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1. What changes have you noticed lately in China's attitude, if any, toward the
territorial disputes in the South China Sea /East Sea?
ANSWER: The most important change in China’s attitude on the East Sea issue came
following Secretary Clinton’s intervention at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting last
year. Once she indicated that the United States had an interest in facilitating a
peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, China moved quickly to revive the
moribund ASEAN‐China Joint Working Group to implement the Declaration on
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It has now been revealed that Vietnam
and China held four secret meetings last year to discuss the East Asia. China made
clear that the Paracel Islands were not on the table for discussions. Both sides are
trying to work out the principles to guide their discussions on maritime issues.
Progress may be possible on waters that form the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin. But
there are no signs of any positive movement by China on other East Sea issues.
2. Any changes in the political – diplomatic relations between the Southeast Asian
countries, China and United State in regards to the East Sea issue?
ANSWER: Secretary Clinton’s intervention was in response to regional concerns
about Chinese assertiveness. China countered by applying diplomatic pressure on
individual ASEAN states in order to prevent a consensus from developing on how to
deal with China on maritime issues. Chinese pressures succeeded and ASEAN
members insisted that any reference to the South China Sea be dropped from the
joint statement issued after the 2nd ASEAN‐US leaders summit in New York hosted by
President Obama.
Clearly the South China Sea will recede in relative importance because Vietnam is no
longer chair of ASEAN. Most recently Indonesia has expressed concern that US and
Japanese intervention on the South China Sea may complicate ASEAN discussions
with China.
3. The Chinese Communist Party (CPC) recently distributed a territory law that
declares sovereignty over domains ruled by China back to hundred of years ago.
Should this be a concern for these countries?
ANSWER: This is yet another example of China’s tactic of “dropping water on stone”.
China’s assertion of claims of this nature are designed to wear down their
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opponents. This represents nothing new because China has made such historical
claims before. Indeed, China’s claims to the South China Sea are not based on
international law but China’s own interpretation of history.
4. Being afraid to upset China, an important trade counterpart, some countries in the
Asia‐Pacific region have tried not to involve in the East Sea territorial disputes. What
can be done to overcome their concern?
ANSWER: Three Southeast Asian countries did not support Vietnam last year when it
pushed in ASEAN circles for consensus on the East Sea. These countries were
Myanmar, Cambodia and Thailand. These are three different countries. China’s
pressures could be overcome by offering alternatives. Cambodia needs access to the
US market to sell its textiles and garments. The US could put pressure on Cambodia
to change its position on the South China Sea but is unlikely to do so. The US has no
means to pressure Myanmar. Thailand is supposedly a major non‐NATO ally of the
United States. But its highly volatile domestic politics mitigate against taking a stand
on the South China Sea at odds with China.
ASEAN itself needs to demonstrate to its members that unity and solidarity on the
South China Sea is one component of a larger need to work together as a unit in
dealing with China. But ASEAN remains consensus driven and does not force
members to take stands that they are uncomfortable with.
5. The US now welcomes VN to participate in its maritime exercises like the CARAT at
any time. Does it seem like Washington is trying to strengthen the US‐VN alliance by
all means, and would this put any pressure to the Peking at all?
ANSWER: The United States would like to develop increased defence ties – as
distinct from an alliance ‐ with Vietnam so as to be able to influence Hanoi on a
variety of regional security issues, including China. But defence relations are still in
the confidence and trust building stages. The US has made clear, for example, that
the sale of military equipment is related to an improvement in Vietnam’s human
rights situation. So there are self‐imposed limitations on the US side. Vietnam will
not allow itself to be used in any US strategy to contain China. Vietnam seeks to play
off both powers. It fears their collusion will be at Vietnam’s expense.
6. ASEAN Foreign Ministers and their Chinese counterpart are going to meet by the
end of January 2011 to discuss a rather‐necessary common law based on the DOC
which signed in 2002. Do you think they would be able to reach an agreement?
ANSWER: The ASEAN‐China Joint Working Group may be able to make some
progress in moving forward on implementing some of the confidence building
measures in the DOC. But ASEAN guidelines call for them to meet and form a
consensus prior to meeting with China. China objects to this and wants to be able to
negotiate bilaterally. Friction over this point may slow progress on implementing the
DOC. The DOC is just an initial step towards a more legally binding Code of Conduct.
There is some expectation that there will be some progress in order to celebrate the
tenth anniversary of the DOC in 2012. As long as Vietnam insists on including the
Paracel Islands and as long as China refuses, there will be little progress on a Code of
Conduct. The best that can be hoped for is small, incremental and mainly symbolic
steps at implementing the DOC’s confidence building measures.