Aldovino v.

Gold and Green Manpower

Doctrines:

1. Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding benefits to which they are
legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in compensation less than what is
mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from subsequently claiming benefits to
which they are legally entitled.
2. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were validly dismissed rests on the
employers. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is illegal. A valid dismissal must
comply with substantive and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure.
The employer must comply with the two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given an
opportunity to be heard.

Facts:

Petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas, Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto, Revilla S. De
Jesus, and Laila V. Orpilla applied for work at Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development Services,
Inc., a local manning agency whose foreign principal is Sage International Development Company, Ltd. Eventually,
they were hired as sewers for Dipper Semi-Conductor Company, Ltd. (Dipper Semi-Conductor), a Taiwan-based
company. Their respective employment contracts provided an eight (8)-hour working day, a fixed monthly salary,
and entitlement to overtime pay, among others. Once Aldovino and her co-workers arrived in Taiwan, Gold and
Green Manpower took all their travel documents, including their passports. They were then made to sign another
contract that provides that they would be paid on a piece-rate basis instead of a fixed monthly salary. Because they
were paid on a piece-rate basis, they received less than the fixed monthly salary stipulated in their original contract.
When Aldovino and her co-workers inquired, Dipper Semi-Conductor refused to disclose the schedule of payment
on a piece-rate basis. Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, filed before a local court in Taiwan a
Complaint against their employers, Dipper Semi-Conductor and Sage International. The parties met before the
Bureau of Labor Affairs for a dialogue. Dipper Semi-Conductor ordered Aldovino and her co-workers to return to
the Philippines as it was no longer interested in their services. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Based on the Compromise Agreement, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Release. All of them returned to the Philippines. They eventually filed before the Labor Arbiter a case
for illegal termination, underpayment of salaries and other money claims. Respondents question the legality of the
monetary damages awarded to petitioners. They assert that the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the parties'
Compromise Agreement, pointing out that the labor tribunals had already rendered it valid.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Compromise Agreement barred all other claims against respondents Gold and Green
Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Company,
Ltd., and Alberto C. Alvina
2. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to the reimbursement of
their placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
3. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

Held:

1. It is erroneous for the respondents to claim that the Compromise Agreement barred petitioners from
holding them liable for claims. Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned upon
for being contrary to public policy. Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in
compensation less than what is mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from
subsequently claiming benefits to which they are legally entitled. The object and foundation of the
Compromise Agreement was to settle the payment of salaries and overtime premiums to which petitioners
 were legally entitled. Hence, it should not be construed as a restriction on petitioners' right to prosecute
other legitimate claims they may have against respondents.
2. The petitioners are illegally dismissed and are entitled to the reimbursement of their placement fees and
payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Under the Labor Code, employers may only
terminate employment for a just or authorized cause and after complying with procedural due process
requirements. Articles 297 and 300 of the Labor Code enumerate the causes of employment termination
either by employers or employees. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were
validly dismissed rests on the employers. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is
illegal. The termination of petitioners' employment was effected merely because respondents no longer
wanted their services. This is not an authorized or just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code.
Employment contracts cannot be terminated on a whim. Petitioners did not voluntarily sever their
employment when they signed the Compromise Agreement, which, again, cannot be used to justify a
dismissal. Also, petitioners were not accorded due process. A valid dismissal must comply with substantive
and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer must comply
with the two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard. Here,
petitioners were only verbally dismissed, without any notice given or having been informed of any just
cause for their dismissal. As a consequence of the illegal dismissal, petitioners are also entitled to moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
3. The clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" as reinstated in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 is unconstitutional, and has no force and effect of law. It violates due
process as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose. A
statute declared unconstitutional "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all." The reinstated clause in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 10022 has no force and effect of law. It is unconstitutional. Hence, petitioners are entitled to the
award of salaries based on the actual unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
Marilyn R. Yangson (Yangson) was Principal III at the Surigao Norte National High School (Surigao National). On
April 30, 2008, Yangson was personally served a Memorandum dated April 14, 2008 issued by then Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent Officer-in-Charge Fidela Rosas (Rosas). In the Memorandum, Yangson was
reassigned from Surigao National to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School (Toledo Memorial).
Yangson refused to accept the Memorandum without first consulting her counsel.

Two (2) days prior to the effectivity of her reassignment, Yangson filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition
for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against Rosas and Dulcesima Corvera
(Corvera), who was supposed to replace Yangson as the new principal of Surigao National. Yangson alleged that the
Memorandum violated Department of Education Circular No. 02, series of 2005, because it failed to specify the
duration of her reassignment and because it was issued without her prior consultation. She also claimed that there
was no vacancy in the position, and the reassignment would cause diminution in her rank. The Regional Trial Court
denied Yangson's prayer for preliminary injunction. It held that Yangson did not have a vested right over her
position at Surigao National because her appointment as Principal III was not station-specific. It also held that the
reassignments were in good faith and within Rosas' authority. It ruled that the issuance of an injunction was
improper as Yangson could still appeal to the Director of Public Schools under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 4670,
or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

Yangson appealed before the Department of Education CARAGA Regional Office but it was denied. Regional
Director Jesusita Arteche (Regional Director Arteche), citing Section 26 of the Administrative Code, which
differentiated transfers from reassignments, she found that Yangson was reassigned, not transferred. Thus, Section 6
of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which only provided for transfers, was inapplicable. Regional
Director Arteche also ruled that Yangson was not constructively dismissed because her reassignment was done in
good faith.

Yangson elevated her case to the Department of Education Central Office, but her appeal was denied. The
Department of Education Central Office affirmed the decision of Department of Education CARAGA Regional
Office that Yangson was reassigned, not transferred, since her movement did not involve the issuance of an
appointment. It held that since Yangson's appointment was not station-specific, her reassignment was within the
prerogative of the head of office for the exigency of service. Hence, Yangson could be assigned to any school. The
Department of Education Central Office found that since her reassignment was done to promote efficiency in
government service, her consent was not necessary. Thus, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers was not
violated. Yangson's consent was not required since her appointment was not station-specific. It explained that when
the appointment is not station-specific, one's consent is not required when he or she is merely assigned or
temporarily appointed. There was no malice in Yangson's reassignment. Rosas made several earnest efforts to serve
Yangson the Memorandum on time, beginning April 22, 2008. In all those instances, Yangson refused to receive the
Memorandum, and only accepted it on May 2, 2008. Thus, it ruled that Yangson could not feign ignorance of the
action as it was she who employed delaying tactics. The Department of Education Central Office, likewise, ruled
that Yangson's reassignment to a smaller school was neither a demotion nor constructive dismissal. It held that
government projects, programs, efforts, and resources could not be subordinated to individual preferences of Civil
Service employees as it would defy the notion that "a public office is a public trust."

Yangson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Thus, she elevated her claims to the Civil Service
Commission. the Civil Service Commission reversed both Resolutions of the Department of Education Central
Office and ruled in favor of Yangson. It found that her reassignment did not comply with the requirements of
Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. The Civil Service Commission affirmed that Yangson
could be assigned anywhere in the school division. However, it noted that while the movement would be in the same
region, Yangson would be placed in a different division. It found that Surigao National is under the Division of
Surigao City, while Toledo Memorial is under the Division of Surigao del Norte. Thus, it ruled that Yangson's
consent was necessary.

The Department of Education elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the rulings
of the Civil Service Commission. The Court of Appeals maintained that while reassignments are different from
transfers, both are covered by Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. However, though it was
applicable, the Court of Appeals found that the provision was not violated. It explained that Yangson was being
reassigned under the Division Office's plan to reshuffle school administrators in the exigency of service, as the last
reshuffling had happened more than five (5) years earlier. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the reassignment was
valid without Yangson's consent, and the notice served to her sufficiently complied with the requirement under the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. It agreed with the Civil Service Commission that Yangson had not been
demoted as there was no reduction in Yangson's rank, status, or salary. The Court of Appeals further found that
Yangson was reassigned to a school in the same division as Surigao National. It noted that she was appointed at the
Department of Education, Division of Surigao del Norte, and not any specific station or school.

PAL v. DAWAL

PAL severed the employment of Isagani Dawal (Dawal), Lorna Concepcion (Concepcion), and Bonifacio
Sinobago (Sinobago). Until their dismissal from work, they were regular rank-and-file employees of PAL and
"bona fide members" of the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA). When PAL was privatized,
the new owners acquired PAL's alleged aging fleet and overly manned workforce. PAL sought to expand its
business through a five-year re-fleeting program. It began implementing the re-fleeting program in July 1993. In
1997, the Asian Financial Crisis devalued the peso against the dollar. PAL claims that this strained its financial
resources which was exacerbated by a three-week strike by the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines. PAL
claims that this strike caused the "further deterioration of [the company's] financial condition[.]” and thus, PAL
implemented a massive retrenchment program on June 15, 1998. PAL then filed for corporate rehabilitation
before the Securities and Exchange Commission. A year after, PAL President and Chief Operating Officer
Avelino L. Zapanta allegedly wrote to PALEA, informing the latter of the "new management's plan to sell" the
Maintenance and Engineering Department. the Securities and Exchange Commission approved PAL's Amended and
Restated Rehabilitation Plan (Rehabilitation Plan). The Rehabilitation Plan stated that PAL's "non-core
activities . . . have the potential to be sold off" which included the Catering and the Maintenance and
Engineering Departments. PAL met with PALEA, during which PAL President and COO Zapanta had assured the
employees that there would be no economic dislocation and diminution of benefits for the employees. PALEA then
held a general election for its new officers. Headed by PALEA President Jose T. Peñas III, the newly proclaimed
officers included Dawal as Secretary. However, the result of the election was contested. On March 24, 2000, the
new union leadership informed PAL of the election result and requested a courtesy call visit. However, PAL refused
to meet with them in light of pending election protests. Meanwhile, Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc.
(Lufthansa) expressed its desire to purchase PAL's Maintenance and Engineering Department. The
Securities and Exchange Commission approved the sale to Lufthansa. Under Article XXIV, Section 4 of the
1995-2000 PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement dated
November 2, 1996, "[i]n case PAL deems it necessary to reorganize its corporate structure for the viability of
its operations by forming joint ventures and spin-offs, PAL shall do so only after proper consultation with
PALEA within 45 days before implementation of said reorganization[.]" No consultation meeting was held
within 45 days. When PAL turned down the courtesy call visit of the newly elected PALEA officers, the latter
refused to commence the consultation meeting "until PAL management respects" their alleged election. To
make up for this, PAL issued primers to "address questions regarding the spin-off." The primers stated that the
spin-off aimed to reduce PAL's costs, improve its performance and efficiency, and pre-pay its creditors, among
others. PAL also allegedly conducted ugnayan sessions with its employees to inform them of the spinoff. According
to Dawal, et al., PAL announced the planned spin-off informally and belatedly, reaching them sometime in
April 2000. PALEA members signed and executed Resolution No. 01-1, Series of 2000, rejecting the spin-off.
Under the spin-off program, the following PAL employees were to be "retrench[ed]" from work: those from
the Maintenance and Engineering Department, and those from Logistics and Purchasing, Financial Services,
and Information Services Departments doing purely maintenance and engineering-related tasks, whose work
would be absorbed by Lufthansa. After signing a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim, Dawal, Concepcion,
Sinobago, and other affected employees were given generous separation packages less their outstanding
obligations or accountabilities. PAL also offered work for the employees who were not absorbed by Lufthansa.
When PAL spun off the engineering and maintenance facilities, it also created a new engineering department,
called the Technical Services Department, allegedly "in compliance with aviation regulations requiring
airline companies to maintain an engineering department." PALEA and Dawal, et al. filed before the Labor
Arbiter a Complaint dated January 31, 2001 for unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
Francisco A. Robles found PAL guilty of illegal dismissal. PAL was ordered to reinstate Dawal, et al. to their
"former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and privileges and to pay them full backwages[.]" The
National Labor Relations Commission reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision in toto. The
National Labor Relations Commission stated that PAL validly exercised its management prerogative. Dawal,
et al. filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC
and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals ruled that PAL's dismissal of Dawal,
et al.'s services was illegal, and that PAL actually invoked redundancy, not retrenchment. The Court of
Appeals struck out the part of the decision finding PAL guilty of unfair labor practice and reduced the award
for moral and exemplary damages.

Issues:

63. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. V. DAWAL

G.R. Nos. 173921 & 173952, February 24, 2016

DOCTRINE: 

The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal of its employees is with a valid and authorized
cause. The employer's failure to discharge this burden makes the dismissal illegal. Mere showing of incurred or
expected losses does not automatically justify retrenchment. The business losses must be "substantial, serious,
actual[,] and real," not merely de minimis.

FACTS:

PAL severed the employment of Isagani Dawal (Dawal), Lorna Concepcion (Concepcion), and Bonifacio Sinobago
(Sinobago) who were regular rank-and-file employees of PAL and "bona fide members" of the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA), until their dismissal. PAL implemented a massive retrenchment program on June
15, 1998. PAL then filed for corporate rehabilitation before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The
Rehabilitation Plan stated that PAL's "non-core activities . . . have the potential to be sold off" which included the
Catering and the Maintenance and Engineering Departments. Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. (Lufthansa)
expressed its desire to purchase PAL's Maintenance and Engineering Department. The Securities and Exchange
Commission approved the sale to Lufthansa. Under Article XXIV, Section 4 of the 1995-2000 PAL-PALEA
Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Memorandum of Agreement dated November 2, 1996, "[i]n case PAL
deems it necessary to reorganize its corporate structure for the viability of its operations by forming joint ventures
and spin-offs, PAL shall do so only after proper consultation with PALEA within 45 days before implementation of
said reorganization[.]" No consultation meeting was held within 45 days. When PAL turned down the courtesy call
visit of the newly elected PALEA officers, the latter refused to commence the consultation meeting "until PAL
management respects" their alleged election. To make up for this, PAL issued primers to "address questions
regarding the spin-off." According to Dawal, et al., PAL announced the planned spin-off informally and belatedly,
reaching them sometime in April 2000. PALEA members signed and executed Resolution No. 01-1, Series of 2000,
rejecting the spin-off. Under the spin-off program, the following PAL employees were to be "retrench[ed]" from
work: those from the Maintenance and Engineering Department, and those from Logistics and Purchasing, Financial
Services, and Information Services Departments doing purely maintenance and engineering-related tasks, whose
work would be absorbed by Lufthansa. After signing a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim, Dawal, Concepcion,
Sinobago, and other affected employees were given generous separation packages less their outstanding obligations
or accountabilities. PAL also offered work for the employees who were not absorbed by Lufthansa. When PAL spun
off the engineering and maintenance facilities, it also created a new engineering department, called the Technical
Services Department, allegedly "in compliance with aviation regulations requiring airline companies to maintain an
engineering department." PALEA and Dawal, et al. filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint dated January 31,
2001 for unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles found PAL guilty of illegal
dismissal. PAL was ordered to reinstate Dawal, et al. to their "former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and
privileges and to pay them full backwages[.]" The National Labor Relations Commission reversed and set aside the
Labor Arbiter's Decision in toto. The National Labor Relations Commission stated that PAL validly exercised its
management prerogative. Dawal, et al. filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals ruled that PAL's
dismissal of Dawal, et al.'s services was illegal, and that PAL actually invoked redundancy, not retrenchment. The
Court of Appeals struck out the part of the decision finding PAL guilty of unfair labor practice and reduced the
award for moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: 

Whether the termination of the employment of Isagani Dawal, Lorna Concepcion, and Bonifacio Sinobago
was due to an authorized cause, and could be justified as redundancy or retrenchment;

HELD:

Redundancy requires good faith in abolishing the redundant position. To establish good faith, the company
must provide substantial proof that it is overmanned which was absent in this case. When PAL spun off the
engineering and maintenance facilities, it also created a new engineering department called the Technical Services
Department.  Moreover, after it fired the affected employees, PAL offered to rehire the same retrenched personnel as
new employees. The Court of Appeals held that “[t]he dismissal of the petitioners who were later on offered
reemployment . . . as new employees of PAL appears to be merely a clever ruse . . . to deprive [Dawal, et al.], as
well as the other employees similarly situated, of the privileges and benefits to which they are already entitled to by
reason of the length of services they have rendered to PAL[.]” PAL's acts effectively defeated its employees'
security of tenure and seniority rights. The presence of bad faith cancels out any claim of redundancy. There are
several guidelines that PAL should observe to validly dismiss Dawal, et al. due to retrenchment. Among others, the
following are the four (4) criteria that the employer must meet: 

1. The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly
sought to be forestalled by retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in
character, the bonafide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be seriously in question.
2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a certain degree of urgency
for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of
the employees retired or otherwise laid-off.
3. It must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses because of the
consequential nature of retrenchment.
4. Alleged losses, if already realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be
proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. The reason for requiring this quantum of proof is readily
apparent: any less exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground for termination
of services of employees.

The employer has the burden of showing by clear and satisfactory evidence that there are existing or
imminent substantial losses, and that "legitimate business reasons justif[y] . . . retrenchment." Mere showing of
incurred or expected losses does not automatically justify retrenchment. The business losses must be "substantial,
serious, actual[,] and real," not merely de minimis. In this case, there is no showing that PAL "resorted to less drastic
and less permanent cost-cutting measures" prior to the so-called retrenchment. PAL has "failed to explain how the
rehiring of the affected employees in the spin-off could possibly alleviate PAL's financial difficulty." For there to be
a valid retrenchment, the employer must exercise its management prerogative "in good faith for the advancement of
its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees' right to security of tenure[.]" PAL attempts to prove its
alleged good faith on "[t]he very generosity of the separation package [and] the job offers" it gave to the dismissed
employees. According to PAL, providing generous separation pay "negates any impression that PAL was guilty of
bad faith or misdoing its retrenchment policy." That PAL gave separation pay way beyond what the law requires is
not challenged by the parties. However, this sheds doubts on PAL's alleged "dire financial condition[.]" In addition,
PAL spun off the engineering department but created a new one under a different name, i.e., the Technical Services
Department which, according to PAL, is also "an engineering department." PAL "rehired a number of" the
retrenched personnel and assigned them to this newly formed engineering department. PAL's inconsistency belies its
allegation of good faith. PAL failed to prove "any degree of urgency to implement such retrenchment." Indeed, if
retrenchment were really necessary to forestall serious business losses, PAL should not have offered to rehire the
dismissed employees, especially after it had already given them generous separation benefits. Considering that PAL
acted in bad faith and that the grounds for termination were "not sufficiently and convincingly established," its
dismissal of Dawal, et al.'s services is therefore unjustified, illegal, and of no effect.

64. IN RE: FERRER

A.C. No. 8037 (Resolution), February 17, 2016

DOCTRINE: 

FACTS:

ISSUE: 

HELD:

65. BARSOLO V. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM

G.R. No. 187950, January 11, 2017

DOCTRINE: 

For a claim for myocardial infarction as a compensable occupational disease to prosper, there must be substantial
evidence to prove any of the following conditions:

a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;
b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed
within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.
c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it
is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.

FACTS:

Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was employed as a seaman by
various companies from 1988 to 2002." From July 2, 2002 to December 6, 2002, Manuel served as a Riding
Gang/Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star with Vela International Marine Ltd., (Vela). Vela was his last
employer before he died in 2006. After his separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. He was examined and treated at the
Philippine Heart Center as an outpatient from April 2, 2003 to October 22, 2004. When he died on September 24,
2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death. Believing that the cause of Manuel's
death was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended,
with the Social Security System.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Cristina is entitled to compensation for the death of her husband Manuel.

HELD:

Petitioner's claim for death benefits was correctly denied by the Court of Appeals. petitioner offered no
proof that her husband suffered any of the symptoms during his employment. All she managed to prove was that her
husband went to the Philippine Heart Center and was treated for Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease from April 2,
2003 to January 9, 2004, four months after his contract with Vela ended on December 6, 2002. The Medical
Certificate did not help petitioner's cause, as this only shows that Manuel was already suffering from hypertension
even before his pre-employment examination, and that he did not contract it during his employment with Vela.
Having had a pre-existing cardiovascular disease classifies him under the first condition. However, for a claim under
the first category to prosper, petitioner must show that there was an acute exacerbation of the heart disease caused
by the unusual strain of work. Petitioner failed to adduce any proof that her husband experienced any symptom of a
heart ailment while employed with Vela, much less any sign that his heart condition was aggravated by his job.
Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury during the performance
of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's employment caused the disease or that his
working conditions aggravated his existing heart ailment. Moreover, due to the considerable lapse of time from his
disembarkation from MV Polaris Star, more convincing evidence must be presented in order to attribute the cause of
death to Manuel's work. In the absence of such evidence and under the circumstances of this case, this Court cannot
assume that the illness that caused Manuel's death was acquired during his employment with Vela. Furthermore,
Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different major causative factor, which could explain his illness and
eventual death, defeats petitioner's claim.

66. ALDOVINO V. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 200811, June 19, 2019

DOCTRINES: 

1. Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding benefits to which they are
legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in compensation less than what is
mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from subsequently claiming benefits to
which they are legally entitled.
2. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were validly dismissed rests on the
employers. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is illegal. A valid dismissal must
comply with substantive and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure.
The employer must comply with the two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given an
opportunity to be heard.

FACTS:

Petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas, Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto, Revilla S. De
Jesus, and Laila V. Orpilla applied for work at Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development Services,
Inc., a local manning agency whose foreign principal is Sage International Development Company, Ltd. Eventually,
they were hired as sewers for Dipper Semi-Conductor Company, Ltd. (Dipper Semi-Conductor), a Taiwan-based
company. Their respective employment contracts provided an eight (8)-hour working day, a fixed monthly salary,
and entitlement to overtime pay, among others. Once Aldovino and her co-workers arrived in Taiwan, Gold and
Green Manpower took all their travel documents, including their passports. They were then made to sign another
contract that provides that they would be paid on a piece-rate basis instead of a fixed monthly salary. Because they
were paid on a piece-rate basis, they received less than the fixed monthly salary stipulated in their original contract.
When Aldovino and her co-workers inquired, Dipper Semi-Conductor refused to disclose the schedule of payment
on a piece-rate basis. Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, filed before a local court in Taiwan a
Complaint against their employers, Dipper Semi-Conductor and Sage International. The parties met before the
Bureau of Labor Affairs for a dialogue. Dipper Semi-Conductor ordered Aldovino and her co-workers to return to
the Philippines as it was no longer interested in their services. The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Based on the Compromise Agreement, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Release. All of them returned to the Philippines. They eventually filed before the Labor Arbiter a case
for illegal termination, underpayment of salaries and other money claims. Respondents question the legality of the
monetary damages awarded to petitioners. They assert that the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the parties'
Compromise Agreement, pointing out that the labor tribunals had already rendered it valid.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not the Compromise Agreement barred all other claims against respondents Gold and Green
Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Company,
Ltd., and Alberto C. Alvina
2. Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to the reimbursement of
their placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

HELD:

1. It is erroneous for the respondents to claim that the Compromise Agreement barred petitioners from
holding them liable for claims. Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned upon
for being contrary to public policy. Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled. The law does not recognize agreements that result in
compensation less than what is mandated by law. These quitclaims do not prevent employees from
subsequently claiming benefits to which they are legally entitled. The object and foundation of the
Compromise Agreement was to settle the payment of salaries and overtime premiums to which petitioners
were legally entitled. Hence, it should not be construed as a restriction on petitioners' right to prosecute
other legitimate claims they may have against respondents.
2. The petitioners are illegally dismissed and are entitled to the reimbursement of their placement fees and
payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Under the Labor Code, employers may only
terminate employment for a just or authorized cause and after complying with procedural due process
requirements. Articles 297 and 300 of the Labor Code enumerate the causes of employment termination
either by employers or employees. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees were
validly dismissed rests on the employers. Failure to discharge this burden means that the dismissal is
illegal. The termination of petitioners' employment was effected merely because respondents no longer
wanted their services. This is not an authorized or just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code.
Employment contracts cannot be terminated on a whim. Petitioners did not voluntarily sever their
employment when they signed the Compromise Agreement, which, again, cannot be used to justify a
dismissal. Also, petitioners were not accorded due process. A valid dismissal must comply with substantive
and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The employer must comply
with the two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard. Here,
petitioners were only verbally dismissed, without any notice given or having been informed of any just
cause for their dismissal. As a consequence of the illegal dismissal, petitioners are also entitled to moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 

67. YANGSON V. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

G.R. No. 200170, June 3, 2019

DOCTRINES: 
1. Reassignments differ from transfers, and public employees with appointments that are not station-specific
may be reassigned to another station in the exigency of public service.
2. An appointment is station-specific if the employee's appointment paper specifically indicates on its face the
particular office or station the position is located. Moreover, the station should already be specified in the
position title, even if the place of assignment is not indicated on the face of the appointment.
3. The legal concept of transfer differs from reassignment. Most notably, a transfer involves the issuance of
another appointment, while a reassignment does not.
4. It is presumed that reassignments are "regular and made in the interest of public service."
5. A demotion means that an employee is moved or appointed from a higher position to a lower position with
decreased duties and responsibilities, or with lesser status, rank, or salary.
6. Constructive dismissal occurs whether or not there is diminution in rank, status, or salary if the employee's
environment has rendered it impossible for him or her to stay in his or her work. It may be due to the
agency head's unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations, hardship because geographic location,
financial dislocation, or performance of other duties and responsibilities inconsistent with those attached to
the position. 
7. A reassignment may be deemed a constructive dismissal if the employee is moved to a position with a more
servile or menial job as compared to his previous position. It may occur if the employee was reassigned to
an office not in the existing organizational structure, or if he or she is not given a definite set of duties and
responsibilities. It may be deemed constructive dismissal if the motivation for the reassignment was to
harass or oppress the employee on the pretext of promoting public interest. This may be inferred from
reassignments done twice within a year, or during a change of administration of elective and appointive
officials.
8. Demotion and constructive dismissal are never presumed and must be sufficiently proven.

FACTS:

Marilyn R. Yangson (Yangson) was Principal III at the Surigao Norte National High School (Surigao
National). On April 30, 2008, Yangson was personally served a Memorandum dated April 14, 2008 issued by then
Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Officer-in-Charge Fidela Rosas (Rosas). In the Memorandum, Yangson
was reassigned from Surigao National to Toledo S. Pantilo Memorial National High School (Toledo Memorial).
Yangson refused to accept the Memorandum without first consulting her counsel. Two (2) days prior to the
effectivity of her reassignment, Yangson filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Injunction with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against Rosas and Dulcesima Corvera (Corvera), who was supposed
to replace Yangson as the new principal of Surigao National. Yangson alleged that the Memorandum violated
Department of Education Circular No. 02, series of 2005, because it failed to specify the duration of her
reassignment and because it was issued without her prior consultation. She also claimed that there was no vacancy in
the position, and the reassignment would cause diminution in her rank. The Regional Trial Court denied Yangson's
prayer for preliminary injunction. It held that Yangson did not have a vested right over her position at Surigao
National because her appointment as Principal III was not station-specific. It also held that the reassignments were
in good faith and within Rosas' authority. It ruled that the issuance of an injunction was improper as Yangson could
still appeal to the Director of Public Schools under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 4670, or the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers. Yangson appealed before the Department of Education CARAGA Regional Office but it
was denied. Yangson elevated her case to the Department of Education Central Office, but her appeal was denied.
The Department of Education Central Office affirmed the decision of the Department of Education CARAGA
Regional Office. Yangson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Thus, she elevated her claims to the
Civil Service Commission. the Civil Service Commission reversed both Resolutions of the Department of Education
Central Office and ruled in favor of Yangson. The Department of Education elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals set aside the rulings of the Civil Service Commission. The Court of Appeals
maintained that while reassignments are different from transfers, both are covered by Section 6 of the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers. However, though it was applicable, the Court of Appeals found that the provision was
not violated. It explained that Yangson was being reassigned under the Division Office's plan to reshuffle school
administrators in the exigency of service, as the last reshuffling had happened more than five (5) years earlier. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that the reassignment was valid without Yangson's consent, and the notice served to her
sufficiently complied with the requirement under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. It agreed with the
Civil Service Commission that Yangson had not been demoted as there was no reduction in Yangson's rank, status,
or salary. The Court of Appeals further found that Yangson was reassigned to a school in the same division as
Surigao National. It noted that she was appointed at the Department of Education, Division of Surigao del Norte,
and not any specific station or school.

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not petitioner Marilyn R. Yangson's reassignment was valid.

1. Whether or not petitioner's appointment is station-specific.
2. Whether or not Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers applies to petitioner's
movement.
3. Whether or not petitioner's reassignment violated her security of tenure.
4. Whether or not petitioner's reassignment was for the exigency of service and in accordance with
policy.
5. Whether or not petitioner was demoted; and
6. Whether or not petitioner's appointment may be indeterminate.

HELD:

1. Petitioner’s reassignment is valid.

1. Petitioner’s appointment is not station-specific. An appointment is station-specific if the
employee's appointment paper specifically indicates on its face the particular office or station the
position is located. Moreover, the station should already be specified in the position title, even if
the place of assignment is not indicated on the face of the appointment. Petitioner's appointment is
not solely for Surigao National or for any specific school. There is no particular office or station
specifically indicated on the face of her appointment paper. Neither does her position title
specifically indicate her station.
2. Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers does not apply. Section 6 applies to
transfers, not reassignments. Petitioner's movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial
was a reassignment, not a transfer. The Memorandum petitioner questions specifically stated that
she was being reassigned.
3. Petitioner's reassignment did not violate her right to security of tenure. It has been established that
petitioner's appointment is not station-specific. While she is entitled to her right to security of
tenure, she cannot assert her right to stay at Surigao National. Her appointment papers are not
specific to the school, which means she may be assigned to any station as may be necessary for
public exigency. Because she holds no vested right to remain as Principal III of Surigao National,
her right to security of tenure was not violated.
4. The Court cannot conclude as a matter of established fact that petitioner was reassigned by whim,
fancy, or spite, as she would like this Court to believe. It is presumed that reassignments are
"regular and made in the interest of public service." The party questioning its regularity or
asserting bad faith carries the burden to prove his or her allegations.
5. Demotion and constructive dismissal are never presumed and must be sufficiently proven. Again,
petitioner failed to rebut this reasonable presumption. Petitioner's position at Toledo Memorial is
still Principal III. She retains the same rank, status, and salary, and is expected to exercise the
same duties and responsibilities. There is no movement from a higher position to a lower position.
She was not given a more servile or menial job. Similarly, she was not humiliated, demeaned, or
treated unreasonably. She did not allege that it was impossible for her to continue her work due to
the geographic location. There is no showing that she was financially dislocated or that she was
being made to perform duties and responsibilities that contravene those of her position. Moreover,
Toledo Memorial is a high school within her area of appointment. She was given a definite set of
duties and responsibilities. This is not the second reassignment within a year, or a reassignment
during a change of administration of elective and appointive officials.
6. When an employee's appointment is station-specific, his or her reassignment may not exceed a
maximum period of one (1) year. This is not the case for appointments that are not station-
specific. In such instances, the reassignment may be indefinite and exceed one (1) year— as in
petitioner's case.