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Dedicated to
my beautiful daughters Amulya and Shreya for their love & affection
5
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks are also due to all the respondents of the questionnaire circulated by me
for patiently going through the voluminous queries and in penning their valuable
opinions & suggestions without which my research work would not have been
completed. My sincere gratitude is also due to all my colleagues especially Shri
Jainendra Kumar, Technical Examiner at Border Roads Inspection Cell of Govt of
India for suitable refinement to my questionnaire and constant encouragement. Further
I thankfully acknowledge the assistance provided by Professors Tridib, Arup Roy,
Mrinmoy and students of Business Administration Mr Abhijeet & Chetri of Tezpur
University for software assistance through SPSS computer package in carrying out the
statistical analysis.
ABSTRACT
The introductory chapter gives an insight into the present scenario on Indian
highways including cross continental comparison with the neighbouring China as well
as developed nations such as USA and Europe. The poor quality of road infrastructure
coupled with heavy congestion on important national highways has led to initiation of
National Highway Development Project (NHDP) was discussed in detail in the sub
section background of study. The wide prevalence of delays in the implementation of
highway projects under NHDP has necessitated the present study on time and cost
overruns. This chapter further discusses on the research methodology adopted,
limitations of the study and future scope for further research.
Chapter 2 covers the literature survey in detail covering the period since 1980.
Important findings of various researchers on project delays were depicted for the
information of the reader. The survey included authors from all over the globe and
reasons for delays in construction projects comprised from planning as well as design
and construction phases. Shortages of resources, inclement weather, frequent changes
to design and scope of work, lack of coordination between client and contractors,
unforeseen site conditions etc were mostly listed as reasons for project delays. On the
contrary, cost overruns were stated to be on account of inflationary price rise, higher
cost of land acquisition and under estimation of the original cost. Few constructive
suggestions from parliamentary and inter ministerial committees also found a mention
in the literature survey.
The analysis on time and cost overruns is extensively covered in the chapter 3.
The status report of Ministry of Statistics and Project Implementation (MOS&PI)
highlights the prevailing scenario on the inordinate delays caused in the
implementation of highway projects. Various vital statistical parameters of these
highway projects were deliberated in detail including the trend of time overruns. Extent
of delays and corresponding reasons were also brought out covering the various
geographical regions of the country. Certain interesting inferences were also drawn
with respect to the highway projects carried out under various phases of NHDP.
Regression analysis was carried out on the ongoing highway projects using SPSS
computer program and mathematical equations were derived between various project
parameters to portray the behavior of time and cost overruns. Delay Index model
incorporating the various causes of delay was evolved for estimation of time overruns
and for predicting the future outcomes.
7
Chapter 4 further takes the analytical part of the research one step further in
ascertaining the various causes of delays and subsequent diagnosis of the time and cost
overruns. The prominent reasons for delay such as land acquisition was discussed in
detail going into the historical and legislative perspectives. Questionnaire survey
findings on the land acquisition front were also debated with focus on micro level
organizational problems and the recent government initiatives in the form of land
legislation bill introduced in the parliament. A sizeable portion of thesis was devoted to
lacunae in the preparation of Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) and their impact on the
highway projects along with the corrective measures. The next most important problem
was contractual matters and dispute resolution mechanism suggesting procedural
reforms for effective contract administration. Further financing mechanisms of NHDP
were discussed at length ever since the inception of NHDP. Certain innovative
suggestions such as beneficiary participation and auctioning of highway projects were
aired for the sound implementation of NHDP. Strategies for future implementation
such as project packaging, appropriate mix of BOT, ways and means to address the
capacity constraints were highlights of this chapter.
Concluding chapter 5 at the end tried to summarise the findings of the analysis
of time and cost overruns. This chapter has brought out the importance of physical
connectivity through highway infrastructure in the country through the massive
development programme in the form of NHDP and at the same time envisaging the
role of the governments in removing the constraints. The various impediments on the
path of project implementation were listed according to their criticality. Tabulation of
various factors causing delays and suggested measures to overcome the delays is the
highlight of this chapter giving the readers the crux of the research carried out by the
research scholar. The state of preparedness in India is covered under overall general
economic scenario. The chapter ends with a note of optimism shared by the
engineering fraternity stating that the committed target of achieving the road
construction at the rate of 20 km per day is attainable if timely corrective actions are
taken.
8
CONTENTS
Glossary 13
Abbreviations 16
List of Tables 20
List of Figures 22
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1 Introduction 32
2.2 International Scenario 33
2.3 Time Vs Cost Overruns 34
2.4 Indian Context 35
2.5 Previous Studies 39
2.6 Proposed Study 40
3.1 Introduction 42
3.2 Status Report on Project Implementation 43
3.3 Regression Analysis of Time and Cost Overruns 52
3.3.1 Assumptions in Regression Analysis 57
3.3.2 Regression Analysis Computations 57
3.3.3 Test for Significance 61
3.3.4 Regression Analysis Results 63
3.4 Delay Index Model for Estimation of Time Overruns 66
4.1 Introduction 73
4.2 Pre-Construction Activities 78
4.2.1 Land Acquisition 78
4.2.1.1 Legislations on Land Acquisition 79
4.2.1.2 Land Acquisition on NHDP 81
9
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
10
APPENDICES
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS
ii. Kishore Kumar M., Ch. Hanumantha Rao., and Boeing Singh Laishram (2012).
“Time and Cost Overrun Analysis of National Highway Development Project.”
Journal of Indian Roads Congress, ISSN No : 0376-7256, Vol 73-3, Paper No 582,
Oct-Dec 2012, pp 299-321.
iii. Kishore Kumar M., and Ch. Hanumantha Rao (2012). “E-Auctioning for
Awarding Highway Projects: An Optimal Methodology for Reaping Maximum
Revenues.” NICMAR Journal of Construction Management, ISSN No : 0970-
3675, Vol. XXVII, No.I, pp.27-35.
iv. Kishore Kumar M., and Ch. Hanumantha Rao (2011). “Capacity Constraints on
progressing of National Highway projects in India”, Prabandhan - Indian Journal
of Management, Vol. 4 (8), August, 2011, ISSN No : 0975-2854, pp. 30-43.
v. Kishore Kumar M., and Ch. Hanumantha Rao (2011). “Sound Financial
Management & Reliable Sources of Funding – Key Attributes for timely
completion of National Highway Development Project (NHDP).” International
Transportation Economic Development Conference I-TED 2011, May 01-03,
Charleston, West Virginia (USA).
vi. Kishore Kumar M., and Ch. Hanumantha Rao (2010). “A Decade of Highway
Infrastructure Development under NHDP – An Insight on Varied
Experiences”, International Journal of Earth Sciences and Engineering, ISSN No :
0974-5904, Vol. 3, No.6, Dec 2010, pp. 904-915.
12
vii. Kishore Kumar M., Ch Hanumantha Rao, and K. R. Ramana (2010). “Planning
and Monitoring of Road Construction Projects in Jammu and Kashmir”
NICMAR Journal of Construction Management, ISSN No : 0970-3675, Vol. XXV,
No.III, pp.64-83.
13
GLOSSARY
Accounting Year (AY) or Financial Year (FY) means the accounting year
commencing on 1st April of any calendar year and ending on 31st March of the
subsequent year.
Arbitration Act means Aribtration & Conciliation Act 1996 and shall include any
amendment to or any re-enactment thereof as in force from time to time.
Bill of Quantities means the priced and completed Bill of Quantities forming part of
the Bid.
Build Operate Transfer (BOT) means the concessionaire meets the upfront cost of
construction and expenditure on annual maintenance and recovers the entire cost along
with the interest from collection the user fee (toll) collections during the concession
period. The highway authority viz., NHAI gives the project requirements based on DPR
and capital grant up to a maximum of 40% under the risk sharing concept as envisaged
in the Model Concession Agreement (MCA). In the case of annuity model, the
concessionaire meets the entire upfront cost (no grant is paid by the client) and the
expenditure on annual maintenance recovering the entire investment through pre-
determined annuity payments by NHAI.
Cess is nothing other than a tax or levy. It is to be levied as per the prescribed
percentage on items specified by law. Cess is often used as rider to a tax for collecting
additional revenue for a specific purpose. The then Hon’ble Finance Minister of India
during his budget speech for the year 2003-04, has announced additional levy of cess
of 50 paise (US 1 cent) per litre each on petrol and high-speed diesel. The revenue
generated from the cess would be used to finance all categories of roads.
Commercial Operations Date (COD) starts from the date on which Independent
Engineer (IE) issues the provisional or completion certificate in accordance with the
provisions of MCA.
Completion Date is the date of completion of the works as certified by the Project
Management Consultant (PMC) or his nominee in accordance with the relevant
contract conditions.
Concessionaire is a person or firm that operates a business within the premises
belonging to another (the grantor) under a concession, usually as the only seller of
certain goods or services.
Contract is the agreement entered between the employer and the contractor to execute,
complete and maintain the works.
Contract Price is the price stated in the letter of acceptance and thereafter as adjusted
in accordance with the provisions of the contract.
Contractor is a person or corporate body whose bid to carry out the works has been
accepted by the employer.
14
(1) Agreement
(6) Specifications
15
(7) Drawings
(9) Any other documents listed in the Contract Data as forming part of the contract.
Plant is any integral part of the works which is to have mechanical, electrical,
electronic or chemical or biological function.
Site Investigation Reports are those which were included in the bidding documents
and are factual interpretative reports about the surface and sub-surface conditions at the
site.
Site is the area defined as such in the contract data.
Specification means the specification of the works included in the contract and any
modification or addition made or approved by the employer or his nominee.
Subcontractor is a person or corporate body who has a contract with the contractor to
carry out a part of the work in the contract which includes work on the site.
Temporary Works are works designed, constructed, installed and removed by the
contractor which are needed for construction or installation of the works.
Variation is an instruction given by the PMC or his nominee which varies the works.
Works are what the contract requires the contractor to construct, install and turn over
to the employer as defined in the contract document.
16
ABBREVIATIONS
` - Indian Rupees
AP - Affected Populace
AT - Arbitral Tribunal
ET - Economic Times
EV - Expected Value
GQ - Golden Quadrilateral
JV - Joint Venture
LA - Land Acquisition
NH - National Highway
PM - Prime Minister
SH - State Highway
TS - Technical Sanction
UV - Utility Value
LIST OF TABLES
SNo Table No Name of Table Page No
1 1.1 Transportation Sector in India vis-à-vis Developed 24
Countries
2 1.2 Phase wise details of NHDP Projects in India 25
3 1.3 Progress of NHDP works as on 29th Feb 2012 28
4 2.1 Status of Highway Projects as on 31st Mar 2008 35
5 3.1 Status of Highway Projects 43
6 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Highway Projects on 44
MOS&PI’s monitor
7 3.3 Frequency Distribution of Projects with Time 46
Overruns
8 3.4 Status of Approved Projects (March 2010) 49
9 3.5 NHDP Phase wise Delays 50
10 3.6 State wise Statistics on Delays in Highway Projects 51
(March 2008)
11 3.7 Cost Overruns in Highway Projects (March 2010) 52
12 3.8 Correlation Matrix between Project Parameters 55
13 3.9 Relationships between Project Parameters 56
14 3.10 Regression Analysis Computations 58
15 3.11 Cross validation of Regression Analysis 60
16 3.12 Regression Coefficients of Time Overrun on Project 61
Cost
17 3.13 Regression Analysis of Time Overruns in various 62
States
18 3.14 Time Overruns vs Project Cost 63
19 3.15 Regression Equations 64
20 3.16 Correlation Matrix of Cost Overruns 65
21 3.17 Regression Analysis of Cost Overruns in States 66
22 3.18 Weightages for Delay Index Model 67
24 3.19 Established Relation between Delay Index and Time 69
Overruns
21
LIST OF FIGURES
SNo Fig No Name of Figure Page No
1 1.1 NHDP showing GQ and NSEW Corridor 26
2 3.1 Frequency Distribution of Project Length 45
3 3.2 Frequency Distribution of Project Cost 45
4 3.3A Distribution of Time Overruns in 2008 47
5 3.3B Distribution of Time Overruns in 2010 47
6 3.4 Pattern of Time Overruns 49
7 3.5 Scatter Plot showing best line fit 59
8 4.1 Underground Walkable Service Duct/Corridor 92
9 4.2 PPP Projects in Infrastructure 106
10 4.3 Schematic Diagram of Fast Track Construction Concept 127
23
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The main roads in the Indian subcontinent have not kept pace with traffic
volumes as well as in terms of quality also. Out of the total 3.34 million km road
length, National Highways is just 2 % of total road network, but carries 40 % of total
traffic. Further, amongst the sixty thousand odd km National Highways and 130,000
km State Highways, only 2 percent of their length is four-lane, 34% two-lane, and 64%
single lane. As far as National Highways are concerned, only 5% of their length is four-
lane, 80% two-lane and the balance 15% continues to be single lane [MORT&H 2007].
Thus the road sector, in spite of its high priority is adversely affected by the poor
quality and service levels. The poor quality of Indian roads is highlighted by
congestion, old fatigued bridges and culverts, railway crossings, low safety, no by-
passes, slow traffic movement and also contributing to high rate of road accidents. The
deficiencies in the road network are causing huge economic losses. The rapid growth of
traffic from 1.9 to 8.8 million in a span of two decades @ 8.9% per annum without
matching augmentation of capacity has only added to the deterioration of the network.
25
Although the Indian transportation infrastructure is one of the largest in the world, it is
far from being the best.
NHDP initially envisaged four laning of the existing high density highway
corridors linking four mega metropolitan cities of Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and
Kolkata, popularly known as Golden Quadrilateral (GQ), and providing North South
East West (NSEW) corridor linking Srinagar in the North and Kanyakumari in the
down South, and Porbandar (Gujarat) in the West to Silchar (Assam) in the East along
with other projects including those providing connectivity to major ports in the country
with overall length of 14,146 km at an estimated cost of ` 580 billion (at 1999 price
level). NHDP is one of the largest highway projects in the world as shown in Fig 1.1.
Later on, the scope of NHDP was extended to seven phases covering a total
length of 45,000 km at an estimated cost of ` 2200 billion (2006 prices). The phase
wise schedule of NHDP is given at Appendix 1. Special Accelerated Road
Development Programme in the North-eastern region (SARDP-NE) aims at improving
the road connectivity to state capitals, district headquarters and remote places of NE
region. It envisages two-four laning of about 5,174 km of National Highways and two
laning/improvement of about 4,589 km of state roads. This would provide connectivity
to 85 district headquarters to National Highways/State Roads [DOEA 2009]. A major
portion of the expenditure was met from the cess on petrol and diesel which is
estimated to be around ` 20 billion per annum. External Assistances from World Bank,
Asian Development Bank (ADB) etc also contributed significantly in the form of long
term concessional development loans. The cess and external assistances combinedly
accounted for 75 % of total fund requirements of Golden Quadrilateral. The balance
was made up through market borrowings in the form of NHAI Infrastructure Bonds etc
and partly through private sector participation viz., various forms of Build Operate
Transfer (BOT) mode through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV), Annuity and Shadow
Tolls. Incentives for private sector in the form of tax holidays for 10 years u/s 80(1)A
of Income Tax Act 1951, concession periods for toll collection up to 22 years or so are
pronounced for their active participation. Even Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) up to
100 % on automatic route obviating the earlier requirement of prior approval from
Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) has been allowed with 5 year tax holiday
and 30 % deduction on profits for purpose of tax during the next five years. In order to
boost highways sector, Government of India (GOI) carried out all preparatory work
including land acquisition and utility removal so that Right of way (ROW) could be
made available to the concessionaires free from all encumbrances. National Highway
Authority of India (NHAI) has announced to provide capital grant up to 40% of project
cost to enhance project viability on a case to case basis. Concession period was allowed
up to 30 years and Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 based on UNICITRAL
provisions was catered for all disputes. Duty free import of specified modern high
capacity equipment for highway construction was also allowed. Despite these
concessions and major initiatives by the Government of India, National Highway
Development Project has not progressed as per the stipulated deadlines as shown at
28
Table 1.3, thus this prestigious highway project was crippled with serious time and cost
overruns.
Port Connectivity
Total by NHAI
SARDP -NE
Others
Phase VII
Phase IV
Phase III
Phase VI
Ph. I & II
Phase V
NSEW
NHDP
Total
GQ
Nov 05
Mar 05
Dec 03
Dec 07
Dec 06
Dec 07
Jun 98
Date of
Approval
Original
Dec 03
Dec 09
Dec 09
Dec 12
Dec 14
Dec 12
Total
12109
14799
48096
50254
5846
7142
6500
1000
1390
700
388
380
Length
(Km.)
1540 (24%)
6146 (86%)
5491 (45%)
1126 (81%)
374 (98%)
69 (18%)
(100%)
Already 4-
20872
22416
(43%)
(42%)
5846
247
21
Laned
-
(Km.)
Under
12415
12500
6314
2763
2549
751
244
20
43
Implementa
6
-
tion (Km.)
Contracts
Under
212
253
66
54
13
18
2
4
-
Implementa
tion (No.)
Balance
12250
15660
15956
2363
2919
1000
length for
420
659
276
20
0
-
award
(Km.)
costing ` 10 billion and above were under implementation in the highway sector.
Whereas 202 Nos Major projects (each costing between ` 1.0 billion and ` 10 billion)
costing about ` 615.52 billion and 22 Nos Medium projects (each costing between `
200 million and ` 1.0 billion) costing approx ` 15.20 billion were under various stages
of execution. A major chunk of about 75 percent highway projects under National
Highway Development Project (NHDP) monitored by the Ministry of Road Transport
and Highways were reported to be running behind schedule and many of these projects
have been delayed due to lack of infrastructure facilities, delay in finalisation of
detailed engineering plans, release of drawings and delay in availability of funds,
changes in scope/delay in finalization of the scope, industrial relations and law and
order problems, delay and uncertainty in feedstock supply, pre-commissioning teething
troubles, technology problems, and geological surprises. Cost overruns were reported in
approximately 10 percent of the projects and these cost overruns were on account of
time overruns, changes in rates of foreign exchange and statutory duties, high cost of
environmental safeguards and rehabilitation measures, higher cost of land acquisition,
change in the scope of the project, higher prices being quoted by the bidders in certain
areas, under-estimation of original cost, and general price rise [MOS&PI 2008]. Thus, a
huge 85% of projects are crippled with time and cost overruns. The scope of the present
study encompasses in analysing the time and cost overruns in highway projects and to
assess the reasons for delays in the implementation of projects. The objectives of
research study on time and cost overruns are as under :
a) Analyse the various ongoing road construction packages under National
Highway Development Project (NHDP) for time and cost overruns.
b) Ascertain the reasons for prevalent time and cost overruns in highway projects
and suggest suitable remedial measures to overcome the overruns.
c) Explore the relationship between various project parameters using mathematical
models and statistical techniques such as Correlation and Regression.
Apart from the questionnaire survey, statistical analysis such as correlation and
regression was carried out on the existing secondary data drawn from MOS&PI’s status
reports using SPSS computer package. Secondary data drawn from MOS&PI’s status
reports of 230 highway projects from 2008 to 2010 was extensively used for statistical
analysis for identifying as well as quantification of the various parameters responsible
for time and cost overruns. The mathematical equations between the Overruns and
project variables were developed through the regression analysis. Delay Index model
was evolved to estimate the time overruns incorporating the real time inputs given by
Project Implementation Units and the results obtained are quite encouraging.
The research findings of this study will be immensely useful to all the stake
holders in the field of highways, be it engineers, consultants, construction firms,
lending agencies or administrators from the corridors of power viz., NHAI, MORT&H,
and MOS&PI.
32
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter 2 covers the literature survey in detail covering the period since
1980. Important findings of various researchers on project delays were
depicted for the information of the reader. The survey included authors
from all over the globe and reasons for delays in construction projects
comprised from planning as well as design and construction phases.
Shortages of resources, inclement weather, frequent changes to design
and scope of work, lack of coordination between client and contractors,
unforeseen site conditions etc were mostly listed as reasons for project
delays. On the contrary, cost overruns were stated to be on account of
inflationary price rise, higher cost of land acquisition and under
estimation of the original cost. Few constructive suggestions from
parliamentary and inter ministerial committees also found a mention in
the literature survey.
Contents
2.1 Introduction 32
2.2 International Scenario 33
2.3 Time Vs Cost Overruns 34
2.4 Indian Context 35
2.5 Previous Studies 39
2.6 Proposed Study 40
2.1 Introduction
The main purpose of literature review is to give an insight into the existing
literature on the subject of research with an attempt to gauge the breadth and depth of
the research work carried so far. This is an essential pre-requisite for proceeding ahead
in search of the persistent gaps in the topic of research and ultimately to bridge the
vacuum with the new findings and so on.
33
Most of the literature reviewed emphasised the micro level project specific
factors mainly responsible for time and cost overruns. As per Rowland (1981), the
likelihood of cost overrun increased with the contract size, complexity, length of
communication channels, and distortion of information associated with larger projects.
In another study, Mansfield et al (1994) affirmed that overruns are attributed to finance
and payment arrangements, poor contract management, materials shortages, inaccurate
estimating, and overall price fluctuations. Recommendations are given on how project
management could be improved in developing countries such as Nigeria by appropriate
action being taken at both the conceptual and detailed planning stages of projects.
Wider action is further called for at both government and international level. Changes
in site conditions were identified as another major factor which must also be linked to
inadequate technical feasibility studies before project authorisation. Aibinu and
Odeyinka (1994) looked into the causes of delays and cost overruns in public highway
and building projects, and found that there was a very good agreement between the
professionals surveyed on those factors that could cause delays and cost overrun. The
four most important items agreed on by the contractor, consultants, and public clients
surveyed were the financing of and payment for completed works, poor contract
management, change in site conditions, and shortages of materials.
construction is another major problem. Many workers do not take construction work as
all year round work. They usually go back to their villages at harvest and planting
times. The scarcity of technical personnel is due to inelasticity of supply. Local
educational facilities are not sufficient to meet the demand in boom years. Non-
availability of labour during harvest season is applicable in the Indian context too.
Peter F Kaming et al (1997) concluded from the projects and project managers
surveyed that cost overruns occur more frequently and are thus a more severe problem
than time overruns on high-rise construction in Indonesia. The predominant factors
influencing time overruns/delays were stated to be design changes, poor labour
productivity, inadequate planning and resource shortages. Whereas, in the case of cost
overruns, the most important factors were found to be material cost increases due to
35
Category of Total No. Within Within Time Within Cost With Time
Project of Time and but with Cost but with and Cost
Projects Cost overrun Time overrun
overrun
Mega ( ` 10 - - - - -
billion and above)
Major ( ` 1.0 – 202 30 21 133 18
10 billion)
Medium ( ` 0.20 22 5 0 15 2
– 1.0 billion)
Total 224 35 21 148 20
As per MOS&PI (2008) status report, many of the projects have been delayed
on account of suspension of contracts and the time taken for award of fresh contracts.
This has resulted in rescheduling of large number of sections due to failure of contracts.
While the cost overruns due to general inflation cannot be avoided, the escalation on
account of delays can be minimized. The Standing Committees have been instituted in
each Ministry to review the time and cost overruns in projects and to fix responsibility
36
for making the monitoring mechanism to be effective. In general, the following reasons
have been stated to be contributing to time and cost overruns:
x Time overruns
x Changes in rates of foreign exchange and statutory duties
x High cost of environmental safeguards and rehabilitation measures
x Higher cost of land acquisition
x Change in the scope of the project
x Higher prices being quoted by the bidders in certain areas
x Under-estimation of original cost
x General price rise.
Contract Management by the Design and Project Consultants contributed to the under-
performance.
outstanding contractors, who strictly comply with the construction standards and
quality control and also complete the projects well within the targeted date, to
undertake more and more projects as incentives. Pre-Budget Economic Survey (2007)
stated that the problems in land acquisition, removal of structures, shifting of utilities
and law and order in some states are among the problems affecting the growth of the
road sector. In order to facilitate investment in infrastructure, the government will have
to ensure long-term funding with long pay back periods, for example from insurance
and pension funds. Thus, the success on the infrastructure front will be facilitated by
the development of a vibrant bond market and pension and insurance reforms. A single
unified exchange-traded market for corporate bonds would help create a mature debt
market for financing infrastructure.
The 268th Flash Report on Central Sector Projects (2008) has brought out
that in the Road Transport and Highways Sector, 93 packages have slipped in the range
of 1-12 months vis-a-vis the scenario the previous month because of the various
reasons in general such as tardy progress by the contractor, termination of contract, law
and order situation in the region and late award of contract etc. Report of the Inter-
Ministerial Committee (2009) strongly recommended major steps for restructuring and
strengthening of National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), which is the
implementing agency for the National Highway projects. Institutional mechanisms are
required to be established to address bottlenecks arising from delays in environmental
clearance, land acquisition etc. A special focus is being provided for traffic
management and safety related issues through the proposed Directorate of Safety and
Traffic Management. It is expected that the sum total of these initiatives should be able
to deliver an efficient and safe highway network across the country. In order to specify
the policy and regulatory framework on a fair and transparent basis, a Model
Concession Agreement (MCA) for PPPs in national highways has been mandated. It is
expected that this common framework, based on international best practices, will
significantly increase the pace of project award as well as ensure an optimal balance of
risk and reward among all project participants.
39
Sikdar (2010) states incomplete DPRs prepared in a great hurry due to political
interference with inadequate details in the absence of service roads, pedestrian and
cattle crossing facilities is greatly responsible for time and cost overruns. Although the
government shows its seriousness in getting private fund, there is no seriousness shown
in the rigor of the projects to be delivered within time and cost limit. He has suggested
to examine the contracting principles of awarding the work to lowest bidder ‘L1’ and
mechanisms to control the poor quality work delivered by unqualified sub-contractors.
author has carried out extensive analytical study involving overruns and reasons behind
the project delays using the primary data collected from the questionnaires and
secondary data obtained from Project Implementation Units and compiled by MOS&PI.
42
CHAPTER 3
Contents
3.1 Introduction 42
3.2 Status Report on Project Implementation 43
3.3 Regression Analysis of Time and Cost Overruns 52
3.3.1 Assumptions in Regression Analysis 57
3.3.2 Regression Analysis Computations 57
3.3.3 Test for Significance 61
3.3.4 Regression Analysis Results 63
3.4 Delay Index Model for Estimation of Time Overruns 66
3.1 Introduction
Time overrun is the difference between the actual project duration and initially
expected duration and is expressed as a percentage of initially estimated duration. Cost
overrun is measured as actual out-turn costs minus estimated costs as a percentage of
43
estimated costs. Actual costs are defined as real accounted construction costs
determined at the time of project completion. Estimated costs are defined as budgeted
or forecasted construction costs determined at the time of the decision to build [Chantal
C. Cantarelli., et al 2010]. Time and cost overruns have been a major problem affecting
the infrastructure projects in India resulting in rescheduling of large number of highway
projects. An analysis has been carried out on the various ongoing road construction
packages under National Highway Development Project (NHDP). While the cost
overruns are found to be up to 18% above original cost estimates that too within 10%
of the projects, time overruns are posing a major hindrance to project implementation.
This is evident from the startling figures of 70% of the projects entangled in time
overruns ranging from 3 to 78 months as shown at Table 3.1. It is quite evident that
though cost escalation due to general inflation cannot be avoided, the escalation on
account of delays can be minimized. The Standing Committees were instituted in each
Ministry to review the time and cost overruns in projects and to fix responsibility for
making the monitoring mechanism to be effective [MOS&PI 2008]. This chapter
analyses at length the various project parameters contributing to inordinate delays and
cost overruns in highway projects.
at Table 3.2, the package length varied from 0.48 km to as large as 136 km and cost
varied from ` 0.24 billion to ` 9.41 billion. Lalapet ROB with a length of 0.48 km is
the shortest length package costing ` 0.24 billion whereas Salem Ulundrupet Km 0.313
- 136.67 on NH 68 in Tamilnadu with an estimated cost of ` 9.41 billion was the
longest package (136 km) as well as costliest under NHDP. The average length of the
highway package was found to be 42.71 km with standard deviation of 24.6 km
amongst the total 224 highway projects and average cost turned out to be ` 2.77 billion
with standard deviation of ` 1.46 billion. An interesting thing to note at this juncture
that these 224 projects were at various stages of completion ranging from 0 % to 100%.
Std Dev
Kurtois
ion ‘n’
Skew
ness
Length
24.16
0.801
0.907
(km) 224 135 0.48 136 9437 42.13
Cost
0.883
1.217
( ` billion) 224 9.17 0.24 9.41 621.1 2.77 1.46
Cost
19.98
Overrun 224 2.19 - 0.64 1.55 9.50 0.04
0.20
3.76
( ` billion)
Progress in
-1.004
29.93
0.454
-1.035
March
25.98
0.698
2008
(months)
Time
Overrun in
21.94
1.058
0.499
Frequency distribution of project length and cost shown at Fig 3.1 and 3.2
reveals the prevailing pattern of the ongoing projects. The skewness measure the
variation of mean (horizontally) with respect to mean of normal distribution curve
whereas kurtosis measures the extent of vertical variation. Bangalore Neelamangala
road on NH4 under Phase III was completed 12 months prior to stipulated completion
schedule whereas Lucknow Kanpur highway recorded maximum time overrun of 78
months. The average progress of ongoing projects though went up from 40 % in 2008
to 65% in 2010 but at the same time maximum time overrun of 78 months noticed in
2008 registered an all time high at 98 months, thus registered an increase of 25 %. The
average time overrun of 14.82 months observed in the year 2008 went up to 32.23
months in the year 2010 i.e., registered an increase of 125 % as shown at Table 3.3,
Figs 3.3A and 3.3B. A high correlation of 0.906 was found between time overruns
reported in 2008 and 2010 amongst 156 highway projects implying that slippages in
completion schedules continues unabated and the significance value of 0.000 (< 0.05)
obtained in the correlation highlights the fact that high positive correlation is not by
mere chance. The gravity of time overruns can be gauged from the extent of delay in
many projects at a mere glance at Appendix 3. For instance, Lucknow-Kanpur section
of NH 25 stretching from km 59.5 to 75.5 listed at Srl No 1 of Appendix 3 originally
slated for completion by Dec 2001 was rescheduled for June 2008 i.e., delayed by 78
months.
Time
91 - 100
<0 0
11 – 20
21 – 30
31 – 40
41 – 50
51 – 60
61 – 70
Overrun
71 - 80
81 - 90
0 – 10
(months)
No of
Projects 4.5 29.1 22.9 19.7 3.2 6.3 7.1 5.4 0.9 0.9 - -
in %
(2008)
No of
Projects 1.3 0.6 9.0 19.9 32 11.6 6.4 4.5 6.4 3.8 3.2 1.3
in %
(2010)
47
Apart from the quantitative data viz., name of road stretch being improved to
four lane or six lane, National Highway Route No, length in kms, Date of Approval,
cost and time overruns etc, the status reports carried descriptive picture furnished by
PIUs such as reasons for delays. Broadly the causes of delay brought out by PIUs were
land acquisition, utility shifting, poor contractor performance, termination of contract,
late conclusion of contract, rains/floods, law and order problems, and delays in
approvals of bridges ROB/RUBs. While tabulating the data at Appendix 3, numeral ‘1’
was inserted under the respective columns where the project was delayed on account of
those reasons for delay. In case the column is blank, the same is treated to be zero i.e.,
unaffected. The following illustration helps in understanding the methodology adopted
in tabulation.
positive trend of reduced time overruns in the later phases may be attributed to
overcoming of the teething problems faced initially.
in 2010 (months)
Year of Approval
in 2008 (months)
Progress
Completed
Average Delay
Average Delay
No of Projects
Original Cost
above
Length (km)
Projects NHDP
90%
( ` billion)
Component
No % No %
This observation is further reinforced after having a glance at Table 3.5 showing
NHDP phase wise delays. As may be seen from Table 3.5, out of 25 highway packages
under Golden Quadrilateral, mean delay of 37 months was reported in the MOS&PI
report of 2008 and the same touched at 43 months in the year 2010. Similarly North
South and East West corridor projects have experienced drastic time overruns. The
reasons attributed for time overruns in these initial phases are mainly attributed to land
acquisition, utility shifting, poor contractor performance. Further, it may be seen from
Table 3.5 that the East West Corridor project traversing through Bihar, Uttar Pradesh
and Assam accounts for maximum delays not only due to natural calamities such as
rains and floods but also from the law and order situation.
No of Projects affected by
No of Highway
(months) [Status
(months) [Status
Delay
Delay
Contractor Poor
Late Conclusion
Land Acquisition
ROB Approvals
Law and Order
Utility Shifting
Report 2008]
Report 2010]
Rains/Floods
Performance
Termination
of Contract
of Contract
NHDP Phase
Packages
Mean
Mean
Golden
25 37 43 10 8 16 9 3 1 3
Quadrilateral
East West
79 15 23 37 20 19 2 12 28 20 2
Corridor
Phase III 26 -12 12 8
MORT&H 11 4 15 4 1 2 1 1
North South
66 12 21 17 13 14 3 4 4
Corridor
Other Roads 7 10 20 1 2
Port
8 10 21 3 3 3
Connectivity
Phase V
2 0 0
(6 Laning)
Total 224 14 32 72 44 54 17 27 29 22 9
The data given in Table 3.6 showing the provincial administrative state wise
progress of various ongoing highway construction packages incorporating crucial
51
information as average delay period and relevant causes of delay is a further testimony
to this fact. The north eastern state of Assam accounted for 90 percent of highway
projects in East West corridor delayed due to law and order. Assam also figured
prominently on the list of delayed projects owing to land acquisition, utility shifting
and rains/floods. The state of Bihar also accounted for maximum delays due to rains
and floods. Projects on North South Corridor in southern state of Tamilnadu were
reported to be affected with land acquisition and poor contractor performance as shown
at Table 3.6. The state of Orissa has recorded a massive time overruns in all the six
projects averaging at 53 months against an all India average of 32 months.
Table 3.6 State wise progress of various highway packages under NHDP
Mean
Highway Delay No of Projects affected by
Packages (months)
State/Provinc Contractor Poor
Late Conclusion
ROB Approvals
Status Report
Status Report
Cancellation
ial
Acquisition
of Contract
Contract
Shifting
Length
Administrati
Utility
Land
(km)
2008
2010
ve Unit
Cost
(`
No billion)
Assam 25 634 53.10 14 28 21 14 4 4 13 20
Andhra
14 691 43.22 3 8 1 1
Pradesh
Bihar 16 566 42.58 23 32 6 4 5 1 12 1
Chattisgarh 3 131 10.78 0 5
Delhi 2 112 6.20 15 0 1
Gujarat 8 525 34.17 14 3 4 3 1
Haryana 5 144 12.42 11 22 1 1 1 1
Jammu &
7 138 8.40 18 33 3 6 3 1 2
Kashmir
Jharkhand 1 79 3.99 42 63 1 1 1 1
Karnataka 14 527 40.93 21 28 1 1 2 3 1
Kerala 3 57 9.75 0 23 1 1
Maharastra 12 460 32.85 19 28 5 3 3
Madhya
16 821 41.77 3 16 2 2 2
Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh 36 1128 82.04 13 15 6 9 8 3 4 3
Orissa 6 274 14.39 49 53 4 5 4
Punjab 6 169 12.90 8 15 2 2
Rajasthan 15 780 51.13 8 7 7 3 9
Tamil Nadu 33 1596 108.20 6 16 13 1 12 3 7 1
West Bengal 2 58 3.40 0 47 1 1
Total 224 8890 612.22 14 32 72 44 54 17 27 29 22 9
52
The statistics on cost overruns are given at Table 3.7 and it may be seen that 20
projects were reported to have shot up over the projected cost and 16 out of these 20 are
from East West Corridor. When compared to time overruns, cost overruns appear to be
under control since number of projects affected by cost overruns remained more or less
within 10% of the projects under the monitor from 2008 to 2010, whereas the quantum
of overall cost overrun has come down from 18% in 2008 to just 1.5% in 2010 due to
upward revision to project costs in 2010.
Cost Overruns
No of Road Total
As % of
NHDP Phase Highway Length Cost Amount
No Total
Packages (km) (` billion) (` billion)
Cost
Golden
25 1054 67.80 1 0.42 0.6
Quadrilateral
East West
79 2838 210.52 16 8.87 4.2
Corridor
Phase III 26 1549 115.21 0 0 0
MORT&H 11 296 24.51 0 0 0
North South
66 2639 170.62 2 -1.34 -0.7
Corridor
Other Roads 7 450 24.43 1 1.55 6.3
Port
8 247 14.99 0 0 0
Connectivity
Phase V (6
2 149 11.52 0 0 0
Laning)
Total 224 9222 639.60 20 9.50 1.5
The monitoring agency NHAI needs to address the issue of cost overruns in EW
corridor projects through periodical reviews for effective implementation. The status of
various projects from Phase I to VII was given in Table 1.3 at chapter 1, wherein it can
be seen that all projects are lagging far behind the original completion schedules.
In these equations, X^ and Y^ denote the sample means, and Sx and Sy are
standard deviations. COVxy, the covariance between independent variable X and
dependent variable Y, measures to the extent to which X and Y are related. The
54
Correlations
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
In Mar 2008
In Mar 2010
Project Cost
(` in billion)
(` in billion)
(months)
(months)
Progress
Progress
Physical
Physical
Length
(km)
a) The error term is normally distributed. For each fixed value of X, the
distribution of Y is normal.
b) The means of all these normal distributions of Y, given X, lie on a straight line
with slope b. Regression equation is normally represented as Y = a + b.X where
Y is dependent variable, X is independent variable, a is intercept with the
vertical axis and b is slope of the regression line.
c) The mean of the error term is 0.
d) The variance of the error term is constant. This variance does not depend on the
values assumed by X.
e) The error terms are uncorrelated. In other words, the observations have been
drawn independently.
variables in a causal sense. Regression analysis is concerned with the nature and degree
of association between variables and does not imply or assume any causality. Multiple
regression involves a single dependent variable and two or more independent variables.
Step wise regression analysis was carried out with time overrun as dependent variable
and project length and cost as independent variables. The purpose of step wise
regression is to select the relevant variables which account for most of the variation.
The predictor variable ‘Length’ was removed by the SPSS computer program in the
backward elimination as shown at Table 3.10 since variation in Length did not account
for any substantial variation in the Time Overrun owing to significance value 0.859 >
acceptable value of 0.05. Thus the analysis is carried out as bi-variate regression with
Time Overrun as dependent variable and Project Cost as independent variable.
Excluded Variablesb
Collinearity
Partial Statistics
Model Beta In t Sig. Correlation Tolerance
a
1 Length km .016 .177 .859 .012 .499
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Project Cost ` in billion
b. Dependent Variable: Time Overrun in Mar2008 months
the regression line is not fully accounted for. The vertical distance from the point to the
line is the error. The distances of all the points from the line are squared and added
together to arrive at the sum of squared errors. In fitting the line, the least squares
procedure minimizes the sum of squared errors. The best fitting line is called the
regression of Y on X, because the vertical distances are minimized. In a fit line, the
data points are fitted to a line that usually does not pass through all of the data points.
The fit line represents the trend of the data. Some fit lines are regression based. Others
are based on iterative weighted least squares. Fit lines apply to scatterplots. One can
create fit lines for all of the data values on a chart or for the data values in groups,
depending on what one selects when one creates the fit line. The scatter diagram
indicates whether the relationship between Y and X can be modeled as a straight line
and, consequently, whether the bivariate regression model is appropriate.
decided to assess the relative importance of the predictor variable i.e., project cost
through cross validation by splitting the data on the basis of year of approval. Cross
validation further ensures whether the regression model continues to hold good on
comparable data. As may be seen from the cross validation exercise carried out at Table
3.11, coefficient of determination ‘r2’ of split data based on the year of approval varied
from -28% to +26% of that of the total data for 230 odd projects establishing the
coherence of data.
Coefficient of
Significance ‘α’
Sample Size ‘n’
Determination
Correlation
Approval
Remarks
(2 tailed)
factor
Year
S No
‘r2’
‘r’
It may be noted that Time Overrun is taken as dependent variable and project
cost as independent or predictor variable. As per the regression coefficients generated
by SPSS computer program output as shown at Table 3.12, intercept (Constant)
represented as ‘a’ is calculated as 26.852 and slope of the line (b) has been arrived as
minus 4.407.
The statistical significance of the linear relationship between project cost and
time overruns can be tested by t test. The null hypothesis implies that there is no linear
relationship between project cost and time overruns. On the contrary, the alternate
hypothesis is that there is a relationship, positive or negative. The standard error (SE b)
is estimated as 0.767 as shown at Table 3.12 and the value of t statistic, t = b/SE b = -
4.407 / 0.767 = - 5.745. Since the size of population (n) is 230, degree of freedom is n –
2 = 228. From ‘t’ table, the critical value of t with 228 degrees of freedom and α = 0.05
(95 % confidence level) is 1.971 for a two tailed test. Since the calculated value of t
(5.745) is larger than the critical value ascertained from t table, the null hypothesis is
rejected. Hence there is a significant linear relationship between time overruns and
project cost. Though the model is acceptable, the low coefficient of correlation (r)
which is minus 0.356 indicates a feeble relation. The coefficient of determination (r sq
Linear) is 0.127 as shown in Fig 3.5, which underlines the fact that only 12% of the
variation in time overruns is explained by this model. Another reason for low value of
‘r’ is wide spread variation between various states geographically spread out in a vast
country like India, often referred to as Indian subcontinent. The regression equations
derived for each state as reproduced at Table 3.13 is a testimony to the gross disparity
amongst the states.
Regression Equation Y = a ± b X
of
pertaining to
Significance
State
b = slope of regression line
Coeff
Data
Regression Equation Y = a ± b X
of
pertaining to
Significance
Y = Time Overrun TOR (in months)
Correlation
a = Constant (Ordinate value)
(2 tailed)
State
b = slope of regression line
Coeff
Data X = Cost of highway project ( ` in crore)
‘α’
‘r’
[Conversion factor : 1 crore = 10 million]
Andhra 2008 TOR = 12.779 – 0.031 x Cost 0.477 0.085
Pradesh 2010 TOR = 32.941 – 0.075 x Cost 0.617 0.077
2008 TOR = 66.356 – 0.161 x Cost 0.672 0.004
Bihar
2010 TOR = 77.822 – 0.150 x Cost 0.585 0.028
Chattisgarh Computation not possible due to fewer than 2 data sets. Hence
Delhi relationship could not be established since data only for single project.
2008 TOR = 24.518 – 0.024 x Cost 0.167 0.692
Gujarat
2010 TOR = 6.092 – 0.005 x Cost 0.054 0.899
2008 TOR = 25.819 – 0.015 x Cost 0.110 0.890
Haryana
2010 TOR = 264.185 – 2.185 x Cost 1.000 0.000
Jammu and 2008 TOR = 12.315 + 0.051 x Cost 0.148 0.752
Kashmir 2010 TOR = 33.405 + 0.050 x Cost 0.832 0.112
2008 Computation not possible due to fewer than 2 data sets.
Jharkhand 2010 Hence relationship could not be established due to existence
of data only for a single project.
2008 TOR = 56.024 – 0.117 x Cost 0.639 0.014
Karnataka
2010 TOR = 83.483 – 0.136 x Cost 0.730 0.017
2008 Statistics could not be completed since TOR = 0, in all the
Kerala three cases.
2010 TOR = 46.971 – 0.074 x Cost 0.907 0.277
2008 TOR = 36.679 – 0.072 x Cost 0.594 0.054
Maharastra
2010 TOR = 54.508 – 0.076 x Cost 0.701 0.035
Madhya 2008 TOR = 8.322 – 0.017 x Cost 0.506 0.054
Pradesh 2010 TOR = 23.858 – 0.011 x Cost 0.154 0.632
Uttar 2008 TOR = 32.111 – 0.039 x Cost 0.250 0.142
Pradesh 2010 TOR = 51.523 – 0.050 x Cost 0.293 0.139
2008 TOR = 75.770 -0.123 x Cost 0.790 0.111
Orissa
2010 TOR = 70.954 + 0.030 x Cost 0.458 0.697
2008 TOR = 70.479 – 0.221 x Cost 0.736 0.156
Punjab
2010 TOR = 44.986 – 0.086 x Cost 0.340 0.660
2008 TOR = 23.567 – 0.046 x Cost 0.620 0.014
Rajasthan
2010 TOR = 80.421 – 0.225 x Cost 0.922 0.078
2008 TOR = 14.782 – 0.026 x Cost 0.379 0.030
Tamil Nadu
2010 TOR = 21.497 – 0.018 x Cost 0.181 0.305
West 2008 TOR = 33.226 – 0.121 x Cost 0.445 0.376
Bengal 2010 TOR = 13.315 + 0.105 x Cost 0.435 0.565
63
Except for few states like Assam, Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Tamilnadu and West
Bengal, correlation coefficient ‘r’ appears to be reasonably acceptable. From statistical
point of view, correlation coefficient is preferred to be above 0.600 with confidence
level of 95% i.e., significance value ‘α’ ≤ 0.05. In the state of Jammu and Kashmir,
though the value of r is as high as 0.832, the significance value ‘α’ being 0.112
indicates that time overruns predicted by the regression equation falls outside the
generally acceptable 95% confidence level i.e., confidence level of 88.8% {(1.000 –
0.112) x 100}. Further it may be seen from the equation (1) arrived through regression
analysis as shown at paragraph 3.3.2 that time overrun is inversely proportional to
project cost implying larger the project in size and cost, lesser the time overruns. As per
the equation Time Overrun (in months) = 26.852 - 4.407 x Project Cost, project will not
experience any time overrun if project cost is ` 6 billion as shown at Table 3.14.
This argument stands logically true since larger project demands joint ventures
and conglomerates bringing in the expertise and knowhow, thus chances of success
rates for project completion also goes up. Bigger or more expensive projects also
experience less cost overruns when compared to less expensive projects probably
because bigger projects often have international consultants and longer planning and
evaluations. On similar lines, the equations for other parameters were derived from the
regression analysis. The same are reproduced at Table 3.15. It may be seen that
amongst the regression equations established at Table 3.15, time overruns of 2010 vs
2008 are closely related with the coefficient of correlation at 0.906 highlighting the fact
that project once delayed is bound to get further delayed, thus the necessity for close
monitoring from the very beginning of the project. As regards to cost overruns, the very
low values of r and r2 at 0.116 and 0.014 respectively coupled with significance value
of 0.076 (> 0.05) for confidence level of 95% literally rules out any meaningful
correlation with project cost.
64
As shown at Table 3.16, the correlation matrix of cost overruns with other
parameters such as project length, cost, physical progress and expenditure highlights
the low values of correlation coefficient ruling out any substantial relationships.
Notwithstanding the poor correlation of cost overruns, regression equations were
established in the affected states of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh
and Rajastan and reproduced at Table 3.17. A perfect positive correlation with the
value of correlation coefficient as ‘1’ and significance as ‘0’ was established for the
state of Haryana. Apart from Haryana, meaningful relation could be established for
Rajasthan alone. While data pertaining to Uttar Pradesh has produced high coefficient
of correlation, the higher value of significance deters its application for any meaningful
results on cost overruns.
65
Percentage
Percentage
Prog 2008
Prog 2010
Mar 2007
Dec 2007
Overrun
Project
Project
Length
Expdr
Expdr
Cost
Cost
Cost Pearson
1 .259 .144 -.150 .112 .382* .386*
Overrun Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .175 .457 .445 .649 .041 .038
n 29 29 29 28 19 29 29
Project Pearson ** **
1 .779 -.175 -.085 .517 .794**
Cost Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .372 .728 .004 .000
n 29 29 28 19 29 29
Project Pearson
1 -.011 -.053 .625** .757**
Length Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .955 .830 .000 .000
n 29 28 19 29 29
Percentage Pearson
1 .655** -.066 -.209
Prog 2008 Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .738 .286
n 28 18 28 28
Percentage Pearson
1 .072 -.051
Prog 2010 Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .768 .836
n 19 19 19
Expdr Pearson
1 .800**
Mar 2007 Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
n 29 29
Expdr Pearson
1
Dec 2007 Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
n 29
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
66
Regression Equation
Coeff of Correlation
Data pertaining to Y=a±bX
Y = Cost Overrun ( ` in crore)
Significance ‘α’
a = Constant (Ordinate value)
State
b = slope of regression line
(2 tailed)
X = Cost of highway project
( ` in crore)
‘r’
[Conversion factor : 1 crore = 10 million]
Andhra 2008 Y = 12.120 – 5.596 x Cost 0.295 0.705
Pradesh
Gujarat 2008 Y = 247.402 – 0.488 x Cost 0.539 0.269
Haryana 2008 Y = - 24.912 + 0.324 x Cost 1.000 0.000
Uttar 2008 Y = 78.903 – 0.338 x Cost 0.669 0.533
Pradesh
Rajasthan 2008 Y = - 61.192 + 0.302 x Cost 0.779 0.005
All India 2008 Y = 3.697 + 0.092 x Cost 0.259 0.175
Before going into the model suggested by the author for quantifying delay, it is
noteworthy to mention about the previous studies carried out on this subject. Ayman H
Al-Momani of Jordan (2000) has tried to establish a relation between actual time vs
planned time of construction projects. He had developed a simple linear regression
equation categorizing the projects as housing, office and administrative building,
school projects, medical centers and communication facilities. Though the various
statistical coefficients were satisfying 99% confidence level, the author has himself
admitted that the model failed to include intrinsic variables such as construction
experience of the contractors. More over, this model serves as a post mortem analysis
since actual construction time is required to perform the analysis, thus useful only for
completed projects. Ram Singh’s study (2010) is aimed at covering all the
infrastructure sectors in India. He had made an attempt to evolve a general purpose
simultaneous equation for time overruns incorporating technical and natural factors,
contractual failures and economic factors. Though the model is exhaustive covering the
entire infrastructure sector, it has failed to explain the reasons for superior performance
of certain states.
67
Land Acquisition
Contractor Poor
Contractor Poor
Late Conclusion
Late Conclusion
ROB Approvals
ROB Approvals
Termination of
Termination of
Utility Shifting
Utility Shifting
Law & Order
Rains/Floods
Performance
Rains/Floods
State/
of Contract
of Contract
Contract
Contract
Administrat
ive Unit
Total (6)
Total (2)
Total (3)
Total (4)
Total (5)
Total (7)
Total (8)
Total (9)
(2) /
(3) /
(4) /
(5) /
(6) /
(7) /
(8) /
(9) /
Andhra Pradesh
1 1 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jammu &
3 6 3 1 2 0.042 0.136 0.056 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.222
kashmir
Utility Shifting
Utility Shifting
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Rains/Floods
Rains/Floods
Performance
Performance
Termination
Termination
of Contract
of Contract
Acquisition
Acquisition
Contractor
Contractor
Approvals
Approvals
Contract
Contract
Land
Land
ROB
ROB
Poor
Poor
Late
Late
State/
Administrati
ve Unit
Total (2)
Total (3)
Total (4)
Total (5)
Total (6)
Total (7)
Total (8)
Total (9)
(1)
(2) /
(3) /
(4) /
(5) /
(8) /
(6) /
(7) /
(9) /
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Madhya
2 2 2 0.028 0.045 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pradesh
Total 72 44 54 17 27 29 22 9
Based on the weightages so calculated, Delay Index was evaluated for each
highway project as shown at Appendix 3. To start with the Lucknow-Kanpur Section of
the National Highway NH 25 between km 59.5 to 75.5 as shown at Serial No 1 in
Appendix 3, the project was stated to be delayed on account of poor contractor
performance and termination of contract. From Table 3.18, the corresponding
weightages for these delay factors are 0.148 and 0.176 and when these weightages are
summed up, we get Delay Index as 0.324 for this stretch of Lucknow-Kanpur highway
Km 59.5 to 75.5. Similarly Delay Indices were calculated and inserted for all the 224
highway projects listed in Appendix 3. As seen from the Appendix 3, Delay Index (DI)
was shown as zero for as many as 101 projects where PIUs have not intimated any
reasons for delay. The value of Delay Index varied from 0.0278 to 1.9672. With the
help of computer assisted software SPSS, Regression Analysis was carried out to
ascertain the relation between the calculated Delay Index and the time overruns. The
relationship so determined between Delay Index and time overruns using linear
regression technique is depicted at Table 3.19.
69
Table 3.19 Established Relationship between Delay Index and Time Overruns
Regression Equation Y = a + b X
of
Correlation
Significanc
pertaining
Y = Time Overrun TOR (in months)
(2 tailed)
State a = Ordinate (constant)
Coeff
Data b = slope of regression line
e ‘α’
‘r’
to
X = Delay Index (DI) of highway project
2008 TOR = 11.575 + 1.595 x DI 0.121 0.547
Assam
2010 TOR = 27.969 + 2.475 x DI 0.121 0.583
Andhra 2008 TOR = 0.846 + 454.772 x DI 0.946 0.000
Pradesh 2010 TOR = 8.750 + 585.383 x DI 0.950 0.000
2008 TOR = 47.402 – 59.648 x DI 0.583 0.018
Bihar
2010 TOR = 71.258 – 82.219 x DI 0.661 0.010
Chattisgarh Computation not possible due to fewer than 2 data sets. Hence relationship
Delhi could not be established due to data only for single project.
2008 TOR = - 0.884 + 168.67 x DI 0.919 0.001
Gujarat
2010 TOR = - 0.513 + 48.902 x DI 0.398 0.329
2008 TOR = 5.808 + 568.629 x DI 0.706 0.294
Haryana
2010 TOR = - 4.996 + 1106.122 x DI 0.982 0.121
Jammu and 2008 TOR = 35.049 – 73.117 x DI 0.633 0.127
Kashmir 2010 TOR = 64.200 – 108.053 x DI 0.807 0.053
Computation not possible due to fewer than 2 data sets. Hence relationship
Jharkhand
could not be established due to data only for single project.
2008 TOR = 16.585 + 21.509 x DI 0.071 0.835
Karnataka
2010 TOR = 15.647 + 132.564 x DI 0.567 0.185
2008 Statistics could not be completed since TOR = 0, in all the three
Kerala cases.
2010 TOR = 12.500 + 407.503 x DI 0.991 0.087
2008 TOR = 8.088 + 527.018 x DI 0.785 0.004
Maharastra
2010 TOR = 26.723 + 487.571 x DI 0.695 0.038
Madhya 2008 TOR = 2.846 + 51.259 x DI 0.485 0.067
Pradesh 2010 TOR = 18.643 – 169.020 x DI 0.558 0.025
Uttar 2008 TOR = 11.167 + 45.408 x DI 0.476 0.003
Pradesh 2010 TOR = 25.907 + 50.407 x DI 0.497 0.008
2008 TOR = 30.476 + 75.077 x DI 0.732 0.098
Orissa
2010 TOR = - 5.494 + 231.442 x DI 0.986 0.000
2008 TOR = 3 + 218.579 x DI 0.922 0.026
Punjab
2010 TOR = 14.5 + 198.087 x DI 0.980 0.020
2008 TOR = 7.5 + 28.263 x DI 0.050 0.859
Rajasthan
2010 TOR = 9.75 – 247.945 x DI 0.241 0.386
2008 TOR = 1.256 – 0.439 x DI 0.018 0.953
Tamil Nadu
2010 TOR = 36.46 – 35.644 x DI 0.602 0.153
2008 TOR = 4.5 + 316.947 x DI 0.558 0.250
West Bengal
2010 TOR = 17.5 + 200.517 x DI 0.330 0.523
70
It may be noted that the unit of Delay Index is mere number whereas time
overrun is assessed in months. From the Table 3.19, it may be noted that strong
correlation existed between Delay index and time overruns as evident from the high
value of coefficient of correlation ‘r’ except for few states such as Assam and
Rajasthan. The significance value ‘α’ indicates the confidence level with which the
results can be predicted i.e., α = 0.01 and 0.05 signifies confidence level of 99% and
95% respectively. From statistical point of view, correlation coefficient is preferred to
be above 0.600 with confidence level of 95%. In the case of 3 states viz., Chattisgarh,
Delhi and Jharkhand, computation was not possible due to fewer than 2 data sets and
relationship could not be established due to existence of data only for a single project.
The basic input given by PIUs on the delay factors need to be substituted to arrive at
Delay Index based on the weightages given in Table 3.18. The proposed model is
simple to understand as explained in the following illustration.
Since the project is located in Andhra Pradesh and the reason for slow progress
being poor performance of the contractor, the weightage for delay factor as per Table
3.18 is 0.019. For this lone delay factor, Delay Index = 0.019. Referring to Table 3.19,
71
As seen from the above illustration, time overrun ascertained through Delay
Index model adopting regression technique is more or less coinciding with the ground
data. Further it may be noted that time overrun assessed by PIU based on ground data
in practice can vary. Since the input is taken as per PIU data, the model can be stated to
reflect the accurate ground conditions. But it suffers from the limitation that
computation is not possible in case of lack of data or paucity of information from PIUs.
Moreover the gravity of the delay factors cannot be assessed in the absence of any such
information from PIUs. This shortcoming can be overcome if PIUs are asked to share
the information on delay factors as well as their intensity in the form of certain ranking
on linear rating scale. Further no significant relationship between Delay Index and
Time Overruns could be established on all India basis for all the 224 projects since
correlation coefficient ‘r’ was just 0.109 with significance value ‘α’ of 0.104, thus
implying no uniformity amongst the states. However, the model suggested in this study
has a scope for improvement if data on delay factors can be further elaborated by PIUs
in terms of intensity of delay factors and also bringing out the reasons for delay where
PIUs have left blank for as many as 101 projects. The time overruns on various
ongoing projects have been assessed based on Delay Index model as well as regression
equations developed on the basis of Project Cost as shown at Table 3.13 are tabulated
at Appendix 3A. In majority of the cases, time overruns arrived based on DI and
Project Cost are more or less matching and not much variation is noticed. Further these
overruns may not be sacrosanct and only serves as an estimate which can alert the
officials for concentrating on those projects with high time overruns. The author’s
paper titled “Estimation of Time Overruns on National Highway Development
Project using Regression Analysis” has been published in the reputed journal Indian
Highways, Indian Road Congress (IRC) Journal, Sep 2014, pp 31-45.
72
CHAPTER 4
Contents
4.1 Introduction 73
4.2 Pre-Construction Activities 78
4.2.1 Land Acquisition 78
4.2.1.1 Legislations on Land Acquisition 79
4.2.1.2 Land Acquisition on NHDP 81
4.2.1.3 Micro Level Organizational Problems 85
4.2.1.4 Government’s Initiatives on Land Acquisition 87
4.2.2 Shifting of Utilities 88
4.2.2.1 Contractual Provisions 90
73
4.1 Introduction
Worldwide, cost and time overruns on highway projects are critical issues that
adversely affect project delivery and public relations, and disrupts highway programs.
Cost and time overruns generally result from factors that occur at various phases of the
project life cycle [Abhishek Bhargava et al, 2010]. Construction delays are for the most
74
part costly, and completing projects on time is beneficial to all project parties.
Therefore, it is essential to identify the actual causes of delay in order to minimize and
avoid the delays and their corresponding expenses [Abd El-Razek et al, 2008]. Delays
give rise to disruptions of work and loss of productivity, late completion of project,
increased time related costs, and third party claims and abandonment or termination of
contract. Construction projects involve more variables and uncertainties than in the
product line. This factor increases the probability of delay occurrences in construction
projects and makes effective management important to reduce the diversions from the
original program [Rahman et al, 2006].
Out of 224 highway projects listed in the MOS&PI’s status report of March
2008, 148 projects were affected by time overruns and another 20 projects were stated
to plagued by time as well as cost overruns. A significant number of projects were
found delayed due to rains/floods and law and order situation. Delays in approvals for
ROBs, design changes to structures and their delayed completion are also stated to be
few important factors. Projects were reported to be delayed on account of tree felling in
an about dozen cases. In six odd cases, the projects were complete except for critical
structures such as bridges on the water gaps thus practically remained incomplete. One
court case, 4 Nos encroachments and 12 tree felling cases were also reported by Project
Implementing Units (PIUs) as reasons for delay in completion of projects. These
factors responsible for delays are discussed in detail in the succeeding paragraphs.
75
The questionnaire survey carried out by the author has revealed various
interesting results as shown at Table 4.2. The results of questionnaire survey as
tabulated at Table 4.2 also puts the preconstruction activities and delays in various
approvals on the top of the list of factors responsible for time overruns. Delays in
Project Approvals, requisite clearances from concerned Ministries as Railways for
ROB/RUBs, MOEF for forest clearance etc were the second most important factor
followed by poor response from concessionaires and shifted priorities of the
government of the day. Law and order also figured quite high on the agenda of the
respondents to the questionnaire owing to the fact that nearly one third of the NHDP
falls in the naxal infested red corridor area.
Importance
Weightage
Weightage
Aggregate
Relative
Factor
Factor
Rank
Completion Schedules
Index
Score
Total
Significance
Cumulative
Importance
Weightage
Weightage
Aggregate
Reasons for Slippage in
Relative
Relative
Factor
Factor
Rank
Completion Schedules
Index
Score
Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Delays in Project Approvals,
requisite clearances from concerned
14.74 31.58 76.36 Significant
2 Ministries as Railways for 252
% % %
ROB/RUBs, MOEF for forest
clearance etc.
Poor response from Concessionaires
to take up projects on BOT (Toll and
11.58 43.16 60.00 Significant
3 Annuity) basis and in that eventuality 198
% % %
inadequacy of funds to get the work
on EPC mode.
Change of guard at the highest
echelons of governance from NDA to
10.88 54.04 56.36 Significant
4 UPA of 2004 - 09 leading to shifted 186
% % %
priorities from highways to rural
development
With 70 odd districts often referred as
red corridor affected by naxalism and
a couple of border states such as J&K
10.88 64.91 56.36 Significant
4 and Assam infected with 186
% % %
insurgency/militancy, law and order
has taken a significant toll on
progress of highway projects.
Delays in preparation of Detailed
Project Reports (DPRs) incorporating 74.74 50.91 Significant
5 168 9.82%
feasibility studies, traffic projections % %
and revenues etc
Contracting Principles of awarding
the work to ‘L1’ alone, thus inferior
84.56 50.91
5 and overloaded contractors unable to 168 9.82% Significant
% %
undertake the gigantic workload of
NHDP leading to inordinate delays.
Lack of supporting infrastructure/
equipment bank such as construction 93.33 45.45
6 150 8.77% Insignificant
machinery, hot mix plants, % %
specialized subcontractors etc.
Rains and floods on annual pattern in
100 34.55
7 some parts or the other have affected 114 6.67% Insignificant
% %
the highway construction
G/Total 1710
Note : (i) Rank at Col (1) is based on the total score at Col (3)
(ii) Total Aggregate Score at Col (3) = Sum total of ratings assigned by all the
78
The various causes of delays along with suggested remedial measures have been
discussed under the following subheads :
A) Pre-construction Activities – Land Acquisition, Utility Shifting, Detailed Project
Reports (DPRs), Financing Mechanism.
B) Construction Phase – Contractual problems, Capacity Constraints, Rains/Floods,
Design Changes/Critical Structures Delayed, Law and Order situation.
C) Post Mortem Analysis – Policy Decisions, Cross Continental Experiences.
Much of the progress on the road construction will depend on how rapidly the
constraints such as delays in land acquisition, clearances from State Forest and
Pollution Control Board (PCB), removal of structures and shifting of utilities are
removed so that the stage is set for construction.
Land acquisition more than any other factor is the most important constraint on
development and especially in infrastructure development [Sebastian Morris and Ajay
Pandey 2007]. Land is not only a precious asset in an agrarian economy like India, but
it carries an emotional and sentimental value. No individual likes to get displaced from
his native origins especially during forcible evictions required for developmental
activities such as construction of dams and reservoirs, highways, industries etc. The
history of land acquisition right from the dawn of independence is riddled with
political, economic and social implications requiring massive interference from
parliament, executive as well as judiciary. Historical Perspective of Land Acquisition
79
which has recorded a massive confrontation between legislature and executive on the
one hand and judiciary on the other hand in the fight for individual liberties versus
broader social justice encompassing the society as a whole has been elaborated in detail
at Appendix 4. Though the debate on the powers of the Government to acquire the land
for public purpose is a settled issue, aspects relating to compensation, litigation and
prolonged delays in the process of acquisition is a matter of serious concern. The
quantum of land acquisition is unprecedented for National Highway Development
Project (NHDP) works since about 8300 hectares required for the Golden Quadrilateral
alone and another 19000 hectares for NSEW corridor. Further the criticality of timely
acquisition of land can be gauged from the obligatory clause from Model Concession
Agreement on BOT projects for handing over the land for construction purposes,
reproduced as under :
“The site shall be made available to the concessionaire pursuant hereto by
NHAI free from all encumbrances and occupations and without the concessionaire
being required to make any payment to NHAI on account of any costs, expenses and
charges for the use of such site for the duration of the concession period save and
except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement. NHAI shall procure for the
Concessionaire access to the site, free of encumbrances, not later than 150 (one
hundred and fifty) days from the date of this Agreement. Provided, however, that if
NHAI does not enable such access to any part or parts of the site for any reason other
than a Force Majeure Event or breach of this Agreement by the Concessionaire, NHAI
shall pay to the Concessionaire damages at the rate of ` 1000 (Rupees one thousand)
per month per 1000 (one thousand) sq. meters or part thereof if such area is required by
the Concessionaire for Construction Works. Such damages shall be raised to ` 2000
(Rupees two thousand) per month after Commercial Operations Date (COD) if such
area is essential for the smooth and efficient operation of the Project Highway”.
The Land acquisition Act, 1894 was enacted for the purpose of compulsorily
acquiring of land required for public purpose or for purpose of companies and for
determination of the amount of compensation to be paid on account of such acquisition
[Jagannadha Rao 2002]. The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 is a legal Act in India
80
which allows the Government of India to acquire any land in the country. “Land
Acquisition” literally means acquiring of land for some public purpose by
government/government agency, as authorised by the law, from the individual
landowner(s) after paying a government fixed compensation in lieu of losses incurred
by land owner(s) due to surrendering of his/their land to the concerned government
agency [LA Act 1894]. After independence in 1947, the Indian Government adopted
“Land Acquisition Act 1894” as a tool for land acquisition. Since then various
amendments have been made to the 1894 act from time to time. Despite these
amendments, the administrative procedures have remained same thus quite often
coming under severe criticism due to lengthy process of LA.
The National Highways Act 1956 is an act to provide for the declaration of
certain highways to be national highways and for matters connected therewith. National
Highway Act 1956 was employed for acquisition of land for widening of various
highways under NHDP. The various clauses pertaining to land acquisition under this
act such as power to acquire land, survey, hearing of objections, declaration of
acquisition, power to take possession, determination of amount payable as
compensation, deposit and payment of amount etc makes this enactment a powerful
tool with the highway administrators. The competent authority under National
Highways Act has certain powers of civil court and Land Acquisition Act of 1894 shall
not apply in the context of highways [NH Act 1956]. Acquisition of land for highways
under the ambit of National Highways Act, 1956 has advantages such as time taken in
land acquisition is much less as compared to the LA Act, purpose of acquisition can’t
be challenged and preliminary works as survey, dig/bore work and setting out
boundaries can be commenced immediately on notification without waiting for
declaration, land is considered acquired on issuance of declaration under sec 3D,
arbitration process to address compensation related grievances, and acquisition cannot
be referred to the courts. At the same time, NH Act 1956 suffers from few limitations
viz., revenue authorities not familiar with NH Act and land records not updated causing
inherent delays in the LA process, delay in award of compensation by competent
authorities, inadequate institutional framework at the state level, difficult to transfer LA
81
Significant if Cumulative Factor Weightage at Column (5) is within 80% (or) Relative
Importance Index at Column (6) is above 50% confirming to minimum bench mark
criterion. Hence pragmacity lies in managing those significant factors and leaving
insignificant ones.
Table 4.3 Delays on account of Land Acquisition
Significance
Cumulative
Importance
Weightage
Weightage
Aggregate
Causes of Delay on Land Acquisition
Relative
Relative
Factor
Factor
Index
Score
Front
Rank
Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Removal of encroachments, which
1 252 8.47% 8.47% 76% Significant
quite often take political colours
Delayed resettlement and rehabilitation
1 252 8.47% 16.94% 76% Significant
of Affected Populace (APs)
Fixing of compensation amount on
lower side due to fear of vigilance Significant
1 252 8.47% 25.40% 76%
department, thus compelling the
affected populace to go to court of law.
Disputes in assessment of
Significant
2 compensation amount for acquired 246 8.27% 33.67% 75%
land
Stricter Forest Laws and tedious Significant
3 234 7.86% 41.53% 71%
Environmental Clearences
Resistance by land holders especially Significant
3 234 7.86% 49.40% 71%
in tribal and remote areas
Corruption and extensive delays in Significant
4 228 7.66% 57.06% 69%
disbursing of compensation amount
Non availability or incomplete land Significant
4 228 7.66% 64.72% 69%
records
Lack of commitment from land Significant
5 192 6.45% 71.17% 58%
revenue record holders
Insufficient or ill trained survey staff Significant
6 186 6.25% 77.42% 56%
preparing land details
Lengthy acquisition procedures as per Significant
6 186 6.25% 83.67% 56%
LA or NH Acts
Non Passage of LA Amendment Bill Significant
6 186 6.25% 89.92% 56%
(2007) in the Parliament
Insignifica
7 Frequent changes to alignment 162 5.44% 95.36% 49%
nt
Acquisition of land much beyond Insignifica
8 138 4.64% 100.0% 42%
actual requirement citing future needs nt
G/Total 2976
Note : (i) Rank at Col (1) is based on the total score at Col (3)
(ii) Total Aggregate Score at Col (3) = Sum total of ratings assigned by all the respondents to the
questionnaire as per the following response scale : 5 - Highly critical factor; 4 - Critical factor; 3 -
Important factor; 2 - Significant factor; 1 - Not so important factor; 0 - No Significance at all
83
(iii) Relative Factor Weightage at Col (4) = {Total Score at Col (3) / G Total of Col (3) i.e., 2976}
x 100
(iv) Cumulative Factor Weightage at Col (5) = Cumulative value of Col (4)
(v) Relative Importance Index at Col (6) = [{Col (3)}/{Highest Response Scale i.e., 5 x N}] x 100,
where N = no of respondents to the questionnaire i.e., 66 in the instant case.
(vi) Significance at Col (7) = Significant if Cumulative Factor Weightage at Col (5) is within 80%
(or) Relative Importance Index at Col (6) is above 50% confirming to minimum bench mark
criterion.
Stricter forest laws and tedious environmental clearences were also stated to be
an important reason for delays in the implementation of many highway projects.
Judicial intervention has also further strengthened the case for green cover. There have
been some cases recently, where the Supreme Court of India has intervened and have
forced the government to make changes in laws [Mohammed Arif et al., 2009].
Environmental Impact Assessment has been made mandatory for all projects costing
more than ` 1 billion and the period for obtaining requisite forest clearences is very
time consuming. Infact, Ministry of Road Transport has filed a case on Environment
84
Ministry in the highest court of the country for impeding highway projects by
Environment Ministry. Procedures envisaging Environmental and Forest Clearences are
covered under Appendix 6. Review meetings at cabinet secretary level have become a
regular practice now with the Government of India to sort out all the important issues
involving various ministries. It usually takes 12-14 months to obtain clearance under
the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, for acquiring forest land required for rural road
projects. This is a major implementation constraint in hill states like Uttarakhand,
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir as well as in Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh,
Orissa and Maharashtra. Many developmental schemes could not be implemented
because of Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Steps should be taken to amend the related
laws immediately. While determining the parameters in this regard, the available forest
cover in the state and its present economic and social status should be kept in mind. It
is also suggested to use degraded forest land for compensatory afforestation. The states
which have more forest cover than the national average should be given special
financial assistance for preservation and conservation of forests [Madhu Koda 2007].
In order to ensure that forest clearance is available by the time projects are
ready for execution, States have been advised to initiate pro-active upfront action for
seeking forest clearances as soon as survey commences for preparation of Detailed
Project Reports (DPRs). State Governments are, therefore, requested to review the
process and procedure of formulating proposals for obtaining forest clearance with a
view to compressing this time frame [DARPG 2008]. The Indian government’s
ambitious target of building 20 km national highway per day is becoming difficult to
achieve in the event of refusal by few states like UP, Gujarat, Delhi, Tamil Nadu and
J&K to sign the State Support Agreement (SSA) which is an umbrella pact that calls for
all necessary support from the State Governments in the matters of land acquisition,
providing right of way (ROW), removal of encroachments, shifting of utilities,
rehabilitation and maintaining local law and order and so on. In the absence of SSA,
NHAI has to approach states for approval of each and every project. The reason stated
by these states for not signing the agreement is the existence of a provision in SSA that
stops states from building competing roads. Uttar Pradesh, for example, is working on
several expressways that run parallel to projects planned by NHAI. The paradigm shift
85
to Public Private Partnership (PPP) mode for future development of highways does not
absolve the Government of its basic responsibilities for creating conducive investment
environment.
Digitisation of revenue maps and data though it takes a quite a lot of effort, time
and expenditure is a worthy exercise for all the times to come. Difficulty in transferring
of land acquisition plans on ground has also been reported at many locations in the
absence of updated revenue records and the solution to this vexed issue lies in extensive
employment of Geographic Information System (GIS) duly supported by satellite
imagery. GIS based Satellite Imagery is proposed to be implemented by NHAI on a
pilot project of 1200 km covering country’s far flung areas. Pilot project to be part of
updating existing GIS and web based Road Information System (RIS) of 7,000 km
which is available on NHAI website. The envisaged benefits would be better
management of ongoing works by verification and authentication of ground progress.
In the case of new projects, GIS based satellite imagery can be used for route alignment
and fixation as per feasibility report/ DPR submitted by consultant; correct provisioning
and location of costly structures such as RUB/ ROB/ flyover etc; and land acquisition,
shifting of utilities, identification of forest area, encroachments etc [MORT&H 2011].
Further, institutional framework at the state level should be modernised and inter-
departmental coordination should be improved for inducing accountability. The dealing
staff should be made familiar with Land Acquisition and National Highway Acts and
the same can be achieved through seminars, refresher courses and departmental
examinations linking to their annual increments so as to create awareness as well as
seriousness towards their job. On all important assignments such as NHDP works,
extensive delegation of powers to ground executives should be considered where ever
delays are expected in the issuance of declaration by the concerned secretary to the
state government or his authorised official in the Secretariat. All these measures are
intended to avoid delays in the entire land acquisition proceedings from the notification
stage till its culmination in making the award, disbursement of compensation amount to
affected parties and taking possession of the acquired land.
87
It was revealed from Table 4.1 that majority of the projects were delayed due to
land acquisition and moreover time overruns noticed in land acquisition delayed
projects ranged between 5 to 78 months in 2008 and the same rose to 19 (minimum)
and 96 (maximum) in the year 2010. The average delay in land acquisition affected
projects was 42 months in 2008 and the same went up to 68 months. Realising the
gravity of the problem by Government of India, National Land Acquisition and
88
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill 2011 was recently introduced in the Indian
Parliament which aims to address rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) by providing
safeguards for both landowners and livelihood losers while clearly defining the “public
purpose” for which land can be acquired by the government. The proposed bill will not
supersede 16 of the specialized items of legislation on land acquisition, including those
for special economic zones and railways [MoRD 2011]. Apart from envisaging time
bound higher compensation to the affected populace, the bill also addresses the key
R&R issues. The salient features of the bill are given at Appendix 7.
Utilities are classified as those bearing water and those related to power,
communication and petroleum. The number of agencies involved has created a huge
mess under the road. Shifting of electrical poles & heavy transmission towers, water
pipe lines, irrigation channels, telephone poles, underground communication cables,
gas/oil pipes etc is infact a major source of worry for any highway engineer
undertaking the road widening works. Constant liaison with the various agencies
requesting them for joint survey and forwarding the necessary estimates for shifting or
relocating the same is the first & fore most step in this tedious process. This is no mean
task considering the number of agencies and casual bureaucratic mode of functioning
prevalent in most of the departments. Thereafter processing those estimates till their
sanction along with payment to the concerned agency so as to enable them to do the
needful for undertaking road construction work is not an easy task. Even after payment
of requisite compensation to these agencies, considerable time is taken for removal &
89
shifting of the existing utilities and sometimes no guarantee for shifting of utilities even
after making payment as illustrated below.
place after the cessation of work each day. Special consideration shall be given in the
preparation of the Traffic Control Plan to the safety of pedestrians and workers and
delineation of the roadway at night.
In urban areas, every new construction runs the risk of meeting an existing
utility underground. Most of these are unmarked on maps that might not be updated for
ages, invariably forcing the new projects to shift in part or whole, and leading to huge
escalations in cost. Work on the five flyovers in Central Mumbai has been delayed by a
forced shift of utilities (water mains in the median) which were not anticipated earlier,
according to Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA). The
Municipal Corporation had earlier given the go-ahead, saying no major utility would be
disturbed, but excavation later uncovered large water and power utilities. The shifting
of utilities not only delayed the flyover project, but has resulted in a 25-30 per cent
escalation in the cost. In the absence of updated map of underground utilities, road and
bridge construction workers use the hit and miss technique, digging up the general area
of the foundation until they come across some piped utilities.
Every conceivable utility from electric cables to water mains and phone cables
runs beneath the roads, complicating construction, especially pile driving and
foundation laying. Many instances of piles driven into the ground were abandoned
necessitating design changes. In the construction of one flyover in Mumbai,
anticipating such troubles, the MSRDC has cleverly included the provision for shifting
these utilities in the tender documents. The incentives were offered @ ` 1 lakh for each
day of early project completion to ensure that contractors work double quick to rectify
the fault. The Mumbai Metro rail corridor’s cost rose due to a shift of utilities and
subsequent design changes, another Pedestrian Grade Separation Scheme dropped
midway due to difficulties in shifting utilities and subsequent cost escalation, and even
Eastern Freeway has similar problems of utility shift thus an urgent need for an updated
mapping system for underground utilities. Over 20 agencies are involved in supplying
the various services and when contracts for projects are awarded, they take permission
and start digging without any knowledge of what lies beneath. Though the urban local
92
body does give a rough estimate of utilities under the site, it is mostly outdated as
newer utilities have been added. Unified mapping of underground utilities like in
Western countries would resolve the issue. According to urban planners, utility
mapping is a crucial aspect of comprehensive urban management. Updated utility
mapping is very important for urban planning anywhere. Unfortunately in our country,
there is no accuracy in maps and records are not maintained and this can be made
feasible by better coordination between various agencies. There are technologies and
equipments available for mapping but they are expensive. The respective urban bodies
as Municipal Corporations should make some efforts to get mappings done on priority.
Fig 4.1 Underground Walkable Service Duct/Corridor along the 20 km six lane IT
Expressway on Old Mamallapuram Road (OMR) in Chennai
93
Financial Express dated back to 20th October 2009 quoted that ‘Despite good
response to the bidding process for NHDP Phase III projects, there is a backlog of
contracts to be awarded to successful bidders. Between May and Aug 2009, against a
target of 28 contracts, only eight could be awarded and NHAI officials attributed this
backlog to problems like non-preparation of DPRs and bid documents’. The Ministry of
Road Transport came under severe criticism as it had failed to capitalise the upsurge in
highway investment as evident through negative grants in many contracts. It may be
noted that in Build Operate Transfer (BOT) contracts under Public Private Partnership
(PPP) introduced for development of highway infrastructure, Viability Gap Funding
(VGF) up to 40% of project cost based on competitive bidding for each project is being
permitted by Government of India. In the competitive bidding, who so ever demands
less VGF from the government is declared the successful bidder. In few attractive
routes under Phase III and V, construction firms instead of seeking VGF from the
government, they in turn were offering grants to the government, thus termed as
negative grants. In a couple of years, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)
has received revenues to the tune of ` 20 billion through negative grants. Delays in
preparation of project reports has been ranked at No 5 spot in the Table 4.2 depicting
the questionnaire survey probing on project delays. 90% of the respondents felt that
reasons for poor quality of DPRs owes to less time given to consultants for preparation
of DPRs as shown at Table 4.4.
on date. Two-thirds of the opinion tilted towards the aspect of lack of expertise with the
consultants and lack of seriousness on their part.
Responses
Reasons for poor quality of DPRs
Yes No
Time devoted for preparation of DPR is quite less. 90% 10%
Do you recommend the Design Consultant’s life time
responsibility for their work built into contracts and their input
90% 10%
should continue until construction is complete as practiced in
China.
Poor enforcement from regulatory body since these lean
organizations have neither capacity nor desire to check the details
81% 19%
[or] may be due to acute shortage of Consultants thus
compromising on the quality of work
Lack of expertise with Consultants. 63% 37%
Lack of seriousness on the part of Consultants as evident from the
absence of Internal Quality Audit System before submitting their 63% 19%
reports.
coefficient and Spearman rank correlation coefficient which is found to be 0.432 and
0.424 respectively using SPSS computer program.
The correlation is perfect and positive if r is equal to one and perfect negative in
case r = -1. If r = 0, then there is no correlation between the two variables and thus the
two variables are said to be independent [Arora and Arora 2003]. The values obtained
in this case tends to be around 0.4 showing little coherence amongst the respondents of
the questionnaire thus the solution lies in a mix of the improvement measures listed at
Table 4.5.
The future phases of NHDP will be implemented mainly through PPP route on
Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO) basis [MORT&H 2000]. The role of
consultants in the implementation of such projects will become more crucial as they, in
addition to the task/ activities for implementation of traditional type of projects, would
96
National Highways Act 1956 was amended in 1995 to permit private sector
participation and with the passage of this amendment, Government of India can enter
into agreement with any person for development and maintenance of NHs, for
collection and retention of user fee (toll) and to regulate and control traffic as per Motor
Vehicle Act 1988. Implementation agencies should be given adequate funds and
98
decision-making authority so that they can deliver their services in an efficient manner
[Asian Development Bank 2001]. The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)
Act, which was enacted by the Parliament in 1988, provided for the setting up of a
central authority for the development, maintenance and management of national
highways vested to it. The role of NHAI is that of facilitator for preparation of Detailed
Project Reports (DPRs) thus making information available to bidders culminating in
conclusion of contracts; regulator in setting the terms and conditions in Construction
Contracts, legal bonding with Concessionaires in BOT contracts through Model
Concession Agreements (MCA); monitor for controlling the activities of contractors
and concessionaires during construction as well as operations and maintenance (O&M)
through project management consultants (PMCs); and financier in arranging funds for
construction activities through cess, borrowings, PPP mode etc. The funding of NHDP
is given at Table 4.6 and it may be seen that initial phases of NHDP was partly
financed from funding agencies such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank and
Japanese Bank JBIC to the extent of ` 200 billion. NHAI has also invested about ` 300
billion mostly on EPC projects.
billion)
Length 90 90
MSRDC (Km)
(0.25 %) Cost (` 5.50 5.50
billion)
Length 454 1279 11445 2549 6775 41 22543
TOLL (Km)
(61.78 %) Cost (` 35.98 104.15 689.33 187.42 364.28 23.35 1404.51
billion)
Length 475 1029 1518 3022
ANNUITY (Km)
(8.28 %) Cost (` 23.53 139.12 95.54 258.19
billion)
Length 435 435
SPV (Km)
(1.19 %) Cost (` 32.48 32.48
billion)
Length 7523 6625 12978 2549 6775 41 36491
(Km)
TOTAL
Cost (`` 325.65 547.42 785.97 187.42 364.28 23.35 2234.09
billion)
Various sources of financing of NHDP and their relative merits and demerits
have been elaborated at Appendix 8. Certain problems related to financial management
of the highway program leading to time and cost overruns are discussed as under.
In the initial phases, much of the success on NHDP works under Phase I and II
owes to BOQ/EPC mode and very minimal BOT contracts were in place. For instance
as may be seen from Table 4.7, out of 5846 km in the case of GQ, BOT toll component
was mere 373 km and another 382 km through annuity model, thus total BOT mode is
less than 13%. Even in the case of NSEW corridor, toll roads were only 10%. In case of
BOT mode, the private sector meets the upfront cost of construction as well as the
expenditure on annual maintenance. The entire cost along with the interest is to be
recovered from user fee collections during the concession period thus taking upon itself
the entire risk. However capital grant up to a maximum of 40% is to be provided by
NHAI as per the risk sharing concept envisaged in Model Concession Agreement
(MCA). The less attractive road stretches were to be executed through Annuity model
100
wherein the concessionaire invests on construction and maintenance (no capital grants
allowed) and recovers the entire investment through pre-determined annuity payments
by the Highway Authority. BOT mode for development of highways is given in detail
at Appendix 9. Incentives such as 10 year corporate tax holiday and 30% relief for next
5 years, extension of concession period up to 30 years, duty free import of specified
modern high capacity equipment for highway construction etc were allowed to boost
public private partnership in highway construction.
Table 4.7 BOT Component in initial Phases of NHDP (As on Jan 2011)
Total BOT (Toll) BOT (Annuity)
NHDP Length Length Cost Length Cost
Component (Km) (km) (%) ( ` billion) (km) (%) ( ` billion)
GQ 5846 373.4 6.4 26.79 382.57 6.5 19.79
Port 380 80.7 21 9.18 93 24.5 3.75
Total 6226 454.1 7.3 35.97 475.6 7.6 2354
NSEW 7300 787.44 10.8 68.49 1029 14 13.92
Others 1383 205.22 14.8 12.60
Total 8683 992.66 11.4 81.09 1029 14 13.92
In the midst of highway program, Government of India has revised its policy
stating that all projects are to be first bid out as BOT (Toll) and on failure are to be then
offered under BOT (Annuity) and if this also fails, then they are to be taken under EPC
after taking specific approval from Cabinet Committee for Economic Affairs (CCEA).
P. Chidambaram, former Union Finance Minister declared on May 21, 2006 stating that
"the time has come to make the PPP model a success and, for that, a well-designed
framework of policies is needed. We cannot have policy changing with every change in
administration. Investors will only come if there is an assurance of transparency,'' he
said. Noting that a standard of services would have to be maintained for the PPP
model's success, Mr. Chidambaram said : "From now on, all projects under the
National Highway Development Programme would be in the PPP mode. The works
contract model will be adopted only in exceptional circumstances.” The works plan
envisaged by BK Chaturvedi Committee constituted for restructuring of NHDP as
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shown at Table 4.8 also reflected the underlying principle, thus BOT component was
aimed at a staggering 90% which is not practical.
Realising the ground reality, Government of India has reversed its earlier stand
on BOT to EPC as shown in the news clipping of September 2012 reproduced below.
102
Table 4.9 Toll and Annuity projects from Phase III onwards during 2007 to 2011
Only 45 % success rate achieved even on the most attractive six laning of GQ
stretches under Phase V. The poor response from the concessionaires owes to the
prevailing sluggish economic scenario and saturation amongst the construction firms in
view of the huge infrastructure works going on in the country. In a Questionnaire
surveys carried out on selected Grade G7 Malaysian contractors registered under the
Malaysian Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia who had working
experience in India, for a query on ‘What type of procurement system did they use for
the construction projects’, the reply is as follows. Despite various considerations given
to BFOT (Build, Finance, Operate and Transfer) contracts, seventy one percent (71%)
of successful Malaysian contractors were keen to be involved in Lump Sum using BQ
(Bills of Quantities) or Drawing and Specification contracts. Only twenty-nine percent
(29%) of the respondents were involved in BFOT projects. For the unsuccessful
contractors, hundred percent (100%) of the respondents were involved in the Lump
Sum contracts. The reason behind the responses is that BFOT contracts involve higher
financial capabilities and longer time to recoup profits. Lump Sum contracts usually
provide clear cut basis for pricing and claims and require only several years of
involvement [Nur Aishah Mohd Hamdan 2008].
The fund requirement kept on escalating from ` 580 billion for GQ/NSEW
corridor to ` 1.6 trillion for all the 7 phases in the year 2004. The same was further
revised to ` 2.2 trillion till reaching a galloping sum of over ` 9 trillion (2009 prices) as
shown at Table 4.10. The sources of financing, be it through cess or budgetary support
has reached a saturation point and moreover loan and borrowings bring in huge
liabilities in the form of debt servicing and repayment. Market borrowings would have
to be raised against suitable forms of support or back-stopping by the Finance Ministry.
This may include a commitment that cess revenues at a pre-determined level would be
made available to NHAI and may be suitably assigned for debt service [CoI 2006].
NHAI has recently introduced 3 year investment bond at 6% interest per annum
exempted from TDS in the denomination of ` 10,000. This bond has been rated as
AAA Stable by CRISIL and an upper ceiling limit of ` 190 billion has been fixed by
the Government for raising funds through the NHAI investment bond.
104
From Phase III onwards, emphasis has been on BOT projects as Government
has made it clear that any further investment in the highway sector except for a small
portion has to be from private participation. This is partly responsible for slow down in
awarding of project. BOT projects concluded so far amounts to roughly ` 1000 billion
against requirement of about ` 2500 billion, thus the share of private sector and toll
revenues is purely dependent on the response from concessionaires and general
economic scenario respectively thus filled with some sort of uncertainty. Government
has to seriously consider the accessibility of pension, provident and insurance funds for
tackling the money crunch for infrastructure development. In the event of no substantial
increases in cess revenues and not so encouraging toll projects in the future, the only
available option left to Government is to go for Annuity and EPC models which
increase the financial liability on the government thus the necessity arises for
generating funds for road development. Certain innovative fund mobilisation schemes
such as beneficiary participation, e-auctioning etc was advocated by the author in his
paper titled ‘Sound Financial Management and Reliable Sources of Financing – Key
Attributes for timely completion of NHDP’ presented at International Transportation
Economic Development Conference on 03rd May 2011 in USA and the same have been
reproduced at Table 4.11.
105
Beneficiary Participation
Working Group on Roads for 11th Five Year Plan (2007-2012) as constituted by
Planning Commission (Transport Division) in their report (Apr 2007) has suggested
that some funds can be tapped from beneficiaries for projects linking Special Economic
Zones (SEZs), satellite towns, ports, power plants, steel plants and other industries.
Corpus Fund
No prior Government approval is required for road sector under automatic route
allowing 100% FDI. Government of India has mooted proposals mega highways of
over 500 km, involving contracts worth ` 40 to 50 billion and a concession period
within a 30-50 year range. Mega road projects demand huge investments, high
experience, latest technologies and innovative approach. All these factors have
definitely created a huge opportunity for foreign contractors and investors to enter the
lucrative Indian highways sector, which in turn will spur infrastructure growth in the
country [Jeeta Bandopadhyay 2009]. Moreover the government is insisting that foreign
players will have to engage Indian firms for the projects has given the sector an
additional boost since it would pave way for key learning session for Indian Companies
under Joint Venture. Initially, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways planned to
take up the six-laning of the 558 km Kishangarh-Udaipur-Ahmedabad section for an
estimated cost of ` 42.84 billion and a concession period of 30 to 50 years.
Increase in equity grant (VGF) to 40% by merging equity and Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) grants.
Project wise Pre-Qualification (PQ) in Request for Qualification (RFQ) to be
substituted with annual/periodic PQ.
Threshold Technical Capability (TTC) of bidders to be reduced from twice the
estimated project cost to just estimated project cost i.e., brought down by 50%.
Applicability of Conflict of interest at RFP stage instead of RFQ since applicants would
be unaware of each other at RFQ stage. The identity of other bidders occurs only when
the list of qualified/eligible applicants is put up for information only after RFQ stage.
Relaxing the condition of forfeiture of entire Bid Security which is a significant amount
between 1 to 2 % of Total Project Cost (TPC) to mere 5% of value of Bid Security due
to non-responsiveness of tenderers.
Extension of concession period of Concessionaire in proportion to cost to be incurred
for capacity augmentation with an upper cap of 5 years instead of existing clause for
termination in case of exceeding of designed traffic.
Termination of Concession Agreement in case of exceeding of designed capacity if
concessionaire refuses for undertaking capacity augmentation through the construction
of additional lanes, of course with the payment of termination fees which was not
included in the original concession agreements.
Exit Policy for Developers for divesting their shares to O&M companies for further
maintenance which does not exist in the MCAs. By permitting such concessionaire
companies to divest in favour of O&M companies, a total capital of ` 160 billion will
be freed and made available to the developer construction companies. Hence a policy
initiative permitting such an action by concessionaires would enable faster rotation of
capital which will translate into a higher level of capital availability for concessionaire
companies.
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The project implementation has been faced with a number of constraints that
include poor performance of some contractors, capacity constraints, rains/floods, design
changes/critical structures delayed, and law and order problem in some states. The slow
progress of the NHDP Phase I attracted the attention of the Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG). The CAG has criticized the NHAI, for completing only 1846 km
stretches, out of the target 6359 km of national highways by June 2004. In its report, it
is said that the overall performance of NHAI in terms of output in NHDP Phase I was
only 29 percent. The report has pointed out that there was no corporate plan to
implement such a large project. Deficient planning and inefficient contract management
by the design and project consultants contributed to the underperformance [CAG 2005].
Some of the problems faced by the highway projects are given at Table 4.13.
Problem Details
Quarries Delayed permissions by the State Governments affected the work
in some cases by 6 to 9 months. Quarries were not given to
contractors in Bihar. They have to procure aggregate from private
suppliers.
Law and order Serious problems of law and order have affected the work in Bihar.
At few places, local people were obstructing work of construction,
making unreasonable demands for structures such as flyovers and
underpasses in many States
Court cases In one case, award of work was held up for 19 months.
109
price per week of early completion, subject to maximum of 5% of the contract price
may be paid to the contractor [MOS&PI 2005a].
Experienced and quality-conscious contractors base their price on the equipment
specified by the client, while in actual practice unscrupulous contractors use inferior
equipment during the execution of work which has an impact on the price of items of
work. Thus the quality-conscious contractor does not have a level playing field. The
contractors arguments for employing motor grader in lieu of Paver is purely guided by
the cost considerations whereas engineers are insisting for laying of Wet Mix Macadam
(WMM) by Pavers from the quality point of view.
Delay in payments is a concern across the board. MORT&H and NHAI are delaying
decisions and approvals on variation of items of work, increase in rates recommended
by lower levels, finalisation of extension of time, final bills, etc, causing delays of
payment to contractors.
On financial matters, there are numerous policy letters being issued by the finance and
administrative departments of the NHAI which are not part of the tender and contract
conditions. For example, there was a dichotomy noticed in the escalation clauses in
some of the contracts of the GQ. An administrative order was issued which stipulated
that the escalation be paid against bank guarantees.
Due to the sudden increase in the number of road projects, qualified persons are not
available in the country. Most companies are poaching on others' turf. The fallout is
that a large number of engineers are a floating population who change jobs frequently,
salary expectations have sky rocketed and the projects are suffering due to lack of
continuity.
It is now almost common practice to appoint a supervision consultant who, as per the
book, has all powers to decide contractual matters but in practice looks towards the
client for approval of any decision. Since, they are appointed by the client, they are
indebted to him. This delays decision-making and makes the contractor knock at two
doors instead of one.
Intended for the early redressal of disputes, in practice Dispute Resolution Board
(DRB) decisions are always challenged by the contractor or by the client (whosoever is
the loser!) making the clause useless.
Many clients provide interest-free mobilisation advance to the extent of 15 per cent of
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the contract value. Thus, the cunning bidder can secure the contract by quoting an
unrealistically low price. His intentions are to get the mobilisation advance on award of
the contract and then prolong execution of the work on one small pretext or the other
while earning interest on the non interest-bearing mobilisation advance.
Fear of reprisal from the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) or Comptroller and
Auditor General (CAG) has caused even independent consultants to keep issues like
drawings, variations in orders, etc, on a complete freeze. They would rather sit on the
decision than run the risk of being questioned for having taken one.
One of the respondents to the questionnaire has opined that NHAI should be
granted authority like say Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC) to resolve and close
out contractual issues in a time frame. Delhi Metro has been a perfect present day
example of inducing efficiency in the implementation of infrastructure projects.
Surprisingly, majority of the staff were drawn from the typical government department
Indian Railways, but these very same ordinary souls excelled at Delhi Metro and the
important reasons for this is astute leadership of Mr Sreedharan and the special powers
entrusted to them. Certain rules such as governmental contracting principles of
awarding the work to lowest bidder (L1) is done away with the Delhi Metro. For the
query regarding contracting principles of awarding the work to ‘L1’ alone, thus inferior
and overloaded contracting firms unable to undertake the gigantic workload of NHDP
was posed in the questionnaire probing the reasons for inordinate delays in the
implementation of projects as shown at Table 4.2, majority of the respondents voted in
favour of doing away with the ‘L1’ methodology atleast for important project like
NHDP. BK Chaturvedi Committee has suggested a pragmatic one time measure as
shown at Table 4.16 to the vexed issue of prolonged litigations.
influence on project success, past performance was found to have least influence on
contractors’ ability to succeed in subsequent projects [Hemanta Doloi et al., 2010].
even if in other fields. When a new appointee is being inducted into a project, NHAI
should insist on the company producing a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the
previous employer of the individual before the approval process is set in motion. "The
construction industry should meet and evolve a strategy to curb this menace," is
Patwardhan's take on the subject who happens to be Managing Director of Madhucon
Projects Ltd. The author in his paper ‘Capacity Constraints on progressing of National
Highway projects in India’ published in Prabandhan Journal of Management (Aug
2011) has introduced certain strategies for overcoming the capacity constraints as
reproduced below.
they need review in the light of procedural changes made at the Central level to keep up
with the latest technology. There should be proper synchronisation of the workings of
the procedures and systems at the Central and State levels. Many State PWDs have
established a separate organisation for implementation of the works on National
Highways. This needs to be done by all the State Governments. The State Governments
should develop these National Highway departments by posting the officers having
experience only in roads and bridge works. Due to present emphasis on private sector
participation for development and maintenance of National Highways systems and
procedures in the State PWDs are also to be amended. There is considerable stagnation
at the State level of the technical officers with adequate qualification and experiences.
The State Government may adopt a policy of allowing the engineers of the Public
Works Department to take up jobs with the contracting and consulting organisations
both in private and public sectors for a fixed tenure and retain lien with the parent
Department. This would help to the Government departments, individual engineers as
well as the contractor / consultancy organisations. Some State Governments like
Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh are following this practice. There is urgent need for the
other State Government departments to adopt this policy. The Central Government may
amend their policy in this regard’.
financial terms by paying annual contribution. This will help in augmenting the
activities of NITHE. Its charter should be further reactivated vigorously to extend its
services to interested entrepreneurs, consultants and construction firms.
strength by over 300 percent, thus pavement can be designed with reduced bituminous
and base courses. The trial stretch adopted at NH1 showed significant reduction in the
crust thickness by 40 to 50 % and totally eliminated the layer of dense bituminous
macadam as proclaimed by the manufacturer India Polyroads Pvt Ltd (IPPL) Gurgaon
(Haryana). Hence usage of new technology/materials such as nano polymers can reduce
the requirement of materials, thus reduced quarrying efforts and construction time. The
manufacturers also claim an overall savings of 12 % as shown at Appendix 12 by
partially compensating the extra expenditure on polymer solution through reduced crust
thickness and speedy completion. Addition of superplasticisers in cement concrete
apart from increased workability has a vast potential for reduced sections due to
enormous strength multiplication [Mishra, L.K 1997]. Utilisation of flyash in road
construction is another innovative alternative as elaborately dealt by Abhai Kr Verma
and Ashish Gupta in their paper ‘Study on the utilization of flyash’ presented at
Seminar Udaipur (India) and the relevant extract is reproduced as under :
Fly ash is a lightweight material, as compared to commonly used fill material (local
soils), therefore, causes lesser settlements. It is especially attractive for embankment
construction over weak subgrade such as alluvial clay or silt where excessive weight
could cause failure. Fly ash embankments can be compacted over a wide range of
moisture content, and therefore, results in less variation in density with changes in
moisture content. It is easy to handle and compact because the material is light and
there are no large lumps to be broken down and can be compacted using either
vibratory or static rollers. High permeability ensures free and efficient drainage. After
rainfall, water gets drained out freely ensuring better workability than soil. Work on fly
ash fills / embankments can be restarted within a few hours after rainfall, while in case
of soil it requires much longer period. Considerable low compressibility of flyash
results in negligible subsequent settlement within the fill. It further conserves good
earth; which is precious topsoil, thereby protecting the environment. Higher value of
California Bearing Ratio as compared to soil provides for a more efficient design of
road pavement. Pozzolanic hardening property imparts additional strength to the road
pavements/ embankments and decreases the post construction horizontal pressure on
retaining walls. Fly ash is amenable to stabilization with lime and cement and can
replace a part of cement and sand in concrete pavements thus making them more
120
economical than roads constructed using conventional materials. Fly ash admixed
concrete can be prepared with zero slump making it amenable for use as roller
compacted concrete. Considering all these advantages, it is extremely essential to
promote use of fly ash for construction of roads and embankments.
firms and the same were acknowledged as critical by monitoring agencies and
consultants too. Shortage of construction goods such as cement, bitumen, steel etc was
rated critical by monitoring agencies as well as construction firms. Security threat to
personnel deployed on construction sites and resistance and/or disturbance from the
local populace are of high importance and needs to be dealt locally on a case to case
basis. Surprisingly, power cuts were not given any importance, probably due to their
own captive arrangements such as generator sets etc. Absence of local quarries for
stone and sand was rated highly critical by construction firms and some contractors are
complaining that they are compelled to go for their own arrangement for quarrying and
mining on private lands by shelling huge money, thus possibility of time and cost
overruns.
4.3.3 Rains/Floods
The 2008 floods in Orissa and Bihar have taken a heavy toll of delays in NHDP
projects in these states. The western front is also equally affected going by the spate of
damages occurred on the Vadodara-Surat section of NH-8. Major repair work has been
ordered by NHAI on NH-8. Meanwhile, the Ahmedabad-Vadodara Expressway has
reported an increase in traffic with commuters avoiding the rain-hit NH-8 between the
two towns. In September 2008, even as the Bihar floods had not receded completely,
the north-eastern state of Assam faced floods with rising waters from the Brahmaputra
River. Kaziranga National Park, which has the highest density of rhinos in the world,
122
was 90% submerged in water. The flood situation has affected estimated 2.1 million
people causing 24 deaths. Worst affected districts are Dhubri, Jorhat, Kamrup,
Lakhimpur, Dhemaji and Morigaon thus badly affecting the East – West corridor
project. The following pan-Indian data at Table 4.18 pertaining to NHDP works
affected by rains & floods in the year 2008 alone illustrates the wide spread nature of
the natural fury on the developmental works.
Natural Calamities such as rains & floods cannot be eliminated and project
authorities have neither control over such furies of nature. Even they cannot be
predicted accurately thus a situation of uncertainty prevails. The only solution available
to the construction engineer lies in proper planning of works duly accounting for
unpredictable weather and strict monitoring of the worked out plans subjected to
various ‘ifs & buts’ of the unknown future. An exclusive case study on road widening
works under Prime Minister’s Package to J&K covering various management
techniques and their applications as advocated by the author in his paper ‘Planning and
Monitoring of Road Construction Projects in Jammu and Kashmir’ published in
NICMAR Journal (July 2010). A great emphasis has been made on the basics of project
management techniques and seriousness with which project managers have to put these
techniques into practice inorder to attain the broader goal of timely completion of
projects within the budgeted cost avoiding time & cost over-runs.
industrial set up. The learned readers are well aware of the peculiar unorganized
scenario of the construction industry exposed to the vagaries of climate unlike
controlled manufacturing in factories thus the implications of employing such tested
techniques in the construction arena. Moreover Project Management is confined to just
one aspect of time planning through Critical Path Method (CPM) and Bar Charts thus
totally ignoring the related cost and resource factors. The lack of enthusiasm in their
applications amongst the practitioners is mainly attributed to non-availability of
sophisticated tools which have the potential of integrating the management techniques
incorporating all the related criteria for successful completion of any project. The
advent of computer software packages such as MS Project and Primavera facilitating
planning, scheduling and monitoring techniques with inbuilt resource levelling and cost
control mechanisms have brought in revolutionary changes in the mindset of managers,
who otherwise used to term these management tools as ‘mere theoretical’. A simple
Line of Balance (LOB) control chart is adequate for monitoring the construction of
protective/cross drainage structures as R/Wall, B/Wall, Culverts etc and Bar charts are
good enough to monitor each of those structures. Precedence Network Analysis (PNA)
depicting various activities on nodes of the network was employed for bridge
construction works showing the complex interdependencies, critical path and floats
available for each and every activity, so that project managers can exercise effective
control over the project. For works progressing on a continuous linear scale works as
pavement layers for sub-base, base courses and bituminous layers, Linear Programme
Chart (LPC) representing activity location, rate of work and time schedule can be
successfully employed for planning as well as its monitoring throughout the project
duration [Chitkara 2001].
Primarily the international standard software was used in the industry for
general administration and project management processes. Like MS Office for
administrative functions, MS Project and Primavera Project Planner are appropriate
tools for time and cost scheduling processes. Only 19 surveyed organizations (about
13%) utilized customized software for ‘Bill of Quantities (BOQ) preparation,
Comparative analysis of bids received, Tender preparation and Contract management
[V. Ahuja et al.. 2009]. Having realized the potential of these techniques, all
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government bodies are insisting on employing the same in all construction works
making them mandatory through the contract clauses. The engineering fraternity too
should welcome the same and adopt these techniques for ensuring better planning,
monitoring and execution of the works.
Except for very primitive slab bridges, most masonry bridges have been arch
bridges. These arch bridges imply permanence and have a graceful appearance but at
the same time require unyielding abutments and piers. Stone masonry arch bridges are
by nature strong and require very little maintenance. Their inherent reserve strength is
evident from the many stone arch bridges existing in service, now carrying many times
125
their originally designed load. Their main disadvantage and probably the reason for
discarding these durable arch bridges is the slow pace of construction. It takes time to
build them piece by piece. Each stone is required to be quarried, dressed and
individually matched with the surrounding stones. Hence in developed nations with
high labour costs, stone/brick arch bridges are not favored and developing countries
seem to follow suit by extensively going in for concrete girder bridges of various
configurations. Girder bridges of reinforced concrete will be highly uneconomical for
spans beyond 35 m whereas arch type can be used advantageously in the span range of
35 to 200 m. The most important advantage of these arch bridges are total elimination
of movable parts like bearings which require regular periodic maintenance and often
replacement after a very few years during the designed life of bridge which add to the
cost of the bridge. That’s the reason these arch bridges continue to be in service with no
maintenance at all well beyond their designed life that too under the increased traffic
intensity to the extent of 200 to 300 %. Coronation bridge near Siliguri with main span
of about 80 m can be taken as a classic example of majestic arch bridge which is in
totally sound condition without any repairs/maintenance even after a life of 80 years
since its commissioning in 1930. The research scholar’s paper titled ‘Back to Arches :
Increasing Incidences of Distress in Concrete Bridges & Renewed Interest on
Durable Arch Bridges’ published in Civil Engineering & Construction Review
(CE&CR), ISSN No : 0975-9034, Vol 24, No 12, pp 102-112 stressed the need for
adopting appropriate design and construction methodology for eliminating time
overruns.
of Earth Sciences and Engineering, ISSN No : 0974-5904, Vol. 4, No.6 Spl, Oct, 2011,
pp. 780-784 has brought out a case study on Tidding bridge in Arunachal Pradesh
where the partially complete bridge was to be abandoned due to dangerous tilt to one of
the pier wells at 1 in 3 vertical slope. Appropriate structural design scheme at the initial
planning stage itself was advocated by the author in his review article titled
‘Economics of Alternative Structural Schemes of Prestressed Concrete Bridges’
published in the International Journal of Civil and Structural Engineering, ISSN No :
0976-4399, Vol.1, No.3, 2010, pp. 425-439 for eventually eliminating the delays.
With the advent of BOT concept under public private partnership (PPP) being
implemented by National Highway Authority of India (NHAI), the Concessionaires are
free to carry out their own designs and construction, thus fast track construction can be
advantageously employed on all highway projects eliminating time and cost overruns.
For that matter, NHAI came into existence solely for executing the massive highway
development project NHDP on fast track basis. Prime Contractor is one who performs a
substantial part of the construction work himself and the balance, if any, by
subcontractors, while bearing full responsibility for the whole contract [SPD 2005].
127
Negottation
Normal construction
Approvals
schedule
Bidding
Planning Design Construction
Govt
and
1 2 3
◊ ∆ ©
1 2 3
Bidding
and Negotition
◊ Govt Approvals Time saved
∆ Construction ©
1 2 3
◊
Time saved
∆ ©
As per FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction, the contractor shall not
subcontract the whole of the works [FIDIC 2006]. Whereas, NHAI in the true spirit of
fast track construction allows the Concessionaire a free hand as evident from the Clause
5.4 (a) (iv) of Model Concession Agreement for Annuity Based Projects as reproduced
below :
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) may be roped in NHDP since CISF
services were only available to Government Organisations and PSUs in the past but by
amendment in CISF Act, the Government of India has now permitted CISF to offer
129
Consultancy Services in the field of Security and Fire Protection to public as well as
private sector. NHAI may consider special incentives in the form of security cover
through CRPF/BSF armed battalions, increased viability gap funding on toll projects,
attractive annuity packages and if required to undertake these projects through EPC.
NHAI may explore the possibility of entrusting works to Border Roads Organisation
(BRO) which operates mostly in the insurgency prone areas of J&K and NE states and
is the largest employer in these remote border areas. It is not surprising to know that
even in the peak of insurgencies in the states like J&K, Nagaland, Assam, Manipur and
Mizoram when armed forces were being attacked recklessly, BRO was left relatively
untouched and this is due to goodwill generated by them through productive
employment. But for this livelihood, these local tribals could have easily taken to arms.
These local labourers, infact stood solidly behind BRO and prevented the assault from
ultras due to fear of losing their jobs in the case of BRO withdrawing from the area due
to militant threats.
economic development of the country through connecting remote areas and creating
conducive environment for domestic and foreign investment. The present road policy in
India has two basic tenets, viz. accessibility and mobility. The accessibility objective is
to be achieved through improved rural roads network viz., Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak
Yojana (PMGSY) to provide all weather road connectivity in rural areas. Mobility is to
be facilitated through improvement in capacity and strengthening of high-density
corridors. The National Highway Development Project (NHDP) is the main initiative in
this regard and it aims at four laning and six laning of Golden Quadrilateral and North
South East West corridor. Apart from focus on the improvement of low grade sections,
rehabilitation and reconstruction of weak bridges, construction of bypasses, emphasis
was also on improving the riding quality of the existing highways. Construction of
more transportation hubs and logistics SEZs is also being initiated to create more
common shared facilities for transportation. Lack of industry status makes it difficult
for transporters to raise capital and debt through organized banking and financial
channels. Uniform integrated tolling systems can be introduced where vehicles need to
only slow down rather than completely stop and wait in queues for collection of toll at
toll gates. At present, construction activities are administered through 32 laws, rules
and statutes. Besides, there is no singular nodal agency empowered by the government
to administer construction activities. Requirement of Unified Construction law is being
envisaged by many entrepreneurs so as to induce efficiency and create effectiveness.
Golden Quadrilateral which was commenced in 1998 for linking the four major
metropolitan cities initially slated for completion in December 2003, whereas the same
was 100% completed after 10 long years during May 2013. As regards to NSEW
Corridor, 86 % of 7000 km is four laned as on 31st May 2013 against its stipulated
completion in December 2009. A mere glance at the progress of various packages
under NHDP as given at Table 1.3 in chapter 1 illustrates the inordinate delays in the
ambitious highway programme taken up by Government of India and various policy
decisions responsible for the present state of affairs are discussed in the subsequent
paragraphs as under.
131
Because of the active interest of the Prime Minister and his key advisors in the
area of Information technology and Telecom, the policy was not allowed to fail
[Virmani 2004]. Hence for any policy to succeed, active support of the government is
the need of the hour. Change in the corridors of power at centre with focus on National
Rural Employment Guarantee program (NREGA) has put NHDP commenced by
previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government on a back seat. However
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government on its reelection in 2009 has shown its
resolve to speed up the highway program.
With the rapid growth of the economy in recent years the importance and the
urgency of removing infrastructure constraints have increased. Traditionally, power,
railways, roads, ports, airports and telecommunications were the exclusive domain of
the government. Policy has changed gradually over the past two decades under the
pressure of rising gaps between demand and supply of infrastructure and deteriorating
quality of assets. Government has made an effort to facilitate the entry of private
enterprise into this sector through changes in the legal framework. A role for private
sector participation has also been facilitated by technological change that allow
unbundling of infrastructure, so that the public and the private sectors can take up the
components most suited to their capacities. Government continues to invest significant
sums in areas where private participation is minimal or not forthcoming. It will
continue to play a lead role in infrastructure development during the Eleventh Plan
[Economic Survey 2007-2008]. NHDP Phase III downwards, the highway projects are
being implemented on a ‘pay-as-you-use’ principle, they are usually constructed and
operated on commercial principles implying efficiency in execution and better level of
service to users. The concept of direct tolling, viewed mainly as a user charge was
initially implemented successfully mainly on bridges, bypass roads and on four lane
National Highways. The developer assumes the majority of the risk associated with
design, construction, maintenance, operation and financing of the road. To encourage
private sector participation, the Govt. has introduced annuity approach in which a fixed
annual payment is made to the entrepreneur. Due to limitation of the budgetary
resources, the role and participation of private sector are to be encouraged by and large
for the development of National Highways. In order to encourage participation of
private sector, the Department of Road Transport and Highways has laid down
comprehensive policy guidelines for private sector participation in the highway sector.
The private sector participation envisaged in Phase- II of NHDP has also been
increased. The Government has also announced several incentives such as tax
exemptions and duty-free import of road building equipments and machinery to
encourage private sector participation. Implementation of projects through construction
contracts is to be done in exceptional cases where private sector participation is not
possible at all. Preparatory work has begun in consultation with the Planning
133
Commission for seeking the Government approvals for the enhanced scope of NHDP.
Following actions are recommended to expand the role of PPPs as the main basic
delivery mode at both the national, state and municipal levels.
a) Most countries engaged in broad based PPP program recognized the need to develop
a cross sectoral pool of expertise in a dedicated PPP unit. Creation of national level
PPP unit may be considered, that would perform the functions of information
dissemination and guidance so as to provide advisory to PPP programme. It is
recognized that such a unit has been created in Ministry of Finance and is in the process
of being created in NHAI. Such PPP unit should also be established at state levels for
guidance for developing roads in states and municipal level for PPP projects.
b) The existing ambiguities for tax treatment, licensing, imports, banking, audits
require critical re-look and substantial modifications so as to facilitate commercial
matter to provide encouragement for foreign investors.
d) For highway projects implemented through PPP, traffic is a critical and sensitive
issue. Therefore traffic studies and projection has to be studied and established as
accurately as possible so that investors are aware of the risk involved. Possibility of
involving insurance companies for providing suitable insurance cover to
concessionaires to mitigate risks (traffic risks etc.) may be explored.
e) The project cost estimation should be as realistic as possible and should be based on
actual market forces.
g) Land acquisition and utility removal is another important area which can adversely
impact the implementation process of PPPs. Therefore, the projects on PPP are to be
identified and land acquisition process started quite early so that most of the land is
available at appointed date.
134
h) BOT (Annuity) and shadow tolling could be better options for medium/ low traffic
density corridors and should preferably be adopted.
i) While formulating the PPP proposals for highway projects, the scope for innovations
and using latest technologies and materials may be suitably incorporated.
indicate that a three to four fold increase in investments would be required and
budgetary resources could be leveraged to increase private investments.
While the light motor vehicle industry such as cars has seen substantial influx of
new technology, truck and bus manufacturing has a clear and urgent need for a major
technology upgradation. The fabrication of bus and truck bodies has become virtually
unregulated. A bus body code has been developed and work is on to draft a similar
code for trucks. To implement these norms, a system of accreditation of heavy vehicle
body manufacturers needs to be evolved. Proposing a differential tax on multi-axle
vehicles that save 50 per cent of fuel per tonne km, the draft says there is need for
increased use of low tyre weight. On the environment front, it has proposed a fitness
regime for non-transport vehicles which includes adherence to pollution control norms,
temperature and engine speed standards.
and mail to fresh produce and the latest fashions. And they have increased the mobility
of all Americans, allowing them to move out of the cities and establish homes in a
growing suburbia even farther from their workplaces and to travel quickly from one
region to another.
i. Strong need for advance planning and capacity building. Before embarking
upon any major highway development program, the stakeholders, particularly the
government, should undertake assessment and measures to enhance the country’s
policy and design capabilities and to augment the capacity of construction and the
associated supply chain industry to meet the demand, in addition to developing
uniform policies and standards.
ii. Strong emphasis on design quality and reviews. There should be a strong
design review mechanism built into the system of project approvals. The design
consultants should have a life-time responsibility for their work built into
contracts and their input should continue until construction is complete. More
effort and time should be spent on surveying, data collection and design and more
funds should be allocated for these very important project preparatory activities.
The design costs are much higher in China (typically 2.5% of project cost)
compared to India (typically 1%) and in China about 40-50% of the overall
project period is spent in surveys and design, while in India it is less than 20% of
total time [but the extra time and cost spent on design are more than recouped
later through timely construction within budget]. To ensure better quality
engineers, the salaries for design engineers have to be comparable with other
industries. In China the design engineers are offered substantially higher salaries
than their counterparts in construction or even than the average pay in the IT
industry. Entry requirements to the design institutes in China are often quite
stringent and a Masters degree in a relevant field is a minimum.
iii. Putting enough manpower and attention into completing land acquisition
and pre-construction before starting works is also amply rewarded by
subsequent rapid construction. In Hubei, although land acquisition and
resettlement are easier than in India, large teams are mobilized within the
implementing agency to work speedily on these issues with success.
designs are dynamic in nature and the core design team is maintained throughout
project implementation. Time and cost overruns on account of design deficiencies
are unheard of in China.
vii. Stricter mobilization requirements and control. In China joint accounts are set
up for mobilization advances to monitor their use and avoid the diversion of funds
to other contracts by the contractor. Moreover, the mobilization requirements are
much more stringent in China than in India. To cite an example, for structures the
contractor must mobilize 25% of the staging, centering and shuttering materials
(formwork), so that the work can be completed in four to five cycles of casting.
viii. Supply chain industry. There is a need to strengthen the supply chain industry
and agencies specialized in pavement, earthwork, road furniture and maintenance,
etc. The strong supply chain industry can attract foreign contractors with good
project management skills.
ix. Faster decisions on variations and design changes. Decision making in China
is fairly decentralized, in contrast to the highly centralized decision making
practice in India. Moreover, the overwhelming fear of vigilance (intrusive audits)
also slows down decision making in projects in India. In China such situations are
averted by fully involving the design consultant, the anticorruption department
139
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Concluding chapter 5 at the end tried to summarise the findings of the
analysis of time and cost overruns. This chapter has brought out the
importance of physical connectivity through highway infrastructure in
the country through the massive development programme in the form of
NHDP and at the same time envisaging the role of the governments in
removing the constraints. The various impediments on the path of
project implementation were listed according to their criticality.
Tabulation of various factors causing delays and suggested measures to
overcome the delays is the highlight of this chapter giving the readers
the crux of the research carried out by the research scholar. The chapter
ends with a note of optimism shared by the engineering fraternity stating
that the committed target of achieving the road construction at the rate
of 20 km per day is attainable if timely corrective actions are taken.
Contents
5.1 Introduction 141
5.2 Findings of the Study 143
5.3 Recommendations for Effective Implementation 146
5.4 Limitations of Study 151
5.5 Scope for Further Research 152
5.1 Introduction
participation (PPPs) through concessionary agreements viz., tolls and annuity models to
bridge the infrastructure deficit in the country. Several initiatives have been taken since
2002 to promote PPPs in sectors like power, ports, highways, airports, tourism and
urban infrastructure. Under the overall guidance of the Committee of Infrastructure
(COI) headed by the Prime Minister, the PPP programme has been finalised and the
implementation of the various schemes is being closely monitored by the constituent
Ministries/Departments under this programme. The appraisal mechanism for the PPP
projects has been streamlined to ensure speedy appraisal of projects, remove red tape,
adopt international best practices and have uniformity in guidelines. An appraisal
mechanism has been notified including the setting up of the Public Private Partnership
Appraisal Committee (PPPAC) responsible for the appraisal of PPP projects in the
central sector. The committee has mandated detailed guidelines for submitting
proposals and follows a pre-determined time frame for according approval to proposals
submitted in a time bound manner.
of variables using a rating scale (0 - 5). The reasons for slippage of completion
schedules on NHDP are shown below :
Critical Factors
Pre-construction activities such as land acquisition, utility shifting etc not geared up
so as to keep pace with the proposed completion schedules.
Delays in preparation of Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) incorporating feasibility
studies, traffic projections and revenues etc.
Delays in Project Approvals, requisite clearances from concerned Ministries as
Railways for ROB/RUBs, MOEF for forest clearance etc.
With 72 odd districts often referred as red corridor affected by naxalism and a
couple of border states such as J&K and Assam infected with insurgency/
militancy, Law and Order has taken a significant toll on progress of highway
projects.
Significant Reasons
Poor response from Concessionaires to take up projects on BOT (Toll and Annuity)
basis and in that eventuality inadequacy of funds to get the work on EPC mode.
The following pan-Indian data pertaining to NHDP works affected by rains and
floods in the year 2008 alone illustrates the wide spread nature of the natural fury
on the developmental works affecting highway programme
S No State Affected NHs Remarks
i) Assam 31C, 37 and 54 Floods
ii) Bihar 28 and 57 Kosi river Breach
iii) Gujarat 8A, 14 and 15 Incessant rains
iv) Tamil Nadu 4, 5 and 45 Torrential Rains
v) West Bengal 31 Rains and Floods
Active support of the government is required for any policy to succeed. Change
in the corridors of power at centre with focus on National Rural Employment
Guarantee program (NREGA) has put NHDP commenced by previous National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government on a back seat. However United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) government on its reelection in 2009 has shown its resolve to speed up
the highway program. Further, NHAI instead of completing the ongoing projects has
expanded NHDP to seven phases with projected investment shooting up from 50 to 200
billion USD over the period 2005 - 2012. The highway program has become
unmanageable at times due to bowing down to pressures from local parliamentarians
for extending NHDP to their constituencies under Phase III not covered under GQ or
NSEW corridor. Pruning the highway program from time to time by prioritizing the
projects on the basis of feasibility and deferment of certain packages due to poor
bidding response as well as resource crunch was carried out. The time delays are in
turn causing cost overruns due to general price inflation. Coupled with this frequent
changing of Chairman of NHAI had led to administrative paralysis affecting the
government flag ship programme NHDP. At the lower level incorporating Project
Managers, decision making was affected due to fear of vigilance thus piling up of many
disputes on claims and extra work etc affecting the smooth progressing of works. Thus
dispute resolution is another sore issue in the project implementation and NHAI needs
to seriously consider implementation of BK Chaturvedi’s suggestions as one time
measure.
In principle, the corridors having medium or low traffic density may not be
viable on BOT (Toll) basis and therefore for such corridors, BOT (Annuity) mode
would be more appropriate for PPP. If a proper due diligence indicates any project to be
146
unviable on BOT (Toll), then it should be offered on BOT (Annuity) basis in the first
instance itself. Therefore, there is need to revisit the policy of first offering the project
on BOT, and then BOT annuity, and then to civil works contracts, with an approval at
each stage, since this process would not only take more time, but may also lead to lack
of seriousness among the bidders. Where ever less response is anticipated for toll
projects, straight away these projects can be earmarked under annuity mode so as to
save the precious time involved in tendering and awarding. EPC mode should be the
last resort and NHAI should be geared up to mobilize the funds for annuity and EPC
projects. Presently, a huge 90% of the projects were planned through BOT mechanism
which appears to be not practical, hence switching over partly to annuity and EPC
models may be resorted to. This will be coupled with requirement of fund generation
for sustaining the flow of finances and this study has suggested certain innovative
methods such as beneficiary participation, corpus fund and e-auctioning. Periodic
reviewing needs to be done for tailoring the requirements to suit the prevailing
economic and market scenario.
India is among the world's youngest nations with a median age of 25 years as
compared to 43 in Japan and 36 in USA. According to the World Fact Book, of the
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, India is projected to stay the
youngest with its working-age population estimated to rise to 70 per cent of the total
demography by 2030 -- the largest in the world. The economy is vibrant - India's
foreign exchange reserves stood at a healthy $300 billion. In 2007-08 alone, foreign
147
institutional investors (FIIs) brought in $ 16.1 billion and foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows rose 56.5 percent to $ 24.57 billion. The number of companies
incorporated has increased from 712,000 to 865,000. However, all the progress made
by the country is obscured by the core problems that plaques the nation such as poor
infrastructure, poor educational standards, balance of payments, high levels of debt,
unemployment, economic inequality, large budget deficit, high inflation, rigid labor
laws and high subsidies. These problems stunt growth and restrict India to being only a
developing economy. Reform of inappropriate policies, unproductive government
programs and inefficient public organizations and projects can generate hope and
confidence in a more productive future.
It is strongly believed that the key to solving the critical problems that are faced
by the nation lies in the integration of the efforts of the different states and the centre.
The states of the Indian federation should share the responsibility of fiscal
consolidation and prudence in a federal polity. State finances need to be strengthened,
for both macroeconomic and structural reasons. A shuffle in the revenue expenditure by
states can decrease the revenue deficit while leaving sufficient funds for developmental
expenditures, especially for the key area of human resource development. Inadequate
infrastructure such as irrigation, electricity, roads etc and human capital formation viz.,
expenditures on education, basic health etc where states shoulder major responsibilities
have large costs not only to the states concerned but beyond their borders. Improving
the center-state financial relations and working towards economic integration would go
a long way in nation building and socio-economic development. For this India can take
learning from integration models followed in USA (between states) and European
Union (between countries) and thus target inclusive economic growth in the nation. The
taxation and subsidy regimes of states and center should be in consonance for creating
an encouraging and exciting business environment such that the benefits accruing from
the reforms of central policies are maximized. Nearly 30 per cent of the Central Road
Fund (CRF) collected through a cess @ ` 1.50 on petrol and diesel, goes to states.
About 60 per cent is used for building national highways and the rest for rail over-
bridges. States have not come forward with enough proposals on road development.
The amount released to state government is based on the progress in various projects.
The fund is non-lapsable. A low utilization despite high accruals, would mean locking
148
up of resources, till the states have found a use for them. There are few instances of
states such as Uttar Pradesh not coming forth in signing State Support Agreement
(SSA) meant for removal of hurdles in project implementation.
In a project like NHDP of vast magnitude spread in the length and breadth of
the country over a period of two decades, the reasons for delay are mostly from
preconstruction activities like land acquisition, shifting of utilities etc. Contractor’s
poor performance which owes to capacity constraints in the form of requisite number of
contracting firms, skilled manpower etc was also found to be a predominant hindrance
in the implementation of projects. Cost overruns are mostly prevalent in EW corridor
projects. Lack of consistent policy on the implementation of highway projects is also
responsible for slackness in the implementation and eventual cost and time overruns.
The role of the state in addressing these larger issues of national importance such as
capacity constraints, law and order and necessary policy formulations so as to promote
the highway construction cannot be negated. It is also emphasised in this thesis that
strategies for reinforcing the highway program can be of low effort without any
financial burden on the government such as issuing circulars to the concerned
departments for expeditious working and better coordination, sparing of surplus
technical staff from engineering departments on deputation/lien and offering few
incentive schemes etc. The gist of recommendations to overcome the hurdles in
implementation of NHDP is brought out at Table 5.1.
highway program. Owing to the size of the robust economy of the Indian subcontinent,
it is just the political will and dedicated push for integrated effort on the
implementation front, which is required at this hour.
The list of projects considered for statistical analysis is not exhaustive and only
those projects which are reported by the Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in the
MOS&PI’s status reports were considered for the analysis. Particularly some of the
projects costing less than ` 200 million are not reported by the Ministry of Road
Transport and Highways (MORT&H). The anticipated dates of commissioning and
anticipated cost of the projects do not reflect the exact assessment of the project
authorities at the time of reporting. This needs to be reviewed taking the progress in the
master network of the project. This will reveal the true status. The project authorities
are not furnishing complete and accurate data in time. Further the reasons brought out
by Project Implementation Units (PIUs) might turn out to be superficial and do not
reflect the root cause of the problem/ground reality.
Delay Index model developed by the author suffers from the limitation that
computation is not possible due to lack of data or paucity of information from PIUs.
Moreover the gravity of the delay factors cannot be assessed in the absence of any such
information from PIUs. This shortcoming can be overcome if PIUs are asked to share
the information on delay factors as well as their intensity in the form of certain ranking
on linear rating scale. Further no significant relationship between Delay Index and
Time Overruns could be established on all India basis for all the 224 projects since
correlation coefficient ‘R’ was just 0.109 with significance value ‘α’ of 0.104, thus
implying no uniformity amongst the states. However, the model suggested in this study
has a scope for improvement if data on delay factors can be further elaborated by PIUs
in terms of intensity of delay factors and also bringing out the reasons for delay where
PIUs have left blank for as many as 101 projects.
have affected the responses. For certain queries such as regarding the quantum of
mobilization of funds through beneficiary participation or corpus fund, response was
nil since these concepts were new and not familiar to the respondents.
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164
APPENDIX 1
PHASE WISE SCHEDULE OF NHDP
The National Highways Development Project (NHDP) is a project to upgrade,
rehabilitate and widen major highways in India to a higher standard. The project was
commenced in 1998. National Highways account for only 2% of the total length of
roads, but carry about 40% of the total traffic across the length and breadth of the
country. This project is managed by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)
under the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORT&H).
x Phase I : The Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) connects the four major cities of Delhi,
Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata. The length of this project connecting the four metro
cities is 5846 km. Total cost of the project is ` 300 billion funded largely by the
cess levied on the petroleum products and government borrowings.
x Phase II : North South East West (NSEW) corridor comprising national highways
connecting Srinagar in the north to Kanyakumari in the south including spur from
Salem to Kochi (via Coimbatore), and Silchar in the east to Porbandar in the west.
Total length of the network is 7300 km at a cost of ` 350 billion with funding
similar to Phase I.
x Phase III : Government of India has approved NHDP III to upgrade 12,109 km of
national highways on a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis. Phase III takes
care of the high density traffic routes connecting state capitals and places of
economic importance which are not covered under Phase I and II.
x Phase IV : This comprises widening of 20,000 km of highways that were not part of
Phase I, II, or III. Phase IV will convert existing single lane highways into two
lanes with paved shoulders.
x Phase V : As road traffic increases over time, a number of four lane highways will
need to be upgraded/expanded to six lanes. The current plan calls for upgrading of
about 5,000 km of four-lane roads mostly from Golden Quadrilateral.
Ahmedabad section. The World Bank is studying this project. The project will be
funded on BOT basis.
x Phase VII : This phase calls for improvements to city road networks by adding ring
roads to enable easier connectivity with national highways to important cities. In
addition, improvements will be made to stretches of national highways that require
additional flyovers and bypasses considering the population and housing growth
along the highways and increasing traffic.
166
APPENDIX 2
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of traffic from 1.9 to 8.8 million in a span of two decades @
8.9% per annum without a matching augmentation of capacity has only added to the
deterioration of the road network. Coupled with inadequate capacity, the principal
causes of congestion that slow down the movement of traffic and increase the
consumption of fuel are mainly due to poor maintenance, lack of bypasses to
circumvent urban areas, octroi/tax barriers, road side encroachments and mixed traffic.
The advantages of having a well developed network of world class highways are many
for a nation like India poised to surge ahead as shown below :
x Savings in vehicle operating costs and safer travel;
x Faster and comfortable journey along with reduced fuel consumption;
x Reduced maintenance costs and all round development of areas; and
x Benefits to trade especially in the movement of perishable goods.
Accounting for the vast importance of National Highways and to overcome the
problems as explained above, National Highway Development Project (NHDP) was
envisaged through four laning of the existing high density highway corridors linking
four mega metropolises known as Golden Quadrilateral (GQ), and NSEW corridor with
port connectivity (overall length of 14,146 Km at an estimated cost of ` 580 billion at
1999 price level is one of the largest highway projects in the world. Later on the NHDP
was expanded in its scope covering 45,000 kms under Phase I to VII at a gigantic sum
of ` 2200 billion in 2006. There were 224 projects on the Ministry of Statistics and
Project Implementation (MOS&PI) monitor at Q/E March 2008. The status of various
projects as on 31st Mar 2008 were as under :
Category Total Within Within Time Within Cost With Time
No. of Time but with but with and Cost
Projects and Cost Time overrun overrun
Cost overrun
Mega - - - - -
Major 202 30 21 133 18
Medium 22 5 0 15 2
Total 224 35 21 148 20
167
SCOPE OF RESEARCH
QUESTIONNAIRE
x Poor response from Concessionaires to take up projects on BOT (Toll and Annuity)
basis and in that eventuality inadequacy of funds to get the work on EPC mode.
[ ]
x The following pan-Indian data pertaining to NHDP works affected by rains and
floods in the year 2008 alone illustrates the wide spread nature of the natural fury
on the developmental works.
S No State Affected NHs Remarks
i) Assam 31C, 37 and 54 Floods
ii) Bihar 28 and 57 Kosi river breach
iii) Gujarat 8A, 14 and 15 Incessant rains
iv) Tamil Nadu 4, 5 and 45 Torrential rains
v) West Bengal 31 Rains and floods
These rains and floods on annual pattern in some parts or the other have
affected the highway construction. [ ]
x With 150 odd districts often referred as red corridor affected by naxalism and a
couple of border states such as J&K and Assam infected with insurgency/militancy,
Law and Order has taken a significant toll on progress of highway projects. [ ]
x Lack of supporting infrastructure/equipment bank such as construction machinery,
hot mix plants, specialized subcontractors etc. [ ]
x Any other reason, as you think fit and appropriate.
removal of structures and shifting of utilities, law and order problems in some states are
removed.
Some of the reasons attributed to delays in LA are listed below. Assign the
figure from the rating scale corresponding to its importance and impact on the LA
process.
Highly critical Critical Important Significant Not so No
factor causing factor factor factor important significance
delays factor at all
5 4 3 2 1 0
Disputes in assessment of compensation amount for acquired land
Corruption and extensive delays in disbursement of compensation amount
Non availability or incomplete land records
Removal of encroachments, which quite often take political colours
Insufficient or ill trained survey staff preparing land details
Lack of commitment on the part of revenue circle holding land records
Delayed resettlement and rehabilitation of Affected Populace (APs)
Acquisition of land much beyond actual requirement citing future needs
Lengthy acquisition procedures as per LA or NH Acts
Frequent changes to alignment by concerned agencies involved in LA
Stricter Forest Laws and tedious Environmental Clearences
Resistance by land holders especially in tribal and remote areas
Fixing of compensation amount on lower side due to fear of vigilance department,
thus compelling the affected populace to go to court of law.
Non Passage of LA Amendment Bill (2007) in the Parliament
only when the list of qualified/eligible applicants is put up for information only
after RFQ stage.
Relaxing the condition of forfeiture of entire Bid Security which is a significant
amount between 1 to 2 % of Total Project Cost (TPC) to mere 5% of value of Bid
Security due to non-responsiveness of tenderers.
Extension of concession period of Concessionaire in proportion to cost to be
incurred for capacity augmentation with an upper cap of 5 years instead of existing
clause for termination in case of exceeding of designed traffic.
Would you suggest anything else, which you feel important ?
Expressway Authority (YEA). The huge appreciation in land prices can be made
out from the fact that the land was acquired at ` 700 per sq.m whereas YEA is
venturing residential plots adjacent to expressway @ ` 4750 / sq.m i.e., almost
500% after accounting for incidental expenditure on development.
[ ` 4000 billion / ` 3000 billion / ` 2000 billion / ` 1000 billion / ` 500 billion /
< ` 500 billion / No idea ]
Any other source of funding, according to you... so as to avoid further delays since
completion schedules already shifted by 3 years as per the revised strategy
formulated by BK Chaturvedi committee of 2009.
Our country spends only about 6% of GDP on infrastructure when China is
spending about 20%. Does India has the means and will to enhance the investment
on highway construction on par with China ?
Means Yes No
Yes No
Will No Yes
7. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) – Shri Kamal Nath, the Minister of Road
Transport and Highways is actively pushing for mega projects to attract global players.
These mega projects will build highways of over 500 km, involving contracts worth `
40 - 50 billion and a concession period ranging between 30 to 50 years. Mega road
projects demand huge investments, high experience, latest technologies and innovative
approach. All these factors have definitely created a huge opportunity for foreign
contractors and investors to enter the lucrative Indian highways sector, which in turn
will spur infrastructure growth in the country. Moreover, the Minister’s announcement
that the foreign players will have to engage Indian firms for the projects has given the
sector an additional boost since it would pave way for key learning session for Indian
Companies under Joint Venture. Now, tell me your opinion on the success of these
mega projects by quoting the relevant figure as per the ‘degree of success’ scale given
below.
x Initially, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways planned to take up the six-
laning of the 558 km Kishangarh-Udaipur-Ahmedabad section for an estimated cost
of ` 42.84 billion and a concession period of 30 to 50 years. What is your
expectations on the success of this project ? [ ]
x Predictions for such mega projects in future ? [ ]
1989
1990
1995
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2005
2007
2008
Length
11605
16314
19453
34300
45339
53913
(kms)
1603
3422
4771
8733
147
271
Option 1 – Not possible for such initiative since highway development being carried
out through PPP and these PSUs cannot finance BOT projects on their own without
government budgetary support.
Option 2 – Only possibility for engaging these PSUs in EPC contracts where response
to BOT mode is poor and not many private enterprises are forthcoming.
Option 3 – Compulsory for Consortiums to bid as JV with PSUs similar to China.
10. Ground problems at Construction sites – From the list of constraints generally
faced by construction firms, identify as per the rating scale given below according to
their impact causing delays in development of highways.
Highly Critical High importance Low No impact
critical importance
4 3 2 1 0
11. Dispute Resolution - The employers representatives are afraid of taking fair and
positive decision due to fear of finance, audit and vigilance or giving room for similar
claim in other contracts for same reasons or because the mistakes committed by the
employer, knowingly or unknowingly, which would reflect back on them. The safe
course of action is hence taken to challenge in arbitration, even if Dispute Resolution
Board (DRB) members are of reputed nature. The arbitration itself has become now-a-
days like a court, taking lot of time for award with more legal people coming and
dragging the matter. Thus the main purpose of settling in arbitration early through
experts is lost. Again in arbitration, if the arbitrator hold the decision like Dispute
Board, again it is challenged in the court repeatedly up to Supreme Court. Once a
matter goes to court, it takes decades for decision, and the relevance of decision is lost.
Per change if any right thinking person takes a decision in favour of DRB or
Arbitrations award, his integrity is doubted. Should Arbitrator’s award be made final
and binding on both the parties without recourse to court of law [Yes/No/Can’t say]
12. Final Say on NHDP - As per the World Bank Report on India’s Road
Construction Industry : Capacity Issues, Constraints and Recommendations (Oct 2009)
Indian road construction sector is plagued by poor planning and execution,
corruption, and huge time and cost overruns. When the outer limit of extension
for contracts in UK is 25%, it is as high as 70% in India.
About 40% of road contracts have cost overrun of 25 to 50%.
90 billion rupees is locked up in disputes and arbitration.
180
Anticipated Date of
Date of Approval
Original Date of
Commisioning
Commisioning
2008 (months)
2010 (months)
Length (km)
million)
billion)
billion)
NHDP
Name of road N
SNo State
stretch H
Lucknow
Uttar Apr Dec Jun-
1 Kanpur Km 25 16 EW 0.51 0.51 32.05 0 78 96
Pradesh -00 -01 08
59.5-75.5
Purnea
Ma
Gayakota Km Apr Mar
2 31 Bihar 15 EW 0.63 0.63 41.99 0 y- 74 98
410-419 & 470- -00 -02
08
476
Mehsi Kotwa Dec Jul- Sep
3 28 Bihar 40 EW 2.39 2.39 59.75 0 50 68
Km 480 - 440 -03 05 -09
Muzzaffarpur
Dec Jul- Sep
4 Mehsi Km 520- 28 Bihar 40 EW 2.75 2.75 68.75 0 50 68
-03 05 -09
480
Purnea
Apr Jul- Sep
5 Gayakota Km 31 Bihar 28 EW 2.06 2.06 73.48 0 50
-00 04 -08
419-447
Bijni-
Assam/WB 31 Dec Jun- Jun-
6 Assam 30 EW 2.30 2.30 76.67 0 48 78
Border Km 30 - C -03 05 09
0
25
Lucknow Uttar Apr Jun- Jun-
7 & 23 EW 1.83 1.86 79.88 30 48 75
Bypass Pradesh -00 04 08
28
Deesa Ma
Dec 798. Feb
9 Radhanpur Km 14 Gujarat 86 EW 4.00 4.80 46.50 y- 39
-03 5 -05
372 - 458 08
Radhanpur Ma
10 Dec - Feb
10 Gagodhar-V 15 Gujarat EW 4.29 4.10 40.09 y- 39
7 -03 190 -05
Km 138.8 - 245 08
Harangajo
Maibang Km Dec Sep Dec
11 54 Assam 26 EW 2.12 2.12 81.54 0 27
164.08 - -03 -07 -09
190.587
Orai Jhansi Km Uttar Dec Mar Dec
12 25 50 EW 3.40 3.40 68.00 0 21 33
220 - 170 Pradesh -03 -08 -09
Silchar
Dec Sep Jun-
13 Udarband Km 54 Assam 34 EW 1.57 1.55 46.31 -29 21 42
-03 -07 09
309-275
Sonapur
Dec Mar Dec
14 Guwahati Km 37 Assam 19 EW 2.45 2.45 128.95 0 21 33
-03 -08 -09
183 - 163.895
Dharmatul Ma
Dec Dec
15 Sonapur Km 31 Assam 22 EW 1.60 1.60 72.73 0 y- 19 31
-03 -09
205 - 183 08
182
Original Cost ( Rs in
Anticipated Date of
Time Overrun in
Time Overrun in
Original Date of
Cost/km (Rs in
Commisioning
Commisioning
Length (km)
in billion)
million)
million)
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
SNo NH State
stretch
Nagaon
Dec Jun- Dec
16 Dharamtul Km 37 Assam 25 EW 2.65 2.65 105.89 0 18 30
-03 08 -09
255 - 230
Gagodhar
Dec Nov Mar
17 Garamore Km 8A Gujarat 36 EW 4.12 4.79 114.44 670 16 31
-03 -07 -09
245 - 281.3
Guwahati
Dec Apr Jun-
19 Nalbari Km 31 Assam 28 EW 1.98 1.98 70.71 0 14 32
-03 -08 09
1093 - 1065
Guwahati
Dec Apr Jun-
20 Nalbari Km 31 Assam 28 EW 1.76 1.76 62.86 0 14 47
-03 -08 09
1121 - 1093
Simrahi
Dec Apr Jun-
22 Ringbund Km 57 Bihar 25 EW 1.01 1.01 40.20 0 14 23
-03 -08 09
190 - 165
Gogunda
Rajasta Dec Aug Sep
23 Udaipur Km 76 31 EW 2.66 2.88 85.81 220 13 28
n -03 -07 -08
104 - 73
Bijni-
Assam/WB 31 Dec Jun- Jun-
24 Assam 30 EW 1.95 1.95 65.00 0 12
Border Km 30 - C -03 08 09
60
Bijni-
Assam/WB 31 Dec Jun- Jun-
25 Assam 33 EW 2.38 2.38 72.06 0 12 42
Border Km 93 - C -03 08 09
60
Dakoba Nagaon Dec Jun- Jun-
26 36 Assam 31 EW 2.25 2.25 73.77 0 12 30
Km 36 - 5.5 -03 08 09
Darbhanga
Dec Jun- Jun-
27 Muzaffarpur 57 Bihar 30 EW 2.92 2.92 97.27 0 12 24
-03 08 09
Km 30 - 0
Darbhanga
Dec Jun- Jun-
28 Muzaffarpur 57 Bihar 40 EW 3.05 3.05 76.25 0 12 24
-03 08 09
Km 70 - 30
Dharmatul
Dec Jun- Jun-
29 Sonapur Km 31 Assam 26 EW 2.00 2.00 78.43 0 12 30
-03 08 09
230.5 - 205
Maibang
Dec Nov Nov
31 Lumding Km 54 Assam 15 EW 1.55 1.55 100.32 0 12 25
-03 -08 -09
111 - 126.45
Maibang
Dec Nov Dec
32 Lumding Km 54 Assam 23 EW 1.67 1.67 72.61 0 12 25
-03 -08 -12
60.5 - 83.4
183
of Commisioning
Time Overrun in
Time Overrun in
Anticipated Date
Anticipated Cost
Original Date of
Original Cost (
Cost/km (Rs in
Commisioning
(Rs in billion)
Rs in billion)
Length (km)
in million)
Mar 2008
Mar 2010
(months)
(months)
million)
NHDP
Name of road
SNo NH State
stretch
Nagaon
Byepass Km 36
Dec Jun- Jun-
33 5.5(NH36) to &3 Assam 18 EW 2.30 2.30 127.78 0 12 21
-03 08 09
Km 7
262.7(NH37)
Nalbari Bijni Dec Jun- Jun-
34 31 Assam 30 EW 2.00 2.00 66.67 0 12 25
Km 1013 - 983 -03 08 09
Nalbari Bijni
Dec Jun- Jun-
35 Km 1065 - 31 Assam 25 EW 2.25 2.25 90.00 0 12 30
-03 08 09
1040.3
Purnea
Dec Apr Apr
37 Forbesganj Km 57 Bihar 62 EW 3.10 3.10 50.00 0 12 24
-03 -08 -09
268-330
Purnea
Dec Apr Apr
38 Forbesganj Km 57 Bihar 41 EW 2.76 2.76 67.32 0 12 24
-03 -08 -09
309-268
Ringbunds
Dec Jun- Jun-
39 Jhanjharpur Km 57 Bihar 45 EW 3.40 3.40 75.56 0 12 24
-03 08 09
155 - 110
Deewanpur
UP/Bihar Dec Oct- Sep
40 28 Bihar 42 EW 3.00 3.00 71.43 0 11 25
Border Km 402 -03 08 -09
- 360
Kotwa Dewapur Dec Oct- Sep
41 28 Bihar 38 EW 2.40 2.40 63.16 0 11 29
Km 440 - 402 -03 08 -09
Raj/MP Border
Rajasta Dec Apr Mar
42 - Kota Km 76 43 EW 2.97 3.59 69.07 620 11
n -03 -08 -09
449.15 - 406
Siliguri
West Dec Jul- Jun-
43 Islampur Km 31 26 EW 2.25 2.25 86.54 0 11 23
Bengal -03 08 09
526 - 500
Garamore
Dec Nov Sep
44 Bamanbore Km 8A Gujarat 72 EW 3.60 3.80 50.00 200 10
-03 -07 -08
254 - 182.6
Harangajo
Dec Feb Dec
45 Maibang Km 54 Assam 14 EW 2.80 2.80 200.00 0 10 22
-03 -09 -09
126.45 - 140.70
Forbesganj
Dec Sep Jun-
48 Simrahi Km 57 Bihar 40 EW 3.33 3.33 83.25 0 9 30
-03 -08 09
230 - 190
Ganga Bridge-
Ramadevi Uttar Dec 466. Sep Jun-
49 Crossing Km 75 -
25 5 EW 1.55 2.02 310.00 9 33
Pradesh -03 6 -08 09
80
184
Original Date of
Original Cost (
Cost/km (Rs in
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
Cost Overrun
Rs in billion)
Length (km)
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
Approval
(months)
(months)
million)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
SNo NH State
stretch
Jhajharpur
Dec Sep Jun-
50 Darbanga Km 57 Bihar 40 EW 3.40 3.40 85.00 0 9 39
-03 -08 09
110 - 70
Ayodhya
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
51 Lucknow Km 28 42 EW 2.12 2.12 50.48 0 8 24
Pradesh -03 08 09
135 - 93
Ayodhya
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
52 Lucknow Km 28 37 EW 1.93 1.93 52.16 0 8
Pradesh -03 08 09
45 - 8
Ayodhya
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
53 Lucknow Km 28 48 EW 2.17 2.17 45.21 0 8 24
Pradesh -03 08 09
93 - 45
Bakaria
Rajasta Dec Apr Dec
54 Gogunda KM 76 44 EW 4.57 5.30 103.86 730 8
n -03 -08 -08
73 - 29
Karur Madurai
TamilN Dec Dec Dec
55 Km 373.275 - 7 53 NS 2.84 2.84 53.16 0 0
adu -03 -08 -08
426.60
Gorakhpur
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
56 Ayodhya Km 28 44 EW 2.27 2.27 51.59 0 8 26
Pradesh -03 08 09
208 - 164
Gorakhpur
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
57 Ayodhya Km 28 43 EW 2.39 2.39 55.58 0 8 24
Pradesh -03 08 09
251 - 208
-
Kota Bypass Rajasta Dec Oct- Jun-
58 76 25 EW 2.75 2.50 110.00 246. 8 20
Km 406 - 381 n -03 08 09
1
Maibang
Dec Apr Dec
59 Lumding Km 54 Assam 21 EW 2.00 2.00 97.56 0 8 20
-03 -09 -09
40 - 60.5
Maibang
Dec Apr Apr
60 Lumding Km 54 Assam 28 EW 2.00 2.00 71.36 0 8 20
-03 -09 -09
83.4 - 111
Raj/MP Border
Rajasta Dec Apr Dec
61 - Kota Km 509 - 76 60 EW 3.78 4.30 63.00 520 8
n -03 -08 -08
449.15
Swaroopganj 76
Rajasta Dec 231. Apr Dec
62 Bakaria Km 29- &1 44 EW 2.20 2.43 50.00 8
n -03 1 -08 -08
0 & 264-249.7 4
Assam/WB
Border - West Dec Nov Jun-
63 31 32 EW 2.22 2.22 69.32 0 7 19
Gairkatta Km Bengal -03 -08 09
255 - 223
Rajasta Dec Feb Sep
64 Chambal Bridge 76 6 EW 2.75 2.81 500.00 63.1 7 10
n -03 -10 -10
Ma
Jhansi Shivpuri Madhya Dec Dec
65 25 41 EW 2.20 2.20 53.66 0 y- 7
Km 91 - 50 Pradesh -03 -08
08
Kasia
Uttar Dec Dec Jun-
66 Gorakhpur Km 28 40 EW 2.42 2.42 60.50 0 6 24
Pradesh -03 -08 09
319.8 - 279.8
185
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
UP/Bihar
Border - Kasia Uttar Dec Dec Jun-
67 28 41 EW 2.27 2.27 55.37 0 6 24
Km 360.9 - Pradesh -03 -08 09
319.8
Chittorgarh
Rajasta Dec Apr Sep
68 Bypass Km 253 76 40 EW 3.84 4.48 96.00 640 5
n -03 -08 -08
- 213
Harangajo
Dec Jul- Dec
69 Maibang Km 54 Assam 24 EW 1.96 1.96 81.67 0 5 41
-03 09 -09
140.7 - 164.08
Kota
Rajasta Dec 631. Apr Sep
70 Chittorgarh Km 76 63 EW 4.41 5.04 69.92 5
n -03 6 -08 -08
316 - 253
Kota
Rajasta Dec Apr Sep
71 Chittorgarh Km 76 65 EW 4.46 5.28 68.62 820 5
n -03 -08 -08
381 - 316
Shivpuri Bypass
upto MP/Raj
Border 25
Uttar Dec Feb Jun-
72 Km 15 - 0 of &7 46 EW 3.60 3.60 78.26 0 4
Pradesh -03 -08 08
NH25 & Km 6
610 - 579 of
NH76
Palanpur
Rajasta Dec Mar Jun-
73 Swaroopganj 14 76 EW 4.98 4.98 65.53 0 3
n -03 -09 09
Km 264 - 340
Raj/MP Border
Rajasta Dec Mar Jun-
74 - Kota Km 579 - 76 70 EW 3.11 3.49 44.43 380 3
n -03 -08 08
509
Bara Orai Km
2& Uttar Dec Apr Apr
75 449-422 & Km 62 EW 4.65 4.65 75.00 0 0 14
25 Pradesh -03 -09 -09
255-220
Brahmaputra
Dec Apr Apr
76 Bridge Km 31 Assam 5 EW 2.18 2.18 435.22 0 0 8
-03 -10 -10
1126 - 1121
Kosi Bridge incl
Dec Mar Mar
77 approaches Km 57 Bihar 10 EW 4.18 4.18 418.00 0 0 15
-03 -10 -10
155 - 165
Rajkot Bypass-
Dec 123 Mar Mar
78 Gondal Jetpur 36 Gujarat 10 EW 2.65 3.88 265.00 0
-03 0 -08 -08
Km 185-175
Siliguri
West Dec Oct- Oct-
79 Islampur Km 31 25 EW 1.55 1.55 62.00 0 0
Bengal -03 08 08
551 - 526
Gorakhpur
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
80 Bypass Km 28 28 EW 6.00 6.00 214.37 0 -4 17
Pradesh -03 09 09
251.7 - 279.8
Sunakhala
Apr Apr Dec
81 Ganjam Km 5 Orissa 54 GQ 2.25 2.25 41.67 0 68 90
-00 -04 -09
338-284
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
Balasore
Apr Feb Dec
83 Bhadrak Km 5 Orissa 62 GQ 2.27 2.27 36.65 0 58 82
-00 -04 -08
137-199
Bridges
Dhankuni- West Apr Feb Dec
84 6 2 GQ 0.81 0.81 500.00 0 58
Kharagpur Km Bengal -00 -04 -08
17.6-136
Ganjam
Apr Feb Nov
85 Icchapuram Km 5 Orissa 51 GQ 2.63 2.63 51.62 0 57 76
-00 -04 -08
233-284
Bhubaneswar
Apr Jan- Jun-
88 Khurda Km 5 Orissa 30 GQ 1.41 1.41 46.95 0 53 74
-00 04 08
388-418
Chitradurga
Karnata Apr Aug Oct-
91 Bypass Km 207 4 18 GQ 1.04 1.04 57.78 0 50 69
ka -00 -04 08
- 189
Bridges
Ma
Balasore- Apr Apr
92 5 Orissa 3 GQ 1.55 1.55 500.00 0 y- 47
Chandikhole -00 -08
04
Km 61-199
Handia Varnasi Uttar Apr Jul- Apr
93 2 72 GQ 2.86 2.86 39.72 0 45
Km 245-317 Pradesh -00 04 -08
Chitradurga
Karnata Apr Aug Apr
94 Sira Km 189- 4 67 GQ 3.04 3.04 45.37 0 44
ka -00 -04 -08
122
Gorhar Barwa
Jharkha Apr Mar Sep
95 Adda Km 320- 2 79 GQ 4.00 4.00 50.60 0 42 63
nd -00 -05 -08
399
Agra
Uttar Apr Mar Jul-
96 Shikohabad Km 2 51 GQ 3.67 3.67 72.06 0 40 69
Pradesh -00 -05 08
200-251
Ma
Etawah Rajpur Uttar Apr Mar
97 2 72 GQ 3.48 3.48 48.39 0 y- 38
Km 321-393 Pradesh -00 -05
08
Varanasi Ma
Uttar Apr Mar
98 Mohania Km 2 12 GQ 4.68 4.68 390.00 0 y- 38 63
Pradesh -00 -05
317-329 08
Kanpur
Uttar Apr Mar Apr
99 Fatehpur Km 2 13 GQ 4.95 4.95 381.04 0 37
Pradesh -00 -05 -08
470-483
187
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
Sasaram Dehri-
Apr Mar Apr
100 on-Sone Km 2 Bihar 30 GQ 2.22 2.22 73.96 0 37
-00 -05 -08
110-140
Shikohabad
Uttar Apr Mar Apr
101 Etawah Km 2 57 GQ 2.61 2.61 45.83 0 37
Pradesh -00 -05 -08
250.5-307.5
Allahabad
Ma
Bypass Uttar Apr Mar
102 2 1 GQ 0.91 0.91 913.60 0 y- 26
Contract-I Km Pradesh -00 -06
08
158-159
Allahabad
Bypass Uttar Apr Dec Jun-
103 2 40 GQ 4.41 4.41 110.23 0 18 36
Contract-II Km Pradesh -00 -06 08
158-198
Allahabad
Ma
Bypass Uttar Apr Jun-
104 2 44 GQ 5.34 5.34 121.45 0 y- 13 31
Contract-III Km Pradesh -00 08
07
198-242
Harihar
Karnata Apr Aug
105 Chitradurga Km 4 77 GQ 3.18 3.18 41.30 0 0 70
ka -00 -04
284 - 207
Jalandar
Mar Feb Nov
106 Amritsar Km 1 Punjab 49 III 2.63 2.63 53.67 0 9 14
-05 -09 -09
407 - 456
Tovaramkurchi
TamilN Dec Aug Jan-
107 Madurai Km 60 64 III 2.63 2.63 41.09 0 4 16
adu -03 -08 08
- 124
21
Ambala Mar Nov Nov
109 &2 Punjab 36 III 2.98 2.98 82.78 0 0
Zirakpur -05 -08 -08
2
Kondali
Mahara Mar Mar Mar
116 Telegaon Km 6 50 III 2.12 2.12 42.40 0 0
shtra -05 -09 -09
50 - 100
188
Original Date of
Original Cost (
Cost/km (Rs in
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
Cost Overrun
Rs in billion)
Length (km)
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
Approval
(months)
(months)
million)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
SNo NH State
stretch
Meerut
Uttar Mar Mar Mar
119 Muzaffarnagar 58 79 III 3.59 3.59 45.44 0 0 15
Pradesh -05 -09 -09
Km 52 - 131
Nagpur
Mahara Mar Dec Dec
120 Kondhali Km 9 6 41 III 1.68 1.68 40.98 0 0 16
shtra -05 -08 -08
- 50
Neelamangala
Jn (NH4) to Karnata Mar Jul- Jul-
121 4 55 III 4.41 4.41 80.00 0 0 30
Devihalli ka -05 10 10
(NH48)
Pondichery TamilN Mar Jul- Jul-
122 40 III 2.85 2.85 71.25 0 0 30
Tindivanam adu -05 20 10
Salem
TamilN 13 Mar Jan- Jan-
123 Ulundrupet Km 68 III 9.41 9.41 69.19 0 0 30
adu 6 -05 11 11
0.313 - 136.67
Sitapur
Uttar Mar Jun- Jun-
124 Lucknow Km 24 75 III 3.22 3.22 42.93 0 0 20
Pradesh -05 09 09
488 - 413
Six Laning
Bangalore Karnata Mar Jul- Jul-
125 7 15 III 1.10 1.10 73.33 0 0
Hosur Km ka -05 08 08
18.75 - 33.51
Thanjavur
TamilN Mar Jun- Jun-
126 Trichy Km 80 - 67 55 III 2.80 2.80 50.91 0 0 12
adu -05 09 09
135
Dhule
Mahara 11 Mar Mar Dec
129 Pimpalgaon Km 3 III 5.56 5.56 48.35 0 -3 12
shtra 5 -05 -09 -08
380 - 265
Madurai
45 TamilN 12 Mar Nov Nov -
130 Tuticorin Km III 6.29 6.29 49.92 0 -5
B adu 6 -05 -10 -10 10
138 - 264
MO
Service road & Mar Aug Aug
132 Assam 10 RT 0.34 0.34 33.78 0 12
Flyover -05 -07 -08
H
4,5 MO
TamilN Dec Nov Oct-
133 Chennai Bypass &4 32 RT 4.80 4.80 150.00 0 11 31
adu -03 -07 08
5 H
189
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
Improvement of MO
TamilN Jan- Apr Mar
134 Access of GQ 4 4 RT 2.10 2.10 525.00 0 11 44
adu 05 -07 -08
within Chennai H
MO
TamilN Jan- Sep Aug
135 Lalapet ROB 0 RT 0.24 0.24 503.96 0 11
adu 06 -07 -08
H
Trichy Bypass- MO
45 TamilN Dec Aug Mar
136 Tuvaramkurchi 61 RT 2.61 2.61 42.79 0 7 19
B adu -03 -08 -09
Km 0 - 60.95 H
MO
Dhalkola West Mar Aug Aug
137 34 6 RT 0.67 0.67 121.82 0 0 28
Bypass Bengal -06 -08 -08
H
Islam Nagar to MO
Andhra Dec Mar Mar
138 Kadtal Km 230 48 RT 5.46 5.46 113.75 0 0 4
Pradesh -03 -10 -10
- 278 H
Kangayam MO
TamilN Feb Aug Aug
139 Coimbatore Km 55 RT 0.80 0.80 14.46 0 0 18
adu -06 -08 -08
277 - 332 H
Karur MO
TamilN Feb Aug Aug
140 Kangayam Km 59 RT 0.63 0.63 10.64 0 0 14
adu -06 -08 -08
218.2 - 277.4 H
Lumding MO
Dec Aug Aug
141 Daboka Km 44 Assam 22 RT 1.30 1.30 59.09 0 0
-03 -10 -10
- 22 H
NH
MO
Connectivity to Apr Feb Feb
142 SH Kerala 86 RT 5.57 5.57 65.07 0 0 10
JCTT -07 -10 -10
H
Vallarapadam
Haryana Border
- Mukaraba Apr 272. Apr Sep
143 1 Delhi 13 NS 0.71 0.98 55.51 65
Chowk Km -00 2 -03 -08
29.3-16.5
Panchi Gujran
Haryan Apr Sep Sep
144 Sonepat Km 44- 1 22 NS 0.82 0.84 37.27 16.7 60 85
a -00 -03 -08
66
Thumpipadi
TamilN Apr Aug Jun-
145 Salem Km 180- 7 19 NS 0.82 0.82 42.96 0 58 82
adu -00 -03 08
199.2
Nandhi Hills
Karnata Apr Mar Aug
146 Devanahalli Km 7 17 NS 1.72 1.72 101.21 0 53
ka -00 -04 -08
556-539
Kunjwani Jammu
Apr Dec Dec
147 Vijaypur Km 1A & 17 NS 1.10 1.10 64.71 0 48 72
-00 -04 -08
80-97 kashmir
Devdhari
Mahara Dec Jul- Jun-
148 Wadner Km 94- 7 29 NS 1.45 1.45 50.00 0 47
shtra -03 05 09
123
Devdhari
Mahara Dec Jul- Mar
150 Kelapur Km 7 30 NS 1.44 1.44 48.00 0 44 59
shtra -03 05 -09
123-153
190
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
Thopurghat Ma
TamilN Dec Sep
152 Thummipadi 7 17 NS 0.93 0.93 55.41 0 y- 40 56
adu -03 -08
Km 163.3-180 05
Agra Bypass
Uttar Dec Sep Oct-
154 Km 176/NH2 to 2 39 NS 3.48 3.48 89.23 0 37 41
Pradesh -03 -07 10
Km 13/NH3
Gundla
Pochampally Andhra Apr Dec Dec
155 7 10 NS 0.72 0.72 71.57 0 36 54
Shivrampalli Pradesh -00 -05 -08
Km 464-474
Jammu - Ma
Srinagar Bypass Dec Sep
156 1A & 18 NS 1.25 0.61 70.22 643. y- 28 55
Km 286-303.8 -03 -08
kashmir 4 06
Pathankot Ma
Dec Dec
157 Bhogpur Km 1A Punjab 44 NS 2.84 2.84 64.55 0 y- 19 31
-03 -09
26-70 08
Pathankot Ma
Dec Dec
158 Bhogpur Km 1A Punjab 40 NS 2.29 2.29 57.25 0 y- 19 27
-03 -09
70-110 08
Pathankot J&K Jammu Ma
Dec Dec
159 Border Km 1A & 7 NS 0.98 0.98 136.69 0 y- 19 31
-03 -09
110.45-117.6 kashmir 08
Vijaypur Jammu
Dec Mar Jun-
160 Pathankot Km 1A & 34 NS 1.93 1.93 56.76 0 15 28
-03 -08 09
16.35 - 50 kashmir
Hyderabad
Andhra Dec Sep Sep
161 Bangalore Km 7 40 NS 2.43 2.43 60.85 0 12 21
Pradesh -03 -08 -09
336-376
Vijaypur Jammu
Dec Mar Mar
162 Pathankot Km 1A & 30 NS 1.66 1.66 55.42 0 12
-03 -08 -09
50-80 kashmir
Gorakhpur
Uttar Dec Oct- Jun-
163 Ayodhya Km 28 29 NS 2.05 2.05 70.69 0 8 24
Pradesh -03 08 09
164-135
Rajmarg
Choraha Madhya Dec Oct- Jun-
164 26 54 NS 2.51 2.51 46.49 0 8 32
Lkhnandon Km Pradesh -03 08 09
297-351
Rajmarg
Choraha Madhya Dec Oct- Jun-
165 26 55 NS 2.30 2.30 41.80 0 8 32
Lkhnandon Km Pradesh -03 08 09
351-405.7
Sagar Rajmarg
Madhya Dec Oct- Jun-
166 Choraha Km 26 44 NS 2.03 2.03 46.23 0 8 26
Pradesh -03 08 09
211-255
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
Jammu
Kunjwani Jammu Ma Ma
Dec
168 (Jammu 1A & 15 NS 0.85 0.85 56.89 0 y- y- 7 24
-03
Bypass) Km 0- kashmir 08 09
15
Madurai
TamilN Dec Mar Oct-
169 Kanyakumari 7 40 NS 5.07 5.07 126.87 0 7 25
adu -03 -08 08
Km 120-160
Madurai
TamilN Dec Mar Oct-
170 Kanyakumari 7 38 NS 4.74 4.74 124.79 0 7
adu -03 -08 08
Km 42-80
Madurai
TamilN Dec Mar Oct-
171 Kanyakumari 7 40 NS 3.23 3.23 80.84 0 7 30
adu -03 -08 08
Km 80-120
Madurai
TamilN Dec Mar Oct-
172 Tirunelveli Km 7 42 NS 5.67 5.67 135.09 0 7
adu -03 -08 08
0-42
Kelapur Ma
Mahara Dec Nov
173 Pimpalkatti Km 7 22 NS 1.17 1.17 53.36 0 y- 6 31
shtra -03 -08
153 - 175 09
Tirunelveli
TamilN Dec Mar Sep
174 Panagudi Km 7 43 NS 4.24 4.24 98.50 0 6
adu -03 -08 -08
160-203
Panipat Panchi
Haryan Dec Oct- Mar
176 Gujaran Km 86- 1 20 NS 1.09 1.09 54.50 0 5 26
a -03 08 -09
66
Salem Karur
TamilN Dec Aug Nov
177 Km 258.65 - 7 34 NS 2.06 2.06 60.47 0 3
adu -03 -08 -08
292.6
AP Border
Nandi Hill Karnata Dec Mar Mar
178 7 63 NS 4.03 4.03 63.94 0 0 9
Crossing Km ka -03 -09 -09
464-527
Dholpur
Madhya Dec Sep Sep
179 Morena Km 51- 3 10 NS 2.32 2.32 232.00 0 0 6
Pradesh -03 -10 -10
61
Farukhnagar
Andhra Dec - Feb Feb
180 Kotakotta km 7 46 NS 2.67 2.55 58.09 0
Pradesh -03 122 -09 -09
34-80
Farukhnagar
Andhra Dec - Feb Feb
181 Kotakotta km 7 55 NS 3.14 3.02 57.04 0
Pradesh -03 117 -09 -09
80-135
Hyderabad -
Andhra Dec Mar Mar
184 Bangalore Km 7 76 NS 6.11 5.92 80.95 194. 0
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
135.47 - 211 4
192
Original Date of
Original Cost (
Cost/km (Rs in
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
Cost Overrun
Rs in billion)
Length (km)
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
Approval
(months)
(months)
million)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
SNo NH State
stretch
Hyderabad
Andhra Dec Aug Aug
185 Bangalore Km 7 40 NS 1.95 1.95 48.70 0 0 8
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
211-251
Hyderabad
Andhra Dec Aug Aug
186 Bangalore Km 7 42 NS 2.08 2.08 49.63 0 0 8
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
251 - 293.4
Hyderabad
Andhra Dec Sep Sep
187 Bangalore Km 7 43 NS 2.39 2.39 55.63 0 0 9
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
293 - 336
Hyderabad
Andhra Dec Aug Aug
188 Bangalore Km 7 42 NS 2.06 2.06 49.03 0 0 8
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
376-418
Hyderabad
Andhra Dec Aug Aug
189 Bangalore Km 7 45 NS 2.44 2.44 54.14 0 0 8
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
418-463
Krishnagiri
TamilN Dec Dec Dec
193 Thopurghat Km 7 62 NS 3.73 3.73 60.11 0 0
adu -03 -08 -08
94-156
Lakhnandon -
Madhya Dec Jun- Jun-
194 MP/Mah Border 7 50 NS 4.07 4.07 81.40 0 0 12
Pradesh -03 10 10
Km 547-597
Lakhnandon -
Madhya Dec Sep Jun-
195 MP/Mah Border 7 49 NS 2.63 2.63 53.67 0 0 9
Pradesh -03 -09 10
Km 596 -653
Mah/AP Border
Andhra Dec Nov Nov
197 to Islam Nagar 7 55 NS 3.60 3.60 65.45 0 0 4
Pradesh -03 -09 -09
Km 175-230
Sagar Rajmarg
Madhya Dec Oct- Oct-
198 Choraha Km 26 72 NS 2.07 2.07 28.74 0 0 18
Pradesh -03 08 08
225-297
Salem Karur
TamilN Dec Jan- Jan-
199 Km 207.05- 7 42 NS 2.54 2.54 60.97 0 0
adu -03 09 09
248.625
Salem Kerala
Border Km TamilN Dec Dec Dec
200 47 54 NS 4.70 4.70 87.76 0 0 16
203.96(NH7) - adu -03 -08 -08
Km 53(NH4)
Salem Kerala
TamilN Dec Dec Dec
201 Border Km 53- 97 47 NS 3.80 3.80 80.81 0 0
adu -03 -08 -08
100
193
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
Ma
Paradip Port Apr Feb
216 5A Orissa 77 Port 4.28 4.28 55.58 0 y- 15
Km 0 - 77 -00 -07
08
Ma Ma
Mahara Apr
217 JNPT Phase II 54 14 Port 1.43 1.43 99.65 0 y- y- 12 29
shtra -00
07 08
Commisioning
Commisioning
Time Overrun
Time Overrun
(Rs in million)
( Rs in billion)
Cost Overrun
Original Date
Original Cost
Length (km)
Cost/km (Rs
in Mar 2008
in Mar 2010
Anticipated
Anticipated
Cost (Rs in
in million)
Approval
(months)
(months)
Date of
Date of
billion)
NHDP
Name of road
of
SNo NH State
stretch
17
New Mangalore Karnata Apr Jun- Dec
219 &4 37 Port 1.97 1.97 53.11 0 6 24
Port ka -00 08 -08
8
Bharuch Surat Ma
Jul- Jul-
223 BOT-II Km 0 - 8 Gujarat 65 V y- 4.92 4.92 75.69 0 0
09 09
65 (6 Laning) 06
Vadodara
Ma
Bharuch BOT-I Jul- Jul-
224 8 Gujarat 84 V y- 6.60 6.60 78.57 0 0
Km 108-192 (6 09 09
06
Laning)
APPX 3 (CONTD)
Delay in Approvals of
Late Conclusion of
Critical Structures
Legal/Court Cases
Design Changes to
Land Acquisition
Poor Contractor
Encroachments
Termination of
Utility Shifting
Rains/Floods
Tree Felling
ROB/RUB
Structures
Contracts
Contracts
Delayed
Name of road Delay
SNo
stretch Index
Lucknow Kanpur
1 1 1 0.3246
Km 59.5-75.5
Purnea Gayakota
2 Km 410-419 & 470- 0.0000
476
Mehsi Kotwa Km
3 1 0.0926
480 - 440
Muzzaffarpur Mehsi
4 1 1 0.5064
Km 520-480
Purnea Gayakota
5 1 1 0.5047
Km 419-447
Bijni-Assam/WB
6 1 1 0.6098
Border Km 30 - 0
Land Acquisition
Poor Contractor
Late Conclusion
Design Changes
Encroachments
Termination of
Utility Shifting
to Structures
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
ROB/RUB
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Critical
Cases
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
Jhansi Bypass Km
8 1 1 1 0.4360
104 - 91
Deesa Radhanpur
9 1 1 0.1775
Km 372 - 458
Radhanpur
10 Gagodhar-V Km 1 1 0.2146
138.8 - 245
Harangajo Maibang
11 Km 164.08 - 1 1 1 1.3489
190.587
Silchar Udarband
13 1 1 1 1.0581
Km 309-275
Sonapur Guwahati
14 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 183 - 163.895
Dharmatul Sonapur
15 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 205 - 183
Nagaon Dharamtul
16 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 255 - 230
Gagodhar Garamore
17 1 1 0.1775
Km 245 - 281.3
Guwahati Nalbari
19 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 1093 - 1065
Guwahati Nalbari
20 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 1121 - 1093
Nalbari Bijni Km
21 1 1 1 1 1.9672
1040 - 1013
Simrahi Ringbund
22 1 1 1 0.5880
Km 190 - 165
Gogunda Udaipur
23 1 1 0.0278
Km 104 - 73
Bijni-Assam/WB
24 0.0000
Border Km 30 - 60
196
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Bijni-Assam/WB
25 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Border Km 93 - 60
Dakoba Nagaon Km
26 1 1 0.3657
36 - 5.5
Darbhanga
27 Muzaffarpur Km 30 1 0.4138
-0
Darbhanga
28 Muzaffarpur Km 70 1 1 1 1 0.6335
- 30
Dharmatul Sonapur
29 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 230.5 - 205
Lanka Daboka Km
30 1 1 0.3657
22 - 2.4
Maibang Lumding
31 1 0.9091
Km 111 - 126.45
Maibang Lumding
32 1 0.9091
Km 60.5 - 83.4
Nagaon Byepass
33 Km 5.5(NH36) to 1 1 1 1 1.9672
Km 262.7(NH37)
Nalbari Bijni Km
34 1 1 1.2008
1013 - 983
Nalbari Bijni Km
35 1 1 1 1 1.9672
1065 - 1040.3
Nalbari Bijni Km
36 1 1 1 1 1.9672
983 - 961.5
Purnea Forbesganj
37 1 1 0.4971
Km 268-330
Purnea Forbesganj
38 1 1 0.4971
Km 309-268
Ringbunds
39 Jhanjharpur Km 155 1 0.4138
- 110
Deewanpur
40 UP/Bihar Border 1 1 0.1759
Km 402 - 360
Kotwa Dewapur
41 1 1 0.5064
Km 440 - 402
Raj/MP Border -
42 Kota Km 449.15 - 1 1 0.0278
406
197
Poor Contractor
Late Conclusion
Design Changes
Encroachments
Termination of
Utility Shifting
to Structures
Rains/Floods
Performance
Approvals of
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
ROB/RUB
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Critical
Cases
Land
Delay
SNo Name of road stretch
Index
Siliguri Islampur
43 1 1 0.0000
Km 526 - 500
Garamore
44 Bamanbore Km 254 1 0.0741
- 182.6
Harangajo Maibang
45 1 0.9091
Km 126.45 - 140.70
Jetpur Bhiladi Km
46 1 0.0741
117 - 52.5
Jhansi Shivpuri Km
47 1 1 1 0.1103
50 - 15
Forbesganj Simrahi
48 1 1 1 0.5880
Km 230 - 190
Ganga Bridge-
49 Ramadevi Crossing 0.0000
Km 75 - 80
Jhajharpur
50 Darbanga Km 110 - 1 1 0.5064
70
Ayodhya Lucknow
51 1 1 0.4167
Km 135 - 93
Ayodhya Lucknow
52 0.0000
Km 45 - 8
Ayodhya Lucknow
53 0.0000
Km 93 - 45
Bakaria Gogunda
54 1 0.0000
KM 73 - 29
Karur Madurai Km
55 0.0000
373.275 - 426.60
Gorakhpur Ayodhya
56 1 0.1481
Km 208 - 164
Gorakhpur Ayodhya
57 1 0.1481
Km 251 - 208
Kota Bypass Km
58 1 1 0.0278
406 - 381
Maibang Lumding
59 1 0.9091
Km 40 - 60.5
198
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Maibang Lumding
60 1 0.9091
Km 83.4 - 111
Raj/MP Border -
61 Kota Km 509 - 1 1 0.0278
449.15
Swaroopganj
62 Bakaria Km 29-0 & 1 0.0278
264-249.7
Assam/WB Border -
63 Gairkatta Km 255 - 0.0000
223
Jhansi Shivpuri Km
65 1 1 1 0.1103
91 - 50
Kasia Gorakhpur
66 0.0000
Km 319.8 - 279.8
UP/Bihar Border -
67 Kasia Km 360.9 - 0.0000
319.8
Chittorgarh Bypass
68 1 0.0278
Km 253 - 213
Harangajo Maibang
69 1 1 1.0572
Km 140.7 - 164.08
Kota Chittorgarh
70 1 0.0000
Km 316 - 253
Kota Chittorgarh
71 1 1 0.0278
Km 381 - 316
Shivpuri Bypass
upto MP/Raj Border
72 Km 15 - 0 of NH25 0.0000
& Km 610 - 579 of
NH76
Palanpur
73 Swaroopganj Km 1 0.0000
264 - 340
Raj/MP Border -
74 1 0.0000
Kota Km 579 - 509
Brahmaputra Bridge
76 1 0.1481
Km 1126 - 1121
199
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Kosi Bridge incl
77 approaches Km 155 1 1 0.4508
- 165
Rajkot Bypass-
78 Gondal Jetpur Km 0.0000
185-175
Siliguri Islampur
79 0.0000
Km 551 - 526
Gorakhpur Bypass
80 1 0.1481
Km 251.7 - 279.8
Sunakhala Ganjam
81 1 1 1 0.3834
Km 338-284
Tumkur Bypass Km
82 1 1 1 0.2274
75-62
Balasore Bhadrak
83 1 1 1 0.3834
Km 137-199
Bridges Dhankuni-
84 Kharagpur Km 1 1 0.0773
17.6-136
Ganjam Icchapuram
85 1 1 0.3279
Km 233-284
Etawah Bypass Km
86 1 1 0.3246
307.5-321.1
Haveri Harihar Km
87 0.0000
340 - 284
Bhubaneswar
88 Khurda Km 388- 1 1 1 0.3834
418
Fatehpur Khaga Km
89 1 0.1481
38-115
Hubli Haveri Km
90 0.0000
404 - 340
Chitradurga Bypass
91 1 0.1765
Km 207 - 189
Bridges Balasore-
92 Chandikhole Km 0.0000
61-199
Handia Varnasi Km
93 1 1 0.3527
245-317
Chitradurga Sira
94 1 1 0.0598
Km 189-122
200
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Gorhar Barwa Adda
95 1 1 1 1 0.1006
Km 320-399
Agra Shikohabad
96 1 1 1 0.6860
Km 200-251
Etawah Rajpur Km
97 0.0000
321-393
Varanasi Mohania
98 1 1 1 0.4360
Km 317-329
Kanpur Fatehpur
99 1 1 0.3527
Km 470-483
Sasaram Dehri-on-
100 0.0000
Sone Km 110-140
Shikohabad Etawah
101 1 1 1 1 0.6125
Km 250.5-307.5
Allahabad Bypass
102 Contract-I Km 158- 1 1 0.2315
159
Allahabad Bypass
103 Contract-II Km 158- 1 0.1481
198
Allahabad Bypass
104 Contract-III Km 1 1 1 1 0.7694
198-242
Harihar Chitradurga
105 1 0.1765
Km 284 - 207
Jalandar Amritsar
106 0.0000
Km 407 - 456
Tovaramkurchi
107 Madurai Km 60 - 1 0.2593
124
Agra Bharatpur Km
108 0.0000
17 - 63
Aurang Raipur Km
110 0.0000
232 - 281
Bangalore Hoskote
111 Mudbagal Km 237 - 0.0000
318
Bharatpur Mahua
112 1 0.0000
Km 63 -120
201
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
Encroachme
of Contracts
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Conclusion
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Law &
Design
Utility
Order
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
nts
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
Elevated Highway
113 SilkBoardJn to 0.0000
Electronic City
Gonde Vadape
114 (Thane) Km 440 - 0.0000
539.5
Kondali Telegaon
116 0.0000
Km 50 - 100
Mahua Jaipur Km
118 1 0.0000
120 - 228
Meerut
119 Muzaffarnagar Km 1 0.1481
52 - 131
Nagpur Kondhali
120 0.0000
Km 9 - 50
Neelamangala Jn
121 (NH4) to Devihalli 0.0000
(NH48)
Pondichery
122 0.0000
Tindivanam
Salem Ulundrupet
123 0.0000
Km 0.313 - 136.67
Sitapur Lucknow
124 0.0000
Km 488 - 413
Six Laning
125 Bangalore Hosur 0.0000
Km 18.75 - 33.51
Thanjavur Trichy
126 1 0.2593
Km 80 -135
Dhule Pimpalgaon
129 0.0000
Km 380 - 265
Madurai Tuticorin
130 1 0.2593
Km 138 - 264
202
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Bangalore
131 0.0000
Neelamangala
Improvement of
134 Access of GQ 1 1 0.2033
within Chennai
Trichy Bypass-
136 Tuvaramkurchi Km 1 1 0.4028
0 - 60.95
Islam Nagar to
138 Kadtal Km 230 - 0.0000
278
Kangayam
139 Coimbatore Km 277 0.0000
- 332
Karur Kangayam
140 0.0000
Km 218.2 - 277.4
Lumding Daboka
141 1 0.9091
Km 44 - 22
NH Connectivity to
142 0.0000
JCTT Vallarapadam
Haryana Border -
143 Mukaraba Chowk 1 0.0185
Km 29.3-16.5
Panchi Gujran
144 1 1 0.0773
Sonepat Km 44-66
Thumpipadi Salem
145 1 1 0.4028
Km 180-199.2
Nandhi Hills
146 Devanahalli Km 0.0000
556-539
Kunjwani Vijaypur
147 0.0000
Km 80-97
Devdhari Wadner
148 1 1 0.0732
Km 94-123
203
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Borkhedi Jam Km
149 1 1 1 0.0732
36.6 - 64
Devdhari Kelapur
150 1 0.0278
Km 123-153
Jam Wadner Km
151 1 1 1 0.0732
64-94
Thopurghat
152 Thummipadi Km 1 1 0.4028
163.3-180
Butibori ROB Km
153 1 0.0000
22.85-24.65
Agra Bypass Km
154 176/NH2 to Km 0.0000
13/NH3
Gundla
Pochampally
155 1 1 0.0773
Shivrampalli Km
464-474
Srinagar Bypass Km
156 1 1 0.1780
286-303.8
Pathankot Bhogpur
157 1 1 0.0732
Km 26-70
Pathankot Bhogpur
158 1 1 0.0732
Km 70-110
Pathankot J&K
159 Border Km 110.45- 1 1 1 1 0.2706
117.6
Vijaypur Pathankot
160 1 1 1 0.4141
Km 16.35 - 50
Hyderabad
161 Bangalore Km 336- 0.0000
376
Vijaypur Pathankot
162 1 1 0.1919
Km 50-80
Gorakhpur Ayodhya
163 1 0.0833
Km 164-135
Rajmarg Choraha
164 Lkhnandon Km 0.0000
297-351
Rajmarg Choraha
165 Lkhnandon Km 0.0000
351-405.7
204
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Sagar Rajmarg
166 Choraha Km 211- 0.0000
255
Sagar Bypass Km
167 0.0000
187-211
Jammu Kunjwani
168 (Jammu Bypass) 1 1 0.3586
Km 0-15
Madurai
169 Kanyakumari Km 1 1 0.4028
120-160
Madurai
170 Kanyakumari Km 1 1 1 0.6620
42-80
Madurai
171 Kanyakumari Km 1 1 1 0.6620
80-120
Madurai Tirunelveli
172 1 1 0.4028
Km 0-42
Kelapur Pimpalkatti
173 0.0000
Km 153 - 175
Tirunelveli
174 Panagudi Km 160- 1 1 0.4028
203
Lalitpur Sagar Km
175 0.0000
132-187
Panipat Panchi
176 1 1 0.0366
Gujaran Km 86-66
Salem Karur Km
177 0.0000
258.65 - 292.6
AP Border Nandi
178 Hill Crossing Km 1 0.0370
464-527
Dholpur Morena
179 0.0000
Km 51-61
Farukhnagar
180 0.0000
Kotakotta km 34-80
Farukhnagar
181 Kotakotta km 80- 0.0000
135
Gwalior Bypass Km
182 0.0000
0 - 42.033
Gwalior Jhansi Km
183 0.0000
16 - 96.13
205
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Hyderabad
184 Bangalore Km 0.0000
135.47 - 211
Hyderabad
185 Bangalore Km 211- 0.0000
251
Hyderabad
186 Bangalore Km 251 - 0.0000
293.4
Hyderabad
187 Bangalore Km 293 - 0.0000
336
Hyderabad
188 Bangalore Km 376- 0.0000
418
Hyderabad
189 Bangalore Km 418- 0.0000
463
Jhansi Lalitpur Km
190 0.0000
0 - 49.7
Jhansi Lalitpur Km
191 0.0000
49.7 - 99
Kadal Armur Km
192 0.0000
278-208
Krishnagiri
193 Thopurghat Km 94- 0.0000
156
Lakhnandon -
194 MP/Mah Border 0.0000
Km 547-597
Lakhnandon -
195 MP/Mah Border 0.0000
Km 596 -653
Lalitpur Sagar Km
196 0.0000
94-132
Mah/AP Border to
197 Islam Nagar Km 0.0000
175-230
Sagar Rajmarg
198 Choraha Km 225- 0.0000
297
Salem Karur Km
199 0.0000
207.05-248.625
Salem Kerala
Border Km
200 0.0000
203.96(NH7) - Km
53(NH4)
206
Encroachment
Law & Order
Conclusion of
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
Termination
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
Changes to
ROB/RUB
Structures
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Shifting
Critical
Design
Utility
Cases
Land
Poor
Late
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
s
Salem Kerala
201 0.0000
Border Km 53-100
Srinagar Bypass Km
202 1 1 0.1780
286-303.8 Phase I
Thrissur Angamalli
203 0.0000
Km 270-316.7
Kadloor Yellareddy
204 Pochampalli Km 0.0000
367-447
Karur Madurai Km
205 0.0000
305.6 - 373.28
Panipat Elevated
206 0.0000
Highway Km 96-86
Kanyakumari
207 Panagudi Km233.6- 1 1 0.3987
203
Chittorgarh Bypass
208 0.0000
Km 159 - 213
Delhi Gurgaon
209 Expressway Km 0.0000
143 - 42
Hapur
210 Garhmukteswar Km 1 1 0.2879
58 - 93
Garhmukteswar
211 Muradabad Km 93 - 1 0.2045
149
Tindivanam
212 Uiundurpet Km 121 0.0000
- 192
Padalur Trichy Km
213 0.0000
285 - 325
Uiundurpet Padalur
214 0.0000
Km 192 - 285
Tuticorin Port Km 0
215 1 1 0.3987
- 47.2
Paradip Port Km 0 -
216 1 0.0556
77
Chennai Ennore
218 0.0000
Expressway
207
Late Conclusion
Design Changes
Encroachments
Termination of
Utility Shifting
to Structures
Approvals of
Performance
Rains/Floods
of Contracts
Legal/Court
Tree Felling
Acquisition
Contractor
ROB/RUB
Structures
Contracts
Delay in
Delayed
Critical
Cases
Land
Poor
SNo Name of road stretch Delay Index
New Mangalore
219 0.0000
Port
Chennai Ennore
220 0.0000
Expressway
Cochin Port Km
221 1 1 0.0773
348 - 358
Bharuch Surat
223 BOT-II Km 0 - 65 0.0000
(6 Laning)
Vadodara Bharuch
224 BOT-I Km 108-192 0.0000
(6 Laning)
208
4 Armur to Under
Kadloor Impleme
NHDP
Yellareddy (NS- Feb- ntation
NHAI 390.56 BOT ######## Phase 0.019 9.48 3.649
2/AP-1) 2012
II
(Approved
Length 60.25)
5 Thrissur to Under
NHDP
Angamali (KL-I) Jul- Impleme
NHAI 312.50 BOT Sep-2005 Phase 0.403 50.82 6.65
2011 ntation
II
6 Four laning from Under
MP/Maharashtr Impleme
a border to NHDP ntation
1,170. Oct-
Nagpur I/C NHAI BOT Aug-2009 Phase 0.137 80.28 34.41
52 2012
Kamptee II
Kanoon and
Nagpur bypass
43 Chengapalli to Under
Coimbatore Impleme
Bypass and End NHDP ntation
Mar-
of Coimbatore NHAI 852.00 BOT Jan-2010 Phase 0.437 20.88 7.37
2013
Bypass to II
TN/Kerala
Border
75 Six lanning of Under
Vadakkancherry NHDP Impleme
Aug-
- NHAI 617.00 BOT Feb-2009 Phase ntation 0.019 20.24 1.31
2012
Thrissuresection II
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
120 Srinagar to NHDP LOA
Banihal 1,100. Annuit Issued
NHAI Sep-2010 # Phase
70 y
II
121 Kosi Bridge Under
including Impleme
NHDP
approaches and Annuit Dec- ntation
NHAI 418.04 Apr-2006 Phase 0.507 29.57 0.94
Guide Bond & y 2011
II
Afflux Bond (BR-
5)
122 Gwalior Bypass NHDP Under
(NS-1/BOT/MP- Annuit Jun- Impleme
NHAI 300.93 ######## Phase 0.11 0.05 3.22
1) y 2012 ntation
II
127 Jhansi to NHDP Under
Lalitpur (NS- Annuit Aug- Impleme
NHAI 276.09 Apr-2006 Phase 0.11 0.05 3.63
1/BOT/UP-3) y 2011 ntation
II
1 End of Durg Under
Bypass - NHDP Impleme
Jul-
Chattisgarh / NHAI 464.00 BOT Dec-2006 Phase ntation 0.47 0.434
2011
Maharashtra III
Border
2 Kandla - Mundra NHDP Under
Port(Approved NHAI 953.88 BOT Jan-2010 # Phase Impleme
Length 73 Km) III ntation
3 4-lanning of LOA
Kannur NHDP Issued
1,312.
Vengalem NHAI BOT Jul-2009 # Phase
00
Kuttipuram III
(Package -II)
7 Muzaffarnagar - LOA
NHDP
Haridwar Issued
NHAI 754.00 BOT Dec-2009 # Phase
(Approved
III
Length 77 )
8 Meerut- NHDP Under
Muzaffarnagar Jul- Impleme
NHAI 359.00 BOT Mar-2005 Phase 0.584 37.68 18.11
2011 ntation
III
9 Ghaziabad-
NHDP
Aligarh 1,141.
NHAI BOT Dec-2009 # Phase
(Approved 00
III
Length 106 )
10 Hyderabad- Under
NHDP
Yadgiri May- Impleme
NHAI 388.00 BOT Dec-2009 Phase 0.019 9.48 3.84
(Approved 2012 ntation
III
Length 30)
11 Bhubneshwar- LOA
Puri(Approved NHDP Issued
Length 59 Km) NHAI 500.29 BOT ######## # Phase
III
15 Pondicherry - Under
NHDP
Tindivanam Jul- Impleme
NHAI 285.00 BOT Mar-2007 Phase 0.426 21.27 7.37
2011 ntation
III
16 Trichy - Karur Under
NHDP Impleme
Dec-
NHAI 516.00 BOT Mar-2007 Phase ntation 0.685 12.04 1.366
2011
III
210
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
17 Panji- NHDP LOA
Goa/Karnatka NHAI 471.00 BOT Jan-2010 # Phase Issued
Border III
18 Panipat - NHDP Under
Rohtak(Approve Oct- Impleme
NHAI 807.00 BOT Jan-2010 Phase 0.056 56.94
d Length 73 Km) 2014 ntation
III
19 4 Laning of Barhi LOA
- NHDP Issued
Hazaribagh(Appr NHAI 398.00 BOT ######## # Phase
oved Length 40 III
Km)
21 Patna - NHDP LOA
Bakhtiarpur NHAI 574.00 BOT Dec-2010 # Phase Issued
III
22 4 Laning of Under
Belgaum- Impleme
Khanpur ntation
Section(Km 0.00
to Km 30.00)
and 2 Laning NHDP
Sep-
with paved NHAI 359.00 BOT Jul-2010 Phase 0.111 30.35 34.65
2013
sholuders of III
khanpur-
Knt/Goa
border.(Km
30.00 to Km
84.120)
23 Indore-Jhabua- Under
NHDP
Gujrat/MP 1,175. Apr- Impleme
NHAI BOT Dec-2009 Phase 0.11 0.05 11.65
(Approved 00 2013 ntation
III
Length 168)
24 Zirakpur - NHDP Under
Parwanoo Dec- Impleme
NHAI 295.00 BOT Feb-2007 Phase 0.073 28.96 5.28
2011 ntation
III
25 Pimpalgaon - Under
NHDP
Nasik - Gonde Jul- Impleme
NHAI 940.00 BOT Jan-2009 Phase 0.47 255.78 16.93
2012 ntation
III
26 Tirupati - LOA
Tiruthani - NHDP Issued
Chennai(Approv NHAI 571.00 BOT Apr-2010 # Phase
ed Length 125.5 III
Km)
27 4 Laning of Under
Godhara to Impleme
NHDP
Gujarat /MP ntation
NHAI 785.50 BOT Jan-2010 # Phase
Border(Approve
III
d Length 210
Km)
31 Rohtak - NHDP LOA
Bawal(Approved Nov- Issued
NHAI 650.00 BOT Feb-2010 Phase 0.056 66.93
Length 97 Km) 2013
III
33 Kurali - Kiratpur Under
NHDP Impleme
Jul-
NHAI 309.00 BOT Dec-2006 Phase ntation
2011
III
36 4-lanning of LOA
Kannur NHDP Issued
1,366.
Vengalem NHAI BOT Jul-2009 # Phase
00
Kuttipuram III
(Package -I)
39 Bijapur - Under
Hungund NHDP Impleme
Mar-
Section NHAI 748.00 BOT Feb-2010 Phase ntation 0.111 30.36 31.49
2013
(Approved III
Length 194 Km)
211
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
42 Charthalai- NHDP LOA
ochira 1,535. Issued
NHAI BOT Jan-2010 # Phase
00
III
44 4 Laning of NHDP LOA
Brahampore- NHAI 998.79 BOT Feb-2010 # Phase Issued
Faraka III
45 4 Laning of NHDP LOA
Faraka-Raiganj 1,078. Issued
NHAI BOT Feb-2010 # Phase
84
III
46 4 Laning of NHDP LOA
Raiganj-Dalkola NHAI 580.43 BOT Feb-2010 # Phase Issued
III
47 Hungund- Under
NHDP
Hospet Mar- Impleme
NHAI 946.00 BOT Feb-2010 Phase 0.111 30.36 54.658
(Approved 2013 ntation
III
Length 194 Km)
50 Deoli - Kota NHDP Under
Jul- Impleme
NHAI 593.00 BOT Apr-2010 Phase 0.486 110.75 53
2013 ntation
III
51 KNT/Kerala LOA
Border to NHDP Issued
1,157.
Kanuur NHAI BOT ######## # Phase
16
Section(Approve III
d Length 286.3)
52 Motihari-Raxaul NHDP LOA
(Approved NHAI 375.09 BOT Jan-2011 # Phase Issued
Length 67 Km) III
54 Pune-Sholapur LOA
Pkg-II(Approved NHDP Issued
Length I & II NHAI 835.00 BOT Aug-2009 # Phase
170 Km) III
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
70 Rimoli - Roxy - LOA
Rajamunda(App NHDP Issued
roved Length NHAI 586.00 BOT Apr-2010 # Phase
163Km) III
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
93 Panvel-Indapur NHDP LOA
NHAI 942.69 BOT Oct-2010 # Phase Issued
III
94 4 laning of Under
Jetpur-Somnath NHDP Impleme
section of NH- NHAI 828.00 BOT Sep-2010 # Phase ntation
8D (approved III
length 127.6)
95 Jaipur-Tonk - Under
NHDP
Deoli(Approved Dec- Impleme
NHAI 792.06 BOT Oct-2009 Phase 0.153 28.041 12.86
Length 148.77 2012 ntation
III
Km )
96 Kota - Jhalawar NHDP LOA
NHAI 530.01 BOT Apr-2011 # Phase Issued
III
98 Patna- NHDP LOA
Muzzaffarpur Annuit Feb- Issued
NHAI 671.30 Nov-2009 Phase 0.312 45.6 41.67
y 2013
III
99 Barasat - NHDP LOA
Krishnanagar Annuit Issued
NHAI 867.00 Feb-2011 # Phase
y
III
104 khagaria - NHDP LOA
Purnea Annuit Issued
NHAI 664.00 Feb-2011 # Phase
y
III
106 2 Laning of LOA
Mokama- NHDP Issued
Annuit
Munger(Approv NHAI 351.54 ######## # Phase
y
ed Length 70 III
Km)
107 2 Laning of LOA
Muzaffarpur - NHDP Issued
Annuit
Sonbarsa(Appro NHAI 511.54 Jul-2010 # Phase
y
ved Length 89 III
Km)
108 Gopalganj- NHDP LOA
Chappra Annuit Issued
NHAI 325.00 Feb-2011 # Phase
y
III
109 2 Laning of LOA
Forbesganj- NHDP Issued
Annuit
Jogwani(Approv NHAI 73.55 ######## # Phase
y
ed Length 13 III
Km)
110 Krishnanagar - NHDP LOA
Berhampore Annuit Issued
NHAI 702.16 Feb-2011 # Phase
y
III
111 Ranchi - NHDP LOA
Rargaon - 1,479. Annuit Issued
NHAI Mar-2011 # Phase
Jamshedpur 00 y
III
112 Hazaribagh- NHDP Under
Ranchi Annuit Jan- Impleme
NHAI 625.07 Aug-2009 Phase 0.681 15.26
y 2013 ntation
III
113 Reengus - Sikar NHDP Under
Annuit Impleme
NHAI 333.51 Mar-2011 # Phase
y ntation
III
114 Bhopal- NHDP LOA
Sanchi(Approve Annuit Issued
NHAI 209.00 ######## # Phase
d Length 40 Km) y
III
117 4 Laning of LOA
Chappra- NHDP Issued
Annuit
Hajipur(Approve NHAI 575.00 ######## # Phase
y
d Length 153 III
Km)
123 2 Laning of LOA
NHDP
Dindigul- Annuit Issued
NHAI 485.00 ######## # Phase
Perigulam- y
III
Theni-Kumili
214
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
124 Haridwar - LOA
NHDP
Dehradun Annuit Issued
NHAI 478.00 Dec-2009 # Phase
(Approved y
III
Length 69)
126 Two Laning of LOA
Trichy - Issued
Karaikudi and NHDP
Annuit
Trichy NHAI 374.00 ######## # Phase
y
Bypass(Approve III
d Length 100
Km)
32 Khalghat - NHAI 549.00 BOT Oct-2007 May- NHDP Under
MP/Maharashtr 2011 Phase Impleme 0.028 13.91 1.01
a Border III ntation
20 Agra - Aligarh NHDP LOA
NHAI 250.50 BOT Nov-2010 # Phase Issued
IV
28 Kanpur - Kabrai NHDP LOA
NHAI 373.47 BOT Nov-2010 # Phase Issued
IV
29 Raibariely to NHDP LOA
Allahabad NHAI 291.36 BOT Dec-2010 # Phase Issued
IV
30 Aligarh - Kanpur NHDP LOA
NHAI 723.68 BOT Dec-2010 # Phase Issued
IV
101 4 Laning of NHDP Under
Nagpur Betul 2,498. Annuit Aug- Impleme
NHAI ######## Phase 0.083 70.46
76 y 2014 ntation
IV
14 Six Laning of NHDP Under
Hosur- Dec- Impleme
NHAI 535.00 BOT ######## Phase 0.037 20.57 0.87
Krishnagiri 2013 ntation
V
35 Panipat - NHDP Under
Jalandhar (Six 2,288. Nov- Impleme
NHAI BOT Feb-2008 Phase 0.073 18.96
lane) 00 2011 ntation
V
37 Chennai - Tada NHDP Under
(Six lane) Oct- Impleme
NHAI 353.37 BOT Feb-2008 Phase 0.426 21.27 5.59
2011 ntation
V
38 Gurgaon - NHDP Under
Kotputli - Jaipur 1,673. Jun- Impleme
NHAI BOT Feb-2008 Phase 0.153 28.18 53.39
(Six lane) 70 2012 ntation
V
40 Chilkaluripet - NHDP Under
Vijayawada (Six Aug- Impleme
NHAI 572.30 BOT Feb-2008 Phase 0.019 9.48 9.96
lane) 2012 ntation
V
41 Ahmedabad to NHDP LOA
Vadodara 2,125. Issued
NHAI BOT Apr-2011 # Phase
Section 24
V
49 Six Laning of Under
NHDP
Krishnagiri- 1,250. Dec- Impleme
NHAI BOT Mar-2010 Phase 0.204 29.18 17.72
walajhapet 00 2013 ntation
V
section
53 Surat - Dahisar NHDP Under
(Six lane) 1,693. Aug- Impleme
NHAI BOT Feb-2008 Phase 0.111 17.83 16.11
75 2011 ntation
V
57 Six Laning of LOA
Chandikhol- Issued
Jagatpur- NHDP
1,047.
Bhubaneswar(A NHAI BOT Apr-2010 # Phase
00
pproved Length V
61 Km)
S. No. Project Name Depart Estima Struct Date of Likely Remark Time Time
ment/ ted ure Award Date s, if any Overru Overrun
NHDP
Agency Cost (BOT, of n (months
Phase
(Rs. BOOT, Compl (mont )
Catego
Crore) etc.) etion Delay hs) [DI [Project
ry
Index model Cost
(DI) ] Model]
59 Indore- NHDP Under
Dewas(Approve May- Impleme
NHAI 325.00 BOT Mar-2010 Phase 0.073 6.29
d Length 55 Km) 2013 ntation
V
63 Belgaum- Under
NHDP
Dharwad(Appro Jun- Impleme
NHAI 480.00 BOT ######## Phase 0.037 20.55
ved Length 111 2013 ntation
V
Km)
64 Six Laning of NHDP LOA
Nellore- 1,535. Issued
NHAI BOT ######## # Phase
Chilkaluripet 00
V
76 Chitradurga - Under
Tumkur NHDP Impleme
Aug-
Bypass(Approve NHAI 839.00 BOT ######## Phase ntation 0.037 20.55
2013
d Length 145 V
Km)
82 6-Laning of LOA
NHDP
Dhankuni- 1,396. Issued
NHAI BOT Feb-2011 # Phase
Khargpur 18
V
Section
86 Delhi - LOA
NHDP
Agra(Approved 1,928. Issued
NHAI BOT ######## # Phase
Length 180.3 22
V
Km)
87 Samaikhiali- NHDP Under
Gandhidham NHAI 805.39 BOT Jan-2010 # Phase Impleme
V ntation
92 Varanasi- NHDP LOA
Aurangabad 2,848. Issued
NHAI BOT Apr-2010 # Phase
00
V
34 New 4-Lane Under
Elevated Road NHDP Impleme
1,655. Sep-
from Chennai NHAI BOT Jan-2009 Phase ntation 0.204 29.18
00 2013
Port - VII
Maduravoyal
48 Upgradation of Under
NHDP
Hyderabad- Nov- Impleme
NHAI 680.00 BOT Feb-2010 Phase 0.019 9.48
Bangalore 2012 ntation
VII
Section
119 Jorbat-Barapani LOA
Annuit SARDP Issued
NHAI 536.00 ######## #
y -NE
APPENDIX 4
LAND ACQUISITION : A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Fundamental ‘Right to Property’ goes back to the historic objective
resolution of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 22nd
January 1947, which inspired the shaping of Indian Constitution through all its
subsequent stages : 'The guarantee and security to all the people of India, justice -
social, economic and political; equality of status of opportunity before the law; freedom
of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action, subject
to law and public morality were the objectives for drafting the Constitution.' The
preamble embodied these objectives. The socialistic pattern of society was visible in
the entire document. The word 'socialist' was, however, added to the preamble by 42nd
Amendment Act in 1976. The then Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi explained : “We
have always said that we have our own brand of socialism. We will nationalise the
sectors, where we feel the necessity. Just nationalisation is not our type of socialism”.
The Constitution of 1949 had a threefold provision for safeguarding the right to
0private property [Sunil Ambwani 2007]. It not only guaranteed the right of private
ownership but also right to enjoy and dispose of property free from restrictions other
than reasonable restrictions, as under :
x Art. 19 (1) (f) guaranteed to every citizen the right to acquire any property by any
lawful means such as inheritance, personal earnings or otherwise, and to hold it as
his own and to dispose it freely, limited to such reasonable restrictions, which may
not be in excess of the requirement of the interest of the general public.
x Art.31 (1) guaranteed that no person shall be deprived of his property saved by the
authority of law. Any property seized without proper legal authority was to be
released at the intervention of the Court. A subject could not be deprived of his
property by an executive order.
x Art.31 (2) enjoined that if the State wants to acquire private property, it could do so
by acquisition or requisition for public purpose and by payment to the owner by
fixing the amount or specifying the principle upon it, it is to be determined.
The development of the socialist order by the then government led by Jawahar
Lal Nehru was not possible without vast acquisition of land and for reorganisation of
217
agricultural holding. The right to property was a serious threat to socialistic pattern of
society. In Kameshwar Vs. State of Bihar (1951), Patna High Court held the Bihar
Land Reforms Act unconstitutional. Allahabad and Nagpur upheld land reforms,
against which appeals were pending in Supreme Court. The Constitution was amended.
Through the first constitutional amendment in 1951, exceptions were added to Art.31
(2) and Art.31A to 31C were inserted. The first amendment also added in 9th Schedule
to the Constitution with reference to Art.31B purportedly to save those legislations
dealing with land reforms, which were struck down by the Court. The amended
Art.31A provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Art.13, no law providing
for acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights, taking over of the management
of any property by the State for a limited period either in public interest, or to secure
proper management of the property, amalgamation of two corporations in public
interest or to secure proper management of any of the corporations, the extinguishment
or modification of any rights of managing agents, secretaries and treasurers etc. and
extinguishment or modification of any rights by virtue of any agreement, lease or
license for searching, or winning, mineral or mineral oil or premature termination or
cancellation of such agreement, lease or license, shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or approaches any of the rights
conferred by Art.14 or Art.19 of the Constitution of India.
In Shankari Prasad Singh Deo Vs. State of Bihar (1952), Kochunni Vs. State of
Madras (1960) and Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan (1965), the Supreme Court
upheld the first amendment and further held that the law, which seeks to deprive a
person of his property must be a valid law, enacted by competent legislature and not in
consistent with any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court, however, noted that if the effect of the amendment made in the
Fundamental Rights on Art.226 is direct and not incidental, different considerations
may perhaps arise. Justice Mudholkar questioned, “it is also a matter of consideration
whether making a change in basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely as
an amendment or would it be, in effect rewriting a part of the Constitution, and if the
latter, would it be within the purview of Art.368.” The brute majority of the Congress
Government allowed it to amend the Constitution 41 times, till the promulgation of the
emergency. The 4th, 5th and 25th and then 42nd amendment during the emergency in
218
1975 put the laws of acquisition of the State or other intermediate interest in land
beyond scrutiny of fundamental rights, the directive principle of state policy or even
basic structure of the Constitution.
Though the legislature was, until the 4th amendment, under constitutional
obligation to pay compensation the adequacy of which was not made questionable by
the 4th amendment (1955) in Art.31 (2). In State of West Bengal Vs. Bela Banerji
(1954), the Supreme Court interpreted the word 'compensation' simplicitor as full
compensation i.e. market value of the property on the date of acquisition. The
Government was not happy as it did not have adequate resources to pay compensation
for all the property, which was to be nationalised. In R.C.Cooper Vs. Union of India
(1970) (the Bank Nationalisation case), the Supreme Court held that the word
'compensation' implied full monetary equivalent of the property taken away from the
owner i.e. market value on the date of acquisition. In I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. Vs.
State of Punjab (1967), a majority of 6:5 overruled Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh
holding that constitutional amendment is law within the meaning of Art.30 and if it
takes away or abridges any rights conferred by part III, it is void. The judgment was
made prospective with effect from the date of decision (27th Feb. 1967). Golak Nath
case resulted into :
x 24th amendment (1971) adding Art.13 (4), that the article shall not apply to any
amendment of the Constitution under Art.368 and also amended Art.368 (1) by
adding the word “in exercise of its constituent powers”.
x 25th amendment (1971) amending Art.31 by which the amount fixed for acquisition
could not be challenged on the ground of adequacy in Court and inserted Art.31 (c)
declaring that law securing any of the principle in part 4 shall not be deemed to be
void if it takes away the rights by Art.14 and Art.19, and no law containing such a
declaration will be questioned in Court.
x 26th amendment (1971) omitting Art.291, (privy purses) and Art.362 (right and
privileges of the rulers of the Indian states) and inserted Art.363-A ceasing the
recognition of rulers and abolishing privy purses and 29th amendment (1972)
adding to Kerala Amendment Act in 9th Schedule.
219
(u) Legislation seeking to nullify the awards made in exercise of the judicial power of
the State by Arbitration Tribunals constituted under an Act.”
Applying basic feature doctrine the majority in Kesavananda Bharati held that
second part of Section 3 of the Constitution 25th Amendment Act, 1971 was invalid in
Art.31C, which provided that no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect
to such policy shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that it does not
give effect to such policy. The 25th Amendment 1971 substituted the word
compensation in Art.31 (2) with the word 'amount' but again the majority of the
Supreme Court reserved an area for judicial intervention in Kesavananda Bharti Vs.
State of Kerala (1973) with the majority of 6:5 that the amount fixed by the legislature
could not be arbitrary or illusory but must be determined by a principle, which is
relevant to the acquisition of the property. The Indira Gandhi Government reacted
sharply by putting specified laws of acquisition of land beyond pail of Art.31 by
engrafting exceptions in Art.31A to 31D, which excluded the obligation to pay any
amount as compensation if such laws related to matters specified in the exceptional
provisions namely, law for acquisition by the State of any estate or other intermediate
interest in land to affect agrarian reforms and to improve the agricultural wealth of the
country as well as social control of the means of production. Art.31A, except certain
clauses of laws, Art. 31B read with 9th Schedule gave blanket cover to certain
enactments, the number of which swelled from 13 to 284 by the year 2000. Art.31C
inserted by 25th amendment (1971) provided that any law, which seeks to implement
the directive in Art. 39 (b) or 39 (c) with a view to plan the socialistic distribution of
wealth and the means of production was not to be void for any inconsistency with
Art.14 or 19.
The decision in Keshavanand held that judicial review is one of the essential
feature of the Indian constitution, which cannot be taken away by amendment under
Art.368 and further held that the immunity to any particular law to implement the
directive in Art. 39 (c) is unconstitutional. The 42nd amendment (1976) was introduced
during the emergency, amended as many as 56 Articles as well as 7th Schedule and
changed the vital principles underlying the 1949 Constitution, including an attempt to
overrule the judgment of this Court nullifying the election of Indira Gandhi enlarged
221
the scope of Art.31C by including within its protection laws to implement any of the
directive principle in Part IV of the Constitution - not merely Art.39 (b) and (c). The
44th amendment (1978) by the Janata Government, tried to do away with all the harm
that was done to the Constitution by the 42nd amendment, but gave a death blow to the
right of property guaranteed of the Constitution in 1948 in Art. 19 (1) (f) and 31. Art.19
(1) (f) was repealed and Art.31 was taken out of Part III and made Art.300-A. Right of
property is no longer a fundamental right and was substituted as a constitutional right.
An individual's property could be taken away by a public official without legal
authority such a person would not be left with remedies under Art.32 as Art. 300A is
not a fundamental right. A person complaining of any law taking away his right to
property will have to look for his remedies under Art.226 or by an ordinary suit. The
same amendment omitted clause 2 (A) (6), of Art.31 and Clause (2) of Art.31 and
transferred its proviso to Art.30 as Clause (1) (A). The protection under Art.31 to the
laws violating fundamental rights remained to operate as an exception to Art.14 and 19.
Right to compensation to the actual tiller in Art.31 (A) (1), however, has been retained,
even though Art.31 was omitted. The 42nd amendment tried to overreach the
implication of Kesavananda Bharti case and in order to upheld the sovereignty of
Parliament (as constituent body) in Clause (5) of Art.386 declared that “there shall be
no limitation” on the constituent power of the Parliament to amend and such
amendment, shall not be called in any Court on any ground (Clause 4). In Minerva
Mills (1980) case, the Supreme Court by then armed with basic structure doctrine
declared Clause (4) and (5) of Art.368 to be invalid on the ground that these clauses
removed all limitations upon the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution and
to destroy the right of judicial review, which is “essential feature” or “basic structure”
of the Constitution.
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APPENDIX 5
LIST OF PROJECTS DELAYED DUE TO LAND ACQUISITION
S No Name of work Cost Date of Completion
( ` billion) Original Revised
Schedule Schedule
1. Balasore-Bhadrak Km 137-199 (NH5) 2.27 02/2004 12/2008
Orissa
2. Bhubaneshuar-Khudra Km 388-418 1.40 01/2004 06/2008
(NH-5) Orissa.
3. Smakala Ganjam Km 284-338 (NH-5) 2.25 04/2004 12/2009
Orissa.
4. Agra-Shikohabad Km 200-251(NH-2) 3.67 03/2005 07/2008
U.P
5. Vasnasi-Mohania Km 317-329 (NH-2) 4.67 03/2005 05/2008
U.P & Bihar.
6. Gorhar-Barwa Adda Km 320-399 3.99 03/2005 09/2008
(NH-2) Jharkhand
7. Tumkur By Pass Km 62-75 (NH-4) 0.83 12/2003 12/2008
Karnataka.
8. Allabad By Pass Km 158-159 (NH-2) 0.91 03/2006 05/2008
U.P
9. Allabad By Pass Km 198-242 (NH 2) 5.34 05/2007 06/2008
U.P
10. Shikohabad-Etawah Km 250-307 2.61 03/2005 04/2008
(NH-2) U.P
11. Thampipadi-Salem Km 180-199 NH- 0.82 08/2003 06/2008
7) T.N.
12. Thopurghat-Thunpiadi Km 163-180 0.92 05/2005 09/2008
(NH-7) T.N.
13. Borkhedi-Jam Km 36-64 (NH-7) 1.10 06/2005 03/2009
Maharastra.
14. Jam-Wadner Km 64-94 (NH-7) 2.45 07/2005 03/2009
Maharastra.
15. Devdhari- Kelapur Km 123-153 (NH- 1.44 07/2005 03/2009
7) Maharastra.
16. Devdhari-Wadner Km 94-123 (NH-7) 1.45 07/2005 06/2009
Maharastra.
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APPENDIX 6
ENVIRONMENTAL & FOREST CLEARENCES
Development brings about benefits like goods and services to the people
whereas unplanned development leads to deterioration of the environment in which
people are living. Like all infrastructure projects, roads and highways play a major role
in boosting the economy of any country. The construction of roads and highways has
resulted in loss of thousands of square kilometers of forestlands. According to Ministry
of Environment and Forests (MoEF) study, while about 6891 hectares of forestland has
been diverted for the purpose of road construction in the two decades (1980 – 1999),
whereas in a period of mere four years from 1999 to 2003, 7172 hectares of forestland
has been consumed for road construction. This highlights the rapid pace of
development at the cost of depleted forests, which has become an issue confronting
development with environment.
Roads, especially if they pass through wildlife sanctuaries and natural reserves
take its toll on the local ecologies resulting in the loss of lives of wild animals due to
increased accidents. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification 1994 has
made it mandatory to obtain prior environmental clearance for new road projects such
as bypasses costing more than ` 500 million and later the ceiling raised to ` 1.0 billion
through 2002 Amendment. As far as the widening of existing roads is concerned as
being done in NHDP, it is to be ensured that the existing alignments do not pass
through ecologically sensitive areas such as national parks, sanctuaries, tiger reserves,
reserve forests etc. It is further stipulated that marginal land acquisition i.e., not
exceeding a total width of 20 metres on either side of the existing alignment is
permitted. Public opinion plays an important role in making the projects people
friendly. The importance of involving the local people in the project planning stage was
recognized by the MOEF and public hearing was made mandatory for projects
attracting the provisions of EIA Notification 1994 vide amendment dated 10th April,
1997. However, public hearing was waived in 2001 amendment but again in the
amendment of 13th June, 2002, it was stated that for highway projects, public hearing
shall be conducted in each district through which the highway passes. In addition to the
environmental clearance, forest clearance from Central Government is also essential for
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projects, if the highway requires diversion of forestland. If the project area falls within
a national park or wildlife sanctuary, forest clearance is granted only after it is cleared
by the National Wildlife Board. Till the recent past, environmental issues were waived,
brushing them aside as impediments to economic developments. In the regulations
itself, there are some loopholes. Bypasses often are of short stretches and the costs are
often less than ` 1.0 billion and hence are expensed from the environmental clearances.
However, small projects do have serious consequences on the local
environment. However, in today’s world, when the environmental brigade is gaining
momentum, environmental clearance cannot be done away with. There are quite a
number of road projects that are gathering dust, as they have not been approved
clearance. Such situations can be avoided by the planners and designers right in the
beginning of the project planning stage by selecting alignments, providing bypasses
and detours, so that the impacts on the environment is minimal. As seen, there are quite
a number of regulations, which should be strictly followed to avoid an environmental
catastrophe.
Under Sec 84 of Forest Act 1927, whenever it appears to the State Government
that any land is required for any of the purposes of this Act, such land shall be deemed
to be needed for a public purpose within the meaning of Sec 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act 1894 (1 of 1894). As per Forest (Conservation) Act 1980, all proposals for
diversion of forest land to any non-forest purpose would require the prior approval of
the Central Government. The term forest land refers to reserved forest/protected
forest/or any area recorded as forest in the Government record. The user agency has to
pay Net present Value (NPV) for the forest land to be diverted for non-forest purposes
as calculated by Forest authorities along with specified amount towards compensatory
afforestation etc. The various Forest Acts have devolved lot of stringent powers to its
implementation agencies, even judicial powers to grant penalty including imprisonment
for persons violating the Forest Act which may act as a strong deterrent to erring
officials associated with developmental activities such as road construction.
It was observed that one of the main reasons for delays in projects, especially in
Uttar Pradesh, was problems in land acquisition, forest clearance and shifting of
utilities, while in Madhya Pradesh, the main problem faced by concessionaire was in
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obtaining forest clearance and clearance for Pench tiger reserve in Seoni district. The
modalities under the Forest Act had to a great extent made it very difficult for diversion
of forest land for non-forestry purposes. As the Court adopted the dictionary meaning
of forests, it also became mandatory for the state to even protect the standing trees on
private forests. Forest Rights Act (FRA) if implemented, even the government cannot
acquire such declared forest land without the consent of the Gram Sabha. The decision-
making authorities under the Act are clearly spelt out. They are the Gram Sabha / Palli
Sabha, Sub-Divisional Level Committee and the District Level Committee. It must be
noted that the role of the officials is to render proper and timely assistance to these
committees and to ensure custody of the records. No individual officer has been given
the powers under the Act to overrule or object to the decisions of the appropriate
authority, other than filing appeal to the next higher authority as prescribed [Ajit Kumar
Tripathy 2009].
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APPENDIX 7
LAND ACQUISITION, REHABILITATION & RESETTLEMENT
BILL 2011
x National Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation & Resettlement Bill 2011 aims to
address rehabilitation and resettlement (R&R) by providing safeguards for both
landowners and livelihood losers while clearly defining the “public purpose” for
which land can be acquired by the government. It also adds a clause prescribing a
specific timeline for compensation.
x A significant addition to the final Bill is the timeline for providing compensation as
well as R&R entitlements to land owners and livelihood losers. Compensation will
have to be given within three months from the date of the award; monetary R&R
entitlements have to be provided within six months.
x Infrastructure R&R benefits will have to be given within 18 months of the award. In
the case of irrigation or hydel projects, R&R should be completed six months prior
to submergence.
x The Bill also provides for transferring land to the state government if the area is not
used for the purpose it was acquired for within 10 years. The ministry will make
another amendment to the Bill to allow the state to either return the land to its
original owner or use it for any public purpose as defined by the Act.
x While the provision for creating a land bank was introduced, the period was
increased from five to ten years to allow for securing all clearances for a project.
x Other provisions introduced in the bill include tightening the definition of public
purpose, introducing a stage-based retrospective effect clause, removing the blanket
ban on acquisition of multi-crop irrigated land, tightening the urgency clause to
remove the “rarest of rare” provision in which it can be invoked as well as slight
modifications to the R&R package.
x Significantly, compensation in rural areas has been lowered from six times the
original market value to four times, while that in urban areas remains the same at
double the market value.
231
x Bill will not supersede 16 of the specialized items of legislation on land acquisition,
including those for special economic zones and railways. The Union government,
however, will have the power to apply provisions of this law through a notification.
States will also continue to have their own land acquisition laws, but the new Bill
will provide a minimum compensation and R&R package.
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APPENDIX 8
NHDP - SOURCES OF FINANCING
Revenues from Cess - The cess inflows of ` 32.70 billion for the year 2005-06 are
based on the approved Budget Estimates. For 2006-07, the total inflow calculated
@ ` 2 per litre on diesel and petrol has been estimated at ` 66.91 billion. The
growth rate in cess has been assumed as 3% per annum, based on projected growth
in consumption.
Surplus from Toll Revenues - An average toll revenue of ` 5.0 million per km and
` 1.8 million per km has been assumed for GQ and NSEW corridor respectively.
The net surplus from toll revenues after adjusting maintenance costs and servicing
of loan component of external assistance can be used for financing of NHDP works.
It was noted that the average toll collection for GQ in 2004-05 was ` 3.0 million per
km and an amount of ` 11 million per km was received in 2005-06 for the NH-8
section of Jaipur-Kishangarh. There is significant scope for additional resource
mobilisation through better toll recovery.
Borrowings - The shortfall between the inflows from all sources and the projected
outflows, including the payment of annuity, is proposed to be met out of market
borrowings. Market borrowings such as NHAI Infrastructure Bonds would have to
be raised against suitable forms of support or back-stopping by the Finance
Ministry. This may include a commitment that cess revenues at a pre-determined
level would be made available to NHAI and may be suitably assigned for debt
service. Given the size and tenure of borrowings, it would be necessary for the
Ministry of Finance to provide the requisite comfort to lenders so that NHAI is able
to raise the projected borrowings.
233
Negative Grants - The country’s private sector seems to have turned bullish on
road development projects in a big way. While the government typically provides
grants in the form of ‘Viability Gap Funding (VGF)’ to make infrastructure projects
feasible for private players, some companies are now saying no to the aid. Instead,
they are offering to pay the government a dedicated sum called a ‘negative grants’
to get contracts for potentially lucrative Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) toll projects.
In a couple of years, National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) has received
revenues to the tune of ` 20 billion from negative grants as shown below. There is
so much money to be made in these projects that private companies are willing to
pay money to NHAI for getting development rights. NHAI is expected to generate
substantial revenues through such negative grants in the future and the same can
become a reliable source of funding though it may not be a significant amount.
of June 2012 stating that the process of giving Viability Gap Funding (VGF) will be
done away with a new scheme wherein concessionaire asking for the lowest concession
period will be declared a winner in the competitive bid. Apart from obviating the
burden of VGF on the government, it will also entail benefit to the users in the form of
lesser tolls since concessionaire with the lowest concession period is preferred in the
selection process of awarding the BOT contract.
Projects awarded on Revenue Share Basis
Road Section Length Estimated Cost Revenue Share (%)
(km) ( ` billion)
Surat-Dahisar 239 26 38
Gurgoan-Jaipur 225 19 48
Panipat-Jalandhar 291 22 20
Chennai-Tada 42 3.17 17
Vijayawada-Chilakaluripet 85 11.73 2
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) - The mandate given to NHAI under the NHAI
Act 1999 provides for it to undertake a number of functions: road development and
safety policy, contracting for road development, financing authority for the inter-
state highways, etc. Therefore, to segregate these functions, the financing for the
NHDP is to be separated into a number of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). The
SPVs will in essence be financing vehicles that will have a limited life till all the
debt raised through them is paid off and these would automatically extinguish
thereafter. Various types of projects – annuity, EPC and BOT can be merged into a
single project to be financed through a particular SPV and large segments of the
roads can be made into a single project and financed through a single SPV [Prithvi
& Praveen 2003]. These SPVs enter into a number of contracts with the various
parties as shown below :
ii) with the civil contractors for road construction and maintenance,
iv) with a specialized arm of NHAI (insurance function) to buy political and
traffic insurance,
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vi) with a bank for managing any financial risk that may be present in the
financing structure and for adequate liquidity, and
vii) with a rating agency to rate the various types of instruments to be offered to
the investors to financially participate in the project.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) - The FDI regime has been progressively
liberalized during the course of the 1990s (particularly after 1996) with most
restrictions on foreign investment being removed and procedures simplified
[MOSRT&H 2009]. With limited exceptions, foreigners can invest directly in India,
either wholly by themselves or as a joint venture. India welcomes FDI in virtually
all sectors, except those of strategic concern such as defence (opened to a limited
extent), railway transport and atomic energy, where the existing and notified
sectoral policy does not permit FDI beyond a certain ceiling. The major source of
FDI in India is through the equity route, which accounted for 81% of the total FDI
inflows in India. Reinvested earnings of FDI companies accounted for 18% of the
total Direct Investment. Acquisitions accounted for 17% of total FDI. Under the
automatic route, no prior government approval is required if the investment to be
made falls within the sectoral caps as specified below for the listed activities. Only
filings have to be made by the Indian company with the concerned regional office
of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within 30 days of receipt of remittance and
within 30 days of issuance of shares.
• Roads -100%
• Insurance – 26%
• Domestic airlines – 49%
• Telecom services & Private sector banks – 74%
• Exploration & mining of coal, lignite, diamonds & gems – 100%
• Development of new airports – 100%
• Development of existing airports – 74%
• Trading -whole sale cash & carry & for exports-100%
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Debt Fund - Since infrastructure projects have a long pay-back period, they require
long-term financing in order to be sustainable and cost-effective. However, debt
financing for infrastructure projects has been largely confined to banks who have
difficulty in providing long-term debt due to their asset-liability mismatch. On the
other hand, insurance and pension funds have stayed away on account of their risk
perceptions. A proposal has been mooted for setting up an India Infrastructure Debt
Fund for ` 50,000 crore ($ 11 billion) to meet the needs of long-term debt for
infrastructure projects that are set up through Public Private Partnerships (PPP).
The debt fund will also help bridge the emerging gap in the total debt required for
funding infrastructure projects which presently rely on commercial banks. The
provision of low-cost long-term debt is necessary for reducing the cost of
infrastructure projects and this Fund would be a significant step in that direction
[IIDF 2010].
The debt fund would only lend to projects that have entered into commercial
operation after completion of construction. This would imply taking over of the
existing debt of commercial banks and thus releasing their lending space for
provision of loans to new projects. When the debt fund is fully operational, it will
also help create a secondary market for debt bonds. The debt fund will be set up by
one or more sponsors who will act as the general partners of the debt fund. The
sponsors could be one or a combination of IIFCL, SBI, ICICI, LIC, IDFC, UTI, an
infrastructure NBFC or an investment bank. A combination of two or three general
partners/sponsors may be preferred. In addition, the sponsors may also include one
or two foreign entities – such as IFC or ADB – as general partners in order to
enhance the credibility of the debt fund from the perspective of foreign investors.
The sponsors would be required to invest at least 10% of the total investment in the
form of subordinated debt. Typically, the holders of such long-term debt would be
insurance and pension funds (including provident funds), both Indian as well as
foreign. In addition, some sovereign funds could also be tapped for this purpose.
These debt funds have so far stayed away from financing Greenfield projects set up
by special purpose vehicles (SPVs) since they are regarded as risky investments,
especially from the perspective of pension and insurance funds. If this risk
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APPENDIX 9
BOT MODE FOR DEVELOPING HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE
BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER (TOLL)
x The private sector meets the upfront cost of construction and expenditure on annual
maintenance.
x The private sector recovers the entire cost along with the interest from collection
the user free collections during the concession period.
x Highway Authority gives the project requirements based on DPR.
x Capital grant up to a maximum of 40% provided by NHAI.
x Risk sharing concept in Model Concession Agreement (MCA).
BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER (ANNUITY)
x The concessionaire meets the entire upfront cost (no grant is paid by the client) and
the expenditure on annual maintenance.
x The concessionaire recovers the entire investment through predetermined annuity
payments by the highway authority (NHAI).
Briefly stated, the basic difference between BOT (Toll) and BOT (Annuity) is
that while in case of the toll roads, construction, maintenance and tolling form part of
the concession and budgetary support is restricted to an upfront grant (viability gap
funding) to the concessionaire. The selection of concessionaire would be based on open
competitive bidding. All project parameters such as concession period, toll rates, price
indexation and technical parameters would be frozen and short listed bidders would be
required to specify the amount of grant required by them. The bidder seeking minimum
grant would be awarded the contract [Ajeet K Choudhary, et al 2001]. Whereas in the
case of the annuity model, construction and maintenance form part of the concession
and the concessionaire relies on annuity payments determined by competitive bidding
and made out of budgetary allocations spread over time. In the toll mode, the
traffic/commercial risks are borne by the concessionaire and the investment is sustained
by toll revenues, while in the annuity mode, all costs are to be paid by the government
in the form of deferred budgetary payments. The government may grant a separate
tolling contract for annuity projects if it so decides. In case of projects where tolling is
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USER FEE/TOLL
These rates are subject to revision after every five years based on whole sale
price index and fixed in multiple of rupees five. MORT&H can stipulate higher rates of
toll on expressways, major bridges, new bypasses, tunnels and in other exceptional
cases where so justified by level of traffic.
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POLICY THRUST
x Committee on Infrastructure (CoI) constituted under the Chairmanship of Hon’ble
PM.
x Model Concession Agreement (MCA) and procurement process revised. No
departure from the ceiling of 40% on Viability Gap Funding for BOT (Toll) based
projects.
x BOT (Annuity) model with government approval is to be adopted where response
to BOT (Toll) is inadequate.
x EPC (Engineering, Procurement & Construction) approach is to be resorted to with
prior government approval where inadequate response to BOT (Annuity) projects.
x Public Private Partnership (PPP) Appraisal Committee (PPPAC) constituted in
Ministry of Finance (MOF).
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APPENDIX 10
MODEL CONCESSION AGREEMENT (MCA)
Initially, not much private sector investment was forthcoming, but NHAI
addressed their concerns through the Model Concession Agreement (MCA), which
ensured that their investment would be secure and facilitated loans for companies from
financial institutions. There were also concerns about the growth of traffic over time,
which directly impact the toll collection targets. To address this, the NHAI came up
with the annuity scheme, under which the private investor builds and maintains the
road over a fixed period of time, the NHAI collects toll and pays the company an
annual amount. Also, to make the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects attractive to
private investors, the NHAI evolved a system under which it can give a grant up to
40% of the cost of a project under the system of Viability Gap Funding (VGF). A new
Model Concession Agreement (MCA) for Highway Projects was put into practice from
the year 2006. The new agreement includes Design, Build, Finance, Operate and
Transport activities instead of Build, Operate and Transfer. Replacing ‘transfer’ by
‘transport’ is crucial as it implies that government, instead of owning the asset after the
concession period, would continue to buy ‘road services’ from the Concessionaire
[NHAI 2002a].
The MCA framework addresses the issues which are typically important for
PPP projects, such as unbundling of risks & rewards, symmetry of obligations between
the principal parties, equitable sharing of costs & obligations, and risk mitigation
options under various scenarios including force majeure & termination, under
transparent procedures. All the new NHAI projects, including the six laning of 6500 km
highways at a cost of ` 227.50 billion cleared by the PM’s Committee on Infrastructure
(CoI) are being awarded as per the new MCA. The highlights of the new MCA are as
under :
x Partial guarantee of traffic risk to the Concessionaire.
x Concessionaire’s interest protected in competing roads.
x Performance standards of the highways clearly spelt out.
x Provision for change in scope, if any, required during construction and operation
period included.
246
With these measures, NHAI has been fairly successful in attracting private
investment. The government has also approved the construction of ring roads, bypasses
and flyovers as part of the national highways network. These will be implemented on a
BOT (toll) basis, with the private sector providing ` 120 billion of the required
investment and the government shelling out ` 75 billion. Domestic and international
companies have been eyeing the project, first mooted in 2006, because the existing
overlap of passenger and cargo lines results in long delays, high costs and poor safety.
BOT bids are invited for six laning with 20 years concession period. However, option
exists for Concessionaire and the NHAI after 8 years if not interested for 6 laning. In
such case, concession shall be terminated after four laning with 12 years concession
period.
The MCA has been developed in consultation with all stakeholders based on
internationally accepted principles and best practices. Throughout, it seeks to achieve
reasonable balance of risks and rewards for all the participants. As an underlying
principle, risks have been allocated to the parties that are best suited to manage them.
Project risks have, therefore, been assigned to the private sector to the extent it is
capable of managing them. The transfer of such risks and responsibilities to the private
247
sector would increase the scope of innovation leading to efficiencies in cost and
services. The commercial and technical risks relating to construction, operation and
maintenance are allocated to the concessionaire, as it is best suited to manage them.
Other commercial risks, such as the rate of growth of traffic, are also allocated to the
concessionaire.
Key Concessionaire Risks –
x Construction Risk - The concessionaire is required to commence construction
works when the financial close is achieved or earlier date that the parties may
determine by mutual consent. The concessionaire shall not be entitled to seek
compensation for any prior commencement and shall do it solely at his own risk.
x O & M Risk - Concessionaire to operate and maintain the project facility (includes
road and road infrastructure as specified in the concession agreement). Failure to
repair and rectify any defect or deficiency within specified period shall be
considered as breach of responsibility.
x Financial Risk - The concessionaire shall at its cost, expenses and risk make such
financing arrangement as would be necessary to finance the cost of the project and
to meet project requirements and other obligations under the agreement, in a timely
manner.
x Traffic Risk - The MCA provides for increase or decrease of the concession period
in the event the actual traffic falls short or exceeds the target traffic. NHAI
stipulates the target traffic during the year specified in project concession
agreement, which is usually around the 10th year from the date of signing of the
agreement. The target traffic is determined based on 5% Compounded Annual
Growth Rate (CAGR) over the base year traffic for the project. MCA also provides
for termination of the agreement if the average daily traffic in any accounting year
exceeds the design capacity and continues to exceed for three subsequent
accounting years. Termination payments under this scenario will be commensurate
to those applicable under an Indirect Political Event
• Approvals - NHAI will provide all reasonable support and assistance to the
concessionaire in procuring applicable permits required from any Government
Instrumentality.
OBLIGATIONS ON CONCESSIONAIRE
x Design, Engineering, Financing, Procurement, Construction, Operation and
Maintenance of a stretch of NH entrusted to Concessionaire during the concession
period.
x 7 days notice to NHAI before the proposal closure of lane for maintenance/repair
works. Permission from NHAI in consultation with PMC within 5 days of receiving
such request from concessionaire by stipulating the re-opening period. Damages for
delay in re-opening @ ` 10,000 per day for every stretch of 100 metres in the first
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year of Operations and revised by Whole Sale Price (WPI) in each subsequent
operating years.
x Reimbursement of 50% expenses towards PMC within 15 days from the receipt of
expenditure statement from NHAI.
GUARANTEES TO CONCESSIONAIRE
Concession period of 15 years commencing from the appointed date i.e. date on
which financial close is achieved (20 years concession period as per new MCA) for
collection of toll/user free.
No additional toll way to be opened to traffic before expiry of 8 years from the
Appointed Date. If additional tollway commissioned at any time after 8 years from
Appointed Date, Concession Period to be increased by half the number of years by
which such commissioning period precedes the expiry of concession period, e.g. if
additional tollway occurs after 10 years, concession period is to be increased to 17.5
years against originally agreed 15 years.
Toll from additional tollway not to be less than 133% of toll being levied by
Concessionaire.
NHAI to enable access to the site free from encumbrances, assist in obtaining
applicable permits, access to necessary infrastructure facilities & utilities including
water, electricity, telecom facilities at commercial rates.
The Site shall be made available to the Concessionaire pursuant hereto by NHAI
free from all Encumbrances and occupations and without the Concessionaire being
required to make any payment to NHAI on account of any costs, expenses and
251
charges for the use of such Site for the duration of the Concession Period save and
except as otherwise expressly provided in this Agreement. NHAI shall procure for
the Concessionaire access to the Site, free of Encumbrances, not later than 150 (one
hundred and fifty) days from the date of the Agreement. Provided, however, that if
NHAI does not enable such access to any part or parts of the Site for any reason
other than a Force Majeure Event or breach of the Agreement by the
Concessionaire, NHAI shall pay to the Concessionaire Damages at the rate of `
1000 (Rupees one thousand) per month per 1000 (one thousand) sq. meters or part
thereof if such area is required by the Concessionaire for Construction Works.
Such Damages shall be raised to ` 2000 (Rupees two thousand) per month after
Commercial Operations Date (COD) if such area is essential for the smooth and
efficient operation of the Project Highway. Provided further that the Completion
Certificate or the Provisional Certificate, as the case may be, for the Project
Highway shall not be affected or delayed as a consequence of such parts of the Site
remaining under construction even after the Scheduled Project Completion Date.
Change of scope of work not exceeding 5% of the total project cost and not
adversely affecting the Commercial Operations Date (COD).
Revenue shortfall loan for debt service payments with interest rate @ SBI PLR per
annum if realizable fees in any accounting year during the concession period fall
below the subsistence revenue level as a result of indirect political event or political
event after accounting for insurance claims.
50% Force Majeure cost due to indirect political event to be reimbursed by NHAI
after deducting insurance claims. 100% reimbursement in case of political event &
no reimbursement if cause attributed to non political event. Interest @ SBI PLR
plus 2% on reimbursement is admissible.
In case Project needs to be terminated with Force Majeure event subsisting for more
than 180 days, entire debts to be cleared by NHAI.
The notification of the New National Highways Fee Rules (2008) has provided for
a revision of toll rates and hence realisable toll revenues for all vehicle categories.
The new toll rules are applicable for all new road projects. The salient features of
the new toll rules are:
252
While the earlier tolling rules prescribed a standard base toll rate on a Passenger
Car Unit (PCU)/km basis for a highway project, the new rules prescribe base toll rates
also for high-cost structures (such as bridges, bypass or tunnels) separately. The base
toll rates for such high-cost structures are indexed to the estimated project cost on
vehicle per trip basis.
MCA also provides for termination of the agreement if the average daily traffic
in any accounting year exceeds the design capacity and continues to exceed for three
subsequent accounting years. Termination in such scenario will be deemed to happen
on account of an Indirect Political Event.
253
Financial Close i.e., date from which concessionaire has access to funding by
Senior Lenders. MCA stipulates that Concessionaire to achieve Financial Close
within 180 days from the date of execution of Concession Agreement failing which
Concessionaire entitled to a further period of 90 days subject to an advance weekly
payment of ` 100,000 per week. Further if Financial Close does not occur within
270 days (180 + 90), Termination of Concession Agreement with mutual consent.
254
Performance Security in the form of Bank Guarantee for ` 100 million within 120
days from the date of Agreement. Bid Security to remain in full force & effect till
Concessionaire provides Performance Security to NHAI.
In the event of the Concessionaire being in default in the due and faithful
performance of its obligations under this Agreement and failing to remedy such
default within the Cure Period, the NHAI shall without prejudice to its other rights
and remedies hereunder be entitled to encash and appropriate the Performance
Security as Damages for such default. Upon such encashment and appropriation of
the Performance Security, NHAI shall grant a period of 15 (fifteen) days to the
Concessionaire to provide fresh Performance Security and the Concessionaire shall
within the time so granted furnish to NHAI such Performance Security failing
which NHAI shall be entitled to Terminate this Agreement. The provision set forth
in this Clause shall apply mutatis-mutandis to such fresh Performance Security
• Land acquisition for project is the job of the authority - it should also acquire the land
for police post, health centre, etc. The compensation payable at ` 50 per 1,000 sqm per
day needs to be reviewed. The toll rights should not be affected due to delay in handing
over the land.
• Issues like permits, security against law and order issues, day-to-day interference by
state authority etc are a part of the State Support Agreement. This needs to be signed
before calling BOT tenders with full assurance of timely action by State.
• The time of completion of the project depends mostly on geophysical and local
climate conditions. The construction period should not be a part of the concession
period of 12 or 20 years.
• The revenue shortfall should be in the form of a grant and not an interest-bearing loan.
256
• The toll collection revenue sharing at eighth year and thereafter is not desirable
because it would lead to accounting problems and possible legal disputes and
interference of the government in day-to-day working.
• A yearly fixed amount may be prescribed for each project as for above safety fund.
• The concession agreement should be dynamic and provide for separate fiscal cash
compensations. The toll-fee hike should not be linked with the wholesale price index
whenever applicable but it should be enhanced by 10% every two years.
• The concessionaire should be allowed to appoint his own engineer and staff for
implementation of the project. Appointment of independent engineer by the authority
should be with the consent of the concessionaire.
• The variation in traffic growth and effect on the concession period should not be
based on seven days PCU count. This should be on the basis of past six months toll
vehicle count.
• According to the contract, the accounts are to be audited by the authority on a regular
basis, which has nothing to do with any of their obligations. Since submission of
audited accounts as per company law is a mandatory requirement, indulgence by the
authority is not desirable.
Though the draft concession agreement has been substantially amended, it stills
lacks in many aspects. Past experience shows that the authority is bound by several
other government procedures which cannot afford any relaxations. The document has to
be simpler and lesser regulated. The effort of the authorities to bring out a
comprehensive document is commendable. It is hoped that it will be further refined
taking into consideration the above points. The new model concession agreement can
then be better implemented in the true spirit of public-private partnership.
257
APPENDIX 11
NANO POLYMER BASE STABILIZATION OF NH-1 STRETCH
ON PANIPAT-JHALANDHAR SECTION FROM KM 96.000 TO
KM 387.000 IN THE STATE OF HARYANA & PUNJAB
[Source ; Publication No 38, IRC Highway Research Board (2010-11)]
Date of Starting and Duration : 17 Dec 2010
Date completion (Targeted): 23 Dec 2011
India Polyroads Pvt. Ltd. Gurgaon, Haryana (IPPL) (R,I)
Scope and Objectives
x To assess the suitability of Soil Stabilised Base (SSB) Layer with Nano polymer
base stabilizer “SoilTech MK-III” for Road, Runway, Hard Stand Construction
by comparing their Physical, Engineering, Financial and Execution time
properties with those already implemented vide current specification by detailed
Laboratory investigations.
x To correlate design procedure with IRC : 37; As per the Pavement Crust
Catalogue frizzed in IRC : 37.
x Design of Pavement Cross section using Nano Polymer base stabilizer
‘SoilTech MK-III’ considering the actual traffic to be stimulated over design
life and site condition.
x Geotechnical Laboratory & field investigation to evaluate the suitability of
material/design mix/product application for real time construction.
x Monitoring of performance of Constructed Road over a period of time including
monsoon which includes DCP Test and APTF simulates.
Design, Drawing & Execution Methodology
(a) Design of Road and Concept
As per IRC:37-2001, trial pavement design are to be analysed using linear
elastic layered theory and maximum vertical strain on sub-grade and maximum tensile
strain at the bottom of bituminous layer are computed for a standard load. Design
thickness combination is so selected that the computed critical strain values, which
correspond to the initial condition of the pavement, are less than the limiting strain
values given by the performance criteria adopted in the guidelines. Limiting strain
criteria have been given in IRC : 37 for two distresses :- rutting along wheel paths and
258
seen rock like surface has been created thus obviating the requirement of any base layer
prior to laying of the wearing course.
(soaked
)
7 Resilient 154 8016 268 6895 154 3264
Modulus
(Mpa)
(C Field Testing and visual observation 7 days 6
months
8 C.R.B (%) 90 218
9 Resilient 1448 1887
Modulus
(Mpa)
10 R.I (mm/km) 1436 1232 1265
11 BBD Test 0.071 0.447
IIT & CRRI
(mm)
Laboratory Test Only
12 Rutting Not New Not found
found
13 Fatigue Not New Not found
found
14 Actual Traffic 1.80 msa
Stimulation
Looking to table C and layer theory of Highway Design (IRC : 37); it is now
understood that once, we are replacing Base/Sub-base Layer with SSB Layer, the
impact of wheel load or failure of Fatigue & Rutting minimize substantially. In table C
it has been observed that after six month report 1.80 MSA Real stimulation of traffic
there was no major failure or deviation from the original construction made.
Interim Conclusion
THICKNESS (MM)
NUMBER/SIDE
WIDTH (M)
AMOUNT
QUANTITY
UNIT
RATE
LENGTH (M)
ITEM
Semi Dense 1
Bituminous
500 7.00 25 88 Cum 9,800 862,400
Concrete
(SDBC)
Tack Coat II 1 500 7.00 3500 Sqm 35 1,222,500
Dense 1
Bituminous
500 7.00 60 210 Cum 9,000 1,890,000
Macadam
(DBM)
Track Coat I 1 500 7.00 3500 Sqm 35 122,500
Prime Coat 1 500 7.00 3500 Sqm 63 220,500
Wet Mix 1
Macadam 500 7.20 250 900 Cum 2,474 2,226,600
(WMM)
Soil Stabilized
Base (SSB) Cum 1022 -
THICKNESS (MM)
NUMBER/SIDE
WIDTH (M)
AMOUNT
QUANTITY
UNIT
RATE
LENGTH (M)
ITEM
Seal Coat
1 500 7 6 3500 Cum 75 262,500
Embankment
(As per profile) Cum 175 -
APPENDIX 13
INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM OF USA
To link its vast territory, the United States built a network of high-capacity,
high-speed highways, of which the most important element is the Interstate Highway
system. These highways were commissioned in the 1950s by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower and modeled after the German Autobahn. There is also a transcontinental
rail system, which is used for moving freight across the lower forty-eight states.
Passenger rail service is provided by Amtrak, which serves forty-six of the lower forty-
eight states. In the summer of 1919, just months after the end of World War I, an
expedition of 81 Army vehicles - a truck convoy set out from Washington, D.C., for a
trip across the country to San Francisco. The convoy's purpose was to road test various
army vehicles and to see how easy or how difficult it would be to move an entire army
across the North American continent. The convoy assumed wartime conditions -
damage or destruction to railroad facilities, bridges, tunnels, and the like - and imposed
self sufficiency on itself. Averaging about 6 miles an hour, or 58 miles (90 km) a day,
the trucks snaked their way from Washington, up to Pennsylvania and into Ohio, then
due west across the agricultural Midwest, the Rockies, and into California. Generally, it
followed the "Lincoln highway," later known as U.S. 30, arriving in San Francisco 62
days and 3,251 miles later.
The convoy involved 24 army officers and 258 enlisted men. One of those
officers, a young lieutenant colonel, went along as a Tank Corps observer "partly for a
lark and partly to learn," he wrote decades later. "We were not sure it could be
accomplished at all. Nothing of the sort had ever been attempted." The convoy made a
lasting impression on the young officer and stoked in him an interest in good roads that
would last for decades. A generation later, during World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower
was still thinking about good roads as supreme Allied commander in Europe, where he
oversaw the invasion of Western Europe and the defeat of the Nazi army, which was
able to move quickly on the autobahns running throughout Germany. Later, as
President of the United States, Eisenhower cited the 1919 convoy and his World War II
experiences to persuade Congress to enact the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956,
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creating what is now known as the interstate highway system, which observed its 50th
anniversary in the year 2006.
"The old convoy had started me thinking about good, two-lane highways," he
wrote years later in his popular memoir, At Ease, "but Germany had made me see the
wisdom of broader ribbons across the land." The interstate system now comprises
46,876 miles. The completion of the system, at a cost of $129 billion, was a cooperative
federal-state undertaking. Each state transportation department managed its own
program for location, design, right-of-way acquisition, and construction. The states also
were responsible for the ownership and maintenance of the system, and in 1981, they
began receiving federal funds for maintenance. Congress provided revenues from the
federal gasoline tax to provide 90 percent of the cost of the construction of the
interstates with the states picking up the remaining 10 percent. The technical standards
for the highways were highly regulated - lanes had to be 12 feet wide and shoulders 10
feet wide, the bridges had to have 14 feet of clearance, grades had to be less than 3
percent, and the highway had to be designed for travel at 70 miles an hour. The most
notable attribute of the system is the limited access concept. The 42,000 mile system
only has approximately 16,000 interchanges (Interstate 90 at Seattle, Washington
shown below). The interstate system has had an enormous and lasting impact on the
social and economic fabric of the nation, even as it has provided, as Eisenhower hoped,
a system of highways that might be needed to move material & troops in time of war.
267
All this might never have happened if Lieutenant Colonel Eisenhower had not
been involved with the 1919 transcontinental convoy, for the history of the interstate
highway system certainly begins with this event. Eisenhower, along with the other
observers, endured rough conditions on the trip. Half the distance, particularly west of
the Mississippi River, was over dirt roads, wheel paths, desert sands and mountain
trails. More than 230 recorded road accidents occurred, as the heavy trucks, driven
mostly by inexperienced drivers, sank in quicksand or mud, ran off the road, or
overturned. Other problems included inadequate bridges; limited sleep; lack of food,
shelter, and bathing facilities; and even the lack of drinking water. In spite of all this,
the results of the transcontinental exercise provided much valuable information about
the operation and maintenance of a motor truck convoy as well as the feasibility of
moving a large military force by road across the continent under simulated wartime
conditions.
Eisenhower, in his report on the expedition, agreed with some of these points
but had observations of his own. "Extended trips by trucks through the middle western
part of the United States are impracticable until the roads are improved," he said, "and
then only a light truck should be used on long hauls." On the other hand, he observed
that in the eastern part of the country, the roads were much better, allowing a light truck
to travel 100 miles a day. But the convoy did more than just indicate what the army
needed to do to improve its mobility. Along the way, its arrival in cities and towns
throughout the nation's midwest and west was a major event. Some 3,250,000 people in
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350 communities turned out to see the latest military equipment and listen to patriotic
speeches. And the expedition stirred interest in road building.
The increased public interest in roads also raised the issue of federal aid to
highways. Early in the debate, there were many critics of federal aid to highways.
Thomas M. McDonald, who became chief of the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) in
1919, "appreciated the need for a connected system of interstate highways, but he did
not believe that a separate national system under a federal commission was the way to
achieve it," according to a history of America's highways, A History of the Federal-Aid
Program. He also questioned the assumption that long distance highways were
necessary for national defense, saying that what was needed was a system of roads
connecting military installations.
At the same time, Congress also got into the act. The Federal Highway Act of
1938 directed the Bureau of Public Roads to study the feasibility of a six-route toll
highway network. In its 1939 report, "Toll Roads and Free Roads," the bureau
concluded that with some exceptions, the "amount of transcontinental traffic was
insufficient to support a network of toll superhighways." The report recommended a
43,000-mile non-toll highway network in its "Master Plan for Free Highway
Development." This proposal called for highways to follow existing roads whenever
possible, have more than two lanes of traffic available if traffic required it, and be
269
limited-access in high-traffic areas. In the large cities, the proposal allowed for above-
or below-grade intersections and limited-access belt lines surrounding the central
business district to permit traffic to bypass the inner city and to link intercity
expressways. Roosevelt enthusiastically approved the report and sent it to Congress on
April 27, 1939, saying that instead of imposing user tolls, the cost of highways could be
recovered by selling off federal land along the right-of-way (ROW) to homebuilders
and others. Critics in and out of Congress condemned this suggestion as a "socialistic
scheme to transfer the cost of providing deluxe highways from those most benefited to
the already heavily burdened landowner." Overall, however, reaction was favorable
within the highway community.
With the outbreak of World War II, the need for a national system of highway
dropped in priority. However, toll roads were being built by the states. When the
Pennsylvania Turnpike (now I-76 and I-70) opened to traffic on October 1, 1940, it was
the prototype of the modern, high-speed interstate highway. In New York and
Connecticut, the Hutchinson River Parkway and the Merritt Parkway, both toll roads,
proved highly profitable. Other freeways and toll roads were incorporated into the
interstate system at the time of its creation in 1956. As the war began to turn in the
allies' favour, attention refocused on the federal highway program. The Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1944, enacted after nine months of intense negotiations in Congress,
was the largest highway bill in history, even though it did not meet the expectations of
the administration and the states. Its net effect was to maintain the status quo. However,
it did authorize a limited 40,000 mile National System of Interstate Highways, to be
selected by the state highway departments, to connect the major metropolitan areas and
to serve the national defense. But the act was passed without any provision for
construction funds because Congress rejected the President's suggestion for raising
money by selling off excess rights-of-way.
The Public Roads Administration (PRA), the successor agency to the Bureau of
Public Roads, was responsible for formulating an interstate highway system based on
the states' recommendations. On August 2, 1947, after a year of negotiations, a 37,681-
mile system, including urban thoroughfares and circumferentials, was approved. Also,
design standards for the interstate system were developed by the PRA, along with the
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But 1952 also brought a presidential election, which swept into office the same
man who had been appalled by the conditions of roads in 1919 and impressed by the
German autobahns in 1944. One of Eisenhower's top priorities upon becoming
President was to secure legislation for an interstate highway system. Since his first year
in office, 1953, was dominated by the Korean war, he did not raise the highway issue
until 1954. That year, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954, which
authorized $175 million for an interstate system, to be distributed on a 60-40 federal-
state basis. Signing it, however, Eisenhower called it merely "one effective forward
step." More, he believed, was needed.
In July 1954, he brought up the idea again, and a conference of state governors
at Lake George, New York, provided the setting. Eisenhower was unable to attend
because of his sister-in-law's death, so he sent Vice President Richard Nixon to deliver
his message to the governors. The legislation he had signed a few months earlier, he
told them, was a "good start," but a more comprehensive interstate network of
highways was needed to reduce the number of highway deaths and injuries, cut down
on delays because of detours and traffic jams, reduce the amount of highway-related
271
litigation, and allow more efficient truck transportation of goods. And, he added, the
system was needed to address "the appalling inadequacies to meet the demands of
catastrophe or defense, should an atomic war come." Eisenhower also proposed a self-
liquidating financing system that would avoid debt.
The proposal excited the governors, and the President named a special panel to
study the problem. Headed by retired Gen. Lucius D. Clay, it gave its report to the
President early in 1955, and he forwarded it to Congress. The panel called for a Federal
Highway Corporation that would issue bonds to build the system and for a gas tax to be
used to retire the bonds over three decades. The cost of building an interstate system of
highways would be about $27 billion, it said, with $25 billion of it coming from the
issuance of the bonds. Members of Congress, however, had their own ideas. Legislation
calling for an interstate system with 90 percent federal funding was defeated even after
intense efforts to strike a compromise that would have wide appeal. In his State of the
Union speech in January 1956, Eisenhower tried again. And the Bureau of Public
Roads issued a book, General Location of National System of Interstate Highways, that
showed where interstates would be located in and around the nation's largest
metropolitan areas. Opponents to the funding mechanism in 1955 were now agreeing to
some increases in the gas tax.
With Eisenhower standing firm for legislation to create the interstate system,
Congress went back to work on it, and finally produced legislation that called for 90
percent federal funding, with money coming from a Highway Trust Fund that received
the revenue from the federal gasoline tax. The final version also reflected a compromise
on how the funds would be apportioned among the states, and it contained provisions
on uniform design standards, inclusion of existing toll roads, and the wage rate to be
paid on these federal construction projects. It also permitted use of federal funds to
purchase the rights-of-way for the roads and allowed two-lane segments, although later
legislation required all parts of the system to be four-lane, limited-access highways. On
June 26, 1956, both the Senate and the House gave final approval to the compromise
version and sent it to Eisenhower, who was in Walter Reed Army Hospital with an
intestinal ailment. There, he signed the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 privately,
without ceremony, on June 29, 1956.
272
Today's interstate highway system first envisioned in the 1930s, then enacted
two decades later after Eisenhower put his considerable prestige behind it has had a
tremendous impact on the country. While created in part to help defend the nation in
the event of an emergency, the interstates with limited access and many lanes, have also
spurred and speeded the development of commerce throughout the country and abroad.
Trucks move quickly from one region to another, transporting everything from durable
goods and mail to fresh produce and the latest fashions. And they have increased the
mobility of all Americans, allowing them to move out of the cities and establish homes
in a growing suburbia even farther from their workplaces and to travel quickly from
one region to another for vacation and business.
But the interstates have also increased congestion, smog, and automobile
dependency. The shift to the increasingly outward bound suburbs has caused a drop in
population densities of urban areas, and the ease of long-distance travel on high-speed,
limited-access highways has contributed to the decline of mass transit, such as rail and
bus. During the decades of its construction, the interstate highway system was the
largest public works project in American history - pumping billions into the nation's
economy all over the country. Today, it still has an economic impact because of the
continued maintenance and repairs needed for the roadways. In 1990, on the centennial
of Eisenhower's birth, President George H.W. Bush redesignated the interstate system
as the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.
One of the system's longest roadways, Interstate 80, would be quite familiar to
Eisenhower today. It starts just across the Hudson River from New York City, then
goes through New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and into Ohio, where it then follows
generally the route of the 1919 Army convoy to San Francisco that stoked an interest in
roads for the young Army officer from Kansas. For both U.S. and interstate highways,
north-south routes carry odd numbers, while east-west routes have even numbers.
Interstate 90, which runs from Boston to Seattle, is the longest, at 3,020 miles. The
shortest, not counting spurs and beltways, is Interstate 73 in North Carolina, running 12
miles from Greensboro to Emery.
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APPENDIX 14
INDUSTRY REFORMS BY CHINA FOR IMPLEMENTING
NATIONAL TRUNK HIGHWAY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
(NTHDP)
network planning in China is : (i) the tree rooted at Beijing connecting all the provincial
capitals, (ii) all chords connecting provincial capitals, (iii) all cities with population
over 200,000, (iv) all rail hubs, (v) all ports, (vi) all major airports, and (vii) the old
trading routes. The following reforms carried out by Chinese in implementing the grand
highway programme NTHDP are worth emulating.
All companies in China were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but none were
adequately experienced to undertake the new expressway expansion on their own. The
government of China understood that international contractors who undertake mainly
large scale and technically complicated projects would bring to their Chinese
counterparts advanced technology, improved management techniques and modern,
high-tech equipment. They therefore invited the international contracting community to
become involved with their initial expressway projects, but with strict requirements that
all contractors had to bid the project as a joint venture with local Chinese construction
companies as partners. This was specifically required to ensure that the local highway
construction industry could benefit from technology transfer and develop its own
capacity. The international contractors attracted to China were mainly from Hong
Kong, Japan and South Korea.
275
Evolution of the Industry Structure - Prior to 1976 during the leadership of Mao
Zedong business enterprises and communes, including construction organizations, were
all directly controlled by the central or provincial governments. This was the time of
the “iron rice bowl”, when enterprise workers were guaranteed life-long employment
and security even if the enterprise was over-staffed and lacked financing to provide
adequate services. Construction was viewed at this time as a simple activity of
assembling materials, plant and other items made by the other sectors of the economy
to create building or civil engineering works and was considered to add no significant
value to the total social product. Most of the central ministries formed their own
construction companies to implement their own specific capital projects.
In December 1978 the Chinese Government announced the decision to shift the
focus of its work from class struggles to economic development. This historic decision
catapulted a major economic reform. The need for reform in China was highlighted by
the problems with the SOEs. In 1984 it had been recognized that the policy of using
SOEs as a social framework for employment was leading to major inefficiencies and
debt due to bloated pay rolls, redundant construction, and incompetent management.
Accordingly the Government introduced a “responsibility” system for enterprise
managers to separate economic management of the enterprise from political presence
within these organizations. This provided the managers with much greater flexibility
and control over whom they could hire and fire. This in turn led to SOE employees,
who once had a job-for-life situation, now facing job insecurity and working on
276
temporary contracts. In 1993 the Government decided that due to the inefficient
operation of SOEs, large and medium-sized SOEs should in future be run on a
corporate basis. Accordingly the State Economic and Trade Commission was set up in
May 1993 to formulate sectoral programs for SOE reform. Since 1998 the number of
SOE employees has dramatically reduced and incompetent managers have been sacked.
Many SOEs turned to the talent market for new management recruits, including
attempts to attract foreign managers. The Chinese Government started believing that
construction could be a profit making industry. Agreement was reached on a series of
reform programs which introduced market mechanisms into the construction industry.
The reforms required state bodies to :
• Diversify ownership of construction enterprises.
• Deregulate employment in the construction industry to allow companies to hire
and fire or downsize to reflect the actual market conditions.
• Diversify the business scope of construction enterprises. Deregulate building
materials supply to avoid manufacturing or supply based on central policy rather
than demand.
• Use bidding procedures to allocate construction work.
• Bring the construction industry under the unified administration of the Ministry of
Construction (MOCn) and its local agencies.
• Further privatize the state-owned construction enterprises.
• Separate field operations from management.
the 1984 reforms. Urban collectives have been developed and are under the
administration of Municipal, Borough, District, and Town Governments or Community
Committees. They are normally given small and relatively simple work to complete and
act somewhat like a small public works unit. There are approximately 25,000 urban
collectives. Rural collectives or brigades are owned and run by townships or villages
and are employed to build houses or small projects. There are currently some 50,000
such brigades in China. They are normally restricted to their own communities,
although they can take part in projects in other parts of the country with permission
from the local construction commissions. Both urban and rural construction brigades
are allowed to work in urban areas as either a general contractor, subcontractor or a
labor-only contractor on major works for the SOEs.
From the start of the expressways program it was established that the provincial
governments would be responsible for the design, implementation and construction of
the expressways and each province had its specific SOE teams to complete the work.
The quality was initially not good but it improved gradually with imported technology
and the experience of working with international consortia. Every project they
completed led to greater experience and the number of teams developed rapidly. In the
early days the provincial communications departments would tend to use their local
construction enterprises, but the principle of competitive bidding became very well
established in China and SOEs centrally and provincially were permitted to bid against
each other for contracts. This led to a strengthening of the industry’s capacity through
good and transparent business practices.
construction industry has developed its capacity to a level estimated at three times
greater than demand, so China’s construction capacity is now being exported.
Building Manpower Capacity - China enjoys wide manpower resources from the
many central and provincial SOEs. It was only up to the mid/late 90s that the capacity
was considered to be insufficient to meet the demands of the expressway program. The
Chinese highway industry rapidly learned from their international joint venture partners
and the MOC now reports that it is now unusual to require the assistance of the
international highway building community on expressways. The process by which large
SOEs win expressway bids in the provinces and then hire smaller SOEs and private
subcontractors to complete specific sections or supply particular trades on the project
has rapidly developed the supply chain for manpower in the industry. There are also
technical colleges and professional schools where some higher caliber labor can be
trained. Skilled operators for plant and equipment have been trained initially by the
international machine manufacturing companies who, when selling plant and
equipment to Chinese companies, arranged either to train operators in their own
country and/or to send trainers to China with their equipment to work alongside the
trainee operators. There has never been a shortage of high caliber civil engineers in
China. The profession is highly regarded in the community and salaries are higher than
the average for other professions and even the IT industry. There is great competition
for students entering civil engineering streams in certain universities, and particularly in
certain institutions.
Since 1984, China has been pursuing project bidding for contracts [Daud
Ahmad and Zong Yan 1994]. Generally contracts are competitively bid as regular price
contracts based on a bill of quantities and the winning SOE then sublets to smaller
subcontractors. Sub-contracting is capped at 30% of the overall contract value.
Occasionally SOE contractors may be awarded a contract through a negotiated
agreement, but this is only for a very small portion of the projects. If private money is
being used through a concessionaire contract, the concessionaire may elect to use a
particular contractor or the contractor may be part of the concessionaire’s venture.
There has also been a growing acceptance in China to use other forms of procurement
such as Design Build/ Turnkey and BOT. However, the use of BOT has been seen not
to be too successful in the Chinese highway construction market.
managers, engaged for the full project term and rotated from one project site to the
next. Typically for an expressway project (of say 100 km) the PIU consists of a fully
dedicated team of about 50-60 staff. It is responsible for overall project
implementation, including procuring and managing design and construction supervision
services, carrying out pre-construction activities, and procuring and managing the
construction contracts. The Finance Bureau in the respective province plays a key role
in overall coordination, management and monitoring of project implementation. The
Finance Bureau’s anticorruption department (equivalent to CVC in India), audit
departments and comprehensive department (responsible for overall coordination
among various agencies) are fully involved during implementation and collectively
endorse large contract variations (above 15% of contract value).
Urban transport projects are often completely located within a municipal area.
This is the case of World Bank-financed projects in Wuhan and other large cities such
as Shanghai or Tianjin. In such case agencies in charge of road construction, bus
operation and several utilities report to the same vice-mayor. This reporting relationship
facilitates the coordination and speedy implementation of urban road transport projects.
However, such institutional integration does not extend to rail systems, nor to traffic
police, making coordination with them difficult. [Some projects have been complicated
by the allocation of responsibility for the inner city to the municipal counterpart of the
Ministry of Construction, while responsibility for the suburbs rests with the counterpart
of the Ministry of Communications.]
Project Preparation - Surveys and Design - Great attention is paid and precision is
attached to surveys, investigations and detailed project designs. In China, there are
about 15,000 qualified highway design engineers employed in 410 large (Class A and
B combined) survey and design institutes in the 31 provinces. In addition, there are
several hundred small Class C design institutes responsible for design of rural and
lower category roads. Entry requirements to the design institutes are often quite
stringent and a Masters degree in a relevant field is a minimum. These institutes attract
the best talent, as salaries offered are substantially higher than those in construction.
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For a greenfield expressway project (of say 100 km length) concept to detailed
design typically takes about 36 months, almost the same time required for construction.
The cost of designs is typically 2.5 to 3% of the overall project cost (compared to about
1% or less in India). There are also several levels of checks and balances in the design
process. After the preliminary concept designs and alignments are verified by the MOC
and the National Development and Reform Commission, the detailed designs are
assigned to the provincial survey and design institutes. Further, the detailed designs are
independently verified by other competent design institutes and academicians in
reputed institutes. Moreover, the survey control points are handed over by the designers
to the implementing agency and the contractor(s) after a thorough joint verification at
the start of construction and the designers remain liable for any clarifications on the
survey issues during the entire period of implementation. The result of this strong
review and checking procedure is fewer design changes or surprises during
construction in China.
monitoring project progress. All contracts have dispute resolution provisions that
include adjudication, through an individual adjudicator or a dispute review board
(DRB), followed by arbitration as the next step. Due to the Chinese culture that
encourages a team approach to resolving problems, disputes are generally resolved
rapidly and at site level. Apparently it is considered a failure on behalf of the project
team if a dispute were ever to get to arbitration and the actual use of the adjudicator or
DRB on highway projects has generally not been necessary, due to the intent of all
parties to resolve issues as they occur.
Vender Qualification And Credit System - The MOC is responsible for managing the
qualification and performance management system of Project Legal Person,
Contractors, Supervision Enterprise and Survey/Design Enterprise in the country, in
close coordination with the provincial communications departments. The MOC and
Provincial Communication Departments are responsible for appointing the Project
Legal Person for each project. Project Legal Persons are classified as Class A for all
classes of highways or Class B for just Class II highways and below.
Contractors: Construction agencies are broadly divided into three categories: General
Highway Construction Contracting Enterprise (highway, railway, hydraulics etc),
Professional Contracting Enterprise (bridges, tunnels etc) and Labor Subcontracting
Enterprise (by the type of work). The classification ‘General Highway Construction
Contracting Enterprise’ is further divided into three categories, namely Highway Road
Surface Project Professional Contracting (pavement works), Highway Roadbed Project
Professional Contracting (earthworks) and Highway Transportation Project
Professional Contracting. The following are the classification/qualification categories
and numbers of General Highway Construction Contracting Enterprises in China:
• Special Class Enterprise&General Project Contracting (7 )
• Class I Enterprise&Highway Projects of all Classes (482)
• Class I Professional : Highway Projects of all Classes (79)
• Class II Enterprise& Highway Projects of Class I and below
• Class III Enterprise& Highway Projects of Class II and below
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Supervision Agencies: Project Supervision Enterprises are classified into three grades
(A, B and C) and three specialties (special independent bridge, special independent
tunnel and electrical-mechanical engineering). Grade A and B are approved by MOC,
while Grade C is approved by PCDs. There are 270 Grade A, 100 Grade B and 300
Grade C supervision enterprises in China.
Survey and Design Institutes: Survey and Design enterprises are also classified into
three grades (A, B and C). Grade A and B are approved by MOC, while Grade C is
approved by PCDs. The following are the classification criteria and numbers of survey
and design institutes in China:
• Grade A divided into highway, bridge, tunnel and transportation projects (150)
• Grade B Highways of Class II and below (300)
• Grade C Highways of Class III and below (1000)
Highway Construction Credit System: The MOC has recently set up a national
highway construction enterprise information system, and some provinces are also
developing provincial information systems. These systems are intended to share the
classification and credit rating of these enterprises among stakeholders, including the
public. The MOC is currently working at a five-level credit evaluation system (AA, A,
B, C and D) to monitor performance of the enterprises.
Road Safety - Road accidents have been a major problem all over the world. Every
year about 1.2 million people are killed and 50 million people are injured on the
world’s roads. In China also, road accidents have been increasing. In 1999 there were
83,500 deaths and 286,000 injuries. These have increased to 98,738 deaths and 469,911
injuries in 2005. China’s accident rate of 7.6 deaths per 10,000 vehicles is high
compared with the accident rates in countries like the USA, Japan and Malaysia.
However, China is addressing the road safety issue in a comprehensive manner
following international best approaches. These include collection and analysis of road
accident data, setting targets for improved safety, defining the agencies responsible for
achieving them, enacting legislative procedures for supporting interventions, and
addressing safety issues in all parts of the project cycle i.e. during planning, design,
construction and operation of highways.
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During the planning stages of the NTHDP, China developed standards for the
highway system to be adopted for the upcoming highway and expressway projects.
This approach resulted in uniform standards all over the country, fostering uniformity,
reliability and safety during driving. China has been able to reduce the accident rate on
its high-traffic core network by: (a) reducing the number of possible conflict points at
each intersection from over 20 to zero, (b) eliminating slow moving and two-wheeler
traffic on the core network, (c) controlling access to the network through well designed
entrance and exit ramps. The long-distance traffic which uses the expressway network
enjoys the advantages of gentle and long slopes, long curves, long sight distances, good
drainage systems facilitating quick disposal of water and improving skid resistance,
large traffic sign boards, elaborate road markings, crash barriers on the median and
along the sides to avoid head-on collisions and vehicles overturning. These design
features contribute to reducing the number and severity of accidents. The team also
noted that pavement surfacing in China uses relatively open-graded courses with mastic
asphalt, which improve the skid resistance of the surface.
The MOC and the PCDs are responsible for the ‘Engineering’ aspects of road
safety. For ‘Education’ and ‘Enforcement’ the Ministry of Public Security (police) and
provincial communications departments are responsible. The Ministry of Public
Security is also responsible for compliance with regulations on licenses, vehicle
conditions and driver testing. In 2004 the Chinese Government enacted a Highway Law
and its first National Road Safety Law, which define the regulations, agency
responsibilities and implementation arrangements. Enforcement activities undertaken
by Chinese authorities include compulsory seatbelt wearing, speed limit restrictions,
and checking overloading.
Each major project generally has a resettlement office working from the design stage
through to the construction. The entire land acquisition, resettlement and rehabilitation
activities take about 5-6 months. However, project-affected people are becoming more
active and resettlement implementation time is lengthening in China. The emphasis on
environmental measures like Bio Engineering and drainage is given high priority
during design as well as construction. The team noted some good practice examples for
slope treatment during the field visit using bio engineering.
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APPENDIX 15
HIGHWAYS OF DEVELOPMENT
The Government has embarked upon an ambitious programme for the next
seven years (2005-2012) which envisages an investment of ` 2200 billion for
development of National Highways projects. This includes :
Completion of ongoing GQ & NS-EW Corridors along with Port connectivity
under NHDP Phase I & II
4-laning of 10,000 km under NHDP Phase-III (earlier called Pradhan Mantri Bharat
Jodo Pariyojana)
2-laning with paved shoulders of 20,000 km of National Highways under NHDP
Phase-IV
6-laning of 6500 km of selected stretches of National Highways under NHDP
Phase-V
Development of 1,000 km of expressways under NHDP Phase-VI
Construction of ring roads, flyovers and bypasses on selected stretches under
NHDP Phase-VII
x Safety Features - Road safety is an aspect of road building that is never ignored.
The roads are designed by Design Consultants of international repute. Provisions
for flyovers, bypasses, railway over / under bridges, etc are made with an eye on
enhancing road safety. In the Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), provisions are also
made for overhead signs, cautionary/regulatory/informatory retro-reflective
signboards, crash barriers and median railings. For safety of road users during
construction stage, provisions are made in contract documents for safety features
such as advance traffic warning, retro-reflective signs and reflective lights at
hazardous locations.
x Operation & Maintenance - Several initiatives have been taken to ensure safe and
comfortable journey on completed corridors of National Highways. They include
thermoplastic line marking on carriageway, crash barriers at the location of high
embankment and curves, railing at the central median and service road in urban
areas to prevent crossing of pedestrian and cyclists and shrubs/plantations in the
central median to improve aesthetics and reduce the glare of light of vehicles
coming from opposite direction. In addition, there is provision of well-equipped
ambulance with requisite para-medical staff and necessary medical equipments for
every 50 km of completed stretch to provide immediate help to accident victims and
to take them to nearest Trauma care center or hospital. Tow-away vehicle facility is
available for all completed stretches for towing away the broken down or damaged
vehicles from the carriageway. Route patrol vehicle on 24 hours basis are provided
for every 50 km length of National Highway on completed corridors to assist the
road users. Each patrol vehicle is equipped with adequate sign boards, traffic cones,
fire extinguishers, gas cutters, hydraulic jack and first aid kit.
x Wayside Amenities - NHAI has initiated drive to develop comprehensive wayside
amenities for use of highways, which will have provision for refueling,
refreshment, rest and relaxation, separate places for parking of cars, buses and
trucks, workshop for repairs of vehicles, telephones, small shopping centers etc.
x Highway Traffic Management System (HTMS) - NHAI has provided a pilot
project on Highway Traffic Management System on Kotpulti-Ajmer Section of
NH-8. This comprises Emergency Call Boxes (ECB), Variable Message Signs
(VMS), Closed Circuit Television (CCTV), Meteorological data station, Automatic
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vehicle counter and classifier (AVCC), Mobile Radio System and Control Centre.
Another HTMS is now operational on the recently-completed Jaipur-Kishangarh
highway.
x Green Highways - Since most stretches of the National Highways were still two
laned at the time of taking up NHDP, widening of these stretches was the primary
task. The first adverse consequence of widening, from environmental point of view,
was inevitable felling of trees grown along the highways. However, in order to save
maximum possible number of trees from felling, a conscious decision has been
taken to restrict widening of the highways to one side only, wherever feasible. This
has, indeed, saved a lot of trees. Any loss of trees is sought to be offset by planting
at least double the number. Not only this, following the approach of “Corridor
Development & Management”, rather than “Highway Development” NHAI plans to
enhance the aesthetics of the highway corridor from all possible angles. The main
objectives of planting along the Highways are :
Aesthetic enhancement of the project corridors and places of historical and
cultural importance by planting selective ornamental trees, landscaping and
turfing with grasses and shrubs.
To reduce the impacts of air pollution and dust as trees and shrubs are known
to be natural sink for air pollutants.
To provide much needed shade on glaring hot roads during summer. To reduce
the impact of ever increasing noise pollution.
To arrest soil erosion at the embankment slopes.
Prevention of glare from the headlight of incoming vehicles.
Climate amelioration and moderating the effect of wind and incoming
radiation.
To define the ROW especially highlight sharp horizontal curves during night.
Till June 2005, plantation had been carried out along the substantially
completed section of NHDP Phase I. Over 500,000 trees had been planted along nearly
1200 km of avenues - of these over 37 thousands are fruit-bearing trees - while about
0.75 million saplings were planted on 1600 km of highways along the median. Andhra
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu top the list of states with high plantations. In Andhra Pradesh,
on the Chennai-Kolkata corridor, nearly 260,000 avenue plantations and 200,000
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median plantations had been carried out. In Tamil Nadu, on the Mumbai-Chennai
corridor of GQ, nearly 60,000 saplings have been planted along the avenue and 18,000
on the median, covering 62 km and 29 km respectively. In Maharashtra, on the Delhi
Mumbai Corridor of GQ, nearly 23,000 saplings have been planted on avenues over 57
km. In addition, tree plantations have been carried out in Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand,
Gujarat, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
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