[1] CHOICE OF ORGANIZATION; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: Right to form, join and assist labor organizations of their

own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives (Art. 257).

[2] CONCERTED ACTIVITIES; MUTUAL AID: Right to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose or for
their mutual aid and protection (Art. 257).

[3] ELECTION OF LEADERS: Their freedom to organize would be rendered nugatory if they could not choose their own
leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.

[4] PREFERENCE FOR UNION MEMBERSHIP: The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason
why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by the union, the resignation of the member-
employees is an expression of their preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative.

[5] REGARDLESS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: Recognition of the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the
basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation.

[6] RENUNCIATION OF MEMBERSHIP: The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to
refuse or refrain from exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right
granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted
to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such membership.

[7] RIGHT NOT TO JOIN: Subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union is the right NOT to join, affiliate
with, or assist any union; or to leave a union and join another one. (Heritage Hotel Manila v. PIGLAS-Heritage; G.R. No.
177024)

Elizalde Case (Iglesia ni Cristo case)

An employee has the right to join or not to join a labor union. A member of a labor union may leave and cancel his
membership at any time. An employee who joins a union does not make any commitment or assume any undertaking to
continue his membership therein for a fixed period of time, much lesser indefinitely. He is a free agent. However, in case
there is a closed-shop or union-shop agreement, the employee concerned is duty-bound to keep his union membership
for the duration of the CBA as a condition for his continued employment. If such membership is validly terminated, he may
likewise be dismissed from employment. The only exception to this is when the employee objects to such membership on
the ground of religious belief.

In the case of Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, the defendants questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 3350 which prescribed that closed shop agreements shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization. The main issues were:

1. It infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations;

2. It impairs the obligation of contracts;
3. It discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions. It unduly
protects certain religious sects and leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations.

The issues were resolved as follows:

1. The assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces
it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No.
3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
2. The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty,
and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion.
It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger.
3. To compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious
scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions. Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their
 resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and
philosophic objections. Furthermore, coerced unity and loyalty even to a labor - union assuming that such unity and
loyalty can be attained through coercion - is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious
liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

Doctrine of Necessary Implication

The doctrine of necessary implication is the legal basis for ineligibility of confidential employees to join, assist or form any
union. Article 255 [245] of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union
activities. Their disqualification proceeds merely from the application of the doctrine of necessary implication because
what Article 255 [245] singles out as ineligible to engage in union activities are managerial employees. By necessary
implication, the disqualification extends to a confidential employee who, by reason of his position or nature of work, assist
or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records
and information related to labor relations. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed.

The Doctrine of Necessary Implication is therefore the legal basis for ineligibility of confidential employees to join a union.

Cases where confidential employees were allowed to join unions

(Filoil vs. Filoil Supervisory and Confidential Employees’ Assocation, L-267336, 1972)

Doctrine: The inclusion of confidential employees with the union of supervisory employees may be valid if the confidential
employees are very few in number and are, by practice and tradition, identified with supervisors in their role as
representatives of management vis-à-vis the rank-and-file employees. Such identity of interest has allowed their inclusion
in the bargaining unit of supervisors for purposes of collective bargaining.

(Southern Philippines Federation of Labor V. Ferrer-Calleja)

It is maintained by the petitioner that under the Labor Code, managerial employees are excluded from forming or joining a
collective bargaining unit; and under the collective bargaining agreement executed between Apex and respondent union,
among those who are excluded from the bargaining unit are: a) managerial employees as defined in paragraph K, Article
212 of the Labor Code; b) those performing supervisory functions; and c) those holding confidential positions as
determined by the company. Therefore, the employees holding the positions of Supervisors II and III and those in the
confidential payrolls should be excluded from joining the bargaining unit and from voting in the certification election.
Likewise, those employees who are not paying union dues should be excluded from the same since the existing CBA
contains a Union shop provision.

The contentions have no merit.

Although we have upheld the validity of the CBA as the law among the parties, its provisions cannot override what is
expressly provided by law that only managerial employees are ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization (See
Art. 247, Labor Code). Therefore, regardless of the challenged employees' designations, whether they are employed as
Supervisors or in the confidential payrolls, if the nature of their job does not fall under the definition of "managerial" as
defined in the Labor Code, they are eligible to be members of the bargaining unit and to vote
in the certification election. Their right to self-organization must be upheld in the absence of an express provision of law to
the contrary. It cannot be curtailed by a collective bargaining agreement.

(San Miguel Corporation Supervisors and Exempt Employees Union V. Laguesma)

This Court rules that said employees do not fall within the term "confidential employees" who may be prohibited from
joining a union. There is no question that the said employees, supervisors and the exempt employees, are not vested with
the powers and prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff,
recall, discharge or dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who,
under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the very same
provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or
form separate labor organizations of their own. The only question that need be addressed is whether these employees are
properly classified as confidential employees or not. Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a
confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential
employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor
must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees
who, in the normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal
objective sought to be accomplished by the ''confidential employee rule." The broad rationale behind this rule is that
employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. "Management should not be
required to handle labor relations matters through employees who are represented by the union with which the company
is required to deal and who in the normal performance of their duties may obtain advance information of the company's
position with regard to contract negotiations, the disposition of grievances, or other labor relations matters." An important
element of the "confidential employee rule" is the employee's need to use labor relations information. Thus, in determining
the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently considered is the employee's necessary access to
confidential labor relations information. It is the contention of respondent corporation that Supervisor employees 3 and 4
and the exempt employees come within the meaning of the term "confidential employees" primarily because they
answered in the affirmative when asked "Do you handle confidential data or documents?" in the Position Questionnaires
submitted by the Union. In the same questionnaire, however, it was also stated that the confidential information handled
by questioned employees relate to product formulation, product standards and product specification which by no means
relate to "labor relations." Granting arguendo that an employee has access to confidential labor relations information but
such is merely incidental to his duties and knowledge thereof is not necessary in the performance of such duties, said
access does not render the employee a confidential employee. "If access to confidential labor relations information is to
be a factor in the determination of an employee's confidential status, such information must relate to the employer's labor
relations policies. Thus, an employee of a labor union, or of a management association, must have access to confidential
labor relations information with respect to his employer, the union, or the association, to be regarded a confidential
employee, and knowledge of labor relations information pertaining to the companies with which the union deals, or which
the association represents, will not cause an employee to be excluded from the bargaining unit representing employees of
the union or association." "Access to information which is regarded by the employer to be confidential from the business
standpoint, such as financial information or technical trade secrets, will not render an employee a confidential employee."

(Nat’l Association of Trade Unions-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter V. Torres)

Albeit included in the book of Chan, SC decided in this case that the confidential employees which the respondent bank
petitioned to be disqualified to form, join, or assist in a union because of the Doctrine of Necessary Implication. Under the
doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly disqualified. This doctrine states that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof.

Rule on commingling union membership

Article 245 of the Labor Code states the prohibition on commingling union membership. Supervisory employees shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own. (As amended by Section 18, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).

However, it bears noting that in case there is commingling membership of supervisors and rank-and-file employees in one
union, the new rule enunciated in Article 256 of the Labor Code is that it cannot be invoked as a ground for the
cancellation of the registration of the union. The employees so improperly included are automatically deemed removed
from the list of members of said union. In other words, their removal from the said list is by operation of law.

Substitutionary doctrine

This doctrine holds that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their
employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract. The
employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on the collective bargaining contract, except to negotiate with
the management for the shortening thereof. (Elisco-Elirol Labor Union, December 29, 1977) The CBA continues to bind
the members of the new or disaffiliated and independent union up to the CBA’s expiration date. (Associated Workers
Union, July 30, 1990)

Check-off, assessments and agency fees

“Check-off” means a method of deducting from the employee’s pay at prescribed periods, any amount due for fees, fines
or assessments. It is a process or device whereby the employer, on agreement with the union recognized as the proper
bargaining representative, or on prior authorization from its employees, deducts union dues and assessments from the
latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union. Assessments are fees charged to union members in addition to their
normal dues. The following requisites must concur in order for union dues and special
assessments for the union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses to be valid, namely:

(a) Authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called
for the purpose;
(b) Secretary’s record of the minutes of said meeting; and
(c) Individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the employees concerned.

The dues and other fees that may be assessed from non-union members within the bargaining unit who accept and avail
of the benefits flowing from the CBA are called “agency fees.” Payment of agency fee to the bargaining union/agent which
negotiated the CBA is but a reasonable requirement recognized by law, to prevent non-union members from enriching
themselves at the expense of union members. (See Article 248 [e], Labor Code; Section 4, Rule XXV, Book V, Rules to
Implement the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 40-03, Series of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003]).
It must be emphasized that non-members of the certified bargaining agent which successfully concluded the CBA are not
required to become members of the latter. Their acceptance of the benefits flowing from the CBA and their act of paying
the agency fee does not make them members thereof.

All unions are authorized to collect reasonable amounts of:

1. Membership fees
2. Uniond dues
3. Assessments
4. Fines
5. Contributions for labor education and research, mutual death and hospitalization benefits, welfare fund, strike fund
and credit and cooperative undertakings
6. Agency fees

Requisites for validity of union dues and special assessments:

1. Authorization by written resolution of the majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called
for that purpose;
2. Secretary’s record of the minutes of said meetings;
3. Individual written authorization for check-off duly signed by the employees

Assessment for Attorney’s fees, Negotiation fees and similar charges

Attorney’s fees, Negotiation fees and similar charges arising from negotiation or conclusion of the CBA shall not be
imposed on any individual member of the contracting union. Such fees and charges may be charged only against the
union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties.

Individual written authorization, when not required.

In the following cases, individual written authorization is not required:

1. Assessment from non-members of the SEBA of agency fees.

2. Deductions for fees for mandatory activities such as labor relations seminars and labor education activities.
3. Check-off for union service fees authorized by law.
4. Deductions for withholding tax.
5. Deductions for withholding of wages because of employee’s debt to the employer which is already due.
6. Deductions made pursuant to a judgment against the worker under circumstances where the wages may be the
subject of attachment or execution but only for debts incurred for food, clothing, shelter and medical attendance.
7. Deductions from wages ordered by the court.
8. Deductions authorized by law such as for premiums for PhilHealth, Social Security, PAG-IBIG, Employee’s
compensation and the like.

Agency fees
Fees collected from non-members of the SEBA but covered by and included in the CBU who accept the benefits provided
in the CBA. It is called agency fees  because by availing of the benefits of the CBA, they, in effect, recognize and accept
the SEBA as their agent  as well.

 Non-SEBA members refer to members of minority union. They are obligated to pay two kinds of dues:
1. Union dues and special assessments to their own union; and
2. Agency fee to the SEBA.

Check-off of Agency Fees

 Check-off agency fees is a process whereby the employer, upon agreement with the SEBA, deducts agency fees
from the wages of non-SEBA members who avail of the benefits from the CBA and remits them directly to the SEBA.
 The right of the SEBA to demand from the employer the check-off of agency fees accrues from the moment the
non-SEBA member accepts the benefits from the CBA.

Limitations on the amount of Agency fee

1. It should be reasonable in amount; and

2. It should be equivent to the dues and other fees paid by the members of the SEBA.