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Pepsi Cola vs Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 518 (1998)

Facts: The case is a petition for review and certiorari by the petitioner upon the denial by the lower and
appellate court on their motion for reconsideration for the postponement of the hearing due to
unavailability of their witnesses and for declaring that the petitioner waived its right to present evidence
in support to its defense. The case began from the civil action filed by private respondents who won
from the Pepsi Number Fever Promotion" sponsored by petitioner Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc.,
wherein numerous holders of the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored and paid by
petitioner due to an alleged mistake in the security codes in the crowns. While the private respondents
are finished presenting their evidence, the petitioner continues to file a motion for postponement due
to unavailability of witnesses. The schedule for presentation of evidence began on May 28, 1993 and
with frequent postponement, the court issued a warning to the petitioner’s counsel that the scheduled
hearing on January 20, 1995 shall be intransferrable in character. Notwithstanding said warning,
petitioner moved for postponement again which motion was denied by the court for unreasonable delay
on the case. The court of appeals affirmed the said decision hence this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: WON the court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

RULING: The court held that the petitioner was given ample time to prepare for their witnesses causing
the trial to take up to 2 years due to their motion for postponement and reminded the counsel of the
petitioner that they have the duty to give proper administration of justice without any delay and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Yumol vs Atty. Ferrer, Sr. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005

Facts: The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human Rights, files a disbarment case against
respondent, Attorney IV said commission on ground for grave misconduct. The respondent was found to
have issued 2 orders awarding custody of a child to a complainant in the Commission, ordered a bank to
reinstate the bank account of the said complainant, engaging in private practice, notarizing public
documents, and attending court hearings while filling up his DTR at the Commission as present at the
same time. The case was referred to the IBP and the investigating commissioner recommended
suspension for 2 years which was modified by the IBP Board to 6 months.

ISSUE: WON respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following alleged acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government employee;
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against him for engaging in
private practice.

RULING: The court held on the following:


1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in private practice (adopting the
Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to some conditions with indispensable requirement to
secure approval from the CHR. In the absence of such approval, the respondent is not allowed in private
practice and proved to have falsified his attendance in the DTR while appearing in court at the same
time without approved leave of absence.
2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR authorized his practice as a notary public.
3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is merely to investigate all forms of human rights
violation. They cannot try and decide cases.
With the above constituting grounds for suspension of lawyers stated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, the court ruled to modify the suspension of 1 year as sufficient sanction.

Cruz v Atty. Cabrera AC No. 5737 October 25, 2004

Facts: The complainant files an administrative charge against the respondent for misconduct in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in court
in his own behalf as he instituted a case against his neighbor who is represented by the respondent as
counsel. During a hearing, the respondent uttered remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and
misconduct in the performance of his duties as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP
commissioner who recommended suspension of respondent in the practice of law for 3 months which
was annulled by a resolution of the IBP Board recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct.

RULING: The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it is not to such a
magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The court thereby dismissed
the case due to lack of merit.

Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000

FACTS: Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll
of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his
comment, respondent alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the
Bar Confidant was tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the
meeting of the MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading
as counsel for the candidate.

I: WON the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.


R: The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the
activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a
member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally
upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the
moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding
the fact that he already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.

In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975

FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during
the 1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the
same bar exam, in his confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later
identified as Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting
upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their
sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by
Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar examiner
explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained in all subjects
by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and
low grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass.
In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam
of the candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation also
revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did
not revealed the information in his application to take the bar examination.

ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the
examination result of a bar candidate.

RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each
examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior
authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination
notebooks after they are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of
the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the
candidate themselves. With the facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the
exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and confidence
given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the rolls of attorneys.
Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in his
application for the bar exam while under oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar
examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties
with due care.

Tapucar vs Tapucar A.C. No. 4148

FACTS: Disbarment was filed against Atty. Lauro Tapucar by his wife on grounds for gross immoral
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous circumstances. Prior to the
disbarment case, an administrative case was filed against Atty. Tapucar in connection with his co-
habitation in which he was penalized with 6 months suspension without pay. He continued the illicit
affair that gave rise to another charge against him on grounds for conduct unbecoming for a court
officer and gross immoral conduct which caused his dismissal and separation from the service as a judge.
He continued his cohabitation that born 2 children and he eventually marry the paramour in the
subsistence of his previous marriage and completely abandoned his real family. The wife migrated in the
States but was receiving complaints from their children left in the Philippines who are humiliated with
said act of Atty, Tapucar. This caused the wife to institute a disbarment case to shield their daughter
with her daughter-lawyer representing her case. The IBP commissioner recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Tapucar.

RULING: The court held that it is a settled rule that good moral character is a precedent condition for
admission in the legal profession and must be remain intact to maintain one’s good standing as member
in the Bar. The facts showed that despite previous sanction to Atty. Tapucar, he continued his illicit affair
and he even showed arrogance in the face of charges against him in the presence of the IBP commission.
Thus, he was disbarred and his name was stricken out from the rolls of attorneys.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Argosino
was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with
homicide through reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years
imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the court with a 2 yr
probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to
allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The
court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE: WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING: The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar members, keeping in
mind that such is of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of
justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the
admission of the law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished
to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999.

Facts: Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and a father of Chinese national on April 11, 1964. He
took the bar exam subject upon submission of proof of his Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age
of 35 years old. There was a question regarding his citizenship therefore he was not allowed to take
oath. The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar.

ISSUE: WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his citizenship.

RULING: The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect
Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect
his Phil. Citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21
years old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of majority, Ching failed
to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be
admitted in the Phil. Rolls of atty. for being a Chinese citizen.

Tan vs Sabandal B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

Facts: Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to finally take oath
and practice the law profession after considering his plea for forgiveness and showing willingness to
reform along with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which is a testimonial by the
IBP Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its President, a counsel for
the in-laws of Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members. The court allowed the IBP
to manifest testimony to certify as to the good moral character of the respondent and asked for a
comment from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested that they see no
impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the RTC Judge informed the court of the civil
case against the respondent concerning the mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which
turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a free patent. The civil case
however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged of any crime. Subsequently, Tan
already forgave the respondent and withdrew her opposition for the taking of oath of office of the
respondent while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide.

ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office

RULING: The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed the
civil case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together
with the testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending case
against him. The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent.
Although there were testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without any
knowledge of the case against him. The commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty. With the
practice of law a matter of privilege and not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member of the
law profession therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the respondent to take oath.

In Re: Atty. Marcial Edillion A.M. 192 August 3, 1978

FACTS: The IBP adopted a resolution on Admin case against Atty. Edillion on matter involving his
membership due delinquency, recommending striking his name from the rolls of attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues. Atty. Edillion contends that the Rules of Court 139-A and the IBP by-
laws are unconstitutional and thereby questioning the power of the court to compel him to become an
IBP member as well as the provision of the Rules of Court requiring payment for membership fee of the
IBP.

ISSUE: WON the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

RULING: Yes. The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers
are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his
annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Furthermore, the Court
has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel
all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Re: Application of A.M. Hernandez July 27, 1993

FACTS: Hernandez is a Filipino citizen who have a degree of Juris Doctor from Columbia Law School in
New York and passed the bar examinations in the same City in 1990. He is currently taking bar subjects
in Ateneo Law School and taking a 5 month bar review course there. He now asks the court to allow him
to take the bar exam in the Phils.

ISSUE: WON the S.C. may allow him to take the bar exam in the Phils.

RULING: Yes, he may be allowed to take the bar because there were some instances in the past where a
Filipino studied law in a foreign law school and were allowed to take the bar in the Philippines. However,
the court held this time that in the following year, applicants for the Bar must study in a local law school
in the Phils. And must present certifications required by Section 5 and 6 of Rule 138 to be able to take
the bar. Such certification however is not issued to foreign law school graduates therefore anyone who
wants to take the bar in the country should study in any of the law schools in the Phils. to be able to take
the bar exam.

In re: Amparo 65 SCRA 120 (1974)

FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a piece of paper during
the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the paper until the head watcher
threatened to report him to the authorities. The paper contains the list of duration of penalties and
formula computing them, which Amparo justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out of his pocket as he
tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an investigation ensued.

ISSUE: WON Amparo is guilty for his actions.

RULING: Yes. He violated Rule 133, section 10 prohibiting examinees from bringing papers, books, or
notes into the examination room. Amparo committed an overt act indicative of an attempt to cheat by
reading notes. The report of the bar showed that he did not passed the bar thus the court ordered he
will not be allowed to re-take the bar the following year.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of
P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he worked at the Phil. Civil Service then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his employment with the
CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The
compulsion that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a
lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP annual
membership.

RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of regulatory measure by
the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory
requirement to pay the fees subsists for as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one
is a practicing lawyer or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues
is denied.

Santos Jr. v Llamas A.C. No. 4749 1.20.00

FACTS: This is a complaint against respondent for misrepresentation and non-payment of IBP
membership dues. For years, the respondent does not indicate proper PTR no. in his practice of the law
profession. Now of old age, he contends that he is engaged in the limited practice of his profession and
as a senior citizen, he is exempt from paying taxes and membership dues with the IBP.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is exempt from paying his membership dues owing to limited practice of
law and for being a senior citizen.

RULING: No. He is not exempt since Rule 139-A requires all IBP members to pay the annual fee and
failure thereof for 6 months merits suspension of the membership and for 1 year becomes a ground for
removal of the member’s name from the Rolls of Attorney regardless one is a practicing lawyer or not.
His non-renewal of his PTR is a misrepresentation to the public and the courts that he has paid his dues
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Diao v Martinez 7 SCRA 745 3.29.63

FACTS: 2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed against Diao on false representation of
his application to the Bar examination that he has the requisite academic qualification. The Solicitor
General made an investigation and recommended to strike the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education.

I: WON Diao may continue to practice the law profession.

RULING: The court held that his admission to the bar was under the pretense that he had acquired a
pre-legal education, an academic requirement before one could take the bar exam. Such admission
having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.
His name thus was stricken out from the Rolls of Attorneys.

Vda. De Mijares v Justice Villaluz A.C. No. 4431 6.19.97

FACTS: Complainant files a disbarment case against the respondent on grounds of bigamy after
contracting a marriage with another woman several months after their marriage. Respondent contends
theirs was a sham marriage in an effort to protect the complainant from the administrative case on
immorality to be charged against her by her legal researcher and that during their marriage his marriage
with his first wife was subsisting since the declaration of its annulment was not yet final and executory
pending publication of the decision. The administrative case was referred to Associate Justice Purisima
of CA for investigation who recommended suspension of the respondent for 2 years with a warning that
similar future misconduct shall be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: WON respondent be disbarred.


RULING: Yes. The mere admission of the respondent of contracting the marriage with the complainant
while knowingly his first marriage subsists and then married another woman after said marriage with
complainant is a gross misconduct. His claim that he married complainant to protect her from the
administrative charge against her is unfounded since one cannot correct a wrong by doing another
wrongful act. Finding the respondent morally unfit in the practice of the law profession, the court
upheld the recommendation of Justice Purisima.

In Re: Vicente Almacen


31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil
case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said
motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion
was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the
trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on
certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then
filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as he
claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high court
are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged
that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons
why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also
stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as  the Court wanted to wait
for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s
certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him . . .
in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is
“the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The
proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It
should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals’ opinion.

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as
uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is true
that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.  His right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known
that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place
of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to
blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

 Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic


223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession –
Practice of Law

Facts: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services
of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because
of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041

8:30am – 6:00pm

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila


GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res.
& Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.

Call Marivic.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy

Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in
Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of
specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as
complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation
and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and
attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the
US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond
the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law.  Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and  who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods.  Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce,
secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can
facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention.
That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.  The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list


2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

Vda de Mijares vs Villaluz - A case digest


A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997
PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

Facts; Respondent a Justice of the Court of Appeals was charged with Bigamy by complainant and is
being recommended for suspension from practice of law.

Priscilla Castillo vda de Mijares and Justice Onofre Villaluz married each other pending the court's
decision on the former's marriage. However, their relationship was shortlived as right after the
marriage, the complainant left their would-be-honeymoon place after some unbearable utterances
made by the respondent. Several months after, the complainant learned that respondent a
subsequently married a certain Lydia Geraldez, thus, the basis of this complaint.

Issue; WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of law.

Ruling; Citing Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Supreme Court found the
respondent engaging in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceiful conduct and recommends
SUSPENSION with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit
the same or a similar offense hereafter.
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel [G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970]
07 Aug

Ponente: SANCHEZ, J.

FACTS:

The first contempt proceeding arose from third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and
Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, that the petitioners, who, according to the Solicitor General and
based on their submitted and signed memorandum, alleged that petitioners:

 To have made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the
courts against MacArthur International (such efforts could be accurately called “scattershot
desperation”);
 To have such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant
attitude of the petitioners, and petitioners … opportunistically change their claims and stories
not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Atty Santiago further
alleged that the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel and

And the Supreme Court in the effect:

 “Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the “right to
reject any and all bids”) can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to
the public, a government agency or just plain fraud…”. Atty. Santiago also filed a motion to
inhibit against Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro.

The second contempt proceeding arose when respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty.
Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for
reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised,
and included citing the New Rules of Court Section 1 Rule 51 and that alleged injustice may cut
off all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government by invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment
after making it known to the World Court. Meads, for his part tried to reason out why such a
distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by “XS” which is a
common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to
characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that “it is not candid nor
fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.”.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:
a)    Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto;  Graciano C. Regala; and Associates;
and Atty. Erlito R. Uy; are guilty of contempt on the filed Third Motion for Reconsideration;

b)    Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Juanito M. Caling, and Mr. Morton F. Meads are guilty of
contempt on the filed Fourth Motion for Reconsideration;

HELD:

a)    For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago – YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

For Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto – YES. Fine of P100.00.

For Atty. Graciano C. Regala and Associates – NO. (Took no part)

For Atty. Erlito R. Uy – NO. (Took no part)

b)    For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago – YES. Additional fine of P1,000.00

For Atty. Juanito M. Caling – YES. Fine P200.00.

For Mr. Morton F. Meads – YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

RATIO:

a)    On the Third Motion for Reconsideration

The Supreme Court finds language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. Atty.
Santiago pictures petitioners as “vulturous executives” and speaks of this [Supreme] Court as a
“civilized, democratic tribunal”, but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice. Atty. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-
counsel in this case. Finally, borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also
involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation.

b)    On the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration

Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned
from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client
takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics should have reminded him that “[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain
and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and
suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.”
Atty. Caling lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. He has not shown to the
satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it
was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.

As to Mr. Meads, having admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration, he
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer.

Donald Dee vs C.A. [G.R. No. 77439. August 24, 1989]


16 Oct

Ponente: REGALADO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent, accompanied by the latter’s
cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s
brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada,
U.S.A. Private respondent personally talked with the president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas,
Nevada. He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be
better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could
convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey Dee would be exculpated from
liability for the account. Upon private respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon
Sy and the latter was convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private
respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt and asking for a
discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared and the casino never bothered him.

Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent several demand
letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however,
ignored said letters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between parties.

HELD:

YES. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of Appeals. Costs against the petitioner.

RATIO:

[T]here is no question that professional services were actually rendered by private respondent to
petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee,
with Caesar’s Palace was assumed by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed
from the apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-called mafia. For
such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to receive a reasonable compensation and
this right cannot be concluded by petitioner’s pretension that at the time private respondent
rendered such services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine consultant
of Caesar’s Palace.

A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services
rendered at the special instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good
faith trying to serve and represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just
fees.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4058. March 12, 1998]

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B.


FLORES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no
violation of its code of conduct. Accordingly, a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes,
engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in his pleadings must be sanctioned.
The Case

This is an administrative complaint against Atty. Ernesto Flores filed by Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) before this Court on July 5, 1993, seeking his removal or
suspension from the bar for forum shopping, which amounted to “grave misconduct, x x
x unduly delaying the administration of justice, and violating with impunity his oath of
office and applicable laws and jurisprudence.” i[1]

After the respondent submitted his Comment, dated August 21, 1993, we referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on September 27, 1993 for
investigation, report and recommendation. On August 15, 1997, we received a
resolution from the IBP Board of Governors, finding respondent guilty of violating
Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommending his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months, viz:

“RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-149


Adm. Case NO. 4058
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
Atty. Ernesto B. Flores
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, hereinmade [sic] part of this Resolution/Decision as
Annex “A”; and finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Ernesto
Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months for
violating the provision of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.”ii[2]
The Facts

Because the partiesiii[3] agreed to dispense with the presentation of testimonial


evidence, the case was submitted for resolution on the basis of their documentary
evidence. As found by Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, the facts are as
follows:

“x x x. On February 25, 1993, Labor Arbiter Irenarco Rimando of the National


Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch, Cordillera Administrative
Region, Baguio City, issued a Writ of Execution (x x x) in NLRC Case No. RAB-1-
0313-84 to enforce the decision rendered by the Supreme Court on May 18, 1992
in G.R. No. 89070 (Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 209 SCRA 55).
The Writ of Execution was issued on motion of Benguet Electric Cooperative
(BENECO for short) to collect the amount of P344,000.00 which it paid to Peter
Cosalan during the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court, on the basis of
its decision ordering the respondent board members ‘to reimburse petitioner
BENECO any amount that it may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan by
virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen.’

After issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent, as new counsel for the
losing litigant-members of the BENECO Board of Directors, filed a Motion for
Clarification with the Third Division of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070, the
minute resolution to wit: ‘to note without action the aforesaid motion’.

Thereafter, the respondent instituted a suit docketed as Civil Case NO. 2738-R
(x x x) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Baguio City, seeking to enjoin the
defendants Clerk of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of
the said writ of execution. That case, however, was dismissed by the Presiding
Judge Clarence Villanueva in his Order dated March 18, 1993 (x x x).

Accordingly, the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTC, Baguio City, through Sheriff
III Wilfredo Mendez, proceeded to levy on the properties of the losing board
members of BENECO. Thus, a sale at public auction was set on June 1, 1993, at
10:00 o’clock in the morning in front of the Baguio City Hall, per Sheriff’s Notice of
Sale dated May 4, 1993 (x x x), of the properties of Abundio Awal and Nicasio
Aliping[,] two of the losing members of the Board of Directors of BENECO in the
aforementioned case.
Respondent claims in his comment (x x x) that Branch 7, motu proprio,
dismissed Civil Case No. 2738-R for lack of jurisdiction on March 18,1993, which
dismissal was [sic] became final due to respondent’s failure to perfect an appeal
therefrom which claim according to the complainant, constitute[s] deliberate
misrepresentation, if not falsehood, because the respondent indeed interposed an
appeal such that on May 11, 1993, the RTC 7 of Baguio City transmitted the entire
record of Civil Case No. 2738-R to the Court of Appeals per certified machine copy
of the letter transmittal of same date (x x x).

While respondent ‘never essentially intended to assail the issuance by the


NLRC of the Writ of Execution x x x nor sought to undo it’ (x x x) the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2738-R which he filed prays for the immediate issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary writ of injunction for defendants Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio City Sheriff to cease and desist from enforcing the
execution and levy of the writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR, pending
resolution of the main action in said court (x x x) which complainant likewise claims
as an unprocedural maneuver to frustrate the execution of the decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 89070 in complete disregard of settled jurisprudence
that regular courts have no jurisdiction to hear and decide questions which arise
and are incidental to the enforcement of decisions, orders and awards rendered in
labor cases citing the case of Cangco vs. CA, 199 SCRA 677, a display of gross
ignorance of the law.

On May 26, 1993, respondent again filed for Abundio Awal and Nicasio Aliping with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, La Trinidad, Benguet, separate complaints for
Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, Ope Lege, and thus Exempt from
Levy and Execution the subject properties with Damages, etc. docketed as Civil
Cases Nos. 93-F-0414 (x x x) and 93-F-0415 (x x x), which are essentially similar
actions to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment rendered in NLRC Case No.
RAB-1-0313-84. He also filed an urgent Motion Ex-parte (x x x) praying for
temporary restraining order in these two (2) cases.

The complainant further alleges that respondent’s claim for damages against
the defendant Sheriff is another improper and unprocedural maneuver which is
likewise a violation of respondent’s oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said
Sheriff was merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job.”
Recommendation of the IBP

As noted earlier, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended, and the


IBP Board of Governors concurred, that respondent be suspended from the bar for six
months for:

1. Falsehood, for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R was not appealed on time
2. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping

Commissioner Jose ratiocinated:

“A cursory glance of (sic) x x x the complaint filed by the respondent in Civil Case No.
2738-R before the RTC of Baguio City, which complaint was signed and verified under
oath by the respondent, reveals that it lacks the certification required by Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91 which took effect on January 1, 1992 to the effect that ‘to the best of
his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency. If there is any other
action pending, he must state the status of the same. If he should learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or pending before the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals or different divisions thereof or any tribunal or agency[,] he should notify the
court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from such notice.’

“Among the other penalties, the said circular further provides that the lawyer may also
be subjected to disciplinary proceedings for non-compliance thereof.

“In sum, it is clear that the respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility under which the lawyer owes candor, fairness
and good faith to the court and exert[s] every effort and consider[s] it his duty to assist in
the speedy and efficient administration of justice.” iv[4]
This Court’s Ruling

We adopt and affirm the recommendation of the IBP suspending the respondent from
the bar, but we increase the period from six (6) months to one (1) year and six (6)
months.
Forum Shopping

Circular No. 28-91,v[5] dated September 4, 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992,
requires a certificate of non-forum shopping to be attached to petitions filed before this
Court and the Court of Appeals. This circular was revised on February 8, 1994. The
IBP found that the respondent had violated it, because the complaint he filed before the
RTC of Baguio City “lack[ed] the certification required by Supreme Court Circular No.
28-91.”vi[6]

We distinguish. Respondent’s failure to attach the said certificate cannot be deemed a


violation of the aforementioned circular, because the said requirement applied only to
petitions filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals. vii[7] Likewise inapplicable is
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated February 8, 1994 which extended the
requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping to all initiatory pleadings filed in all
courts and quasi-judicial agencies other than this Court and the Court of Appeals.
Circular No. 04-94 became effective only on April 1, 1994, but the assailed complaint for
injunction was filed on March 18, 1993, and the petition for the constitution of a family
home was instituted on May 26, 1993.

Be that as it may, respondent is still guilty of forum shopping. In Chemphil Export and
Import Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,viii[8] this Court declared that “(t)he rule against
forum shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars ix[9] of this Court
merely formalized the prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against
transgressors.” The prohibition is found in Section 1(e) of Rule 16 and Section 4 of
Rule 2 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provide:

“SECTION 1. Grounds. -- Within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action
may be made on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause;

xxx xxx xxxx[10]

“SEC. 4. Effect of splitting a single cause of action. -- If two or more complaints are
brought for different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the first may be
pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance with section 1 (e) of Rule 16,
and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others.” xi[11]

The prohibition is also contained in Circular No. 28-91. This circular did not only
require that a certification of non-forum shopping be attached to the petitions filed
before this Court or the Court of Appeals; it also decreed that forum shopping
constituted direct contempt of court and could subject the offending lawyer to
disciplinary action. The third paragraph thereof reads:

“3. Penalties.

(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the
multiple petition or complaint.

(b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party and his lawyer wit the filing of
multiple petitions and complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute direct
contempt of court.

(c) The submission of false certification under Par. 2 of the Circular shall likewise
constitute contempt of Court, without prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the
guilty party. The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary proceedings.”
(Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing were substantially reproduced in Revised Circular No. 28-91 xii[12] and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94.xiii[13]

In a long line of cases, this Court has held that forum shopping exists when, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another,xiv[14] or when he institutes two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. xv[15] The most important factor in determining the
existence of forum shopping is the “vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a
party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant the same
or substantially the same reliefs.”xvi[16]

After this Court rendered its Decisionxvii[17] in Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al.xviii[18] and upon motion of BENECO, Labor
Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of execution xix[19] ordering the clerk of court
and ex officio city sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at
public auction personal and real property of the members of the Board of Directors of
BENECO.

On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for BENECO Board
Members Victor Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping, Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with
the RTC an injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) “to preserve the status quo as now obtaining between the parties,” as well as a
writ of preliminary preventive injunction ordering the clerk of court and the ex officio city
sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to “cease and desist from enforcing by execution and levy
the writ of execution from the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action raised
in court.”xx[20]

When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores filed with another branch
of the RTC two identical but separate actions both entitled “Judicial Declaration of
Family Home Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from Levy and Execution; with Damages,
etc.,” docketed as Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415. xxi[21] The said complaints
were supplemented by an “Urgent Motion Ex Parte” xxii[22] which prayed for an order to
temporarily restrain Sheriff Wilfredo V. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of
plaintiffs’ property “to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus [oficio] any judgment of the
court later in this [sic] cases, until further determined by the court.”

Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 are groundless suits. Modequillo vs.
Breva,xxiii[23] reiterated in Manacop vs. Court of Appeals,xxiv[24] shows the frivolity of
these proceedings:

“Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors
should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to
the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

xxx.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of
the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein.”

Adhering to the Court’s declaration in said cases, the subject properties are deemed
constituted as family homes by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code.

The suits for the constitution of a family home were not only frivolous and unnecessary;
they were clearly asking for reliefs identical to the prayer previously dismissed by
another branch of the RTC, i.e., to forestall the execution of a final judgment of the labor
arbiter. That they were filed ostensibly for the judicial declaration of a family home
was a mere smoke screen; in essence, their real objective was to restrain or delay the
enforcement of the writ of execution. In his deliberate attempt to obtain the same relief
in two different courts, Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a “friendly” forum
which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction and was thereby trifling
with the judicial process.xxv[25]

We remind the respondent that, under the Code of Professional Responsibility, xxvi[26]
he had a duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. xxvii[27] The
Code also enjoins him from unduly delaying a case by impeding the execution of a
judgment or by misusing court processes.xxviii[28]

In consonance with Millare vs. Monteroxxix[29] and Garcia vs. Francisco,xxx[30]


respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year. In Millare, the
respondent filed with different courts a total of six appeals, complaints and petitions
which frustrated and delayed the execution of a final judgment. Holding that
“respondent ‘made a mockery of the judicial processes’ and disregarded canons of
professional ethics in intentionally frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose favor a
judgment in the case was rendered [and], thus, ‘abused procedural rules to defeat the
ends of substantial justice,’”xxxi[31] this Court suspended the respondent from the
practice of law for one year.

In Garcia, the respondent was also suspended for one year from the practice of law, for
violating the proscription against forum shopping. This Court held that “he deserve[d] to
be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to
other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.” xxxii[32]
Falsehood

The investigating commissioner also held respondent liable for committing a falsehood
because, in this administrative case, he stated in his comment that he had not
“perfected an appeal on the dismissal” of his petition for injunction. In his said
comment, the respondent stated:

“Branch 7 (of the RTC) motu proprio, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on
March 18, 1993. Not having perfected an appeal on the dismissal, the order of
dismissal became final under the Rules 15 days after its receipt by respondent on
record, or before April 6, 1993. So that today this case is no longer pending.

xxx.

It should be noted that when Civil Case Nos. 93-F-0414 and 93-F-0415 for family
homes and damages were filed in the court below on May 26, 1993, Civil Case NO.
2378-R which seems to give basis to the present Complaint was deemed terminated,
there being no appeal formally taken and perfected in accordance with the Rules.

xxx.

And that precisely was the primal reason why respondent decided not to appeal any
further anymore [sic] the order of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of the court below in
Civil Case No. 2738, and let it be deemed final by the Rules and jurisprudence.” xxxiii[33]
(Underscoring supplied.)

The indelible fact, however, is that respondent did file an appeal which was perfected
later on. The original records of the injunction suit had been transmitted to the appellate
court.xxxiv[34] Moreover, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal.xxxv[35] Thus, in denying that he had appealed the decision of the RTC,
respondent was making a false statement.

Respondent argues that the withdrawal of his appeal means that no appeal was made
under Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The pertinent provisions of Rule
50xxxvi[36]read:

“SEC. 2. Effect of dismissal.-- Fifteen (15) days after the dismissal of an appeal, the
clerk shall return to the court below the record on appeal with a certificate under the
seal of the court showing that the appeal has been dismissed. Upon the receipt of such
certificate in the lower court the case shall stand there as though no appeal had ever
been taken, and the judgment of the said court may be enforced with the additional
costs allowed by the appellate court upon dismissing the appeal.”

xxx xxx xxx

“SEC. 4. Withdrawal of appeal.-- An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time


before the filing of appellee’s brief. x x x. The withdrawal of an appeal shall have the
same effect as that of a dismissal in accordance with section 2 of this rule.”
Respondent’s explanation misses the point. True, he withdrew his appeal. But it is
likewise true that he had actually filed an appeal, and that this was perfected. False
then is his statement that no appeal was perfected in the injunction suit. Worse, he
made the statement before this Court in order to exculpate himself, though in vain, from
the charge of forum shopping.

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he


owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. xxxvii[37] He shall neither do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any. He also has a duty not to mislead or allow
the courts to be misled by any artifice. xxxviii[38]

For this offense, we suspend the respondent from the practice of law for another year.
True, in Ordonio vs. Eduarte,xxxix[39] Porac Trucking, Inc. vs. Court of Appealsxl[40] and
Erectors, Inc. vs. NLRC,xli[41] we imposed a suspension of only six months for a similar
malfeasance. But in Flores’ case, his falsehood is aggravated by its brazenness, for it
was committed in an attempt, vain as it was, to cover up his forum shopping.

Before we close, we note that this simple case was referred to the IBP on September
27, 1993. It was deemed submitted for resolution per the investigating commissioner’s
order dated May 10, 1995. However, the investigating commissioner submitted his
report only on May 5, 1997. Moreover, the IBP transmitted its recommendation to the
Court only through a letter dated July 31, 1997, which was received by the Office of the
Bar Confidant on August 15, 1997. Why it took the IBP almost four years to finish its
investigation of the case and over two years from the date the parties filed their last
pleadings to resolve it escapes us. After all, the case did not require any trial-type
investigation, and the parties submitted only documentary evidence to prove or rebut
their respective cases. Thus, we find it opportune to urge the IBP to hasten the
disposition of administrative cases and to remind it that this Court gives it only ninety
days to finish its investigation, report and recommendation. Should it require more time,
it should file with the Court a request for extension, giving the reason for such request.

WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping,


Respondent Ernesto B. Flores is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR and, for violating his oath and the Canon of Professional
Responsibility to do no falsehood, he is SUSPENDED for another period of ONE (1)
YEAR, resulting in a total period of TWO (2) YEARS, effective upon finality of this
Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of a similar misconduct will be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be included in his files which are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, CJ. Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
iRegala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG
wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information
regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its client’s name?

Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-
client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.” He cannot be obliged to grope in
the dark against unknown forces.

Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the
client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer’s legal advice was
obtained.

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007 DIGEST

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct
and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January
2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to
Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love you,” “I miss
you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her
work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001
complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent
celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to
Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New
Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she
was pregnant.

Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.

Held: Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall
not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in
any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334
of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in
any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART.
XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that
he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

MARX ANDREI OSCAR V. YAUN

LEGAL RESEARCH

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JESUS MA. CUI


vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI,
 
ROMULO CUI
FACTS:

Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now
deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation and endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the
 Hospicio
Until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who
both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio"
entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his
brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant
demanding that the office be turned over to him; and the demand not having been complied with
the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same
office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the
 Hospicio
in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the
deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea
titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al
estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree
of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar,
not having passed the examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the
 Hospiciode Barili
.

Court
a quo
- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-
fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or purpose of the
administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law
degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor. I S S U E : W O N t h e p l a i n t i f f i s n o t e n t i t l e d , a s a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t , t o t h e
o f f i c e o f   administrator? YESRATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere  possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the
Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a
law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and u p o n w h o m p e c u l i a r d u t i e s ,
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a n d l i a b i l i t i e s a r e d e v o l v e d b y l a w a s a consequence. In this jurisdiction
admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule
138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a
certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate  being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as
evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has
"successfully completed all the  prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed
there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone
through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as
lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning
ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado"
because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university. The founders of
the
 Hospicio de San Jose de Barili
must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the
administrator should bea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be
the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act
No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the
 Hospicio
shall "make regulations for the government of said institution; shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which
invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the rules
and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law
and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset

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