The FBI’s “Russian-Based” Misdirection

One of the most puzzling – and frustrating - details of investigation into the genesis of the Steele
dossier is the mystery surrounding the identity (or even nationality) of the “collector” who
supposedly was the supplier of all, or nearly all, of the information published in the memos
making up the Steele dossier.
The FBI told the FISA court and the House Intelligence Committee that Steele’s collector
(termed the “Primary Sub-Source” in the Horowitz Report) was “Russian-based”. Relying on the
FBI, the Nunes Report stated that the Primary Sub-Source was Russian-based, with all or
virtually all subsequent commentators doing likewise.
But is this true? There is strong reason for doubt. Indeed, rather than being based in Russia,
Steele’s Primary Sub-Source is more likely to be located in a Washington DC suburb, perhaps in
northern Virginia.
One hoped that the recent, less redacted release of the Carter Page FISA Applications would
yield further details on the Primary Sub-Source, but unfortunately, descriptors of the Primary
Sub-Source were rigorously redacted throughout. However, a single unredacted sentence in the
Horowitz Report enables interpretation of several key redactions in the FISA Applications,
revealing a sorry tale of deception and mendacity by Steele, the FBI and even the redactors
themselves.

The Horowitz Report

In a preview of a later chapter, the Horowitz Report used the descriptor “Russian-based” to
describe the Primary Sub-Source, echoing the phrase used in the Nunes Report:
As discussed in Chapter Eight, Carter Page FISA Renewal Application Nos. 2 and 3 advised the
court that following the January interview with the Primary Sub-source, "the FBI found the
Russian-based sub-source to be truthful and cooperative." [my bold] (p, 190),
Curiously, the phrase “Russian-based” was redacted in the corresponding paragraph from the
Carter Page FISA Renewal Application #2, as shown below:

However, it can be easily shown that the phrase “Russian-based”, which we know from both the
Horowitz quotation and the Nunes report, fits exactly in context and in character count not just
to the corresponding quotation, but to both of the first two redactions in this paragraph, as shown
below:
(U) (TS//UF) In an effort to further corroborate Source #1's reporting, the FBI
has met with Source #1's Russian-based sub-source described immediately above.
During these interviews, the FBI found the Russian-based sub-source to be
truthful and cooperative. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The FBI is
undertaking additional investigative steps to further corroborate the information
 provide by Source #1 and, where feasible, contact the sub-sources identified
herein.
Carter Page FISA Excerpt #1
In all four FISA versions1, the Primary Sub-Source was introduced in an identical paragraph in a
lengthy footnote, as shown below:

Once again, the phrase “Russian-based sub-source” fits all four redactions in this paragraph both
in context and in character spacing, as shown below, can be interpolated with almost total
confidence:
(U) (TS//UXF) Source #1 maintains a network of sub-sources, who, in many
cases, utilize their own sub-sources. The source reporting in this application,
which was provided to the FBI by Source #1, is derived primarily from a Russian
based sub-source, who uses a network of sub-sources. Thus, neither Source #1
nor the Russian-based sub-source had direct access to the information being
reported by the sub-sources identified herein (each sub-source will be separately
identified herein based on the information provided by Source #1). The FBI has
no control over the Russian-based sub-source or any of the sub-sources used by
the Russian-based sub-source.

Carter Page FISA Excerpt #2

Similarly, Sub-Source #1 was introduced in a paragraph in a footnote, which was identical in all
four versions of the Carter Page FIS Application, as shown below:

The phrase “Russian-based sub-source” fits exactly both in context and in character count, as
shown below, and, once again, can be interpolated with almost total confidence:
10
(U) (TS//EF) Sub-Source #1 is an independent sub-source operated by Source
#1’s Russian-based sub-source. The FBI believes that Sub-Source #1 does not know
his/her reporting will be directed to the FBI. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

1
Original: I, 16, fn 19; R#1: 18, fn 11; R#2: 18, fn ^; R#3:
Horowitz Footnote 389
This information can be used to interpret an extremely important (and questionable) redaction in
footnote 389 of the Horowitz Report.
Footnote 389 was linked from the sentence: “The Supervisory Intel Analyst did not recall
anyone asking him whether he thought the Primary Sub-Source was ‘truthful and cooperative’ as
noted in the renewal applications389.” The footnote then stated that the Supervisory Intel
Analyst had advised the OGC Attorney [Kevin Clinesmith] that the Primary Sub-Source was not
[something redacted] “as stated in the FISA applications”, as shown below:

Once again, the redaction is almost certainly connected to the phrase “Russian-based”, though
the character spacing here suggests the slight rephrasing to “based in Russia”, as shown below:
389 Email communications reflect that in March 2017--after the first FISA application and first

renewal were filed and before the last two renewals--the Supervisory Intel Analyst reviewed the first
FISA application and the first renewal at OGC's request to assist with potential redactions before the
Department responded to Congressional information requests. The Supervisory Intel Analyst provided
comments to the OGC Attorney, including advising him that the Primary Sub-source was not based in
Russia, as stated in the FISA applications, and asking whether a correction should be made. The
Supervisory Intel Analyst did not provide any other comments relating to the Primary Sub-source, and
he told us that he did not notice anything else potentially inaccurate or incomplete in the applications
at that time.

Thus, we can read footnote 389 reasonably securely as stating that, in March 2017, the
Supervisory Intel Analyst “advis[ed] the OGC Attorney that the Primary Sub-source was not
based in Russia, as stated in the FISA applications, and asking whether a correction should be
made”.
There is circumstantial evidence that strongly supports this interpretation.
In late December and/or early January, David Laufman and his staff at DOJ negotiated with the
Primary Sub-Source’s lawyer for his attendance at an FBI interview. The interview took place
on Jan 13, exactly one day after the first renewal of the Page FISA warrant. The first part of the
interview was attended on behalf of DOJ by Laufman and by his assistant for the latter part; it
was attended on behalf of the FBI by Case Agent 1 (Somma) and the Supervisory Intel Analyst.
The PSS was interviewed twice more - in March 2017 and May 2017 - by an agent from the
Washington Field Office. These circumstances indicate that the interviews took place on or near
Washington, supporting the premise that the Primary Sub-Source was not Russian-based, but
most likely US-based, probably near Washington DC.

With this additional context, footnote 389 is a great deal more troubling than the redacted
version.
Implications
The false description by Steele of the Primary Sub-Source as “Russian-based”, the adoption of
this lie by the FBI and the almost total redaction of the incident have far-reaching implications.
• First, as stated in footnote 389, by March 2017, the OGC Attorney knew that this
characterization of the Primary Sub-Source was untrue, but did not inform the FISA
Court in the subsequent second and third FISA renewals. This was an important failure,
made all the more significant because the OGC Attorney who failed to make the
requested correction was Kevin Clinesmith, the lawyer who not only concealed Carter
Page’s connection to an intel agency, and but even forged a change to an email from the
CIA to cover up this deception.
• While the false description of the Primary Sub-Source appears to have originated in a lie
by Steele, the FBI perpetuated the lie in its FISA (and presumably other) documents even
after it knew otherwise. The original lie was Steele’s fault, but FBI owned the lie after it
knew otherwise.
• The lie was relevant not just to evaluation of the Primary Sub-Source, but, perhaps even
more importantly, to the evaluation of Steele’s credibility. The FBI told the FISA court
(and presumably others) that Steele was credible. But if Steele deceived the FBI on a
detail as fundamental as where the Primary Sub-Source was based, that would be a huge
blemish on his credibility and something that the FISA court ought to have been
informed about in bold type. And not just the FISA court. Any policy makers within the
FBI and outside the FBI ought to have been informed.
• Indeed, more serious damage arising from this misinformation may well result not from
misleading the FISA court, regrettable as that may be, but from misleading the 2017-
2018 House Intelligence Committee chaired by Devin Nunes. Had Nunes known (1) that
Steele had deceived the FBI about the location of the Primary Sub-Source; and (2) that
the Primary Sub-Source was not “Russian-based”, then one can’t help but think that
Nunes’ committee would have done whatever they could to locate and depose the
Primary Sub-Source three years ago, especially if, as we surmise, the Primary Sub-
Source was based in the US near Washington. Had Nunes interviewed the Primary Sub-
Source in 2017, subsequent events would have unfolded quite differently
• While Horowitz focused on the March 2017 memo from the Supervisory Intel Analyst to
Clinesmith as the date on which the FBI was on notice that the Primary Sub-Source was
not [Russian-based], the actual date on which the FBI became cognizant of this was
almost certainly in late December or early January, at the latest. The Horowitz Report
stated the interview with the Primary Sub-Source took place shortly after renewal of the
Jan 12 FISA warrant. A date of January 13, 2017 has been reported by seemingly well-
informed source.2 Horowitz also reported that the terms for the meeting were negotiated
DOJ lawyers with the lawyer for the Primary Sub-Source. To do so, the FBI knew the
identity and location of the Primary Sub-Source prior to the January 12 FISA renewal.
• the correction requested by the Supervisory Intel Analyst, Clinesmith not only deceived
the FISA Courts, but also deceived the House Intelligence Committee, which used the
FBI’s false description in the Nunes Report.
• The deal with the Primary Sub-Source was negotiated by David Laufman, who
previously had been one of two senior interviewers in the powder puff FBI examination
of Hillary Clinton (the other, of course, being Peter Strzok) and who subsequently

2
Eric Wemple, Dec 31, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/31/yeah-i-briefly-chased-pee-
tape-new-york-times-reporter-talks-steele-dossier-horowitz-report-more/
 represented Christine Blasey Ford. Laufman was presumably involved in giving cushy
immunity deals to Cheryl Mills, Huma Abedin and others in the Hillary Clinton orbit,
which stand in such stark contrast to the dawn raids on Paul Manafort and Roger Stone.
Thus far, there is no information on what sort of deal was negotiated between Laufman
and the Primary Sub-Source, but one cannot help but wonder whether it was as cushy as
that given to the Clinton associates.

While the Horowitz Report is to be commended for discovery and reporting of Clinesmith’s
failure to correct the false description of the Primary Sub-Source, Horowitz, as in other areas,
was a sort of “limited hang-out”. Steele’s lie on where the Primary Sub-Source was based was a
major deception, which ought to have undermined his credibility and been immediately reported
both within the FBI and to the FISA court. Horowitz should have noted this failure and included
it in his list of major offenses. In addition, Horowitz should have called out the FBI’s continued
endorsement of the false description and included it as a separate major error/deception in his
summary list.

Conclusion
In the original FISA application, the FBI was presumably deceived by Steele. However, after
they had discovered this deception, instead of reporting Steele’s deception and correcting the
record in their FISA applications and elsewhere, the FBI doubled down, effectively adopting
Steele’s deception as their own.
The redactors of the FISA Applications and the Horowitz Report have also been complicit in
this deception. There was no valid national security interest served by redacting either the false
descriptors in the FISA Applications or the critical phrase in Horowitz footnote 389. The only
purpose of these redactions was to conceal previous deceptions by the FBI.
Finally, it is remarkable that the FBI, which routinely leaked any information (true or false)
damaging to the Trump administration, has kept not only the identity of the Primary Sub-Source
as a closely guarded secret, but even his nationality and country of location, while perpetuating
the false story that the Primary Sub-Source was “Russian-based”. One cannot help but speculate
that the truth, whatever it is, will be embarrassing to the FBI and the US intel community.
So many questions, so few answers. After nearly four years, we know essentially nothing about
Steele’s Primary Sub-Source. It is a scandal.

April 27, 2020