DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 17-CO-507

JAYVON R. WHITE, APPELLANT,

AUG 28 2020
v.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia
(FEL-2363-00)

(Hon. Jennifer M. Anderson, Motions Judge)

(Argued September 12, 2018 Decided August 28, 2020)

Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, BECKWITH, Associate Judge, and

WASHINGTON,* Senior Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM: In 2001, appellant pled guilty to second-degree murder while

armed and possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, and was sentenced
to consecutive prison terms of 20 years to life for the first and 5 to 15 years for the
second. He now appeals from the denial of his motion filed in 2012 under D.C.
Code § 23-110 alleging that the guilty plea had been induced by a mistaken
statement by the trial court (Judge Retchin), in conducting the plea colloquy, that
he would be eligible for parole after serving a combined mandatory minimum term
of ten years if the court imposed consecutive sentences. After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court (now Judge Anderson) acknowledged the possibility that
Judge Retchin’s statement in question was “potentially confusing to” appellant,
but found “incredible” his assertion that the statement in fact had caused him to

*
Senior Judge Farrell was originally assigned to this case. Following his
retirement on January 23, 2019, Senior Judge Washington was assigned to take his
place on the division.
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plead guilty. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
appellant’s motion and, therefore, reverse and remand.

“When considering a motion to vacate sentence under § 23-110 which is

filed after a defendant has pleaded guilty and been sentenced, the motion is
properly treated as a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.” Id. Such a motion may
be granted “only if the defendant affirmatively establishes that the trial court’s
acceptance of [his] plea was manifestly unjust, and that the plea proceeding was
fundamentally flawed such that there was a complete miscarriage of justice . . . .”
Johnson v. United States, 631 A.2d 871, 874 (D.C. 1993) (internal citations
omitted).

“Manifest injustice can take several forms.” Abbott v. United States, 871
A.2d 514, 521 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). “In the context of a plea
agreement, it may exist if the defendant was coerced into pleading guilty or did not
knowingly plead guilty, or if the government failed to comply with the terms of the
agreement.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “A plea may be involuntary either
because the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional
protections that he is waiving or because he has such an incomplete understanding
of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.”
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (internal citation omitted).
Where a defendant seeks to withdraw his guilty plea because such plea was entered
involuntarily, there is no requirement that the defendant show that but for the error,
he would not have pled guilty. See id. at 644 n.12; see also Gates v. United States,
515 F.2d 73, 80-81 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that where the trial court “not only
fails to inform [the defendant] prior to his plea of his ineligibility for parole, but
also incorrectly informs him at the time of sentencing that he will be eligible[,]
[t]hese compound errors present exceptional circumstances” requiring reversal of
conviction and an opportunity to plead anew”); Spradley v. United States, 421 F.2d
1043, 1047-48 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that were the trial court misled or
inadvertently misinformed the defendant about the time of his parole eligibility, the
error was prejudicial enough to require a reversal of the conviction and an
opportunity for the defendant to decide whether to stand trial or to again enter a
guilty plea).

In the present case, in ruling on appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea, the trial court focused its inquiry on whether appellant could show that, but
for the statement from the trial court regarding his parole eligibility date, he would
not have pled guilty. Ultimately, the court concluded that for “multiple reasons” it
did not “find . . . credible” appellant’s claim that any misstatement by Judge
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Retchin had influenced his decision to plead guilty. Appellant, however, was not
required to demonstrate such but for prejudice – he did not need to show that Judge
Retchin’s statement influenced his decision to plead guilty.

On the contrary, appellant need only show that his plea was not entered
voluntarily. We hold that appellant has met this burden. During appellant’s Rule
11 colloquy, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Now your lawyer says he’s going to

make an argument to me that I should make those
sentences run concurrent to each other. But I want you to
understand that I may or may not do that, and I could
choose to give you consecutive sentences, meaning that I
could sentence you to as much as 25 years to life. Do
you understand?

MR WHITE: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: And although this offense was committed

before the Truth In Sentencing law went into effect,
meaning that you’re still eligible for parole, I want you to
understand that the mandatory part of the sentence is
exempted from the parole, meaning that you would be
required to serve a minimum of five years. And if I make
this sentence consecutive, it would be a minimum of 10
years before you’re even eligible for parole. Do you
understand?

MR WHITE: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Has anyone told you what sentence I will

give you?

MR WHITE: No, ma’am. They just told me what you

can give me and what you can’t give me.

(emphasis added). A person hearing such a statement at a plea proceeding might

reasonably – albeit falsely – believe that he would be eligible for parole in ten
years. Indeed, we have held that similar statements uttered by trial counsel
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constitute misinformation that could render a plea involuntary. See, e.g., Goodall
v. United States, 759 A.2d 1077, 1083-84 (D.C. 2000).

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that appellant lacked sufficient

knowledge regarding the fundamental right he relinquished in making his guilty
plea and, as a result, his guilty plea was involuntary. The trial court abused its
discretion in requiring appellant to show that, but for the misstatement made by the
trial court, he would not have entered his guilty plea before he could vacate his
guilty plea. No such showing was required. Because appellant showed that his
guilty plea was involuntary, his conviction must be vacated and he should have the
opportunity to plead anew – to decide whether to go to trial or to enter another
guilty plea.

Reversed and remanded.

ENTERED BY DIRECTION OF THE COURT:

JULIO A. CASTILLO
Clerk of the Court

Copies to:
Honorable Jennifer M. Anderson
Director, Criminal Division

Copies e-Served to:

Matthew J. Dowd, Esquire
Elizabeth Trosman, Esquire
Assistant United States Attorney