Paat vs. CA Full Text SCRA

9/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 266
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 167

Paat vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997.
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),

Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO
LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and
VICTORIA DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Before a

party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him.—This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-
condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s
intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding
of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was

not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000174b340401630ad2d75003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exceptions.—However,
we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad
rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative
agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Same; Same; A party cannot, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings.—It was easy to perceive then that the private
respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an
adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek court’s intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an
administrative proceedings.
169
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 169

Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of primary

jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.—Moreover, it is important to
point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial
court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes
an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction

over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
Same; Same; Due Process; Deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.—To sustain the claim of private respondents
would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of
excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances
prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private
respondents to be without merit. First, they argued that there was violation
of due process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order of
confiscation of petiioner Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on.
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot
be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on
his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private
respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side
when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was,
170

however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director

Baggayan.
Statutes; Statutory Construction; Statutes should be construed in the
light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed,
and they should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.—The Secretary and
his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and
forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws,
rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough
to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The
only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must
be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the
statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved
and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure
the benefits intended.
Same; Same; When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly
room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.—
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of
P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing

forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent
now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of
Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code” and inserted the words “shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.”
When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended
court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies;
Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to one’s recourse to the courts and more importantly, being
an element of private respondent’s right of action,
171
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 171

is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.—From the foregoing

disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against
the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D.
705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in
view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies
should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the
administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s recourse to
the courts and more importantly, being an element of private respondents’
right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
Remedial Law; Replevin; Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable
in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that
he is entitled to the possession of property, that the property is wrongfully
detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has
not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment,
or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of
the property.—It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is
founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the
property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of personal
chattels that are unlawfully detained. “To detain” is defined as to mean “to
hold or keep in custody,” and it has been held that there is tortious taking
whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or
claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this,
without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of
Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show
by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that the
property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized
under execution, or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such
seizure, and the actual value of the property. Private respondents miserably
failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck
obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by
the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the
required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of
P.D. 705 as
172

amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,

unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the
conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the
continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no
wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Same; Certiorari; Courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary
except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.—
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to
question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in
pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of
the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the
said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts
may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads: SECTION 8. REVIEW—All
actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or
upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head
whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30)
days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision, unless
appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19, Series
of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the
courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Pedro R. Perez, Jr. for private respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable
property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture
proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D.
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VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 173

705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the

Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered
to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal
forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our
resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989
when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on
its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for
brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver
could not produce the required documents for the forest products
found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation
of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within
which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however,
1
failed to submit the required
explanation. On June 22, 1989, the Regional Executive Director
Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner of Layugan’s
action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended
by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of
Executive Director Baggayan, which2 was, however, denied in a
subsequent order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently, the case was
brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents’ statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989
that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then
“this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 235.
2 Rollo, pp. 241-242.
174

3
3
Secretary.” Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for
replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private
respondents4
against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director5
Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,
which issued6 a writ ordering the return of the truck to private
respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia,
that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied
7
the motion to
dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. Their motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari
was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals
which sustained the trial court’s order 8
ruling that the question9
involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present petition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 10
9, 1993. By
virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for
the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was
granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit
for replevin because the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. Private respon-
_______________
3 Rollo, p. 239.
4 Baggayan died during the pendency of Civil Case 4031, he was succeeded in
office by Petitioner Leonardo Paat.
5 Presided by Judge Ricardo A. Baculi.
6 Rollo, pp. 251-252.
7 Rollo, pp. 274-275.
8 Rollo, pp. 36-46 penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurred by Justices
Luis A. Javellana and Jorge S. Imperial.
9 Rollo, pp. 14-35.
10 Rollo, pp. 117-119.
175
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 175

dents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this
principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of
the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due process was violated
because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2) the
seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the
Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal
forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was
not used in the commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant
jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of
petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature
11
invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel 12
the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of
administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
_______________
11 National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas

Consolidated Mining Company vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-15809, August 30, 1961;
Aboitiz v. Collector of Customs, G.R. No. L-29466, May 18, 1978; Pestenas v.
Dyogi, G.R. No. L-25786, February 27, 1978.
12 Soto v. Jareno, G.R. No. 38962, September 15, 1986; Hodges v. Mun. Board, L-
18276, January 12, 1967; Abe-Abe v. Manta, L4827, May 31, 1979; Gone v. District
Engineer, L-22782, August 29, 1975.
176

and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less

true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as
to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This
doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings
of a case. Hence,
13
it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of
due process,
14
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, (3) when the administrative action 15
is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there 16
is
estoppel on the part of the administrative
17
agency concerned, (5)
when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of 18the President

bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion
19
of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
20
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim, (9) when
21
the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy
and
_______________
13 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

14 Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, L-76633, October 18, 1988.
15 Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat, L-29171, April 15, 1988.
16 Vda. De Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission, L-12944, March 30, 1959.
17 De Lara v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-21653, May 31, 1965.
18 Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 13000, September 25, 1959; Bartulata
v. Peralta, G.R. No. 23155, September 9, 1974.
19 Cipriano v. Marcelino, G.R. No. L-27793, February 28, 1972.
20 Alzate v. Aldana, G.R. No. 14407, February 29, 1960.
21 Soto v. Jareno, supra.
177
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 177

adequate remedy, and (11) when there 22

are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention. In the case at bar, there is no
question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the
petitioners of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July23
12, 1989. In their letter of reconsideration
dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the
presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as
they did avail, in the resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:
“x x x
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action,
24
then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.”

It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked
up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By
appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate
and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary
course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek the court’s
intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their
relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of
forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development
and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be
given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which
_______________
22 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.

23 Rollo, pp. 236-240.
24 Rollo, p. 239.
178

is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,

therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes
an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
25
lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. 26
In Felipe Ismael, Jr.
and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated 27
in
the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this
Court held:
“Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and

multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources,
the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.”

To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring
the instant controversy beyond the pale of the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of
excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the
circumstances prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these
assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First, they
argued that there was violation of due process because they did not
receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner
Layugan. This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does
not necessarily mean or28
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity
or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than
_______________
25 Vidad v. RTC, G.R. No. 98084, October 18, 1993.
26 G.R. No. 79538, October 18, 1990.
27 G.R. No. 109113, January 25, 1995.
28 Pepsi Cola Distributors of the Phil. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100686, August 15,
1995.
179
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 179

29
oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot
30
be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
31
given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the
instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the
opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in
an order of July 12, 198932
of Executive Director Baggayan. In
Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled that:
“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.”

Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of
seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative officers
of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these acts under
the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate
and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products
as can be gleaned from the second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D.
705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as
follows:
_______________
29 Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

30 Ibid.
31 Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Cooperative, G.R. No. 79968, August 23,
1995.
32 G.R. No. 101875, July 14, 1995.
180

“SECTION 68. x x x
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipments, implements and tools
illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.”
(Italics ours)

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with
private respondents’ thinking not only because the aforequoted
provision apparently does not mention nor include “conveyances”
that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large
extent, due to the fact that private respondents’ interpretation of the
subject provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and
inevitably reduces the other provision of Section 68-A, which is
quoted herein below:
“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His

Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of
violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter.”
(Italics ours)

It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary
and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to
confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code
or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose of
the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances
in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be
made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a
way as
181
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33
to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes
should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the
evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and
34
34
secure the benefits intended. In this wise, the observation of the
Solicitor General is significant, thus:
“But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws ‘more

responsive to present situations and realities’ and in view of the ‘urgency to
conserve the remaining resources of the country,’ that the government opted
to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an administrative remedy
totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than anything
else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize
enforcement of forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO
277—the law that added Section 68-A to PD 705—is most revealing:
‘WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of

the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected
through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and
regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical
difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts
more responsive to present situations and realities;’
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing

the DENR to confiscate, not only ‘conveyances,’ but forest products as well.
On the other hand, confiscation of forest products by the ‘court’ in a
criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private
respondents insist, the power of confisca-
_______________
33 Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

34 De Guia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992.
182

tion cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68,
then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A
would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO 277,
35
supra.”

Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal
because the petitioners themselves admitted in the Order dated July
12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that the truck of private
respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This
order, a copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of
private respondents, reads in part, viz.:
“x x x while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in
the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is
not liable for the crime and in no case could a criminal case be filed against
her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. x x
36
x”

We observed that private respondents misread the content of the
aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted the intention of
petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners when they stated
that the truck “was not used in the commission of the crime” is that
it was not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no
case can a criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for
violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being
used in the commission of another crime, that is, the breach of
Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. In the same order of
July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
“x x x However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further

amended by Executive Order No. 277 specifically provides for the
confiscation of the conveyance used in the transport of forest products not
covered by the required legal documents. She may not
_______________
35 Rollo, pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

36 Rollo, p. 242.
183
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 183

have been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question
but the fact that she accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor
37
liable. x x x”

Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime
defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified theft,
so that, when petitioner admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that
private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then
necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act
constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O.
277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the
aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
“SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other

products without license.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty
of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x.” (Italics ours; Section 68, P.D. 705 before its
amendment by E.O. 277)
“SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
‘Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products
without license.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code x x x” (Italics ours; Section 1, E.O. No. 277 amending
Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
_______________
37 Ibid.
184


With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending
Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting,
removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes
a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to
be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive
Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code” and inserted the words “shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code.” When the statute is clear and explicit,
there is hardly room for 38
any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin
can not be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck
taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings
in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P.D. 705, as amended. Dismissal
of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private
respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of
assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the
writ ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in
the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to one’s
recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of

private respondents’ right of action, is too significant to be waylaid
by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is
founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds
the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover possession of
personal chattels that are unlawfully
_______________
38 Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.
185
VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 185

39
detained. 40 “To detain” is defined as to mean “to hold or keep in
custody,” and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever
there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or
claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority41
or right;
this, without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. Under the
Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the
plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the
possession of property, that the property is wrongfully detained by
the defendant, alleging the cause of detention, that the same has not
been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution, or
attachment, or if so seized, that it 42is exempt from such seizure, and
the actual value of the property. Private respondents miserably
failed to convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject
truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was
seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products
without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention
of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as
well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or
detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture
proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention
exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural
tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by
the DENR in pursuance to the authority given
_______________
39 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p. 850, footnote 57; I.

Tanenbaum Son and Company vs. C. Ludwig Baumann and Company, 261 NY 85,
184 NE 503, 86 ALR 102.
40 Ibid., footnote 59; Anderson vs. Hapler, 34 Ill 436; Wails vs. Farrington, 27
Okla 754, 116 P 428.
41 Id., footnote 60; Haythorn vs. Rushforth, 19 NJL 160.
42 Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
186

under P.D. 705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that
actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are
subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not
review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition. It reads:
SECTION 8. REVIEW—All actions and decisions of the Director are

subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved
thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and
executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved
party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with
Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department
Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991 and its
Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27,
1993 is hereby made permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is
directed to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—When the language of the statute is clear it should be

given its natural meaning. (Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary,
Department of Justice, 238 SCRA 5 [1994])
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9/22/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 266

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 167

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Ofﬁcer-in-Charge (OIC),

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Before a

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 169

Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of primary

arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction

170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director

P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 171

is too signiﬁcant to be waylaid by the lower court.—From the foregoing

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

amended by E.O. 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

TORRES, JR., J.:

proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 173

705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 175

11 National Development Company v. Hervilla, L-65718, June 30, 1987; Atlas

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less

department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of 18the President

13 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, G.R. No. 85156, February 5, 1991.

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 177

adequate remedy, and (11) when there 22

responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural

22 Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, supra.

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,

“Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 179

“The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as

29 Concerned Ofﬁcials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, supra.

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 181

“But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws ‘more

‘WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of

It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing

33 Lopez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104158, November 6, 1992.

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“x x x However, under Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended and further

35 Rollo, pp. 170-171; Memorandum pp. 12-13.

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 183

“SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of

38 Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386, June 14, 1994.

VOL. 266, JANUARY 10, 1997 185

39 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Volume 66, p. 850, footnote 57; I.

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SECTION 8. REVIEW—All actions and decisions of the Director are

Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ.,

Note.—When the language of the statute is clear it should be

© Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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