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ALM in
Asset and liability management in financial crisis
financial crisis
Arzu Tektas, E. Nur Ozkan-Gunay and Gokhan Gunay
Department of International Trade, School of Applied Disciplines, 135
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey
Abstract
Purpose – An efficient asset-liability management requires maximizing banks’ profit as well as
controlling and lowering various risks. This multi-objective decision problem aims to reach goals such
as maximization of liquidity, revenue, capital adequacy, and market share subject to financial, legal
requirements and institutional policies. This paper models asset and liability management (ALM) in
order to show how different managerial strategies affect the financial wellbeing of banks during crisis.
Design/methodology/approach – A goal programming model is developed and applied to two
medium-scale Turkish commercial banks with distinct risk-taking behavior. This article brings new
evidence on the performance of emerging market banks with different managerial philosophies by
comparing asset-liability management in crisis.
Findings – The study has shown how shifts in market perceptions can create trouble during crisis,
even if objective conditions have not changed.
Originality/value – The proposed model can provide optimal forecasts of asset-liability components
and banks’ financial standing for different risk-taking strategies under various economic scenarios.
This may facilitate the preparation of contingency plans and create a competitive advantage for bank
decision makers.
Keywords Assets management, Liability, Financial management, Banking, Turkey
Paper type Case study
Introduction
Internationalization and financial integration and have increased the possibility of
financial contagion among emerging and developed countries. The recent financial
crises in Asia, Russia, Latin America, and Turkey demonstrated the extent of
vulnerability in global financial markets to changes in emerging financial markets.
The significance of the banking sector in the smooth and efficient functioning of the
overall economy as well as the domestic financial system has become even more
apparent during these crises. Therefore, developing appropriate bank management
strategies seems crucial for lowering the devastating effects of crises.
A vital issue in strategic bank planning is asset and liability management (ALM),
which is the assessment and management of endogenous – financial, operational,
business – and exogenous risks. The objective of ALM is to maximize returns through
efficient fund allocation given an acceptable risk structure. ALM is a multidimensional
process, requiring simultaneous interactions among different dimensions. If the
simultaneous nature of ALM is discarded then decreasing risk in one dimension may
result in unexpected increases in other risks.
ALM has changed significantly in the past two decades with the growth and
integration of financial institutions and the emergence of new financial products and The Journal of Risk Finance
Vol. 6 No. 2, 2005
services. New information-based activities and financial innovation increased types of pp. 135-149
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1526-5943
This article is supported by Boğaziçi University Research Fund. DOI 10.1108/15265940510585806
JRF endogenous and exogenous risks as well as the correlation between these.
Consequently, the structure of balance sheet instruments has become more complex
6,2 and the volatility in the banking system has increased. These developments necessitate
the use of quantitative skills to manage risks more objectively and improve
performance:
Banking risk management is both a philosophical and operational issue. As a philosophical
136 issue, banking risk management is about attitudes toward risk and the pay off associated
with it, and strategies in dealing with them. As an operational issue, risk management is
about the identification and classification of banking risks, and methods and procedures to
measure, monitor and control them (Angelopoulos and Mourdoukoutas, 2001, p. 11).
Diversity in bank decision makers’ attitudes toward risk results in diverse ALM
strategies. Risk taker decision makers are willing to accept higher risk for higher
return whereas risk averse managers accept lower level of risks for lower return.
Consequences of high risk taking strategies might be more devastating in unstable
macroeconomic environments such as emerging financial markets, leading to systemic
banking crises. On the other hand, financial risks may also increase a bank’s overall
risk. Since this type of interdependency has been observed during the recent crises in
Turkey, it might be worthwhile to analyze ALM strategies with varying risk-taking
attitudes during the crises period in order to demonstrate the sensitivity of banks’
performance to different risk taking strategies.
The aim of the paper is to model ALM in order to show how different managerial
strategies affect the financial well being of banks during crisis. The goal programming
model is built on the managerial goals and policies of the bank along with financial and
regulatory conditions. It manages different risks such as liquidity, capital, credit,
currency, market and operational risks that comprise critical issues in emerging
financial markets. Banks carrying these risks and facing worsening economic
conditions could benefit using the proposed model by analyzing the consequences of
alternative options in asset-liability management. The model is applied to two medium
scale Turkish commercial banks, one risk-averse and the other risk-taker, for the crisis
year 2000 as a specific case of an emerging financial market.
The financial structure of the Turkish banking sector during crisis is discussed in
the next section. Banking literature on multi-objective decision making; methodology
and the model developed; empirical results and conclusion are discussed in consecutive
sections.
138
Table I.
Methodology
There is no way simultaneously to maximize returns (or profits) and minimize risks
but banks can only make risk/return tradeoffs and attempt to maximize returns for
whatever aggregate level of risk they choose to undertake (Uyemura and Van
Deventer, 1993). The objective of goal programming is to reach a satisfactory level of
multiple objectives whenever it is not possible to achieve every goal to the full extent,
so that the decision maker may come as close as possible to reaching goals.
Goal programming model (GP) is preferred to find the optimal composition of a
bank’s assets and liabilities in the Turkish banking sector. Choice of GP best describes
the multi-objective nature of the problem and it eliminates the computational
difficulties as well as practitioner’s unfamiliarity experienced with stochastic models.
Flexible nature of GP enables the decision maker to incorporate a number of goals
under a set of constraints. GP minimizes deviations between set goals and what can
actually be achieved within the given constraints.
In GP, the objective function (1) minimizes the sum of deviations (di) from each goal
(Gi). Each goal is assigned a priority weight (Pi) that shows its relative importance
among other goals. Therefore, goals with higher Pi values are achieved before the
others. The goals (2) reflect the objectives that are set by decision makers. Constraints
(3) represent the availability or upper/lower limits of resources.
Determine X ¼ ðx1 ; x2 ; . . .; xj ; . . .xn Þ such that:
XI
Min Z ¼ f dþ 2
i ; di ¼ P i dþ 2
i ; di ð1Þ
i¼1
subject to:
X
n
þ
Goals ðG i Þ aij xj þ d 2
i 2 d i ¼ bi for i ¼ 1; :::; I : ð2Þ
j¼1
X
n
Constraints cmj xj # r m for m ¼ 1; :::; M ð3Þ ALM in
j¼1 financial crisis
where:
xj: mean value of variable j;
aij: technological coefficient of xj in goal i; 141
b i: target value of goal i;
cmj: consumption coefficient of xj in constraint m;
rm: available amount of resource m;
dþ
i : overachievement of the target for goal i;
d2
i : underachievement of the target for goal i; and
P i: priority weight of the deviation variables of goal i.
Min Z ¼ P 1 d2 2 2 2 2 2
1 þ P 2 d 2 þ P 3 d 3 þ P 4TL d 4TL þ P 4FX d 4FX þ P 5TL d 5TL
þ P 5FX d2 2
5FX þ P 6 d 6
subject to:
(1) Goals:
þ
.
G1: Liquidity – (Liquid assets/Total assets) þ d21 2 d 1 ¼ a.
.
G2: Revenue – (Total interest income 2 Total interest expense) þ
þ
d2
2 2 d 2 ¼ b.
.
G3: Capital adequacy – (Shareholders equity/Total risk weighted assets) þ
þ
d2
3 2 d 3 ¼ c.
.
G4TL: DepositTL market share – (Total TL depositsbank i/Total
þ
TL depositssector)þ d2 4TL 2 d4TL ¼ d.
.
G4FX: DepositFX market share – (Total FX depositsbank i/Total FX
þ
epositssector) þ d 2
4FX 2 d 4FX ¼ e.
.
G5TL: LoanTL market share – (Total TL loanbank i/Total TL loansector) þ
þ
d2
5TL 2 d 5TL ¼ f .
.
G5FX: LoanFX market share – (Total FX loanbank i/Total FX loansector) þ
þ
d2
5FX 2 d 5FX ¼ g.
þ
.
G6: Total asset – Total assets þ d 2 6 2 d 6 ¼ h.
JRF (2) Environmental constraints:
6,2 .
E1: Capital Adequacy ratio $ 8 percent.
.
E2: TL reserve requirement/TL total deposits $ 6 percent.
.
E3: FX reserve requirement / FX total deposits $ 11 percent.
.
E4: Disponibility for TL $ 2 percent.
142 .
E5: Disponibility for FX $ 2 percent.
.
E6: Disponibility for government bonds as legal reserves $ 4 percent TL
deposits þ 1 percent FX deposits.
.
E7: Shareholders equity/Total liabilities $ 5 percent.
.
E8: Total loans/Total assets $ 30 percent.
capital criteria, banks should maintain a minimum capital adequacy level of 8 percent
against losses, which may result from existing and potential risks (R1). The Central
Bank of Turkey (The Central Bank of Turkey, 1996) requires a minimum TL and FX
reserve requirements of 4 percent (E2) and 11 percent (E3), respectively. Minimum TL
and FX disponibilities (required reserves for liability items excluding deposits and own
JRF funds) of 2 percent each (E4, E5) should be met. Disponibility for government bonds
6,2 should constitute at least the sum of 4 percent of TL and 1 percent of FX deposits (E6).
Finally, a minimum 5 percent ratio of shareholders’ equity to total liabilities (E7) and a
minimum 30 percent of total loans to total assets ratio (E8) are the generally accepted
principles in the Turkish banking sector.
Bank policy constraints capture the major risks present in emerging financial
144 markets. Their upper and lower limits reflect bank management strategies and can be
adjusted to changing preferences and environmental conditions. They are classified
information therefore they are not presented in the paper. Market risk includes external
factors such as environmental, political and monetary factors. Since high public sector
borrowing requirement has been an important constraint for the government, the
model controls market risk stemming from borrowing requirement by assigning upper
and lower limits on the government securities held by the bank (P1). Currency risk
shows the arbitrage between FX borrowing funds and TL asset items and is controlled
by imposing a range for the ratio of assets to liabilities in FX and TL (P2 and P3).
Credit risk represents the possibility of a delay in a repayment or no repayment of
credit. The constraint (P4) limits the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
Interest rate risk is the mismatch of maturities between short-term borrowings and
long-term lending as well as the pricing mismatch of the assets and liabilities in terms
of fixed and variable interest rate. The related constraint (P5) imposes a minimum level
on the amount of short-term loans. Liquidity shows how quickly assets can be
converted to cash to meet current obligations. Different types of liquid items such as
cash and due from banks are forced to maintain a minimum level (P6-P11). Operational
risk is controlled by maximum upper limits of fixed assets and operating expenses in
total assets (P12 and P13).
To demonstrate the impact of different risk taking behaviors on bank
performance during crisis, ALMM is run for two commercial banks with opposite
strategies. Risk behavior differences are reflected in the model by changing the
target levels of related goals and upper and lower limits of bank policy constraints
as shown in Table III.
Liquidity and capital adequacy goals are taken as indicators of attitudes towards
risk. Minimum compulsory risk levels for liquidity and capital adequacy are defined by
the monetary authorities. Although RTB suffices with these levels, RAB prefers to
keep higher ratios in order to lower its risk under unstable economic conditions. RTB
takes higher market risk by carrying higher volume of government securities in total
assets. On the other hand, RAB lowers currency risk by holding higher ratio of FX
assets. RAB is more sensitive to remain liquid therefore; it aims at higher ratio of liquid
assets in total assets.
Conclusion
Strong domestic financial systems play an important role in development and
148 stabilization of the overall economy. The significance of the banking sector within the
financial system becomes even more apparent in emerging markets like Turkey, which
are highly vulnerable to economic distortions and financial crisis. Structural
differences in emerging markets introduce new risks such as currency and maturity
mismatch thus the bank managers have to consider a wide range of scenarios and
manage their balance sheets optimally by developing an efficient asset-liability
management strategy. This study proposes a multi-objective decision model to reach
an optimal strategy.
GP is developed as a decision tool for ALM in order to show how different
managerial strategies affect the financial well being of banks during crisis. It is applied
to two medium scale Turkish commercial banks with different risk taking behaviors
and the results are compared under optimistic and pessimistic economic scenarios.
Although applying the model improves wellbeing of both banks, the improvement
becomes more significant as pessimistic perception of the economic environment or
risk taking propensity of the banks increases. The model is capable of developing
rational responses to strategy and scenario changes, thus can be proposed as a decision
making tool for banks operating under uncertainty. Results could be generalized
further by applying them to representatives of different bank groups as well as testing
the model under various economic and financial scenarios.
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Further reading
(The) Banks Association of Turkey (1998), Banks in Turkey, The Banks Association of Turkey,
Istanbul.
(The) Banks Association of Turkey (1999), Banks in Turkey, The Banks Association of Turkey,
Istanbul.
(The) Banks Association of Turkey (2000), Banks in Turkey, The Banks Association of Turkey,
Istanbul.