3. G.R. No.

32069, October 24, 1970]

G.R. No. L-32096  October 24, 1970

ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE G. ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO respondents.
 

FACTS: 
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, petitioned the SC to rule
squarely on the constitutionality of the Reflector Law in this proceeding for certiorari and
prohibition against respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the
enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition,
filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing; the validity of such enactment as well as
such administrative order.

Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in
effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: “No motor vehicles of whatever style,
kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such
reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or
luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at all
times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters away at night.” 35 Then
came a section on dimensions, placement and color.

As to dimensions the following is provided for: “Glass reflectors — Not less than 3 inches in
diameter or not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape — At least 3 inches wide and 12
inches long. The painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner.”
Provision is then made as to how such reflectors are to be “placed, installed, pasted or painted.”

There is the further requirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted
or painted four reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or
painted in front and those in the rear end of the body thereof. The color required of each
reflectors, whether built-in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in
the front part of any motor vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in
the rear shall all be red.

Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: “Non-compliance with the
requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor
vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration maybe suspended in pursuance of the
provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; Provided, however, that in the case of the violation of
Section 1 (a) and (b) and paragraph (8) Section 3 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more
than fifty pesos shall be imposed.

The  respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of injunction.

ISSUE:  
1.) WON Reflector Law is unconstitutional.
2.) WON A.O No. 2 is invalid and contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

HELD:  
NO. both are valid and constitutional.
It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to
promote public safety. What is delegated is authority which is non-legislative in character, the
completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.
1. Police Power.  It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of
government. “the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable of powers,” (Justice Holmes)
aptly pointed out “to all the great public needs.”
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo:
“Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-
being of the nation.

2. Delegation of Legislative Power. It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of

separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other
branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local
affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the
statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine
whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquiry must be directed to
the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to
make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to
exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made. The
Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It
is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety.

*Political law; It has been defined as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” 

4. Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation, G.R. No. L-9657, November 29, 1956]

FACTS: Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco
Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, AssistantCorporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel
for Defendant ,requested said stenographers for copies of thetranscript of the stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor
the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to
Leopoldo T. Bacaniand P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page the
Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of
the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut
Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.

ISSUE: WON NACOCO is a Government Entity

HELD: They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they donot come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National
CoconutCorporation. While it was organized with the purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry
to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities
for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a
function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote thecoconut industry, however,
it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it wasmade
subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the
powers that it mayexercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It
may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it
is an entity different from our government. As this Court hasaptly said, ³The mere fact that the
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public. the term
³Government of the Republic of the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of thegovernment are
exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which
political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local
government. These are whatwe call municipal corporations. They do not include government
entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and
which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, dutiesand liabilities have to be
determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not thereforecome
within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court.

5. Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Court of Industrial Relations, 65 SCRA

416

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in
excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than
eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction. 

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising
governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and
dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is
exempt from CA No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people
and promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.
The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the
Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says
that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant
functions is now considered obsolete. 

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
be DENIED. 

*The Philippine Tobacco Administration is not liable for overtime pay, since it is
performing governmental functions. Among its purposes are to promote the
effective merchandising of tobacco so that those engaged in the tobacco industry will
have economic security, to stabilize the price of tobacco, and to improve the
living and economic conditions of those engaged in the tobacco industry.

6. Gov’t of the Phililppine Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 35 SCRA 738

Government of the Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

Trent, J.

FACTS: About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by
the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which
took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of
that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute
the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the
relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, and, by order
of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the
names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila. There was later
distributed, in accordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving
a balance of S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte
de Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its
treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in
installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15,
March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On
account of various petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned
allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts, the
Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, “through the Attorney-
General and in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands,” the $80.000,
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of
names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.

By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was
ordered to “inform this ministerio what is the total sum available at the present time, taking into
consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your
general Government on February 1, 1883,” and after the rights of the claimants, whose names
were published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been
established, as therein provided, as such persons “have an unquestionable right to be paid the
donations assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke them all within a
reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without regard
to their financial status,” and finally “that when all the proceedings and operations herein
mentioned have been concluded and the Government can consider itself free from all kinds of
claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of
the Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting
the relief board and your general Government and taking account of what sums have been
delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public
calamities,” and “in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of
the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned
comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879.”
On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance was called
upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that
Department’s report to the Governor-General.

ISSUE: Whether the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the
Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty

HELD: While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending,
war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the
latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth
article, Spain relinquished to the United States “all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts,
structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law,
belonged to the public domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain.” As the $80,000
were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore, pass
to the present sovereign. This, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as the right to
recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be “other immovable property”
mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the
Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States.

All laws theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or
institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force, is also plain. But it is equally settled in
the same public law that the great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic
rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler.

If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or
institutions of the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of
the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among “that great body of municipal
law which regulates private and domestic rights,” they continued in force and are still in force
unless they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class
is clear from their very nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense
of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and duty to supervise,
regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign,
in exempting “provident institutions, savings banks, etc.,” all of which are in the nature of
charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as the investment in
securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of the crown of Spain
devolved upon the United States.

7. Cabañas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94

58 SCRA 94, July 25, 1974

MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.FRANCISCO PILAPIL, defendant-appellant.

FACTS: Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the father of Millian
Pilapil, left an insurance having his child as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco
Pilapil, to act as trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court decided to give the
mother of the child the right to act as trustee while her child is a minor citing the appropriate
provisions in the Civil Code. The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration here, and
the mother resides with the child so she is the rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its role
as an agency of the State parens patriae, called for the mother to take responsibility. The
defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the amount in question by invoking
the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

ISSUE: Whether the mother or the uncle should be entitled to act as a trustee of a minor
beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy from her deceased father? Whether the trial
court erred in its decision to give the right to the mother?

RULING: The decision is affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant. The provisions of
Article 320 and 321 of the Civil Code became the basis of the decision. The former provides that
“the father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance." The
latter provides that "The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire
with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in
usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company
he lives; ...

With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any
evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest
scrutiny. The appealed decision is supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by
its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of
every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no
affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the
great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall strengthen the family as
a basic social institution." 10 If, as the Constitution so wisely dictates, it is the family as a unit
that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of doubt that even if a stronger case were
presented for the uncle, still deference to a constitutional mandate would have led the lower
court to decide as it did.
The trust, insofar as it is in conflict with the above quoted provision of law, is pro tanto null and
void. In order, however, to protect the rights of the minor, Millian Pilapil, the plaintiff should file
an additional bond in the guardianship proceedings, Sp. Proc. No. 2418-R of this Court to raise
her bond therein to the total amount of P5,000.00."

8. Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113

FACTS: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated during the time of the
Japaneseoccupation. After the liberation of Manila Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue
hearingson his case saying that the proclamation of Gen Douglas MacArthur has invalidated
andnullified all judicial proceedings and judgements of the courts of the Philippines and
withoutthe enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of proceedings
pendingin the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or Not judicial proceedings and decisions during the Japanese
Occupationwere valid and remained valid.

2. Whether or not the proclamation of General MacArthur declared that all laws,
regulations and processes of any other Government other than that of thecommonwealth are null
and void, invalidated and all judgements and judicial actsproceeding from the courts.

3. Whether or not of they were invalidated (reference to No.2), the courts can continuehearing
the cases pending before them.

HELD:1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings and
non-political judgements of a de facto government are good and valid. The governments by
thePhilippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the
Japanesemilitary occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial
actsand proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a
politicalcomplexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of
postliminy(postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the
liberation orreoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the
leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

2. It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
GeneralDouglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other
government" in saidproclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles
of international law.The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to
governmental processesother than judicial processes of court proceedings.

"A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possibleconstruction remains."

If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied,

andforbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing therein
their civilrights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or
therestored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered
bysaid courts in their litigation during the period of occupation.

3. The proceedings in cases then pending in said court may continue, without necessity
ofenacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. The laws
andcourts of the Philippines did not become the laws and courts of Japan by being continued
asrequired by the law of nations. Same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdictions
and cases pending therein before the restoration of the commonwealth until abolished
andreplaced by the said government.

DECISION: WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS ISSUED to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordering him to take cognizance and continue to final judgement the proceedings in Case No.
3012.

3 Kinds of De Facto Government:

1. Established through Rebellion – Governments gets possession and control through theforce of
the voice of the majority and maintains itself rightful government.

2. Established through Occupation – (PARAMOUNT FORCE) Maintained by the military forces who
invade and occupy the territory of the enemy.

3. Established through Insurrection – Established as an independent government by the

inhabitants of the country who rise in insurrection against the parent state

9. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856

FACTS: In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the
petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese
occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was then
suspended

HELD: No.

RATIO: The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain
vested in the legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government
(which is the supreme power which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state).

10. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at
designated military camps all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro, thus, forcing
petitioner and his band to move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the
“Bolo area“. A certain Captain Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and
duties in the “Bolo area” by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of
command. Captain Beloncio was, thus, allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was
committed, which was at the time of war and Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court ruled that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of
the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws
even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as
a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover,
they were operating officers, which made them even more eligible for the military court’s
jurisdiction.

11. People v. Gozo [G.R. No. L-36409, October 26, 1973]

FACTS: Loreta Gozo seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the
municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification,
alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the very least, its
applicability to her, by invoking due process citing the case of People v. Fajardo. She contend
that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces
located inside the United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo
City and therefore shall be exempted from the Municipal Ordinance No. 14.

ISSUE: WON the property of the Appellant shall be exmpeted from the application of the
Municipal Ordinance.

RULING: Yes. The appellant’s contention that because her property was located within the naval
base leased to the American armed forces located inside the United States Naval Reservation,
she must be entitled of the exemption from complying with the ordanance was given no merit.
Though the property yielded within the Naval base of US, it is a clear doctrine that the
Philippines still possesses the sovereignty over that area – given the record that it is still a part
of its territory. Thus, it can still enforce its administrative jurisdiction by virtue of its government
instrumetalities which the people sojourning to that territory must always adhere and
respect.Citing the case of Reagan vs CIR it states that, “By the Agreement, it should be noted,
the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain
cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The
Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine
territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not
granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of
their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine
sovereignty over the bases; the second from the express provisions of the treaty." Thus, the
Philippine jurisdictional right might be diminished but will never disappear. This manifests the
principle of Sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is
the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competence."

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it found the
accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No.
14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish the house that is the
subject matter of the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this
decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that
portion of the appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.

12. People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the
newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto – published an article
against the Philippine Senate. Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown.
Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be
applied in the case at bar?

HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government, Article 256 of the SPC was
enacted to protect Spanish officials as representatives of the King. However, the Court explains
that in the present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the provision to
protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the Philippines from Spanish to American, it
means that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated. The Court
determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for it is about the relation of the State
to its inhabitants, thus, the Court emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that
on acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no longer in force and cannot be applied
to the present case. Therefore, respondent was acquitted.

13. Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS: On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case
3010 final for lack of an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of
partition of lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of
plaintiffs and petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated
October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots
denominated as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who
was issued transfer of certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On
March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and
interest inn Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion
was the President and his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also
the stockholder of the corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code
of Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec.
12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed
against Asuncion.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

RULING: No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts
unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but
from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion
bought the lot on March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and
November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of
the Philippines, Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of
Commerce, appears to have been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the
sovereignty, political laws of the former sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are
reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public
officers cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part
in his official capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the
corporation and sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation
did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance from the time of the drafting of the Articles of
Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967.
The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes against Canon 25.

14. Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 US 345

FACTS: Petitioners are creditors of the city of Manila before the cession of the Philippine Islands
to the United States. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the
present municipality is a totally different corporate identity from the previous one and is not
liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.

ISSUE: Is the present municipality liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the
cession to the United States?

HELD: The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a
mere change of sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral force. The city, acting as
a corporation, possesses two kinds of powers: governmental and public. In view of the dual
character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for the presuming their total
dissolution as a consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. The cession did not
operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations. The present city is, in every legal sense,
the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to the property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its liabilities. All three of plaintiffs in
error are entitled to judgment.

Syllabus

Even if there is no remedy adequate to the collection of a claim against a governmental

subdivision when reduced to judgment, a plaintiff having a valid claim is entitled to maintain an
action thereon and reduce it to judgment.
Where the case turned below on the consequence of a change in sovereignty by reason of the
cession of the Philippine Islands, the construction of the Treaty with Spain of 1898 is involved,
and this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine

Islands under § 10 of the Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 695.

While military occupation or territorial cession may work a suspension of the governmental
functions of municipal corporations, such occupation or cession does not result in their
dissolution.

While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded territory,
and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign, the
great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until
abrogated or changed by the new ruler.

Although the United States might have extinguished every municipality in the territory ceded by
Spain under the Treaty of 1898, it will not, in view of the practice of nations to the contrary, be
presumed to have done so.

The legal entity of the City of Manila survived both its military occupation by, and its cession to,
the United States, and, as in law, the present city, as the successor of the former city, is entitled
to the property rights of its predecessor, it is also subject to its liabilities.

The cession in the Treaty of 1898 of all the public property of Spain in the Philippine Islands did
not include property belonging to municipalities, and the agreement against impairment of
property and private property rights in that treaty applied to the property of municipalities and
claims against municipalities.

One supplying goods to a municipality does so, in the absence of specific provision, on its
general faith and credit, and not as against special funds in its possession, and even if such
goods are supplied for a purpose for which the special funds are held, no specific lien is created
thereon.

The facts, which involve the liability of the present City of Manila in the Philippine Islands for
claims against the City of Manila as it existed prior to the cession under the Treaty of 1898, are
stated in the opinion.

15. Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285

FACTS: William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of
the Philippines.

The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive
Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military
forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it
does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE/HELD:
 - WoN the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?

a.) YES. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the
usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency.

- WoN the sentence of life imprisonment valid?

a.) YES. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65.

- WoN the punitive sentence ceased to be valid from the time of the restoration of
Commonwealth, by virtue of the principle of posliminium?

a.) YES. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be
valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a
crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

16. Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 749

FACTS: Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms
with less serious physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty from arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the
validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance
of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE: Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

HELD: Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence
which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a
political complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts
already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of
territorial law and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is
necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier.
Such is the case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.