E.
Surnames; 174, 176, 189, 369; 364-380 NCC; RA
9255; Sec 5(d), RA 8239; RA 9048, RA 10172
1) Alfon v Republic, GR No. 51201, 29 May 1980
Facts:
 Petitioner through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez,
prayed that her name be changed from Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
 Her parents, Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte, has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs.
Hector Alfon. Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have
been residing at Mandaluyong, MM for 23 years.
 From the testimonial and document evidence presented,
such as the birth records and baptismal certificate, it
appears that petitioner was registered and baptized as
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte. (born=May 15,
1952)
 However, petitioner has advanced the following reasons
for filing the petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her
childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in
college using the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon
since her infancy and all her friends and acquaintances
know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same
name.
 Trial Court granted the petition insofar as the first name
but denied with respect to her surname. (From MEVPD to
EAD) invoking Art 364 of CC.
Issue:
WON petitioner may change her surname to that of her
mother.
Ruling:
YES. Art 364 of the CC provides that “Legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.” But the word "principally" as used in this provision is
not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal
obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to
use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of
name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is
a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is
acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to
avoid confusion; addl grounds in 3) Wang v. Registrar : (4)When the one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (5) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (6) When the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has,
since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although
her birth records and baptismal certificate show otherwise;
her scholastic records are under the name Estrella S. Alfon;
all her friends call her by this name; and she exercised the
right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore
ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not
whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and
reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is allowed to change not
only her first name but also her surname so as to be known
as ESTRELLA S. ALFON.
2) Yasin vs Shari’a District Court, supra
Facts:
Petitioner after the dissolution of her marriage by
divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the Philippines,
filed a petition to the respondent court, a petition to resume
the use of her maiden name and surname. The petition was
denied by the respondent court on the ground that the
petition is substantially for change of name and that
compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of Court
on change of name is necessary if the position is to be
granted as it would result in the resumption of the use of
petitioners maiden name and surname.
Issue:
WON petition for resumption of maiden name and
surname is also a petition for change of name.
Ruling:
The court rules in the negative. Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial
conformation of the right of divorced woman to resume her
maiden name and surname. Wherefore the petition is
granted.
3) Wang v Registrar, GR No. 159966, 30 Mar 2005
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or
filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Facts:
 Petitioner was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married
to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son
so that his name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
 Planning to stay in Singapore for a long time to study
there, petitioner, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa
Wang, filed a petition to drop his middle name and have his
registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang to Julian Lin Wang because he may be
discriminated against in Singapore (where middle names are
not carried in a person’s name).
 RTC denied the petition finding the reason for the change
of name (discrimination bcoz of his middle name – merely for the
convenience of the child) as not within the grounds recognized
by law. Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names
cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.
Issue:
WON the law allows one to drop the middle name from
his registered name.
Ruling:
NO. Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish
him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the
birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be
indicated in the certificate. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus
contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a
surname.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by
petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is a minor. Considering the nebulous
foundation on which this petition is based, it is best that this matter
of change of name be left to his judgment/discretion when he
reaches the age of majority.
4) Bar Matter No. 1625 Re Petition of Josephine
Uy-Timosa, 13 July 2006
Marriage does not change a woman's name, it merely changes her
civil status.  Her true and real name is that given to her and entered in the
Civil Registry which she may continue to use despite her marriage or
cessation of marriage for whatever reason she may have.
Facts:
 Petitioner requests that she be allowed to use her maiden
name, Josephine P. Uy, in her Petition to Take the 2006
Bar Examinations.
 She alleged that, despite her marriage, she has
continuously used her maiden name in all her
transactions, except in her school records and those in
the CHED and other offices.  However, all her records in
the UST reflect her maiden name.
 That she and her husband have been separated since
May 2000 and that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage is now pending before the RTC.
Issue:
WON petitioner has the right to use her maiden name
“Jospehine P. Uy” in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar
Exam.
Held:
YES. Under Art 370 CC: A married woman may use: (1) Her
maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2)
Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or (3) Her husband's
full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
The word "may" indicates that the wife’s use of her
husband's surname is optional (permissive) rather than
obligatory.  We have no law which provides that the wife shall change
her name to that of the husband upon marriage.  This in is consonance
with the principle that surnames indicate descent.  Therefore, a
married woman may use only her maiden name and
surname.  Also, she has an option, but not a duty, to use the
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Art
370.
Similarly, when the marriage ties no longer exists, the
widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden
name as the use of her former husband’s name is optional
and not obligatory for her.
Clearly, petitioner has the right to use her maiden
name Jospehine P. Uy in her Petition to Take the 2006 Bar
Examinations.
5) Remo v Secretary of DFA, GR No. 169202, 5 Mar 2010
Facts:
 Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino
citizen whose Philippine passport was then
expiring.  Petitioner being married to Francisco Rallonza,
the following entries appears in her passport: “Rallonza”
as her surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and
“Remo” as her middle name.
 Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport,
petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the
renewal of her passport with the DFA office in Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden
name and surname in the replacement passport.
 However, her request has been denied by the DFA Sec, then
by the Office of the Pres, then by the CA. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
WON petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in
her expired passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name
in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage.
Ruling:
NO. The SC ruled that once a married woman opted to
adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name (in replacement passport),
except in the cases enumerated in section 5(d) of RA 8239.
These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3)
annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists,
placing her case outside the purview of Section 5(d) of RA
8239, she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based
only on the severance of the marriage.
Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code,
the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically
dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the
provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general
law on the use of surnames.  A basic tenet in statutory
construction is that a special law prevails over a general
law.
Petition DENIED.
6) Grande vs Antonio, supra
VIII. Parental Authority;
sec. 12, art. II, Const.; RA 6809; 209-233; 2180, 2182, 2176, 19-
21 NCC; A.M. No. 03-04-04 SC; A.M. No. 02-11-12 SC; sec. 25,
Rule 130; arts. 11-12, 101-103 RPC, sec. 1 Rule 111
A. Liability of parents
7) Libi v IAC & Sps Gotiong, GR No. 70890, 18 Sep 1992
FACTS: ---ibpzn ART 220-233
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
the former broke up with the latter after she found out the
Wendell were irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted
reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted
him to resort to threats. One day, they were found dead
from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same
gun licensed in the name of Petitioner Cresencio Libi. The
parents of Julie, herein private respondents, filed a civil
case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages.
Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE:
WON the parents should be held liable for damages.
RULING:
Yes. The parents are and should be held primarily liable for
the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by
their minor children under their legal authority or control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damages.
Under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code,
as so modified.
Since the parents failed to establish in its defense, the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent such damage, the court held that the civil liability of
the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary
and not subsidiary.
2) Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil
liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.
Facts: - UST Compilations
Due to an incident that led to the death of Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi, a case for damages was
filed by Spouses Felipe and Shirley Gotiong, parents
of Julie Ann, against Spouses Cresencio Libi and
Amelia Yap Libi, parents of Wendell. Prior to the
incident, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were
sweethearts however eventually their relationship
went sour. Attempt of Wendell for reconciliation
likewise failed which led to threats against Julie Ann.
Both Julie Ann and Wendell died due to gunshots.
The gun recovered in the crime scene was licensed
under the name of Cresencio Libi, the father of
Wendell.
Spouses Gotiong contends that it was Wendell who
shot their daughter and thereafter committed
suicide. As such, Spouses Gotiong wanted to claim
damages against Spouses Libi arising from the
latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. On appeal, the IAC reversed the RTC decision.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Libi are liable for vicarious
liability.
Ruling:
Yes. Parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses
committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
such damages. That primary liability is premised on
the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal
Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by
their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but
under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over
9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15
years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless
Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-
delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court
did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages
arising therefrom. Spouses Libi failed to duly
exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to
prevent such damages.
3) Facts: - CCD
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi died, each from a single gunshot wound from
a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi.
The respondents, parents of Julie Ann, filed a case against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the
latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
the IAC set aside the judgment of the lower court
dismissing the complaint of Julie Ann’s parents.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was
correctly interpreted by the respondent Court to make
petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were gravely remiss in their
duties as parents in not diligently supervising the activities
of their son. Both parents were wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of
their son. The petitioners utterly failed to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in preventing their son
from committing the crime by means of the gun which was
freely accessible to Wendell Libi because they have not
regularly checked whether the gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only
after the crime had been committed. The civil liability of
parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article 2180, is primary and not subsidiary.
B. Liability of teachers; heads
8) Palisoc vs Brillantes, GR No. 29025, 4 Oct 1971
School = not a school of arts and trades (even if murag vocational)
but an academic institution of learning
FACTS:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio
Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the Manila
Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966
during recess, an altercation transpired between the
deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident,
Dominador was sixteen years old while Virgilio was already
of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador
looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark
that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result,
Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by
inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s stomach, which
caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint.
The latter died, the cause of death being “shock due to
traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador
filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton,
the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the teacher
in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who
is a member of the board of directors and former sole
proprietor of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the
other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause “so long
as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of
the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and boards
with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the
pupil supersedes those of the parents., and such control
and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the
father and mother to the teachers. This
legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v.
CA, which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno.
The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable in
this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the
defendants-officials at the time of the incident. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Who must be held liable for damages for the death
of Dominador together with the defendant?
HELD:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton
and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and
severally with the Virgilio for damages. No
liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the
MTI board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable
since it had not been properly impleaded as
party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students
remain in their custody” means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long
as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such
liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the
tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in
the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on
which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The
rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for
the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to
a certain extent to their pupils and students and are called
upon to “exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the child.” In this case, The unfortunate death resulting
from the fight between the protagonists-students could have
been avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty
of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students
from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage, they cannot likewise avail of the
exemption to the liability. The judgment of
the appellate court was modified, while claim for
compensatory damages was increased in accordance with
recent jurisprudence and the claim for
exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross
negligence on the part of the said defendants.
9) Amadora vs CA, GR No. 47745, 15 Apr 1988
FACTS: - ibpzn
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was
mortally hit by a gun by PablitoDaffon resulting to the
former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through
reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein
petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal,
dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and
2 other students. Complaints against the students were
dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants
completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the
following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic
institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2.
Those students were not in the custody of the school since
the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event,
defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining
discipline. Petitioners on the other hand claimed their son
was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of
Physics reports).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be
held liable.
RULING:
No. Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should not be held
liable.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that “teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Responsibility shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Even though at the time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in
the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened; it
was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish
his physics requirement. What was important is that he was
there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector,
high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as
defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general
authority over the students and not direct control and
influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of
particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should
probably be held liable considering that he had earlier
confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later
returned to him without taking disciplinary action or
reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was
clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to
necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable
under the provision because only the teacher of the head of
school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed,
none of the respondents were held liable for the injury
inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
2) Facts: - CCD 
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora
was looking forward to the commencement exercises where
he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his
relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it
turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that
awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit
Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. 
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean
of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and
two other students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial,
the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the
plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the
decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved. 
Issue: 
Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo
Amadora. 
Ruling: 
The Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the
canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is
academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student.
This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the
heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly
involved with the students. 
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head
and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the
general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the
masters or heads of the school personally and directly
instructed the apprentices. 
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-
charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he
was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or
that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of
the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact
that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him
because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes
had already ceased.
10) St. Mary’s Acad v Carpitanos, GR#.143363,
2/6/2002
1) To be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to
the accident.
Facts: ---UST Compilations
During an enrollment drive conducted by St. Mary’s
Academy of Dipolog City, the vehicle used by its
student turned turtle and caused the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos. Records showed that the
vehicle used was then driven recklessly by
James Daniel II, a minor. Later, Spouses William and
Lucia Carpitanos, parents of Sherwin Carpitanos,
filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents,
James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
before the RTC of Dipolog City.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Capistrano. St.
Marys Academy was ordered to pay damages and in
case of its insolvency, James Daniel, Sr. and Guada
Daniel, parents of James Daniel II, shall be subsidiary
liable. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision
but reduced the amount of actual damages. Motion
for reconsideration to this decision was likewise
denied. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not St. Mary’s Academy is liable for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
No. For petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident. In this case, the
respondents failed to show that the negligence of
petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of
the victim. Significantly, respondents did not present
any evidence to show that the proximate cause of
the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of
the Family Code that those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
was unfounded.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by
the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily.
The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident.
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver
or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event
over which St. Marys Academy had no control, and
which was the proximate cause of the accident,
petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.
2) FACTS: - ibpzn
Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos
joined the campaign. Along with the other high school
students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School.
Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old
student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the
jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned
turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St.
Marys Academy
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the
damages.
RULING:
No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep
owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which
was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under
Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was
pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive
and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in
the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be
a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however,
it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action
unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that
petitioner school allowed the minor to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence, the registered
owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd
persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the
road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin. Wherefore, the case was remanded to the
trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants
excluding herein petitioner.
3) Facts: - CCD 
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school
year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was
the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees
were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy,
Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. 
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along
with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way
to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City. The jeep was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of
the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a
case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel
Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of
Dipolog City and claimed for damages. 
Issue: 
Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy
is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 
Ruling: 
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for
determination of any liability of the school. The Court held
that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence,
must have causal connection to the accident. There is no
showing of such. 
 Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented
by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
 C. Liability of schools
11) St. Joseph,et al v Miranda, GR No.182353, 6/29/2010
- civil liability of private school, supervising school official, teacher-
in-charge for injuries sustained by students
Facts:
 The class where respondent Jayson Miranda belonged
was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulfur
powder and iron fillings under the supervision of Teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo. (Jayson’s Class adviser is Estafania Abdan).
 Tabugo left her class during the experiment
 In the middle of it, Jayson checked the result of the
experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying
glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group
mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson.
At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted
out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and
the different parts of the bodies of some of his group
mates.
 As a result, thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically
burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication.
 Jason sent a demand letter to petitioners to pay his
medical expenses but the latter refused hence the
complaint for damages.
Issue:
WON the petitioners were liable for the accident.
Ruling:
YES. The immediate cause of Jayson’s injury was the
sudden explosion of the chemicals, independent of any
intervening cause. Knowing that the experiment is dangerous, they should
have taken affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students; they
should have installed safety reminders, distributed safety instruction
manuals, provided protective gears and devices to shield students from
expected risks and anticipated dangers; Petitioner Tabugo should have
been inside the classroom the whole time to supervise. Failure to do
such acts to prevent that foreseeable mishap equates to
petitioners’ negligence & failure to exercise the higher
degree of care, caution and foresight required of the school,
its administrators & teachers (as imposed by Art 218 FC & Art 2180
CC), and ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to
Jayson.
12) PSBA, et al vs CA, GR No. 84698, 4 Feb 1992
Facts:
 Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA
and its officers liable for damages for the death of their
son, Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who
was stabbed while on the premises of PSBA by assailants
from outside the school.
 PRs are suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the
school and its officers’ negligence, recklessness and lack
of safety precautions before, during, and after the attack
on the victim.
 Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit (claiming that the
complaint states no cause of action against them since academic
institutions, e.g. PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in Art 2180 CC-
quasi-delicts) but were denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.
Issue:
WON PSBA may be held liable (under quasi-delicts)
Ruling:
NO. Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation (when an acad insti accepts studs,
there established a contract resulting in bilateral obli w/c both are bound to
comply) between PSBA and Carlitos, the rules on quasi-delict
(Art 2180 CC; extra-contractual obli bet parties not bound by contract) do
not really govern. However, should the act which breaches
a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Art 21
CC, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a
quasi-delict.
In the case at bar, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between PSBA and Bautista had been breached
thru the former’s negligence in providing security measures.
This would be for the trial court to determine. Even if there
be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances in Art 21 CC where quasi-delict
may arise.
SC held that a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of
its students against all risks. To do so would be inequitable, for even if
there are security measures installed, the same may still fail against
indiv/groups determined to carry out a notorious deed inside their
premises. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence (omission of the degree of diligence required)
D. Custody
i. Stranger
13) Medina v Makabali, GR No. L-26953, 28 Mar 1969
Custody of minor given to a non-relative as against the mother.
The basis is Art 363 & 356, CC. The right of custody entails the proper
discharge of parental duties.
FACTS:
 On February 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida Medina gave
birth to Joseph Casero in a clinic owned by respondent
Dra. Venancia Makabali.
 Medina left the child with Dra. Makabali from his birth. The
latter took care of Joseph as her own son; paid his treatment
for poliomyelitis; and sent him to school.
 Medina never visited her child, nor paid for his expenses,
until she filed a writ of habeas corpus for the custody of
Joseph.
 During the trial, the lower court asked Joseph with whom
he wanted to stay, and he pointed to Makabali calling her
“Mammy”
 The trial court denied the writ and held that it was for the
child’s best interest to be left with his foster mother until
reaching the age of 14 where he can then choose of
whom to live with
ISSUE:
WON petitioner is entitled to the custody of the child.
HELD:
NO. Under Art 363 CC, “in all questions on the care,
custody, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated
from her child under 7 years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.” Therefore, the right
of parents to the company and custody of their children is
but ancillary to the proper discharge of parental duties to
provide the children with adequate support, education,
moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Art
356 CC).
In this case, Medina proved remiss in these sacred
duties; she not only failed to provide the child with love and
care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
Hence, petitioner is not entitled to the custody of the child
14) Luna v IAC, GR No. 68374, 18 Jun 1985
When the child is in an age when she can exercise an
intelligent choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce,
and give meaning and substance to that choice and uphold her
right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral,
and intellectual development.
FACTS:
 2 or 4 months after the birth of Shirley Salumbides
(subject of this custody case), her parents, private
respondents Ma Lourdes Santos and Sixto Salumbides,
gave her to petitioners (grandparents), where Horacio Luna is
the illegitimate father of Santos , who thereafter showered
Shirley with love and affection and brought her up as their
very own.
 The Lunas decided to take Shirley to America (Disneyland).
When the petitioners asked for the PRs’ written consent to
the child’s application for a U.S. visa, the PRs refused to
 give it. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without
Shirley whom they left with the PRs upon latter’s request.
 When they returned, they learned that the PRs had
transferred Shirley to another school; also refused to
return Shirley to them; and neither did the PRs allow
Shirley to visit the petitioners.
 Hence, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus
against the PRs for the custody of Shirley.
 The trial court granted the custody to the petitioners.
However, the CA reversed the decision and ordered
petitioner to return Shirley to her biological parents. This
was affirmed by the SC.
 When the judgment became final, execution was issued,
the child manifested that she would kill herself or run
away from home if she should be taken away by the
parents from the grandparents.
 The respondent judge denied the motion to set aside the
writ of execution and the CA likewise dismissed the
petition. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE:
WON procedural rules, more particularly the duty of
lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in
child custody cases, should prevail over and above the
desire and preference of the child.
HELD:
NO. It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of
a higher court is returned to the lower court, the only
function of the latter court is the ministerial one of issuing
the order of execution.
However, the child’s manifestation to the trial court that she
would kill herself or run away from home if she should be forced to live with
PRs is a supervening event that would justify the
cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered
by the CA. Otherwise, that would make the execution of the
judgment inequitable, unfair and unjust, if not illegal.
Art 363 CC (now Art. 213 FC) provides that, in all
questions relating to the child, his welfare is paramount.
This means that the best interest of the minor can override
procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the
custody of their children. Since the very life and existence of
the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she
can exercise an intelligent choice, the courts can do no less
than respect, enforce and give meaning and substance to
that choice and uphold her right to live in an atmosphere
conducive to her physical, moral and intellectual
development.
SUMMARY:
FACTS: This case involved a contest of the custody of a 9-year old child,
Shirley, who was given by her parents, just two or four months after her
birth, to the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Horacio Luna. Horacio was the
illegitimate father of Shirley’s mother. The natural parents were awarded
custody over Shirley. When the judgment became final, execution was
issued, but a new development happened whereby the child manifested
that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be taken
away by the parents from the grandparents.
DOCTRINE: The Best Interests of the Child is always the paramount
consideration in custody cases. Even a final decision subject already to
execution of a court granting custody to one party is subject to change, as
exemplified in Luna v. IAC. Also, the matter of custody is not permanent
and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody suffers a future
character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be
re-examined and adjusted.
ii. Illegitimate mother – Art 176 FC
15) Briones vs Miguel, GR No. 156343, 18 Oct 2004
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the
mother. In the exercise of that authority, she is entitled to keep the child in
her company. The Court will not deprive her of custody, absent any
imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and
care.
Facts:
 Petitioner Joey Briones filed a petition for habeas corpus
to obtain custody of his minor child, Michael Pineda. He
alleged that the latter is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta Miguel, who is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.
 However, respondent prayed that the custody be given to
her by reason of the minor’s illegitimacy.
 CA awarded the custody to respondent (mother), however,
petitioner was granted visitorial rights.
Issue:
WON petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied
the custody and parental care of his own child
Ruling:
YES. Having been born outside a valid marriage, the
minor is deemed an illegitimate child of the parties. Article
176 FC explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code”. This is the rule regardless of whether the
father admits paternity.
In this case, Michael is an illegitimate child having been
born out of wedlock (natural illeg child under the old CC as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal
impediment to marry at the time of his birth) . Pursuant to Article 176
FC, sole parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition
of him. (his recognition is not a ground for custody but may be ordered to
give support; sole PA to mother, only if she defaults can the father assume
custody). The SC likewise affirm the visitorial rights granted to
petitioner.
She cannot be deprived of that right unless the most compelling
reasons shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and custody. Such
grounds include: mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority;
neglect or abandonment; unemployment; immorality; habitual
drunkenness; drug addiction; maltreatment of the child; insanity; and
affliction with a communicable disease.
16) David vs CA, GR 111180, 16 Nov 1995
While it is true that the determination of the right to the custody
of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married
to each other, are for some reason separated from each other, it does not
follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation .
Facts:
 PR Ramon Villar, a married man, had three children with
petitioner Daisie David.
 Such relationship became known to the family of Villar
and later accepted the children.
 During their family vacation, they invited Christopher J.,
then 6 yrs of age, with Daisie’s permission. However, after
such vacation, Villar refused to give back the child. This
prompted Daisie to file a petition for habeas corpus.
 RTC granted the custody to petitioner.
 However, CA reversed the decision and held that the
petition for habeas corpus is not proper and that the
question of custody should be brought in a case singularly
filed for the purpose; and that the child should remain
under PR’s custody. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is proper to
recover the custody of a child.
Ruling:
YES. Rule 102, ROC provides that "the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." While it is true
that the determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are
married to each other, are for some reason separated from
each other, it does not follow, however, that it cannot arise
in any other situation.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child
since at the time of his conception, his father, Ramon R. Villar, was married
to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to
Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the sole
parental authority of his mother, and as a consequence of
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since,
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Rule 102 makes no distinction between the case of a mother
who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody
of her child; and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by
law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her
rightful custody of her child.
2) ISSUE:
WON the mother has the rightful custody of the child.
2) RULING:
Yes. Pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J., illegitimate
child, is under the parental authority of his mother thus entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her
rightful custody of her child by private respondent; she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him
custody of the child. Under Art.213 of the Family Code, “no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being
less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by
the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother’s custody. Even now that the
child is over seven years of age, the mother’s custody over him will have to
be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with
his mother.
iii. Letigimate mother – Art 213 FC
17) Espiritu vs CA, GR No. 115640, 15 Mar 1995
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be
awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests.
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable [and] can
always be re-examined and adjusted.
FACTS:
 While Teresita Masauding was still in a subsisting
marriage, she maintained a common law
relationship with Reynaldo Espiritu which begot
two children and later they got married.
 The marriage went sour and Teresita left their
conjugal home and went to California. Due to his
assignment abroad, Reynaldo has to leave his
children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma
Layug. (still legally married)
 When Teresita returned in the Philippines, she filed a
petition for habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister
to gain custody of the children.
 RTC dismissed the petition thus conferring upon
Reynaldo the sole parental authority over the
children subject to the visitation rights granted to
Teresita.
 CA reversed the RTC decision and gave Teresita
the custody of the children. The CA relied on the
presumption that the custody of a child below
seven years of age will be lodged to the mother.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the custody of the children should be given to
Reynaldo.
RULING:
YES. In cases of care, custody, education and property
of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount
concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be
ordered to be separated from the mother for compelling
reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best
custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but
not conclusive.
In this case, both children are now over 7 yrs of age.
(1) Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay
is clear from the record. Rosalind chose to stay with his
father/aunt. She was found of suffering from emotional
shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. (2) Furthermore,
there was nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is
unfit, well in fact he has been trying his best to give the children the kind
of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend.
Thus, meeting the 2 requirements found in Art 213 (1) of FC (???). On
the other hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of
bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least
with the daughter (a compelling reason & relevant considerations not
to grant the custody to the mother assuming the presumption should have
persuasive value for children, 1 or 2 yrs beyond the age of 7 yrs old)
Hence, custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
Rules:
 If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that
the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but
it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling
reasons".
 If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the
court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court
may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the
other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the
circumstances.
18) Perez vs CA, GR No. 118870, 29 Mar 1996
The laws clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
Facts:
 Pet Nerissa Perez, while working in the US, begot her
only one child (RJ) with PR Ray Perez. They went home
to the Philippines for a vacation but Ray decided to stay
together with RJ to take care of his sick mother but has
promised to follow Nerissa. However, this never
happened.
 Later, they separated in fact. Longing for her only child,
who was being kept away from her by her husband,
Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to
surrender the custody of their son.
 RTC awarded the custody of the 1-yr old child to Nerissa
holding that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother (Art 213 FC)
 However, CA reversed the decision holding that granting
custody to the boy's father would be for the child's best
interest and welfare. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the custody of the child should be given to
Nerissa.
Ruling:
YES. When the parents of the child are separated,
Article 213 FC is the applicable law. (Note: Couples who are
separated in fact are covered within the term separation) . The law clearly
mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 FC and Rule 99,
sec 6, RROC (similar provision) connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother finds its raison d'être in
the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only
the most compelling of reasons (see Full Text - 6 not compelling
reasons) shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such
a child to someone other than his mother, such as her
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. Absent of this,
the custody is awarded to the mother.
19) Pablo-Gualberto v Gualberto, GR No.154994, 6/28/05
There being no sufficient proof of any compelling reason
to separate the minor from his mother, custody should remain with
her.
Facts:
 Respondent Crisanto Gualberto V filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Joycelyn
w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their
almost 4yr-old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/
her from their conjugal home and his school when she left
him.
 RTC granted the custody pendente lite to the father, since
the wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of
the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child
as she very often goes out of the house and even saw her
slapping the child. Another witness testified that after
surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian
relations.
 RTC reversed her previous order, and this time awarded
the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the
reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason
as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.
 However, CA directed that the child be turned over to the
father until the issue (motion to lift the award of custody pendente
lite to the father, as it is yet to be properly considered and ruled upon)
was resolved
Issue:
WON the custody of the minor child should be awarded
to the mother.
Ruling:
YES. Article 213 FC provided that: “No child under
seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This
Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the
foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes
its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which reads:
“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter welfare shall be paramount.
No mother shall be separated from her child under seven
years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for
such measure.”
In this case, the custody was awarded to Joycelyn
because their child was below seven years of age and
being a lesbian was not a compelling reason to separate
her from her child. There was no evidence that the child
was exposed to Joycelyn’s alleged lesbian relationship that
suffer his moral and psychological development.
20) Dacasin vs Dacasin, GR No. 168785, 5 Feb 2010
And as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a
custody agreement can never be regarded as ―permanent and
unbending, the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and
even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement
would no longer be to the latter’s best interest.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Herald Dacasin, an American citizen filed the
case for review, the dismissal of a suit toenforce a post-
foreign divorce child custody agreement for their daughter,
Stephanie, whose solecustody was awarded to the
respondent, a Filipino citizen, filed in Illinois court for lack
of jurisdiction.Petitioner sued respondent in RTC Makati to
enforce the agreement (contract) executed by theparties in
Manila that modified the terms of the post-divorce decree
from sole custody of theirdaughter to joint custody, alleging
the respondent’s retention of sole custody.The respondent
sought for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction
because the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce decree even after the respondent undertook the
relinquishment of the Illinois court’s jurisdiction to the
Philippine courts. Hence, the agreementboth parties
executed is void. The RTC dismissed the caseThe
petitioner sought reconsideration. His contention is that the
divorce decree sought by therespondent in Illinois court is
void. Hence, the post-foreign divorce decree is also void
citing the Nationality Rule  under Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the motion. Hence, this case.
ISSUES:
- WON the RTC has the jurisdiction over the case.
- WON the Agreement (contract) executed in Manila is valid.
RULING:
The RTC has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not
to enforce the Agreement which is Void. However, factual
and equity considerations militate against the dismissal
of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to
settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
The RTC has jurisdiction
Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms
of agreementsubject to the minimum ban on stipulations
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,or
public policy.
The agreement is void.
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on
28 January 2002,two facts are undisputed:(1) Stephanie
was under seven years old (having been born on
21 September 1995). Thisis in contrary to law as stated in
Art. 213 of the Civil Code; and(2) petitioner and respondent
were no longer married under the laws of the United
Statesbecause of the divorce decree.
Based on Art. 15 or the Nationality Rule, petitioner cannot
rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity- not because
the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce
decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse.
Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid accordingto their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from themarriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Call for the Remand of the Case.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the
caseoutside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing itwithin coverage of
the default standard on child custody proceedings – the
best interest of thechild
IX. Support; 194-208; 305, 2164, 2164-66 NCC
21) Dolina vs Vallecera, GR No. 182367, December 15,
2010
SUMMARY: The filiation of the child to the parent must first
be established before support from said parent can be
granted by the court
FACTS: -projectjurisprudence
Antonia Perla filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of
a temporary protection order against the respondent for
alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262 and asked
for financial support.
She alleged that respondent is the father of her child. The
man, however, made a denial of the claim of his being the
father of the child and that the signature appearing in the
child Certificate of Live Birth is not his signature. The RTC
dismissed the petition on the ground that there is no prior
judgment establishing the filiation of the child hence, there
is no basis to order support.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not the RTC made error in judgment in
dismissing the case and in requiring the petitioner to first
prove filiation before support is granted
RULING: 
No, the RTC made no error in so doing.
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of RA 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children
who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance
of a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order
to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively,
she may directly file an action for support, where the issue
of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
What is the proper remedy?
[1] Action for Compulsory Recognition to Establish Filiation.
Afterwards, she can demand support; or
[2] Action for Support, where one of the issues is filiation.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is
Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall
have proved his relation to him. (Art. 195, Family Code).
The child’s remedy is to file through her mother a judicial
action for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation.. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional
rights but their filiation must be duly proved.
2) DOCTRINE: - lawtechworld
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation.
FACTS:
In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order against Glenn
Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse
under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl added a
prayer for support for their supposed child. She based such
prayer on the latter’s certificate of live birth which listed
Vallecera ‘s employer, to withhold from his pay such amount
of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s
petition was essentially one for financial support rather than
for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was
not the child’s father and that the signature in the
birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition
is a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the
child as his and therefore give financial support.
RTC dismissed petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s action
for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child?
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for
her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the
case is the protection and safety of women and children
who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance
of a protection order against the respondent in the case can
include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child,
this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and
to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived
with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper
action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is
not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolina’s demand for
support for her son is based on her claim that he is
Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall
have proved his relation to him. The child’s remedy is
to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera
for compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation. In short, illegitimate
children are entitled to support and successional rights but
their filiation must be duly proved.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order
to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively,
she may directly file an action for support, where the issue
of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved.
22) Valino vs Adriano, GR No. 182894, 22 Apr 2014
FACTS:
1) Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario, they had 6
children.
2) Marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however,
turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino,
one of his clients, until they decided
to live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children.
3) Atty. Adriano died in 1992, during which Rosario was in
the US.
4) None of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral
and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario
learned about the death of her husband,
she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay
the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. Respondents were not able to
attend the interment.
5) Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view
the remains of Atty. Adriano before he
was buried and that his burial at the Manila
Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes,
respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that
they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
6) In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty.
Adriano had been separated for more
than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino
claimed that throughout the time they were
together, he had introduced her to his friends and
associates as his wife.
7) RTC ruled in favor of Valino. CA reversed
ISSUE: Who between a legal spouse and a live-in partner,
who has taken care of and lived with
the deceased at the time of illness and subsequent death,
has better right over the body?
HELD: The legal spouse
Art. 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the
Civil Code provides who has
rights over funeral arrangements. The SC stated that the
law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to
the exclusion of one’s common law
partner.
It it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact
that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died
has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly
or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.
9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and
While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and
Rosario and their
children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes
that human compassion, more often
than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once
a family member joins his Creator.
Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents
wasted no time in making frantic pleas to
Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they
could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased.
FACTS:
1) Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario, they had 6
children.
2) Marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however,
turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino,
one of his clients, until they decided
to live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children.
3) Atty. Adriano died in 1992, during which Rosario was in
the US.
4) None of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral
and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario
learned about the death of her husband,
she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay
the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. Respondents were not able to
attend the interment.
5) Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view
the remains of Atty. Adriano before he
was buried and that his burial at the Manila
Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes,
respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that
they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
6) In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty.
Adriano had been separated for more
than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino
claimed that throughout the time they were
together, he had introduced her to his friends and
associates as his wife.
7) RTC ruled in favor of Valino. CA reversed
ISSUE: Who between a legal spouse and a live-in partner,
who has taken care of and lived with
the deceased at the time of illness and subsequent death,
has better right over the body?
HELD: The legal spouse
Art. 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the
Civil Code provides who has
rights over funeral arrangements. The SC stated that the
law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to
the exclusion of one’s common law
partner.
It it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact
that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died
has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly
or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.
9
Rosario and their
children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes
that human compassion, more often
than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once
a family member joins his Creator.
Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents
wasted no time in making frantic pleas to
Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they
could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased.
FACTS:
1) Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario, they had 6
children.
2) Marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however,
turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino,
one of his clients, until they decided
to live together as husband and wife. Despite such
arrangement, he continued to provide financial
support to Rosario and their children.
3) Atty. Adriano died in 1992, during which Rosario was in
the US.
4) None of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral
and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario
learned about the death of her husband,
she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay
the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. Respondents were not able to
attend the interment.
5) Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view
the remains of Atty. Adriano before he
was buried and that his burial at the Manila
Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes,
respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that
they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed
and transferred to the family plot.
6) In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty.
Adriano had been separated for more
than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino
claimed that throughout the time they were
together, he had introduced her to his friends and
associates as his wife.
7) RTC ruled in favor of Valino. CA reversed
ISSUE: Who between a legal spouse and a live-in partner,
who has taken care of and lived with
the deceased at the time of illness and subsequent death,
has better right over the body?
HELD: The legal spouse
Art. 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the
Civil Code provides who has
rights over funeral arrangements. The SC stated that the
law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to
the exclusion of one’s common law
partner.
It it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario,
she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact
that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died
has no controlling significance. To say
that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly
or impliedly, her right and duty to
make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of
conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end.
9 Who between a legal spouse and a live-in partner, who has
While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and
Rosario and their
children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes
that human compassion, more often
than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once
a family member joins his Creator.
Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents
wasted no time in making frantic pleas to
Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they
could attend the service and view the
remains of the deceased.
SUMMARY:
Atty. Adriano died. His 30 years common-law wife Fe buried
his remains in her family mausoleum without waiting for the
legal family. The legal wife Rosario and their children filed
petition for transfer of the corpse to the family plot. Both
claimed that they are just following the expressed wish of
the deceased. The Supreme Court decided in favor of the
legal wife Rosario. The expressed wish of the deceased
provided in Article 307 (NCC) is not absolute. Article 305
(NCC) provides the limitation.
DOCTRINES:
Article 307 (NCC) provides that the funeral shall be in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased.
Article 305 (NCC) provides that the duty and the right to
make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support under
Article 294 (now 199 of FC).  Article 199 (FC) provides the
following order: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the
nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
and (4) The brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Who between Rosario (the legal wife) and Valino (common-
law wife) is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano. The
legal wife Rosario.
FACTS:
1) Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario, they had 6
children.
2) Marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned
sour and they were eventually separated-in-fact. Years
later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until
they decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite
such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support
to Rosario and their children.
3) Atty. Adriano died in 1992, during which Rosario was in
the US.
4) None of the family members was around, Valino took it
upon herself to shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for
Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that
she delay the interment for a few days but her request was
not heeded. Respondents were not able to attend the
interment.
5) Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view
the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried and that
his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his
wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino
praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the
family plot.
6) In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty.
Adriano had been separated for more than twenty (20)
years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout
the time they were together, he had introduced her to his
friends and associates as his wife.
7) RTC ruled in favor of Valino. CA reversed
ISSUE:
taken care of and lived with the deceased at the time of
illness and subsequent death, has better right over the
body?
HELD:
The legal spouse
Art. 199 of the Family Code in relation to Article 305 of the
Civil Code provides who has rights over funeral
arrangements. The SC stated that the law simply confines
the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law
partner.
It is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving
legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living
separately from her husband and was in the United States
when he died has no controlling significance. To say that
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or
impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and
duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will
not be considered as having been waived or renounced,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.9While
there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario
and their children when he was still alive, the Court also
recognizes that human compassion, more often than not,
opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family
member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact
that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas
to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so
they could attend the service and view the remains of the
deceased.
23) Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, Gr No. 193707, 12/10/
2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage
bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her
son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma,
Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their
son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and
resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the
petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial
court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his
minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
support his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of
Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well
as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not,
however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s
son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands,
he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same. It is
incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents
the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
To give justice is the most important function of law; hence,
a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be
of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A
9262) because the foreigner is living here in the Philippines
and committed the offense here.
X. Summary Proceedings
24) Republic vs Narceda, GR No. 182760, 10 Apr 2013
FACTS:
Robert and Marina Narceda got married on July 22, 1987.
Marina went to Singapore in 1994 and never returned.
Robert tried to look for her but he could not find her. It was
after several years that he was informed by a town mate
who came home from Singapore that his wife was already
living with a Singaporean husband.
In view of his wife’s absence and his desire to remarry,
Robert filed with the RTC a petition for a declaration of
presumptive death and/or absence of Marina. The court
then approved the petition. Petitioner appealed and claimed
that the respondent failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with diligence required by law. The CA
dismissed the appeal on the ground that the judgment of the
court in the summary proceeding is immediately final and
executory. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Petition.
 
HELD:
No. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in
a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and
executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases,
such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with
the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an
appeal.
2) Facts:
Robert P. Narceda and Marina Narceda got married on July
22, 1987. In 1994, Marina went to Singapore and never
returned or communicated with respondent. The last the
respondent has heard about her is that she’s been living
with a Singaporean husband.
For purposes of remarriage, on May 16, 2002 Robert filed a
Petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
and/or absence of Marina. The RTC granted the petition
and declared the Presumptive death of Marina. Petitioner
appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals on the
guround that respondent failed to conduct a diligent search
of his wife and there was no well-founded belief that Marina
was dead. The CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and ruling that the hearing of a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, being such the
judgments herein shall be immediately final and executory.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was also denied hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the
appeal of Robert Narcedo.
Held:
Art. 41(2) states: For the purpose of contracting the
subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The OSG availed the wrong remedy when it filed its
notice of appeal. The wrong filing did not toll the running of
the period for filing the Petition for Certiorari, which has
lapsed. As a result, petitioner's contention that respondent
has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by
this Court.
25) Republic vs Olaybar, GR No. 189538, 10 Feb 2014
In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
Facts: - UST Compilations
When Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR), she discovered that
she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a
Korean National, in 2002. She then filed a petition for
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract especially
the entries in the wife portion thereof. She impleaded the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged
husband, as parties to the case. She denied having
contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know
the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. The RTC granted her
petition. Petitioner then contends that there was no clerical
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Also, it was asserted that the
grant of the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion
of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of "all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract" is in effect
declaring the marriage void ab initio.

Ruling:
No. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence
was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
Olaybar showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware
of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only “evidence” of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
While the Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed
of to determine the validity of marriage, the Court cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the
allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed,
and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Olaybar indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof,
the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.

26) Fujiki vs Marinay, supra