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B__________
IN THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
VALERIE HANEY,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent.
Valerie T. McGinty
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 8
3
billion-year commitment to Scientology—then she was abused, trapped,
and trafficked. .......................................................................................... 12
C. Starting in 2010, plaintiff was pressured to sign several non-mutual
arbitration agreements that required all arbitrators be “Scientologists in
good standing.” ........................................................................................ 14
D. After submitting “seven” “written requests to leave” that were all
denied, Plaintiff escaped in the trunk of a car and the Church cut off all
communication to her family who remained there. ................................. 16
E. The Church lured Ms. Haney back to sign one more arbitration
agreement under the watch of an armed guard, designating again that
each arbitrator would be a Scientology minister...................................... 16
F. After Ms. Haney left Scientology, defendants continued to harass her
and declared her a Suppressive Person. ................................................... 18
G. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
and denied reconsideration....................................................................... 19
VII. Timeliness of petition. .................................................................. 19
VIII. Basis for writ relief—this case meets all applicable Omaha
factors. ....................................................................................................... 20
X. Irreparable harm............................................................................. 23
PRAYER .................................................................................................... 25
VERIFICATION ....................................................................................... 26
I.
4
II.
5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 .............................................................. 31, 32, 33, 36
Barrett v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1176 .............................. 21
Bruni v. Didion (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1272............................................ 33
Cantwell v. State of Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296 ............................... 26
Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2013 9th Cir.) 733 F.3d 916 ................. 35
Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs.
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676 ...................................................................... 35
City of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989) 492 U.S. 573 ...................................... 26
Davis v. Kozak (2020) 2020 WL 5000760 ................................................. 25
Fitz v. NCR Corp. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 702 ......................................... 37
Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc.
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 846 ................................................................ 31, 37
Gatton v. T-Mobile (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571........................................ 25
Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443 ................................... 31, 33
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807 .................................... 35
Higgins v. Superior Court (Disney/ABC Int’l Television, Inc.
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1238 .................................................................. 36
Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc.
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322 .................................................................... 32
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064 ................................... 33
Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049 ............................ 21
McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083 .................................................................... 17
McIntosh v. Mills (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 333 .......................................... 29
Mercuro v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 167 .............................. 37
Nguyen v. Applied Med. Resources Corp.
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 232 ........................................................................ 21
Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390 ........................................................... 21
Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (Greinke)
(1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266.................................................................... 19
Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc.
(1984) 36 Cal.3d 171 ............................................................................... 23
6
Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 758 ............................... 21
Phelan v. Superior Court of San Francisco (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363 .............. 20
Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507 ............................ 17
Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 .......................................... 20
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. V. Schempp (1963) 374 U.S. 203 ................. 28
Science Applications Internat. Corp. v. Superior Court
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1095 .................................................................... 18
Sieger v. Sieger (N.Y. App. 2002) 297 A.D. 2d 33 .................................... 30
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624 ................................... 28
Suh v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504.................................. 25
Szetela v. Discover Bank (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1094 .............................. 20
Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387 ............ 33
Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38 ........................................................ 29
Young Seok Suh v. Superior Court
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504 ............................................................ 32, 34
Zembsch v. Superior Court (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 153 ........................... 18
Statutes
Civ. Code § 1550 ......................................................................................... 29
Civ. Code § 1598 ......................................................................................... 29
Rules
CRC 8.104(e) ............................................................................................... 17
Constitutional Provisions
Cal Const. art. I § 4 ...................................................................................... 29
First Amendment, U.S. Constitution ........................................................... 26
7
INTRODUCTION
8
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
To the Honorable Presiding Justices and Honorable Associate Justices of
the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District:
I. Issues presented.
These issues warrant review to determine the proper analysis for the
First Amendment right to freedom of religion and the unconscionability
doctrine in the context of “religious arbitration” agreements drafted and
imposed by religious institutions.
9
II. Relief sought.
V. The parties.
4. Petitioner is Valerie Haney, the plaintiff in the action now pending in the
Superior Court of Los Angeles, Case No. 19STCV21210.
6. Real parties in interest are the defendants in that action, the Church of
Scientology International, Religious Technology Center, and David
Miscavige.
10
VI. Factual background.
A. Plaintiff was abused and trafficked.
8. Ms. Haney was a member of the “Cadet Org,” which is “for the children
of Scientology’s most dedicated members.” (1 EP 16, ¶ 45.) As a “Cadet
Org” member, Ms. Haney was “subjected to military-like conditions, which
included a strict schedule of working and cleaning for approximately
twelve hours per day.” (1 EP 16, ¶ 45.) She attended “school” on the
compound but learned only “Scientology’s practices, rather than…the
minimum compulsory education required under state law.” As a result,
when she “began public school” “at 8 years old, she was two grades behind
her peers.” (1 EP 16, ¶ 45.)
9. From a young age, Ms. Haney was “told what she could and could not
say publicly about Scientology,” she was “taught never to question
Scientology’s teachings and practices,” and she was “told she could never
go to the police and/or any government agency, because they were the
enemy of Scientology.” (1 EP 17, ¶ 46.)
11
“forced” to “sit in a chair while adults screamed offensive things in her face
such as ‘I am going to fuck you and then your mother,’ and ‘You are going
to suck my dick.’” If Ms. Haney “reacted in any way,” the “entire process
of ‘bullbaiting’ would start all over again.” (1 EP 17, ¶ 48.) These actions
all constituted “child abuse” under “California Penal Code § 273(a).” (1 EP
17, ¶ 48.)
12. At age 15, while still a minor, she was “made to” sign a contract
“pledging a billion year commitment to Scientology,” “known within CSI
as the ‘billion year contract.’” (1 EP 18, ¶ 50.)
13. Defendants “forced” Ms. Haney to work “7 days a week” for “months
on end” and she was “rarely given a day off.” (1 EP 18, ¶ 51.) Defendants
“forced” Ms. Haney to “begin work early in the morning” and perform
“laborious and back-breaking work” “without breaks and/or legally
mandated meals until late at night.” (1 EP 18, ¶ 51.)
12
Haney had “little to no contact with anyone outside Scientology.” (1 EP 18,
¶ 52.) Defendants “prevented altogether or heavily censored” Ms. Haney’s
communication with non-Scientologists and any “contact she did have”
“was always supervised and heavily restricted.” (1 EP 18, ¶ 52.)
16. Ms. Haney began “working closely” with Scientology leader David
Miscavige and “became his steward,” working with him “7 days a week.”
(1 EP 18, ¶ 53.) To be “approved” as his “steward,” Ms. Haney was “forced
to reveal her entire sexual history.” (1 EP 18, ¶ 54.)
17. Ms. Haney “worked in close proximity” to Miscavige “on a daily basis
for years,” “becoming close with his wife, Shelly Miscavige.” (1 EP 18, ¶
55.) Because of her “intimate knowledge of David Miscavige,” she was
“more and more restricted from leaving the Gold Base” and was put in the
category of people who were “restricted to the Base.” (1 EP 18, ¶ 55.)
13
tinted vehicle pull up” and “saw Shelly Miscavige, who was crying and
visibly distraught, being escorted out of the building and put into a car.”
She was not “seen or heard from again.” (1 EP 19, ¶ 57.)
19. After Ms. Haney completed her “sentence,” confined at the Gold Base
and “performing hard labor, she was reassigned to work on filming
promotional videos for CSI.” (1 EP 19, ¶ 58.) She hired “non-Scientologist
actors for the promotional videos and received information from outside the
Base through them.” (1 EP 19, ¶ 59.) “These actors were the only non-
Scientologists she was permitted to have contact with, and they became her
‘life-line’” to the outside world. (1 EP 19, ¶ 59.)
21. The 2010 “Religious Services” “Agreement and General Release” was
drafted by the Church and, as its terms explained, Ms. Haney was “not
eligible for any scientology religious services unless” she signed “this
contract.” (1 ER 178.) This “agreement” purports to represent that Ms.
Haney is “forever” “waiving” “any dispute, claim or controversy against
14
the Church” and that, “should any dispute, claim or controversy arise,” she
“will pursue resolution of that dispute” through “binding religious
arbitration” in which “all” arbitrators are “Scientologists in good standing
with the Mother Church.” (1 ER 177 (emphasis added).)
23. The 2013 “Religious Services” “Agreement and General Release” was
drafted by the church and included Ms. Haney’s purported agreement that
“any dispute between me and the Church” is “BY ITS VERY NATURE”
“A MATTER OF RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE” that “MUST BE
RESOLVED SOLELY AND EXCLUIVELY BY THE
ECCLESIASTICAL AUTHORITES AND RELIGIOUS PROCEDURES
OF SCIENTOLOGY” in which “[e]ach arbitrator shall be a Scientology
minister and current staff of the Church.” (1 ER 188-189.) The agreement
also purported to represent that Ms. Haney did “WANT TO GIVE US THE
PROTECTION” of Civil Code Section 1542, which bars a general release
from extending to claims a person “does not know or suspect to exist…at
the time of executing the agreement.” (1 EP 190 (emphasis in original).)
24. The 2013 “Staff Commitment and General Release” was drafted by the
church and included Ms. Haney’s purported agreement that “any problem
that may arise out of this relationship is strictly religious in nature” and that
“any dispute concerning…service as a CSI staff member” shall be resolved
through “religious arbitration procedures exclusively,” where “[e]ach
15
arbitrator shall be a Scientology minister and current staff” of the church.
(1 EP 201 (emphasis added).) The agreement also contained a waiver of
Civil Code Section 1542. (1 EP 202.)
25. In 2016, Ms. Haney “submitted written requests to leave” “seven times”
but “[a]ll requests were denied.” (3 EP 560.) “On one occasion,” Ms.
Haney “was physically restrained and prevented from leaving.” (3 EP 560.)
26. In November 2016 Ms. Haney “learned that filming would be moved
off Gold Base” and she “would lose the non-Scientologist ‘life-line’ to the
outside world.” (3 EP 560.) She “decided to make an escape attempt and
hid in the trunk of an actor’s car to leave” and she was “then able to reunite
with [her] father.” (3 EP 560.)
E. The Church lured Ms. Haney back to sign one more arbitration
agreement under the watch of an armed guard, designating
again that each arbitrator would be a Scientology minister.
27. When defendants “discovered that Ms. Haney had escaped,” they got
her “mother and brother, both active Scientology members, to threaten” to
“immediately disassociate” from her (called “Disconnection’”) “if she did
not return.” (1 EP 20.)
28. Defendants “assured” Ms. Haney it would take “no more than” “three
weeks” to “complete the ‘routing out’ process.” (1 EP 20.)
29. Instead, Ms. Haney was held for “three months and again” “treated”
“like a prisoner.” (3 EP 560.) She was “forced to do everything with a
16
‘handler,’ including using the bathroom, showering, and sleeping.” (3 EP
560.) She was “made to do videotaped interrogations in which” she was
“forced to make false confessions” and “provide false positive testimonials
about [her] experiences with CSI.” (3 EP 560.)
30. Indeed, Ms. Haney had already been “dismissed” (4 EP 801, 804) and
was “subject to” being declared a Suppressive Person (4 EP 856) before she
signed the “Staff Departure” agreement. (1 EP 130.) According to the
church, a “Suppressive Person” is “one that actively seeks to suppress or
damage Scientology or a Scientologist by suppressive acts,” which are also
“called Crimes and High Crimes.” (4 EP 902.) When someone is declared a
“‘Suppressive Person’” that person is considered “an enemy of
Scientology” (4 EP 850), may be “‘deprived of property or injured by any
means by any Scientologist” and may be ‘tricked, sued or lied to or
destroyed.’” (4 EP 851.)
31. After her termination and while still under the threat of being declared a
Suppressive Person, she was “made to sign” another arbitration agreement
(the “Staff Departure” agreement) while in the presence of only
“Scientology’s general counsel and a man armed with a gun.” (3 EP 560.)
She “was not given copies of the documents” and did “not know the
contents of any of the documents.” She “signed any document that was
given” to her because she “just wanted it to be over and to get out of there.”
(3 EP 560.) She was “desperate to escape Scientology” and would have
been “further punished or imprisoned” if she “did not comply.” (3 EP 561.)
17
experiences…as a voluntary religious worker…necessarily raises a
Scientology religious issue that can be resolved only through the
application of Scientology doctrine by the appropriate Scientology
ecclesiastical authorities.” (1 EP 127-128 (emphasis added).)
33. Ms. Haney “never had any opportunity or chance to negotiate any of the
terms of the arbitration agreements.” (3 EP 561.)
34. Since Ms. Haney’s escaped from Scientology for the last time,
defendants have “stalked, followed, surveilled, and harassed Ms. Haney.”
(1 EP 25.) “For a period of three to four months in 2018, on a daily basis,
Defendants and their agents followed Plaintiff’s vehicle, and in one
instance, almost ran Plaintiff off the road.” (1 EP 26.) “Defendants’
constant surveillance, harassment, and stalking of Plaintiff has caused her
extreme emotional distress.” (1 EP 26.)
35. Moreover, after Ms. Haney fled Scientology, she was declared a
“Suppressive Person” (4 EP 856.) “In the eyes of Scientology,” Ms. Haney
“has committed Crimes and High Crimes including speaking with the
media, spreading ‘disaffection,’ refusing to comply with the orders of the
organization, reporting alleged crimes by Scientologists to law
enforcement, and finally the act of bringing a lawsuit against Scientology.”
(4 EP 850; see also 4 EP 905.)
18
G. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration and denied reconsideration.
36. On February 18, the court issued its Order granting defendants’
Motions to Compel Religious Arbitration. (3 EP 708.)
37. On August 11, the court issued a minute order denying plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration. (7 EP 1727.)
38. On August 11, the court’s minute order denied reconsideration, which
was served by defendants on August 13. (7 EP 1724, 1732.)
39. This writ is filed within 30 days of the minute order and from service of
the same. (CRC 8.104(e); see also McDermott Will & Emery LLP v.
Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1100 (“appellate courts have
discretion to decide a writ petition filed after the 60-day period, and
typically look to whether there is any prejudice to the opposing party in
doing so”—no prejudice exists here since a date for the arbitration has not
yet been set); see also Polanski v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
507, 531 (appellate court has discretion to entertain writ petition filed after
60-day deadline where one-day delay in filing was “truly minimal” and
“any court interest in holding fast to the timeliness principle against a
nonprejudicial one-day incursion is far outweighed by the interest in
considering” the “grave” “misconduct alleged here”).)
19
VIII. Basis for writ relief—this case meets all applicable Omaha
factors.
42. When deciding whether to grant writ review, courts consider the
following:
20
(5) whether the petitioner lacks an adequate means, such as a direct
appeal, by which to attain relief; and
43. All applicable Omaha factors support writ relief in this case, as follows:
21
3. Omaha Factor 4: The trial court’s order is both clearly erroneous
as a matter of law and substantially prejudices plaintiff by
condemning her to an arbitration process she never freely agreed to.
The order is clearly erroneous because it: (1) forces plaintiff, a
survivor of abuse and trafficking, to participate in a religious
procedure in violation of her First Amendment freedom of religion
and to be adjudged according to that religion’s doctrine and by that
religion’s ministers, (2) compels plaintiff’s participation in a
religious arbitration based on an agreement that is procedurally and
substantively unconscionable, and (3) deprives plaintiff of her
Constitutional jury trial rights.
44. For the fifth and sixth Omaha factors, see the dedicated sections below.
46. A later appeal is not an adequate remedy here because plaintiff will be
required to try her case twice, causing plaintiff an unreasonable financial
burden, along with a great inconvenience to all of the experts and percipient
22
witnesses. (Parada v. Superior Court (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 758, 768
(high cost of arbitrating and the amount of time necessary to complete
arbitration justify reviewing the order compelling arbitration by writ of
mandate).) When an erroneous ruling will require a retrial if reversed on
appeal, the exercise of writ review is not only appropriate but essential to
prevent a waste of judicial resources in unnecessary multiple trials. (Barrett
v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1176, 1183 (“were we not to
issue the writ . . . and were the order here under review determined to have
been incorrect, then a second trial would be required, with the attendant
waste of judicial resources”).) Therefore, a later appeal is not an adequate.
48. Ms. Haney has no adequate remedy other than to seek relief in this
Court and extraordinary writ relief is necessary to prevent multiple
duplicative proceedings.
X. Irreparable harm.
49. As discussed below, plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm and prejudice
in a manner that cannot be corrected on appeal. Where, as here, petitioner
“would suffer irreparable injury if a second trial were required because of
an erroneous summary adjudication by the trial court,” writ relief is proper.
(Marron v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056.) Writ relief
23
is appropriate where “unnecessary trial proceedings” would result from
delaying review of the issue. (Olson v. Cory, supra, 35 Cal.3d at 400-401.)
50. Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the Writ is not granted because
plaintiff will be forced into two trials (assuming that the order compelling
arbitration is later reversed on appeal) and having two proceedings will
require duplicative testimony from percipient witnesses and experts, all at
double the cost to plaintiff.
51. In the first proceeding (arbitration), plaintiff would present her claims
stemming from the abuse and trafficking she suffered at the hands of
defendants, with the damages going from the date of her injuries through
the time of arbitration. The second proceeding (trial) would include all the
same percipient and expert witnesses, with damages going up through the
time of trial.
24
PRAYER
25
VERIFICATION
______________________
Valerie T. McGinty
26
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
Standard of Review: Orders compelling arbitration are
reviewed de novo.
27
II.
Novel First Amendment Issue: Because the arbitration
agreement violates Petitioner’s First Amendment rights, the
trial court’s order compelling arbitration must be reversed.
28
B. The agreement forces participation in a religious ritual: Under
the agreement, “any” “dispute” “necessarily raises” a
“Scientology religious issue that can be resolved only through
the application of Scientology doctrine.”
For example, the most recent 2017 agreement provides that “any
problem” or “dispute” “necessarily raises a Scientology religious issue that
can be resolved only through the application of Scientology doctrine by the
appropriate Scientology ecclesiastical authorities.” (1 EP 127-128.)
29
AND MUST BE RESOLVED SOLELY AND
EXCLUSIVELY BY THE ECCLESIASTICAL
AUTHORITIES AND RELIGIOUS PROCEDURES OF
SCIENTOLOGY.” (1 EP 188-189 (emphasis in original).)
As the United States Supreme Court stated: “If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.” (State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 642.)
30
nonbeliever to partake in religious practices the nonbeliever rejects, which
violates the First Amendment. (Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38, 60;
see also Cal Const. Art. I § 4.)
31
E. Courts in other states have invalidated religious arbitration
agreements that violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of
freedom of religion.
32
III.
Unconscionability: Because the arbitration agreement is both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, the trial
court’s order compelling arbitration was error.
33
matter how one-sided the contract terms,” a court would have no basis to
“overturn” it. (Id. at 470.)
And likewise, the converse applies: “the fact that some degree of
unconscionability is present does not mean necessarily that the arbitration
agreement is unenforceable. But it does mean that the agreement is not
immune from judicial scrutiny to determine whether or not its terms are so
one-sided or oppressive as to be substantively unconscionable.” (Id. at
472.)
34
latter”—despite the employees’ ability to opt out of it. (Gentry, supra, 42
Cal.4th 443, 472.)
Here, Ms. Haney was not even provided with a copy of the
agreements, let alone a copy of the rules that would govern. Indeed, when
35
she asked to “take these documents home” to review, she was told it was
“’not possible.’” (3 EP 559.)
36
1. In designating exclusively Scientologist ministers as the
arbitrators, the agreements ensure a biased arbitrator,
lacking an “essential” attribute of arbitration.
37
situated body,” and it is “not designed to be fair but instead to achieve a
specific outcome which is the outcome most favorable to the Church.” (4
EP 857.)
38
In Higgins, a television corporation moved to compel arbitration of
actors’ claims. The court held that the contract’s one-sided “I agree”
language was substantively unconscionable because it showed that only the
actors, and not the corporation were required to arbitrate their claims. (Id. at
1254.)
Here, the agreements all recite only her promise to arbitrate her
claims against the church, never the church’s promise to arbitrate its claims.
39
CONCLUSION
Respondent Court erred in granting defendants’ motion to
compel. The agreements are unenforceable because they are
unconscionable and illegal as violative of the First Amendment’s
guarantee of freedom of religion.
For these reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court
reverse the Respondent Court’s order compelling arbitration.
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify this petition, excluding tables, is 7,068 words long.
By: _____________________________
Valerie T. McGinty
40
PROOF OF SERVICE
(C.C.P. §1013(a), 2015.5)
the United States, and over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my
business address is 524 Fordham Rd, San Mateo, CA 94402. On this date, I served the interested
parties in this action the within documents: PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE;
____________________
Valerie T. McGinty