rule is that a motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member of the Court had
already given an opinion on the merits of the case, 1 the rationale being that "a litigant cannot
be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court . . . (only to) raise an objection of this
sort after a decision has been rendered." Second, as can be readily gleaned from the summary
of the Decision quoted above, the absence of public bidding is not one of the ratio decidendi of
the Decision which is anchored on violation of specific provisions of the Constitution. The
absence of public bidding was not raised as an issue by the parties. The absence of public
bidding was mentioned in the Decision only to complete the discussion on the law affecting
reclamation contracts for the guidance of public officials. At any rate, the Office of the Solicitor
General in its Motion for Reconsideration concedes that the absence of public bidding in the
disposition of the Freedom Islands rendered the Amended JVA null and void. 2 Third, judges
and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because they have written
legal articles on the law involved in the case. As stated by the Court in Republic v. Cocofed, 3 —
The mere fact that, as a former columnist, Justice Carpio has written on the coconut levy will
not disqualify him, in the same manner that jurists will not be disqualified just because they
may have given their opinions as textbook writers on the question involved in a case.
Besides, the subject and title of the column in question was "The CCP reclamation project" and
the column referred to the Amari-PEA contract only in passing in one sentence.
Amari’s motion to set the case for oral argument must also be denied since the pleadings of the
parties have discussed exhaustively the issues involved in the case.
The motions for reconsideration reiterate mainly the arguments already discussed in the
Decision. We shall consider in this Resolution only the new arguments raised by
respondents.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, Amari argues that the Decision should be
made to apply prospectively, not retroactively to cover the Amended JVA. Amari argues that the
existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached, citing De Agbayani v. PNB, 4 thus:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
. . .. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative
or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after
the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is
now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of
fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
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consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official." This language has been quoted with approval in a
resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. . . ..
x x x
. . . That before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly.
There is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the
existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to
which legal consequences are attached.
Amari now claims that "assuming arguendo that Presidential Decree Nos. 1084 and 1085, and
Executive Order Nos. 525 and 654 are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution, the limitation
imposed by the Decision on these decrees and executive orders should only be applied
prospectively from the finality of the Decision." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Amari likewise asserts that a new doctrine of the Court cannot operate retroactively if it impairs
vested rights. Amari maintains that the new doctrine embodied in the Decision cannot apply
retroactively on those who relied on the old doctrine in good faith, citing Spouses Benzonan v.
Court of Appeals, 5 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was
that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe
and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are
also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex
prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is
easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already
become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco
v. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1961]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]." . .
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
There may be special cases where weighty considerations of equity and social justice will
warrant a retroactive application of doctrine to temper the harshness of statutory law as it
applies to poor farmers or their widows and orphans. In the present petitions, however, we find
no such equitable considerations. Not only did the private respondent apply for free agricultural
land when he did not need it and he had no intentions of applying it to the noble purposes
behind the law, he would now repurchase for only P327,995.00, the property purchased by the
petitioners in good faith for P1,650,000.00 in 1979 and which, because of improvements and
the appreciating value of land must be worth more than that amount now.
The buyers in good faith from DBP had a right to rely on our rulings in Monge and Tupas when
they purchased the property from DBP in 1979 or thirteen (13) years ago. Under the rulings in
these two cases, the period to repurchase the disputed lot given to respondent Pe expired on
June 18, 1982. He failed to exercise his right. His lost right cannot be revived by relying on the
1988 case of Belisario. The right of petitioners over the subject lot had already become vested
as of that time and cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Belisario ruling.
Amari’s reliance on De Agbayani and Spouses Benzonan is misplaced. These cases would apply
if the prevailing law or doctrine at the time of the signing of the Amended JVA was that a
private corporation could acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and the Decision
annulled the law or reversed this doctrine. Obviously, this is not the case here.chanrob1es
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virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed to acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, private corporations were
banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution continued this constitutional prohibition. The prevailing law before, during and after
the signing of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The Decision has not annulled or in any way changed the
law on this matter. The Decision, whether made retroactive or not, does not change the law
since the Decision merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Thus, De Agbayani, which refers to a law that is invalidated by a decision of the
Court, has no application to the instant case.
Likewise, Spouses Benzonan is inapplicable because it refers to a doctrine of the Court that is
overruled by a subsequent decision which adopts a new doctrine. In the instant case, there is
no previous doctrine that is overruled by the Decision. Since the case of Manila Electric
Company v. Judge Castro-Bartolome, 6 decided on June 29, 1982, the Court has applied
consistently the constitutional provision that private corporations cannot hold, except by lease,
alienable lands of the public domain. The Court reiterated this in numerous cases, and the only
dispute in the application of this constitutional provision is whether the land in question had
already become private property before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 7 If the land
was already private land before the 1973 Constitution because the corporation had possessed it
openly, continuously, exclusively and adversely for at least thirty years since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, then the corporation could apply for judicial confirmation of its imperfect title. But if the
land remained public land upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, then the corporation
could never hold, except by lease, such public land. Indisputably, the Decision does not
overrule any previous doctrine of the Court.
The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private
corporations cannot hold, except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is one of
the two main reasons why the Decision annulled the Amended JVA. The other main reason is
that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable and beyond the
commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of
1886. Clearly, the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial
doctrine.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the Decision does
not overrule existing law or doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this
jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have always been part of the public domain. And
since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be
sold to private corporations. The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban
to include any alienable land of the public domain.
There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of the law or
Constitution, hold that the sale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated because of
"weighty considerations of equity and social justice." 8 The invalidation of the sale or transfer
may also be superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional ban has been achieved.
But none of these cases apply to Amari.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who
later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent
sale to a citizen. 9 Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine
citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land
ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. 10 In short, the law disregards the constitutional
disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified
party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party. In the instant case, however, Amari has
not transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualified party. In fact, Amari
admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA. 11
The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no longer be
questioned under the principle of res judicata, provided the requisites for res judicata are
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present. 12 Under this principle, the courts and the parties are bound by a prior final decision,
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. As the Court declared in Toledo-Banaga v. Court of
Appeals, 13 "once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no
matter how erroneous it may be." In the instant case, there is no prior final decision
adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.
There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari from invoking equity
principles. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA
on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning
precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this
petition, two Senate Committees 14 had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate
Committee Report No. 560. This Report concluded, after a well-publicized investigation into
PEA’S sale of the Freedom Islands, to Amari, that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of
the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the
attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the
Freedom Islands. Amari states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.00 15 out of the
P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon in the Amended JVA. Moreover,
Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent
infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any
physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of the
Amended JVA. And yet Amari claims that it had already spent a "whopping P9,876,108,638.00"
as its total development cost as of June 30, 2002. 16 Amari does not explain how it spent the
rest of the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost after paying PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly,
Amari cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value.
In its Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration, PEA claims that it is "similarly situated" as the
Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) which under R.A. No. 7227 is tasked to sell
portions of the Metro Manila military camps and other military reservations. PEA’s comparison is
incorrect. The Decision states as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with
authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency
charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being
leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of
other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public
domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private
lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
PEA is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide.
PEA took the place of Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity)
as the government agency charged with leasing or selling all reclaimed lands of the public
domain. In the hands of PEA, which took over the leasing and selling functions of DENR,
reclaimed foreshore lands are public lands in the same manner that these same lands would
have been public lands in the hands of DENR. BCDA is an entirely different government entity.
BCDA is authorized by law to sell specific government lands that have long been declared by
presidential proclamations as military reservations for use by the different services of the armed
forces under the Department of National Defense. BCDA’s mandate is specific and limited in
area, while PEA’s mandate is general and national. BCDA holds government lands that have
been granted to end-user government entities — the military services of the armed forces. In
contrast, under Executive Order No. 525, PEA holds the reclaimed public lands, not as an end-
user entity, but as the government agency "primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In Laurel v. Garcia, 17 cited in the Decision, the Court ruled that land devoted to public use by
the Department of Foreign Affairs, when no longer needed for public use, may be declared
patrimonial property for sale to private parties provided there is a law authorizing such act.
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Well-settled is the doctrine that public land granted to an end-user government agency for a
specific public use may subsequently be withdrawn by Congress from public use and declared
patrimonial property to be sold to private parties. R.A. No. 7227 creating the BCDA is a law that
declares specific military reservations no longer needed for defense or military purposes and
reclassifies such lands as patrimonial property for sale to private parties.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to private parties,
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands
acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial property 18 which even private
corporations can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain
if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to
patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation to private
parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified private corporations.
We reiterate what we stated in the Decision is the rationale for treating PEA in the same
manner as DENR with respect to reclaimed foreshore lands, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA
has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of hectares of these
reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one transaction.
This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the
public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds, if not thousands, of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private
lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this
country — creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The 1935
Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of public
lands. The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind of public
land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General and PEA argue that the cost of reclaiming deeply
submerged areas is "enormous" and "it would be difficult for PEA to accomplish such project
without the participation of private corporations." 19 The Decision does not bar private
corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their services in
reclaiming lands. What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate, is
for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no prohibition
on the directors, officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens,
from acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain. They can
acquire not more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes private
land.
Despite the nullity of the Amended JVA, Amari is not precluded from recovering from PEA in the
proper proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis, whatever Amari may have incurred in
implementing the Amended JVA prior to its declaration of nullity.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motions for Reconsideration to be without merit, the same are hereby
DENIED with FINALITY. The Motion to Inhibit and for Re-Deliberation and the Motion to Set
Case for Hearing on Oral Argument are likewise DENIED.cralaw : red
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales and Callejo,

Sr., JJ., concur.
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Azcuna, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
And in the naked light I saw
Ten thousand people, maybe more.
People talking without speaking,
People hearing without listening,
People writing songs that voices never share
And no one dared
Disturb the sound of silence.
— Paul Simon, Sound of Silence
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A STEREOTYPICAL ACTION, AN ARCHETYPAL RESPONSE, A MATTER OF DUE PROCESS — a

motion for reconsideration relieves the pressure of mistakes shrouded in the mystified body of
putative precedents. It serves the traditional and standard procedure for a second chance not
only in favor of party-litigants but the courts as well, before taking that great leap of faith into
stare decisis where even our errors are etched as rules of conduct or, as our conscious choice
would have it, into the jural postulate of a civilized society where men are able to assume that
they may control, for purposes beneficial to them, what they have created by their own labor
and what they have acquired under the existing social and economic order. With such
opportunity presenting itself in the instant case, I am up to the task of scrutinizing a
monumental challenge to the course of economic decision-making inherent not in the mandate
of this Court but in those of the accountable political branches of our government whose long-
standing discretion we have thrashed — a perfunctory acquiescence amidst the disturbing
sound of silence is certainly feckless and inappropriate.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
First, my concurrence. I am happy that this Court has stuck to a civil libertarian’s honesty and
transparency in government service when interpreting the ambit of the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern. Nothing can be more empowering on this aspect than
to compel access to all information relevant to the negotiation of government contracts
including but not limited to evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to such reports or
minutes, all relating to any proposed undertaking. This to me encourages our people to watch
closely the proprietary acts of State functionaries which more often than not, because they
have been cloaked in technical jargon and speculation due to the absence of verifiable resource
materials, have been left unaccounted for public debate and searching inquiry.
Having said what is positively remarkable about the ponencia, let me discuss the crux of my
dissent.
Firstly, as explained by the contracting parties now adversely affected by the Decision to nullify
ab initio the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (AJVA), there is no reason to go that far to
prove a point. I agree with them. According to the ponencia, the AJVA was intended to —
. . . develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged. areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the
Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP . . .. The subject matter
of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties,
namely: 1.’[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo
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Boulevard in Parañaque and Las Piñas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441
square meters;’ 2.’[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;’
and 3.’[A]t AMARI’s option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to
regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area.’ PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves
"the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of about 250 hectares . . .,’
plus an option ‘granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares . . .’ In short,
the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-
hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still
submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse
PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA’s ‘actual cost’ in partially reclaiming the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands.
AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15
hectares, still to be reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and
30 percent, respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the
total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARI’s share in the
net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c) of
the Amended JVA provides that — ‘. . ., PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the
necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARI’s land share based on
the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the
issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering AMARI’s Land Share in the
name of AMARI, . . .; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at
any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of
the titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of
additional land pertaining to PEA has been titled.’ Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI
will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its
name. To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
venture PEA’s statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged
areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that — ‘PEA hereby contributes to
the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and Horizontal
Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full
and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the
Master Development Plan.’ The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original
JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995. 1
But the AJVA, which is basically a specie of an "I do, you give" contract, is severable in the
sense that AMARI’s share in the project need not be paid in parcels of the reclaimed land but
also in cash. The majority cannot set this alternative aside since lawyers for AMARI are also
interested in this substitute option if all else fail. 2 Another tame solution, so they say, is for the
Public Estates Authority to hold title to the reclaimed lands until transferred to a qualified
transferee. 3 This too is possible in the name of equity. To be sure, the prestation in the PEA-
AMARI contract is not contrary to law or public policy since the government stands to be
benefited by AMARI’s part of the bargain while the latter must in turn be compensated for its
efforts; in the present context service and compensation, "I do, you give" are certainly not
illegal considerations. Since the baseless anxiety about the AJVA lies only in the mode of
recompense for AMARI, and the AJVA offers an abundance of means to get it done, even
granting that the ponencia has correctly understood the law to prevent permanently the
transfer of reclaimed lands to AMARI, no reason could sanely justify voiding the entire contract
and eternally deny a party its due for its onerous activities. As we have held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 4
. . . it appearing that something compensable was accomplished by them, following the

applicable provision of law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one, not even the
government shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another, we believe and so
hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done and dredge fill
poured in . . . .
Secondly, I am not comfortable with the idea of forever withholding reclaimed lands as
unmoving assets in our developmental concerns.
Government lands are classified in a number of ways. They may be lands of the public domain,
either alienable or inalienable, or lands of the private domain, which refer to "land belonging to
and owned by the state as a private individual, without being devoted for public use, public
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service or the development of national wealth . . . similar to patrimonial properties of the
State." 5 Under the Civil Code, government lands can either be properties of the public
dominion, or those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character, or
those which belong to the State, without being for public use, intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth; 6 or patrimonial properties of the State, i.e.,
properties other than properties of the public dominion or former properties of the public
dominion that are no longer intended for public use or for public service. 7 Clearly, the
government owns real estate which is part of the "public lands" or alienable lands of the public
domain and other real estate which is not a part thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Alienable lands of the public domain, or those available for alienation or disposition, are part of
the patrimonial properties of the State. 8 They are State properties available for private
ownership except that their appropriation is qualified by Secs. 2 and 3 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and the public land laws. 9 Before lands of the public domain are declared available
for private acquisition, or while they remain intended for public use or for public service or for
the development of national wealth, they would partake of properties of public dominion just
like mines before their concessions are granted, 10 in which case, they cannot be alienated or
leased or otherwise be the object of contracts. 11 In contrast, patrimonial properties may be
bought or sold or in any manner utilized with the same effect as properties owned by private
persons. 12 Lands of the private domain, being patrimonial properties, are valid objects of
contracts generally unfettered by the terms and conditions set forth in Secs. 2 and 3 of Art. XII
of the Constitution, which refer only to lands of the public domain, nor by statutes for the
settlement, prescription or sale of public lands.
The ponencia classified the reclaimed lands herein involved to be lands of the public domain.
Thus, as summarized in the ponencia sought to be reconsidered —
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources
of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and
declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands
qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are
inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind
of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter,
the government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. 13
This is where I also disagree. Reclaimed lands are lands sui generis, as the majority would rule,
and precisely because of this characterization we cannot lump them up in one telling swoop as
lands of the public domain without due regard for vested rights as well as joint executive and
legislative intent to provide otherwise. For, after all, it is the executive and legislative powers
that determine land classification. 14 To illustrate, in Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
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Zamboanga 15 this Court took note of the diverging "norms" provided by laws, i.e., the Civil
Code and the Law of Municipal Corporations, in classifying municipal lands into either public or
patrimonial, and held that "applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the
Law of Municipal Corporations, all those . . . properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local
administration, public education, public health, etc." Clearly, the categorization of government
lands depends upon legislative intent which the courts must implement.
The Freedom Islands was reclaimed by the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP) pursuant to a contract with the Republic whereby the former in exchange for
its efforts would receive fifty percent (50%) of the total reclaimed land. This arrangement is
authorized under Art. 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provides," [l]ands reclaimed from
the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party constructing
such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority," and by PD 3-A
(1973) stating that," [t]he provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the
reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under a proper contract ( Emphasis supplied)." Both
statutes are still effective since neither one repeals the other but only a modification is inserted
in that reclamation by a private contractor must now be governed by a "contract." As the
standing laws, i.e., Art. 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters and PD 3-A, treat reclaimed lands as
proper objects for disposition whether by grant of authority or contract, such reclaimed lands as
they have been acquired by the State by means of a contract are not properties of public
dominion but patrimonial lands of the State that it can dispose, and lands of the private domain
that the State may alienate to anyone since the statutes make no restriction altogether.
The reclaimed lands pertaining to CDCP under the contract with the Republic are private
properties of CDCP. The Republic is authorized to convey them to CDCP, a corporation duly
organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines, 16 and the lands themselves are
products of CDCP’s efforts, money and expertise. When CDCP acquires property, it does so in
its private capacity in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity and
acting as an ordinary person capable of entering into contracts or making transactions for the
transmission of title or other real rights. 17 Under Art. 712 of the Civil Code, ownership and
other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by tradition in consequence of
certain contracts. In fact, PD 1085 (1977) 18 acknowledges the existence of rights in favor of
CDCP and conditions the transfer of assets from CDCP to PEA upon the recognition and respect
for "the rights and interests of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
pursuant to the aforesaid contract," and furthermore, upon the transfer of "such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned
contract" to the contractor or his assignees.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The rest of the lands reclaimed by CDCP as Freedom Islands but belonging to the Republic
under the contract, i.e., the other fifty percent (50%) thereof, are lands of the private domain.
The reason is simple: this fifty percent (50%) to which the Republic is entitled is only an
extension of the other fifty percent (50%) that went to CDCP as its private property in
consideration of its reclamation. An "extension," signifies enlargement in any direction — in
length, breadth, or circumstance. 19 Thus, in Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals 20 we
held:" [i]f the reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the same nature or
character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it has been said that a power to extend (or
continue an act or business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally distinct." Moreover, as
in the case of lands obtained in escheat proceedings or succession which are properties of the
private domain, the reclaimed lands are procured through the contract between the Republic
and CDCP without which they would not have come into being.
The transfer of the Freedom Islands to the PEA under PD 1085 (both the fifty percent (50%)
owned by CDCP and the other half owned by the Republic) does not alter the description of the
reclaimed lands — they remain lands of the private domain. In fact, the conveyance bolsters
such characterization: fifty percent (50%) was obtained from a private owner, CDCP, hence
subsuming it under the private domain. 21 The other fifty percent (50%) belonging to the
Republic is given to PEA in exchange for a participation in the latter’s equity. As explained in
DoJ Opinion No. 026, s. 1994, which answers negatively whether the President may transfer
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gratuitously the title of the Republic over all lands within the Old Bilibid Compound (OBC) in
favor of the PEA, subject to the existing valid private rights if there be any, to form part of
PEA’s project-related asset pool —
First and foremost, PEA’s Charter delimits the contributions of the National Government to the
PEA which are to be compensated by the equivalent number of shares of stocks of the PEA in
the name of the Republic (Secs. 7 and 15, P. D. 1084). The proposed gratuitous transfer of
valuable national government property of the PEA by a Presidential Proclamation would go
beyond the amount of the contribution/exposure of the National Government to the capital of
the PEA as prescribed by law and do away with the consideration therefor that is the equivalent
number of shares of stocks of the PEA to be issued in the name of the National Government.
Accordingly, the said proposal would run counter to the provisions of the abovementioned
Charter, or amount to an amendment of the said law ( Emphasis supplied).
Consequently, under LOI 1390 (1984), to accelerate the development of the First Neighborhood
Unit Project within the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project, an excess of the reclaimed land was
ceded by PEA to the Marina Properties Corporation. Administrative Order No. 348 (1997)
authorized PEA to undertake "pursuant to its charter (PD 1084 and PD 1085) ancillary
reclamation works to put in place the drainage canals and outfalls and to negotiate and enter
into such agreements including land-swapping, on a value for value basis as may be necessary
for the acquisition of rights-of-way (ROW) for the said major roads/drainage canals in order
that these are undertaken at no cost or budgetary outlay on the part of PEA or the National
Government (Emphasis supplied)." 22 Subsequently, AO No. 397 (1998) of then President
Ramos settled claims of CDCP against PEA by conveying portions of the lands previously
reclaimed under CDCP’s contract with the Republic.
Evidently, by these official measures making the reclaimed lands available for the ownership of
private corporations as transferees, the portions of land reclaimed by CDCP were not intended
by the executive and legislative branches of government as proper authorities for such purpose
to be labeled alienable lands of the public domain but lands of the private domain, hence,
generally not subject to the strictures of Secs. 2 and 3 of Art. XII of the Constitution. There is
none of the intention to devote them to public use in order that they may be considered as
properties still of the public domain. 23 As it is "only the executive and possibly the legislative
department that have the authority and the power to make the declaration that said property is
no longer required for public use," 24 or for that matter, already belongs to the private domain,
and with the declaration having been made by enlisting the reclaimed lands as pieces of assets
available for commercial use, they continue as private lands of the State when transferred to
PEA, and from the latter as mode of compensation for AMARI in the assailed AJVA.
The authority to dispose of government lands is a strong indicum of the patrimonial composition
of the properties. 25 Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without further
limitations than those established by law, and jus disponendi of one’s property is an attribute of
ownership. This is clear from PD 1084 (1977), the charter of PEA which states as among the
purposes thereof to "reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling
or other means, or to acquire reclaimed lands," or to "develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and
other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government."
To this end, PEA was empowered to "purchase, lease, build, alter, construct, erect, enlarge,
occupy, manage, sell, mortgage, dispose of or otherwise deal in, buildings of every kind and
character whatsoever, whether belonging to, or to be acquired by the Authority."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Significantly, to stress the legislative intent to segregate PEA’s patrimonial lands or lands of the
private domain which are being used as assets in its commercial undertakings from the realm of
alienable lands of the public domain, PD 1084 purposely vested it with the right to "hold lands
of the public domain in excess of [the] area permitted to private corporations by statute." In
the same DoJ Opinion No. 026, s. 1994 mentioned above, it is articulated although ruefully that
the power of PEA to dispose of its assets constitutes adequate legal basis under Sec. 48, Chapt.
12, Bk. I, of EO 292, the Administrative Code of 1997, 26 as well as under our ruling in Laurel
v. Garcia 27 that" [i]t is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will . . . [a]ny such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by Congress . . . [i]t requires executive and legislative concurrence"
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for PEA to exercise validly such mandate.
The proscription of Secs. 2 and 3 of Art. XII of the Constitution finds no application in the
instant case, especially as regards the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands. As explained above, this real estate is not of the public domain but of the
private domain. In the same way, the various public land laws in their essential parts do not
govern the alienation of the Freedom Islands. What is more, reclaimed lands are not plain and
simple patches of the earth as agricultural, timber or mineral lands are, in the full sense of
being products of nature, but are the results of the intervention of man just like in the
extraction of mineral resources, i.e., gold, oil, petroleum, etc. Landform encompasses only six
(6) major categories: high mountains, low mountains, hills, plains with high relief features,
plains of moderate relief and plains of slight relief. 28 The terrain types identified by this system
are established by a uniform set of descriptive properties, and nowhere do we read therein
reclaimed lands. The origin of our islands as other islands in the western Pacific is believed to
be "the upfoldings of ancient continental rocks with deep troughs between representing
downfolds or down-dropped blocks . . . [h]ence, the elevations of those islands . . . which rest
upon submarine platforms has been aided by deformation of the earth’s crust" 29 — our islands
were not created through the process of reclamation but through natural formation.chanrob1es
virtua1 law library
In fact, reclaimed lands are the result of man’s interference with nature. They are not akin to
land categories as we know them but more representative of the exploitation of natural
resources coupled with the inventiveness of man. As mentioned above, the more relevant
comparisons would be the exploration and utilization of mineral resources that are turned over
to the private contractor in exchange for certain fees and royalties. 30 To be sure, the
constitutional injunction in Sec. 2 of Art XII that" [w]ith the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated" was never intended to restrict our leaders in the
executive branch to require in mineral agreements a stipulation "requiring the Contractor to
dispose of the minerals and by-products produced at the highest market price and to negotiate
for more advantageous terms and conditions subject to the right to enter into long-term sales
or marketing contracts or foreign exchange and commodity hedging contracts which the
Government acknowledges to be acceptable . . . ( Emphasis supplied)" 31
Without doubt, what applies to reclamation projects is this portion of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the
Constitution —
. . . [t]he exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements [are] . . . under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law (Emphasis supplied)."cralaw virtua1aw library
The clause "under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law" refers to the standing
laws affecting reclaimed lands, such as the PEA charter. The orientation to this portion of Sec. 2
explains why in most executive issuances and statutes relating to reclamation of lands we
would read references to joint venture or production-sharing agreements. Hence, in EO 405
(1997) Authorizing the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to Reclaim and Develop Submerged
Areas Vested in the PPA For Port-Related Purposes, it was noted in the "Whereas" Clauses that
land reclamation and development projects are capital intensive infrastructure enterprises
requiring huge financial outlays through joint venture agreements. In this light, we ought to
resolve the instant reclamation project according to the clear intendment of the executive and
legislative branches of government to handle reclaimed lands as patrimonial properties and
lands of the private domain of the State.
As regards the real character of reclaimed lands, Sec. 302 of RA 7160 (1991) 32 provides that"
[t]he contractor shall be entitled to a reasonable return of its investment in accordance with its
bid proposal as accepted by the local government unit concerned . . .. In case of land
reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant of
a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed." Under Sec. 6
of RA 6957 (1990), 33 "the contractor shall be entitled to a reasonable return of its investment
and operating and maintenance costs . . .. In the case of land reclamation or the building of
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industrial estates, the repayment scheme may consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of
the reclaimed land or industrial estate built, subject to the constitutional requirements with
respect to the ownership of lands." The mention of the "constitutional requirements" in RA 6957
has to do with the equity composition of the corporate recipient of the land, i.e., "corporations
or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens" and not to
the outright prohibition against corporate ownership of lands of the public domain. 34 It is also
important to note that a "contractor" is any "individual, firm, partnership, corporation,
association or other organization, or any combination of any thereof," 35 thus qualifying AMARI
to receive a portion of the reclaimed lands.
There is nothing essentially wrong with the agreement between PEA and AMARI in that the
latter would receive a portion of the reclamation project if successful. This is a common
payment scheme for such service done. It is recognized under the Spanish Law of Waters and
authorized by the PEA charter as well as by RA 6957. The assailed AJVA is not awarding AMARI
a portion of the Manila Bay, a property of public dominion, but a fraction of the land to be
uplifted from it, a land of the private domain. While the reclamation project concerns a future
thing or one having potential existence, it is nonetheless a legitimate object of a contract. 36
We do not have to be confused regarding the nature of the lands yet to be reclaimed. They are
the same as the Freedom Islands. Both are meant to serve legitimate commercial ends, hence,
lands of the private domain intended by both the executive and legislative branches of
government to be used as commercial assets. This objective is obvious from PD 1084 which
empowers PEA to "enter into, make, perform and carry out contracts of every class and
description, including loan agreements, mortgages and other types of security arrangements,
necessary or incidental to the realization of its purposes with any person, firm or corporation,
private or public, and with any foreign government or entity." Executive Order No. 525 (1979)
37 provides that" [a]ll lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which
shall be responsible for its administration, development, utilization, or disposition in accordance
with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may
derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084." Finally, EO 654 (1981) 38 mandates that" [i]n the
disposition of its assets and properties, the Authority shall have the authority to determine the
kind and manner of payment for the transfer thereof to any third party." Since the principal task
of PEA is to reclaim lands or to approve the execution of it by others, its power to contract must
necessarily involve dealings with the reclaimed lands.
Admittedly, our public land laws classify reclaimed lands as alienable lands of the public domain.
39 Under such taxonomy, the real estate would fall within the prohibition against ownership by
private corporations under Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, of the Constitution. Under the public land
laws, the mode of disposing them is mainly through lease, or if titled in the name of a
government entity, by sale but only to individual persons. But herein lies the rub — the
nomenclature attached to reclaimed lands as belonging to the public domain is statutory in
origin. This means, and ought to import, that the category may change according to legislative
intent. The power to make laws includes the power to alter and repeal them. Nothing
sacrosanct like a constitutional injunction exists that reclaimed lands be always classified as
lands of the public domain; the class is statutory in foundation and so it may change
accordingly, as it was modified for purposes of the mandate of the Public Estates Authority.
The issuance of a "special patent" under PD 1085, i.e., "Special Land Patent/Patents shall be
issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the Public Estate Authority without
prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his assignees of such portion or
portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned
contract . . . [o]n the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall issue the
corresponding certificates, of title," does not mean that the reclaimed lands prior to such
"special patent" are classified as lands of the public domain.
As a matter of ordinary land registration practice, a special patent is a "patent to grant, cede,
and convey full ownership of alienable and disposable lands formerly covered by a reservation
or lands of the public domain" and is issued upon the "promulgation of a special law or act of
Congress or by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources as authorized by an
Executive Order of the President." 40 This meaning of a "special patent" cannot override the
overwhelming executive and legislative intent manifest in PDs 1084 and 1085 to make the
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reclaimed lands available for contract purposes. What is important in the definition of "special
patent" is the grant by law of a property of the Republic for the full ownership of the grantee
while the classification of the land is not at all decisive in such description since the "special law
or act of Congress" or the "Executive Order" may classify the subject land differently, as is done
in the instant case. Thus the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
through the Reservation and Special Land Grants Section of the Land Management Division, is
tasked to issue special patents in favor of "government agencies pursuant to special laws,
proclamations, and executive orders . . . ( Emphasis supplied)." 41 Verily, in the absence of a
general law on the authority of the President to transfer to a government corporation real
property belonging to the Republic, 42 PD 1085 is free to choose the means of conveying
government lands from the Republic to PEA, a government corporation, whether by special
patent or otherwise without adjusting their character as lands of private domain.
Additionally, nothing momentous can be deduced from the participation of the Secretary of
Natural Resources in the signing of the "special patent" since he is by law, prior to the transfer
of the reclaimed lands to PEA, the land officer of the Republic for lands of the private domain as
may be gleaned from Sec. 1 of Act 3038, the general law dealing with the disposition of lands
of the private domain, 43 i.e.," [t]he Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is hereby
authorized to sell or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the Philippines
Islands . . .." 44 This is because under the organization of the DENR, the Land Management
Division is charged with the "planning, formulating, and recommending policies for the sound
management and disposition of . . . friar lands, patrimonial properties of the government, and
other lands under the region’s administration as well as guidelines on land use and
classification," while the Reservation and Special Land Grants Section thereof prepares the
special patents proposed to be issued in favor of "government agencies pursuant to special
laws, proclamations, and executive orders . . .. ( Emphasis supplied)" 45
The reference to a "special patent" is called for since the conveyance of the reclaimed lands
begins with the Republic not with PEA. Once the transfer of the reclaimed lands is perfected by
the issuance of special land patents signed by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of
PEA, the subsequent disposition thereof, e.g. the transfer from PEA to AMARI, falls within the
coverage of PEA’s charter and cognate laws. The reason is that PEA is henceforth the owner of
all lands reclaimed by it or by virtue of its authority "which shall be responsible for its
administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1084." 46 Significantly, for the registration of reclaimed lands alienated
by PEA pursuant to its mandate, it is only necessary to file with the Register of Deeds the
"instrument of alienation, grant, patent or conveyance" whereupon a certificate of title shall be
entered as in other cases of registered land and an owner’s duplicate issued to the
grantee.chanrob1es virtua1 law library
Indeed, there should be no fear calling reclaimed lands "lands of the private domain" and
making them available for disposition if this be the legislative intent. The situation is no
different from the trade of mineral products such as gold, copper, oil or petroleum. Through
joint ventures that are allowed under the Constitution, our government disposes minerals like
private properties. At the end of the pendulum, if we refer to reclaimed lands as lands of the
public domain inalienable except to individual persons, then it is time to end all reclamation
projects because these efforts entail too much expense and no individual person would have
the capital to undertake it himself. We must not hamstring both the Executive and Congress
from making full use of reclaimed lands as an option in following economic goals by the
declaration made in the ponencia.
And what about rights that have been vested in private corporations in the meantime? In the
words of Dean Roscoe Pound," [i]n civilized society men must be able to assume that they may
control, for purposes beneficial to themselves, what they have discovered and appropriated to
their own use, what they have created by their own labor and what they have acquired under
the existing social and economic order. This is a jural postulate of civilized society as we know
it. The law of property in the widest sense, including incorporeal property and the growing
doctrines as to protection of economically advantageous relations, gives effect to the social
want or demand formulated in this postulate." 47 It appears we have not accounted for the
rights of others who are not even involved in the instant case.
The underlying issue is about trust and confidence in our government. If we want to deal with
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the perceived mistrust in the motivation of our leaders, the solution rests elsewhere. In the
same manner that we do not have to scorch the face to treat a pimple, so must we not prevent
executive and legislative intent from disposing reclaimed lands, which in the first place had to
be "constructed" so it would exist, very much unlike the permanent patches of earth that we
should rightly control.
Giving petitioner Chavez a full recognition of his right to access matters of public concern is a
correct step in the appropriate direction. The ponencia should have cut and cut clean there as
we must do now. Anything beyond that, as the ponencia has done previously, is ivory-tower
and unaccountable interventionism at its worst.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, I vote to GRANT the Motions for Reconsideration and DISMISS the
Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order EXCEPT as to the right of petitioner Francisco I. Chavez to have access to all
information relevant to the negotiation of government contracts including but not limited to
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of
reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to any
proposed legitimate undertaking, which shall at all times be respected, without prejudice to any
appropriate action the petitioner may hereafter take in the premises.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
PUNO, J.:
I respectfully submit that the plea of the private respondent AMARI for a prospective application
of our Decision of July 26, 2002 deserves serious attention. From the mosaic of facts, it appears
that private respondent is a Philippine corporation whose capital structure includes a heavy mix
of public investment and foreign equity. It further appears that respondent AMARI did not
conclude its Amended Joint Venture Agreement (AJVA) with the government, thru the public
respondent Public Estates Authority (PEA) without exercising the due diligence required by law.
Private respondent AMARI claims and the records support it, that its AJVA passed the proverbial
eye of the needle before it was approved by the Chief Executive of the country.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The submission of private respondent AMARI that it believed in good faith that its AJVA does
not suffer from any legal infirmity should not be dismissed with a cavalier attitude. First,
respondent AMARI contends that it relied on the unbroken opinions of the Department of
Justice allowing the entity that undertook the reclamation project to be paid with part of the
reclaimed lands. It calls our attention to DOJ Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, given under
the 1935 Constitution, and rendered by no less than the eminent Chief Justice Jose Abad
Santos, then the Secretary of Justice, to the effect that "reclaimed land belong to the entity or
person constructing the work for the reclamation of the land," viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the Philippines
into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since the
enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "Agricultural public lands" had,
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public land laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, held that he phrase
‘agricultural public lands’ means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
timber or mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many
subsequent cases (Montano v. Ins. Gov’t., 12 Phil. 572) by prescribing distinct rules as to their
disposition. Lands added to the shore by accretion belong to the State while lands reclaimed
belong to the entity or person constructing the work for the reclamation of the land."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The advent of the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions does not appear to have changed the
opinion of the DOJ. 1 Secondly, respondent AMARI avers that Congress has consistently
enacted laws allowing portions of reclaimed lands to be paid to whoever undertook the work.
These laws passed under the 1935 Constitution are, among others, the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
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"(i) Rep. Act No. 161 (1947) which authorizes the City of Bacolod to undertake reclamation and
own the reclaimed lands;
(ii) Rep. Act No. 287 (1948) which authorizes the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar to
undertake reclamation and own the reclaimed lands;
(iii) Rep. Act No. 1132 (1954) which also authorizes the City of Bacolod to lease out or sell
reclaimed lands;
(iv) Rep. Act No. 3857 (1964), as amended by Rep. Act No. 4654 (1966), which authorizes
Cebu to reclaim lands and own the reclaimed lands;
(v) Rep. Act No. 4663 (1966) which authorizes the Cagayan De Oro Port Authority to undertake
reclamation and own the reclaimed lands;
(vi) Rep. Act No. 4776 (1966) which provides for the authority of Tacloban City to undertake
reclamation and to lease, sell or barter such reclaimed land;
(vii) Rep. Act No. 4850 (1966) which authorizes the Laguna Lake Development Authority to
undertake reclamation and to own such reclaimed land;
(viii) Rep. Act No. 5412 (1968) which authorizes General Santos City to undertake reclamation
and to own such reclaimed land;
(ix) Rep. Act No. 5518 (1969) which authorizes the city of Oroquieta to undertake reclamation
(x) Rep. Act No. 5519 (1969) which authorizes the City of Mandaue to undertake reclamation
(xi) Rep. Act No. 5798 (1969) which authorizes the City of Dumaguete to undertake reclamation
(xii) Rep. Act No. 5956 (1969) [An Act Making the Municipality of Dapa, Province of Surigao Del
Norte, a Sub-Port of Entry, and Authorizing the Appropriation of the Necessary Funds for the
Operation of a Customs Service Therein] which authorizes he City to undertake reclamation and
to own such reclaimed land."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same kind of laws was passed by Congress under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Respondent AMARI cites, among others, the following laws:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(i) Exec. Order No. 1086 (1986) [Tondo Foreshore Area], as amended by Proclamation No. 39
(1992), which provides that reclaimed lands shall be owned by the National Housing Authority;
(ii) Rep. Act No. 6957 (1990) [Build-Operate-Transfer Law] which provides that in case of
reclamation, the repayment scheme may consist of a grant of a portion of the reclaimed land;
(iii) Rep. Act No. 7160 (1992) [Bases Conversion Development Authority] which authorizes the
BCDA to reclaim lands and to own the reclaimed lands;
(iv) Rep. Act No. 7621 (1992) [Cebu Port Authority] which authorizes the Cebu Port Authority to
reclaim lands and to own the reclaimed lands."cralaw virtua1aw library
Republic Act No. 6957, enacted in 1990, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Law (BOT Law), as amended by R.A. No. 7718, is of great significance to the case at bar. The
Senate deliberations on the law clearly show that in case of reclamation undertakings, the
repayment scheme may consist of the grant of a portion of the reclaimed land. I quote the
pertinent deliberations, viz: 2
"x x x
The President Pro Tempore. We are still in the period of interpellations.

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Senator Gonzales. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Senator Gonzales is recognized.
Senator Gonzales. Mr. President, may I be permitted to ask a few questions from the
distinguished Sponsor.
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Please proceed.
Senator Gonzales. Mr. President, Section 6 provides for the repayment scheme. It provides here
that for the financing, construction, operation, and maintenance of any infrastructure project
undertaken pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the contractor shall be entitled to a
reasonable return of his investment, operating and maintenance costs in accordance with the
bid proposal of the contractor as accepted by the concerned contracting infrastructure agency
or local government unit and incorporated in the contract terms and conditions. This repayment
scheme is to be effected by authorizing the contractor to charge and collect reasonable tolls,
fees and rentals for the use of the project facilities, et cetera. May I know, distinguished
colleague, whether this repayment scheme is exclusive, in the sense that the repayment here
would always consist in authorizing the contractor to charge and collect reasonable tools, fees,
or rentals for the use of the project facilities?
Senator Ziga. Exclusive to the . . .?
Senator Gonzales. Exclusive in the sense that no other repayment scheme may be pursued or
adopted?
Senator Gonzales. If it be so, Mr. President, I notice that, among others, the project that can be
the subject of the build-operate-and-transfer scheme are land reclamations.
Senator Ziga. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. Now, in land reclamation, does the distinguished Gentleman expect that the
one or the builder or contractor who effects or undertakes the reclamation project will be
merely repaid or will be required to recoup his investments, plus profits, and otherwise, by
imposing tolls. That is not the usual arrangement as far as land reclamation is concerned.
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr. President. "Tolls" here are concentrated more on horizontal
constructions, such as roads and bridges.
Senator Gonzales. Yes, Mr. President, but undoubtedly, the priority projects here would be land
reclamation. In land reclamation, the usual arrangement is that there should be a certain
percentage of the reclaimed area that would be under the ownership of the Government. On
the other hand, a certain percentage of the land area reclaimed would go to the contractor or
the reclaiming entity.
Senator Gonzales. If as the Gentleman now say that Section 6, which is the repayment scheme,
is exclusive, then that would not be allowable and we cannot effect land reclamation.
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr. President. I believe that there is a little bit of difference that probably
this concept, that the Gentleman put into light here by the reclamation project, could be met
under the build-and-transfer scheme only.
Senator Gonzales. Yes, Mr. President, the build-and-transfer scheme, but there is no question
that they are already covered, either by the build-operate-and-transfer scheme and build-and
transfer scheme. The question is repayment. How will the contractor be able to recoup his
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investments, plus reasonable returns of whatever amount that he had invested for the purpose?
I think, the distinguished Gentleman is agreeable that the imposition of tolls, fees, and rentals
would not be appropriate.
Senator Ziga. In reclamation.
Senator Gonzales. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Ziga. Yes, Mr. President. I believe that there is a space for improvement on these
reclamation projects.
Senator Gonzales. So, we can provide for another scheme of repayment outside of the
repayment scheme as provided for in Section 6 of the bill now.
Senator Gonzales. Now, would a foreign entity, probably, wholly owned by foreigners, be
authorized to engage in land reclamation?
Senator Ziga. In the earlier interpellation, we have stated that the issue of the sharing of 60:40
is one of the acceptable points of amendment. I believe that, in this bill, we are still covered by
that ratio. As of now, this bill intends that it can only allow contractor or developers, whether
they be private corporations, but with the requirements of the Constitution as to foreign
participation.
Senator Gonzales. Yes, Mr. President. Because, in Section 2, paragraph a provides:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library
. . . any private individual, partnership, corporation or firm desiring to undertake the

construction and operation of any of the infrastructure facilities mentioned in Section 3 of this
Act. The private individual contractor/developer must be a Filipino citizen. For a corporation,
partnership or firm, 75 percent of the capital must be owned by the citizens of the Philippines in
accordance with Letter of Instructions No. 630.
My problem here is in land reclamation, Mr. President. Normally, the arrangement here is that a
certain percentage goes to the Government, and a certain percentage of the reclaimed land
would go to the developer or the contractor. Now, would the distinguished Gentleman require a
75:25 percent ratio as far as the ownership of stocks are concerned, while the Constitution
allows a 60:40 ratio as far as ownership of the land is concerned?
Senator Ziga. Mr. President, we have stated that the requirements of the Constitution would be
adhered to.
Senator Gonzales. I see. So it would be sufficient that an entity, a corporation, or a partnership

that undertakes a land reclamation project be owned on the basis of the 60:40 ratio between
Filipino citizens and foreigners.
Senator Ziga. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. All of these would require undoubtedly amendments in this bill. Would the
distinguished Gentleman be willing to, at least, consider these amendments at the opportune
time?
Senator Gonzales. Thank you, Mr. President."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the basis of his interpellations, Senator Gonzales then introduced the following amendment
which was accepted by Senator Ziga and approved by the Senate, viz: 3
"GONZALES AMENDMENT
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Senator Gonzales. Mr. President, between lines 8 and 9, I am proposing a new paragraph which
would read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
IN CASE OF LAND RECLAMATION OR THE BUILDING OF INDUSTRIAL ESTATES, THE.

REPAYMENT SCHEME MAY CONSIST OF THE GRANT OF A PORTION OR PERCENTAGE OF THE
RECLAIMED LAND OR INDUSTRIAL ESTATE BUILT SUBJECT TO CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE OWNERSHIP OF LANDS.’
Because, Mr. President, the repayment scheme includes all of these — payment of tolls, fees,
rentals, and charges. But in case of land reclamation, that is not the ordinary arrangement.
Usually, the compensation there takes the form of a portion or a percentage of the reclaimed
land. And I would apply it all, as far as the building of industrial estates is concerned. Of course,
we have to respect the constitutional provision that only Filipino citizens or corporations — at
least, 60 percent of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines — may acquire
or own lands.
The President. What is the pleasure of the Sponsor?
Senator Ziga. Accepted, Mr. President.
Mr. President. Is there any objection? Any comment? (Silence) Hearing none, the same is
approved.
Senator Gonzales. Thank you, Mr. President."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6957 (BOT Law), as amended, thus provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 6. Repayment Scheme. — For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance
of any infrastructure project undertaken through the Build-Operate-and-Transfer arrangement
or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent shall be
repaid by authorizing it to charge and collect reasonable tolls, fees, and rentals for the use of
the project facility not exceeding those incorporated in the contract and, where applicable, the
proponent may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other
non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of land
. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 6957 (BOT Law), as amended, likewise
provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 12.13 Repayment Scheme
x x x
"Where applicable, the proponent may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue
of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to the grant of
commercial development rights or the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land,
subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or in the case of corporations
only those with at least 60% Filipino equity will be allowed to own land."cralaw virtua1aw
library
But this is not all. Respondent AMARI points to P.D. No. 1085, the charter of the respondent
PEA, which conveyed to it the reclaimed lands within the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) including the lands subject of the case at bar and which
authorized respondent PEA to dispose of said lands. Pursuant to existing laws, rules and
regulations, it appears that respondent PEA has the discretion to pay the entity reclaiming the
lands a portion or percentage of said lands. P.D. No. 1085 pertinently
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, the National Government acting through the Department of Public Highways is
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presently undertaking pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(m) of Republic Act No. 5137, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 3-A, the reclamation of a portion of the foreshore and
offshore areas of the Manila Bay from the Cultural Center of the Philippines passing through
Pasay City, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Zapote, Bacoor up to Cavite City;
WHEREAS, in the implementation of the above-cited laws bidding was held for the reclamation
works and the corresponding contract awarded to the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to convert the land reclaimed into a modern city and
develop it into a governmental, commercial, residential and recreational complex and this is
better accomplished through a distinct entity organized for the purpose;
NOW, THEREFORE, I FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order the following:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract
for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the
same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of
the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to P.D. No. 1084; Provided, however, That the
rights and interest of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant
to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of
the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the
aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines.
In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall
issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity
with an issued value of said shares of stock shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.
The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall
execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the
Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his
assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in
the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission
shall issue the corresponding certificates of title."cralaw virtua1aw library
Former President Corazon C. Aquino also implemented P.D. No. 1085 by issuing Special Patent
No. 3517 ceding absolute rights over the said properties to respondent PEA, which rights
include the determination whether to use parts of the reclaimed lands as compensation to the
contractor, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETINGS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREAS, under Presidential Decree No. 1085 dated February 4, 1977 the ownership and
administration of certain reclaimed lands have been transferred, conveyed and assigned to the
Public Estates Authority, a government entity created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1084
dated February 4, 1977, subject to the terms and conditions imposed in said Presidential
Decree No. 1085;
WHEREAS, pursuant to said decree the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) of the Public Estates Authority consist of a
total area of 1,915,894 square meters surveyed under Plans RL-13-000002 to RL-13-000005
situated in the Municipality of Parañaque;
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NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in
conformity with the provisions thereof and of Presidential Decree No. 1085, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the
Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety-four (1,915,894) square meters; the technical
descriptions of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof;
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said tracts of land, with appurtenances thereunto of right
belonging unto the Public Estates Authority, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the
condition that the said land shall be used only for the purposes authorized under Presidential
Decree No. 1085;
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, and by authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO,

President of the Philippines, hereby caused these letters to be made patent and the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be hereunto affixed."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent AMARI further claims that the administration of former President Fidel V. Ramos
upheld the legality of the original JVA. On the other hand, it alleges that the amended JVA was
the subject of prior exhaustive study and approval by the Office of the General Corporate
Counsel, and the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee composed of
the Executive Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Budget and Management, Secretary of Trade
and Industry, the NEDA Director-General, the head of the Presidential Management Staff, the
Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Office of the President. 4 The amended
JVA was executed on March 30, 1999 and approved on May 28, 1999 under the administration
of former President Joseph E. Estrada. 5
In sum, the records give color to the claim of respondent AMARI that it should not be blamed
when it consummated the JVA and AJVA with its co-respondent PEA. It relied on our laws
enacted under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and their interpretations by the executive
departments spanning the governments of former Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada, all
favorable to the said JVA and AJVA. Finding no legal impediments to these contracts, it claims
to have invested some P9 billion on the reclamation project.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Should this P9 billion investment just come to naught? The answer, rooted in the concept of
fundamental fairness and anchored on equity, is in the negative. Undoubtedly, our Decision of
July 26, 2002 is one of first impression as the ponente himself described it. As one of first
impression, it is not unexpected that it will cause serious unsettling effects on property rights
which could have already assumed the color of vested rights. Our case law is no stranger to
these situations. It has consistently held that new doctrines should only apply prospectively to
avoid inequity and social injustice. Thus in Co v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 6 this Court, thru Chief
Justice Andres Narvasa, held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many
cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961, (sic) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that
Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back
pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before
effectivity of the act; Lagardo v. Masaganda, Et Al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA
2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause;
Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No.
90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po
Lay, 94 SCRA 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the
Official Gazette; Baltazar v. CA, 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316
prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farm holdings, pending the promulgation of
rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519,
adjudging that RA 6389 which removed ‘personal cultivation’ as a ground for the ejectment of a
tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code
by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500,
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holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177
SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars,
to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, October 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding
that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive
effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No.
90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had
no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to
permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the
Circular was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, ‘although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, (this being) the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.’
So did this Court hold, for example, in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government
in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine
on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero
(1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa, reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967.
The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of our rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the
Macarandang and Lucero in Mapa?
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, ‘Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.’ The
interpretation upon a law was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely
established the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to
effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal
maxim ‘legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet’ — the interpretation placed upon the written law by
a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was
part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true
that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. This is specially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.’
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, Et.
Al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (G.R.
No. 97998), January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527–528:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘We sustain the petitioner’s position. It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP
as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on
September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was
that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe
and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code ‘judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.’ But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that ‘laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided.’ This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
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vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco v.
Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061 (sic)]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions
enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.’
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in
the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374
[1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual
existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, in this Court’s decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which
declared ‘that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect,’ and as regards which declaration some members of the Court
appeared ‘quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect (the) decision might have on
acts done in reliance on the validity of those presidential decrees’ — the Court said:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter States Bank
(308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing
no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shellby County,
118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry, Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, or
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.’
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation
of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32,
issued by the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and
other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in
Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953]) (to be) in 1953 unreasonable, and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer" — the Court made substantially the same
observations, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that
matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from the infirmity, cannot
be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its
repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and
purposes a mere scrap of paper. It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such
challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with.
This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled
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to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their
positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what
has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be
valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can
exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to
deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: The actual existence of a statute, prior
to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate,
and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank,
308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in
Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99
Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for
the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).’
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34, — declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law
regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous
persons — this Court, in Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
‘In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was
promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of
conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of
the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in
particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of
constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial
be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the
Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the
judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of
due process.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971–1981) which were created under
general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an
operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their
consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which
now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the
nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local
government abolished.’
It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that
the Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) — i.e., that
a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22 — should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and
other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22."cralaw virtua1aw library
Despite the stream of similar decisions, the majority holds that it would have been sympathetic
to the plea for a prospective application of our Decision." . . if the prevailing law or doctrine at
the time of the signing of the amended JVA was that a private corporation could acquire
alienable lands of the public domain and the Decision annulled the law or reversed the
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doctrine." 7 It explains that "under the 1935 Constitution, private corporations were allowed to
acquire alienable lands of the public domain. But since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
private corporations were banned from holding, except by lease, alienable lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution continued this constitutional prohibition." 8
I beg to disagree. We should put section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution in its proper
perspective. It provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use
may be the measure and limit of the grant." ( Emphasis supplied.)
With due respect, the plea for prospectivity is based on the ground that our Decision is novel
not because it bars private corporations like respondent AMARI from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease but because for the first time we held, among others, that
joint venture agreements cannot allow entities undertaking reclamation of lands to be paid with
portions of the reclaimed lands. This is the first case where we are interpreting that portion of
section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states that." . . the exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law." Indisputably, this part of
section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is new as it is neither in the 1973 or 1935
Constitutions. Undoubtedly too, our Decision goes against the grain of understanding of the
said provision on the part of the Executive and Legislative Departments of our government. The
disquieting effects of our Decision interpreting said provision in a different light cannot be
gainsaid.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The majority concedes that in Benzonan, 9 we held that the sale or transfer of the land involved
in said case may no longer be invalidated because of "weighty considerations of equity and
social justice." 10 Nonetheless, the majority holds that there are "special circumstances that
disqualify AMARI from invoking equity principles," viz: 11
"There are, moreover, special circumstances that disqualify Amari from invoking equity
principles. Amari cannot claim good faith because even before Amari signed the Amended JVA
on March 30, 1999, petitioner had already filed the instant case on April 27, 1998 questioning
precisely the qualification of Amari to acquire the Freedom Islands. Even before the filing of this
petition, two Senate Committees had already approved on September 16, 1997 Senate
Committee Report No. 560. This report concluded, after a well publicized investigation into
PEA’s sale of the Freedom Islands to Amari, that the Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of
the public domain. Thus, Amari signed the Amended JVA knowing and assuming all the
attendant risks, including the annulment of the Amended JVA.
Amari has also not paid to PEA the full reimbursement cost incurred by PEA in reclaiming the
Freedom Islands. Amari states that it has paid PEA only P300,000,000.00 out of the
P1,894,129,200.00 total reimbursement cost agreed upon in the Amended JVA. Moreover,
Amari does not claim to have even initiated the reclamation of the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas covered in the Amended JVA, or to have started to construct any permanent
infrastructure on the Freedom Islands. In short, Amari does not claim to have introduced any
physical improvement or development on the reclamation project that is the subject of the
Amended JVA. And yet Amari claims that it had already spent a "whopping P9,876,108,638.00
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as its total development cost as of June 30, 2002. Amari does not explain how it spent the rest
of the P9,876,108,638.00 total project cost after paying PEA P300,000,000.00. Certainly, Amari
cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value."cralaw virtua1aw library
Again, with due respect, I beg to disagree. The alleged facts and factors cited by the majority
do not provide sufficient basis to condemn respondent AMARI of bad faith. First, the petition at
bar was filed before the amended JVA was consummated. As alleged by the petitioner, he filed
the petition to: 12
"x x x
5.1 Compel respondent to make public all documents, facts and data related to or in connection
with the ongoing RENEGOTIATIONS between respondents PEA and AMARI, and
5.2 Enjoin respondents from privately entering into perfecting and/or executing any new
agreement with AMARI."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner invoked section 7, Article III of the Constitution which recognizes the right of people
to information on matters of public concern and section 28, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. In fine, the amended JVA was yet inexistent at the time
the petition at bar was filed and could not provide a basis for a finding of bad faith on the part
of respondent AMARI. Secondly, Senate Committee Report No. 560 also pertains to the original
JVA. Precisely because of the report, former President Ramos issued Presidential Order No. 365
which established a presidential legal task force to study the legality of the original JVA. The
legal task force did not reach the same conclusions as the Senate. In any event, the original
JVA was renegotiated and was approved by former President Estrada on May 28, 1999
following intensive review by the Office of the General Corporate Counsel and the Government
Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating Committee which, as aforestated, is composed of the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Budget and Management, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry, the NEDA Director General, the Head of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Office of the
President. To be sure, the value of Senate Report No. 560 is not as proof of good or bad faith
of any party, but as a study in aid of legislation. As a legislative body, the Senate does not
determine adjudicative facts. Thirdly, the allegation that respondent AMARI has not complied
with its obligation to PEA is a matter that cannot be resolved in the case at bar. If at all it can
be raised, it is PEA that should raise it in a proper action for breach of contract or specific
performance. This Court is not a trier of facts and it cannot resolve these allegations that
respondent AMARI violated its contract with PEA. The majority cannot condemn respondent
AMARI of acting in bad faith on the basis of patently inadmissible evidence without running
afoul of the rudimentary requirements of due process. At the very least, the majority should
hear respondent AMARI on the issue of its alleged bad faith before condemning it to certain
bankruptcy.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
This is not all. There is another dimension of unfairness and inequity suffered by respondent
AMARI as a consequence of our Decision under reconsideration. It cannot be denied that
respondent AMARI spent substantial amount of money (the claim is P9 billion), fulfilling its
obligation under the AJVA, i.e., provide the financial, technical, logistical, manpower, personnel
and managerial requirements of the project. Our Decision is silent as a sphinx whether these
expenses should be reimbursed. Respondent AMARI may not be paid with reclaimed lands, but
it can be remunerated in some other ways such as in cash. Our omission to order that
respondent AMARI be paid commensurate to its expenses does not sit well with our decision in
Republic of the Philippines v. CA and Republic Estate Corporation, Et. Al. 13 where we
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
Although Pasay City and RREC did not succeed in their undertaking to reclaim any area within
the subject reclamation project, it appearing that something compensable was accomplished by
them, following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no
one, not even the government shall unjustly enrich oneself/itself at the expense of another, we
believe, and so hold, that Pasay City and RREC should be paid for the said actual work done
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and dredge-fill poured in . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Needless to state, the government will be unjustly enriched if it will not be made to compensate
the respondent AMARI for the expenses it incurred in reclaiming the lands subject of the case at
bar.
We should strive for consistency for rights and duties should be resolved with reasonable
predictability and cannot be adjudged by the luck of a lottery. Just a month ago or on March
20, 2003 this Court en banc resolved a motion for reconsideration in Land Bank v. Arlene de
Leon, Et Al., G.R. No. 143275. In this case, we resolved unanimously to give a prospective
effect to our Decision which denied LBP’s petition for review. Written by our esteemed
colleague, Mr. Justice Corona, our resolution held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Be that as it may, we deem it necessary to clarify our Decision’s application to and effect on
LBP’s pending cases filed as ordinary appeals before the Court of Appeals. It must first be
stressed that the instant case poses a novel issue; our Decision herein will be a landmark ruling
on the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Before this case reached us,
LBP had no authoritative guideline on how to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
considering the seemingly conflicting provisions of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657.
More importantly, the Court of Appeals has rendered conflicting decisions on this precise issue.
On the strength of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Feliciano Buenaventura, penned by
Associate Justice Salvador Valdez, Jr. of the Court of Appeals, certain decisions of the appellate
court held that an ordinary appeal is the proper mode. On the other hand, a decision of the
same court, penned by Associate Justice Romeo Brawner and subject of the instant review, held
that the proper mode of appeal is a petition for review. In another case, the Court of Appeals
also entertained an appeal by the DAR filed as a petition for review.
On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657

regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the
conflicting decisions of (the) Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the
wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buenaventura ruling, LBP
acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Hence, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the
prospective application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of
our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play but also based on the constitutional
tenet that rules of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.
In accordance with our constitutional power to review rules of procedure of special courts, our
Decision in the instant case actually lays down a rule of procedure, specifically, a rule on the
proper mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Under Section 5 (5), Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. In determining whether a rule of procedure affects substantive
rights, the test is laid down in Fabian v. Desierto, which provides that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
‘[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is
whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the
rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter, but
if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.’
We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If
our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to appeal because pending
appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby
sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a
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pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good
faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine."cralaw virtua1aw library
Our Decision under reconsideration has a far reaching effect on persons and entities similarly
situated as the respondent AMARI. Since time immemorial, we have allowed private
corporations to reclaim lands in partnership with government. On the basis of age-old laws and
opinions of the executive, they entered into contracts with government similar to the contracts
in the case at bar and they invested huge sums of money to help develop our economy. Local
banks and even international lending institutions have lent their financial facilities to support
these reclamation projects which government could not undertake by itself in view of its scant
resources. For them to lose their invaluable property rights when they relied in good faith on
these unbroken stream of laws of congress passed pursuant to our 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions and executive interpretations is a disquieting prospect. We cannot invite investors
and then decapitate them without due process of law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
I vote to give prospective application to our Decision of July 26, 2002.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The moving force behind the main decision is sound. It proceeds from policies embodied in our
Constitution that seek to guard our natural resources from the exploitation of the few and to
put our precious land under the stewardship of the common Filipino. Yet we, perched upon our
lofty seat in the heights of Olympus, cannot close our eyes to the far-reaching effects that the
decision will have. Neither can we pretend that practical realities supported by our legal system
have to be conceded. These considerations are so basic that we cannot ignore them. They
represent very fundamental rules of law, upon which decades of Philippine jurisprudence have
been built.
I, for one, refuse to close my eyes or remain silent.
The sweeping invalidation of the Amended Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the Public
Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation (hereinafter, Amari)
has left me ill at ease. The draft resolution and the main decision have taken great pains to
explain the majority position with copious research and detailed exposition. However, scant
consideration was given to the fact that P9,876,108,638.00 had already been spent by the
private respondent and that the voiding of the Amended JVA would compel all the parties to
return what each has received. 1 I submit that there was no need to resort to such a drastic
measure.
First of all, a historical analysis of the laws affecting reclaimed lands indicates that the same
have been treated by law as alienable.
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos, or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of
the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of
authority.
The foregoing clearly mandates that reclaimed property shall belong to the party who
undertook the works. It was on the basis of this provision of law that the Manila Port Area,
which was developed from land dredged by the Department of Public Works and
Communications during the construction of the Manila South Harbor, became private property
of the National Government and registered in its name under the Torrens system.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Republic Act No. 1899, an Act to Authorize the Reclamation of Foreshore Lands by Chartered
Cities and Municipalities, provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 2. Any and all lands reclaimed, as herein provided, shall be the property of the respective
municipalities or chartered cities; Provided, however, That the new foreshore along the
reclaimed areas shall continue to be the property of the National Government.
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Again on the basis of the above provision, the Pasay City Government entered into a
reclamation contract with the Republic Resources Realty Corporation under which a portion of
the reclaimed land shall be conveyed to the latter corporation. 2 However, before the
reclamation was completed, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
3-A, which provided:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under
water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under a proper contract.
All reclamations made in violation of this provision shall be forfeited to the State without need
of judicial action.
Contracts for reclamation still legally existing or whose validity has been accepted by the
National Government shall be taken over by the National Government on the basis of quantum
meruit, for proper prosecution of the project involved by administration.
Thus, the Pasay reclamation project was taken over by the National Government. Later, the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) entered into a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) for the reclamation of the
same area and agreed on a sharing arrangement of the land to be reclaimed.
In 1979, PD 1084 was issued, creating the PEA. EO 525 was issued, Section 3 of which
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible
for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale,
lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084.
Clearly, all the foregoing statutes evince a legislative intent to characterize reclaimed lands as
alienable public lands. In other words, there was never an intention to categorize reclaimed
lands as inalienable lands of the public domain; rather they were expressly made private
property of the National Government subject to disposition to the person who undertook the
reclamation works.
Inasmuch as reclaimed lands are not public lands, the provisions of the Constitution prohibiting
the acquisition by private corporations of lands of the public domain do not apply. In the same
vein, the Court, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., 3 held that public
lands which have become private may be acquired by private corporations. This dictum is
clearly enunciated by Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his concurring opinion, viz:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated
therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully
acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution’s prohibition
against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands are involved. 4
Indeed, the Government has the authority to reclaim lands, converting them into its own
patrimonial property. It can contract out the reclamation works and convey a portion of the
reclaimed land by way of compensation.
Secondly, the reason behind the total nullification of the Amended JVA must be reexamined. I
believe there is some confusion with regard to its infirmities. We must remember that the
Amended JVA is a contract and, as such, is governed by the Civil Code provisions on Contracts,
the essential requisites of which are laid out in the following provision:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
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Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. 5
The main decision states that the Amended JVA is void because its "object" is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and that the "object" is also outside the
commerce of man, citing as authority Article 1409 of the Civil Code. However, it has been
opined, and persuasively so, that the object of a contract is either the thing, right or service
which is the subject matter of the obligation arising from the contract. 6 In other words, the
object of the contract is not necessarily a physical thing that by its very nature cannot be the
subject of a contract. The object of a contract can, as it appears so in this case, contemplate a
service. I submit, therefore, that the object herein is not the reclaimed land, no matter how
much emotion these piles of wet soil leave stirred up. The proper object is the service that was
to be rendered by Amari, which is the act of reclamation. Surely, reclamation, in and of itself, is
neither contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order nor to public policy. The act of
reclamation is most certainly not outside the commerce of man. It is a vital service utilized by
the Republic to increase the national wealth and, therefore, cannot be cited as an improper
object that could serve to invalidate a contract.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Furthermore, in Section 1.1 (g) of the Amended JVA, the term "Joint Venture Proceeds" is
defined as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Joint Venture Proceeds" shall refer to all proceeds, whether land or money or their equivalent
arising from the project or from the sale, lease or any other form or disposition or from the
allocation of the Net Usable Area of the Reclamation Area.
It is actually upon this provision of the Amended JVA that its validity hinges. If it is the
contemplated transfer of lands of the public domain to a private corporation which renders the
Amended JVA constitutionally infirm, then resort to the alternative prestation referred to in this
provision will cure the contract. The Civil Code provision on alternative obligations reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely perform one of
them.
The creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other undertaking.
In an alternative obligation, there is more than one object, and the fulfillment of one is
sufficient, determined by the choice of the debtor who generally has he right of election. 7
From the point of view of Amari, once it fulfills its obligations under the Amended JVA, then it
would be entitled to its stipulated share of the Joint Venture Profits. In this instance, Amari
would stand as creditor, with PEA as the debtor who has to choose between two payment
forms: 70% of the Joint Venture Profits, in the form of cash or a corresponding portion of the
land reclaimed. 8 Since it has been ruled that the transfer of any of the reclaimed lands to
Amari would be unconstitutional, 9 one of the prestations of this alternative obligation has been
rendered unlawful. In such case, the following Civil Code provision becomes
pertinent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1202. The debtor shall lose the right of choice when among the prestations whereby he is
alternatively bound, only one is practicable.
If all the prestations, except one, are impossible or unlawful, it follows that the debtor can
choose and perform only one. The obligation ceases to be alternative, and is converted into a
simple obligation to perform the only feasible or practicable prestation. 10 Even if PEA had
insisted on paying Amari with tracts of reclaimed land, it could not have done so, since it had
no right to choose undertakings that are impossible or illegal. 11
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We must also remember that, in an alternative obligation, the fact that one of the prestations is
found to be unlawful does not result in the total nullity of the Amended JVA. The Civil Code
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1420. In case of a divisible contract, if the illegal terms can be separated from the legal
ones, the latter may be enforced.
As a general rule, Article 1420 is applied if there are several stipulations in the contract, some
of which are valid and some void. If the stipulations can be separated from each other, then
those which are void will not have any effect, but those which are valid will be enforced. In
case of doubt, the contract must be considered as divisible or separable. 12 The contract itself
provides for severability in case any of its provisions are deemed invalid. 13 Curiously, the main
decision makes no mention of the alternative form of payment provided for in Section 1.1 (g) of
the Amended JVA. A reading of the main decision would lead one to conclude that the transfer
of reclaimed land is the only form of payment contemplated by the parties. 14 In truth, the
questionable provisions of the Amended JVA can be excised without going against the intent of
the parties or the nature of the contract. Removing all references to the transfer of reclaimed
land to Amari or its transferees will leave us with a simple contract for reclamation services, to
be paid for in cash.
It should also be noted that declaring the Amended JVA to be completely null and void would
result in the unjust enrichment of the state. The Civil Code provision on human relations
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. 15
Again, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 16 it was the finding of this Court that the reclamation
efforts of the Pasay City government and the RREC resulted in "something compensable." Mr.
Justice Reynato Puno explained it best in his concurring opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Given all the facts, Pasay City and RREC cannot be left uncompensated. The National
Government should not be unjustly enriched at the expense of Pasay City and RREC. Pasay City
and RREC deserve to be compensated quantum meruit and on equitable consideration for their
work. 17
Following the applicable provision of law and hearkening to the dictates of equity, that no one,
not even the government, shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, 18 I believe
that Amari and its successors in interest are entitled to equitable compensation for their proven
efforts, at least in the form of cash, as provided for under the Amended JVA.
At this juncture, I wish to express my concern over the draft resolution’s pronouncement that
the Court’s Decision can be made to apply retroactively because" (t)he Decision, whether made
retroactive or not, does not change the law since the Decision merely reiterates the law that
prevailed since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution." This statement would hold true for the
constitutions, statutes and other laws involved in the case that existed before the Decision was
rendered. However, the issues involved are so novel that even the esteemed ponente concedes
that this case is one of first impression.
For example, Section 3 of E.O. 525 declares that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible
for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1084.
Can we really blame respondents for concluding that any kind of land reclaimed by PEA
becomes the latter’s patrimonial property? It is spelled out as such. It was only the filing of the
present petition which brought to light the possibility that this provision may have already been
modified, even partially repealed by Section 4, Subsections 4, 14 and 15 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. 19
Another doctrine which was set aside by the Court’s Decision is the general rule that alienable
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land of the public domain automatically becomes private land upon the grant of a patent or the
issuance of a certificate of title. 20 Curiously, this legal principle was held to be inapplicable to
government entities, 21 despite several analogous cases which may have reasonably led the
respondents to a different conclusion. 22
Most significantly, the ruling laid down by the Decision that: "In the hands of the government
agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
these lands are still public, not private land," 23 is not based on any previous jurisprudence, nor
is it spelled out in any law. It is the result of a process of induction and interpretation of several
laws which have not been set side by side in such a manner before. 24 This pronouncement
has never been made before, and yet now it is law. So when the Decision claimed that it, "does
not change the law," and that it, "merely reiterates the law that prevailed since the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution," we believe such a statement to be inaccurate, to say the least.
Since new doctrines, which constitute new law, are espoused in the Decision, these should be
subject to the general rule under the Civil Code regarding prospective application:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Moreover, lex prospicit, non respicit — the law looks forward not backward. If decisions that
repeal the rulings in older ones are given only prospective application, 25 why should not
doctrines that resolve questions of first impression be treated in like manner? Therefore, it is
my considered view that, if the amended JVA should be nullified, the ruling must be given
prospective effect and all vested rights under contracts executed during the validity thereof
must be respected.
The foregoing are basic principles in civil law which have been brushed aside in the wake of this
Court’s haste to stamp out what it deems unjust. Zeal in the pursuit of justice is admirable, to
say the least, especially amid the cynicism and pessimism that has prevailed among our people
in recent times. However, in our pursuit of righteousness, we must not lose sight of our duty to
dispense justice with an even hand, always mindful that where we tread, the rights of others
may be trampled upon underfoot.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Therefore, I vote to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration and to DENY the petition for lack of
merit.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It is after deep introspection that I am constrained to dissent from the denial by the majority of
the motions for reconsideration filed by respondents PEA and AMARI.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes of the United States Supreme Court stated that a dissent is
of value because it is "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge
believes the court to have been betrayed." 1
While I joined in the initial grant of the petition, I realized, however, that the tenor of our
interpretation of the Constitutional prohibition on the acquisition of reclaimed lands by private
corporations is so absolute and circumscribed as to defeat the basic objectives of its provisions
on "The National Economy and Patrimony." 2
The Constitution is a flexible and dynamic document. It must be interpreted to meet its
objectives under the complex necessities of the changing times. Provisions intended to promote
social and economic goals are capable of varying interpretations. My view happens to differ
from that of the majority. I am confident, however, that the demands of the nation’s economy
and the needs of the majority of our people will bring the majority Decision and this Dissenting
Opinion to a common understanding. Always, the goals of the Constitution must be upheld, not
defeated nor diminished.
Infrastructure building is a function of the government and ideally should be financed

exclusively by public funds. However, present circumstances show that this cannot be done.
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Thus, private corporations are encouraged to invest in income generating national construction
ventures.
Investments on the scale of reclamation projects entail huge amounts of money. It is a reality
that only private corporations can raise such amounts. In the process, they assist this country in
its economic development. Consequently, our government should not take arbitrary action
against these corporate developers. Obviously, the courts play a key role in all disputes arising
in this area of national development.
This is the background behind my second hard look at the issues and my resulting
determination to dissent.
The basic issue before us is whether a private corporation, such as respondent AMARI, can
acquire reclaimed lands.
The Decision being challenged invokes the Regalian doctrine that the State owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. The doctrine is the foundation of the principle of land ownership
that all lands that have not been acquired by purchase or grant from the Government belong to
the public domain. 3 Property of public dominion is that devoted to public use such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads and that of a similar character. 4 Those which belong to the State, not devoted to
public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth, are also classified as property of public dominion. 5 All other property of the State
which is not of public dominion is patrimonial. 6 Also, property of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State. 7
In our Decision sought to be reconsidered, 8 we held that the following laws, among others, are
applicable to the particular reclamation project involved in this case: the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, the Civil Code of 1889, Act No. 1654 enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1907,
Act No. 2874 (the Public Land Act of 1919), and Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine
National Assembly, also known as the Public Land Act of 1936. Certain dictums are emphasized.
Reclaimed lands of the government may be leased but not sold to private corporations and
private individuals. The government retains title to lands it reclaims. Only lands which have
been officially delimited or classified as alienable shall be declared open to disposition or
concession.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Applying these laws and the Constitution, we then concluded that the submerged areas of
Manila Bay are inalienable natural resources of the public domain, outside the commerce of
man. They have to be classified by law as alienable or disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain and have to be declared open to disposition. However, there can be no classification
and declaration of their alienable or disposable nature until after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Even after the submerged areas have been reclaimed from the sea and
classified as alienable or disposable, private corporations such as respondent AMARI, are
disqualified from acquiring the reclaimed land in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, quoted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lands of the Public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timbre, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
"Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject
to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands
of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor."cralaw virtua1aw library
I dissent from the foregoing conclusions which are based on general laws mainly of ancient
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vintage. Reclaimed lands, especially those under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP), are governed by PD 1084 9 and PD 1085 10 enacted in 1976
and 1977, respectively, or more than half a century after the enactment of the Public Lands
Acts of 1919 and 1936.
PD 1084 and PD 1085 provide:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
PD 1084 —
"Section 4. Purposes. — The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
a. To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other
means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
b. To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and
all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed,
controlled and/or operated by the government;
c. To provide for, operate or administer such services as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties. (Emphasis ours)
PD 1085 —
"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract
for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the
same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of
the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to P.D. No. 1084; Provided, however, that the
rights and interest of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines pursuant
to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.
x x x
"Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of
the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or
his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided
for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration
Commission shall issue the corresponding certificates of title." ( Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to the above provisions, PEA is mandated inter alia to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas, or to acquire reclaimed land. Likewise, PEA has the power to
sell any and all kinds of lands and other forms of real property owned and managed by the
government. Significantly, PEA is authorized to transfer to the contractor or its assignees
portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It is a fundamental rule that if two or more laws govern the same subject, every effort to
reconcile and harmonize them must be taken. Interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. 11 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier
statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative
will. 12 Therefore, it is PD 1084 and PD 1085 which apply to the issues in this case.
Moreover, the laws cited in our Decision are general laws which apply equally to all the
individuals or entities embraced by their provisions. 13 The provisions refer to public lands in
general.
Upon the other hand, PD 1084 and PD 1085 are special laws which relate to particular
economic activities, specific kinds of land and a particular group of persons. 14 Their coverage
is specific and limited. More specifically, these special laws apply to land reclaimed from Manila
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Bay by private corporations.
If harmonization and giving effect to the provisions of both sets of laws is not possible, the
special law should be made to prevail over the general law, as it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly. The special law is a specific enactment of the legislature which constitutes an
exception to the general statute. 15
Our Decision cites the constitutional provision banning private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. 16
Under the Constitution, lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and natural parks. 17 Land reclaimed from the sea cannot fall under any
of the last three categories because it is neither forest or timber, mineral, nor park land. It is,
therefore, agricultural land. 18 Agricultural land of the public domain may be alienated. 19
However, the Constitution states that private corporations may not hold such alienable land
except by lease. It follows that AMARI, being a private corporation, cannot hold any reclaimed
area. But let it be made clear that PD 1084 transfers the public agricultural land formed by
reclamation to the "ownership and administration" of PEA, a government owned corporation.
The transfer is not to AMARI, a private corporation, hence, the constitutional prohibition does
not apply. Corollarily, under PD 1085, PEA is empowered to subsequently transfer to the
contractor portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
Does the Constitution restrain PEA from effecting such transfer to a private corporation? Under
Article 421 of the Civil Code, all property of the State which is not of public dominion is
patrimonial. PEA does not exercise sovereign functions of government. It handles business
activities for the government. Thus, the property in its hands, not being of public dominion, is
held in a patrimonial capacity. PEA, therefore, may sell this property to private corporations
without violating the Constitution. It is relevant to state that there is no constitutional obstacle
to the sale of real estate held by government owned corporations, like the National
Development Corporation, the Philippine National Railways, the National Power Corporation,
etc. to private corporations. Similarly, why should PEA, being a government owned corporation,
be prohibited to sell its reclaimed lands to private corporations?
I take exception to the view of the majority that after the enactment of the 1935 Constitution,
Section 58 of Act 2874 continues to be applicable up to the present and that the long
established state policy is to retain for the government title and ownership of government
reclaimed land. This simply is an inaccurate statement of current government policy. When a
government decides to reclaim the land, such as the area comprising and surrounding the
Cultural Center Complex and other parts of Manila Bay, it reserves title only to the roads,
bridges, and spaces allotted for government buildings. The rest is designed, as early as the
drawing board stage, for sale and use as commercial, industrial, entertainment or services-
oriented ventures. The idea of selling lots and earning money for the government is the motive
why the reclamation was planned and implemented in the first place.cralaw : red
May I point out that there are other planned or on-going reclamation projects in the Philippines.
The majority opinion does not only strike down the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between
AMARI and PEA but will also adversely affect or nullify all other reclamation agreements in the
country. I doubt if government financial institutions, like the Development Bank of the
Philippines, the Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System or other
agencies, would risk a major portion of their funds in a problem-filled and highly speculative
venture, like reclamation of land still submerged under the sea. Likewise, there certainly are no
private individuals, like business tycoons and similar entrepreneurs, who would undertake a
major reclamation project without using the corporate device to raise and disburse funds and to
recover the amounts expended with a certain margin of profits. And why should corporations
part with their money if there is no assurance of payment, such as a share in the land reclaimed
or to be reclaimed? It would be most unfair and a violation of procedural and substantive rights
20 to encourage investors, both Filipino and foreign, to form corporations, build infrastructures,
spend money and efforts only to be told that the invitation to invest is unconstitutional or illegal
with absolutely no indication of how they could be compensated for their work.
It has to be stressed that the petition does not actually assail the validity of the JVA between
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PEA and AMARI. The petition mainly seeks to compel PEA to disclose all facts on the then on-
going negotiations with respondent AMARI with respect to the reclamation of portions of Manila
Bay. Petitioner relies on the Constitutional provision that the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized and that access to papers pertaining to official
transactions shall be afforded the citizen. 21 I believe that PEA does not have to reveal what
was going on from the very start and during the negotiations with a private party. As long as
the parties have the legal capacity to enter into a valid contract over an appropriate subject
matter, they do not have to make public, especially to competitors, the initial bargaining, the
give-and-take arguments, the mutual concessions, the moving from one position to another,
and other preliminary steps leading to the drafting and execution of the contract. As in
negotiations leading to a treaty or international agreement, whether sovereign or commercial in
nature, a certain amount of secrecy is not only permissible but compelling.
At any rate, recent developments appear to have mooted this issue, and anything in the
Decision which apparently approves publicity during on-going negotiations without pinpointing
the stage where the right to information appears is obiter. The motions for reconsideration all
treat the JVA as a done thing, something already concrete, if not finalized.
Indeed, it is hypothetical to identify exactly when the right to information begins and what
matters may be disclosed during negotiations for the reclamation of land from the
sea.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Unfortunately for private respondent, its name, "AMARI," happens to retain lingering unpleasant
connotations. The phrase "grandmother of all scams," arising from the Senate investigation of
the original contract, has not been completely erased from the public mind. However, any
suspicion of anything corrupt or improper during the initial negotiations which led to the award
of the reclamation to AMARI are completely irrelevant to this petition. It bears stressing that the
Decision and this Dissenting Opinion center exclusively on questions of constitutionality and
legality earlier discussed.
To recapitulate, it is my opinion that there is nothing in the Constitution or applicable statutes

which impedes the exercise by PEA of its right to sell or otherwise dispose of its reclaimed land
to private corporations, especially where, as here, the purpose is to compensate respondent
AMARI, the corporate developer, for its expenses incurred in reclaiming the subject areas.
Pursuant to PD 1084 and PD 1085, PEA can transfer to the contractor, such as AMARI, such
portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the motions for reconsideration and to DISMISS the. petition for
lack of merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Endnotes:
1. Limpin, Jr. v. IAC, 161 SCRA 83 (1988); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
2. Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Solicitor General, p. 3.
3. En Banc Resolution of February 26, 2002.
4. 38 SCRA 429 (1971).
5. 205 SCRA 515 (1992).
6. 114 SCRA 799 (1982).
7. Republic v. CA and Iglesia ni Cristo, and Republic v. Cendaña and Iglesia ni Cristo, 119 SCRA
449 (1982); Republic v. Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875 (1982); Director of
Lands v. Lood, 124 SCRA 460 (1983); Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 128 SCRA 44 (1984);
Director of Lands v. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., 141 SCRA 21 (1986);
Director of Lands v. IAC and Acme Plywood & Veneer Inc., 146 SCRA 509 (1986); Republic v.
IAC and Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, 168 SCRA 165 (1988); Natividad v. CA, 202 SCRA
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493 (1991); Villaflor v. CA and Nasipit Lumber Co., 280 SCRA 297 (1997). In Ayog v. Cusi, Jr.,
118 SCRA 492 (1982), the Court did not apply the constitutional ban in the 1973 Constitution
because the applicant corporation, Biñan Development Co., Inc., had fully complied with all its
obligations and even paid the full purchase price before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution,
although the sales patent was issued after the 1973 Constitution took effect.
8. Spouses Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, note 5.
9. United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446 (1988); Sarsosa Vda.
de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547 (1982); Godinez v. Pak Luen, 120 SCRA 223 (1983);
Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 96 Phil. 447 (1955).
10. Lee v. Republic, G.R. No. 128195, October 3, 2001; Yap v. Maravillas, 121 SCRA 244
(1983); De Castro v. Teng, 129 SCRA 85 (1984).
11. Amari’s Motion for Reconsideration, p. 10.
12. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002; Firestone Ceramics v.
Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522 (1999); Herrera v. Canlas, 310 SCRA 318 (1999); People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Mencias, 20 SCRA 1031 (1967); Galvez v. Tuason, 10
SCRA 344 (1964).
13. 302 SCRA 331 (1999).
14. Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and Committee on

Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations.
15. Amari’s Motion for Reconsideration, p. 49.
16. Ibid., p. 50.
17. 187 SCRA 797 (1990); See also Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 (1960); Cebu
Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 (1975).
18. Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920); Jacinto v. Director of Lands, 49 Phil. 853
(1926); Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962); De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 130 SCRA 666 (1984).
19. OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 22–24; PEA’s Supplement to Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 12.
BELLOSILLO, J.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Decision, pp. 3, 44–45.
2. Rollo, p. 622.
3. Ibid.
4. G.R. No. 103882, 25 November 1998, 299 SCRA 199, 238.
5. DENR AO 20-98, re: "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conduct of Appraisal of Public
Lands and Other Patrimonial Properties of the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. Civil Code, Art. 420.
7. Id., Arts. 421 and 422.
8. II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 38 (1992).
9. Sec. 2 reads in part, [a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
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lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The
State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant . . .," while Sec. 3 provides"
[l]ands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable
lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant."cralaw virtua1aw library
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G.R. No. 168464 January 23, 2006
ZENAIDA RAMOS-BALALIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROLANDO RAMOS, EUSEBIO I. RAMOS EVANGELISTO GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 2005 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 58644 reversing the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas, Isabela,
Branch 23, dated July 17, 1996, in Civil Case No. Br. 23-357 which ruled that herein petitioner
Zenaida Ramos-Balalio had a superior right to possess Lot No. 204, Pls-15, situated at Muñoz,
Roxas, Isabela, as well as its Resolution 3 dated June 14, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
As culled from the records, petitioner Zenaida and her brother Alexander (now deceased) are
the children of spouses Susana Bueno and Abundio Ramos. The spouses started occupying Lot
No. 204 in 1938. Abundio died in 1944. Susana met her second husband, respondent Eusebio
Ramos in 1946, with whom she had five children, one of whom is respondent Rolando.
In the interim, prior to 1958, Susana discovered that Felimon Domingo applied for a sales
patent over the subject parcel of land which she opposed. The Bureau of Lands resolved the
dispute, thus:
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is clear that Felimon B. Domingo has not entered,
possessed or cultivated the land in question and therefore he has not acquired any preference
right thereto. Upon the other hand contestant Susana Bueno Vda. de Ramos and her children
have sufficiently established their right of preference over the land except the one hectare
Cemetery site, on the basis of their continuous occupation and cultivation and their valuable
improvements introduced thereon.
Wherefore, it is ordered that the Sales Application No. 21992 of Felimon B. Domingo be as
hereby it is rejected, forfeiting in favor of the Government whatever amount have been paid on
account thereof. The land in question shall be subdivided so as to exclude therefrom the one
hectare portion in the northwestern part of the land, which shall be reserved as barrio cemetery
site, while the remaining area is hereby allocated to SUSANA BUENO VDA DE RAMOS who shall
file an appropriate application therefore within sixty (60) days after the survey thereof at her
own expense, it not appearing that this Office has received the homestead (new) application
allegedly filed by her for the same land.
SO ORDERED.4
It was alleged that as Susana accompanied her husband Eusebio, a soldier, wherever he was
assigned, Susana’s father, George Bueno, and daughter, petitioner Zenaida continued the
cultivation and possession of the subject land. Sometime later, Susana sold the land to
petitioner who, in turn, partitioned it among herself, her brother, Alexander, and respondent
Rolando and his siblings. The partition was not registered but Deeds of Sale were executed in
favor of Rolando and Alexander.
Petitioner thereafter mortgaged her share; however, it came to her knowledge that respondents
Rolando and Eusebio had usurped her share and deprived the mortgagees of possession over
the land. After settling the mortgage, petitioner filed a case for recovery of inheritance,
possession and damages with a petition for preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court had the land surveyed. Subdividing the land into Lots 204-A to 204-H 5 based on
the actual possessor or occupant, the survey plan revealed the following:
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1. Plaintiff Zenaida Ramos Balalio has no possession, occupation, and cultivation
whatsoever of lot 204, Pls-15;
2. Rolando Ramos is in possession and cultivation of lot 204-F, lot 204-G and lot 204-C,
with a total area of 43,957 sq. m., more or less;
3. Eusebio Ramos is occupying and cultivating lot 204-A with an area of 4,994 sq. m.,
more or less;
4. Lot 204-B consisting of 17,685 sq. m., more or less, is possessed and cultivated by
Evangelisto Garcia, another intervenor. His occupation is very much less than the two
(2) hectares sold to him by Alexander Ramos. It is short by 2,311 sq. m., more or less;
5. The total area of the land in question, after deducting one (1) hectare occupied by
the cemetery is 73,150 sq. m., more or less. 6
On July 17, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision holding that petitioner was deprived of
her right to cultivation and possession of her share of Lot No. 204 and thus ruled:
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

plaintiff, Zenaida Ramos and against Rolando Ramos, defendant, and Eusebio Ramos,
intervenor.
1. Ordering Eusebio Ramos to vacate lot 204-A and surrender it to Evangelisto Garcia
because he is not entitled to any portion of the lot in question, it being the conjugal
property of the first marriage of Susana Bueno to Abundio Ramos;
2. Evangelisto Garcia is adjudicated the first two (2) hectares from the North and East of
the cemetery, as he validly bought the area from Alexander Ramos. He is presently
occupying only 17,689 sq. m., more or less. His possession now is increased to two (2)
hectares which includes the area being possessed by Eusebio Ramos;
3. The remaining portion of the share of Alexander Ramos is 4,410 sq. m., more or less.
This is adjudicated in favor of his heirs. This portion now corresponds to the area
immediately South of the area of Evangelisto Garcia, the partition being from East to
West;
4. The middle portion consisting of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, and immediately South
of the cemetery, and also South of the portion adjudicated to the heirs of Alexander is
now given to Zenaida Ramos Balalio as her valid share of lot 204, the partition being
also East to West;
5. South of the share of Zenaida consisting also of 24,410 sq. m., more or less, is the
valid share of Rolando Ramos and his full blooded brother and sisters namely Robin,
Corazon, Myrna and Mila, all surnamed Ramos;
6. Rolando Ramos and Eusebio Ramos are ordered jointly and severally to pay Zenaida
Ramos:
a. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorney’s fees;
b. One thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00) Pesos as appearance fees of her

lawyer;
c. Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as incidental expenses relative to the case;
d. One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred (P100,800.00) Pesos as the reasonable

owner’s share of the produce of the land of Zenaida Ramos from 1975 to the
present, with an interest of 6% per annum until fully paid;
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7. The Clerk of Court and the Sheriff are ordered to repair to the land in question and
partition said land in accordance with the tenor of this decision;
8. And to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that neither Zenaida nor Alexander complied with the
homestead application requirements in order to acquire superior vested right. As a
consequence, it reversed the decision of the trial court, to wit:
As a consequence of the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of appellants as to the fourth error
and finds that the contract supposedly dividing that property among Zenaida, Rolando Ramos
and Alexander Ramos cannot be enforced because neither of the parties therein can claim any
vested right over the subject parcel land which is still part of the public domain.
Also, prescinding from the above ruling, the intervention of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto
Garcia should likewise be dismissed. As to Eusebio, since Susana never filed an application for
homestead, her right never ripened to ownership which she could have transmitted to her heirs.
As to Evangelisto Garcia who supposedly purchased that share of Alexander (an heir of
Susana), since the vendor never inherited anything from Susana there was nothing which he
(Evangelisto) could have bought. In fine, neither of the intervenors could claim any right which
they can enforce in court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, in Civil
Case No. Br. 23-357 is REVERSED and the "Complaint" filed by plaintiff-appellee as well as the
respective "Answer in Intervention" of Eusebio Ramos and Evangelisto Garcia are all hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:
7.1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE

TRIAL COURT’S DECISION AND DISMISSING THE PETITIONER’S COMPLAINT.
7.2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER IS NOT IN PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE SAID LAND, AND DECLARING
THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO THE DISPUTED LAND.
7.3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE ISSUE OF

ACCION PUBLICIANA IN THE CASE AT BAR AND CONFINED ITSELF TO THE CLAIM OF
RECOVERY OF INHERITANCE.9
The petition is partly meritorious.
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and those lands
not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.10 Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.11
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (1936), or the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073 (1977), remains to be the general law governing the classification and disposition of
alienable lands of the public domain. It enumerates the different modes of acquisition of these
lands and prescribes the terms and conditions to enable private persons to perfect their title to
them. It is, therefore, the applicable law to the case before us.
A homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one of the modes to acquire
title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes. Under the Public Land Act, a homestead
patent is one issued to any citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a
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family, and who is not the owner of more than 24 12 hectares of land in the country.13 To be
qualified, the applicant must show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the
municipality where the land is situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land
applied for.14
In the case at bar, petitioner Zenaida asserts her right to a parcel of agricultural land that her
parents Susana and Abundio had possessed since 1938. She claims that, for some time, the
cultivation of this land was left to her and her grandfather and that, following the death of her
father Abundio, the land was allegedly sold to her by her mother Susana.
Zenaida’s argument is flawed because it assumes that her parents had perfected their title over
the land and that they could validly convey the same to third persons, whether by sale or by
inheritance. However, a careful examination of the records shows that petitioner has not
satisfactorily established that a valid application for homestead patent was filed by her parents.
The decision of the Bureau of Lands in 1958 only addressed Zenaida’s family’s right of
preference over the land, in view of their possession and cultivation of the land. Nonetheless,
the Bureau of Lands ordered the filing of an appropriate application for its registration which
indicates that as of that time, there was as yet no valid application filed. 15
The purported sale, therefore, between petitioner and her mother cannot be given effect, nor
can it be a source of right for Zenaida, because Susana did not have the authority to sell what
did not belong to her. The invalidation of the sale consequently nullifies the partition of the
property among Zenaida, Alexander, and Rolando and his siblings because Zenaida could not
have disposed of the land which she did not own.
For the same reason, neither Eusebio nor Rolando can claim any right whatsoever as heirs of
Susana. Their claim evidently relies on the provision of the Public Land Act which states:
Section 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent
or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee
still has obligations pending towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be
succeeded in his rights and obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted
or leased under this Act by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the
patent or final concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements
therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the
purposes of this Act. (Emphasis added)
The reliance is misplaced because the cited provision speaks of an applicant, grantee, or lessee.
Susana was not one of these. In her lifetime, despite her possession and cultivation of the land,
she failed to apply for a homestead patent and to acquire any vested right that Eusebio or
Rolando can inherit. As such, the land remains part of the public domain. Furthermore, Eusebio
and Rolando cannot invoke their prior possession and occupation of the land because the same
cannot be considered as adverse, open, public, peaceful and to the exclusion of all.
Hence, the subject land remains to be part of the public domain and rightfully belongs to the
State. As held by the Court of Appeals, none of the parties obtained a defensible title to the
property which can be upheld by the Court. Nonetheless, the possession of the land is different
from the issue of its ownership. Petitioner argues that her petition may be treated as an accion
publiciana and not merely an action for recovery of inheritance.
An accion publiciana is an action for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action
in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.16 In this case, the issue is whether Zenaida, as an applicant for public
land, may be considered as having any right to the land occupied, which may entitle her to sue
in courts for the return of the possession thereof.
We find that Zenaida has proven prior possession of the portion of land she claims as her share,
which possession antedates the filing of the homestead application. She produced evidence
showing that she has filed a verified application for the registration of the land with the Bureau
of Lands on August 10, 1971, 17 which is still pending. The documents remain uncontested and
the application has not been assailed by any of the parties to the case. She alleged that during
the lifetime of her mother, she and her maternal grandfather cultivated and occupied the land.
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Moreover, Zenaida presented tax declarations both in her name and that of her predecessor-in-
interest (mother Susana Bueno) covering the property. Time and again, we have held that
although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession.18 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to
contribute needed revenues to the Government. 19
All told, petitioner Zenaida’s uncontested and verified application for a homestead patent
coupled with her open and notorious occupation of the land convinces us of her preferential
right to possess the land claimed, which entitles her to be protected by the law in such
possession.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated February 16, 2005 is MODIFIED, insofar as to grant petitioner Zenaida Ramos-Balalio
preferential possession of the portion of Lot 204, Pls-15, situated in Muñoz, Roxas, Isabela, as
delineated in the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, dated July
17, 1996.
SO ORDERED.
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GR. No. 197472
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond Alpuerto of

the Naval Base Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Petitioner,
vs.
REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of
possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect ones alleged right of
possession over the same.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the June 29, 2011 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 89968, which dismissed the appeal therewith and affirmed the
July 3, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 in Spl.
Civil Action Case No. II-2403.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in
humanitarian and charitable activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde,
Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in
peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island
in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under
his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable,
humanitarian and missionary works.4
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for
military purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto,
2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui Island were withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if
there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and the surrounding waters situated in the
Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. Again subject to any private rights, the
entire Palaui Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48 hectares was accordingly
reserved as a marine protected area.
On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana,
Cagayan.1âwphi1 According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of
Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare portion of Palaui
Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men, through the use of force
and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the
Philippine Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic
military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave
the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary
mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the same,
and further, for the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction 6 and the
parties’ submission of their respective memoranda, 7 the RTC issued an Order8 dated February
21, 2002 granting the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However, the
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same pertained to five hectares (subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares claimed to
have been occupied by Rev. Cortez, viz.:
It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers an area of 50 hectares more or less
located at the western portion of Palaui Island which is within the Naval reservation. [Rev.
Cortez] presented what he called as a survey map (Exh. "H") indicating the location of the area
claimed by the Church of the Living God and/or Rev. Claudio Cortez with an approximate area
of 50 hectares identified as Exh. "H-4". However, the Survey Map allegedly prepared by [a]
DENR personnel is only a sketch map[,] not a survey map as claimed by [Rev. Cortez].
Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area [are] not specifically indicated. The sketch only
shows some lines without indicating the exact boundaries of the 50 hectares claimed by [Rev.
Cortez]. As such, the identification of the area and its exact boundaries have not been clearly
defined and delineated in the sketch map. Therefore, the area of 50 hectares that [Rev. Cortez]
claimed to have peacefully and lawfully possessed for the last 38 years cannot reasonably be
determined or accurately identified.
For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Biñas] that [Rev. Cortez]’ claim to the 50
hectares of land identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is unclear and ambiguous. It is a settled
jurisprudence that mandatory injunction is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be
extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate and
commensurate remedy in damages. The right must be clear, the injury impending or
threatened, so as to be averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction. The
reason for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in the light of the
evidence presented, justice and equity demand that the [ status quo be maintained] so that no
advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other. And so it was ruled that unless
there is a clear pronouncement regarding ownership and possession of the land, or unless the
land is covered by the torrens title pointing to one of the parties as the undisputed owner, a
writ of preliminary injunction should not issue to take the property out of possession of one
party to place it in the hands of another x x x.
Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez] tended only to show that [he] has a
pending application of patent with the DENR. Even so, [Rev. Cortez] failed to present in
evidence the application for patent allegedly filed by [him] showing that he applied for patent
on the entire 50 hectares of land which he possessed or occupied for a long period of time.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the title of petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui
Island remains unclear and doubtful, and [is] seriously disputed by the government.
More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on May 22, 1967, [Rev. Cortez]
has not perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired any vested right thereto
considering that he only occupied the land as alleged by him in 1962 or barely five (5) years
before the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect of
removing Palaui Island from the alienable or disposable portion of the public domain and
therefore the island, as of the date of [the] issuance [of the proclamation], has ceased to be
disposable public land.
However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has lawfully possessed and occupied at
least five (5) hectares of land situated at the western portion of the Palaui Island identified as
Exh "H-4". During the hearing, Cmdr.
Rogelio Biñas admitted that when he was assigned as Commanding Officer in December 1999,
he went to Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2) baluga families tilling the land consisting of five
(5) hectares. Therefore, it cannot be seriously disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and his baluga
tribesmen cleared five (5) hectares of land for planting and cultivation since 1962 on the
western portion identified as Exhibit "H-4". The Philippine Navy also admitted that they have no
objection to settlers of the land prior to the Presidential Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had
been identified as one of the early settlers of the area before the Presidential Proclamation. The
DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has filed an application for patent on the western
area and that he must be allowed to pursue his claim.
Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of [Rev. Cortez] that he has already
acquired vested rights over the area claimed by him, the court must recognize that [Rev.
Cortez] may have acquired some propriety rights over the area considering the directive of the
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DENR to allow [Rev. Cortez] to pursue his application for patent. However, the court wants to
make clear that the application for patent by [Rev. Cortez] should be limited to an area not to
exceed five (5) hectares situated at the western portion of x x x Palaui Island identified in the
sketch map as Exh. "H-4." This area appears to be the portion where [Rev. Cortez] has clearly
established his right or title by reason of his long possession and occupation of the land. 9
In his Answer,10 Biñas countered that: (1) Rev. Cortez has not proven that he has been in
exclusive, open, continuous and adverse possession of the disputed land in the concept of an
owner; (2) Rev. Cortez has not shown the exact boundaries and identification of the entire lot
claimed by him; (3) Rev. Cortez has not substantiated his claim of exemption from Proclamation
No. 201; (4) under Proclamation No. 447, the entire Palaui Island, which includes the land
allegedly possessed and occupied by Rev. Cortez, was reserved as a marine protected area;
and, (4) injunction is not a mode to wrest possession of a property from one person by
another.
Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision11 making the injunction final and permanent. In
so ruling, the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples’ [Right] Act (IPRA) as
follows:
The Indigenous [Peoples’ Right] Act should be given effect in this case. The affected community
belongs to the group of indigenous people which are protected by the State of their rights to
continue in their possession of the lands they have been tilling since time immemorial. No
subsequent passage of law or presidential decrees can alienate them from the land they are
tilling.12
Ultimately, the RTC held, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.
xxxx
SO DECIDED.13
Representing Biñas, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Notice of Appeal 14 which
was given due course by the RTC in an Order15 dated August 6, 2007.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its brief,16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. Cortez admitted during trial that he filed the
Petition for injunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural communities in Palaui Island and not
in his capacity as pastor or missionary of the Church of the Living God. He also claimed that he
has no interest over the land. Based on these admissions, the OSG argued that the Petition
should have been dismissed outright on the grounds that it did not include the name of the
indigenous cultural communities that Rev. Cortez is supposedly representing and that the latter
is not the real party-in-interest. In any case, the OSG averred that Rev. Cortez failed to show
that he is entitled to the issuance of the writ of injunction. Moreover, the OSG questioned the
RTC’s reference to the IPRA and argued that it is not applicable to the present case since Rev.
Cortez neither alleged in his Petition that he is claiming rights under the said act nor was there
any showing that he is a member of the Indigenous Cultural Communities and/or the
Indigenous Peoples as defined under the IPRA.
In its Decision17 dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the RTC’s issuance of a final injunction
based on the following ratiocination:
The requisites necesary for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Here, [Rev. Cortez] has shown the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected and an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. Records reveal that [Rev. Cortez]
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has been in peaceful possession and occupation of the western portion of Palaui Island, Sitio
Siwangag, San Vicente, Sta. Ana[,] Cagayan since 1962 or prior to the issuance of Proclamation
Nos. 201 and 447 in 1967 and 1994, respectively. There he built an orphanage and a school for
the benefit of the members of the Dumagat Tribe, in furtherance of his missionary and
charitable works. There exists a clear and unmistakable right in favor [of Rev. Cortez] since he
has been in open, continuous and notorious possession of a portion of Palaui island. To deny
the issuance of a writ of injunction would cause grave and irreparable injury to [Rev. Cortez]
since he will be displaced from the said area which he has occupied since 1962. It must be
emphasized that Proclamation Nos. 201 and 447 stated that the same are subject to private
rights, if there be [any]. Though Palaui Island has been declared to be part of the naval
reservation and the whole [i]sland as a marine protected area, both recognized the existence of
private rights prior to the issuance of the same.
From the foregoing, we rule that the trial court did not err when it made permanent the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that if after
the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained
of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party
or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the
preliminary mandatory injunction.18
Anent the issue of Rev. Cortez not being a real party-in-interest, the CA noted that this was not
raised before the RTC and therefore cannot be considered by it. Finally, with respect to the
RTC’s mention of the IPRA, the CA found the same to be a mere obiter dictum.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premise[s] considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed 3 July
2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 in Civil Case No. II-2403
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
Hence, this Petition brought by the OSG on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (the
Republic).
The Issue
The ultimate issue to be resolved in this case is whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of
mandatory injunction.
The Parties’ Arguments
The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortez failed to prove
his clear and positive right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui Island covered by the same.
This is considering that by his own admission, Rev. Cortez started to occupy the said area only
in 1962. Hence, when the property was declared as a military reserve in 1967, he had been in
possession of the 5-hectare area only for five years or short of the 30-year possession
requirement for a bona fide claim of ownership under the law. The OSG thus argues that the
phrase "subject to private rights" as contained in Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No.
447 cannot apply to him since it only pertains to those who have already complied with the
requirements for perfection of title over the land prior to the issuance of the said proclamations.
Rev. Cortez, for his part, asserts that the arguments of the OSG pertaining to ownership are all
immaterial as his Petition for injunction does not involve the right to possess based on
ownership but on the right of possession which is a right independent from ownership. Rev.
Cortez avers that since he has been in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject
portion of Palaui Island, he has the right of possession over the same which is protected by law.
He asserts that based on this right, the writ of injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in his
favor and aptly affirmed by the CA. On the technical side, Rev. Cortez avers that the Republic
has no legal personality to assail the CA Decision through the present Petition since it was not a
party in the appeal before the CA.
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The Court’s Ruling
We grant the Petition.
For starters, the Court shall distinguish a preliminary injunction from a final injunction.
"Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is directed either to do a

particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction, [as in this case,] or to refrain
from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction." 20 "It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action." 21
"The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction."22 A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case or decide
controverted facts.23 Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are
settled.24 "It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case." 25 A preliminary
injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final
order.26 For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a
right which is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. 27 Simply stated, the
applicant needs only to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his
complaint.28 On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies
a final injunction.29 A final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person
enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of mandatory injunctive writ,
one which confirms the preliminary mandatory injuction. 30 It is issued when the court, after trial
on the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of
permanently enjoined.31 Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up with a definite
pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative of such right, based on
its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a
final and permanant injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be established by
the applicant with absolute certainty.32
What was before the trial court at the time of the issuance of its July 3, 2007 Decision is
whether a final injunction should issue. While the RTC seemed to realize this as it in fact made
the injunction permanent, the Court, however, finds the same to be wanting in basis.
Indeed, the RTC endeavored to provide a narrow distinction between a preliminary injunction
and a final injunction. Despite this, the RTC apparently confused itself. For one, what it cited in
its Decision were jurisprudence relating to preliminary injunction and/or mandatory injunction
as an ancillary writ and not as a final injunction. At that point, the duty of the RTC was to
determine, based on the evidence presented during trial, if Rev. Cortez
has conclusively established his claimed right (as opposed to preliminary injunction where an
applicant only needs to at least tentatively show that he has a right) over the subject area. This
is considering that the existence of such right plays an important part in determining whether
the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction should be confirmed.
Surprisingly, however, the said Decision is bereft of the trial court’s factual findings on the
matter as well as of its analysis of the same vis-a-vis applicable jurisprudence. As it is, the said
Decision merely contains a restatement of the parties’ respective allegations in the Complaint
and the Answer, followed by a narration of the ensuing proceedings, an enumeration of the
evidence submitted by Rev. Cortez, a recitation of jurisprudence relating to preliminary
injunction and/or specifically, to mandatory injunction as an ancillary writ, a short reference to
the IPRA which the Court finds to be irrelevant and finally, a conclusion that a final and
permanent injunction should issue. No discussion whatsoever was made with respect to
whether Rev. Cortez was able to establish with absolute certainty hisclaimed right over the
subject area.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Rule 36 and Section 1, Rule
120 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, similarly state that a decision, judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall state, clearly and distinctly, the facts and the law on
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which it is based. Pertinently, the Court issued on January 28, 1988 Administrative Circular No.
1, which requires judges to make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize
closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented, and avoid the
tendency to generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such
conclusions are deduced.33
Clearly, the Decision of the RTC in this case failed to comply with the aforestated guidelines.
In cases such as this, the Court would normally remand the case to the court a quo for
compliance with the form and substance of a Decision as required by the Constitution. In order,
however, to avoid further delay, the Court deems it proper to resolve the case based on the
merits.34
"Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected
and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right." 35 Thus,
it is necessary that the Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez
indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is necessary that such right must have been established by
him with absolute certainty.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the right of possession
(jus possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the subject area since
1962. He avers that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be peremptorily dispossessed
therefrom, or if already dispossessed, is entitled to be restored in possession. Hence, the
mandatory injunctive writ was correctly issued in his favor.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner 36 is one of the two concepts of
possession provided under Article 525 37 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse
possession,38 this kind of possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by prescription. 39 As
correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in the concept of an owner has in his favor the
legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove
it.40 In the same manner, the law endows every possessor with the right to be respected in his
possession.41
It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of possession. 42 The following cannot be appropriated and
hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common things (res
communes) such as sunlight and air, and things specifically prohibited by law.43
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession,
he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of
the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 44 Hence,
"[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons." 45 To prove that a land
is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation
or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable
must be established.46
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been
declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must
be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and
therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this
light, Rev. Cortez’ claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the
subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot
produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first
place.
The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation No. 447 were made subject
to private rights. The Court stated in Republic v. Bacas,47 viz.:
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Regarding the subject lots, there was a reservation respecting ‘private rights.’ In Republic v.
Estonilo, where the Court earlier declared that Lot No. 4319 was part of the Camp Evangelista
Military Reservation and, therefore, not registrable, it noted the proviso in Presidential
Proclamation No. 265 requiring the reservation to be subject to private rights as meaning that
persons claiming rights over the reserved land were not precluded from proving their claims.
Stated differently, the said proviso did not preclude the LRC from determining whether x x x
the respondents indeed had registrable rights over the property.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had been segregated
from the military reservation, the respondents had to prove that the subject
properties were alienable or disposable land of the public domain prior to its
withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military purposes under
Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The question is primordial importance because it is
determinative if the land can in fact be subject to acquisitive prescription and, thus, registrable
under the Torrens system. Without first determining the nature and character of the
land, all other requirements such as length and nature of possession and occupation
over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession does not
operate when the land is part of the public domain.
In this case, however, the respondents miserably failed to prove that, before the proclamation,
the subject lands were already private lands. They merely relied on such ‘recognition’ of
possible private rights. In their application, they alleged that at the time of their application,
they had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject parcels of
land for at least thirty (30) years and became its owners by prescription. There was, however,
no allegation or showing that the government had earlier declared it open for sale or
settlement, or that it was already pronounced as inalienable and disposable. 48
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his
claimed right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a
final injunction.
Anent the technical issue raised by Rev. Cortez, i. e, that the Republic has no personality to
bring this Petition since it was not a party before the CA, the Court deems it prudent to set
aside this procedural barrier. After all, "a party's standing before [the] Court is a [mere]
procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of [its] discretion, be set aside in view of the
importance of the issue raised."49
We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the injunction so that he could continue his
humanitarian works. However, considering that inalienable public land was involved, this Court
is constrained to rule in accordance with the aforementioned.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR. CV No. 89968 denying the appeal and affirming the July 3, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan-Branch 08 in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-2403,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the final injunction issued in this case is
ordered DISSOLVED and the Petition for Injunction in Spl. Civil Action Case No. II-
2403, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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Inter Alia: Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

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Inter Alia: Oposa v. Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

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Oposa v.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

xxx xxx xxx

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful ( sic) environment

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

FELICIANO, J., concurring

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable

GR NO. 171947, December 18, 2008

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and