Ryan V Trump Injunction Opposition

Case 3:20-cv-05948-VC Document 20 Filed 09/10/20 Page 1 of 24
JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK

Acting Assistant Attorney General
DAVID M. MORRELL
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
ALEXANDER K. HAAS
Branch Director
DIANE KELLEHER
Assistant Branch Director
STUART J. ROBINSON
SERENA M. ORLOFF
MICHAEL DREZNER
Trial Attorneys
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch
Ben Franklin Station, P.O. Box No. 883
Washington, DC 20044
Phone: (415) 436-6635
Fax: (415) 436-6632
E-mail: stuart.j.robinson@usdoj.gov
Counsel for Defendants
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
__________________________________________
)
PATRICK S. RYAN, ) Case No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC
)
Plaintiff, ) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
) MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
v. ) RESTRAINING ORDER
)
DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )
States, and WILBUR ROSS, Secretary of )
Commerce, )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2
I. Factual Background ............................................................................................................ 2
A. Congress and the Executive Branch Identify Chinese Technology

Companies as a Significant and Growing National Security Threat ...................... 2
B. Researchers and Members of Congress Identify TikTok as a Growing

Threat ...................................................................................................................... 3
C. The President Issues Executive Order 13873 and Reports to Congress

under the NDAA ..................................................................................................... 5
D. The President Takes Action Relating To TikTok ................................................... 5
II. This Case............................................................................................................................. 6
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................. 7
I. Legal Standard .................................................................................................................... 7
II. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed On The Merits of His Claims .......................................... 7
A. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Due Process Claims ................................. 7
B. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Equal Protection Claim .......................... 11
C. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Vagueness Claim ................................... 12
D. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Ultra Vires Claim ................................... 12
III. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish Irreparable Harm ........................................................... 14
IV. The Balance of the Equities Weighs Against a Temporary Restraining Order ................ 15
V. Any Preliminary Relief Should Be Limited to Plaintiff ................................................... 15
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 15

i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Department of Treasury,

686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012) ....................................................................................................... 9
Aleman v. Glickman,
217 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................... 11
Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275 (2001) ................................................................................................................... 13
All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) ..................................................................................................... 7
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles,

559 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................................... 7
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Ctr., Inc.,

575 U.S. 320 (2015) ................................................................................................................... 13
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564 (1972) ..................................................................................................................... 8
Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.,

467 U.S. 340 (1984) ................................................................................................................... 13
Cal. Dep’t of Educ. v. Bennett,

833 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1987) ....................................................................................................... 7
California v. Azar,
911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................................................................................................... 15
California v. Trump,
407 F. Supp. 3d 869 (N.D. Cal. 2019) ....................................................................................... 13
Castaneda v. USDA,
807 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1987) ........................................................................................... 8, 9, 11
Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush,

310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................... 15
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump,

No. 1:19-CV-00408 (TNM), 2020 WL 1643657 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020) .................................. 13

ii
Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833 (1998) ................................................................................................................... 10
DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of California,

140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) ............................................................................................................... 12
Dollar Rent A Car of Wash., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,

774 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1985) ................................................................................................... 14
Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell,

747 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................................... 15
Eguia v. Tompkins,
756 F.2d 1130 (5th Cir. 1985) ..................................................................................................... 8
Escamilla v. M2 Tech.,
2013 WL 4577538 (E.D. Tex. 2013) ......................................................................................... 15
FCC v. Fox. Television Stations, Inc.,

567 U.S. 239 (2012) ................................................................................................................... 12
Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court,

739 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) ..................................................................................................... 14
Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ.,

736 F. App’x 622 (9th Cir. 2018) .............................................................................................. 14
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,

561 U.S. 1 (2010) ................................................................................................................... 9, 10
Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft,

219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2002),
aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ..................................................................................... 9, 15
Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist.,

623 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010) ..................................................................................................... 8
Kahawaiolaa v. Norton,
386 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2004) ................................................................................................... 11
Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat’l Football League,

634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980) ................................................................................................... 14
Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968 (1997) ..................................................................................................................... 7

iii
McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky.,

545 U.S. 844 (2005) ................................................................................................................... 10
McLean v. Crabtree,
173 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................... 10
Merritt v. Mackey,
827 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1987) ..................................................................................................... 8
Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb,

804 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. La. 1992) .............................................................................................. 15
Mississippi v. Johnson,
71 U.S. 475 (1866) ..................................................................................................................... 13
Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) ..................................................................................................................... 9
Moving Phones P’ship L.P. v. FCC,

998 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................. 10
OKKO Bus. PE v. Lew,

133 F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.D.C. 2015) ............................................................................................. 10
Orloff v. Cleland,
708 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1983) ....................................................................................................... 8
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

530 U.S. 133 (2000) ................................................................................................................... 10
Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) ................................................................................................................... 12
Sagana v. Tenorio,
384 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2004) ....................................................................................................... 9
Santa Fe. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,

530 U.S. 290 (2000) ................................................................................................................... 10
Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) ................................................................................................... 10, 11, 12
United States v. Amirnazmi,

645 F.3d 564 (3d Cir. 2011)....................................................................................................... 12

iv
United States v. Chem. Found.,

272 U.S. 1 (1926) ....................................................................................................................... 10
United States v. Elcom Ltd.,

203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ..................................................................................... 10
United States v. South Carolina,

720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013) ..................................................................................................... 15
Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40,

300 U.S. 515 (1937) ................................................................................................................... 15
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n,

945 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2019) ..................................................................................................... 11
Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975) ................................................................................................................... 11
Winter v. NRDC,
555 U.S. 7 (2008) ............................................................................................................. 7, 14, 15
Wolfson v. Brammer,
616 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................... 12
Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) ............................................................................................................... 13
STATUTES
50 U.S.C. § 1702 ........................................................................................................................... 13
50 U.S.C. § 1705 ........................................................................................................................... 12
Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018) ................................................................................... 3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
85 Fed. Reg. 29,321 (May 13, 2020) .............................................................................................. 5
85 Fed. Reg. 51,297 (Aug. 14, 2020).............................................................................................. 6
Exec. Order No. 13,726,

81 Fed. Reg. 23,559 (Apr. 19, 2016) ......................................................................................... 12
Exec. Order No. 13,942,

85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020).................................................................................... passim

v
Exec. Order 13,873,

84 Fed. Reg. 22,689 (May 15, 2019) ....................................................................................... 5, 14

vi

DAVID M. MORRELL
ALEXANDER K. HAAS
Branch Director
DIANE KELLEHER
STUART J. ROBINSON
SERENA M. ORLOFF
MICHAEL DREZNER
Trial Attorneys
Phone: (415) 436-6635
Fax: (415) 436-6632
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
__________________________________________
)
PATRICK S. RYAN, ) Case No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC
)
Plaintiff, ) OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
) MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
v. ) RESTRAINING ORDER
)
DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United )
States, and WILBUR ROSS, Secretary of )
Commerce, )
)
Defendants. )
__________________________________________)

INTRODUCTION
For over a decade, it has been a priority of both Congress and the Executive Branch to
address the national security threat stemming from China’s activities in the information
technology and communications sectors. It is well-recognized that large Chinese technology
firms are not purely private, but in fact are intertwined with the Chinese Communist Party
(“CCP”) and the government of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). Moreover, Chinese
law imposes broad obligations on citizens and companies to cooperate with the PRC by
providing data and technological support to security agencies and the military.
Reading Plaintiff’s complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order, one would
think that this concern regarding China has no relevance to his employer, TikTok, Inc. or its
owner, ByteDance Ltd. Pl.’s Mot. for TRO at 3, ECF No. 12 (“Mot.”). But ByteDance is a
Chinese company through and through. It is headquartered in Beijing, subject to Chinese
intelligence laws, contains internal CCP committees, and its founder and CEO has publicly
affirmed that the company is committed to promoting the agenda and messaging of the CCP.1
When users submit to TikTok’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, they agree that their data
may flow to ByteDance and (as such) may be turned over to the PRC. This control presents
serious national security risks in the United States, where use of TikTok has exploded in
popularity. In light of this growth and TikTok’s relationship to the CCP, the United States
Government has determined, based on years of accumulated experience and intelligence, that
TikTok poses a direct threat to the privacy and security of U.S. persons.
The President and Congress have taken numerous steps to respond to the rapidly growing
threat from China posed by TikTok and other Chinese firms. These include numerous legislative
enactments, the issuance of Executive Order 13873 in May of 2019 declaring a national
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the
National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), and various initiatives to address vulnerabilities in the
country’s information and communications technology supply chain and Chinese foreign
investment in the United States. The TikTok Executive Order is one component of this multi-
1
See ASPI, TikTok and WeChat: Curating and Controlling Global Information Flows, Policy
Brief, Report No. 37 (Sept. 2020) (“TikTok and WeChat”), Ex. 1 at 2.
1
pronged strategy, and Plaintiff presents no basis for judicial interference with the President’s
national security determinations. His motion for a temporary restraining order should be denied.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
A. Congress and the Executive Branch Identify Chinese Technology Companies

as a Significant and Growing National Security Threat
In 2012, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (“HPSCI”) launched an
investigation that, although focused on Chinese telecom firms Huawei and ZTE, was premised
on the broader concern that, if allowed unfettered access to United States markets, Chinese
companies with suspected ties to the PRC could provide opportunities for cyber-attacks and
cyber-espionage by China, a nation-state already well-known for perpetrating such activities
against the United States. See HPSCI, Investigative Rep. on the U.S. Nat’l Sec. Issues Posed by
Chinese Telecomms. Cos. Huawei and ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012) (“HPSCI Rep.”), Ex. 2 at 2-4. At the
same time, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (“U.S.-China
Commission”) was reporting that “[n]ational security concerns have accompanied the dramatic
growth of China’s telecom sector” and that “large Chinese companies”—particularly those
prominent in China’s “strategy of overseas expansion—are directly subject to direction by the
[CCP], to include support for PRC state policies and goals.” Staff of U.S.-China Comm’n, 112th
Cong., The Nat’l Sec. Implications of Invs. and Products from the People’s Republic of China in
the Telecomms. Sector (2011) (“2011 USCC Telecomms. Rep.”), Ex. 3 at 9. Similarly, the U.S.-
China Commission explained that, “[al]though claiming to be private, [such companies] are
subject to state influence” and “enjoy favorable government policies that support their
development.” U.S.-China Comm’n, 112th Cong., 2011 Rep. to Congress, Ex. 4 at 47.
Over the following years, intelligence officials across two different administrations
repeatedly concluded that China poses one of the “greatest cyber threats to the United States.”
See Daniel R. Coats, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (“DNI”), Stmt. for the Record: Worldwide Threat
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Cmty. (2018) (“2018 DNI Threat Assessment”), Ex. 5 at 5.
The U.S.-China Commission similarly stated in its 2017 Annual Report to Congress that China’s

2
strategic approach involves domestic companies “achiev[ing] dominant positions in China, and
then . . . expanding to overseas markets.” U.S.-China Comm’n, 115th Cong., 2017 Rep. to
Congress (Nov. 2017), Ex. 6 at 165. And the strategy was working: “the Chinese Government’s
potential access to US business communications is dramatically increasing,” with China’s
intelligence services “operating as an advanced persistent threat to U.S. networks.” FBI,
Counterintelligence Strategic P’ship Intelligence Note, SPIN: 15-002 (Feb. 1, 2015), Ex. 7 at 1.
Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”), the FBI Director
underscored that the FBI is “deeply concerned about the risks of allowing any company or entity
that is beholden to foreign governments that don’t share our values to gain positions of power
inside our telecommunications networks.” Open Hearing on Worldwide Threats Before the
SSCI, 115th Cong., Ex. 8 at 64-65. In 2018, DoD described these and similar threats as “the
principal priorities for the Department . . . because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to
U.S. security and prosperity[.]” DoD Summary of 2018 Nat’l Def. Strategy, Ex. 9 at 4.
Congress has responded to these growing concerns, including recently in the defense
appropriations bill for fiscal year 2019. That law prohibited, inter alia, government agencies
from buying or contracting with entities that use certain equipment or services produced by any
“entity that the Secretary of Defense . . . reasonably believes to be an entity owned or controlled
by, or otherwise connected to, the government of [the PRC].” S. McCain National Defense
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-232 § 889(f)(3)(D), 132 Stat. 1636, 1918 (2018) (the
“NDAA”). Congress also directed the President to assess and formulate strategies to address the
threat posed by China, including the CCP’s “use of political influence, information operations,
censorship and propaganda to undermine democratic institutions[,]” and the “use of economic
tools, including market access and investment to gain access to sensitive United States
industries.” Id. § 1261(b)(2)(A); § 1260(5). Congress also directed the Secretary of Commerce
to provide detailed reporting “on foreign direct investment transactions made by entities of the
[PRC] in the United States.” Id. § 1719(b)(1).
B. Researchers and Members of Congress Identify TikTok as a Growing Threat

Even as Congress took these actions, evidence was emerging that the national security
3
threat from Chinese information technology companies was evolving beyond the
telecommunications sector. On October 23, 2019, Senators Schumer and Cotton jointly asked
U.S. intelligence officials to determine whether TikTok poses “national security risks.” See Ex.
10. The Senators were concerned that “while the company has stated that [it] does not operate
[or store U.S. user data] in China[,] . . . ByteDance is still required to adhere to the laws of
China.” Id. Those laws include the Chinese National Intelligence Law, which “obliges
individuals, organizations, and institutions to assist Public Security and State Security officials in
carrying out a wide array of ‘intelligence’ work.” Murray Scot Tanner, Beijing’s New National
Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense, Lawfare, July 20, 2017, Ex. 11. Senators Schumer
and Cotton emphasized that China lacks an “independent judiciary to review requests made by
the Chinese government for data or other actions, [so] there is no legal mechanism for Chinese
companies to appeal if they disagree with a request.” Ex. 10. Earlier, Senator Rubio had also
expressed concern that the Chinese government is using TikTok to advance its “foreign policy
and globally suppress freedom of speech, expression, and other freedoms,” and urged that the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) “launch a full and thorough
national security review of TikTok’s acquisition of Musical.ly.” See Ex. 12.
These concerns and actions echoed those of private researchers, who have reported that
ByteDance is “uniquely susceptible to other problems that come with its closeness to the
censorship and surveillance apparatus of the CCP-led state.” See ASPI, Mapping More of
China’s Tech Giants, Issue Paper, Report No. 15 (Nov. 2019), Ex. 13 at 9. Specifically, while
the CCP has long used Chinese-language media as a propaganda platform, “TikTok now puts the
CCP in a position where it can attempt to do the same on a largely non‑Chinese speaking
platform—with the help of an advanced AI‑powered algorithm.”2 Id. And while Plaintiff states
confidently that data of U.S. TikTok users “is not accessible in China,” Ryan Decl. ¶ 31, ECF
2
Other troubling aspects of TikTok’s data practices have been reported in different contexts. See
TikTok Tracked User Data Using Tactic Banned by Google, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11, 2020,
Ex. 14 (TikTok “skirted a privacy safeguard in Google’s Android operating system” and
collected “unique identifiers from millions of mobile devices”); TikTok Agrees to $1.1 Million
Deal in Kids’ Privacy Suit, Bloomberg, Dec. 6, 2019, Ex. 15 (involving claims that TikTok
collected children’s information without their parents’ consent).
4
No. 12-1, TikTok itself has stated it can share data with third parties and government entities.
See Class-Action Lawsuit Claims TikTok Steals Kids’ Data And Sends It To China, NPR, Aug.
4, 2020, Ex. 16; TikTok Privacy Policy, Ex. 17.
C. The President Issues Executive Order 13873 and Reports to Congress under
the NDAA
On May 15, 2019, the President issued Executive Order 13873, Securing the Information
and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 84 Fed. Reg. 22689, 22689 (the
“ICTS Order”). The President explained “that the unrestricted acquisition or use in the United
States of information and communications technology or services . . . supplied by persons owned
by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries augments the
ability of foreign adversaries to create and exploit vulnerabilities in information and
communications technology or services, with potentially catastrophic effects, and thereby
constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States.” Id.
In light of these findings, the President invoked his authority under the Constitution and
the laws of the United States, including IEEPA and the NEA, to declare a national emergency
with respect to this threat, and to prohibit transactions with foreign countries or foreign nationals
that pose “an undue risk of sabotage to or subversion” of, inter alia, the “maintenance of
information and communications technology or services in the United States” or “otherwise
pose[] an unacceptable risk” to the national security. Id. at 22690. On May 13, 2020, the
President renewed the declaration of emergency set forth in the ICTS Order. See 85 Fed. Reg.
29321. Shortly thereafter, he presented a report to Congress, in accordance with the NDAA,
outlining strategies in relation to the country’s foreign policy with China. Id.
D. The President Takes Action Relating To TikTok
On August 6, 2020, the President issued the Executive Order pertaining to TikTok. See
Exec. Order No. 13942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48637 (Aug. 6, 2020). In it, he stated that “additional steps
must be taken to deal with the national emergency . . . declared in [the ICTS Order]” because
“the spread in the United States of mobile applications developed and owned by companies in

5
the [PRC] continues to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.” Id. at 48637. He further explained that TikTok “automatically captures vast swaths of
information from its users, including internet and other network activity information such as
location data and browsing and search histories.” Id. The President assessed that this data
collection poses several distinct risks. First, there is a risk the CCP will gain “access to
Americans’ personal and proprietary information—potentially allowing China to track the
locations of Federal employees and contractors, build dossiers of personal information for
blackmail, and conduct corporate espionage.” Id. In addition, the President highlighted
concerns regarding TikTok’s “reported[] censors[ship] [of] content that the [CCP] deems
politically sensitive,” id., as well as concerns regarding the ways in which TikTok “may also be
used for disinformation campaigns that benefit the [CCP], such as when TikTok videos spread
debunked conspiracy theories about the origins of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus.” Id. Finally, the
President noted that other countries had taken action against TikTok (citing the example of
India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, which concluded that TikTok was
“‘stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users’ data in an unauthorized manner to servers which
have locations outside India”). Id. TikTok is also banned on devices for employees of U.S.
Government agencies, as well as American “companies and organizations.” Id. The President
concluded that it is time for the country to “take aggressive action against the owners of TikTok
to protect our national security.” Id.
Based on similar concerns, and in addition to the actions challenged here, the President
has also ordered ByteDance to divest the U.S. operations and assets of TikTok, and all data on
U.S. users of TikTok (including a requirement for a written certification to CFIUS that
ByteDance has destroyed all such data it may have). See Order of August 14, 2020 Regarding
the Acquisition of Musical.ly by ByteDance Ltd., 85 Fed. Reg. 51297 (Aug. 14, 2020).
II. This Case
On August 24, 2020, Plaintiff—a TikTok employee—filed this lawsuit against President
Trump and Secretary Ross, asserting both statutory and constitutional causes of action. Compl.
¶¶ 65-104, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claims TikTok “is neither owned, operated, nor controlled by

6
China or the Chinese government . . . [and] does not even operate in China.” Id. ¶ 2. TikTok
itself has filed its own lawsuit related to the Executive Order in a neighboring district. See
TikTok v. Trump, Case No. 2:20-cv-7672 (C.D. Cal.).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A temporary restraining order “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should
not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” See
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A plaintiff
“must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046,
1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). A “possibility” of irreparable harm is insufficient;
irreparable harm must be likely absent an injunction. Id.; see also Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7,
22 (2008). Alternatively, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that
tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a [temporary restraining order], so long
as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is
in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).
II. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on The Merits of His Claims
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims are not ripe. Rather, they are premised on
speculation regarding the scope and impact of the Executive Order as it will be implemented by
the Secretary, and as such would “entangl[e] [the Court] in abstract disagreements . . . [before]
an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way[.]” Cal.
Dep’t of Educ. v. Bennett, 833 F.2d 827, 833 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court need not
reach his claims at this juncture. Yet even if it were to consider the merits, the Court should
conclude that Plaintiff fails to present even a serious question.
A. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Due Process Claims
Plaintiff contends that the Order violates his rights to substantive and procedural due
process under the Fifth Amendment. Mot. at 7-10. These claims fail on multiple grounds. First,
7
Plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief because, even though he is an employee of TikTok, the
Executive Order does not directly affect him. See Castaneda v. USDA, 807 F.2d 1478, 1479-80
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding manager of convenience store could not assert Fifth Amendment claim
in challenge to agency’s disqualification of store from participating in food stamp program). The
Supreme Court has “left open the possibility that where the government indirectly yet
intentionally injures or affects the legal status of a person by action taken directly against a
private third party, the injured person can maintain a due process challenge against the
government.” Id. at 1480 n.4 (citation omitted)). But Plaintiff here “has not alleged that in
issuing its order the [President] intended to injure him personally[.]” Id. (emphasis added);
compare Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff were directly affected by the Order, he has not established that
the Order implicates his constitutionally protected property or liberty interests. Plaintiff claims a
protected property interest “in his wages and salary from TikTok.” Mot. at 8. But he points to
no “independent source” creating such an interest, see Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll.
Dist., 623 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972). As an employee of a private company, Plaintiff does not have a protected
property interest in future wages and unearned salary, unlike the plaintiffs in the cases he cites,
see Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372, 378 (9th Cir. 1983); Eguia v. Tompkins, 756 F.2d 1130,
1133 (5th Cir. 1985).3 Further, Plaintiff has not been dismissed at all, let alone (1) “for reasons
that might seriously damage his standing in the community,” or (2) altogether “preclude[d]
[from] future work in [his] chosen profession,” see Mot. at 8 (quoting Merritt, 827 F.2d at 1373),
and thus has not established a deprivation of any plausible liberty interest—the threshold
requirement for stating either a procedural or substantive due process claim.
Plaintiff’s procedural due process argument fails because he is not directly affected by
the Executive Order. He therefore has no constitutional right to be “informed of the reasons for
the Executive Order[,]” Mot. at 8; see Castaneda, 807 F.2d at 1479-80, which in any event are
3
The quotation Plaintiff attributes to the Supreme Court’s Sniadach decision, see Mot. at 8, is in
fact from Eguia.
8
presented in the Order itself. His argument thus finds no support in Al Haramain Islamic
Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 1001 (9th Cir. 2012), cited in
Mot. at 8, which concerned a challenge by a designated entity, not an employee of that entity.
Likewise, the Fifth Amendment does not require that persons indirectly affected by government
action be provided with an “adjudication” and be able to “confront the evidence” supporting the
President’s IEEPA-based decisions. See Mot. at 8. Rather, in matters of national security and
foreign affairs, the President must often act swiftly, decisively, and on the basis of protected
information. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); see also Holy Land
Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 77 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding pre-
deprivation notice to designated entity not required), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff also fails to state a substantive due process claim. He references substantive due
process only in passing, see Mot. at 7, apparently arguing that the Order impermissibly burdens
his purported right to private employment with TikTok, see Compl. ¶ 76. Plaintiff, however, has
no “fundamental right” to employment at a specific, private corporation. See Sagana v. Tenorio,
384 F.3d 731, 743 (9th Cir. 2004). And assuming Plaintiff can pursue a substantive due process
claim, judicial review is “a very narrow one,” meaning the Court must “merely look to see
whether the government could have had a legitimate reason for acting as it did.’” Id. (citation
omitted). But the Court need not hypothesize, as the Order is expressly founded on Government
interests of paramount importance: preventing the PRC from using TikTok to surveil the
American people, censor information, sow misinformation, and collect and use “vast swaths” of
personal and proprietary information from American users to advance the PRC’s own interests.
See 85 Fed. Reg. at 48637; see also, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-
34 (2010) (discussing the “sensitive and weighty interests of national security and foreign
affairs”). Preventing or limiting certain transactions involving TikTok would advance the
purposes expressed in the Order, including by potentially reducing the data collected by the
application. Accordingly, the Order is “rationally related to a legitimate government interest,”
McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999), and so readily survives the “very

9
narrow” review applicable here. Cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (upholding
Presidential proclamation on rational-basis review); Moving Phones P’ship L.P. v. FCC, 998
F.2d 1051, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding, on rational-basis review, prohibitions against
granting radio licenses to aliens and certain corporations, because such restrictions serve to
“safeguard the United States from foreign influence in broadcasting”); see also United States v.
Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2002).4
Plaintiff cannot establish otherwise. He suggests that the President has not demonstrated
to Plaintiff’s satisfaction the significance of the threat posed by TikTok, implying that the
reasons provided in the Order are pretextual. See Mot. at 7, 9. As an initial matter, Plaintiff has
failed to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to the President’s decisions. See
United States v. Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). Moreover, he cites no authority for the
proposition that the President must publicly disclose evidence to support his non-reviewable
determination, see infra at 12-13, particularly when that evidence may be privileged, classified,
or otherwise protected from disclosure.5 To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“when the President adopts ‘a preventive measure . . . in the context of international affairs and
national security,’ he is ‘not required to conclusively link all of the pieces in the puzzle before
courts grant weight to his empirical conclusions.’” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409 (citation
omitted);6 see also OKKO Bus. PE v. Lew, 133 F. Supp. 3d 17, 28 (D.D.C. 2015) (whether
government action was an “effective strategy” in fulfilling certain “foreign policy objectives . . .
is not a question for this Court”). Nonetheless, the national security concerns expressed in the
Order find broad support in publicly available reporting by Congress, the Executive Branch, and
private security researchers. See supra at 2-6 and Exs. 1-16.
4
Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim also fails because he has not alleged behavior that is
“so egregious” and “outrageous” as “to shock the contemporary conscience.” See Cty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8, 850 (1998).
5
The cases cited by Plaintiff—McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005), Santa
Fe. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
530 U.S. 133 (2000), cited in Mot. at 9—do not concern actions propelled by national security
concerns, and therefore are inapposite.
6
Plaintiff argues that the President must wait to act until the threat to Americans materializes.
See Mot. at 10. That notion finds no basis in law or logic. See, e.g., Holder, 561 U.S. at 33-34.
10
B. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Equal Protection Claim

According to Plaintiff, the Order violates his right to equal protection because it (1)
“deprives Plaintiff of [a] liberty interest by impugning TikTok’s reputation (and that of its
employees) and stigmatizing TikTok employees in the process”; (2) “discriminates against
Plaintiff and other U.S. employees of TikTok on the basis of the perceived nationality of the
company they work for”; and (3) “was substantially motivated by personal animus toward
TikTok.” Mot. at 10. This theory fails at each turn.
First, for the reasons described above, Plaintiff has not identified a protected liberty
interest. “He thus cannot satisfy the ‘stigma-plus’ standard for direct injury[.]” Castaneda, 807
F.2d at 1480. Second, alleged discrimination on the basis of an employer’s “perceived
nationality,” Mot. at 10, does not implicate a suspect class, see Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d
1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 2004), and so the Court should review Plaintiff’s claim under the rational-
basis standard, see id., 1277-78, which, as discussed above, is satisfied. Plaintiff’s assertion that
“employees of other U.S. companies do[] the exact same work or engag[e] in the exact same
activities,” Mot. at 10, even if true, does not compel a different conclusion. Aleman v. Glickman,
217 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “[r]ational-basis review in equal protection
analysis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of [the government’s]
choices. . . .[,]” and an “imperfect fit between means and ends” is acceptable). This is especially
true in the national security and foreign affairs context. Cf. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.
Nor can Plaintiff demonstrate that heightened scrutiny is warranted based on supposed
“personal animus toward TikTok[.]” Mot. at 10. First, Plaintiff cannot assert the rights of
TikTok. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). Second, Plaintiff offers no authority for
the proposition that alleged animus toward a corporate entity ever implicates heightened
scrutiny. See Mot. at 10; cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 945
F.3d 206, 225 n.29 (5th Cir. 2019). Third, the Supreme Court’s rational-basis analysis in Hawaii
controls here in any event given the national security and foreign affairs interests presented by
the facially neutral Order. See 138 S. Ct. at 2420-21. And fourth, even under heightened
scrutiny, Plaintiff cannot adequately plead animus toward TikTok because he has not

11
demonstrated a “disparate impact on a particular group,” “departures from the normal procedural
sequence,” or “contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body.” See DHS v.
Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1915 (2020) (citation omitted).7
C. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Vagueness Claim
Plaintiff fares no better in contending that the Executive Order is unconstitutionally
vague under the Fifth Amendment because it does not define the prohibited “transaction[s],”
Mot. at 11, so that people “‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning[.]’”
Id. (citing FCC v. Fox. Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012)). Plaintiff need not
guess at the meaning of the Order, because under its express terms, “the Secretary shall identify
the [prohibited] transactions.” Exec. Order No. 13942, § 1(c) (emphasis added).8 And Plaintiff
or other TikTok employees could not reasonably fear prosecution, or be chilled from working at
TikTok, until the Secretary acts. Cf. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1062-63 (9th Cir.
2010) (fear must be “plausible and reasonable” and “imminent,” not merely that a law “might
[later] be construed in a particular manner”). Plaintiff’s due process theory also fails in light of
IEEPA’s scienter requirements for criminal liability. See United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d
564, 589-90 (3d Cir. 2011); 50 U.S.C. § 1705(c). The case on which Plaintiff chiefly relies—
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871 (1997), cited in Mot. at 12—is inapposite, as it concerned a
vague criminal statute that was already enforceable, not an Executive Order directing further
administrative action and specificity before taking effect. See Mot. at 18.
D. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Ultra Vires Claim
Plaintiff’s final theory is that the Executive Order is ultra vires because the grounds set
forth in the Order do not “constitute a bona fide national emergency” and do not fall within the
“the emergency declared . . . in” the ICTS Order. Mot. at 12-13. This claim fails. “[T]here is no
precedent for a court overriding a President’s discretionary judgment as to what is and is not an
7
The statements cited by Plaintiff pertain to concerns about privacy and public health, not
animus on the basis of race, citizenship, or national origin. See Mot. at 4.
8
This framework is not unique; IEEPA orders commonly identify broad subject matter of
concern while delegating implementation and enforcement to one or more administrative
agencies. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13726, § 1(a)(i), 81 Fed. Reg. 23559 (Apr. 19, 2016).
12
emergency”; to the contrary, “the Ninth Circuit has characterized ‘the declaration or continuance
of a national emergency’ as an ‘essentially political question.’” California v. Trump, 407 F.
Supp. 3d 869, 890-91 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citations omitted). Thus, both “whether [a] national
emergency truly exists” with respect to TikTok and whether that threat requires invocation of the
President’s IEEPA powers are “nonjusticiable political questions.” Id.9
Second, Congress has not created a right of action for private citizens to challenge the
President’s actions under IEEPA and the NEA. In fact, Congress declined to take that step in
IEEPA, providing that the delineations of authority under 50 U.S.C. § 1702 “do[] not confer or
imply any right to judicial review.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c). Accordingly, a “cause of action [to
review the President’s IEEPA determinations] does not exist and courts may not create one.”
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001) (“private rights of action to enforce
federal law must be created by Congress”). Plaintiff seeks to rely on the ultra vires theory
recognized in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015), but
even if that theory were available notwithstanding a “fairly discernable” congressional intent to
reserve such review to itself, see Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1984),10
the Supreme Court has long held that courts have “no . . . jurisdiction . . . to enjoin the President
in the performance of his official duties” at all, Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866),
let alone in the national security context. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1861
(2017) (“National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President.”).
Finally, even assuming the Court could reach the merits, the risk that the vast swath of
information collected by TikTok will be exploited by the PRC to this country’s detriment is
plainly a valid national security concern, as Congress and numerous national security officials
across administrations have determined. See supra at 2-6. Moreover, TikTok provides
9
See also, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, No. 1:19-CV-00408 (TNM), 2020 WL
1643657, at *10 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2020) (“Although presidential declarations of emergencies . . .
have been at issue in many cases, no court has ever reviewed the merits of such a declaration.”).
10
Congress has reserved to itself the power to oversee the President’s national emergency
determinations and to override those determinations, through fast track procedures if necessary.
See id. §§ 1621(a), 1622(a)-(c), 1641(a)-(c); California, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 891 (“Congress thus
has the authority to monitor and if needed, reverse, the President’s determination[.]”).
13
“information and communications technology and services” and “store[s] and communicate[s]
vast amounts of sensitive information,” including personal identifying information, as discussed
above. ICTS Order, 84 Fed. Reg. at 22689; see also Exec. Order No. 13942; TikTok Terms of
Service, Ex. 18. The President’s actions in response to TikTok therefore fall within the broad
parameters of the ICTS Order.
III. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff also cannot show that irreparable injury is likely absent an injunction. See
Dollar Rent A Car of Wash., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985);
Winter, 555 U.S. at 19-20. Plaintiff argues he is irreparably harmed because he allegedly will
lose his income and will be subject to emotional and reputational harm, Mot. at 14. But
Plaintiff’s theory speculates about the Secretary’s forthcoming regulations, and “[s]peculative
injury does not constitute irreparable injury[.]” See Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 739
F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, it is well-established in this Circuit that “[m]ere injuries .
. . in terms of money . . . are not enough.” Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l
Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
Nor can Plaintiff shoehorn his theory into the limited precedent recognizing irreparable
harm where lost income is accompanied by severe emotional distress. See Heineke v. Santa
Clara Univ., 736 F. App’x 622, 624 (9th Cir. 2018), cited in Mot. at 14 (explaining that “an
extreme case of lost income or reputational harm might constitute irreparable injury”).
Plaintiff’s vague “recei[pt]” and “aware[ness]” of certain social media comments that
purportedly harm his reputation, Mot. at 14, cannot constitute the rare and extreme case
contemplated by the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, his assertion that he is at risk “of retaliation and
physical violence[,]” id., is too speculative to ground a finding of irreparable injury. And his
“concern[] that his resume will be besmirched due to his TikTok employment,” id., is abstract
and speculative, especially as he has been employed at TikTok for five months, Ryan Decl. ¶ 5,
and apparently has a variety of marketable skillsets, id. ¶ 2 (“I am also a scholar, professor and
expert in Internet governance and free expression, and I am a licensed attorney in [four states].”).

14
IV. The Balance of the Equities Weighs Against a Temporary Restraining Order
Plaintiff cannot show the balance of equities tips in his favor. See Drakes Bay Oyster Co.
v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014). At stake here are significant national security
and foreign policy interests that weigh strongly against an injunction. See Winter, 555 U.S. at
24; cf. United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 533 (4th Cir. 2013); Escamilla v. M2
Tech., 2013 WL 4577538 (E.D. Tex. 2013); Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
Additionally, entry of an order that substitutes the views of a single TikTok employee for that of
the Executive Branch would improperly frustrate and displace the President’s exercise of
discretion, and would not serve the public interest. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40,
300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) (statutory scheme of Congress “is in itself a declaration of public
interest and policy which should be persuasive” to courts); see also Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v.
Newcomb, 804 F. Supp. 846, 854 (E.D. La. 1992).
By comparison, Plaintiff’s asserted interest in his salary, Mot. at 14, is speculative. This
is especially so given that the Secretary will be taking actions to identify the relevant transactions
on September 20, 2020. And insofar as Plaintiff’s argument is premised on his theory that the
Executive Order violates his constitutional rights or has not demonstrated a national security
threat to his satisfaction, see id. at 14-15, it fails for the reasons set forth above.
V. Any Preliminary Relief Should Be Limited to Plaintiff
In the event the Court concludes that preliminary relief is warranted—and it is not—any
relief should be far more limited than that requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin
enforcement of the Executive Order against him “or any other U.S. employee of TikTok[.]” ECF
No. 12-3 at 2. But Plaintiff has no standing to assert the interests of other employees. See, e.g.,
Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff
likewise has not sought class certification. Cf. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 582-83 (9th Cir.
2018). Any preliminary relief should thus apply only to Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order should be denied.

15
Dated: September 10, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

DAVID M. MORELL
ALEXANDER K. HAAS
Branch Director
DIANE KELLEHER
/s/Stuart J. Robinson
STUART J. ROBINSON
SERENA M. ORLOFF
MICHAEL DREZNER
Trial Attorneys
Phone: (415) 436-6635
Fax: (415) 436-6632

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Case 3:20-cv-05948-VC Document 20 Filed 09/10/20 Page 1 of 24

JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

I. Factual Background ............................................................................................................ 2

A. Congress and the Executive Branch Identify Chinese Technology

B. Researchers and Members of Congress Identify TikTok as a Growing

C. The President Issues Executive Order 13873 and Reports to Congress

D. The President Takes Action Relating To TikTok ................................................... 5

II. This Case............................................................................................................................. 6

I. Legal Standard .................................................................................................................... 7

II. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed On The Merits of His Claims .......................................... 7

A. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Due Process Claims ................................. 7

B. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Equal Protection Claim .......................... 11

C. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Vagueness Claim ................................... 12

D. Plaintiff Is Unlikely to Succeed on His Ultra Vires Claim ................................... 12

III. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish Irreparable Harm ........................................................... 14

V. Any Preliminary Relief Should Be Limited to Plaintiff ................................................... 15

Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Department of Treasury,

All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,

Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles,

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Care Ctr., Inc.,

Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,

Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst.,

Cal. Dep’t of Educ. v. Bennett,

Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush,

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump,

Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis,

DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of California,

Dollar Rent A Car of Wash., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,

Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell,

FCC v. Fox. Television Stations, Inc.,

Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court,

Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ.,

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,

Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft,

Johnson v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. Coll. Dist.,

Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat’l Football League,

Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky.,

Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb,

Moving Phones P’ship L.P. v. FCC,

OKKO Bus. PE v. Lew,

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Santa Fe. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,

United States v. Amirnazmi,

Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

United States v. Chem. Found.,

United States v. Elcom Ltd.,

United States v. South Carolina,

Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40,

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n,

50 U.S.C. § 1702 ........................................................................................................................... 13

50 U.S.C. § 1705 ........................................................................................................................... 12

Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 1636 (2018) ................................................................................... 3

85 Fed. Reg. 29,321 (May 13, 2020) .............................................................................................. 5

85 Fed. Reg. 51,297 (Aug. 14, 2020).............................................................................................. 6

Exec. Order No. 13,726,

Exec. Order No. 13,942,

Ryan v. Trump, et al., No. 3:20-cv-05948-VC

Exec. Order 13,873,