Constructivist Approaches

Towards a Dialogue Among

Constructivist Research Programs
Gastón Becerra • Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina • gastonbecerra/at/sociales.uba.ar
José Antonio Castorina • Universidad de Buenos Aires and National Scientific and Technical Research
Council (CONICET), Argentina • ctono/at/fibertel.com.ar Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina

> Context • Constructivist epistemology is not a doctrinal set of clear and consistent theses and assumptions but a
movement full of tensions, with minimally integrated lines of discussions. > Problem • This situation explains why
it is so difficult to come up with a general definition of constructivist epistemology that could serve as a starting
point to study its several research programs systematically and comparatively. > Method • We compare the construc-
tivist epistemologies of Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas Luhmann regarding ten-
sions between knowledge/reality and individual/society. > Results • Our comparison leads to a general definition
of constructivist epistemology as a heterogeneous movement problematizing certain dualities – such as subject/
object, knowledge/reality, or individual/society – that have been shown to be central for epistemological inquiry.
We argue that such dualisms can be used as dimensions for critical analysis, comparison, and discussion among
the different research programs, and that, at the same time, they would allow us to analyze the general strate-
gies characterizing such programs. The comparative and critical analysis of the programs by way of the aforemen-
tioned tensions results in an organized presentation highlighting their convergences, divergences, and singularities.
> Implications • The framework presented for evaluation (and further elaboration) can be useful to elucidate the
standpoints of constructivist epistemology’s research programs, and thence consolidate lines of dialogue among
them. > Key words • Constructivism, epistemology, knowledge, reality, society.

Introduction
« 1 »  Constructivist epistemology is not
a clear doctrinal set of theses and assump-
tions but a movement1 full of tensions where
research programs appear to be related only
by some “family resemblance.” Some of the
metaphors used to characterize it are inher-
ently eloquent: constructivism would be a
“galaxy” not capable of being categorized
under any viewpoint (Sandoval Moya 2010:
31); a “mosaic” belonging to everyone and to
no one at the same time (Holstein & Gubri-
um 2008: 5); “a fragile coalition of marginal,
nomadic academic bands” (Lynch 1998: 14);
and even a “many-headed beast with limbs
that are as varied as they are numerous”
(Francis 2005: 252).
« 2 »  There is an array of research lines
within constructivist epistemology and it
is not easy to find classification criteria for
them (Knorr-Cetina 1989; Riegler 2005;
1 |  We have selected this collective term in-
spired by Steve Fuller’s remarks (1998) that the
dynamism of any social movement is fueled by its
internal tensions.
Schmidt 2010). Just to mention the two
most developed ones:
ƒƒ We could talk about a “constructivism
interested in cognitive theory,” where
Jean Piaget (1970a), Ernst von Glasers-
feld (1995), Heinz von Foerster (2003),
Humberto Maturana (1995), Francisco
Varela (1990), and Niklas Luhmann
(1997b) are amongst the most promi-
nent scholars. This line receives input
from empirical research in fields such as
neurophysiology, biology, psychology,
and sociology, whose interdisciplinary
dialogue has been facilitated by the pre-
eminence of both cybernetic and system
theory.
ƒƒ Or we could also talk about “(social)
constructionism” where the “social
construction” category prevails, with a
double focus on knowledge in everyday
life – along the lines of Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann’s sociology (1966)
– and scientific knowledge – in the
vein of Kuhn’s (1970) “socio-historical”
approach, where David Bloor (1991),
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986)
or Karin Knorr-Cetina (2005) stand out.
« 3 »  Although all such works make a
contribution to understanding science and
knowledge, their discussions normally fail
to accommodate contributions from other
research lines. Thus, for example, compre-
hensive constructionism studies – such as
the very much renowned and cited The So-
cial Construction of What? (Hacking 1999)
or Social Constructionism and the Philoso- 191
phy of Science (Kukla 2000) – do not men-
tion any authors from the first category at
all, while, on the other hand, such authors’
theorizations barely include the problem
of social conditions in the production of
knowledge. It is even more difficult to find
points of dialogue between those taking a
more philosophical approach and others
who propose the “naturalizing” – in Quine’s
(1961) sense – of epistemological thought.
Perhaps such disconnection between inqui-
ry and discussion lines within constructiv-
ism may explain why it has been contrasted
with so many diverse alternatives: for ex-
ample, cognitive constructivism is usually
contrasted with empiricism and innatism;
social constructionism is usually contrasted
with essentialism, inevitabilism, and real-

http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
192
ism; philosophical constructivism is usually
contrasted with realism, determinism, and
other anti-relativist approaches. Likewise,
it should be no surprise that these lines –
and others – differentiate in terms of pub-
lications and citation networks (Becerra
2016b).
« 4 »  Such a characterization would
become even more complex should we
contemplate other developments where
constructivist epistemology is “applied,” as
happens in some psychotherapy streams or
in business administration, not to mention
other art, political or cultural movements
where it has exerted influence. Perhaps the
most iconic (scientific) field of application
is pedagogy, where constructivist episte-
mology is the leading paradigm. Neverthe-
less, as its specialists warn, that is because,
in such a field, constructivism has been re-
duced to a set of very vague and trivial as-
sumptions as a result of merging viewpoints
and assumptions from research programs
as dissimilar as those of Piaget’s, Vygotsky’s,
Paulo Freire’s, among others (Castorina
2003; Coll 1996; Delval 2001; Martí 1996;
Phillips 1995). It is probably because of this
that when proposing to draw a character-
ization and make an analysis of the tensions
traversing constructivist epistemology – as
we hereby do –, it may be good to avoid
“inflating” excessively the term “construc-
tivism” outside the cognitive, epistemic or
philosophical fields, as much as “deflating”
it by identifying it with some specific theo-
retical or methodological stance – such as
perspectivism or the qualitative techniques
used in the field of social research – cor-
responding to any of its application areas
(Castorina 2009).
Toward a definition
of constructivism
« 5 »  The considerations above may ex-
plain why it is so difficult to come up with
a comprehensive definition that could serve
as an entry point to constructivist episte-
mology. For that reason, two complemen-
tary definitions are usually given:
ƒƒ A “negative” one, where the distinctive
feature is a “critical attitude” toward the
occurrence of inevitability, naturalness
or essentiality in certain entities of ev-
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
eryday or scientific life. This is an anti-
foundationalist and anti-aprioristic
definition, which is strongly influenced
by the social constructionist’s interest
in unveiling the performative nature of
social classifications or denouncing the
authority of science.
ƒƒ A “positive” one, which is based on the
assertion that the knowing system/sub-
ject plays an active role in the creation
and transformation of knowledge. The
problem is that the generality of this
definition is based on a strongly meta-
phorical use of “construction,” which
leaves the door open to interpretations
that may be openly opposite. It is no
surprise then that those who criticize
constructivism have been insisting on
using a more literal language (Hacking
1999; Sismondo 1993).
« 6 »  In this work, we want to put a dif-
ferent definition forward:2 we understand
constructivist epistemology as a heteroge-
neous movement that, from different fields
of science, problematizes certain dualities
that have been profoundly central in epis-
temological inquiry, such as subject/object,
knowledge/reality, individual/society, gen-
esis/structure, culture/nature, fact/value,
body/mind, discourse/praxis, emotionality/
rationality, among others.
« 7 »  We propose to adopt some of these
dualities as tensioned axes upon which each
constructivist research program sets its
own position. This will allow us to clarify
and compare the position of each research
program and, eventually, to assess potential
cross-fertilizations. We need to express a
loud and clear word of caution before start-
ing: although we can analyze each tension
2 |  We do not intend to introduce an inno-
vation with this definition since it can be traced
back to the work of several authors who have
tried to put the constructivist discussion in order
in specific fields and within particular traditions
(e.g., Castorina 2009, 2010; Kenny 2007; Over-
ton 1994, 2006; Phillips 1995, 1997). In a more
restricted way, such a definition is also suggested
in the editorial of the initial issue of Constructiv-
ist Foundations (Riegler 2005). Our objective by
reinstituting it herein is to address it more system-
atically and explicitly, free from the limitations
associated with the fields and research programs
where it has been used before.
separately, it is necessary to consider that
the positions taken by a research program
based on certain anchor points are mutually
dependent and that they are consequent
to their corresponding philosophical the-
sis, the problems of their interest, and the
branch of knowledge they take input from.
Thus, identifying the positions of a research
program throughout several axes can be
useful to evaluate how the program’s ele-
ments are connected and even their con-
sistency. Accordingly, we shall compare the
overall strategy each research program has
adopted to problematize these dualities. We
may presume we will come up with some of
the following three situations:
ƒƒ seeking to overcome dualism through
integration or dialectical articulation of
terms;
ƒƒ elimination of dualism, by denying one
of the terms, or else a term’s being sub-
sumed under its opposite;
ƒƒ restitution or reaffirmation of dualisms.
« 8 »  Among the aforementioned du-
alities, the subject/object pair has taken
special prominence due to its broadness,
abstraction, and preeminence in the history
of thought. The topic in dispute is the origin
of knowledge, a problem that is usually dis-
cussed by the following polar contrast: that
of “humans the creators” or that of “nature
as instructor,” and although the discussion
on these terms does not exhaust the prob-
lems characterizing constructivisms, as De-
nis Philips (1995: 7) points out, it is indeed
the one that best captures the crux of the
matter since constructivism’s outer lines are
simply crossed at some point throughout
this tension and one ceases to be a construc-
tivist. Due to the way Immanuel Kant has
addressed this issue, he may be considered
the philosophical father of constructivism.
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1998)
dismisses dogmatic rationalism and empiri-
cism by arguing that neither speculative rea-
son, nor experience alone, is enough to in-
stitute knowledge of the world. In line with
the natural science’s model (Newtonian
physics), Kant proposes that knowledge is
grounded on principles preceding expe-
rience – a priori categories – with which
judgments of phenomena are constructed
and eventually, contrasted. 20th century
constructivist epistemology has criticized
the a priori and universal nature of Kantian
 Constructivist Approaches
categories as well as transcendental meth-
odology as a form of epistemic inquiry.
But if these are the main characteristics in
Kant’s answer to the problem of knowledge,
then constructivism still accepts his outlook
when posing the question.
« 9 »  However, the highly abstract dis-
cussion surrounding the subject/object ten-
sion may hide the numerous approaches
different research programs take in the
constructivist epistemology debate. On this
basis, instead of addressing subject/object
directly, we choose to observe its manifes-
tations or reverberations on the other axes,
which would also allow us to analyze the
way it has been associated with specific is-
sues in constructivist discussions.
« 10 »  In order to evaluate the potenti-
ality of this analysis framework, we propose
to compare research programs within con-
structivist epistemology interested in cog-
nitive theory. We will focus on the research
programs outlined by Piaget (as well as revi-
sions thereof by Rolando García), von Gla-
sersfeld, Maturana, and Luhmann. There
are several reasons for selecting these au-
thors: they explicitly acknowledge links and
criticisms from one another, which makes
such comparison look like a controversy;
their works span across several disciplines,
which means they are considering different
approaches and empirical inputs; and final-
ly, perhaps with the exception of von Gla-
sersfeld, they all have an ambivalent way of
considering themselves as constructivists.
We will not consider social constructivists
such as Latour, Bloor, or Berger & Luck-
mann – although our preliminary explora-
tions show this analytical framework could
be helpful to bridge and compare their po-
sitions (with one another and with those
interested in cognitive theory) – because in
doing so, this first piece would result in an
extremely large and dense argumentation.
Regarding the scope of such comparisons,
we have selected two specific axes or ten-
sions: knowledge/reality, where we nest the
epistemic assertions about knowledge being
constructed; and individual/society, where
the inquiry about the subject or system of
knowledge is. In the next two sections, we
focus on each axis. In the third section, we
extend the reach of our analysis to the dif-
ferent general strategies research programs
adopt to address dualities.
Towards a Dialogue Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina
Knowledge/reality
« 11 »  Characterization of knowledge is
the topic most clearly showing the differ-
ent positions among constructivist research
programs. We can put forward the problem
as follows: if we start from the premise that
knowledge is the construction of a knowing
subject, then to what extent can we assert
that the objects such knowledge refers to are
“real” in the sense of being independent of
the mind? When answering this question,
a tension appears between two positions: a
“moderate” one that understands that the
knowing subject constitutes the object of
knowledge under certain conditions given by
that which exists, thus knowledge somehow
refers to a mind-independent reality; and a
more “extreme” one, for which knowledge is
a creation relatively free from the epistemic
subject, usually sustained by the idea that
such a reality is unknowable per se. What is
disputable in this dimension is the problem
regarding which is the “status of reality” as-
signed to what we refer to as “knowledge,” or,
in other words, whether the objects making
up knowledge refer to a reality that is inde-
pendent of cognition. This issue intertwines
an ontological problem (which entities pop-
ulate the world) with an epistemic one (what
we can know about the world).
« 12 »  Since “reality” is the controversial
word here, it may be well to begin by clari-
fying the realism standpoint. In its ontologi-
cal variant, realism claims that entities our
knowledge refers to exist independently, that
is to say, they are not bound by or changed
because they are known; epistemic realism
claims it is possible to know mind-indepen-
dent reality and that such knowing can be as-
sessed in terms of truthfulness (in the sense
of verisimilitude) (Boyd 1992). Epistemic
realism comprises ontological realism since
knowing things “as they are” entails their
independent existence. These positions also
intertwine with the type of entity claimed to
be in existence or known (Kukla 1998). You
can be realist as regards perceivable physi-
cal objects – common-sense realism (Devitt
1996; Nola & Irzik 2005) –, unobservable ob-
jects, such as theoretical entities articulated
by science – which is also called “scientific
realism” (Hacking 1983; Psillos 1999) –, and
even structural and abstract properties of
the world expressed in mathematical form –
also called “structural realism” (Psillos 2005;
Worrall 1989). Just as there are several types
of realism, there is a broad range of antire-
alist positions. The opposite thesis to onto-
logical realism is immaterial idealism, which
claims that the world’s entities do not stand
independently of knowledge. George Berke-
ley’s statement “esse est percipi (aut perci-
pere)” expresses this idealism in a positive
sense: things exist because we think of them.
More frequently, arguments are against epis-
temic realism, that is to say, against the idea
that we can know mind-independent reality.
Criticism here is not focused on reality but
on the idea that it is possible to come up with
some kind of knowledge that is free from the
knowing subject’s marks of experience and
which could serve as a comparison criterion
(Kitcher 2001; McDermid 1998). The result
is skepticism: there is no way to justify that
a knowledge claim can be designated as real,
objective or true.
« 13 »  Constructivism is usually under-
stood as the opposite to realism, so it would
be closer to the antirealist position, near
the skepticism frontier. This holds for some
specific constructivist research programs
but it is wrong to say that about the whole
constructivist movement. What all construc-
tivist research programs reject is a “represen-
tative” or “correspondence realism,” which
claims there is identity between knowledge
and reality, usually because it assumes a copy
mechanism or passive insertion of the lat-
ter into the former, as some empiricist ap-
proaches maintain. However, as we hereinaf-
ter say, there are some constructivist research 193
programs upholding an explicitly realistic
assumption by means of an incomplete and/
or progressive approximation to mind-inde-
pendent reality.
« 14 »  In our view, one of these research
programs is that of Piaget’s genetic episte-
mology. To explain knowledge transforma-
tion, this program proposes a general pro-
cess of equilibration applied to situations
under the assumption of a system in con-
stant transformation upon interaction with
its environment: in biological matters, it
refers to the adaptation of living systems to
their environment; in cognitive matters, it
refers to the transformation of structures of
the “epistemic subject” throughout cognitive
development periods upon coming into con-
tact with objects of knowledge (Boom 2009;
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
194
Chapman 1992). Situating Piaget in the ide-
alism/realism tension is not easy, mainly be-
cause his extensive oeuvre is ambiguous on
this matter. However, consider the following
interview excerpt:
“  Bringuier: Do objects really possess the prop-
erties we attribute to them? Piaget: An object is a
limit, mathematically speaking; we are constantly
moving toward objectivity, we never attain the
object itself. The object we believe we can attain is
always the object as represented and interpreted by
the intelligence of the subject. Bringuier: Isn’t that
idealism? Piaget: No, because the object exists.
The object exists, but you can discover its prop-
erties only by successive approximations. It’s the
contrary of idealism. You are always getting closer
but you never attain it, because, in order to attain
it, you would necessarily have to grasp an infinite
number of properties, but a great many of them
”
escape you. (Bringuier 1977: 63)
« 15 »  Piaget has spoken out on several
occasions in a way that states that the “object
does exist.” He also proposes knowledge to
be “more or less” “analogous” or “isomor-
phic” to the object, and believes knowledge
progresses toward the object – as a “limit”–
that “you can never reach but you can be
closer by approximation” (Inhelder, García
& Voneche 1981: 77; Piaget 1970a: 15, 1970b:
111, 1975: 53).3 Based on such consider-
ations and on the way he describes science,
Richard Kitchener (1987) and García (2000)
have found this position to match up to criti-
cal realism, the dominant variant of scientific
realism, as have we (Castorina 2009; Becerra
2014; Becerra & Castorina 2016a). Also, giv-
en the way Piaget has described the progres-
sive and rational development of knowledge
in physical and mathematical sciences (Piag-
et & García 1982), Jonathan Tsou (2006) sug-
gests that Piaget’s constructivism addresses
the world’s abstract structures, which is in
line with structural realism.
« 16 »  Ernst von Glasersfeld’s position
is different. Although this author explic-
itly states he is in debt to Piaget, on the very
first page of Radical Constructivism: A Way
of Knowing and Learning (Glasersfeld 1995:
xiii), he quickly moves away from Piaget’s
3 |  For a much more detailed list of refer-
ences both in English and French, please check
(Kitchener 1986:104–11)
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
realism – which von Glasersfeld considered
to be “nothing but slips of mind. In all his
pioneering he may every now and then have
lapsed into the ordinary, current ways of
speaking that belong to the traditional epis-
temology he was struggling to overcome”
(ibid: 74) – and adheres to Berkeley’s, Vico’s,
and Pyrrhonian skepticism. According to
von Glasersfeld, “cognition serves the sub-
ject’s organization of the experiential world,
not the discovery of an objective ontological
reality” (ibid: 51). That is why his research
program is presented as a “theory of know-
ing” without metaphysics (Glasersfeld 1992a:
13, 1995: 1). As Alexander Riegler (2001: 1)
clarifies, this does not imply that radical con-
structivism denies the existence of a world
populated by mind-independent entities, al-
though he does restrict them in an agnostic
way. As a result, von Glasersfeld abandons
the notion of “truth” – when a prediction
turns out to be coherent to that which is
observed, no correspondence to the world
can be intended but just a fit to the circum-
stances of experience, so that regardless of
our success in this domain, reality remains
unknown (Glasersfeld 1990: 19, 1991b: 170,
1992a: 19, 2001: 39) – and proposes instead a
criterion of “viability” in the biological sense.
Because of such limitations to the world of
experience, realists have criticized radical
constructivism as being “ontological ideal-
ism” (Matthews 2014: 691). Von Glasersfeld
has rejected such an accusation by highlight-
ing that in no way does radical constructiv-
ism assert that “mind and its constructs are
the only reality” (Glasersfeld 1991b: 170).
Other more cautious critics have said that
von Glasersfeld fails to recognize variants
of realism other than the representative one
(Castorina 2009).
« 17 »  Maturana’s work is presented as
a biology of cognition, an insight into the
nature of cognition and science based on a
biology that begins considering the problem
of how living organisms are constituted up to
an ethical reasoning about social life (Becer-
ra 2016a). Maturana claims that the nature
of the cognitive process does not allow any
kind of characterization of reality in terms of
independent properties of the observer.
“  From this it follows that reality as a universe
of independent entities about which we can talk
is, necessarily, a fiction of the purely descriptive
domain, and that we should in fact apply the no-
tion of reality to this very domain of descriptions
in which we, the describing system, interact with
”
our descriptions as if with independent entities.
(Maturana 1980: 52)
« 18 »  There is no need to elaborate on
the skeptical roots of this position since the
author himself makes an explicit statement
about the philosophy inspiring him:
“ We cannot speak about the substratum in
which our cognitive behaviour is given, and about
that of which we cannot speak, we must remain
silent, as indicated by Wittgenstein. […] We, as
thinking systems, live in a domain of descriptions,
as indicated by Berkeley, and that through descrip-
tions we can indefinitely increase the complexity
”
of our cognitive domain. (Maturana 1980: 53)
« 19 »  Broadly, this position matches
up to that of von Glasersfeld as regards ac-
cepting the thesis of inaccessibility of a real-
ity-independent-from-experience. However,
Maturana does not recognize himself as a
constructivist along the lines of von Glasers-
feld: for him, von Glasersfeld’s “viability” cri-
terion seems to want a contact with reality by
the failure of our constructions, something
his skepticism makes him reject.4 Without
any such criterion, Maturana gets to “mul-
tiversa” where “existence is constitutively
dependent on the observer, and that there
are as many domains of truths as domains
of existence she or he brings forth in her or
his distinctions” (Maturana 1988a: 11). This
is why instead of a “constructivist,” he would
rather call himself –jokingly– “a super-realist
who believes in the existence of innumerable
equally valid realities” (Maturana & Poerk-
sen 2004: 43).
« 20 »  Like von Glasersfeld and Mat-
urana’s, Niklas Luhmann’s constructivism is
based on a skeptical position where there is
an external reality independent of cognition
that is known only through the introduc-
4 |  Further, Vincent Kenny has pointed out
that because of structural determinism and ad-
aptation to the environment, Maturana’s position
seems to suggest that “we can directly and inti-
mately know the ‘reality’ we are living because it
is we ourselves who have made it” (Kenny 2007:
62). He has named this position “radical realism”
to differentiate it from “radical constructivism.”
 Constructivist Approaches
tion of differences in “observation,” which is
understood as the unit of operations of dis-
tinction (or the introduction of a difference)
and indication. Thus, there can be reference
to both sensory perception, such as the rep-
resentations and cogitations of conscience,
and the communication of social systems
(Luhmann 1997b). This understanding of
observation adds explicitly to the thesis of
the inaccessibility of reality in itself, and
takes Luhmann to an antirealist position in
the epistemic domain (Luhmann 1990: 62,
65, 76, 1997b: 366, 2006a: 242, 260).
“ Thus there is nothing in the environment that
corresponds to cognition, since everything that
corresponds to cognition is dependent on distinc-
tions within which cognition indicates something
as this and not that. Therefore, there are neither
things nor events in the environment if the term
‘environment’ is supposed to indicate that that
which is thus indicated is different from some-
”
thing else. (Luhmann 2006a: 246)
« 21 »  In the ontological domain, Luh-
mann is more cautious than the other au-
thors mentioned above and promptly tries to
hold his skepticism back to avoid falling into
a denial of the world or agnostic stances by
introducing an observation/operation dis-
tinction. This way, operations exist in a world
that contains and enables them, even though
we come to know this only through observa-
tion, that is to say, by introducing a new dif-
ference into the operations (Luhmann 1990:
64–69, 2006a: 254–256). Within the scope of
the constructivist discussion, this position
may not seem controversial; however, it is
indeed, when trying to ground an empirical
sociology, as shown in the long disquisition
around his “es gibt Systeme” at the beginning
of Social Systems: for some, this is a rather
realistic statement that tends to give social
systems an ontological status (Christis 2001);
for others, Luhmann remains in the obser-
vational (conceptual) domain and is not far
from the radical constructivist position (Ma-
tuszek 2015; Moeller 2012; Scholl 2012).
« 22 »  The various positions in the phi-
losophy of knowledge as depicted above
allow us to illustrate how philosophical as-
sumptions influence the relationship be-
tween theoretical insight and empirical
research and, consequently, epistemology’s
naturalizing project. A coherent author, then,
Towards a Dialogue Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina
would be expected to adopt the same epis-
temic position when analyzing knowledge
within their empirical field of study. Follow-
ing this line, Piaget, for example, wrote:
“  I am profoundly realist [because] I have been
trained in biology. […] I cannot conceive an ideal-
istic biologist since biology requires the organism
”
to immerse into real. (Piaget in Inhelder, García
& Voneche 1981: 77, our translation)
« 23 »  For the radical ones, naturaliza-
tion is more complex as their sharp skepti-
cism makes them interpret experimental
results less broadly:
“  experimental results, no matter how compat-
ible they may be with the constructivist model, do
not make the model ‘true.’ The empirical findings
[…] cannot serve as a logical argument […] This
impossibility springs from the sceptics’ insight that
human knowledge cannot be tested by a procedure
that would again involves [sic] the mechanisms of
”
human cognition. (Glasersfeld 1995: 116)
« 24 »  Likewise, Maturana has said that
even his own work at the laboratory only il-
lustrates an experience of a certain domain
of observation but that it cannot be confused
with an objective reality (Maturana & Poerk-
sen 2004: 66f).
Individual/society
« 25 »  The second tension that usu-
ally sets a division among constructivist
positions is the one referring to the ques-
tion about characterizing and outlining the
knowing subject. All in all, two standpoints
are usually opposed: on the one part, there
are constructivist research programs that
take the epistemic subject as an individual
with psycho-cognitive abilities rooted in a
biological structure; and on the other part,
there are those adopting a collective epis-
temic subject or, alternatively, an individual
engaged in social interactions and negotia-
tions who is at the center point of a socializa-
tion process linking them to cultural knowl-
edge and common meanings, ideologies, and
interests. Constructivist research programs
have defined such subjects based on the dis-
ciplines that have fed their theorizations. It
should be no surprise that integrating the
individual/society poles is, at least, a rather
difficult task.
« 26 »  Piaget’s genetic epistemology
defines knowledge as socially and histori-
cally dependent and asserts that social in-
teractions are inseparable from cognitive
development (Piaget 1986). However, such
an association has impeded the study of the
intervention of social processes in the ex-
planatory mechanisms of cognitive novelty,
a problem that was addressed in the 1980s
with the release of Psychogenesis and the
History of Science (Piaget & García 1982). It
is only after Piaget’s death that a profound
theoretical revision was encouraged with the
intention of broadening the subject/object
schema to introduce a third element of social
nature, either as an interlocutor, a cultural or
ideological context or social practices or rep-
resentations participant in the signification
and assimilation mechanisms (Castorina
2014; Overton 2006).
« 27 »  One such theoretical revision is
that of García (1999, 2000). His approach
rests on understanding knowledge as a
“complex system,” which is distributed in
structurally differentiated levels – subsys-
tems – having their own dynamics but in-
teracting with one another by means of their
fluxes (of information, matter, energy, etc.),
which end up constituting the “boundary
conditions” for the evolution of the inter-
nal structures of each subsystem. Complex
systems evolve across time nonlinearly by
successive processes of self-reorganization
fed by exchanges with their environment.5
With this in mind, García proposes a model 195
for the “general system of knowledge,” which
includes a biological subsystem, a psycho-
logical (mental) subsystem, and a social one.
Then he elaborates on the boundary con-
ditions of the psychological/social subsys-
tems, advancing what was first introduced
in Psychogenesis and the History of Science
under the term “epistemic framework.”6 As
5 |  This is a systemic view that explicitly fol-
lows Ilya Prigogine’s account of transformation in
open and far-from-equilibrium systems (Nico-
lis & Prigogine 1977), which Piaget himself had
considered to be close to his own equilibration
mechanism.
6 |  “Epistemic framework” is a central con-
cept in García’s take on constructivism. It spans
across several research interests: epistemology,
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
196
a result, the psychological subsystem has an
activity generated by its inner dynamics that
leads to several paths of development, while
the psychological subsystem has an activity
generated by its inner dynamics that leads to
several paths of development, while the so-
cial subsystem provides the conditions that
act either to favor or inhibit these paths. This
leads to a new version of the theory of equil-
ibration, where consideration of the social
aspect changes the linear model proposed
by Piaget into a pluridirectional one, which
additionally avoids the “immanentism to-
ward the equilibrium” dominant in Piaget’s
work (Castorina & Baquero 2005; Chapman
1988).
« 28 »  As far as von Glasersfeld’s radical
constructivism is concerned, social interac-
tion is an important element of the knowing
experience since, during communication,
pieces of knowledge are confronted as sec-
ond-order viability.
“  This second-order viability [plays] an impor-
tant part in the stabilization and solidification of
our experiential reality. It helps to create that in-
tersubjective level on which one is led to believe
that concepts […] are shared by others and, there-
”
fore, more real. (Glasersfeld 1995: 120)
« 29 »  Notwithstanding this, this inter-
subjective level does not entail the public
nature of meanings (Castorina 2009): sub-
jectivism reappears since meanings are al-
ways an individual construction, even those
whose construction is fostered by commu-
nication (Glasersfeld 1999a). Further, be-
cause of the program’s skeptical position,
any entity outside subjective experience
­– such as society itself, or institutions and
social norms – is given a much-weakened
role in the construction of knowledge via an
unclear ontological status. This conception
is at odds with current sociology – especially
that concerned with knowledge and science
– and may end up being an obstacle to in-
tegrating its empirical research.7 It is symp-
history of sciences, complex systems theory, and
interdisciplinary methodology (Becerra & Casto-
rina 2016a, 2016b).
7 |  These concerns have been well expressed
in open comments on von Glasersfeld’s (2008)
target article “Who Conceives of Society?”, such
as those from Sal Restivo (2008), Karl Müller
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
tomatic that von Glasersfeld recognizes in
radical constructivism the need for a more
profound study of “social interaction,” while
this is just a part of sociology’s inquiry. Mat-
urana introduces considerations of social
phenomena through the concept of “lan-
guaging,” which he defines as “flowing in re-
curring interactions, which constitute a sys-
tem of consensual behavioral coordinations”
(Maturana 1995: 20). The (biological) con-
dition of such coordinations is the emotion
of love, which is understood as accepting
the other as a legitimate being to live with,
which is what eventually makes autopoiesis
possible in individual organisms. This im-
pacts on how this author understands social
phenomena, thus reducing them to relation-
ships based on such emotion, which eventu-
ally places a restraint upon the sociological
task when trying to replicate the conditions
of such relationships (Maturana 1995, 2015).
The conditioning of these social spaces re-
garding cognitive construction is the result
of the influence on the individuals’ corpo-
rality, and then, the type of relationships
established within the constructed knowl-
edge. Thus, a “properly social” exchange
space would enable the necessary tolerance
so that different cognitive constructions can
live together in disagreement – the so called
“multiversa”; on the contrary, an exchange
space based on other emotions, more relat-
ed to obedience or competition, leads to the
denial of outsiders’ constructions alleging a
single “objective” reality (Maturana 1997).
« 30 »  Luhmann takes the concept of
autopoietic systems and chooses commu-
nication as the proper operation of social
systems, which has resulted in an anti-
subjectivist and post-humanist perspective
(Luhmann 1984). He takes these consid-
erations to the field of cognition and says:
“What we know as cognition is the product
of the system of communication called soci-
ety, where consciousness plays a permanent
but always only fractional role” (Luhmann
1990: 78). This does not deny the necessary
role of psychic systems in the construction
of knowledge, although they are relegated to
“material conditions” for the reproduction
of the social system’s own operations In the
case of the science system, these operations
(2008), Ezequiel Di Paolo (2008), or Christian
Fuchs (2008).
consist in the labelling of communications
with the “true” symbol. In a questionable
thesis – although not much discussed by the
specialized literature –, Luhmann seems to
suggest that due to the existence of a single
social system (society with a globalized sci-
entific system), socially designated knowl-
edge would have a tendency to integration,
in a better position to irritate consciousness
with highly improbable and contra-intuitive
demands (Luhmann 1997b: 149). This is
the road taking Luhmann to “radicalize”
constructivism. He provides a plausible
formulation that, failing to refer to an ex-
ternal reality, does not end up getting to the
problems of pluralism and solipsism that he
seems to detect in subjectivist research pro-
grams such as those of von Glasersfeld or
Maturana.
General strategies
« 31 »  Thus far, we have compared the
same axes in different research programs.
In this section, we want to intertwine those
axes into the interior of research programs
to identify the general strategy that has been
adopted in relation to the dualities. This can
be useful to take previous considerations to
other dualities not covered in this work, as
well as to clarify the subject/object pair.
« 32 »  Piaget’s strategy to link the sub-
ject/object pair is strongly influenced by the
“dialectical” perspective that considers that
both elements constitute themselves by inter-
acting in a dynamic synthesis that integrates
their antagonism. In this sense, the category
of “action” becomes central, since it is the
one putting into motion the “constitutive
interaction” between the epistemic subject
and object. Following the theory of equili-
bration, the subject can only reach the object
by means of the transformations triggered by
their activity and, at the same time, the sub-
ject can only be aware of their actions by be-
ing aware of the results on the objects. Thus,
“  subject and object are hereinafter located ex-
actly on the same plane, or rather on the same
subsequent planes, according to the changes in
the spatial scales and the historical and genetic
developments. In sum, legitimately, there are no
more boundaries between subject and object.
(Piaget 1979: 92)
”
 Constructivist Approaches
Towards a Dialogue Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina

{ Gastón Becerra
is an Assistant Professor in the Social Sciences Faculty at the Universidad de
Buenos Aires (Argentina), and post-doc researcher at CONICET (National Scientific
and Technical Research Council, Argentina). He holds a doctorate in philosophy
and a bachelor’s degree in sociology, both from the Universidad de Buenos Aires,
and a master’s degree in epistemology and history of sciences from the Universidad
de Tres de Febrero. His research focuses on the emergence of “complexity” as
an object of study for the social sciences and the constructivist traditions, with
special attention to Rolando García’s and Niklas Luhmann’s oeuvres.

{ José Antonio Castorina

is Consultant Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy at the Universidad de Buenos Aires
(Argentina), and researcher at CONICET (National Scientific and Technical Research Council,
Argentina). He holds a doctorate in education from the Universidad Federal do Río Grande do
Sul and a master’s degree in philosophy from the Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico.
He has taught undergraduate and postgraduate courses in several universities in Argentina,
Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Spain. He has published several books and articles on the
psychological development of social knowledge, social representations, on epistemological
problems of educational and development psychology, and on genetic epistemology.

But this position has been questioned. On
the one hand, this approach turns out to
be undoubtedly effective for treating the
knowledge/reality pair since it is compat-
ible with the defense – poorly supported, by
the way – of a critical realism. On the other
hand, in the individual/society tension we
can observe that an integration of the social
pole pretty much restricted to social interac-
tions and knowledge lacks cultural structure
and practices, which eventually causes such
dualism to endure. At this point, the general
strategy of this research program becomes,
at least in its original formulation, inconsis-
tent. Probably because of this, later revisions
– such as the one outlined by García – aimed
at breaking these last dualisms from a sys-
temic perspective and getting a better inte-
gration, by means of a subject with a social
“epistemic framework,” and an “epistemic
object” embedded in social meaningfulness.
« 33 »  The strategy of the radical per-
spective is different from that of the dialec-
tical integration. Von Glasersfeld seeks an
anti-dualist position by placing knowledge
in the subjective pole with no intentions of
integrating it with the objective pole. “Ex-
perience” is the central category in radical
constructivism, one that replaces Piaget’s
“action.” His viability criterion means that
concepts and theories fit the purposive con-
text in which they are proposed by surpass-
ing any constraints there may have been,
which at best only allows us to describe
reality in negative terms (Glasersfeld 1995:
73). Josef Mitterer has criticized this posi-
tion as inconsequent: a non-dualistic radi-
cal constructivist “[…] could argue that our
(theoretical) constructions can be checked
neither positively nor negatively against re-
ality” (Mitterer 2008: 160).
« 34 »  Regarding the second tension
herein analysed, von Glasersfeld’s epistemic-
ontological position impacts on his under-
standing of the epistemic subject by leaving
him with no tools to deal with society. As
we have argued, this may result in a cost too
high to pay in terms of this program’s capa-
bility to dialogue with sociology.
« 35 »  Maturana could be considered
one of the authors who most enthusiasti-
cally seek to go over dualisms, especially if
considering the dictum “to know is to do”
as referring to an individual inserted into a
reality manifested by action. However, just
as with the radical constructivists, in the
knowledge/society tension, Maturana tends
to subsume one term into another one and,
as there is no contact between these two
poles, the final thesis is that different con-
structions end up in different realities. As
regards the tension in question, the way
Maturana deals with social phenomena is
just as atomist as von Glasersfeld’s. This,
too, has an impact on a possible dialogue
with sociology, which is almost limited to
serve as an evaluation of the requirements
of Maturana’s biology and humanist ethics,
which have an individualistic basis.8 Regard-
ing other tensions, it is clear that Maturana
aims at breaching barriers: autopoiesis is a
special way to link the process/structure 197
pair; subjects integrate the body/mind pair;
and its discussion about “objectivity” flows
in parallel with the rational/emotional path,
in line with the demands of several feminist
epistemologists (Maffia 2005).
« 36 »  The way Luhmann deals with
constructivist dualities is different from any
other of these research programs. There is
8 |  This judgmental orientation is, in our
opinion, the central difference in the way Luh-
mann understands autopoiesis in social systems,
which for Maturana is a diversion from the “prop-
er sociological” task, as filed in previous issues of
Constructivist Foundations (Cadenas & Arnold
2015) in addition to other papers (Maturana &
Poerksen 2007: 124–126; Maturana & Varela
1994: 18f).

http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
198
a predominance of “difference” as the main
characteristic of his approach both in sys-
temic and epistemic matters. In systemic
matters, it is about adding Gregory Bate-
son’s dictum “information is a difference
that makes the difference” to the definition
of self-referring systems, which results in a
paradox: “a system is the difference between
system and environment” (Luhmann 2006b:
38), which, according to Jean Clam (2000:
65), is an attempt to “deontologize” the very
notion of systems. In epistemic matters, he
secures the predominance of difference by
making “observation” the central category of
his research program, as opposed to Piaget’s
“action,” von Glasersfeld’s “experience,” and
Maturana’s “doing.” In the knowledge/reality
tension, observation must be understood as
the possibility of introducing a difference in
reference to the operation, which results in
closure with no denial of the world. In the
individual/society tension, it is about un-
derlining the different levels of observation
and the benefit for the theory of knowledge
of choosing the society pole. So, the general
strategy could be described as a “systemic-
dualist constructivism,” where dualism is
intended to be reinstated to give value to the
“differential identity” of each element. These
considerations about Luhmann’s research
program let us better outline its dissimilar-
ity to the other variants of radical construc-
tivism: there is no attempt to subsume one
pole into the other in addition to observ-
ing a thoughtful attempt to avoid falling
into positions that may deny reality. Unlike
von Glasersfeld, Luhmann does not give up
speaking of reality or the world, although
his foundation on the difference takes him
to make use of paradoxes: “[…] we will
speak of the ‘world’ to indicate the unity of
the difference between ‘system and envi-
ronment’ […] [and] ‘reality’ to indicate the
unity of the difference between ‘cognition
and object’” (Luhmann 2006a: 256). Unlike
Maturana, the observation/operation dis-
tinction seeks to steer away from the dictum
“to know is to do,” to which Luhmann might
well counter-propose “to know is to observe;
to do is to operate.” Finally, this strategy
where difference predominates also discerns
from the dialectical syntheses. Luhmann ex-
plicitly points it out: “we are discussing the
difference between identity and difference,
and not their identity. This is where the fol-
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
lowing reflections diverge from the dialecti-
cal tradition” (Luhmann 1991: 26, Footnote
19). For the theory of knowledge, meaning-
fulness is clear: knowledge does not aim at
an arrival point where differences are dis-
solved but there is only production of sur-
plus excess and openness to new selections.
Conclusion
« 37 »  We started this work character-
izing constructivism as a heterogeneous
movement discussing dualities that have
been central to the epistemological inquiry.
Then we focused on the knowledge/reality
and individual/society tensions as analy-
sis dimensions to compare different con-
structivist research programs. Finally, we
analyzed general strategies thereof in an at-
tempt to come up with the identity of each
research program.
« 38 »  Regarding the knowledge/real-
ity tension, perhaps the most prominent is-
sue in debate could be stated as follows: is
it possible to hold a modest realist assertion
within a general constructivist approach?
For instance, elaborating on Piaget’s posi-
tion, we understand constructivism as the
view that the subject constructs the cogni-
tive structures necessary for knowledge in
such a way that they progressively approach
to reality. To clarify this matter, another ten-
sion – which we have here barely suggested
– may need to be further analyzed: how the
different research programs conceptualize
science within the progressive/non-progres-
sive spectrum.9
« 39 »  Within the individual/society
tension, the most urgent debate seems to
deal with how to characterize the epistemic
subject: is it possible to consider non-sub-
jective accounts of social phenomena – and
society – in the cognitive construction? This
could be an important issue to facilitate so-
ciological inputs in the constructivist theori-
zation, but also to minimize the gap between
9 |  This is an issue in which the works of
Thomas Kuhn have been widely examined. One
could recur to him to abridge conversations
with the research programs at stake, like Piaget’s
(Becerra & Castorina 2016a) or von Glasersfeld’s
(Riegler 2012).
constructivism interested in cognitive theo-
ry and social constructionism.
« 40 »  According to our comparison,
there is a wide spectrum of general strate-
gies. We proposed to understand them as
self-imposed regulatory principles for the
way each research program treats dualities,
so one could use them to evaluate their co-
herence: via García’s revision, we pointed
out Piaget’s program failed to (dialecti-
cally) integrate the social dimension; in a
similar vein, Mitterer’s critique of von Gla-
sersfeld’s and Maturana’s10 programs has
inspired revisions that ask for a broader
understanding of the socio-cultural dimen-
sion (e.g., Schmidt 2011) that alleviates its
subjectivism, yet within the limits of a non-
ontological understanding of society; to the
best of our knowledge, Luhmann’s claim to
restitute dualisms has not been thoroughly
scrutinized yet, but one can only wonder
if it could shed light on how to harmonize
his realist position regarding social systems
with his “radical” understanding of knowl-
edge.
« 41 »  It is our opinion that the main
challenges in the constructivist field are its
research programs’ exchanges and how to
better integrate them into the different sci-
entific fields. The analytical framework pre-
sented in this article tries to assist in this en-
deavor by relying on a wide understanding
of constructivism, one that does not focus so
much on their identities but on their differ-
ences. We hope these notes serve to clarify
positions, and from there, to consolidate
lines of dialogue toward elucidating the pre-
suppositions and assumptions supporting
them to create new discussions that allow
for the renewal of research programs.
Acknowledgements
This work was made possible thanks
to the funding of Universidad de Buenos
Aires – UBACYT program, project ID
20020130100256BA.
Received: 31 October 2017
Accepted: 19 January 2018
10 |  Although one could ask if Kenny’s in-
terpretation of Maturana as a “radical realist”
strengthens or weakens Mitterer’s critique.
 Constructivist Approaches
Open Peer Commentaries
on Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina “Towards a Dialogue
Among Constructivist Research Programs”
Constructivisms and
Ivo Kohler’s Goggles
Hugh Gash
Dublin City University, Ireland
hugh.gash/at/dcu.ie
> Upshot • To provide a context to the
analysis presented in the target article, I
place radical constructivism (RC) within
a three-stage framework and find that
many comments about RC remain in the
first stage because the conceptual shift
required in RC is absent. Also, I appreciate
the analysis of the social in Piaget’s the-
ory in the target article and consider it as
a logically and psychologically inevitable
development given the emphasis within
RC on the centrality of personal meaning
construction.
« 1 »  In their target article, Gastón
Becerra and José Antonio Castorina have
provided an opportunity to consider the
differences and similarities between sev-
eral constructivist theories. This is a wel-
come opportunity because as they point
out, there is a tendency for each of these
constructivist theories to focus on its own
domain and not to “accommodate contri-
butions from other research lines” (§3).
I welcome the target article as I believe it
shows a developmental trend in the posi-
tions presented, illustrating varying implic-
it adoption of key ideas in the constructiv-
ist positions. My remarks are focussed on
two issues in the target article: the status of
reality and the role of the social.
Constructivisms and Ivo Kohler’s Goggles Hugh Gash
« 2 »  In approaching explanations of
constructivist thinking long ago, I was struck
by the difficulty of deciding how to begin a
presentation of what is essentially a systemic
position in linear written form. John Dewey,
Jean Piaget, Humberto Maturana and others
have their own forms of discourse that to
the uninitiated seem like strange languages.
In addition to the issue of where to begin
a description of the theory there are issues
surrounding the nature of the description. I
recall professors saying that once they had
understood Piaget they found their students
could no longer understand them. No won-
der Becerra and Castorina describe meta-
phorical varieties (§1)!
« 3 »  Looking back at a career that in-
cluded teaching about Piaget, I made a case
for a three-stage approach to constructivism
(Gash 1995, 2014).
ƒƒ The first stage acknowledges that the
knowing subject plays an active role
in constructing knowledge (§5). This
much is a sine qua non for constructiv-
ist theories. What is more complicated
is appreciating the implications of a
consistent constructivism and agreeing
to them. Ernst von Glasersfeld played
a major role in arguing for a consistent
constructivism and was one of the early
scholars to carefully examine the philo-
sophical foundations of constructivism.
ƒƒ The second stage acknowledges the
radical paradigm shift entailed by radi-
cal constructivism and its implications.
This means that a variety of concepts
change their meanings, in particular
truth and reality. Traditionally, the ac-
quisition of knowledge was left aside
from epistemology as an irrelevant
“genetic fallacy.” In a constructivist
epistemology the acquisition of knowl-
edge is central to understanding, as in
Piaget’s work, where learning is a proc-
ess of construction. In RC, it cannot
be claimed that knowledge is the rep-
resentation of any mind-independent
reality but serves an adaptive function
as a model of experience. So, represent-
ative truth is replaced with viability.
Since all that we know is constructed
from experience, we must remain si-
lent about any mind-independent re-
ality. Appreciating these connotations
and implications is central to discus-
sions on RC. The third stage involves
working out the implications of RC in
the social context and how knowing
moves from the personal to the social
(Glasersfeld 2008). The chronological 199
and developmental case for emphasis-
ing the third stage in RC is similar to
broadening Piaget’s theory to consider
the role of the social (§26).
« 4 »  Von Glasersfeld (1974) went to
some lengths to explain the implications of
a consistent constructivism he called radi-
cal constructivism (RC). To illustrate this, I
want to refer to the experiment conducted
by Theodor Erismann from the University
of Innsbruck with his student Ivo Kohler
(Sachse et al. 2017). Kohler wore inverting
goggles for a period and eventually learned
to ride a bicycle wearing them. I think ap-
preciating the full implications of von Gla-
sersfeld’s constructivism requires a concep-
tual shift analogous to the sensorimotor
shift Kohler achieved. If a person takes a
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
200
radical constructivist position, then “objec-
tivity” is in parenthesis (Maturana 1988b).
« 5 »  Since what we know is an adap-
tive construction that depends on the op-
erational coherences used to construct it,
RC has no use for the concept of represen-
tational truth. Viability takes the place of
truth as it better captures the viable ways
of adapting to experience – Kohler learned
to adapt. Without appreciating the radi-
cal shift, one remains at Stage 1. There are
many examples of Stage-1 thinking in the
target article. These include Denis Phillips’s
(§8) comments on nature as instructor;
some of Piaget’s own comments; the refer-
ences to critical realism (§§14f); Michael
Matthew’s comments (§16) and some of
the comments concerning Niklas Luh-
mann (§21). To break out of this discus-
sion, movement to Stage 2 will be needed.
Footnote 4 on Vincent Kenny’s (2007) ob-
servation on Maturana calling his theory
radical realism, in my view, emphasises how
the word realism is changing its meaning.
Maturana’s (1988b) theory is, in my view, so
thoroughly constructivist that whatever is
called real by Maturana is constructed. His
account of knowing involves two accounts
of explanations, one based on “objectivity
without parenthesis” and the other on “ob-
jectivity in parenthesis.” In the former, one’s
cognitive abilities as biological phenomena
are ignored or rejected, whereas in the lat-
ter these are accepted. Further, Maturana’s
account of science in his discussion on ex-
planations makes it clear that whichever ac-
count of objectivity is assumed, the result
depends on the same constructive biologi-
cal processes. Further, Maturana talks of
different types of realities resulting from
the way an individual brings forth different
equally legitimate domains of reality as dif-
ferent operations of distinction. While this
is a topic for a different paper, I consider the
parenthesising of objectivity as an idea very
supportive of von Glasersfeld’s agnostic
position on reality and the absence of pa-
renthesising as a form of realism that is an
attitude of the observer rather than a model
of the construction of knowledge.
« 6 »  In the target article there seem to
be a series of interpretations of construc-
tivism that are dissonant with von Gla-
sersfeld’s (1991b) position. It might be fair
to comment that this may be due to the
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
authors’ desire to secure a realist version
of constructivism (§38)? I think that the
observation in §10 that many constructiv-
ists have an ambivalent way of considering
themselves as constructivists is apt. I know
in my own experience how hard it is to be
consistent. Indeed, mixtures of different
stages are the rule in any one subject’s re-
sponses to Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral di-
lemmas, so one can expect a similar varia-
tion in relation to constructivism. Examples
of misinterpretations or misunderstandings
of von Glasersfeld’s RC position include but
are not limited to the authors’ adoption of
realism (§§11f), the difficulties that may en-
sue from von Glasersfeld’s rejecting ontol-
ogy (§29), and Luhmann’s comment about
solipsism (§30). Also, the target article
mentions that von Glasersfeld fails to take
account of other forms of realism (§16). In
an earlier article, Castorina, criticising von
Glasersfeld, wrote as follows:
“ [T]he fact that the objects of knowledge are
built does not prevent us from affirming that
knowledge is directed to the world and pretends
to catch it, although by an asymptotic process
of approximations, without ever reaching it.
(Castorina 2009: 9, my translation)
” a consequence of the microstudies on con-
The distance from this position to radical
constructivism is slight but profound and
requires recognizing that in RC, when we
have discrepancies between what we know
and experience, we are in the process of
gathering knowledge and not in the domain
of the object (Mitterer 1992: 146, quoted in
Schmidt 2008: 165), so we remain agnos-
tic about mind-independent entities (§16).
Could it be that the meaning of realism is
changing in the minds of some, and will co-
incide with RC when knowledge of mind-
independent reality is abandoned?
« 7 »  Turning to the neglect of the social
in radical constructivism (§34), are there
no tools to deal with society in radial con-
structivism? Topics like gender and racial
stereotyping fall within the remit of both
psychological and sociological researchers.
From a radical constructivism perspec-
tive, I have studied children’s stereotypes in
these areas and sought ways to invite chil-
dren to reconsider their constructions of
these prejudices with suitable constructivist
educational strategies (Gash 2014). Indeed,
heroes as socially accepted and socially pro-
moted characters can also be studied from
a radical constructivist position (Gash &
Bajd 2005; Gash & Conway 1997; Gash &
Domínguez Rodríguez 2009). Meanings are
indeed initially subjective then intersubjec-
tive and then public (§29). Within a RC per-
spective it is not a problem to ignore ontol-
ogy (§29), one cannot get beyond the public
we know. Members of political groups are
notorious for having different interpreta-
tions of particular issues compared to their
political rivals. There are many high-profile
international examples at present, for ex-
ample in the USA and England. However, I
accept the idea in the target article that the
emphasis on more social approaches came
later. For example, in papers co-authored
with Charles Smock the first step was an
analysis of the operations involved in the
classification and role-taking tasks used
(Gash & Smock 1975, 1979). This approach
was based on von Glasersfeld’s operational
analyses of language.1 The social interven-
tions could then follow, but only after a
model of the mental operations. This ex-
ample shows the position of the social was
ceptual development within the individual
that are often performed in the educational
sphere. As I mentioned above, the focus on
the social within Piaget’s theory also came
later, perhaps for similar reasons.
Hugh Gash is an Emeritus Associate Professor at
the School of Human Development, Institute of
Education, Dublin City University. His research
has been on applied radical constructivism
and publications are listed on his website at
https://sites.google.com/dcu.ie/hughgashwebpage
Received: 10 February 2018
Accepted: 14 February 2018
1 |  A number of his early papers on this topic
are available on a machine translation archive
assembled by John Hutchins, http://www.mt-ar-
chive.info/srch/authors.htm
 Constructivist Approaches
Some Remarks on the Social
Construction of Constructivism
Raf Vanderstraeten
Ghent University, Belgium, and
University of Chicago, USA
raf.vanderstraeten/at/ugent.be
> Upshot • A dialogue among construc-
tivist theories can be furthered by opting
for a reflective point of view, by analyz-
ing the social conditions that enhanced
their legitimacy. To stimulate the discus-
sion, this commentary briefly looks into
the relationship between constructivist
ideas and the social conditions in which
they have developed.
« 1 »  Constructivist theories have al-
ready frequently been compared with other,
especially realist theories of knowledge. In
recent decades, scores of studies have also
compared and evaluated the merits of dif-
ferent constructivist theories. Often the aim
has been to demonstrate either the weak-
nesses or the strengths of particular theo-
ries or research programs. On the contrary,
papers that call for a dialogue among con-
structivist research programs are scarce.
The target article, authored by Gastón
Becerra and José Antonio Castorina, aims
at a comparative analysis of four construc-
tivist positions that are located in different
disciplinary settings: the theories of Jean
Piaget and Ernst von Glasersfeld (primar-
ily situated within the field of psychology),
Humberto Maturana (primarily embedded
within biology) and Niklas Luhmann (soci-
ology). This article offers an opportunity to
make some additional comments about the
analysis of constructivist theories.
« 2 »  My aim here is not to discuss the
merits of all or some of these theories. From
a reflective point of view, I would rather like
to take the dialogue among constructiv-
ist research programs one step further. In
order to grasp some of the specificities of
the different positions, it might be useful to
pay special attention to the context within
which these different theories originated. It
should not be forgotten that the positions
adopted by Piaget, von Glasersfeld, Matura-
na and Luhmann emerged and made sense
in particular contexts. These positions were
Social Construction of Constructivism Raf Vanderstraeten
well suited to the objectives and the socio-
historical circumstances of their authors.
We may therefore historicize and contex-
tualize the concepts, methods and empiri-
cal observations that are thought to sustain
the positions adopted by theorists such as
Piaget, von Glasersfeld, Maturana and Luh-
mann. It is not necessary to convert their
reasonable and intelligent historical choices
into a universal touchstone for all present
and future theories of knowledge. We may
rather stimulate or further the dialogue
among different (constructivist) research
programs by understanding each of these
research programs as a “product” of its par-
ticular context.
« 3 »  A small parenthetical remark
might be helpful. In the lexicon of the so-
cial sciences, there is a well-known term for
theories or ideas that project the particular
and local as the general and universal. In
the tradition extending back to Karl Marx
and Friedrich Engels, that term is, of course,
“ideology.” It does not, however, seem very
useful to discuss constructivist theories as
ideologies in this sense of the word (as ex-
pressions of the interests of already estab-
lished socio-economic or religious groups).
It seems more appropriate, as Becerra and
Castorina do, to speak of these theories as
research programs, as expressions of partic-
ular scholarly ambitions. We may approach
the work of Piaget, von Glasersfeld, Matura-
na and Luhmann as charters, as programs
for not-yet-established, still-emerging fields
of research. When Luhmann, for example,
describes his own theory of social systems
as a “supertheory” (Luhmann 1984: 19,
1995: 4), he describes and projects his own
concepts, method, and theoretical frame-
work as the core of the sociological enter-
prise as a whole, with other options assimi-
lated into these, marginalized, or occluded
outright. Luhmann’s claim has led to many,
often quite dismissive reactions. But instead
of reacting to the claim as such, it seems
useful to inquire into Luhmann’s interest in
making this claim, in putting forward his
own concepts as the starting point for a new
research program.
« 4 »  Elsewhere I have looked at the
ways Talcott Parsons legitimized his social
theory (Vanderstraeten 2013, 2015). With
regard to the work of Luhmann, I have
discussed Luhmann’s option for commu-
nication as the basic unit of social systems
in relation to the rise of the so-called “in-
formation age” or “information society”
(Vanderstraeten 2012). The constructiv-
ist theory Luhmann developed in the late
1980s and early 1990s no longer builds
upon features of an industrial society. It
was no longer anchored in the processes of
producing and trading goods or resources
(commodities). His research program,
which gives central significance to com-
munication, may be perceived to reflect the
way that communication networks have
become more important in the emerging
information or knowledge society. The le-
gitimacy of this theoretical program is a
consequence of the social transformations
that the same theory tries to understand
and explain. At present, it seems the best
possible starting point for a constructivist
theory of social systems in general and of
society in particular, but it probably could
not have been elaborated under different
social circumstances.
« 5 »  With regard to the legitimation
of Luhmann’s research program, it may in
addition be useful to pay attention to more
specific, disciplinary interests. With much
pride, Luhmann often presented his work as
novel. He never got tired of criticizing and
taunting contemporary sociology’s fascina-
tion for its founding fathers.
“  To a great extent, those interested in theory
return to the classical authors […] The task be-
comes one of dissecting, criticizing, and recom-
bining already-existing texts. What one does not 201
trust oneself to do is assumed to be already at
”
hand. (Luhmann 1995: xlv)
« 6 »  In his view, sociology would be
better off without “reliance on illustrious
names and specialization in them” (ibid:
xlvi). Instead Luhmann turned to other re-
search contexts for the development of his
own research program, including cybernet-
ics and epistemology. He looked for socio-
logical uses of these ideas, but he also used
his explorations in these other contexts to
underline the novelty of his sociological
program. With his turn to constructivist
theories, Luhmann had the intention and
ambition to elaborate a new “supertheory”
on behalf of sociology. For sure, this su-
pertheory affords an encompassing vision
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
202
of the social world. It can be credited with
providing a wide range of path-breaking
insights. However, his understanding and
use of constructivist theories also seems
to be bound to his practical situation and
paradigmatic efforts. It simultaneously was
a way of selling his supertheory to a broader
audience. His use of a new vocabulary and a
new epistemological approach was useful in
underpinning his claims to originality.
« 7 »  The preceding comments fo-
cus on the work of Luhmann, but similar
comments might be made with regard to
the research programs of Piaget, von Gla-
sersfeld, Maturana and others, as well. Let
me therefore conclude with some general
observations. The nature of the relation-
ship between ideas and the social condi-
tions in which they develop has long been
among the central concerns of fields like the
sociology of knowledge, the social history
of ideas, and social epistemology. Among
constructivists, too, it has been debated
how the form of this relationship can be
properly characterized and how it should
be conceptualized and studied. Not many,
however, have tried to apply this point
of view to the genesis and impact of con-
structivist theories themselves. At least in
sociology, constructivist scholars have re-
mained strangely and regrettably silent on
the social conditions that have influenced
(and continue to influence) the formulation
of their own theories. The target article of
Becerra and Castorina offers an opportu-
nity to stimulate research in this direction.
In my view, it is necessary to develop such
a reflective perspective on theoretical and
epistemological work itself. Research along
these lines also seems to be able to further
the dialogue among different constructivist
research programs.
« 8 »  Let me end with a request. The
critical reconstruction of constructivist
theories provided by Becerra and Castorina
points in the first place to the heterogeneity
of constructivist theories. At the same time,
however, their reconstruction can be used
to reflect on the social contexts that first al-
lowed the institutionalization of dualisms,
such as subject/object or knowledge/reality,
and now enable us to problematize these
same dualisms. While Becerra and Castori-
na offered an interdisciplinary reconstruc-
tion of constructivist theories, I hope that
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
they will be able to provide some additional
reflections on the socio-historical contextu-
alization of these theories.
Raf Vanderstraeten is Professor and Director of
the Center for Social Theory at Ghent University
(Belgium). He is also affiliated with the Department
of Sociology of the University of Chicago (USA). He
is currently particularly interested in the sociology
and history of scientific disciplines. Recent work
has appeared in journals such as Science in
Context, Social Science History, Thesis Eleven, Acta
Sociologica, International Sociology and Minerva.
With Kaat Louckx, he recently published Sociology
in Belgium: A Sociological History (2018).
Received: 2 February 2018
Accepted: 13 February 2018
Forms of Constructivism and
Forms for Constructivism
Hugo Cadenas
Universidad Autónoma de
Chile, Chile • hugo.cadenas/at/
uautonoma.cl
> Upshot • I discuss the strategy pro-
posed in the target article to address
constructivist epistemology by means
of “dualities.” I argue that the concept
of “form” is more suitable for answering
constructivist questions, and I explore
some consequences of this proposal.
The problem
« 1 »  According to Gastón Becerra and
José Antonio Castorina, constructivism is a
“movement full of tensions” (§1) and not a
standardized or unified approach. Given its
internal multiplicity it would be relevant to
reconstruct its identity or try to distinguish
at least its main constitutive differences. The
strategy adopted by the authors is that of
contrasting two (or three?) conceptual op-
positions in four representative figures of
this movement since, according to their pro-
posal, constructivism is defined precisely by
problematizing certain dualities (§6).
« 2 »  These dualities are knowledge/re-
ality and individual/society, and there is also
an (ambiguous, to some extent) analysis of
the subject/object pair. The names called to
testify about this are Jean Piaget, Ernst von
Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana and Niklas
Luhmann. According to Becerra and Casto-
rina, in their works there can be detected
three possible positions facing each duality:
overcoming, elimination or restitution (§7).
« 3 »  The main goal of the authors is
linking different traditions within construc-
tivist epistemology to achieve “cross-fertil-
izations” among approaches (§7). Although
the goal is ambitious, the target article pro-
vides only a partial solution to the goal by
focusing on worn-out epistemological de-
bates of constructivism. Thus, the analysis
remains restricted to a single type of con-
structivism, i.e., that which is “interested
in cognitive theory” and ignores the other
type of constructivism distinguished by the
authors, so-called “(social) construction-
ism” (§2) in order to avoid “an extremely
large and dense argumentation” (§10).
« 4 »  At the core of Becerra and Cas-
torina’s argument is the expectation of
defining constructivism by means of op-
positions. However, there is no word about
the reasons for this: why would this be the
best way to define this movement full of
tensions called constructivism? Instead of
a justification, we have to expect that this
duality-approach will allow us to reach rel-
evant conclusions. But is this goal achieved
at the end?
« 5 »  Despite their meticulous reading
of the four selected authors, the result is a
somewhat forced analytical construction,
which sets aside important details of each
approach to give coherence to the proposed
scheme. Consequently, the final product is
not a unified scheme either but a patchwork
of disparate concepts and themes.
« 6 »  My claim is that instead of mis-
spending theoretical efforts on revisiting
out-dated oppositions or processing com-
plex theoretical frameworks to make them
fit into a certain model, a much better defi-
nition of constructivism could be achieved
by deepening the very concept of “duality.”
So, in this commentary, I will try to deepen
the thesis of “duality” of Becerra and Cas-
torina. However, I will appeal to the very
basis of the argument and not to details of
a particular concept or author. My goal is
to test whether it is possible to sustain the
argumentative strategy of the authors.
 Constructivist Approaches
Dividing dualities
« 7 »  First, I propose to replace the con-
cept of duality by that of form. A form, ac-
cording to the mathematician George Spen-
cer Brown (1969), is a mark distinguishing
two sides, a marked side and a not-marked
one. From an epistemological perspective,
signs, words and sounds are forms. Al-
though the form has two sides, and one side
“exists” only because of the other, it is not a
duality in the sense intended by Becerra and
Castorina. There is no opposition, but exclu-
sion between the two sides of a form. One
side stands out against a background that
makes it possible to distinguish the mark.
Following this simple reasoning, construc-
tivism, as a scientific theory, is a conceptual
constellation of forms sometimes associ-
ated, opposed, synthesized or reproduced.
« 8 »  In certain operations it is possible
to apply a form to itself to determine wheth-
er reflexivity has been achieved. Examples
are: observing observations, calculating
calculations, etc. Not all forms have such re-
flexiveness, nor do they have to have it, but
it is crucial that constructivist epistemol-
ogy be able to test its forms by performing
this kind of “re-entry” operation (Spencer
Brown 1969). Constructivism stands out
among other epistemologies by looking for
concepts that are capable of re-entry, and
each epistemological problem of construc-
tivism can be summed up by this type of
criterion.
« 9 »  Constructivist epistemology not
only describes forms, but unceasingly pro-
duces and reproduces this type of form.
Thus, constructivist approaches can put
concepts such as subject/object or knowl-
edge/reality to the test of reflexivity: Who
makes this distinction between subject and
object; is it the subject or the object? Is the
knowledge/reality duality real? On which
side is the operation carried out? It is up to
constructivism to take this type of question-
ing to its limits and to stress the forms.
Realizing forms
« 10 »  If we accept the above, for con-
structivism, reality is a two-sided form. The
marked side is real, only the unmarked side
cannot be knowledge or construction, but
what is not real. No constructivist would ac-
cept that constructions are not real, because
if they were not, they would not have oc-
Forms of Constructivism and Forms for Constructivism Hugo Cadenas
curred at all (Mascareño 2010). Reality can
be known or unknown, but knowledge can-
not be unreal. Descartes was already aware
of this when he divided the world into two
sides and gave res cogitans its respective sta-
tus of reality (res).
« 11 »  The unmarked side is simply what
has not occurred at all, independently of any
individual perception. Constructivism is
neither a practical philosophy for everyday
choices nor a statistical framework. Thus,
trees that do not produce sound when fall-
ing in uninhabited forests can be a probabi-
listic issue or a mere nonsense for someone,
but not a test for reality. This occurs or does
not.
« 12 »  For constructivism it is more
productive to test the form knowledge/
construction instead of that of real/unreal.
Constructions are the result of a search for
knowledge to be known by means of con-
structions since knowledge is the unmarked
side of constructions. Current or past con-
structions are real, as well as knowledge. For
constructivism reality is the unity between
knowledge and construction, since if any
sides of the form are removed, it remains
unreal. Without construction knowledge is
unreal. Without knowledge construction is
unreal.
Time
« 13 »  In the pair individual/society the
problem seems to be agency. Who con-
structs? The individual or the collective?
What would be its unmarked space? Both
the individual and society act, so both are
on the same side. What would be the form
of agency? Passivity? Internal experience?
Reality, again?
« 14 »  Agency is one of the most com-
plicated issues for any epistemology since
it is always presented as an assumption to
elaborate theorems, and not as a variable
to be demonstrated. There is no systematic
analysis about the agency of agency, and
constructivism should explore paths in this
direction.
« 15 »  Kant’s greatest legacy to con-
structivism is action. Knowing is acting.
Kant was able to transcend the rationalism/
empiricism dilemma with a synthesis fil-
tered by the categories of reason and moved
by empirical intuitions. The phenomenon/
noumenon form was a way of maintaining
the Cartesian problem without solving it or
rejecting it altogether. This form remained
as a backdrop for the actor in the scene.
« 16 »  From Kant on, action was taken
for granted, but nothing was asked about
its unmarked space. So, if we search for it
now, we will have to move carefully into
unknown territory.
« 17 »  Passivity is not a good candidate
since it can also be a type of activity. An
actor could have actively decided not to
act, so this would not be genuine passivity.
Internal experience does not seem suitable
either, because an internally experienced
action (a fantasy, a plan, etc.) or an acted
experience (a romantic declaration or a
planning) can easily be exchanged by mov-
ing the motive’s attribution from one side
to the other.
« 18 »  However, activity and passivity,
and action and experience, have something
in common. They all indicate a before and
an after, which means that the problem of
the agency is only secondarily social because
it is mainly a temporary question (Nassehi
1993: 182).
« 19 »  Time has the form before/after
(Luhmann 1995: 60). Present time is the
unit showing the incessant reproduction
(re-entry) of the form itself. Every action
marks a before and an after and it is itself
the mark. Action is not a reflexive concept
because, unlike time, it cannot be applied to
itself (ibid). For constructivism, action is a
first-order concept (Foerster 2003).
« 20 »  Constructions of constructivism
are not actions but forms, i.e., events that 203
occur or do not. The problem of individual/
society duality is about attributions of ac-
tions and has more practical than epistemo-
logical value. The emergence of non-human
entities that construct presents maybe a
complex problem for humanism but not
for constructivism. For constructivism it is
only about new horizons to explore the form
knowledge/construction.
Conclusion
« 21 »  Constructivist epistemology should
not turn into a neo-structuralist search
for conscious or unconscious oppositions.
Forms instead allow constructivism to con-
stantly cross from one side to the other and
to produce new distinctions in every opera-
tion.
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
204
« 22 »  It is not necessary to force con-
structivism to comply with imposed du-
alities. It is more productive to formally
examine whether its constructions can pass
the test of reflexivity. If constructivism says
something about the world that cannot be
applied to itself, then we will have to start
over with the task.
Hugo Cadenas is Director of the Institute for Social
and Humanistic Studies at the Universidad Autónoma
de Chile and Professor at the Universidad de Chile. He
has a PhD in sociology from the Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München (Germany), and a bachelor’s
and master’s degree in social anthropology from
the Universidad de Chile. Cadenas is director and
editor-in-chief of the academic journal Revista
Mad. He has authored various articles, books and
chapters on social systems theory, sociology of
law, social anthropology and sociological theory.
Received: 19 February 2018
Accepted: 22 February 2018
From Constructivist
Monologues to Dialogues
and Polylogues
Theo Hug
University of Innsbruck, Austria
theo.hug/at/uibk.ac.at
> Upshot • Gastón Becerra and José An-
tonio Castorina compare a selection of
constructivist epistemologies aiming
at a general definition of constructivist
epistemology. While I can agree on many
aspects of their critical analysis, I want to
underline some concerns but also argue
for enhanced methodological perspec-
tives.
Introduction
« 23 »  In their inspiring and impor-
tant target article, Gastón Becerra and José
Antonio Castorina reveal convergences,
divergences, and singularities of selected
constructivist epistemologies in a “heteroge-
neous movement” (§6) by means of “prob-
lematizing certain dualisms – such as sub-
ject/object, knowledge/reality, or individual/
society – that have been shown to be central
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
for epistemological inquiry” (Abstract). In
doing so, they provide a number of insights
regarding tensions between knowledge/
reality and individual/society both within
conceptualizations of Jean Piaget, Ernst
von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and
Niklas Luhmann and in terms of clarify-
ing relations between the respective episte-
mologies. The importance of such a critical
endeavor cannot be underestimated since
a deeper understanding of (inter)relations
between constructivist concepts, discourses,
and practices is needed in order to open up
future perspectives for the heterogeneous
movement, or at least for some strands of it.
It is also needed to develop comprehensible
and viable ways of dealing with contempo-
rary problems in a globalized and medial-
ized world. While I have some sympathy for
the authors’ position and find their clarifica-
tions in the target article valuable, I see some
difficulties and options for enhancing meth-
odological perspectives, too.
« 24 »  On the one hand, it seems clear
that open and dynamic definitions are need-
ed to cope with the heterogeneous fields of
constructivist approaches. Listings of con-
cepts or umbrella terms that aim at cover-
ing all perspectives – from old constructivist
ideas in The Upanishads1 to possible future
perspectives on constructing cyber-physical
systems2 based on semi-automated human-
1 |  Already in this ancient collection of texts
(approximately 750–550 BCE) distinctions be-
tween “true knowledge” and “not true knowledge”
(“illusion”) as well as possibilities of distinguish-
ing between perceptions in states of dreaming and
perceptions in waking states are being considered.
Here, “illusion” (Maya) does not refer to pure in-
ventions of human imagination denying reality.
It’s rather about varying degrees of awareness and
misleading sense-worlds of manifold phenomena.
In the words of Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty: “to
say that the universe is an illusion (māyā) is not
to say that it is unreal; it is to say, instead, that
it is not what it seems to be, that it is something
constantly being made. Māyā not only deceives
people about the things they think they know;
more basically, it limits their knowledge.” (Doni-
ger O’Flaherty 1984: 119)
2 |  In this emerging field, principles of de-
sign, modeling, construction and analysis of
cyber-physical systems are being discussed in-
tensively, but so far, not in terms of philosophical
oids, semi-autonomous machines, and ac-
tors enrooted in synthetic biology – may be
helpful in propaedeutic contexts, to some
extent, but not for the renewal of research
programs. However, grouping key issues
around dualities like subject/object, knowl-
edge/reality, individual/society, etc. (§6)
runs the risk of remaining bound to dualist
thinking, although not necessarily in terms
of discrete (as compared to continuous) du-
alities.3 But even if different interpretations
like unities in/of difference, complementa-
rities, antagonisms or “seeking to overcome
dualism through integration or dialectical
articulation of terms” (§7) are considered,
analysis of constructivist epistemologies
might face difficulties. For example, dealing
with influential constructivist epistemolo-
gies as outlined by Siegfried Schmidt (2017:
143–152) in Histories and Discourses (“Ge-
schichten & Diskurse”), who has developed
a non-dualist approach in his recent work
inspired by the non-dualist philosopher Jo-
sef Mitterer, would prove to be a rather para-
doxical endeavor.
« 25 »  I agree that different variants of
constructivism may be regarded as differ-
ent interpretations of connections between
knowledge and the construction of real-
ity. After all, most important is the focus
on how-questions and genetic, generative
or procedural perspectives (Rusch 2012:
174). Along with respective modalities we
find corresponding claims, conceptual pos-
tulates, thematic preferences, problem ar-
rangements, and methodologies aiming at
different scopes.4 (Post-)modern construc-
issues of constructivist approaches (see, for exam-
ple, Suh 2014; Alur 2015; Druml 2017).
3 |  Of course, all dualities are “distinctive”
in some sense – but thinking in terms of, for ex-
ample, “strictly discrete” or “continua” makes a
difference.
4 |  The comparison of the constructivist
epistemologies in the target article gives a good
example of contrasting conceptual postulates
and thematic preferences as well as different
scopes. Further different scopes and contrast-
ing elements could be pointed out by consider-
ing other system-theoretical, socio-culturalist,
social‑psychological, cybernetic, cognitive scien-
tific, constructionist or (knowledge-)sociological
and philosophical variants in the wide field of
constructivist approaches.
 Constructivist Approaches
tivist epistemologies can be further char-
acterized by (a) predilections for issues of
self-reference and self-application, (b) the
assumption that all knowing and knowl-
edge is ineluctably perspectival, and (c) the
renouncement of statements about “real-
ity as such” (Hug 2009; 2012: 129) – three
characteristics that are expressed in what
can be called the “observation theorem”:
“  Observations are made by observing enti-
ties (people, individuals, agents, systems, etc.),
which observations, in the process, cannot si-
multaneously observe the ‘blind spots’ (starting
points, perspectives, contextual requirements,
”
etc.) of the observation. (Hug 2009: 74; see
also Maturana 1970: 8; Foerster 1979: 5; Schmidt
2000: 15–21)
« 26 »  In my view, the methodology
provided in the target article can be en-
hanced in various ways. In this commentary
I want to highlight four options for enhance-
ment, all of which place an emphasis on
contrasting and contextualizing:
a Enhancement can refer to language and
conceptual analysis of key terms;
b The variations-concept presented by
Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin
provides a philosophical option for en-
hancement;
c Consideration of medial forms and
multi-codal forms of articulation could
foster enhanced perspectives; and
d Enhancement in terms of polylogical
research is being considered.
Conceptual analysis of key terms
« 27 »  Which constructivist would not
agree with Becerra and Castorina when
they write that “reality” is a controversial
term (§12)? However, their analysis can be
enhanced by considering conceptual issues
related to language. For example, Ernst von
Glasersfeld has repeatedly pointed out the
importance of growing up with more than
one language for becoming attentive to-
wards different notions of reality (Glasers-
feld 1995: 2f). Consequently, he rejected
the idea that an objective ontological real-
ity could be discovered (§16). In doing so,
he made use of his language skills and dis-
tinguished between Realität und Wirklich-
keit (Glasersfeld 1991a, 1996, 1998), a dis-
tinction which is hard to translate. If we
From Constructivist Monologues to Dialogues and Polylogues Theo Hug
Reality/Substantiality/Unconditionality
(Realität, realtà, realidad, réalité)
transphenomenal
basis of actuality or veritableness
area, which keeps a certain independence
being-in-itself
pre-predicative area
physical, culturally untouched nature
objective social and culture-historic context
possibility and necessity can be distinguished possibility and necessity overlap
in the background, hidden
exists independently of our experience
immovable
space of what happens to somebody
absolute, unconditional
given, stable, certain
invariant towards medial, socio-cultural and
individual influences
Table 1 • Realität – Wirklichkeit (Hug 2005: 572).
look at semantic fields related to “reality/
substantiality/unconditionality” (Realität)
and “reality/actuality/factuality” (Wirklich-
keit) in the German language, we can find
various kinds of subject-related arguments
corresponding to interpretations of reality
as Wirklichkeit (see examples in Table 1).
« 28 »  The situation remains ambivalent
because of the different emphases and par-
tially incompatible views. Discussing inter-
pretations and juxtapositions might feel like
opening a bottomless pit or even Pandora’s
box, especially because possible distinctions
between Realität and Wirklichkeit turn out
to be problematic, too, since it is always
a phenomenal agency calling something
“trans-phenomenal” and since whatever
seems to be “certain” and “immovable” at
one point can easily appear “uncertain” and
“variable” at another. However, considering
cultural, actor- and language-related con-
texts and contrasts can be very helpful for a
deeper understanding of constructivist epis-
temologies.
Reality/Actuality/Factuality
(Wirklichkeit, realtà/reale, realidad, fait)
phenomenal
image of reality
more strongly dependent on acts of consciousness
being, dependent on observer
meaningful reality
“cultural nature” and culture
possibility and necessity overlap
in the foreground, superficial
constructed through our experience and reflection
variable
room for creation
limited, partial
made, unstable, uncertain
dependent on medial, socio-cultural and individual
influences
Conceptualizations and the concept
of variation
« 29 »  What the authors of the target ar-
ticle call “axes” (§7, §9, §31) can be taken as
“topics” that are exemplified in various ways.
Goodman (1978) and Goodman & Elgin 205
(1988) developed a very useful and versatile
solution for the study of philosophical as-
pects of mutual relations of different worlds
and symbolic systems. Like many others,
they reject a “God’s eye view” along with
claims for an innocent view from “outside”
or meta-perspectives into which all other
perspectives could be bundled (Goodman
1978: 5). The basic assumption is that dif-
ferent worlds do not arise from “nothing,”
they are rather created from other worlds:
“Worldmaking as we know it always starts
from worlds already on hand; the making is
a remaking” (Goodman 1978: 6). Relating
the different worlds to one another is not
done by referring to a reality in the sense of a
firm foundation of everything, but by clari-
fying the overall organization of the descrip-
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
206
tions, which are thought of as variations.
This concept of variation does not refer to
the biology, the psychology or the sociology
of worldmaking. It focuses philosophical
aspects of mutual possibilities of relations
between different worlds. Although in prin-
ciple, these variations can be seen as repre-
sentations of an original, it is not the origi-
nal “in itself ” that can serve as a criterion for
the comparison of varying descriptions with
the original. Quite the contrary; it is the per-
spectives that give rise to similarities in the
variations of the descriptions and that also
create a difference between variation and
original (Goodman & Elgin 1988: 66–82). In
this sense, specific conceptualizations of key
terms and fields of tension like “knowledge/
reality” or “individual/society” could be
clarified by explaining conceptual possibili-
ties of relations of different interpretations.
In other words, the task would be to study
points of view that make the exemplary de-
scriptions of “axes” appear as variations of
one topic (Heyting & Hug 2000; Hug 2005).
Why not move on beyond textual
forms?
« 30 »  “Reframing” the methodology
used in the target article by reference to
Goodman and Elgin’s variations-concept
might contribute, for example, to a better
understanding of conceptual aspects regard-
ing the assumed situatedness of knowledge,
be it located in minds or heads, bodies, ob-
jects to be treated, societies, social structures
or networks, in the “cloud” or Vanishing into
Things (Allen 2015). However, the target ar-
ticle, like this commentary and myriads of
scientific and philosophical contributions,
is committed to a textual form. Neverthe-
less, there is no compelling argument that
the study of constructivist epistemologies
and the problematization of key concepts
or selected dualisms should not go beyond
textual forms and The Gutenberg Galaxy
(McLuhan 1962). In the knowledge that it
will be difficult to cultivate alternatives, we
should be aware that constructivist episte-
mologies are not limited to book cultures or
traditional Forms of Articulation (“Formen
der Artikulation”) (Niklas & Roussel 2013).
In view of the ongoing media-cultural dy-
namics and processes of digitalization, we
should also consider changing forms of the
production, representation, description, re-
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
flection, analysis, assessment and critique of
knowledge
a by semiotic means of communication
including multimodal and multi-codal
offers,
b by the application of media technologies
of production, storage and transmis-
sion, and
c as part of sociotechnical integration
and the extension of natural or cultural
boundaries of human capacities.
Visual epistemologies, simulations, dia-
grammatic critique (Depner 2016), the work
of algorithms, digital assistants, and all sorts
of medial forms as shapes and structures of
distinguishable tools in transversally linked
media systems will increasingly challenge
constructivist dialogues, too.
From dialogues to polylogues
« 31 »  So far, many representatives of
constructivist thinking have advocated
their positions in a monological manner
by starting from more or less unquestioned
assumptions of superiority over other ap-
proaches. Although I have a lot of sympathy
for dialogical efforts as available in the target
article, I see a need for polylogical analysis
and examination of the various constructiv-
ist epistemologies, too. According to Franz
Wimmer (2001, 2007), progress can only
come about if we overcome cultural and
epistemic centrisms on every level of re-
flection and argumentation. Polylogical re-
search concerns dialogues between several
or many positions, the ideal scenario being
that all basic concepts, assumptions, start-
ing points and methods are debatable, and
every participant is equally open to argu-
ments. Knowing that assumptions of equal
status, notions of universally balanced inter-
ests, and the willingness to question all basic
concepts have a counter­factual character,
polylogues may enable encounters in which
“for each tradition […] every other one [is]
‘exotic’ in the sense that each is alien to all
the others and none of them is beyond ques-
tion” (Wimmer 2001: 392; my translation).
This message is not new to constructivists.
It corresponds with often-emphasized mo-
dalities of alienation (Verfremdung) (Reich
2009: 557) as being crucial for human know-
ing and understanding as well as for coping
with challenges related to complexity and
contingency.
Theo Hug is a professor in the Department of Media,
Society and Communication at the University of
Innsbruck, and coordinator of the Innsbruck Media
Studies research group. His areas of interest include
media education and media literacy, theory of
knowledge and mobile learning, and methodology and
philosophy of science. Homepage: http://hug-web.at
Received: 16 February 2018
Accepted: 23 February 2018
Boundaries between and
Variety within Approaches
Armin Scholl
University of Münster, Germany
scholl/at/uni-muenster.de
> Upshot • Similar to the target article
I address the following questions: (1)
How can constructivism be defined and
distinguished from non-constructivist
approaches? (2) How can different con-
structivist approaches be brought into
a dialogue despite their variety? My an-
swers to these questions will differ from
those of the authors.
« 1 »  Gastón Becerra and José Antonio
Castorina aim to compare various construc-
tivist approaches. Therefore, the authors
have to first indicate the boundaries be-
tween constructivist epistemology and any
other epistemology before they can identify
relevant constructivist approaches, which
then can be brought to a dialogue (§§1–4).
Both problems are hard to solve as
ƒƒ there is no consensus on which ap-
proaches can be identified as construc-
tivist and which cannot and
ƒƒ the appropriate criteria for comparison
are not easy to find.
While, in principle, I agree with the solution
of the authors, I will offer solutions that are
different from theirs.
« 2 »  How can constructivism be de-
fined? There are many problems with iden-
tifying the core of constructivist argumen-
tation, of the constructivist community or
of constructivist approaches. Some authors
propose basic definitions in order to outline
a lowest common denominator (e.g., Riegler
 Constructivist Approaches
2005). I consider such definitions a neces-
sary and useful boundary to start with. Of
course, any definition is just a convention,
which can be challenged by others who draw
the lines differently. The problem becomes
even harder if these definitions include au-
thors who do not consider themselves con-
structivists (§10).
« 3 »  One solution to this problem could
be a kind of meta-analysis as is practiced by
Karl Müller (2010). He tries to identify ci-
tation and communication networks that
indicate a common interest in the same
epistemological interests and a similar kind
of argumentation. An early attempt to put
together the contributions of constructiv-
ist authors was the edited anthology Der
Diskurs des Radikalen Konstruktivismus
(Schmidt 1987). Although Müller (2010: 35)
criticizes this volume for its lack of compre-
hensiveness and representativeness, such
anthologies may be a helpful empirical basis
or starting point for identifying constructiv-
ist networks.
« 4 »  Another problem is what to do
with apparently similar approaches car-
rying different labels, such as radical con-
structivism and social constructionism.
Becerra and Castorina (§§3f, §10) exclude
social constructionism from their compara-
tive analysis because including all variants
of constructivism would have required an
even more complex or dense argumenta-
tion. Furthermore, social constructionists
do not mention radical constructivists (and
vice versa) and follow a different research
line. This may be an indicator that these
constructivist approaches operate in differ-
ent fields of communication (such as cita-
tion networks) and that they have different
programs (such as research questions or
focuses). Indeed, mutual references are rare
(Kenneth Gergen 2008 being a notable ex-
ception). However, there are ties between
the two seemingly separated networks:
Klaus Krippendorff (2008) shares the episte-
mological foundation of radical constructiv-
ism but considers himself a social construc-
tivist. Similarly, how should Schmidt (2003)
who makes a considerable argumentative ef-
fort to overcome the gap between “natural-
ists” and “culturalists” be treated? Although
I agree with the authors’ advice neither to
“inflate” nor to “deflate” the term “construc-
tivism” (§4), this advice does not solve the
Boundaries between and Variety within Approaches Armin Scholl
problem of inclusion and exclusion. For
practical reasons, though, I accept their re-
striction to include only cognitive, system
theoretical and naturalist approaches (§3)
and their selection of the four proponents
(i.e., Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld,
Humberto Maturana and Niklas Luhmann)
(§10). Still, even if it would be a difficult task
to compare the cognitive, epistemological
and systemic branch of constructivism with
the socio-cultural branch of construction-
ism, it could be a useful one.
« 5 »  The last problem I want to men-
tion in this context is whether the difference
between moderate and radical constructiv-
ism should be considered (§11). Becerra
and Castorina include both epistemological
directions in order to compare them within
the frame of constructivism. Alternatively,
one could try to draw a sharp distinction
between constructivism and realism and re-
strict constructivism to its radical, i.e., most
consistent version. Is it useful to include
“constructivist research programs uphold-
ing an explicitly realistic assumption” (§13)
in a constructivist epistemology that vehe-
mently refuses to rely on even a single onto-
logical assumption, and which develops an
alternative view on topics such as scientific
research, objectivity, and strict observer-ob-
served relationship (e.g., Maturana 1988b)?
(Q1)
« 6 »  The great number of constructivist
approaches takes me to the second question:
How can different constructivist approach-
es be brought into a dialogue despite their
variety? Could the criteria used by the au-
thors to compare the various constructivist
approaches be used? (Q2) The relationship
between cognition, knowledge and reality is
a core issue of all constructivist approaches
and is therefore the most suitable criterion
to distinguish between them. The authors
even use this criterion to elaborate the rela-
tionship between constructivism and real-
ism (§13) and between constructivism and
ontology (§16, §21). Further characteristics
not mentioned by the authors but which
may make it possible to compare (and dis-
tinguish) different constructivist approaches
include the logic of second-order observa-
tion or the cybernetic orientation, which all
are typical for the systemic variants of cog-
nitive and epistemological constructivism
(rather than for social constructionism).
« 7 »  Instead, the authors propose the
distinction between individual and society
(§§25–30), which strikes me as less relevant,
though. At first sight, there is a difference
and even division between representa-
tives of radical or cognitive constructivism
(such as von Glasersfeld, von Foerster, and
Maturana) on the one side, and sociologists
(such as Luhmann, Peter Berger & Thomas
Luckmann, and Gergen) on the other side.
A closer look, however, reveals that this is
a difference at the level of analysis as it is a
matter of the micro-macro distinction (i.e.,
individual vs. society) rather than a differ-
ence in approach (i.e., systemic vs. non-
systemic). For instance, Luhmann’s theory
of social systems takes the perspective of
a sociological macro level and is systemic,
whereas Berger & Luckmann and Gergen,
while also being committed to the sociologi-
cal macro level, do not choose a systemic
approach. All of the cognitive constructiv-
ists mentioned above consider themselves
system theorists or cyberneticians but take
the perspective of the individual, i.e., the
micro level. The relationship between indi-
vidual and society discussed by Becerra and
Castorina mixes up both distinctions (sys-
temic vs. non-systemic and micro vs. macro
level). Furthermore, it is not specific enough
to distinguish and compare different con-
structivist approaches because it is already
a long-standing research topic in sociology
generally (e.g., Alexander et al. 1987; Ador-
no et al. 1950) and not just within construc-
tivist approaches.
« 8 »  The branch of systemic construc- 207
tivism should not mainly be distinguished
with the help of the distinction between
individual and society because all of these
approaches consider systems the starting
points of their philosophy, be they biological,
cognitive or social systems. This deliberate
decision avoids ontologization: if objectiv-
ism were simply “replaced” by subjectivism
the subject would replace the object as the
ontological foundation. By making systems
the foundation of constructivism they can
play both roles, i.e., observing and being
observed (Foerster 1981: 105). Thus, the
dualism of subject and object, which neces-
sarily ends up in ontological thinking, can
be avoided. Even von Glasersfeld (1992b),
whose radical constructivism seems to be
subjectivist, considers himself a cyberneti-
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
208
cian and thus follows a systemic logic rather
than an idealistic philosophy.
« 9 »  Although I consider the criterion
of the distinction between individual and
society not usable in the context of com-
paring different constructivist approaches,
it may be helpful to distinguish between
the micro and macro level of observation
(Scholl 2016). Again, we meet a problem of
hidden ontology: if the distinction between
individual and society is used to separate
different levels of the object under study
these objects are made ontological entities.
Rather, the distinction between the micro
and macro level of observation designates
the perspective of observation (such as the
research question or the methodological
starting point) and thus avoids ontological
assumptions. Unfortunately, constructiv-
ists themselves assess the problem of level
of observation very relevant. For instance,
Maturana (2014, 2015) criticizes Luhmann
for “abusing” his concept of autopoiesis.
Could this be the reason why Becerra and
Castorina use the object-driven and sub-
stantial difference between individual and
society rather than the more methodologi-
cal difference between the micro and macro
level of observation to compare and distin-
guish various constructivist approaches?
(Q3)
« 10 »  In order to find a constructive
solution to the problem of whether certain
criteria are appropriate for comparing two
approaches, I suggest that we must not re-
main at the surface but go into details. For
instance, the comparative analysis of the
concept of autopoiesis applied in different
disciplines or in different theories seems
to be promising: on the basis of nine ques-
tions, sociologist and systemic therapist
Marianne Krüll (Krüll et al. 1989) inter-
viewed Maturana and Luhmann about the
comprehension of their concepts of auto-
poiesis. The answers helped to clarify and
compare the two approaches. Other specific
core concepts could also be the object of
comparison, such as observation, objec-
tivity, and viability/truth: a comparative
analysis of constructivist texts alongside
these core concepts should provide valuable
information about the network relations
and common positions among construc-
tivists as well as about their individual and
different comprehensions within the com-
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
mon discourse of (radical) constructivism.
Becerra and Castorina have started such
an endeavor with the objective of bringing
them into a dialogue. Hopefully, their ar-
ticle will encourage further efforts in this
direction.
Armin Scholl is Professor at the Department of
Communication in Münster, Germany. His research
and teaching focus is on epistemology and philosophy
of science (including constructivism and critical
rationalism), communication theory (including theory
of social systems), empirical methods (including
quantitative and qualitative methodology), journalism
research (including two representative surveys among
German journalists), counter public and alternative
media. He has published and edited books about
systems theory and constructivism, methodology
(among them his dissertation and a textbook
about surveys) and about the two representative
journalism studies. Website: http://www.uni-
muenster.de/Kowi/en/personen/armin-scholl.html
Received: 6 February 2018
Accepted: 15 February 2018
Constructivism in Pains
of Self-Analysis: A Differential
Construction of a Dialogue?
Marta Lenartowicz
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
marta.lenartowicz/at/mac.com
> Upshot • Becerra and Castorina aim
to consolidate lines of dialogue among
the research programs of constructivism
by elucidating the differences between
them. In my commentary I question the
efficacy of their methodological choice,
wondering if marking differences and
drawing dichotomous axes indeed es-
tablishes a good ground for dialogue to
take place. I suggest that perhaps offer-
ing a broader conceptual container to
hold the seemingly mutually excluding
positions could be what is needed for
a deeper communication between dis-
tinct lines of research to unfold.
« 1 »  The ambition of the target article
is to consolidate lines of dialogue among
the research programs of constructivist
epistemology by elucidating the differences
between them (§41). Gastón Becerra and
José Antonio Castorina identify a set of
axes, such as those between genesis/struc-
ture, culture/nature, body/mind, discourse/
praxis (§6), on which significant differences
between constructivists can be mapped, as
well as a set of prominent theorists (§2),
such as Heinz von Foerster, Francisco Vare-
la, Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, Bru-
no Latour & Steve Woolgar, and Thomas
Kuhn, who have marked these axes with
their original standpoints. Starting from the
landscape so broad, their discussion nar-
rows down, however. The selection of the
theorists to be included settles for the rather
usual “suspects,” Jean Piaget, Ernst von Gla-
sersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas
Luhmann (§10), while the first axis to be
explored is constructivism’s central one:
between knowledge and reality (§§11–24).
« 2 »  Because of the centrality of the
knowledge/reality dichotomy in the con-
structivist discourse, in reading the article
my imagination was occupied by an uneasy
image of an old couple’s customary topic
of disagreement being pulled out “in order
to facilitate” their communication. I won-
der: could precise, comparative pinning
down of their respective, eternally perpetu-
ated positions indeed work as a dialogue-
inducing intervention? Understanding
dialogue as a formative mechanism of new
social patterns, I find this question puz-
zling: What is the methodological value of
marking differences and drawing dichoto-
mous axes?  (Q1) I appreciate the authors’
observation that such treatment may be
useful for the purposes of critical analysis,
comparison, or discussion, but I am won-
dering what other methodological choice
could have been made, should a dialogue,
mentioned in the title, be the central in-
tention. The magic of dialogue, as I un-
derstand and value it, is primarily creative:
dialogue facilitates new social patterns to
individuate. In that sense, dialogue can be
expected to forge a new socially embodied
locus of cognition (Lenartowicz, Wein-
baum & Braathen 2016), from which what
was there before can start to be observed
differently. Being observed differently, in
turn, triggers becoming different: since so-
cial patterns are entanglements of diverse
 Constructivist Approaches
cognitive agents interacting (Weinbaum &
Veitas 2017), dialogue, then, fuels an ongo-
ing individuation – change! – in all of them.
Of course, as in any social exchange the
dialogical situation must consist of mark-
ing and expressing differences, here I agree
with the authors’ approach. However, given
the delicate nature of its creative potential,
I believe that dialogue needs different dif-
ferences to be brought forth – certainly not
the continuously perpetuated ones, which
are already known to have contributed to
an impasse. Perhaps some of the other di-
chotomies identified but not explored by
the authors might have therefore served
their intended outcome better than the
flagship knowledge/reality dichotomy of
constructivism can.
« 3 »  Because the difference of posi-
tions along the knowledge/reality spec-
trum has become a source of identity an-
chors for constructivists – one which gives
rise to self-identifications such as von
Glasersfeld’s “radical” (§16) or Maturana’s
“super-realist” (§19) – my methodological
hesitation is particularly relevant for the
discussion of that first axis. The second di-
mension selected by the authors, one that
spreads between the individual and society
(§§25–30), is in my view less problematic
as a potential foundation for a fruitful dia-
logue. This is because what superficially ap-
pears as a conceptual dichotomy analogous
to the knowledge/reality one is more of a
spectrum of interests, rather than an order
of mutually excluding stances. Should the
three interests discussed, von Glasersfeld’s
(§28), Maturana’s (§29) and Luhmann’s
(§30) be put together as different parts of
one bigger puzzle, they would neatly con-
tain the perspectives of three different cog-
nitive systems involved: that of the human
psyche, that of the human mammalian
animal, and that of the social system’s own
cognitive autonomy, respectively.
« 4 »  Even if the complementarity of
their stances has been difficult to acknowl-
edge by the above-mentioned theorists
themselves, approaches such as Rolando
García’s (1999) revision of Piaget (§27)
do provide frameworks for their fruitful
integration. Perhaps the García kind of
“therapy,” offering a broader conceptual
container to hold the seemingly mutually
excluding positions, could be exactly what
Non-Dualism and Self-Reference Edmundo Balsemão Pires
is needed for a dialogue to unfold. I am cu-
rious as to what the authors’ opinion about
that is (Q2).
« 5 »  While not finding the discussion
of the individual-society problematic per
se, I regret to see that the authors have de-
cided against the inclusion of the “(social)
constructionism” line of research in their
overview (§2). Without that inclusion the
spectrum between the human individual
and society does not extend fully, which
may be another reason for the lack of ap-
parent incommensurability exposed in the
discussion. The extension of the axis to-
wards the stances of social constructionism
would have certainly brought many mutual
incommensurabilities to the fore, calling
for another dialogue space to contain them.
Here, as I have argued in a previous com-
mentary (Lenartowicz 2016), it might be
advantageous to construct the “conceptual
therapist” position by following the exam-
ple of Raivo Palmaru (2016a, 2016b), who
has been addressing at great lengths the
apparent incommensurability between the
cognitive operation of the human mind, as
constructivism has it, and the problematic
issues of the emergence and existence of
society, as social constructionism describes
them. Palmaru’s conclusion that, just like
in human cognition, self-organisation also
occurs at the supra-individual level, where
shared knowledge and socio-cultural
meanings emerge in the operatively closed
motion, is very close to my own under-
standing of how points of convergence and
complementarity can be found between the
otherwise diverging lines of research.
Marta Lenartowicz is a postdoctoral researcher at
the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Center Leo Apostel for
Interdisciplinary Studies (CLEA). She received her
PhD in humanistic management (public affairs) in
2014 and MA in philology (theoretical linguistics) in
2001, both from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków,
Poland. In her research she focuses on social ontology
and epistemology, informed by an understanding of
social systems as complex, adaptive, self-organizing
instances of distributed cognition and intelligence.
Website: https://martalenartowicz.academia.edu
Received: 22 February 2018
Accepted: 27 February 2018
Non-Dualism and Self-
Reference in Constructivism
Edmundo Balsemão Pires
Coimbra University, Portugal
edbalsemao/at/icloud.com
> Upshot • The target article claims that
constructivism should be regarded as a
manifold movement, but not as a unique
philosophical doctrine. This commentary
evaluates the legitimacy of this claim.
« 1 »  In §2 of their target article, Gastón
Becerra and José Antonio Castorina distin-
guish two constructivist families:
a “constructivism interested in cognitive
theory”;
b “social constructionism.”
The use of the same word “construction” in
both families can motivate a feeling of se-
mantic familiarity even though nothing is
the “same” in the texts of the respective fam-
ily, in particular when the social dimension
of cognition is at stake. This is the case with
Niklas Luhmann for §2a and Bruno Latour
for §2b.
« 2 »  The scrutiny of the constructivist
family resemblances is based on the clari-
fication of the constructivist attempts to
transcend the dualities (§§7f) that emerge
from “tensioned axes” (§7) present in mod-
ern and contemporary cognitive theories.
Here, “constructivism interested in cogni-
tive theory” (§2a) is understood as an oppo-
nent of the heritage of modern philosophy, 209
mainly of Descartes’s substance dualism.
Two basic dualisms are presented as the
consequence of the metaphysical or episte-
mological grounding in the subject/object
opposition: “knowledge/reality” (§§11–24)
and “individual/society” (§§25–30). The de-
scription of constructivism as an epistemol-
ogy that aims at a deliberate dissolution of
the dualisms of modern philosophy is a first
attempt to specify a common ground for the
constructivist family as a whole. Let us call it
the “dissolution of dualistic thinking.” Even
if the authors succeeded in the identification
of the dissolution of dualist thinking as a
continuous resemblance among constructiv-
ists, the difficulties return when one observes
the manifold strategies put in practice to ac-
complish the dissolution. Heinz von Foer-
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
210
ster, Humberto Maturana and Luhmann’s
common use of the concept of distinction in
first- and second-order observations, with its
two sides; the frequent quotations of George
Spencer Brown’s (1969) Laws of Form; and,
here, the meaning of the operations of in-
dication, re-entry, recursion, and the differ-
ence of marked/unmarked spaces should
decrease excessive optimism concerning an
easy dissolution of dualistic thinking. In-
stead of seeing the dissolution strategy as
the pure elimination of the opposites, one
should explain the reflexivity of either side
of the form in the system’s dynamic, a way
evoked by Luhmann. Reflexivity in the form
of observation supposes that one of the two
sides of the form can represent to the other
a reflective function referring to the opera-
tive meaning of the distinction itself. In ob-
servations, the distinction in the structure of
a form through which one observes is not
a simple opposition between abstract, fixed
sides, contradistinguished as opposites, such
as subject/object. Rather, it entails a reflec-
tive movement and an inner unevenness
between the sides that justify the difference
of marked/unmarked space(s), or inner-
side/outer-side in the operative unity of a
form (Luhmann 1997a: 877). Thus, a con-
frontation of the constructivist movement’s
grammar of the opposites with modern phi-
losophy should not be limited to a critique
of dualisms in the Cartesian or Kantian
versions. §8 of the target article seems only
concerned with the Critique of Pure Reason,
which is a drastic reduction of a more com-
plex theoretical context.
« 3 »  Regarding §2a, the article has re-
viewed Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld,
von Foerster, Maturana and Luhmann’s
versions. Notwithstanding a reference to
Francisco Varela, his contributions to a
constructivist view on cognition and em-
bodiment are overlooked. An assessment
of Varela’s views on embodiment would
bring useful insights into the problem of
the “elimination of dualistic thinking.” It
could also have been important if the au-
thors had written about cognition from the
perspective of the neurosciences or if they
had pondered the implications of construc-
tivism qua enactivism in the debates on the
dissemination of computational metaphors
in the cognitivist programmes (Varela,
Thompson & Rosch 1991).
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
« 4 »  The feeling of a thwarted way
towards a definition of what is common
among cognitive constructivists could
have been partially avoided if the authors
had identified a common source of cogni-
tive constructivism (§2a). Such a common
source can be found in the history of cyber-
netics and in von Foerster’s “second-order
cybernetics.” According to von Glasersfeld
(1995: 60–63, 67; 1999b: 286), also Piaget,
whose own constructivist thinking relies on
basic categories explicitly introduced in cy-
bernetics during and after the 1940s, such
as self-organization, circular causation or
self-referential processes in the structural
organization of the cognitive operations in
child development (Piaget 1937). The arti-
cle elected two “axes” (“knowledge/reality”
and “individual/society”) in the explana-
tion of the constructivists’ commonalities.
§10 elucidates the motives for the choice of
these binaries in conditional formulas. The
binary individual/society clarifies “where
the inquiry about the subject or system of
knowledge is.” Apparently, here it is sug-
gested that the dualism individual/society
serves the purpose of locating cognition,
but this is far from being convincing. A ma-
jor difficulty is the linking of the dualisms
of the two “axes.” If cognition has multiple
instantiations, how to conceive of cogni-
tion within communicative, social process-
es? (Q1)
« 5 »  A much broader historical con-
text than an abstract of Immanuel Kant’s
transcendental reply to metaphysics (§8) is
needed to recognize the depth of the onto-
logical explanations of cognition in mod-
ern and contemporary philosophy. Kant’s
solution to the riddle of the “possibility of
knowledge” confronting the opposition of
dogmatic and sceptical prior solutions is
the authors’ recommended summary of the
meaning of ontology for the constructivist
movement. It is a narrow account of a much
more complex network of theoretical stim-
uli. Georg W. F. Hegel’s dialectics, Edmund
Husserl’s phenomenology, Martin Hei-
degger’s Daseinsanalyse or Spencer Brown’s
calculus of form were sources for Luhmann’s
depiction of “European rationality” (Luh-
mann 1992: 51–91). The dialogue between
Jürgen Habermas and Luhmann (Haber-
mas & Luhmann 1971) included herme-
neutics and a stance regarding the herme-
neutical overcoming of the subject/object
distinction, the Geist/Natur divide and the
implications of the system/environment
distinction in the overcoming of these old
dichotomies. Gotthard Günther offered an
entirely new approach to Hegel’s dialectics,
inspired by cybernetic categories, leading
to a new ontology of reflexion (Balsemão
Pires 2010) that would be of key interest in
the appraisal of recent philosophical ideas
about the observer and self-reference in ob-
servations. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s version
of the blindness of the first-order observer,
in his metaphor of the eye and the visual
field, is mentioned by von Foerster (1993),
illustrating the source of blind spots in first-
order observations.
« 6 »  According to the target article,
Piaget’s views on the epistemological mean-
ing of the concept of reality seem irreso-
lute. This is mainly due to his theoretical
manoeuvring within philosophical seman-
tics. But, his appraisal of schematism in
learning and the organic-psychic articu-
lation of the schemes with sensorimotor
operations transformed the subject/object
dichotomy into a genetic view on the ac-
quisition of cognitive skills (Piaget 1959).
Consequently, the disagreement between
idealists and realists is not the proper meta-
theoretical frame to depict the processes an
organic-psychic evolving system undergoes
in learning. Here, the reference to Kant and
the epistemological background of the Kan-
tian overcoming of traditional metaphysics
may seem out-dated. Generally speaking
and stressing the common views between
Piaget and Luhmann, a “realist” viewpoint
in operative constructivism is only accept-
able under a proviso. I am referring to the
acquisition of self-reference in evolutionary
systems. Luhmann’s Es gibt Systeme may be
rephrased as: what is real is system-depen-
dent. This conclusion leads to the question:
Is the frame of Kantian transcendental phi-
losophy sufficient to articulate the setting
and the problems posed by the status of
systemic reflexivity and self-reference? (Q2)
« 7 »  Piaget (1937) conceived a model
of the cognitive development of the child,
introducing his notions of scheme and as-
similation. He emphasised the concrete op-
erations in the construction of patterns em-
bedded in sensorimotor habits of the child,
which would be mobilized to form coherent
 Constructivist Approaches
cognitive structures in assimilation. The
more or less successful way the child or-
ganizes the world depends entirely on the
degree of coherence acquired by cognitive
schemes in connection with the organism’s
activity. Here, the distinction of idealism/
realism does not help. No one is trying to ig-
nore the physical existence of matter, as es-
tablished by means of the scientific descrip-
tion of the behaviour of defined properties.
Properties of the domain of the physical ex-
istence and the psychological construction
of reality may converge in what is relevant
for an organism. But this is not equivalent
to claiming that outside the operative con-
vergences is a mind-independent reality, as
a meta-organic reality (see Glasersfeld 1995
for a similar conclusion). Maturana’s notion
of the “domain of existence” of biological
systems clarifies the self-referential knot of
the organism and its “domain of existence”
in the following:
“ The operation of distinction that brings forth
and specifies a unity, also brings forth and speci-
fies its domain of existence as the domain of the
operational coherences entailed by the operation
of the properties through which the unity is char-
64)
”
acterised in its distinction. (Maturana 1990:
« 8 »  The authors’ approach to the
knowledge/reality binary would have gone
straight to the point of the significance of
the constructivist turn, if they had depicted
von Foerster’s ideas on second-order cy-
bernetics, self-reference, recursion or the
distinction between trivial/non-trivial ma-
chines (Foerster 1993). Von Glasersfeld’s
1983 “Declaration to the American Society
for Cybernetics” (cited in Schmidt 1987: 12)
summarized von Foerster’s views on reality
as an outcome of the interaction between
observers and their domain of observation,
not as a thing in itself. In this, von Foerster
agrees with Maturana. In the volume on
“radical constructivism” edited by Siegfried
Schmidt (1987), the brief historical char-
acterisation of constructivism as a general
theory of cognition and a non-reductionist
epistemology included Piaget’s genetic epis-
temology as one of the forerunners. Recent-
ly, Albert Müller (2017: 75) mentioned von
Glasersfeld’s appraisal of Piaget’s work, in
his seminal paper of 1974, as a pioneering
Non-Dualism and Self-Reference Edmundo Balsemão Pires
event in the spreading of the label “radical
constructivism.” All these references should
support the view of an effective overcom-
ing of the idealist/realist opposition in con-
structivism. However, the target article does
not present a convincing defence of con-
structivism against the accusation of ideal-
ism, or against so-called “ontological ideal-
ism” (§16), based on a due consideration
of the role of self-reference in the form of
observations. Therefore, a last question is
justified: Do the authors consider that the
constructivist project of dissolution of the
metaphysical/epistemic dualisms succeed-
ed in all their proponents, only in some of
them, or in none of them? (Q3)
Finally let me address yet another aspect
that deserves scrutiny: the all-embracing
view of enactivism. Enactivism and con-
structivism join together in the elimination
of the object of naïve realism and both share
the emphasis on self-reference, acquired in
evolution. However, in the epistemological
strategies of enactivists and constructiv-
ists the elimination of the object of naive
realism is something that should not be
assessed through the lenses of the dualistic
categories of those theories of knowledge
that deal with the object/subject duality,
such as the modern versions of scepticism,
or Kant’s doctrine of the a priori, but also
what the authors refer to as the five varieties
of realism (§12). A serious consideration of
the meaning of the evolutionary acquisition
of self-reference in dynamic systems would
stress the realization of cognition in a great
variety of systems and the formation of in-
ner environments in cognitive systems.1
A constructivist/enactivist view of reality
requires inner environments of the type il-
lustrated by Luhmann in his version of the
functional differentiation of society and
formation of partial systems in the social
system. Enactivism would be a poor idea
if not connected to complexity and to the
system’s acquisition of autonomy in its pro-
cess of reduction of complexity. Society’s
self-differentiation is a way to deal with the
inner complexity of communication that
demands a high degree of autonomous so-
cial functioning and operating not depen-
1 |  See my independently published e-book
Sequencialidade do Sentido e Formas Cognitivas
(2018).
dent on one’s own psychological reduction
of meaning complexity in individual con-
sciousness or individual action. This entails
not only a distinction between psychic and
communicative elements and operations
in social/psychic systems, but also differ-
ences in the meaning of action and cogni-
tive forms mobilized in both types of sys-
tems. Focusing on the social representation
of action and actors, these differences have
been stressed by Luhmann in the notions
of person, intelligence, memory and learn-
ing in social systems, since his essays on
Trust (1968) and Sociology of Law (1987).
If self-reference is a common trait of psy-
chic and social systems, a distinction should
be drawn between the evolution of action
and of actors according to the psychologi-
cal structure of meaning processing and the
social system’s own evolution with its own
self-referential forms. Such a distinction
is decisive in the investigation of the com-
municative processing of expectations in
social systems. In their examination of the
individual/society axis, in §30, the authors
introduce a discussion of Luhmann’s theo-
ry of social systems, but their explanation
seems a sketch of work to be done.
Edmundo Balsemão Pires (born 1961) is Professor
of Philosophy at the University of Coimbra, Portugal.
His scientific interests are focused on theory of
systems and theory of society, constructivism,
Hegel and Luhmann. See more: https://www.
researchgate.net/profile/Edmundo_Pires
Received: 15 February 2018 211
Accepted: 20 February 2018
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra

Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
212
Authors’ Response
Toward a Pluralistic and
Dialogic Constructivism
Gastón Becerra
& José Antonio Castorina
> Upshot • Furthering the commenta-
tors’ input, we seek to clarify the reasons
that fueled some of our decisions when
constructing the analytical framework
introduced in the target article. We re-
assert our case of pursuing a pluralistic
and dialogic constructivism. In particu-
lar we discuss the proposal of axes and
tensions, such as knowledge/reality and
individual/society. Finally, we discuss
some of the alternative proposals sug-
gested by the commentators, which are
mainly based on what the constructivist
research programs have in common.
« 1 »  We welcome the commentators’
criticism and suggestions in relation to our
work. In particular, we are pleased with the
discussion about how to analyze construc-
tivism and with the attempt at highlighting
convergences and divergences of construc-
tivism that make our arguments explicit.
Also, we appreciate that most commen-
taries address our main objective, i.e., the
proposal of a tension-based (or axis-based)
analytical framework (§7). In no case did
we seek to provide a strict definition of
constructivism; problematizing dualities
as tensions (§6) has been only a working
hypothesis and a way to order its research
programs.
« 2 »  Based on the commentaries re-
ceived, in the following sections we will
focus on answering just three questions to
clarify our standpoint. First, in an attempt
to make our proposal clearer, we answer
questions and critical commentaries re-
garding our analytical framework and its
tension-based model. Secondly, we discuss
the alternative proposals provided by the
commentators. Finally, we list some of the
main tasks yet to be addressed.
« 3 »  Since the topics covered in the
commentaries are extensive, in our re-
sponse we will not be able to comment on
what the commentators say about the four
authors we analysed in our target article.
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
For example, Hugh Gash (§4) on Humberto
Maturana and Ernst von Glasersfeld, and
Raf Vanderstraeten (§4) on Niklas Luhmann
have offered a better and clearer character-
ization of the research programs than we
did.
About our analysis framework:
Dualities, tensions, and axes
« 4 »  The tension-based aspect of our
analysis framework was the one most dis-
cussed. The commentary of Hugo Cadenas
deals with our decision to introduce du-
alities as the main categories for our frame-
work. Armin Scholl and Gash – and for other
reasons, Marta Lenartowicz, as well – question
the basis for the individual/society tension
and the way the knowledge/reality tension
allows the inclusion of realist assumptions
in the constructivism discourse. Edmundo
Balsemão Pires’s commentary includes these
lines of discussion.
« 5 »  Cadenas criticizes the way that
our target article ends up introducing “op-
positions” (§§4–9), and eventually suggests
replacing them with the more abstract and
one-sided concept of “form” (§§10–20).
We disagree with Cadenas’s critique, which
holds that our approach is based on an
aprioristic or neo-structuralist perspective
(§21): Cadenas acutely observes that the
“oppositions” we present are not stringent
when, e.g., stating that the opposite of re-
ality is not knowledge, as we suggest, but
unreality (§10). This is where we expect
our initiative to be understood as not be-
ing aprioristic, as Cadenas observes. We
agree with Cadenas that concepts such as
“individual,” “society,” “knowledge” and
“reality” are forms, and thus explicit rea-
sons for pairing them should be provided.
Our main goal was to present the identity
of each research program by means of (re)
constructing a dialogic context that eluci-
dates the differences among constructiv-
ist research programs – an approach that
has quite a few antecedents in the history
and epistemology of science (e.g., Rescher
1977; Nudler 2009). Perhaps Theo Hug’s sug-
gestions in §7 to go for Nelson Goodman’s
“variations” could be yet another possible
approach to reconstruct these contexts. Our
strategy for setting this dialogic context was
to propose comparisons between the au-
thors, by showing how they take a position
between two well-differentiated references.1
Still, Cadenas’s general characterization of
constructivism as “a conceptual constel-
lation of forms sometimes associated, op-
posed, synthesized or reproduced” (§7) can
be inserted into our dialogic outlook as long
as the tensions themself – individual/soci-
ety or knowledge/reality – are accepted as
forms.
« 6 »  There are several reasons why
we chose the knowledge/reality and indi-
vidual/society tensions. One reason is that,
after considering some alternative tensions,
in particular genesis/structure or culture/
nature, they proved to be quite useful for
showing the different positions among the
research programs. Another, perhaps more
important reason is that they both serve to
challenge assumptions about what should
be considered constructivism. For example,
Scholl (§5), Gash (§6), and Balsemão Pires
(§6) have argued that our way of introduc-
ing the knowledge/reality tension results
in the discussion of realist positions within
constructivism. Scholl’s Q1 is sharply ques-
tioning the usefulness of such an inclusion
“in a constructivist epistemology that vehe-
mently refuses to rely on even a single on-
tological assumption […].” We do not agree
with Scholl, since his argumentation tends to
restrict constructivism to its radical version.
For us, not every constructivist position is
opposed to every possible realist position,
i.e., we do not understand constructivism as
inherently anti-realist. Rather, constructiv-
ism is about rejecting representative realism,
which cuts off the active role of the epis-
temic subject. For us, the challenge is about
questioning which realist (or anti-realist)
1 |  Following this line of reasoning, what
would be the other side of the “self-reference”
that Balsemão Pires’s Q2 suggests? Indeed, Kant’s
discussion of metaphysics may seem today like an
outdated context to place current trends in con-
structivist epistemology. However, it is the right
philosophical context in which Jean Piaget (1971)
himself grounds his realist standing. Following
Vanderstraeten’s intervention, it is also the right
context in which his empirical program was legiti-
mized as a novel and groundbreaking approach to
epistemology. Furthermore, as we will argue later,
the idealist–realist debate still serves us to point
out different assumptions, instead of “stressing
the common views” (§6).
 Constructivist Approaches
assumptions or claims are sought to be held
and which problems are raised if not held
(or advocated). For example, in §15 and §38
in our article we refer to Piaget’s idea of a
“reality” as a limit toward which knowledge
approximates infinitely as a way to provide
a progressive characterization of science.
Thus, although our article did not attempt
to defend one-sidedly the position of a con-
structivism associated with critical realism
– and with this we expect to answer Scholl’s
Q1 and Lenartowicz’s Q1 –, in discussing this
position we were compelled to make each
research program’s assumptions explicit.
« 7 »  The same reasoning could be ap-
plied to the individual/society tension.
Some of the commentaries tend to link this
tension with knowledge/reality. In his Q3,
Scholl objects that the individual/society
tension introduces ontological assumptions,
and suggests replacing it with micro/macro,
while in his Q1, Balsemão Pires asks “how
to conceive of cognition” when there are
multiple instantiations. The problem is not
whether we, in the target article, give society
an ontological status but rather whether the
mentioned research programs do. For exam-
ple, Piaget’s constructivism entails a dialec-
tical integration between the individual and
the social conditions where the individual
constructs knowledge, then, referring to Ro-
lando García’s complex system reformula-
tion (§27), we argued that this integration
was further advanced by explicating the way
in which these social conditions work. In
§33, we argued that Piaget’s strategy is not
the same as von Glasersfeld’s, whose iden-
tification of “socialness” with “intersubjec-
tiveness” tends to reduce the former to the
latter. Other variants of constructivism of
a more social nature such as David Bloor’s
(1984) Strong Programme, or even Thomas
Kuhn’s (1970, 1977) description of how
paradigms are socialized, tend to reduce
the importance of individual construction.
Our point is that ontological assumptions
– in this case, regarding the nature of these
“social conditions” and of “society” in gen-
eral – impact on how each research program
delimits the epistemic subject. Arguing this
point, Gash (§7) brings to our attention stud-
ies on psychosocial constructions – such as
stereotypes – that draw on radical construc-
tivism. Following our intent of maximizing
differences, we maintain that it is one thing
Authors’ Response Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina
to deal with the individual and subjective
construction of a social object, and quite an-
other to propose that social practices, social
institutions, ideologies, formal and informal
regulatory frameworks, and other social
entities have a role in the construction and
transformation of knowledge. In our view,
Piaget and García’s approach is closer to the
latter, especially when they suggest that ide-
ology both limits and opens up what can be
asked in science (Piaget & García 1982; Gar-
cía 2000). Perhaps the heart of the matter
can be observed in Gash’s words (§7), when
he states that “[m]eanings are indeed initial-
ly subjective then intersubjective and then
public.” Is there just a passage between these
meanings or are there interactions among
them? Are subjective meanings constructed
within social contexts and conditions that
extend beyond subjectivity and intersubjec-
tivity? Are such contexts objectified in social
practices and conventions?
« 8 »  After analysing the different po-
sitions of the four research programs, we
moved on to identify their overall par-
ticular strategies when addressing dualities
(§7, §40). Our point was that different pro-
grams treat dualities in different ways, and
that their coherence should be evaluated in
their own terms. Again, what is important
is to avoid minimizing the differences. That
is why we think it cautious not to ascribe a
particular objective of a single research pro-
gram to the entire constructivist movement,
e.g., the “dissolution of dualistic thinking,”
as suggested by Balsemão Pires (§2). Instead,
and answering his Q3, one should distin-
guish between “dualities” and “dualism”: the
former refers to the base elements of any
tension, while the latter is a particular way to
treat them by introducing a clean break be-
tween the two parts. For research programs
that uphold an overall strategy towards the
integration or subsumption of dualities (as
mentioned in our §7a and §7b), the occur-
rence of dualisms results in an incoherent
position. We pointed out this incoherence
in both Piaget’s (§32) and von Glasersfeld’s
(§33) programs. Lenartowicz’s Q2 takes these
analyses a step further by asking if systemic
viewpoints such as García’s or Raivo Pal-
maru’s work can integrate different interests
and focuses – such as those of von Glasers-
feld, Maturana, and Luhmann – as “different
parts of one bigger puzzle” (§3). We claim
that the main requirement for such a task is
none other than the compatibility of their
overall strategies.
Alternative proposals
« 9 »  Our main objective of proposing
an analytical framework also lends itself
conveniently to discussing the alternatives
suggested in the commentaries. Balsemão
Pires (§2) suggests that constructivism could
be defined out of a common task and/or
upon its common heritage with cybernet-
ics. Scholl (§2) follows Alexander Riegler
(2005) in defining it on the basis of a com-
mon denominator, common core concepts
(§10), and/or what we could call common
references (§3).2 Hug (§3) signals three other
common characteristics that link (Post-)
modern constructivism to an “observation
theorem.” All these proposals focus on what
the research programs have in common. Un-
doubtedly, the discussion needs a common
ground, and a few minimal shared assump-
tions – such as an anti-foundational attitude,
the rejection of any representationalist po-
sition, and the emphasis of the epistemic
subject’s active role (§8; see also Gash §3) –
will do the job. However, focusing on “what
they have in common” bears the risk of not
showing the range of the dialogic space,
which can only be determined by focusing
on the differences. As an example, one could
consider Hug’s (§3) aforementioned char-
acterization and ask whether these three
common characteristics of “post-modern”
constructivist programs are not held (or de-
nied) by “modern,” i.e., realist constructivist 213
programs.
« 10 »  It is only by setting a genuinely
dialogical context that one can pass from a
first-order observation of the programs to a
second-order observation that reveals their
2 |  Also, here, one could include Gash’s pro-
posal of a kind of three-stage common progression
(§§3): active role of knowing subject  →  silence
about any mind-independent reality  →  moving
from personal to social. However, one could ask
whether this is not a hagiography repeating von
Glasersfeld’s way of arguing verbatim while failing
to remember that the social concern was already
present in Piaget’s early developments (although
we claim that a consistent formulation of this
problem was not well integrated into his program
until Piaget’s death, see our §26).
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra
 potentialities, limits, and blind spots. This is
our best argument in favour of a pluralistic
understanding of constructivism, and for
analytical frameworks that aid us to stress
the differences of their assumptions. An-
swering Scholl’s Q2, this is the way we envi-
sion a possible dialogue for constructivism.
Next steps
« 11 »  Our discussion could benefit from
further analysis, especially by including au-
thors not considered so far. Balsemão Pires
Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
suggests the inclusion of two important fig-
ures into the current constructivist discus-
Combined References
Adorno T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik E., Levinson
D. J., Nevitt Sanford R. (1950) The authori-
tarian personality. Harper, New York.
Alexander J. C., Giesen B., Münch R. & Smelser
N. J. (eds.) (1987) The micro-macro link.
University of California Press, Berkeley.
Allen B. (2015) Vanishing into things: Knowl-
edge in Chinese tradition. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge.
Alur R. (2015) Principles of cyber-physical
systems. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Balsemão Pires E. (2010) Polycontextural
ontology and Luhmann’s concept of world.
214 In: Balsemão Pires E., Nonnenmacher B.
& Stülpnagel S. (eds.) Relations of the self.
Coimbra University Press, Coimbra: 35–55.
Becerra G. (2014) El “constructivismo operativo”
de Luhmann: Una caracterización relacional
con el constructivismo de inspiración
piagetiana y el constructivismo radical [The
“operative constructivism” of Luhmann:
A relational characterization with Piage-
tian-inspired constructivism and radical
constructivism.]. Enfoques 26(2): 29–54.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4527
Becerra G. (2016a) De la autopoiesis a la obje-
tividad: La epistemología de Maturana en los
debates constructivistas [From autopoiesis to
objectivity: Maturana’s epistemology within
the constructivist debates]. Opción, Revista
de ciencias humanas y sociales 32(80):
66–87. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4528
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
sion and its interface with sociology and
psychology: Bruno Latour (§1) and Fran-
cisco Varela (§3). Another possible path is
including further tensions such as body/
mind, rational/irrational, or facts/values, as
long as they prove to be useful to identify
differences (Lenartowicz §2).
« 12 »  Finally, as Vanderstraeten (§2) de-
mands, to properly characterize research
programs there is the pending task of in-
cluding the history of philosophical ideas
as well as the sociocultural context where
they have risen and developed. This is an
important task, especially when we refer to
Becerra G. (2016b) Los usos del constructivismo
en las publicaciones científicas de Lati-
noamérica [Uses of constructivism among
Latin-American scientific publications]. Mad
35: 38–59. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4529
Becerra G. & Castorina J. A. (2016a) Acerca
de la noción de “marco epistémico” del
constructivismo: Una comparación con la
noción de “paradigma” de Kuhn [About the
constructivist notion of “epistemic frame-
work”: A comparison with Kuhn’s “para-
digm” notion]. Revista iberoamericana de
ciencia, tecnologia y sociedad 11(31): 9–28.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4530
Becerra G. & Castorina J. A. (2016b) Una
mirada social y política de la ciencia en la
epistemología constructivista de Rolando
García [A socio-political view of the science
in Rolando García’s constructivist epistemol-
ogy]. Ciencia, docencia y tecnología 27(52):
329–350. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4531
Berger P. & Luckmann T. (1966) The social con-
struction of reality. Penguin, London.
Bloor D. (1984) The strengths of the strong
programme. In: Brown J. R. (ed.) Scientific
rationality: The sociological turn. Springer,
Dordrecht: 75–94.
Bloor D. (1991) Knowledge and social imagery.
The University of Chicago, Chicago.
Boom J. (2009) Piaget on equilibration. In: Mül-
ler U., Carpendale J. I. M. & Smith L. (eds.)
The Cambridge companion to Piaget. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York: 132–149.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4533
scientific problems, since we consider 20th-
century constructivism to be a reflection of
the breakthroughs and challenges in scien-
tific disciplines. But then we must not get
stuck in the problems that have given rise
to research programs. Rather their current
challenges need to be brought up, such as
the current reductionist tendency of certain
neuroscience research programs (Castorina
2016), and the empiricist revival behind the
Big Data mythology (Kitchin 2014).
Received: 6 March 2018
Accepted: 10 March 2018
Boyd R. (1992) Constructivism, realism and
philosophical method. In: Earman J. (ed.)
Inference, explanation and other frustra-
tions. University of California Press, Berke-
ley CA: 131–98. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/3872
Bringuier J. C. (1977) Conversations with Piaget.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Cadenas H. & Arnold M. (2015) The auto-
poiesis of social systems and its criticism.
Constructivist Foundations 10(2): 169–176.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/10/2/169
Castorina J. A. (2003) Las epistemologías
constructivistas ante el desafío de los
saberes disciplinares [Constructivist
epistemologies in front of disciplinary
knowledge challenges]. Psykhe 12(2): 15–28.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4532
Castorina J. A. (2009) El constructivismo de
inspiración piagetiana y el constructivismo
radical: Un análisis crítico [Piagetian-in-
spired constructivism and radical construc-
tivism: A critical analysis]. In: Narciandi J. C.
L., Criado T. S. & Gómez D. L. (eds.) ¿Dónde
reside la acción? Agencia, constructivismo y
psicología. Universidad de Murcia, Murcia:
91–116. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4591
Castorina J. A. (2010) La dialéctica en la psicolo-
gia del desarrollo: Relevancia y significación
en la investigación [Dialectic in develop-
mental psychology: Its importance and sig-
nificance in research]. Psicologia: Reflexao e
Critica 23(3): 516–524.
Castorina J. A. (2014) La explicación para las
novedades del desarrollo psicológico y su
 Constructivist Approaches
relación con las metateorías. In: Talak A.
(ed.) La explicación en psicología. Prome-
teo, Buenos Aires: 57–76.
Castorina J. A. (2016) La relación problemática
entre neurociencias y educación: Condi-
ciones y análisis crítico [The problematic
relationship between neuroscience and
education: Conditions and critical analysis].
Propuesta educativa 46(2): 26–41.
Castorina J. A. & Baquero R. (2005) Dialéctica
y psicología del desarrollo. El pensam-
iento de Piaget y Vigotsky [Dialectics and
developmental psychology. The thought of
Piaget and Vygotsky]. Amorrortu Editores,
Buenos Aires.
Chapman M. (1988) Contextuality and direc-
tionality of cognitive development. Human
Development 31: 92–106.
Chapman M. (1992) Equilibration and the dia-
lectics of organization. In: Beilin H. & Pufall
P. (eds.) Piaget’s theory: Prospects and pos-
sibilities. Psychology Press, Hove: 39–59.
Christis J. (2001) Luhmann’s theory of
knowledge: Beyond realism and con-
structivism? Soziale Systeme 7: 328–349.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4534
Clam J. (2000) System’s sole constituent, the
Operation: Clarifying a central concept of
Luhmannian theory. Acta Sociologica 43(1):
63–79.
Coll C. (1996) Constructivismo y educación
escolar: Ni hablamos siempre de lo mismo
ni lo hacemos siempre desde la misma
perspectiva epistemológica. Anuario de
Psicología 69: 153–78.
Delval J. (2001) Hoy todos son constructivistas
[Today everybody is a constructivist]. Edu-
cere 5(15): 353–359. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4590
Depner H. (2016) Zur Gestaltung von Phi-
losophie. Eine diagrammatische Kritik.
Transcript, Bielefeld.
Devitt M. (1996) Realism and truth. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Di Paolo E. A. (2008) A mind of many.
Constructivist Foundations 3(2): 89–91.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/089
Doniger O’Flaherty W. (1984) Dreams, illusion,
and other realities. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Druml N., Genser A., Krieg A., Menghin M. &
Hoeller A. (2017) Solutions for cyber-phys-
ical systems ubiquity. IGI Global, Hershey.
Foerster H. von (1979) Cybernetics of
cybernetics. In: Krippendorff K. (ed.)
Communication and control in society.
Combined References Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina
Gordon and Breach, New York: 5–8.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1707
Foerster H. von (1981) On cybernetics of
cybernetics and social theory. In: Roth G.
& Schwegler H. (eds.) Self-organizing sys-
tems. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main:
102–105. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1670
Foerster H. von (1993) Wissen und Gewis-
sen: Versuch einer Brücke. Suhrkamp,
Frankfurt/M.
Foerster H. von (2003) Cybernetics of cyber-
netics. In: Foerster H. von, Understand-
ing understanding. Springer, New York:
283–286. Originally published in 1979.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1707
Foerster H. von. (2003) Understanding under-
standing: Essays on cybernetics and cogni-
tion. Springer, New York.
Francis D. (2005) Using Wittgenstein to respec-
ify constructivism. Human Studies 28(3):
251–290. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/2932
Fuchs C. (2008) Sociology, dynamic criti-
cal realism, and radical constructivism.
Constructivist Foundations 3(2): 97–99.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/097
Fuller S. (1998) The reflexive politics of
constructivism revisited. In: Velody
I. & Williams R. (eds.) The politics of
constructionism. Sage, London: 83–99.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4536
García R. (1999) A systemic interpretation of
Piaget’s theory of knowledge. In: Scholnick
E. K., Nelson C., Gerlman S. & Miller P.
(eds.) Conceptual development: Piaget’s
legacy. Psychology Press, Hove: 165–184.
García R. (2000) El conocimiento en construc-
ción: De las formulaciones de Jean Piaget a
la teoría de sistemas complejos [Knowledge
construction: From the formulations of Jean
Piaget to the theory of complex systems].
Gedisa, Barcelona.
Gash H. (1995) Attitudes of Irish primary school
children to European and Third World
children. In: Hackett M. (ed.) Intercultural
education – celebrating diversity. Drum-
condra Education Centre, Dublin: 44–65.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/2183
Gash H. (2014) Constructing constructivism.
Constructivist Foundations 9(3): 302–327.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/9/3/302
Gash H. & Bajd B. (2005) Young people’s heroes
in Ireland and Slovenia. Irish Journal of
Psychology 26: 139–150.
Gash H. & Conway P. (1997) Images of heroes
and heroines: How stable? Journal of
Applied Developmental Psychology 18:
349–372. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/2186
Gash H. & Domínguez Rodríguez P. (2009)
Young people’s heroes in France and Spain
The Spanish Journal of Psychology 12:
246–257.
Gash H. & Smock C. D. (1975) An assessment
of the Mathemagenic Activities Programme.
Irish Journal of Education 9: 58–68.
Gash H. & Smock C. D. (1979) Development
of social relations: Role-taking skills and
classification abilities. Journal of Genetic
Psychology 135: 115‑127.
Gergen K. J. (2008) Who conceives of mind?
von Glasersfeld’s turn to society. Con-
structivist Foundations 3(2): 99–100.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/099
Glasersfeld E. von (1974) Piaget and the
radical constructivist epistemology. In:
Smock C. D. & Glasersfeld E. von (ed.)
Epistemology and education. Follow
Through Publications, Athens GA: 1–26.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1324
Glasersfeld E. von (1990) An exposition of
constructivism: Why some like it radical.
In: Davis R. B., Maher C. A. & Noddings N.
(eds.) Constructivist views on the teaching
and learning of mathematics. National
Council of Teachers of Mathematics, Reston
VA: 19–29. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1415
Glasersfeld E. von (1991a) Fiktion und Realität
aus der Perspektive des radikalen Kon-
struktivismus. In: Roetzer F. & Weibel P.
(eds.) Strategien des Scheins (Strategies of
appearance) Klaus Boer, Munich: 161–175.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1421
Glasersfeld E. von (1991b) Knowing with- 215
out metaphysics: Aspects of the radical
constructivist position. In: Steier F. (ed.)
Research and reflexivity. Sage, London:
12–29. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1420
Glasersfeld E. von (1992a) Questions and
answers about radical constructivism. In:
Pearsall M. K. (ed.) Scope, sequence, and
coordination of secondary school science,
Vol. II: Relevant research. The National
Science Teachers Association, Washington:
169–182. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1439
Glasersfeld E. von (1992b) Why I con-
sider myself a cybernetician. Cybernet-
ics & Human Knowing 1(1): 21–25.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1428
Glasersfeld E. von (1995) Radical constructiv-
ism: A way of knowing and learning. Falm-
er Press, London. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1462
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra
 Glasersfeld E. von (1996) Die Welt als “Black
Box”. In: Braitenberg V. & Hosp I. (eds.) Die
Natur ist unser Modell von ihr (Nature is
our model of it) Proceedings of the Bolzano
Meeting 1995. Rowohlt, Reinbeck: 15–25.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1476
Glasersfeld E. von (1998) Die Radikal-
Konstruktivistische Wissenstheorie. Ethik
und Sozialwissenschaften. Streitforum
für Erwägungskultur 9(4): 503–511.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1500
Glasersfeld E. von (1999a) How do we mean?
Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
A constructivist sketch of semantics.
Cybernetics & Human Knowing 6(1): 9–16.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1503
Glasersfeld E. von (1999b) Piaget’s legacy: Cog-
nition as adaptive activity. In: Riegler A. &
Peschl M. & Stein A. von (eds.) Understand-
ing representation in the cognitive sciences:
Does representation need reality? Kluwer
Academic, Dordrecht: 283–287.
Glasersfeld E. von (2001) The radical construc-
tivist view of science. Foundations of Science
6(1): 31–43. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1536
Glasersfeld E. von (2008) Who conceives of soci-
ety? Constructivist Foundations 3(2): 59–64.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/059
Goodman N. (1978) Ways of worldmaking.
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.
Goodman N. & Elgin C. Z. (1988) Reconcep-
tions in philosophy and other arts and
sciences. Routledge, London.
Habermas J. & Luhmann N. (1971) Theorie
der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie.
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.
Hacking I. (1983) Representing and intervening.
216 Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hacking I. (1999) The social construction of
what? Harvard University Press, Massachu-
setts.
Heyting F. & Hug T. (2000) “Instant knowledge”
– Epistemische und soziale Dimensionen
flotter Weisen der Welterzeugung. In: Fisch-
er H. R. & Schmidt S. J. (eds.) Wirklichkeit
und Welterzeugung: In memoriam Nelson
Goodman. Carl Auer-Systeme, Heidelberg:
223–230.
Holstein J. & Gubrium J. (2008) Handbook of
constructionist research. The Guilford Press,
New York.
Hug T. (2005) Phantoms really exist – don’t they?
Kybernetes 34(3/4): 567–579.
Hug T. (2009) Constructivism and media
socialization: Concepts and perspec-
tives in German-speaking countries.
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
Constructivist Foundations 4(2): 73–81.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/4/2/073
Hug T. (2012) Konstruktivistische Diskurse und
qualitative Forschungsstrategien. Über-
legungen am Beispiel der Global Media
Generations. In: Moser S. (ed.): Konstruktiv-
istisch Forschen: Methodologie, Methoden,
Beispiele. VS Verlag für Sozialwisssen-
schaften, Wiesbaden: 121–144.
Inhelder B., García R. & Voneche J. (1981) Jean
Piaget: Epistemología genética y equili-
bración. Fundamentos, Madrid. Originally
published as: Inhelder B., García R. &
Voneche J. (1977) Épistémologie génétique
et équilibration: Hommage à Jean Piaget.
Delachaux & Niestlé, Neuchâtel.
Kant I. (1998) Critique of pure reason. Edited and
translated by Guyer P. & Wood A. W. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge. German
original published in 1781 and 1787.
Kenny V. (2007) Distinguishing Ernst von
Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism from
Humberto Maturana’s “radical realism.”
Constructivist Foundations 2(2–3): 58–64.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/2/2-3/058
Kitchener R. F. (1986) Piaget’s theory of knowl-
edge: Genetic epistemology and scientific
reason. Yale University, New Haven CT.
Kitchener R. F. (1987) Genetic epistemology,
equilibration and the rationality of scientific
change. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science Part A 18(3): 339–366.
Kitcher P. (2001) Real realism: The Galilean
strategy. The Philosophical Review 110(2):
151–197.
Kitchin R. (2014) Big Data, new epistemologies
and paradigm shifts. Big Data & Society
1(1): 1–12.
Knorr-Cetina K. (1989) Spielarten des
Konstruktivismus: Einige Notizen und
Anmerkungen. Soziale Welt 40(1/2): 86–96.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/2776
Knorr-Cetina K. (2005) La fabricación del
conocimiento. Un ensayo sobre el caracter
constructivista y contextual de la ciencia.
Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes.
Originally published as: Knorr-Cetina K.
(1981) The manufacture of knowledge.
Pergamon, Oxford.
Krippendorff K. (2008) Towards a radi-
cally social constructivism. Construc-
tivist Foundations 3(2): 91–94.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/091
Krüll M., Luhmann N. & Maturana H. R. (1989)
Basic concepts of the theory of autopoietic
systems: Nine questions to Niklas Luhmann
and Humberto R. Maturana and their an-
swers. In: Hargens J. (ed.) Systemic therapy:
A European perspective. Borgmann, Broad-
stairs Kent UK: 79–104.
Kuhn T. S. (1970) The structure of scientific
revolutions. Second edition. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge MA. Originally
published in 1962.
Kuhn T. S. (1977) The essential tension: Selected
studies in scientific tradition and change.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Kukla A. (1998) Studies in scientific realism.
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kukla A. (2000) Social constructivism and the
philosophy of science. Routledge, London.
Latour B. & Woolgar S. (1986) Laboratory life:
The construction of scientific facts. Princ-
eton University Press, Princeton NJ.
Lenartowicz M. (2016) Linking social com-
munication to individual cognition:
Communication science between social
constructionism and radical constructivism.
Constructivist Foundations 12(1): 48–50.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/12/1/048
Lenartowicz M., Weinbaum D. R. (Weaver)
& Braathen P. (2016) The individuation
of social systems: A cognitive framework.
Procedia Computer Science 88: 15–20.
Luhmann N. (1968) Vertrauen: Ein Mechanis-
mus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität. F.
Enke, Stuttgart.
Luhmann N. (1984) Soziale Systeme. Suhrkamp,
Frankfurt am Main. English translation:
Luhmann N. (1995) Social systems. Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press.
Luhmann N. (1987) Rechtssoziologie. West-
deutscher Verlag, Opladen.
Luhmann N. (1990) The cognitive program of
constructivism and a reality that remains
unknown. In: Krohn W., Küppers G. & No-
wotny H. (eds.) Selforganization: Portrait of
a scientific revolution. Springer, Dordrecht:
64–86. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/2712
Luhmann N. (1992) Beobachtungen der
Moderne. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/3754
Luhmann N. (1995) Social systems. Stanford
University Press, Stanford CA German
original published in 1984.
Luhmann N. (1997a) Die Gesellschaft der
Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am
Main. English translation: Luhmann N.
(2012/2013) Theory of society. 2 volumes.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
 Constructivist Approaches
Luhmann N. (1997b) La ciencia de la sociedad.
Anthropos, México. Originally published
as: Luhmann N. (1990) Die Wissenschaft
der Gesellschaft. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.
Luhmann N. (2006a) Cognition as con-
struction. In: Moeller H.-G. (ed.)
Luhmann explained: From souls to
systems. Open Court, New York: 241–260.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4535
Luhmann N. (2006b) System as differ-
ence. Organization 13(1): 37–57.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/2735
Lynch M. (1998) Towards a constructivist
genealogy of social constructivism. In:
Velody I. & Williams R. (eds.) The politics
of constructionism. Sage, London: 1–18.
Maffia D. (2005) Conocimiento y emoción
[Knowledge and emotion]. Arbor 181(716):
515–521.
Martí E. (1996) El constructivismo y sus
sombras [Constructivism and its shadows].
Anuario de Psicología 68: 3–10.
Mascareño A. (2010) Construct this! O por qué
el constructivismo sistémico es real. Revista
Mad 23: 9–24. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/4571
Matthews M. R. (2014) Radical constructivism:
Ernst von Glasersfeld. In: Phillips D. C.
(ed.) Encyclopedia of educational theory
and philosophy. Sage, New York: 690–693.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4525
Maturana H. R. (1970) Biology of cognition.
Biological Computer Laboratory (BCL)
Research Report BCL 9.O. University of
Illinois, Urbana. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/535
Maturana H. R. (1980) Biology of cognition. In:
H. Maturana & F. Varela (eds.) Autopoiesis
and cognition. The realization of the living.
Reidel, Dordrecht: 5–58.
Maturana H. R. (1988a) Ontology of observ-
ing: The biological foundations of self-
consciousness and the physical domain
of existence. In: Conference proceedings
of the American Society of Cybernetics,
Felton CA. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/597
Maturana H. R. (1988b) Reality: The search for
objectivity or the quest for a compelling
argument. Irish Journal of Psychology 9(1):
25–82. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/598
Maturana H. R. (1990) The biological founda-
tions of self-consciousness and the physical
domain of existence. In: Luhmann N., Mat-
urana H., Namiki M., Redder V. & Varela F.
J. (eds.) Beobachter: Konvergenz der Erken-
ntnistheorien? Wilhelm Fink, München:
47–118. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/609
Combined References Gastón Becerra & José Antonio Castorina
Maturana H. R. (1995) La realidad: ¿objetiva o
construida? I: Fundamentos biológicos de
la realidad [Reality: objective or construct-
ed? I: Biological foundations of reality].
Anthropos, México.
Maturana H. R. (1997) La objetividad: Un argu-
mento para obligar [Objectivity: A compel-
ling argument]. Dolmen, Santiago de Chile.
Maturana H. R. (2014) Understand-
ing social systems? Constructiv-
ist Foundations 9(2): 187–188.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/9/2/187
Maturana H. R. (2015) What is sociology?
Constructivist Foundations 10(2): 176–179.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/10/2/176
Maturana H. R. & Poerksen B. (2004) Del ser al
hacer: Los orígenes de la biología del con-
ocer. J. C. Suarez, Santiago de Chile.
Maturana H. R. & Poerksen B. (2007) Autopoi-
esis and social theory. Journal of Sociocyber-
netics 5(1/2): 68–73. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/716
Maturana H. R. & Varela F. J. (1994) De máqui-
nas y seres vivos. Autopoiesis: La orga-
nización de lo vivo. Editorial Universitaria,
Santiago de Chile.
Matuszek K. C. (2015) Ontology, reality and
construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory.
Constructivist Foundations 10(2): 203–210.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/10/2/203
McDermid D. (1998) Pragmatism and truth: The
comparison objection to correspondence.
The Review of Metaphysics 51(4): 775–811.
McLuhan M. (1962) The Gutenberg Galaxy: The
making of typographic man. University of
Toronto Press, Toronto.
Mitterer J. (1992) Das Jenseits der Philosophie:
Wider das dualistische Erkenntnisprinzip
(The beyond of philosophy: Against the
dualistic principle of cognition) Passagen,
Vienna. Republished in 2011 by Velbrück
Wissenschaft, Weilerswist.
Mitterer J. (2008) (Radical) constructivism
– What difference does it make? Con-
structivist Foundations 3(3): 160–163.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/3/160
Moeller H.-G. (2012) The radical Luhmann.
Columbia University Press, New York.
Müller K. H. (2008) The missing links
of radical constructivism. Con-
structivist Foundations 3(2): 78–79.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/078
Müller K. H. (2010) The radical constructiv-
ist movement and its network formations.
Constructivist Foundations 6(1): 31–39.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/6/1/031
Müller A. (2017) Jean Piaget und die Erfind-
ung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus
und Kybernetik zweiter Ordnung. In:
Kanzian C. & Kletzl S. & Mitterer J. &
Neges K. (eds.) Realism – relativism –
constructivism. De Gruyter, Berlin: 73–82.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/4200
Nassehi A. (1993) Die Zeit der Gesellschaft. Auf
dem Weg zu einer soziologischen Theorie
der Zeit. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen.
Nicolis G. & Prigogine I. (1977) Self-organiza-
tion in non-equilibrium systems. John Wiley
& Sons, Toronto.
Niklas S. & Roussel M. (eds.) (2013) Formen der
Artikulation – Philosophische Beiträge zu
einem kulturwissenschaftlichen Grundbeg-
riff. Fink, München.
Nola R. & Irzik G. (2005) Philosophy, science,
education and culture. Springer, London.
Nudler O. (2009) Espacios controversiales: Hacia
un modelo de cambio filosófico y científico
[Controversial spaces: Towards a model of
philosophical and scientific change]. Miño y
Dávila, Buenos Aires.
Overton W. F. (1994) Contexts of meaning: The
computational and the embodied mind. In:
Overton W. F. & Palermo D. S. (eds.) The na-
ture and ontogenesis of meaning. Lawrence
Erlbaum, Mahwah NJ: 1–18.
Overton W. F. (2006) Developmental psychol-
ogy: Philosophy, concepts, methodology. In:
Damon W. & Lerner R. M. (eds.) Handbook
of child psychology. Volume 1: Theoretical
models of human development. Wiley, New
York: 18–88.
Palmaru R. (2016a) Constructivism as a key
towards further understanding of com- 217
munication, culture and society. Con-
structivist Foundations 12(1): 30–38.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/12/1/030
Palmaru R. (2016b) Author’s response:
Cognitive autonomy and communication.
Constructivist Foundations 12(1): 50–58.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/12/1/050
Phillips D. C. (1995) The good, the bad, and
the ugly: The many faces of constructiv-
ism. Educational Researcher 24(7): 5–12.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/2963
Phillips D. C. (1997) Coming to grips with
radical social constructivisms. In: Mat-
thews M. (ed.) Constructivism in science
education. Springer, Dordrecht: 139–158.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/3031
Piaget J. (1937) La construction du réel chez
l’enfant. Délachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel.
http://constructivist.info/13/2/191.becerra
 Piaget J. (1959) Apprentissage et connaissance.
In: Piaget J., Études d’épistémologie géné-
tique VII. PUF, Paris.
Piaget J. (1970a) Genetic epistemology. The
Norton Library, New York.
Piaget J. (1970b) Lógica y conocimiento cientí-
fico. Vol. 1: Naturaleza y métodos de la epis-
temología. Proteo, Buenos Aires. Originally
published as: Piaget J. (1967) Logique et con-
naissance scientifique. Nature et méthodes
de l’Epistémologie. Gallimand, Paris.
Piaget J. (1971) Insights and illusions of phi-
Philosophical Concepts in Constructivist Approaches
losophy. Routledge, New York. Originally
published in French as: Piaget J. (1965)
Sagesse et illusions de la philosophie. Presses
Universitaires de France, Paris.
Piaget J. (1975) Introducción a la epistemología
genética. Volume 1: El pensamiento
matemático. Buenos Aires: Paidós. Origi-
nally published as: Piaget J. (1952) Introduc-
tion à l’épistémologie génétique: La pensée
mathématique. PUF, Paris.
Piaget J. (ed.) (1979) Lógica y conocimiento
científico. Volume 7: Clasificación de las
ciencias y principales corrientes de la epis-
temología contemporanea. Paidós, Buenos
Aires. Originally published as: Piaget J. (ed.)
(1967) Logique et connaissance scientifique.
Gallimand, Paris: 1147–1271.
Piaget J. (1986) Estudios sociológicos. Planeta
DeAgostini, Barcelona. Originally published
as: Piaget J. (1965) Études sociologiques.
Droz, Geneva.
Piaget J. & García R. (1982) Psicogenesis e
historia de la ciencia. Siglo XXI, Mexico.
English translation: Piaget J. & García R.
218 (1989) Psychogenesis and history of science.
Columbia, New York.
Psillos S. (1999) Scientific realism. How science
tracks truth. Routledge, London.
Psillos S. (2005) Is structural realism the best of
both worlds? Dialectica 49(1): 15–46.
Quine W. V. O. (1961) From a logical point of
view. Harvard University Press, Harvard
MA.
Reich K. (2009) Die Ordnung der Blicke: Perspe-
ktiven eines interaktionistischen Konstruk-
tivismus. Volume 1: Beobachtung und die
Unschärfen der Erkenntnis. Second edition.
Luchterhand, Neuwied. Originally published
in 1998.
Rescher N. (1977) Dialectics: A controversy-ori-
ented approach to the theory of knowledge.
State University of New York Press, New
York.
Constructivist Foundations vol. 13, N°2
Restivo S. (2008) Society, social construc-
tion, and the sociological imagination.
Constructivist Foundations 3(2): 94–96.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/094
Riegler A. (2001) Towards a radical con-
structivist understanding of science.
Foundations of Science 6(1–3): 1–30.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/1860
Riegler A. (2005) Editorial. The constructivist
challenge. Constructivist Foundations 1(1):
1–8. ▶︎ http://constructivist.info/1/1/001
Riegler A. (2012) Constructivism. In: L’Abate
L. (ed.) Paradigms in theory construc-
tion. Springer, New York: 235–255.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/446
Rusch G. (2012) Konstruktivismus und System-
analyse. In: Moser S. (ed.): Konstruktivis-
tisch Forschen: Methodologie, Methoden,
Beispiele. VS Verlag für Sozialwisssen-
schaften, Wiesbaden: 172–201.
Sachse P., Beermann U., Martini M., Maran
T., Domeier M. & Furtner M. R. (2017)
“The world is upside down”: The Innsbruck
Goggle Experiments of Theodor Erismann
(1883–1961) and Ivo Kohler (1915–1985)
Cortex 92: 222–232.
Sandoval Moya J. (2010) Construccionismo,
conocimiento y realidad: Una lectura crítica
desde la psicología social [Constructionism,
knowledge and reality: A critical reading
from social psychology]. Revista Mad (23):
31–37.
Schmidt S. J. (ed.) (1987) Der Diskurs des
Radikalen Konstruktivismus (The discourse
of radical constructivism) Suhrkamp, Frank-
furt/Main.
Schmidt S. J. (2000) “Kalte Faszination.” Medien
– Kultur – Wissenschaft in der Mediengesell-
schaft. Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist.
Schmidt S. J. (2008) So far – from now on: Josef
Mitterer’s non-dualistic critique of radical
constructivism and some consequences.
Constructivist Foundations 3(3): 163–171.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/3/2/067
Schmidt S. J. (2010) Radical constructiv-
ism: A tool, not a super theory! Con-
structivist Foundations 6(1): 6–11.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/6/1/006
Schmidt S. J. (2011) From objects to processes:
A proposal to rewrite radical constructiv-
ism. Constructivist Foundations 7(1): 1–9 &
37–47. ▶︎ http://constructivist.info/7/1/001
Schmidt S. J. (2017) Geschichten & Diskurse.
Second edition. Rowohlt, Reinbek bei
Hamburg.
Scholl A. (2012) Between realism and constructiv-
ism? Luhmann’s ambivalent epistemological
standpoint. Constructivist Foundations 8(1):
5–18. ▶︎ http://constructivist.info/8/1/005
Scholl A. (2016) The micro-macro-
problem in constructivism. Con-
structivist Foundations 12(1): 47–48.
▶︎ http://constructivist.info/12/1/047
Sismondo S. (1993) Some social constructions.
Social Studies of Science 23: 515–553.
Spencer Brown G. (1969) Laws of form. Allen &
Unwin, London. ▶︎ http://cepa.info/1634
Suh S. C., Tanik U. J., Carbone J. N. & Eroglu A.
(eds.) (2014) Applied cyber-physical systems.
Springer, New York.
Tsou J. Y. (2006) Genetic epistemology and
Piaget’s philosophy of science: Piaget vs. Kuhn
on scientific progress. Theory & Psychology
16(2): 203–224.
Vanderstraeten R. (2012) Rewriting theory: From
autopoiesis to communication. Systems Re-
search & Behavioral Science 29(4): 377–386.
▶︎ http://cepa.info/3665
Vanderstraeten R. (2013) Talcott Parsons and the
enigma of secularization. European Journal of
Social Theory 16(1): 69–84.
Vanderstraeten R. (2015) The making of Parsons’s
“The American University.” Minerva 53(4):
307–325.
Varela F. J. (1990) Conocer: Las ciencias cogniti-
vas: Tendencias y perspectivas. Cartografía
de las ideas actuales. Gedisa, Barcelona.
Originally published as: Varela F. J. (1988)
Connaître: Les sciences cognitives: Tendances
et perspectives. Le Seuil, Paris.
Varela F. J., Thompson E. & Rosch E. (1991) The
embodied mind: Cognitive science and hu-
man experience. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Weinbaum D. R. (Weaver) & Veitas V. K. (2017)
Open ended intelligence: The individuation
of intelligent agents. Journal of Experimental
& Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 29(2):
371–396.
Wimmer F. M. (2001) Polylogische Forschung.
In: Hug T. (ed.) Wie kommt Wissenschaft zu
Wissen? Vol. 3: Einführung in die Method-
ologie der Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften.
Schneider Verlag Hohengehren, Baltmanns-
weiler: 382–393.
Wimmer F. M. (2007) Cultural centrisms and
intercultural polylogues in philosophy.
International Review of Information Ethics
7(9): 1–8.
Worrall J. (1989) Structural realism: The best of
both worlds? Dialectica 43(1–2): 99–124.