Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,
respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON.
RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and
ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee,
respondent.
 
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D.
Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon.
Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.
Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo,
Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
— for disciplinary action — for their acts and
omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained
in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the
1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho
— who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35%
and 67.55%, respectively — invited the
attention of the Court to "The starling fact that
the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at
least one bar candidate was raised for one
reason or another, before the bar results were
released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol.
I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him,
by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon
C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that
there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations — to raise
the grades — prior to the release of the results.
Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners
concerned reconsidered their grades without
formal motion, there is no reason why they may
not do so now when proper request answer
motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to
due process postulates. Might not one say that
some candidates got unfair and unjust
treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the
discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient
reason for the Court en banc to go into these
matters by its conceded power to ultimately
decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p.
2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the
Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five
subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law
and Remedial Law — of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent
some changes which, however, were duly
initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the
records revealed that the bar candidate with
office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a
perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the
1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%,
respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the
passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar
Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn
statements on the matter, with which request
they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972,
said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the
five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang,
alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking,
stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual
sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the notebook involved
pertaining to his subject upon the representation
to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the
authority to do the same and that the examinee
concerned failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the
respondents warranting a formal investigation,
the Court required, in a resolution dated March
5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice
why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and
therefore he did not obtain a passing average in
the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise
resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice
why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99,
rec.). The five examiners concerned were also
required by the Court "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why no disciplinary action
should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March
12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).
while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo,
Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35,
40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed
another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplication of, his answer filed on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer
on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to
verify the same and complaince came on May
18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,)
rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found
that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who
re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination
booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law
and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in
the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for
submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of
this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo
Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also
discovered that another paper in Political Law
and Public International Law also underwent re-
evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook
with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be
owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation
resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in
the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned
by another successful candidate by the name of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify
in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation upon request of the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that
one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E.
Galang, a student in the School of Law of
Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on
September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of
slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of
Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera,
another student of the same university.
Confronted with this information at the hearing
of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not
remember having been charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI,
pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take
the bar examinations, did not make mention of
this fact which he is required under the rules to
do.
The joint investigation of all the cases
commenced on July 17, 1973 and was
terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter,
parties-respondents were required to submit
their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang
and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar
Landicho took up permanent residence in
Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully
employed. Hence, he was not summoned to
testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents,
except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as
their direct evidence only his oral testimony,
submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits
and answers earlier submitted by them to the
Court. The same became the basis for their
cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer,
which they offered as their direct testimony in
the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the
circumstances under which they re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in
question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent
Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime
in December last year, while I
was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant, explained to me that
it is the practice and the policy
in bar examinations that he
(Atty. Lanuevo) make a review
of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that
candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one
subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the
latter to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation and
change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter
part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law
for re-evaluation, because
according to him the owner of
the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his
grade to 75% the candidate
concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it
and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of
the Supreme Court to do so in
the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in
Civil Law was brought back to
me for such re-evaluation and
upon verifying my files I found
that the notebook is numbered
'95;
6. That the original grade was
64% and my re-evaluation of
the answers were based on the
same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all
others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with
original grades of 7% each was
reconsidered to 10%; No. 5
with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3%
to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to
10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially followed him
reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 and considered
affidavit with following additional statements: his instructions
as reflecting the
xxx xxx xxx rules and policy
of the
3. ... However the grades in Honorable
Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not Supreme Court
reconsidered as it is no longer with respect to
to make the reconsideration of the same; that I
these answers because of the have no
same evaluation and standard; alternative but
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 to take his
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 words;
and 9 at 10%;
b) That
4. That at the time I made the considering this
reconsideration of examination relationship and
booklet No. 951 I did not know considering his
the identity of its owner until I misrepresentati
received this resolution of the on to me as
Honorable Supreme Court nor reflecting the
the identities of the examiners real and policy
in other subjects; of the
Honorable
Supreme Court,
5. That the above re-evaluation
I did not bother
was made in good faith and
any more to get
under the belief that I am
the consent and
authorized to do so in view of
permission of
the misrepresentation of said
the Chairman of
Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
the Bar
following circumstances:
Committee.
Besides, at that
a) Since I time, I was
started isolating myself
correcting the from all
papers on or members of the
about October Supreme Court
16, 1971, and specially
relationship the chairman of
between Atty. the Bar
Lanuevo and Committee for
myself had fear that I
developed to might be
the point that identified as a
with respect to bar examiner;
the correction
of the
xxx xxx xxx
examination
booklets of bar
candidates I e) That no consideration
have always whatsoever has been received
by me in return for such
 recorrection, and as proof of it,
I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because
I was not the one who made
the original correction of the
same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge,
Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his
affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar
Confidant went to my residence
to obtain from me the last bag
of two hundred notebooks
(bearing examiner's code
numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on
February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30
p.m. riding in a Vokswagen
panel of the Supreme Court,
with at least two companions.
The bar confidant had with him
an examinee's notebook bearing
code number 661, and, after
the usual amenties, he
requested me if it was possible
for me to review and re-
examine the said notebook
because it appears that the
examinee obtained a grade of
57, whereas, according to the
Bar Confidant, the said
examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I
recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I
was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me
that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still
within my control and authority
as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code
number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed.
The Bar Confidant told me that
the name of the examinee in
the case present bearing code
number 661 had not been
identified or revealed; and that
it might have been possible that
I had given a particularly low
grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the
truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it
was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading
of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully
read the answer, and graded it
in accordance with the same
standards I had used
throughout the grading of the
entire notebooks, with the
result that the examinee
deserved an increased grade of
66. After again clearing with the
Bar Confidant my authority to
correct the grades, and as he
had assured me that the code
number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded
and his name known, ... I
therefore corrected the total
grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto,
and properly initia(l)ed the
same. I also corrected the
itemized grades (from item No.
1 to item No. 10) on the two
sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the
Bar Confidant brought with him
the other copy thereof, and the
Bar Confidant brought with him
the other copy the grading
sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he
denominated as "Explanation", respondent
Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein
by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn
statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the
examinee's notebook in political
and international law, code
numbered 661, I did know the
name of the examinee. In fact, I
came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of
March 5, 1973; now knowing his
name, I wish to state that I do
not know him personally, and
that I have never met him even
up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under
the impression that I was
authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant
whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so
assured of my authority as the
name of the examinee had not
yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be
in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and
guidelines given to me as an
examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless
called, I refrained as much as
possible from frequent personal
contact with the Chairman lest I
be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant
came to see me at about 7:30
o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate
to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to
me that his representations
were unauthorized or
suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme
Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two
companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular
visit to me of the Bar Confidant,
as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code
numbered 661 was still in the
same condition as when I
submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661,
my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the
correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because
I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,
1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the
Bar Confidant knew the grades
of the examinee in the position
to know and that there was
nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international
law, the original grade obtained
by the examinee with notebook
code numbered 661 was 57%.
After review, it was increased by
9 points, resulting in a final
grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore
stated, my aim was not to make
the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the
representation that he had
passed the other subjects. ...
 9. I quite recall that during the
first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the
examiner in said subject would
review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At
the time of the Committee's first
meeting, we still did not know
the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of
deception, not a party to it. It
had absolutely no knowledge of
the motives of the Bar Confidant
or his malfeasance in office, and
did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of
contract with him before or
rather the review and even up
to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal
Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12,
1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar
Confidant would deliver and
collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I
had already completed
correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in
the correction of some of the
papers in another subject, the
Bar Confidant brought back to
me one (1) paper in Criminal
Law saying that that particular
examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction
of a percent and that if his
paper in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75% then
he would make the general
passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I
raised the grade to 75%, that
is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised
mark and revised also the mark
and revised also the mark in the
general list.
5. That I do not recall the
number of the book of the
examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent
Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of
the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the
examinee in question who up to now remains a
total stranger and without expectation of nor did
I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law,
stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part
of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my
house at No. 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal. He
produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law
which I had previously graded
and submitted to him. He
informed me that he and others
(he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained
that the examine concerned
had done well in other subjects,
 but that because of the 5. In agreeing to re-evaluate
comparatively low grade that I the notebook, with resulted in
had given him in Remedial Law increasing the total grade of the
his general average was short examinee-concerned in
of passing. Mr. Lanuevo Remedial Law from 63.75% to
remarked that he thought that if 74.5%, herein respondent acted
the paper were reviewed I in good faith. It may well be
might find the examinee that he could be faulted for not
deserving of being admitted to having verified from the
the Bar. As far as I can recall, Chairman of the Committee of
Mr. Lanuevo particularly called Bar Examiners the legitimacy of
my attention to the fact in his the request made by Mr.
answers the examinee Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
expressed himself clearly and in however, pleads in attenuation
good enough English. Mr. of such omission, that —
Lanuevo however informed me
that whether I would reconsider a) Having been
the grades I had previously appointed an
given and submitted was Examiner for
entirely within my discretion. the first time,
he was not
3. Believing fully that it was aware, not
within Mr. Lanuevo's authority having been
as Bar Confidant to address apprised
such a request to me and that otherwise, that
the said request was in order, I, it was not
in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, within the
proceeded tore-read and re- authority of the
evaluate each and every item of Bar Confidant of
the paper in question . I recall the Supreme
that in my re-evaluation of the Court to
answers, I increased the grades request or
in some items, made deductions suggest that
in other items, and maintained the grade of a
the same grades in other items. particular
However, I recall that after Mr. examination
Lanuevo and I had totalled the notebook be
new grades that I had given revised or
after re-evaluation, the total reconsidered.
grade increased by a few points, He had every
but still short of the passing right to
mark of 75% in my subject. presume, owing
to the highly
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. fiduciary nature
1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis of the position
supplied). of the Bar
Confidant, that
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, the request was
respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his legitimate.
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising herein
the grade of the respondent
particular downgraded a
examinee previous rating
concerned, of an answer
herein written by the
respondent examinee, from
carefully 9.25% to 9%
evaluated each (Adm. Case No.
and every 1164, pp. 36-
answer written 39, rec.;
in the emphasis
notebook. supplied).
Testing the
answers by the Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile
criteria laid Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,
down by the 1972:
Court, and
giving the said xxx xxx xxx
examinee the
benefit of doubt
That during one of the
in view of Mr.
deliberations of the Bar
Lanuevo's
Examiners' Committee after the
representation
Bar Examinations were held, I
that it was only
was informed that one Bar
in that
examinee passed all other
particular
subjects except Mercantile Law;
subject that the
said examine
failed, herein That I informed the Bar
respondent Examiners' Committee that I
became would be willing to re-evaluate
convinced that the paper of this particular Bar
the said candidate;.
examinee
deserved a That the next day, the Bar
higher grade Confidant handed to me a Bar
than that candidate's notebook (No.
previously given 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
to him, but that
he did not That I reviewed the whole
deserve, in paper and after re-evaluating
herein the answers of this particular
respondent's Bar candidate I decided to
honest increase his final grade to 71%;
appraisal, to be
given the That consequently, I amended
passing grade my report and duly initialed the
of 75%. It changes in the grade sheet
should also be (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72,
mentioned that, rec.; emphasis supplied).
in reappraising
the answers,
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the
foregoing sworn statement, I
hereby state that I re-evaluated
the examination notebook of
Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law in absolute good
faith and in direct compliance
with the agreement made
during one of the deliberations
of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a
candidate fails in only one
subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I
did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I
did not know at the time I made
the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No.
1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, and that I have
never met up to this time this
particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar
Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries
in the grading sheets and the
posting on the record of ratings,
I was impressed of the writing
and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to
scrutinize all the set of
notebooks. Believing that those
five merited re-evalation on the
basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners
shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the
correction of
the papers,
substantial
weight should
then be given
to clarify of
language and
soundness of
reasoning' (par.
4),
I took it upon myself to bring
them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar
Division that immediately after
the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually
swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown
their notebooks. Many of them
would copy their answers and
have them checked by their
professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or
requests for re-correction
and/or re-evaluation. Right now,
we have some 19 of such
motions or requests which we
are reading for submission to
the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of
them are meritorious, but just
the same they have to be
denied because the result of the
examinations when released is
final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the
occurrence of such instances
that motivated me to bring
those notebooks back to the
respective examiners for re-
evaluation" (Adm. Case No.
 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the
notebooks in question to the
examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so
doing, it was not his intention to
forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as bar confidant
but on the contrary to do justice
to the examinee concerned;
that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because
the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was inorder was left
alone to the examiners'
decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not
remember having made the
alleged misrepresentation but
that he remembers having
brought to the attention of the
Committee during the meeting a
matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a
passing general average but
with a grade below 50% in
Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove
the disqualification by way of
raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the
notebook in question to the
Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to
pass. If he remembers right, the
examinee concerned is one
surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de
la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never
entertained a notion that his act
would stir such serious charges
as would tend to undermine his
integrity because he did it in all
good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny
having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that
the examinee involved failed
only in their respective subjects,
the fact of the matter being that
the notebooks in question were
submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation
believing in all good faith that
they so merited on the basis of
the Confidential Memorandum
(identified and marked as Exh.
1-Lanuevo, particularly that
portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated
to all the examiners earlier,
leaving to them entirely the
matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following
coincidence prompted me to pry
into the notebooks in question:
Sometime
during the latter
part of January
and the early
part of
February, 1972,
on my way back
to the office
(Bar Division)
after lunch, I
though of
buying a
sweepstake
ticket. I have
always made it
a point that the
moment I think With this
of so buying, I number (954)
pick a number in mind, I
from any object proceeded to
and the first Plaza Sta. Cruz
number that to look for a
comes into my ticket that
sight becomes would contain
the basis of the such number.
ticket that I Eventually, I
buy. At that found a ticket,
moment, the which I then
first number bought, whose
that I saw was last three digits
"954" boldly corresponded to
printed on an "954". This
electrical number became
contribance doubly
(evidently impressive to
belonging to me because the
the MERALCO) sum of all the
attached to a six digits of the
post standing ticket number
along the right was "27", a
sidewalk of P. number that is
Faura street so significant to
towards the me that
Supreme Court everything I do
building from I try somewhat
San Marcelino instinctively to
street and link or connect
almost adjacent it with said
to the south- number
eastern corner whenever
of the fence of possible. Thus
the Araullo High even in
School(photogr assigning code
aph of the numbers on the
number '954', Master List of
the contrivance examinees from
on which it is 1968 when I
printed and a first took
portion of the charge of the
post to which it examinations as
is attached is Bar Confidant
identified and up to 1971, I
marked as either started
Exhibit 4- with the
Lanuevo and number "27" (or
the number "227") or end
"954" as Exh. 4- with said
a-Lanuevo). number. (1968
Master List is
identified and Provincial
marked as Exh. Hospital as a
5-Lanuevo and result. As will
the figure "27" be recalled, the
at the last Pacific War
beginning of broke out on
the list, as Exh. December 8,
5-a Lanuevo; 1941. While I
1969 Master was still
List as Exh. 6- confined at the
Lanuevo and hospital, our
the figure "227" camp was
at the bombed and
beginning of strafed by
the list, as Exh. Japanese
6-a-Lanuevo; planes on
1970 Master December 13,
List as Exh. 7- 1941 resulting
Lanuevo and in many
the figure "227" casualties. From
at the then on, I
beginning of regarded
the list as Exh. November 27,
7-a-Lanuevo; 1941 as the
and the 1971 beginning of a
Master List as new life for me
Exh. 8-Lanuevo having been
and the figure saved from the
"227" at the possibility of
end of the list being among
as Exh. 8-a- the casualties;
Lanuevo). (b) On February
27, 1946, I was
The significance able to get out
to me of this of the army
number (27) byway of
was born out of honorable
these incidents discharge; and
in my life, to (c) on February
wit: (a) On 27, 1947, I got
November 27, married and
1941 while with since then we
the Philippine begot children
Army stationed the youngest of
at Camp whom was born
Manacnac, on February 27,
Cabanatuan, 1957.
Nueva Ecija, I
was stricken Returning to
with pneumonia the office that
and was same afternoon
hospitalized at after buying the
the Nueva Ecija ticket, I
resumed my matter to their
work which at discretion and
the time was on judgment.
the checking of
the notebooks. 3. That the alleged
While thus misrepresentation or deception
checking, I could have reference to either
came upon the of the two cases which I
notebooks brought to the attention of the
bearing the committee during the meeting
office code and which the Committee
number "954". agreed to refer back to the
As the number respective examines, namely:
was still fresh in
my mind, it (a) That of an
aroused my examinee who
curiosity obtained a
prompting me passing general
to pry into the average but
contents of the with a grade
notebooks. below 50%
Impressed by (47%) in
the clarity of Mercantile
the writing and Law(the
language and notebooks of
the apparent this examinee
soundness of bear the Office
the answers Code No. 110,
and, thereby, identified and
believing in all marked as Exh.
good faith on 9-Lanuevo and
the basis of the the notebook in
aforementioned Mercantile Law
Confidential bearing the
Memorandum Examiner's
(Exh. 1- Code No. 951
Lanuevo and with the original
Exh. 1-a- grade of 4%
Lanuevo) that increased to
they merited re- 50% after re-
evaluation, I set evaluation as
them aside and Exh. 9-a-
later on took Lanuevo); and
them back to
the respective
(b) That of an
examiners for
examinee who
possible review
obtained a
recalling to
borderline
them the said
general average
Confidential
of 73.15% with
Memorandum
a grade below
but leaving
60% (57%) in
absolutely the
one subject
 which, at the paragraph, only one (1) subject
time, I could or notebook was reviewed or re-
not pinpoint evaluated, that is, only
having Mercantile Law in the former;
inadvertently and only Political and
left in the office International Law in the latter,
the data under the facts and
thereon. It circumstances I made known to
turned out that the Committee and pursuant to
the subject was which the Committee authorized
Political and the referral of the notebooks
International involved to the examiners
Law under Asst. concerned;
Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo 5. That at that juncture, the
(The notebooks examiner in Taxation even
of this volunteered to review or re-
examinee bear check some 19, or so,
the Office Code notebooks in his subject but
No. 1622 that I told the Committee that
identified and there was very little time left
marked as Exh. and that the increase in grade
10-Lanuevo and after re-evaluation, unless very
the notebook in highly substantial, may not alter
Political and the outcome since the subject
International carries the weight of only 10%
Law bearing the (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-
Examiner's 47, rec.).
Code No. 661
with the original The foregoing last-minute embellishment only
grade of 57% serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's
increased to story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement
66% after re- of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all
evaluation, as the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
Exh. 10-a- because he "was impressed of the writing and
Lanuevo). This the answers on the first notebook "as he "was
notebook in going over those notebooks, checking the
Political and entries in the grading sheets and the posting on
International the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August
Law is precisely 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a
the same Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the
notebook contents of the notebooks" of respondent
mentioned in Galang "bearing office code number '954."
the sworn
statement of
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Asst. Solicitor
Galang, asserted, among others;
General
Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. 1. That herein respondent is not
------- Pardo). acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo
and never met him before
4. That in each of the two cases
except once when, as required
mentioned in the next preceding
by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers
necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the
consistent policy of the Supreme
Court not to reconsider "failure"
cases; after the official release
thereof; why should it now
reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where
the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each
other and, indeed, met only
once in the ordinary course of
official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to
conclude that the entire
situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before
reading a copy of this Honorable
Court's resolution dated March
5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew
this man intimately nor, had the
herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said
actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of
herein respondent, these
questions arise: First, was the
re-evaluation of Respondent's
examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done
only or especially for him and
not done generally as regards
the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation
of Respondent's grades was
done among those of others,
then it must have been done as
a matter of policy of the
Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that
year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that
only respondent's papers were
re-evaluated upon the influence
of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would
be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact
that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein
Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's
having caused actuations of Bar
confidant Lanuevo to be done in
former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect
because that would be
presuming all the members of
the Bar Examination Committee
as devoid of integrity, unfit for
the bar themselves and the
result of their work that year, as
also unworthy of anything. All of
these inferences are deductible
from the narration of facts in
the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of
facts an unworthy of credence,
or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's
Resolution of March 5, 1973
would make this Respondent
Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners
implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and
the Respondent. The evident
imputation is denied and it is
contended that the Bar
 Examiners were in the
performance of their duties and
that they should be regarded as
such in the consideration of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I Pamatian did not know the identity of the
The evidence thus disclosed clearly
demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and
prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation
and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make
the desired revision without prior authority from
the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court
through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is
simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of
the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around
the middle part of December, 1971 , just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached
Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter
was in the process of correcting examination
booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes
a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of
the examinees and if he finds that a candidate
obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one
subject and a rather low one on another, he will
bring back to the examiner concerned the
notebook for re-evaluation and change of
grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972 ,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
representing that the examinee who owned the
particular notebook is on the borderline of
passing and if his grade in said subject could be
reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get
a passing average. Respondent-examiner
Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and
under the belief that was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court and in his further
belief that he was just manifesting cooperation
in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said
subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office
Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-
56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision,
Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects
including Civil Law. After such revision,
examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and
could not obtain the passing average of 75% for
admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January,
1972 or early part of February, 1972 ,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and
graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook
and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has
reviewed the said notebook and that the
examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively
low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of
said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook
were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet
find the examinee deserving of being admitted
to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly
called the attention of respondent Manalo to the
fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good English.
Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the
attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4
of the Confidential Memorandum that read as
follows:
 4. Examination questions should
be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to
analyze and solve legal
problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of
papers, substantial weight
should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by
respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his
(Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo,
believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar
Confidant, had the authority to make such
request and further believing that such request
was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo,
resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade
in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo
authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading
sheet. The said notebook examiner's code
number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged
to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty.
Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the
passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on
one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the
latter's house a new batch of examination
papers in Political Law and Public International
Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing
Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing
respondent Pablo that particular examinee who
owns the said notebook seems to have passed
in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said
notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark
be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will
pass the bar examinations. After satisfying
himself from respondent that this is possible —
the respondent Bar Confidant informing him
that this is the practice of the Court to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject —
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the
said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-
evaluated the answers, this time with leniency.
After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%.
Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly
initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol.
V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr.,
examinee Galang's general average was still
below the passing grade, because of his failing
marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of
examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the
former informing the latter, who was then
helping in the correction of papers in Political
Law and Public International Law, as he had
already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal
Law — that the examinee who owns that
particular notebook had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if
his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75%, then the examinee would make
the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification
and because he did not want to be the one
causing the failure of the examinee, respondent
Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75%
and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and
also revised the mark in the general list and
likewise initialed the same. The examinee's
Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office
Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and
71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having
been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo
when the latter approached him for this
particular re-evaluation; but he remembers
Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average
but had failed in one subject, as a matter of
policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was
provided a copy of the Confidential
Memorandum but this was long before the re-
evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as
the same was received by him before the
examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could
not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more
subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the
revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set
the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme —
by securing authorization from the Bar
Examination Committee for the examiner in
Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and
the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A
& B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed
by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed
all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within
hearing of the order members, who were all
closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo
made known his willingness tore-evaluate the
particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar
candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and
after re-evaluating the answers, decided to
increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was
not however thereafter officially brought to the
Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-
41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without
being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed
all the others, he would not have consented to
make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V,
p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise
added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the
grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with
Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office
Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last
bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
returned to the residence of respondent Pardo
riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines with two companions.
According to respondent Lanuevo, this was
around the second week of February, 1972,
after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him
on that occasion an examinee's notebook
bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent
Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according
to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in
Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades,
respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of
the examine concerned, resulting in an increase
of grade from 57% of 66% . Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1
& 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol.
V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D.
Lanuevo, respondent.
A of the examination papers and never as a basis
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE
ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,
alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5)
MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
requested on his own initiative the five
examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase
of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing
grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8)
weighted points, more or less, that enabled
Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via
a resolution of the Court making 74% the
passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in
any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's
oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had
no authority from the Court or the Committee to
initiate such steps towards the said re-
evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the
examiners concerned that respondent Galang
failed only in their respective subjects and/or
was on the borderline of passing, Respondent
Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the
authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51,
Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.)
distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he
acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that
the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing
so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray
the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on
the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was
left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of
the investigation, the said confidential
memorandum was intended solely for the
examiners to guide them in the initial correction
for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous
but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo,
Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian —
whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed
by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent
as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the
declarations of the respondents-examiners
(Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive
cross-examination conducted during the
investigation and hearing of the cases show how
respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the
passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations.
It is patent likewise from the records that
respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the
Court and the Examiners implicit in his position
as BarConfidant as well as the trust and
confidence that prevailed in and characterized
his relationship with the five members of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were
thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the
answers of only respondent Galang in five
subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be
admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception
that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-
studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of
the five examiners concerned to the effect that
the examinee failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-
evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five
(5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
while his general average was only 66.25% —
which under no circumstances or standard could
it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed
only in one, or he was on the borderline of
passing. In fact, before the first notebook of
Galang was referred back to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only
one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with
grade of 81%. The averages and individual
grades of Galang before and after the
unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% =
10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1
points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% =
10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11
pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64)
75.5% (75%)
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages
66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the
re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the
five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of
66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase
of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and
prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the
other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated
for each of the latter who — Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and
Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be
stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark
before or after their notebooks are submitted to
it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the
individual grades of every examinee in all
subjects taken and thereafter compute the
general average. That done, he will then
prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of
which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar
Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume
the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know
better than the examiner. Any request for re-
evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the same should be addressed to the Court,
= which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes
himself to suspicion and thereby compromises
his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely
doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly
invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible
fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-
evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than
ninety (90) examinees with far better averages
ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was
fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which
could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in
referring back the papers of Galang to the
Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as
against the original weighted average of 66.25%
of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that
the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90)
examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo,
grave injustice was inflicted on the other
examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates.
And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee
or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-
evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation
and increase of grades, precludes, as the same
is inconsistent with, any pretension of good
faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the
notebook in Political Law and International Law
of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in
Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give
his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance
of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety
examinees who were far better situated than
Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one
notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the
agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the
examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter
shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954,
the office code number given to Galang's
notebook, unveiled for the first time by
respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn
statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried
into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for
support. Furthermore, it was revealed by
respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on
August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five
95) months after he filed his answer on March
19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162,
pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an
after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA
CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK
IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO
PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN
THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT
SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
admitted having referred back the aforesaid
notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law
respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto
Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz
and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo
claimed that these two cases were officially
brought to the Bar Examination Committee
during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.)
and the latter decided to refer them back to the
Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with
respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove
the disqualification in the case of Ty dela
Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the
date of these two cases were contained in a
sheet of paper which was presented at the said
first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-
43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates
of every meeting of the Committee was made
by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented
by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he
left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after
the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28,
41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the
inventory conducted by officials of the Court in
the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo
did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X,
Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp.
11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile
Law, maintained that there was only one
notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially
brought to him and this is substantiated by his
personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35,
rec.). According to him, this notebook's
examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35,
rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty
dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in
the cover of the notebook of said examinee and
the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when
respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code
number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No.
1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced
by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner
Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol.
VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not
interpose any objection to their admission in
evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo
testified that he remembers a case of an
examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in
one and the Committee agreed to refer back to
the Examiner concerned the notebook in the
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp.
15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but
he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is
not aware of any case of an examinee who was
on the borderline of passing but who got a
grade below 50% in one subject that was taken
up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the
notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613
(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return
it to the Examiner concerned. The day following
the meeting in which the case of an examinee
with Code Number 1613 was taken up,
respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook
and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number
954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an
examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law
that was taken up by the Committee. He is not
certain of any other case brought to the
Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo
declared that there was no case of an examinee
that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the
answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law
upon the representation made by respondent
Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at
the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the
members of the Committee that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed
all the others, the Examiner in whose subject
the examinee failed should re-evaluate or
recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh.
2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in
Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred
back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had
other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as
follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law
68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before
and after the re-evaluation of his grade in
Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law
57% 66% = 9
pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws
73% 73% = No
 reevaluation i
Civil Law 75% o
75% = " n
Taxation 69%
69% = " 7
Mercantile Law 2
68% 68% = " %
Criminal Law
78% 78% = " His grades and averages before and after the
Remedial Law disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics
BA
83% 83% = "
———————
——————— Political Law
—— 70% 70% = No
reevaluation
Labor Laws
Average
75% 75% = "
(weighted)
Civil Law 89%
73.15% 74.5%
89% = "
Taxation 72%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, 72% = "
Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.) Mercantile Law
47% 50% = 3
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in pts. or 9
Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner weighted points
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade Criminal Law
of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing 78% 78% = no
grades. These are: reevaluation
Remedial Law
P 88% 88% = "
o Legal Ethics
l 79% 79% = "
i ———————
t ———————
i ———
c
a Weighted
l Averages
L 74.95% 75.4%
a
w (Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

7 The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in

0 Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
% Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971,
T which violation was due to the
a misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
x
a
It must be stated that the referral of the
t
notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the
time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of
four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades
in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated
grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered
75% under the Confidential Memorandum and
was so entered in the record. His grade in
Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by
Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of
serious misconduct — of having betrayed the
trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the
Bar examinations and undermining public faith
in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed
that they should be required to show cause and
the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation
of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil
Law, Political and International Law, Criminal
Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in
admitting candidates to the legal profession,
which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion, requires: (1) previous established
rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition
for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-
545). The determination of whether a bar
candidate has obtained the required passing
grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts
through a Bar Examination Committee,
composed of a member of the Court who acts as
Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who
act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects
with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a
sort of liaison officer between the Court and the
Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual
members of the Committee, on the other, is the
Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance
with the established rules of the Court and must
always be subject to the final approval of the
Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose
position is primarily confidential as the
designation indicates, his functions in connection
with the conduct of the Bar examinations are
defined and circumscribed by the Court and
must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned
of the examination answers of respondent
Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent
Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a
serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled
respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He
is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct.
And whether or not the examinee benefited was
in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial.
What is decisive is whether the proceedings or
incidents that led to the candidate's admission
to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964, in connection, among others,
with the character requirement of candidates for
admission to the Bar, provides that "every
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar
must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against
him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines."
Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a
bar applicant was required to produce before
the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of
good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under
both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay
before the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated,
to enable the Court to fully ascertain or
determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to
determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before
or informing the Court of one's personal record
— whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still
pending — becomes more compelling. The
forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure
not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant
but also of all other criminal cases of which he
has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962
did not expressly require the disclosure of the
applicant's criminal records, if any. But as
already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral
character is his obligation to reveal to the Court
all his involvement in any criminal case so that
the Court can consider them in the
ascertainment and determination of his moral
character. And undeniably, with the applicant's
criminal records before it, the Court will be in a
better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case,
whether pending or terminated by its dismissal
or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a
bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second
and third time, respectively, the application form
provided by the Court for use of applicants
already required the applicant to declare under
oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted
for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any
offense involving moral turpitude; and that there
is no pending case of that nature against him."
By 1966, when Galang took the Bar
examinations for the fourth time, the application
form prepared by the Court for use of applicants
required the applicant to reveal all his criminal
cases whether involving moral turpitude or not.
In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is
required under oath to declare that "he has not
been charged with any offense before a Fiscal,
Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal
of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is
there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case
No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal
from the Court his criminal case of slight
physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and
thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention
of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in
1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971;
and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath
that he had no pending criminal case in court.
By falsely representing to the Court that he had
no criminal case pending in court, respondent
Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the
Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972
was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted
for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation
of his license to practice law is well — settled
(see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to
reach the conclusion that the
respondent, in withholding from
 the board of law examiners and
from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so
serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was
guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had
the board of law examiners, or
the judge to whom he applied
for admission, been apprised of
the true situation, neither the
certificate of the board nor of
the judge would have been
forthcoming (State ex rel. Board
of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207
N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and
annulled, and he was required to surrender to
the clerk of court the license issued to him, and
his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys
(p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the
bar on motion is conferred in
the discretion of the Appellate
Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the
character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the
state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against
him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should
have been submitted to the
court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence
respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS,
102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p.
105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of
his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of
some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that
case(he finally admitted it when he was
confronted by the victim himself, who was called
to testify thereon), and his continued failure for
about thirteen years to clear his name in that
criminal case up to the present time, indicate his
lack of the requisite attributes of honesty,
probity and good demeanor. He is therefore
unworthy of becoming a member of the noble
profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not
part of the formal resolution of the Court
requiring him to explain why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys,
respondent Galang was, as early as August,
1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the
Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not
offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
highly irregular manner in which he passed the
Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order
the surrender of his attorney's certificate and
the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del
Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an
absolute right to be granted
every one who demands it, but
is a privilege to be extended or
withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards
of the legal profession are not
satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape
the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to
the Judiciary to receive one
whose integrity is questionable
as an officer of the court, to
clothe him with all the prestige
of its confidence, and then to
permit him to hold himself as a
duly authorized member of the
 bar (citing American cases) [52
Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present
case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the
past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the
grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses
relative to, the requirement on applicant's
educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico,
resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the
name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of
Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of
good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil.
313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis
Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil.
42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and
Castro, the Court found that the grades of
Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they
were convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI
Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, now
deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted
having made the re-evaluation and/or re-
correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant
Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith;
and that they re-evaluated or increased the
grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said
notebooks; and that they did the same without
any consideration or expectation of any. These
the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of
the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation
or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest
involved in the matter of admission of members
to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners,
under the circumstances, should have exercised
greater care and caution and should have been
more inquisitive before acceding to the request
of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They
could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have
referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At
least the respondents-examiners should have
required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the
average of the examinee represented by
respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstances. This they could have
easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian,
and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really
deserved or merited the increased grades; and
so with respondent Pardo in connection with the
re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in
Political Law. With respect to respondents
Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they
increased the grades of Galang in their
respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo.
Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz:
"You brought to me one paper and you said that
this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact
average and if he would get a few points higher,
he would get a passing average. I agreed to do
that because I did not wish to be the one
causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.;
see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis
ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me
that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject
and that if I can re-evaluate this examination
notebook and increase the mark to at least 75,
this particular examinee will pass the bar submitted my
examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this report at that
being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the time" (Vol. V, p.
practice used to be done before to help out 33, rec.; see
examinees who are failing in just one subject' so also allegations
I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just in paragraphs
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and 2, 3, 4 & 5,
he left it with me and what i did was to go over Affidavit of April
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. 17, 1972, Exh.
While I did not mark correct the answers which B-Montecillo;
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient allegation No.
and if the answers was correct although it was 2, Answer dated
not complete I raise the grade so I had a total march 19,
of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to 1973, Exh. A-
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial Montecillo,
the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis Adm. Case No.
supplied). 1164, pp. 40-
41, and 72,
It could not be seriously denied, however, that rec.).
the favorable re-evaluations made by
respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pamatian —
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that
the increases in grades they gave were deserved 3. That sometime in the later
by the examinee concerned, were to a certain part of January of this year, he
extent influenced by the misrepresentation and brought back to me an
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. examination booklet in Civil Law
Thus in their own words: for re-evaluation because
according to him the owner of
Montecillo — the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his
Q And by grade to 75% the candidate
reason of that concerned will get passing
information you mark;
made the re-
evaluation of 4. That taking his word for it
the paper? and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of
A Yeas, your the Supreme Court to do so and
Honor. in the further belief that I was
just manifesting cooperation in
Q Would you doing so, I re-evaluated the
have re- paper and reconsidered the
evaluated the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-
paper of your Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
own accord in p. 55, rec.); and
the absence of
such 5. That the above re-evaluation
information? was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am
A No, your authorized to do so in view of
Honor, because them is representation of said
I have Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh.
 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the
particular examinee concerned,
herein respondent carefully
evaluated each and every
answer written in the notebook.
Testing the answer by the
criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee
the benefit of the doubt in view
of Mr. Lanuevo's representation
that it was only in that particular
subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher
grade than that previously given
him, but he did not deserve, in
herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38,
Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely
humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that
particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84% in
Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh.
2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the
circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to
induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can
truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by
them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and
competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim
that he deserved the increased grades given
after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of
the explanations of the respondents-examiners,
which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation
of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do
not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained
to remind herein respondents-examiners that
their participation in the admission of members
to the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute
purity of the proceedings — and so are required
to exercise the greatest or utmost case and
vigilance in the performance of their duties
relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his
memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,
claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in
bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending
undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to
respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom
said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and
who, the records will show, did not pass said
examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case
No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious
charge against the honor and integrity of the
late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away
on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot
refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during
the investigation which in his words is "essential
to his defense. "His pretension that he did not
make this charge during the investigation when
Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the
filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian
and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before
the latter departed for Australia "until this case
shall have been terminated lest it be misread or
misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage
for a favorable outcome of this case on the part
of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the
motives of the five other members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in
their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of
the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went
to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian
for the purpose of seeking his help in connection
with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman
of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee.
Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to
Landicho that an examination booklet was re-
evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release
of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec).
Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of
the bar results, it remains an indecorous act,
hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary
who should exhibit restraint in his actuations
demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine
the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct
evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass
the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for
valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by
Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the
official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion
to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife acquired
from the BF Homes, Inc. a
house and lot with an area of
374 square meters, more or
less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale
was dated March 5, 1972 but
was notarized only on April 5,
1972. On the same date,
however, respondent Lanuevo
and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said
house and lot in favor of BF
Homes, Inc. in the total amount
of P67,291.20 (First mortgage
— P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913:
date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April
20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April
20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid
as down payment the amount
of only P17,000.00, which
according to him is equivalent to
20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed
that P5,000.00 of the
P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister
in Okinawa in the form of a loan
and received by him through a
niece before Christmas of 1971
in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp.
41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his
alleged P5,000.00 savings and
P12,000.00 loan from his sister;
are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's
1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities which he filed on
January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement,
respondent Lanuevo listed
under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00.
In his 1972 statement, his bank
deposit listed under Assets was
in the amount of P1,011.00,
which shows therefore that of
the P2,000.00 bank deposit
listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount
of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of
P18,000.00 receivable listed
under Assets in his 1971
statement was not realized
because the transaction therein
involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent
Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972;
Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December,
1971 $2000 loan of respondent
from his married sister in
Okinawa is extremely doubtful.
In the first place, said amount
of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the
alleged note which he allegedly
received from his sister at the
time he received the $200 was
not even presented by
respondent during the
investigation. And according to
Respondent Lanuevo himself,
while he considered this a loan,
his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no
mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And
furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent
Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his
sister in Okinawa. Said promise
was not fulfilled as borne out by
the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his
sister, who has a family of her
own, is among the top earners
in Okinawa or has saved a lot of
money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the
P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten
or undeclared income is
inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo and his
wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00
(Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument;
August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on
March 20,1973, Entry No.
30143. Subsequently, or on
March 2, 1973 the first
mortgage in favor of BF Homes,
Entry No. 90913 was also
redeemed by respondent
Lanuevo and thereafter
cancelled on March 20, 1973,
(See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.).
Hence, only the mortgage in
favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the
monthly amortization of the
GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of
1973, he was unable to pay the
same. In his 1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, which he
filed in connection with his
resignation and retirement (filed
October 13, 1972), the house
and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as
an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS
real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities).
 2. Listed as an asset in his 1972
Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car
valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be
inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in
his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years
previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total
assets, excluding receivables in
his 1971 Statement was
P19,000.00, while in his 1972
(as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and
lot was P18,211.00, including
the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time
between the official release of
the 1971 Bar examinations and
the acquisition of the above-
mentioned properties, tends to
link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal
machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with
respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show
that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above
properties came from
respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the
Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but
after the Court had informed respondent
Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971
Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's
Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn
statement on the matter, as ordered by the
Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his
letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with
the end in view of retiring from the Court. His
resignation before he was required to show
cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was
informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of
a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the
official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to
January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value
thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the
investigation that h e used a part thereof as a
down payment for his BF Homes house and lot
(Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on
April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against
respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or
influencing another public
officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly
promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in
connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to
any party, including the
Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or
judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad
faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees
of offices or government
corporations charged with the
 grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019
authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public
officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep.
Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent
Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets
and Liabilities were not presented or taken up
during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this
Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating
possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a
beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational
program of the Philippine Veterans Board from
his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to
his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to
1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine
Veterans Board which is the governmental
agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958,
Respondent Lanuevo successively held the
position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator
and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service
Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo
had direct contacts with applicants and
beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights.
Galang's educational benefits was approved on
March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of
waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date
of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang
that it was his father who all the time attended
to the availment of the said educational benefits
and even when he was already in Manila taking
up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution
from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to
1958, he was employed as a technical assistant
in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80,
86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp.
12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy
of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the
Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the
transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution
effective the first semester of the school year
1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8
Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared
that he never went to the Office of the
Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even
know the location of the said office. He does not
also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill
of Rights educational benefits are required to go
to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester
to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he had gone to
the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he
insists that he never bothered to take a look at
the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94,
rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine
Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an
investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he
investigated claims for the several benefits given
to veterans like educational benefits and
disability benefits; that he does not remember,
however, whether in the course of his duties as
veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father
of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him
(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the
USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp.
48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla
movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine
Veterans Legion especially while working with
the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49,
rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the
guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.
During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla
outfit was operating in Samar only and he had
no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans
Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does
not remember having attended its meeting here
in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member
of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol.
VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent
Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed
at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
he was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn
statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August
27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang,
was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member
thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the
rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached
and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C
US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with
the 38th Division, US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against
the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of
recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner
has submitted the corrected notebooks to the
Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn
for any purpose whatsoever without prior
authority from the Court. Consequently, this
Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of
the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman
E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED
AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN
FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970 retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR profession.
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, He reiterated and disclosed to the press the
ANTONIO H. CALERO, contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus,
on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times
vs. published statements attributed to him, as
follows:
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an
RESOLUTION unprecedented petition, said he
did it to expose the tribunal's
"unconstitutional and
 
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily
denying petitions or appeals
CASTRO, J.: without any reason.

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's Because of the tribunal's "short-

"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of cut justice," Almacen deplored,
Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest his client was condemned to
against what he therein asserts is "a great pay P120,000, without knowing
injustice committed against his client by this why he lost the case.
Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
xxx xxx xxx
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the There is no use continuing his
Constitution with impunity." His client's he law practice, Almacen said in
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this this petition, "where our
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of Supreme Court is composed of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of men who are calloused to our
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes pleas for justice, who ignore
to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the without reason their own
members of this Court, saying "that justice as applicable decisions and commit
administered by the present members of the culpable violations of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf Constitution with impunity.
and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," so that "the xxx xxx xxx
people may know of the silent injustice's
committed by this Court," and that "whatever He expressed the hope that by
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were divesting himself of his title by
committed must never be repeated." He ends which he earns his living, the
his petition with a prayer that present members of the
Supreme Court "will become
... a resolution issue ordering responsive to all cases brought
the Clerk of Court to receive the to its attention without
certificate of the undersigned discrimination, and will purge
attorney and counsellor-at-law itself of those unconstitutional
IN TRUST with reservation that and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
at any time in the future and in "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
the event we regain our faith supplied)
and confidence, we may
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is
composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in
the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September
28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis
commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused
the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the
Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is
one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a
civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was
counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received
a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on
July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration.
He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the
motion, but did not notify the latter of the time
and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To
prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty.
Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second
motion for reconsideration to which he attached
the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was
ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August
30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen
himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22,
1966, had already perfected the appeal.
Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to
the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this
Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June
24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following
words:
Upon consideration of the
motion dated March 27, 1967,
filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition
thereto filed by defendant-
appellant; the Court RESOLVED
TO DISMISS, as it hereby
dismisses, the appeal, for the
reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5,
1966 (pp. 90-113, printed
record on appeal) does not
contain a notice of time and
place of hearing thereof and is,
therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction
& Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the
period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this
resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a
pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza , L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the
applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution
are the motion dated May 9,
1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed
by defendant- appellant,
praying for reconsideration of
the resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there
are some important distinctions
between this case and that of
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co.,
Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24,
1965, relied upon by this Court
in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
 Appellant further states that in
the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30,
1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the
ruling is contrary to the doctrine
laid down in the Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial
distinction between this case
and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs.
Venturanza, the resolution
denying the motion to dismiss
the appeal, based on grounds
similar to those raised herein
was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier
than the date of promulgation
of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June
24, 1965. Further, the resolution
in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme
Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring
the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep.
vs. Venturanza the Supreme
Court passed upon the issue sub
silencio presumably because of
its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26,
1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on
the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by
certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied
shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave
to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was
made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the
Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave
vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition
to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
already adverted to — a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the
insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced,
against this Court as well as its individual
members, a behavior that is as unprecedented
as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated
September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered
his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him.
So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he manifested "that
he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay,
said case is now final and executory;" that this
Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not
require him to do either a positive or negative
act; and that since his offer was not accepted,
he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline
a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him." Denying the charges contained in
the November 17 resolution, he asked for
permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against
him ... in an open and public hearing." This
Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from
notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed
waived and incident submitted for decision." To
this resolution he manifested that since this
Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and
Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public
hearing" so that this Court could observe his
sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to
file a written explanation "in the event this Court
has no time to hear him in person." To give him "Do not judge,
the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was that you may
allowed to file a written explanation and not be judged.
thereafter was heard in oral argument. For with what
judgment you
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as judge, you shall
it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from be judged, and
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly with what
repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time measure you
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and measure, it
innuendo. Thus: shall be
measured to
At the start, let me quote you. But why
passages from the Holy Bible, dost thou see
Chapter 7, St. Matthew: — the speck in thy
brother's eye,
and yet dost
not consider the
beam in thy
own eye? Or
how can thou
say to thy
brother, "Let
me cast out the
speck from thy
eye"; and
behold, there is
a beam in thy
own eye? Thou
hypocrite, first
cast out the
beam from thy
own eye, and
then thou wilt
see clearly to
cast out the
speck from thy
brother's eyes."

"Therefore all
that you wish
men to do to
you, even to do
you also to
them: for this is
the Law and the
Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no

intention of disavowing the
statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he
stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath
that the underscored
statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent,
contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to
the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring
the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and
constitute conduct unbecoming
of a member of the noble
profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square
that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted
with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the
particular case of our client, the
members have shown
callousness to our various pleas
for JUSTICE, our pleadings will
bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings,
supplications, words of humility,
appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the
highest interest of JUSTICE, —
what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the
unfeeling of the Court towards
our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness
towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has
the guts to tell the members of
the Court that notwithstanding
the violation of the Constitution,
you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of
natural things, is now in the
attempt to inflict punishment on
your respondent for acts he said
in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to
our pleadings and supplications
for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS?
Did His Honors attempt to
justify their stubborn denial with
any semblance of reason,
NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is
this. the way of life in the
Philippines today, that even our
own President, said: — "the
story is current, though
nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still
being circulated that justice in
the Philippines today is not what
it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told
me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a
marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the
SINNER. We detest the ACTS,
not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were
provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We
waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never
 interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But
in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality
on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have
not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your
Respondent rise to claim his
God given right to speak the
truth and his Constitutional right
of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have
attributed to this Court and the
further violations we sought to
be prevented is impliedly shared
by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are
the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe
during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what
crimes are committed in thy name", we may
dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are
committed in thy name' or more appropriately,
'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in
thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is
not free from commission of any
abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is
symbolize in paintings that can
be found in all courts and
government offices. We have
added only two more symbols,
that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness,
understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspite of our beggings,
supplications, and pleadings to
give us reasons why our appeal
has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We
refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement.
We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and
nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost
our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for
which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's
certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost
today may be regained
tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may
decide as to when we must end
our self-sacrifice. If we have to
choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of
the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned
by the members of this Court,
there is no choice, we must
uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative
chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine
the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his
petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's
practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away
with it, to state the facts and the law, and to
spell out the reasons for denial. We have given
this suggestion very careful thought. For we
know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary
hours meticulously marshalls his arguments,
only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged
at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny.
By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case
or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out
effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme
Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only
those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties
involved." Pertinent here is the observation of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore
Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations
underlie denials of the writ, and
as to the same petition different
reasons may read different
justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these
conflicting, and, to the
uninformed, even confusing
reasons for denying petitions for
certiorari, it has been suggested
from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations
preclude. In order that the
Court may be enabled to
discharge its indispensable
duties, Congress has placed the
control of the Court's business,
in effect, within the Court's
discretion. During the last three
terms the Court disposed of
260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the
Court is to do its work it would
not be feasible to give reasons,
however brief, for refusing to
take these cases. The tune that
would be required is prohibitive.
Apart from the fact that as
already indicated different
reasons not infrequently move
different members of the Court
in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes
review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice
Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical
short resolutions, the same
question has been raised
before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions"
within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold
that the petition for review
should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule
46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all
this time so understood it. It
should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision
of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there
is no need to fully explain the
court's denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court
of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of
disposal has — as intended —
 helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of
the U.S. Supreme Court,
wherein petitions for review are
often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this
Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court
of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate
review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons
to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be
moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic
that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this
Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended
to give every losing party another hearing. This
axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals'
decision discretionary.—A
review is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion,
and will be granted only when
there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following,
while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will
be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a
way probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals
has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by
the lower court, as to call for
the exercise of the power of
supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we
found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of
Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and
applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory
power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the
Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew —
or ought to have known — that for a motion for
reconsideration to stay the running of the period
of appeal, the movant must not only serve a
copy of the motion upon the adverse party
(which he did), but also notify the adverse party
of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety &
Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to
evidently is prescribed for
motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule
26), which provides that such
notice shall state the time, and
place of hearing and shall be
served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in
advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no
motion shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held
that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of
paper (Philippine National Bank
v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla,
42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic
Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45
Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets
the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party
 agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to
hear him on his objection, since
the Rules themselves do not fix
any period within which he may
file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate
court to review the lower court's judgment, he
has only himself to blame. His own negligence
caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To
shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy."
But he made sure that he assumed the posture
of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
professional certificate, he took the liberty of
vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating
rancor on the members thereof. It would thus
appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of
Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a
lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time
he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given
'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their
disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but,
also the manner in which they are handed
down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to
comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by
the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer. 5
Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6
because then the court's actuations are thrown
open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and
all our official actions," said the Supreme Court
of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the
press and the people have the undoubted right
to comment on them, criticize and censure them
as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions
before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human
reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent
danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such
a case as this where those who Sit as members
of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint
a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations.
10
For courageous and fearless advocates are
the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer
of the court, every lawyer is expected not only
to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They
should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the
legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a
lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms
and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender,
in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his
right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the
courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp.
487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an
important part of the traditional work of the bar.
In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the
errors of lower courts. In written for law journals
he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays
bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence"
of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d
286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood
in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community
ought to be allowed freer scope
in the expansion or publication
of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of
judges than members of the
bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and
forming a correct judgment.
They are in constant attendance
on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak
on this subject under liability to
be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it
his duty to attack and expose, is
a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to avail of such
right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen."
(Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members
of the bar have the beat
Opportunity to become
conversant with the character
and efficiency of our judges. No
class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has
as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart , 116
N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of
the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the
lips of those in the best position to give advice
and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there
must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit
Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a
person obligations and duties which are not
mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the
legal profession places upon his shoulders no
burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior
toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct
himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14
and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to
maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which
attorneys impliedly assume, if
they do not by express
declaration take upon
themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and
judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but
includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and
 offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d.
647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful
subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
— assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers —
even those gifted with superior intellect are
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or
may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge,
and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect,
but discipline and self-respect
are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they
are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the
judge must be obeyed, because
he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all
times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission.
(In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may
think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege.
And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of
it. That is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however,
should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack
a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts
are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-
22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may
not divide his personality so as to be an attorney
at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the
course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice, may
subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an
examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public
criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme
Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d
604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate
penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every
democratic theory to hold that a
judge or a court is beyond bona
fide comments and criticisms
which do not exceed the bounds
of decency and truth or which
are not aimed at. the
destruction of public confidence
in the judicial system as such.
However, when the likely
impairment of the
administration of justice the
direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the
rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney
was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA,"
which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced
as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city
officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote:
"They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also
DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the
accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences
a desire on the part Of the
accused to belittle and besmirch
the court and to bring it into
 disrepute with the general made by the respondent here.
public. But, in our view, the better rule
is that which requires of those
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the who are permitted to enjoy the
Supreme Court of California affirmed the two- privilege of practicing law the
year suspension of an attorney who published a strictest observance at all times
circular assailing a judge who at that time was a of the principles of truth,
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The honesty and fairness, especially
circular which referred to two decisions of the in their criticism of the courts,
judge concluded with a statement that the judge to the end that the public
"used his judicial office to enable -said bank to confidence in the due
keep that money." Said the court: administration of justice be
upheld, and the dignity and
We are aware that there is a usefulness of the courts be
line of authorities which place maintained. In re Collins, 81
no limit to the criticism Pac. 220.
members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, 4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen,
impartiality, or integrity of the 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
courts, even though it extends woman who had been granted a divorce,
to the deliberate publication by attacked the judge who set aside the decree on
the attorney capable of correct bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
reasoning of baseless letter and gave the press the story of a
insinuations against the proposed libel suit against the judge and others.
intelligence and integrity of the The letter began:
highest courts. See State Board,
etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 Unless the record in In re
LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 Petersen v. Petersen is cleared
and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 up so that my name is protected
Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In from the libel, lies, and perjury
the first case mentioned it was committed in the cases
observed, for instance: involved, I shall be compelled to
resort to such drastic action as
"It may be the law allows and the case
(although we warrants.
do not so
decide) that a Further, he said: "However let me assure you I
libelous do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
publication by unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in
an attorney, dealing with men and not irresponsible political
directed against manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the
a judicial attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
officer, could be Illinois declared:
so vile and of
such a nature ... Judges are not exempt from
as to justify the just criticism, and whenever
disbarment of there is proper ground for
its author." serious complaint against a
judge, it is the right and duty of
Yet the false charges made by a lawyer to submit his
an attorney in that case were of grievances to the proper
graver character than those authorities, but the public
 interest and the administration
of the law demand that the
courts should have the
confidence and respect of the
people. Unjust criticism,
insulting language, and
offensive conduct toward the
judges personally by attorneys,
who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts
and the law into disrepute and
to destroy public confidence in
their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to
the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge
of judicial functions, and the
bringing of the unauthorized
suit, together with the write-up
in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring
the court into disrepute with the
public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer
accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that
the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered.
It does not appear that the attorney had
criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the
Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered
suspended for a period of two years. The Court
said:
A calumny of that character, if
believed, would tend to weaken
the authority of the court
against whose members it was
made, bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter
of the people's right, and
interfere with the administration
of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of
the bar the court will not, under
the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any
part of that freedom of speech
which he possesses as a citizen.
The acts and decisions of the
courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final
determination, are not exempt
from fair and honest comment
and criticism. It is only when an
attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will
be held responsible for an abuse
of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent
bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re
Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney
was suspended for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon
the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said,
constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that
he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,
and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the
fact that there is a growing
habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and
integrity of judicial officers in
the discharge of their duties,
and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and
creating the impression that
judicial action is influenced by
corrupt or improper motives.
Every attorney of this court, as
well as every other citizen, has
the right and it is his duty, to
submit charges to the
authorities in whom is vested
the power to remove judicial
officers for any conduct or act
of a judicial officer that tends to
show a violation of his duties, or
would justify an inference that
he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the
duties devolved upon him; and
such charges to the tribunal, if
 based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged,
and the person making them
protected. ... While we
recognize the inherent right of
an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the
decisions of the courts, or the
reasons announced for them,
the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is
not against the officers whose
acts or motives are criticised,
tends to subvert the confidence
of the community in the courts
of justice and in the
administration of justice; and
when such charges are made by
officers of the courts, who are
bound by their duty to protect
the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional
misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer
published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this
case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary
observations more or less
vituperative and finally
concluded, that, as my clients
were foreigners, it might have
been expecting too much to
look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set
out, not only transcend the
bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or
by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity
of this court, and make out a
prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from
this court and who is under oath
to demean himself with all good
fidelity to the court as well as to
his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the
attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge , 258
Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of
the court and its members to try a case,
charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law
gives to members of the bar is
one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of
such members does not
measure up to the requirements
of the law itself, as well as to
the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and
free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime
importance under our system
and ideals of government. No
right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the
best interest to private citizens,
as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial
capacity or otherwise, would be
served by denying this right of
free speech to any individual.
But such right does not have as
its corollary that members of
the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the
courts where justice is
administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve
their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or
 carelessly asserting the law.
Truth and honesty of purpose
by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The
health of a municipality is none
the less impaired by a polluted
water supply than is the health
of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse
of members of the bar of the
confidence the public, through
its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with
the affairs of the private
individual, the protection of
whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain
the judiciary. For such conduct
on the part of the members of
the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook ,
170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to
the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated
brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the
erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll
of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116
N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that
greater latitude should be allowed in case of
criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in
those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal
letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence
and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his
associates in the decisions of certain appeals in
which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this
paragraph:
You assigned it (the property
involved) to one who has no
better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems
like robbing a widow to reward
a fraud, with the court acting as
a fence, or umpire, watchful
and vigilant that the widow got
no undue
advantage. ... The point is this:
Is a proper motive for the
decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a
constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the
state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University
Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any
other person, can formulate a
statement of a correct motive
for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is
stated, and quarantine after it is
made, it will gratify every right-
minded citizen of the state to
read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering
the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether
the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the
letter addressed to him. This
was done, as we have found,
for the very purpose of insulting
him and the other justices of
this court; and the insult was so
directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done
by him and his associates in
their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could
never subserve any good
purpose. Its only effect in any
case would be to gratify the
spite of an angry attorney and
humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could
not ever enlighten the public in
regard to their judicial capacity
or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by
passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard
to his position, can resent such
an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and
for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to
the judge alone, he can have no
redress in any action triable by
a jury. "The sending of a
libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication." 18 Am.
& Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p.
1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this
letter to the Chief Justice was
wholly different from his other
acts charged in the accusation,
and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are
applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was
in every way discreditable; but
so far as he exercised the rights
of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy,
to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we
hold, from the penalty here
sought to be enforced. To that
extent his rights as a citizen
were paramount to the
obligation which he had
assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the
Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the
court can recognize, but, on the
contrary, willfully violated his
obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and
judicial officers. "This obligation
is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their
official acts." Bradley v. Fisher,
13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed.
646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the
principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an
attorney upon a judge, induced
by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words
addressed to the judge in his
chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different
from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others.
The distinction made is, we
think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod
supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully
sustained the right of a citizen
to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held
that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a
judicial officer, in that case a
commissioner of the court, for
his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of
any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge
because of official acts, if only
the assailant restrains his
passion until the judge leaves
the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own
self-respect to the regard of the
people by tame submission to
the indignity, or else set in his
own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking
the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would
hold judicial office under such
conditions."
That a communication such as
this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for
which a professional
punishment may be imposed,
has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial
justice, complaining of his
conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter
of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136,
99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is
held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City
Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused
attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City
Court of New York, in which it
was stated, in reference to his
decision: "It is not law; neither
is it common sense. The result
is I have been robbed of 80."
And it was decided that, while
such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the
matter should be "called to the
attention of the Supreme Court,
which has power to discipline
the attorney." "If," says the
court, "counsel learned in the
law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges,
to charge them with ignorance,
with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or
accessories, it will not be long
before the general public may
feel that they may redress their
fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a
judge will be anything but a
happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall
into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v.
State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was
in this respect much the same
as the case at bar. The accused,
an attorney at law, wrote and
mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received
by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court,
and which referred in insulting
terms to the conduct of the
judge in a cause wherein the
accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held
that the attorney was rightly
disbarred in having "willfully
failed to maintain respect due to
him [the judge] as a judicial
officer, and thereby breached
his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application
to the facts of this case, we cite
the following: Ex parte Bradley,
7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed.
214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v.
Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408;
People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am.
Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179
Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the
charges against the accused
have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such
a penalty as may be sufficient
lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the
court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18
months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in
which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed
him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court
held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack
against the official acts and decisions of a judge
constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only
the judge, but his decisions in general claiming
that the judge was dishonest in reaching his
decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney
published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate
language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed
disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an
attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks
on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of
the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even
though he expressed an intention to resign from
the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition
and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation
utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations,
whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby
tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the
orderly administration of justice, constitute
grave professional misconduct which may be
visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our
disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in
the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been
disposed of under the power of courts to punish
for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a
different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable
practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these
instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where
counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and
constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an
attorney, in defending the cause
and rights of his client, should
do so with all the fervor and
energy of which he is capable,
but it is not, and never will be
so for him to exercise said right
by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the
dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that
respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would
be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as,
in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of
the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its
dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less
than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights
to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with
having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights
 of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a
senator and the author of the Press Freedom
Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking
said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be
published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has
not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it
is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members," and his belief that "In
the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go
much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced
as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy"
and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and
other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also
announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding
him in contempt, despite his avowals of good
faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free
speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written
statement which he caused to
be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the
decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is
pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a
bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which
decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are
incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence
the final decision of said case by
this Court, and thus embarrass
or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and
integrity of this Court for the
apparent purpose of bringing
the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that
this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so
many blunders and injustices,
that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party
knowing that the law and justice
is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years,
would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the
people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this
Court, and consequently to
lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of
the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of
this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom,
they might be driven to take the
law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an
officer of the courts, Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is
 in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not
to promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to
emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of
the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to
the courts; he may be removed
from office or stricken from the
roll of attorneys as being guilty
of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re
Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with
having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of
blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations,
our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was
unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the
Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language
(heretofore quoted) employed
in the motion for
reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably
arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever
the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the
tendency of this Court to rely on
its own pronouncements in
disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a account were made only after this Court had
sweeping charge that the
decisions of this Court, blindly
adhere to earlier rulings without
as much as making any
reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all
these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of
the industrial court, it has
committed error and
continuously repeated that error
to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which
refuses to hew to the line drawn
by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the
quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court
on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled
to respect. Those statements
detract much from the dignity of
and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the
capability of the members —
and some former members of
this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields
a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule
against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been
expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest
of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the
aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings
filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes
while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen
would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that
the remarks for which he is now called upon to
written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial
proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing
view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in
People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of
the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to.
A complete disengagement from the settled rule
was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for
publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a
farcical manner after the question of the validity
of the said examinations had been resolved and
the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption
of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in
his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them
may still be contempt by publication even after a
case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to
impede, obstruct, embarrass or
influence the courts in
administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding,
constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable
by courts. A publication which
tends to degrade the courts and
to destroy public confidence in
them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind
of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-
important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In
the second kind of contempt,
the punitive hand of justice is
extended to vindicate the courts
from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first
there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as
there is no decision which might
in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists,
with or without a pending case,
as what is sought to be
protected is the court itself and
its dignity. Courts would lose
their utility if public confidence
in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty.
Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained
finality. He could as much be liable for contempt
therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the
pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of
whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and
actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of
our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in
so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his
fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise
of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in
our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics
of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks
from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In
this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a
case in court is altogether of no consequence.
The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue
to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an
attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to
do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the
rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved
themselves unworthy of continued membership
in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline
attorneys, who are officers of
the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of
record, and one which is
essential to an orderly discharge
of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a
declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and
clients is not subject to
restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable
authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to
practice and in this state that
power is vested in this court-has
the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the
practice of law is a representation to all that he
is worthy of their confidence and respect. So
much so that —
... whenever it is made to
appear to the court that an
attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the
public and of the courts, it
becomes, not only the right, but
the duty, of the court which
made him one of its officers,
and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission
and disbarment of attorneys are
judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and
exercises his functions as an
attorney, not as a matter of
right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior
and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to
remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being
unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances
and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's
certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may
seem, no statute, no law stands in its way.
Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language,
he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle
for his vicious tirade against this Court. The
integrated entirety of his petition bristles with
vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial
victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically
denounces the justice administered by this Court
to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb."
With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes
this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the
same time branding its members as "calloused
to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced
threat to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," he caused the publication in
the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up
public indignation and disrespect toward the
Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology.
Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks
and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred
and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty.
Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes
they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never
serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an
irate attorney, attract public attention to himself
and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and
its members into disrepute and destroy public
confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this
character and texture presents no redeeming
feature, and completely negates any pretense of
passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a
whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath
and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal
Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go
unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the
need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit
disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy,
the Court is not, and should not be, above
criticism. But a critique of the Court must be
intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high
function as the court of last resort. And more
than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires
detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must,
possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to
the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the
members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in
this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of
the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that
disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
this proceeding is not — and does not involve —
a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a
certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and
inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with
the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals
but. only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of
their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if
there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof — as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice
be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the
practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31
So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties,
that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because
public policy demands that they., acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and
extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked
out by the Rules of Court, these may range from
mere suspension to total removal or disbarment.
32
The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of
course, primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court which, being neither
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled
by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to
the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty.
Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would
accomplish the end desired, and believing that it
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen
will realize that abrasive language never fails to
do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for
the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct
by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefor leave us no way of determining
how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the
same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter
33
but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we
have authority to completely exclude a person
from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree
and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of
the compass of that authority. The merit of this
choice is best shown by the fact that it will then
be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself
how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court
that he is once again fit to resume the practice
of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court
that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until
further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and
the Court of Appeals for their information and
guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case 8909
on September 17, 1965 in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.
2 See e.g. "Mounting Discontent
against the Supreme Court's
Minute Resolution," 32 Lawyers
J. p. 325; "Lack of Merit
Resolutions are Obnoxious," 31
Lawyers J. p. 329.
3 In the years 1966, 1967 and
1968, this Court rejected by
minute resolutions 803, 682 and
848 petitions, respectively, and
resolved by extended decisions
or resolutions 584, 611 and 760
cases, respectively. For the
period covering the first six
months of the year 1969, this
Court rejected by minute
resolutions 445 petitions, and
resolved by extended decision
or resolutions 279 cases.
4 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731
(1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil.
376; Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61
Phil. 736 (Malcolm, J.,
dissenting); Austria vs.
Masaquel, G.R. L-22536, Aug.
31, 1967; Cabansag vs.
Fernandez, et al., G.R. L-8974,
Oct. 18, 1957.
5 In re Gomez, supra.
6 In re Gomez, supra; In re
Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil.
801 (1930) ; In re Abistado 57
Phil. 668 (1932); People vs.
Alarcon; In re Contempt
Proceedings, Mangahas, 69 Phil.
265 (1939). See Pennekamp v.
State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
90 L. ed. 1295; In re Bozorth,
118 A. 2d 432; In re Jameson,
340 Pac. 2d 432 (1959) ; In re
Pryor, 26 Am. Rep. 474; Hill vs.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286; Caig
v. Hecht, 68 L. ed. 293
(Concurring opinion of Justice
Taft).
7 Strebel v. Figueras, 96 Phil.
321 (1954).
8 State v. Bee Pub. Co., 83
N.W. 204, Sullivan, J. See also
State ex rel Atty. Gen. v. Circuit
Ct., 72 N. W. 193.
9 In re Jameson, 340 Pac. 2d
432 (1959).
10 U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731
(1918) ; In re Gomez, 43 Phil.
376; Cabansag v. Fernandez, L-
18974, Oct. 18, 1957; Austria
vs. Masaquel, L-22536, Aug. 31,
1967; Re Troy (1920), 111 Atl.
723; State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v.
Circuit Ct. (1897), 65 Am. St.
Rep. 90; Goons v. State, 134
N.E. 194; State vs. Sweetland,
54 N.W. 415; Hill vs. Lyman,
126 NYS 2d 286; Case of Austin,
28 Am. Dec. 657.
11 State Board of Examiners v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA
(NS) 585; Re Pryor, 26 Am.
Rep. 747; Ex Parte Steinman,
40 Am. Rep. 637; Case of
Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657;
Brannon v. State, 29 So. 2d
918; Medgar Evers v. State, 131
So. 2d 653; Re Ades, 6 F 2d
467.
12 "A judge as a public official,"
said Justice Thornal in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, "is
neither sacrosanct nor immune
to public criticism of his conduct
in office."
13 In re Bozorth, 118 Atl. 432:
"The harsh and sometimes
unfounded criticism of the
members of any of the three
branches of our Government
may be unfortunate lot of public
officials ..., but it has always
been deemed a basic principle
that such comment may be
made by the public ... . Nor
should the judicial branch ...
enjoy any more enviable
condition than the other two
branches."
In Bridges v. California, 86 L.
ed. 192, Mr. Justice Black,
speaking for the majority, said:
"... an enforced silence,
however, limited, solely in the
name of preserving the dignity
of the bench, would probably
engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much
more than it would enhance
respect." Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who wrote the
minority opinion, said: "Judges
as persons, or courts as
institutions, are entitled to no
greater immunity from criticism
than other persons or
institutions. Just because the
holders of judicial office are
identified with the interest of
justice they may forget their
common human frailties and
fallibilities. There have
sometimes been martinets upon
the bench as there have
sometimes been wielders of
authority who have used the
paraphernalia of power in
support of what they called their
dignity. Therefore judges must
be kept mindful of their
limitations and of their ultimate
public responsibility by a re Klein, 262 NYS 2d 416; In re
vigorous stream of criticism
expressed with candor however
blunt "A man cannot be
summarily laid by the heels
because his words may make
public feeling more unfavorable
in case the judge should be
asked to act at some later date,
any more than he can for
exciting public feeling against a
judge for what he already has
done." ... Courts and judges
mast take their share of the
gains and pains of discussion
which is unfettered except by
laws of libel, by self- restraint,
and by good taste. Winds of
doctrine should freely blow for
the promotion of good and the
correction of evil. Nor should
restrictions be permitted that
cramp the feeling of freedom in
the use of tongue or pen
regardless of the temper of the
truth of what may be uttered."
14 Sec. 3, Rule 138.
15 Sec. 20(b), Rule 138.
16 See e.g. Re Chopac, 66 F.
Supp., where an attorney was
suspended for three years for
writing a judge a letter in which
he said that the judge in signing
an order took "advantage of
your office to rule with passion
and vehemence." Also People v.
Green, 3 P. 65, where an
attorney was disbarred for
stopping a judge upon the
street and addressed abusive,
insulting language to him. See
also Johnson v. State, 44 So.
671; In re McCowan, 170 P.
1101; State v. Calhoon, 102, 2d
604; Re Huppe, 11 Pac. 2d 793;
State v. Rhodes, 131 NW 2d
118; Re Rogers, 212 Pac. 1034;
In re Griffin, 1 NYS 7; In re
Wilkes, 3 NYS 753; Re
Manheim, 99 NYS 87; Re
Greenfield, 262 NYS 2d 349; In
Smith, 36 A 130.
17 In re Humphrey, 163 P. 60;
In re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39; In
Snyder's Case, 76 ALR 666; Re
Troy, 111 A. 723; State v.
Sprigs, 155 P. 2d 285.
18 Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil.
151; In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of Rosario
Olba, Contempt proceedings
against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil.
312, 315; People vs. Carillo, 77
Phil. 579; People vs.
Venturanza, et al., 85 Phil. 211,
214; De Joya, et al. vs. CFI of
Rizal, 99 Phil. 907, 914; Sison
vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29,
1959; Paragas vs. Cruz, L-
24438, July 30, 1965; Cornejo
vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772, 775.
19 In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376;
In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re
Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; People
vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 1965;
Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil. 772,
775. State vs. Dist. Court, 151
Pac. 2d 1002; In re Shannon,
27 Pac. 352; State ex rel. Grice
vs. Dist. Court, 97 Pac. 1032;
Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77
S.E. 2d 405; State vs. Kaiser, 13
P. 964; State vs. Bee Pub. Co.
83 N.W. 204; Patterson vs.
Colorado. 51 L. ed. 879; Re
Hart, 116 N.W. 212.
20 69 Phil. 265.
21 42 O.G. 59.
22 Article VIII, Section 12,
Constitution.
23 Re Simpson, 83 N.W. 541.
24 Re Thatcher, 89 N.E. 39, 84.
25 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules
of Court.
26 See Norman Dorsen,
Frontiers of Civil Liberties, pp.
60-61; Griswold, "Of Time and
Attitudes," 74 Harvard Law
Review, 81, 94; Paul A. Freund,
The Supreme Court of the
United States, (1961) pp. 176-
177; see also Freund, On Law
and Justice (1968) ch. 4.
27 In re Montagne and
Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; De
Durant, 10 Ann. Cas. 1913,
1220.
28 State vs. Peck, 91 Atl. 274;
286; Fairfield County Bar vs.
Taylor, 22 Atl. 441.
29 Ex Parte Tyler, 40 Pac. 33,
34; Treadwell's case, 7 Pac.
724; Deles vs. Aragona, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 634, 644,
and the cases therein cited.
30 Sarcos vs. Castillo, et al., L-
29755, January 21, 1969.
31 Cf. Radiowealth, Inc. vs.
Agregado, 47 O.G., No. 12
(Supp) pp. 87, 89, citing Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, Vol.
2, P. 870; Perfecto vs. Meer, 85
Phil. 552, 553; Ex parte
Alabama State Bar Ass'n., 8 So.
768.
32 Section 27, Rule 138, Rules
of Court.
33 Melville vs. Wettengel, 57 Pa.
2d 699; People vs. Winogard,
287 Pac. 864; People vs. Kelly,
285 Pac. 767; People vs. Harris,
112 N.E. 978; People vs.
Anderson, 112 N.E. 273; In re
Gullickson, 181 Atl. 716;
Haitmanek vs. Turano, 158 A.
878; Grimsell vs. Wilcox, 98 A.
799; States vs. Kern, 233 N.W.
629; In re Borchardt, 192 N.E.
383; State vs. Trapley, 259 Pac.
783; State vs. Jennings, 159
S.E. 627; In re Jacobson, 126
S.E. 2d 346; Mulvey vs. O'Niell,
44 Atl. 2d 880; State ex rel
Oklahoma Bar Ass'n vs.
Hatcher, 209 Pac. 2d 873;
Cleveland Bar Ass'n vs.
Wilkerson, 156 N.E. 2d 136 N.E.
2d 136; In re Eddy, 292 N.Y.S.
619.