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St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor, was obviously one of the most
innovative theological thinkers of the medieval period. But what is equally obvious
seen as innovative, and in fact saw innovation as something to avoid. For St.
Thomas, the project of theology must always be conducted within the boundaries
something very close to heresy. Continuity with the tradition, or at least a pretense
of such continuity, was and is the hallmark of catholic theology. And in the case of
St. Thomas, the theological importance of establishing continuity with the past, of
was only strengthened by his own personal humility: he was a saint, after all, as
well as a professor, and by all accounts he was not motivated by any desire to make
a name for himself or to make a splash in the world of Catholic theology. But
because of the value St. Thomas placed on theological continuity, it is often difficult
to detect exactly where his thought departs from his predecessors in the catholic
play this sort of conciliatory role), and he is absolutely unwilling to score rhetorical
points by striking an antagonistic pose against figures who have taught otherwise
(he dispatches the ontological argument, for example, without mentioning Anselm
in connection with it1). In his doctrine on language about God, therefore, one can
expect that St. Thomas will make no effort to criticize the position laid out in the
pseudo-Dionysian treatise On the Divine Names. For St. Thomas, the prestige of
this work, and what was for him the barely subapostolic authority of its writer,
demand that any subsequent discussion of the subject take seriously what the
pseudo-Denys had to say. It is a text that may be wrestled with, but not rejected.
That St. Thomas recognized the authority of this text is clear, if only from the
number of times he cites it in his own theological writing. But without directly
criticism, St. Thomas in fact proposes a doctrine very different from that of the
pseudo-Areopagite. St. Thomas does not announce this, and I believe that he would
irenic thinking is St. Thomas’s modus operandi. But even if the difference between
St. Thomas and the pseudo-Denys is no more than a difference of emphasis, it is not
a difference without consequence for theology. If one wants to say that St.
Thomas’s project is to establish a grammar for theology, then one could say that he
wants that grammar to allow us to say things which the pseudo-Denys would not.
teaching, we should consider that teaching in itself, which, as a very ancient and
very prestigious teaching, would always have been in the back of St. Thomas’s mind
infinite, beyond our proper understanding, and so properly nameless. We can name
God from created things, he says, because God and the world are connected in a
double motion: the exitus by which things are created by God, and the reditus by
which they ever yearn to return to him. The things of this world, caused by God,
retain something of the Cause by which they came to be; as all things yearn for
him, they hint to us at their final goal. God is simultaneously the essential and final
cause of all that exists.2 But since creation is something God does, and since
everything God does must be an essential part of his nature (as a good Platonist,
and a good Christian, the pseudo-Denys believes in the simplicity of the Godhead),
then it would be impossible if creation did not reveal to us something about the
Godhead who is its origin and goal. And so the pseudo-Denys writes that
In a word: what we know about God is what we know about how God relates to
creatures. Due to the finite and imperfect nature of all fallen things, this means that
we necessarily see through a glass darkly: the pseudo-Denys describes the image of
God in creation in overtly Platonic language, as a seal impression that does not
But for the pseudo-Denys, our knowledge about God from created things falls
short not only because these impressions are faulty. It is not that our knowledge
2
See, e.g., de Div. Nom. I.5 593d: Providence “is the Cause of everything,” and “everything
has it for a destiny.” Translated in Colm Luibheid, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1987).
3
ibid. I.7, 596cd
4
ibid. II.6, cf. Plat. Timaeus 50c.
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fails in spite of its basis in impressions of the divine nature; it fails precisely
because it is based merely in impressions of the divine nature. We know about God
from what we know about his relation to created things, but all we know about that
relation is what we know about it in the created things. The pseudo-Denys is quite
clear that this knowledge does not “reveal” anything about God, who remains
emanations. Ultimately, the most that created things can tell us about God is that
The full implications of this are quite far-reaching: to call God “God” means only “he
deifies”; to call God “being” means only “he causes to be,” &c. We know God as the
cause of things, but we know him only as the cause of things. One could say that,
according to the pseudo-Denys, no man may see the living God, though we may see
his signs of life. Or, to adopt an idiom well-suited to the pseudo-Denys, we could say
that we sit on the floor of Plato’s Cave, seeing only the shadows and never the fire,
and by the word “fire,” signifying nothing more than “that which casts shadow.”
God is unknown not only in that he is greater than anything we might know about
him, but also in that he is other than anything we might know about him. There is,
mysteries, nevertheless “their actual nature, what they are ultimately in their own
source and ground, is beyond all intellect and all being and all knowledge.”6
5
ibid. II.7, 645a
6
ibid., loc. cit.
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In this light, it makes perfect sense that the pseudo-Denys considers the
Good, more so than Being or Truth or Wisdom or any other name, to be the
preeminent name of God. The Good, he argues, is diffusivum sui,7 constantly giving
out more of itself, and never so perfectly communicated that there is not more of it
to be received. The good diffuses itself without limit, and constantly makes itself
more manifest; it is, therefore, the best name we can have for a God whom we
know only through the manifestation of his activities, a God whom we know only
language to make a point). For the pseudo-Denys, since the emanations of the
Godhead tell us nothing about the Godhead who emanates (except that he
emanates), the name of the self-emanating Good is obviously the most appropriate
one our minds can conceive of. Accordingly, the pseudo-Denys gives Goodness
priority even over Being.8 Being, as something which is manifested to us, must, for
him, be inferior to the infinitely unknowable Godhead that manifests it. Thus the
Good, the “first name” of God, “tells of the universal Providence of the one God,
while the other names [“Being,” “Life,” “Wisdom,” &c.] reveal general ways in
which he acts providentially.”9 But ultimately, these names are names not of God
himself, but of his Providence, of his action: we name God from what we know of
7
ibid., IV.1, 693b, about the Good: “It sends the rays of its undivided goodness to everything
with the capacity, such as this may be, to receive it.”
8
see ibid., V.5, 820a: “He originated being, I mean absolute being, and with that as
instrument he founded every type of existent.” (emphasis added). Also V.6, 820c: “The first
gift therefore of the absolutely transcendent Goodness is the gift of being.” For the pseudo-
Denys, the first principle of Being is something other than God; Being itself is not, as in St.
Thomas, the essence of God’s life, but rather one of the first (and admittedly, one of the
best and most important) of his emanations or “gifts.” Thus the pseudo-Denys, with
negative theologians everywhere, says in the first chapter of the Mystical Theology not only
that God is “higher than any being,” but also that he is “beyond all being.”
9
de Div. Nom. V.2, 817a.
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For the pseudo-Denys, God as he is in himself is utterly secret. The one who
would truly know God, he says, must cast away all knowledge about God, and finally
abandon knowing itself, before God will be truly known to him. And as regards this
becomes an absolute riot of paradox. One only knows God, he says, when “one is
beyond the mind by knowing nothing.”10 “The most divine knowledge of God,” and
the only knowledge of God which is knowledge of God himself, is “that which comes
through unknowing.”11 Just as our language is unequal to the task of describing God
as he is, so also is our knowledge unequal to the task of knowing God as he is. And
thus the pseudo-Dionysian account of language about God must always end with a
And with this silence on the part of the pseudo-Denys, we also will fall silent
about the Dionysian doctrine of the divine names. This very brief account has been
enough to make clear the parts of his teaching where St. Thomas Aquinas diverges
from him. But first of all, one must not assume that St. Thomas intends explicitly or
all, that “it is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God,”12 and he
approvingly quotes the pseudo-Denys to the effect that through grace we come to
know God quasi ignoto, “as if something unknown.”13 Though St. Thomas is not
10
Myst. Theol. I.3, 1001a., also in Luibheid.
11
de Div. Nom. VII.3, 872a.
12
Summ. Theol. Ia.q12.a7, corpus. Translated in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica,
trans. English Dominicans, (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), vol. 1.
13
ibid., q12.a13, ad 1um. Interestingly, he uses this quote both in the objection and in the
reply thereto. This is, perhaps, a suggestion of the extent to which he sees the
straightforward Dionysian teaching as something in need of further explanation. At any rate,
as will become clear, St. Thomas quotes these words in a slightly different sense from that in
which they were written.
Gallagher 7
famous as a negative theologian, he, like the Christian tradition generally, has no
intention of stating that God can ever be completely unmysterious. Whatever the
difference is between St. Thomas and the pseudo-Denys, it’s something subtler
14
than that. Like the pseudo-Denys, he insists that we name God from creatures;
names applies not only to God’s progressions or to his relations to the created
world, but also to his substance. St. Thomas argues that we name God from
distinctions, in this case among the names that can without error be ascribed to
God. The first of these distinctions that Thomas makes is between the names of God
that are applied to him metaphorically, and those that are applied to him literally.
The metaphorical names of God, like all metaphors, are constructions which are
understood to be literally false, although illustrative in some way. If I say that God is
my rock, I have not stated that God is actually a stone, but that some of the
predicate of God. By the same token, there are some qualities of the rock—its
God which St. Thomas calls literal, which according to him involve nothing which
would result in absurdity when applied to God.15 Though our overview of the
Dionysian account above should make it clear that the pseudo-Denys would be
14
ibid., q13.a1, corpus: “In this life we cannot know the essence of God, but we know him
from creatures as their principle.” This formulation is more than superficially indebted to the
pseudo-Denys, but as we will see, St. Thomas is here using the word “principle” in a way the
pseudo-Denys would be unlikely to countenance.
15
This distinction, and St. Thomas’s grounds for it, can be found succinctly in Summ. Theol.
Ia.q13.a3.ad1um.
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reluctant to apply any name literally to God himself, this Thomistic distinction
between the names based on sense perception, discussion of which the pseudo-
Denys postpones to his perhaps nonexistent but at any rate missing Symbolic
Theology, and so-called conceptual names of God,” which seem to be the same as
those of the divine names that St. Thomas calls “literal.”16 This distinction, of
course, is nothing to be surprised at. It is obviously something else to call the Lord a
But if St. Thomas here establishes a distinction with which the pseudo-Denys
would most likely agree, he does it while making an argument that subtly distances
himself from the Dionysian position. St. Thomas, in raising an objection to the
the effect that all names “are more truly withheld from God than given to him,”
including names such as “good, wise, and the like” that we might be most inclined
to ascribe unambiguously to God.17 If this is the case (and this, of course, is why St.
Thomas raises it as an objection), not only can there be no literal names for God,
but metaphorical names for God are also rendered problematic; in accordance with
apply such a name to God in his own nature. St. Thomas, naturally, does not believe
that this objection cannot be overcome, but what is interesting is that he refers
St. Thomas, that is, will allow the pseudo-Denys to deny the goodness or wisdom of
God only inasmuch as he argues that the pseudo-Denys actually means to say that
God’s goodness or wisdom is so much better or wiser than ours that it barely
deserves the same name; that in refusing to predicate life and substance of God we
mean to indicate that God is actually more perfectly substantial and more wholly
living than we. This is true, and certainly ad mentem Thomae, as far as that goes,
but it seems like a very weak idea on which to base a thoroughgoing negative
young brother, newly confident in his verbal skills, used to entertain himself by
telling my mother that her cooking was not good—since it was, after all, great. Such
cooking is pretty good, however you want to say it. But we need not be concerned
with such cases here, since that kind of denial is manifestly not what the pseudo-
have seen, argues not only that God is greater than what our language can handle,
but also that he is other than what our language can handle. He calls for silence,
apophaticism, and unknowing, not because language cannot say enough, but
direction. It is for this reason that the pseudo-Denys insists, in the very chapter of
the Celestial Hierarchies that St. Thomas quoted in the above objection, that
metaphorical images “are actually no less defective than” conceptual names for
God.19 Language, for the pseudo-Denys, falls so short of God that there is very little
point in comparing the value of utterances about God. In his response to that
18
ibid, q13.a3, ad 2um.
19
Coel. Hier. II.3, 140c. Also in Luibheid.
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way that the pseudo-Denys seems to support St. Thomas’s own view of the
question, a view that forms the basis for a confident affirmative theology that
admirable to a modern than it would have to a medieval reader, the question still
remains: since St. Thomas’s doctrine on the divine names evidently does not come
out of the pseudo-Denys, where actually does it come from? On what grounds does
St. Thomas bridge the gap between what we see in creation and what we can say
It should be emphasized, first of all, that St. Thomas believes that language
can bridge this gap, but not that the gap is thereby closed, or that created language
between their positions is very small. The pseudo-Denys argues that no name can
signify the divine substance, because all names fall short of a full representation of
God. St. Thomas, on the other hand, argues that “these names signify the divine
substance, although they fall short of a full representation of him.”20 St. Thomas
makes this claim with full awareness that he goes against the pseudo-Denys. In the
article of his Summa treating on these substantial names of God, St. Thomas raises
an objection by citing the pseudo-Denys to the effect that the names of God are
named “according to the divine processions,” and “what expresses the procession
of anything does not signify its essence.”21 St. Thomas also seems to be referencing
20
Summ. Theol. Ia.q13.a2, corpus.
21
ibid, q13.a2, obj. 2. This is what we have inadvisedly called the “phenomenal/noumenal”
distinction in Denys’s thought.
Gallagher 11
the pseudo-Denys when he briefly considers an opinion that the names of God
derive merely from his causal and other relationships with his creatures.22 St.
Thomas rejects these reasons, on grounds that (like so much in his thought) have to
do with his understanding of the relation of creature to creator. For the pseudo-
understanding is completely in line with the thematic of creative exitus and erotic
reditus that predominate in the pseudo-Denys’s thought, and for that matter can be
found in some form or another in any number of Christian thinkers. But this
separation explains why for the pseudo-Denys, though created things can certainly
point in the direction of God, they cannot actually lead us to him. But, in the context
of his discussion of the divine names, St. Thomas rejects this understanding of the
This is not a narrative of emanation but of participation. Perfections, here, are not
like Platonic forms stamped upon recalcitrant matter, but rather more like
Aristotelian forms, in which matter takes part. And so the perfections of God—the
perfections that are God, since St. Thomas is also a believer in the simplicity of the
22
ibid, q13.a2., corpus.
23
N.B. This is not, in the pseudo-Denys, anything close to a Manichean view. He does not
think that the world is evil or abandoned by God, but rather that creation exists as an
emanation into time of a primal and eschatological unity. He emphasizes absolutely that
creation, though coming from God, is not God; and God, though before and behind
everything in creation, is not creation. It probably would be better to call this something
other than “creation’s separation from God,” but I can’t think of happier language that
wouldn’t spoil the real (erotic) tension between procession and return that strikes me as
such a prominent theme in his thought.
24
Summ. Theol. Ia.q13.a2, corpus.
Gallagher 12
Godhead—are perfections that can also occur in creatures. The perfections of God,
according to St. Thomas, are more, infinitely more, than any creaturely perfections.
But the way in which he understands the relation of creator and created allows him
esse of God. Of course creatures represent their creator imperfectly, but inasmuch
as there are any perfections in creatures, it is correct, for St. Thomas, to say that
they are also the perfections of God. For “whatever good we attribute to creatures,
preexists in God.”25 For this reason, it is not a problem to name God from creaturely
in fact represent his essence, since every perfection he communicates into creation
is also a perfection that exists essentially in him. St. Thomas, then, believes in a
theological language which can never speak completely, but which can speak
correctly. Unlike the pseudo-Denys, he believes human language is (or at least can
At this point, however, St. Thomas seems to have come dangerously close to
a very serious theological problem. In the article cited above, he argued not only
that the perfections of creatures can represent the perfections of God, but he also
argued that this representation does not happen according to “the same species or
genus.” But in this case, when the same words are not applied according to the
same species or genus, it would seem that they are applied equivocally. This would
language of the pseudo-Denys, but it does seem to seriously threaten St. Thomas’s
And yet one can see why he needs to add this qualification; for if God and creatures
25
ibid., loc. cit.
Gallagher 13
were described according to the same species and genus—that is, univocally—then
the absolute distinction that St. Thomas (and almost all theological authorities)
placed between creature and Creator seems to have broken down. Confronted with
this dilemma, the pseudo-Denys chose equivocal language, and the consequent
disconnection of all God-talk from God, rather than language that would
blasphemously reduce God to a being among beings. Confronted with the same
dilemma, St. Thomas’s response is to deny that it is a dilemma, and to argue for the
though God is not good in the same way that creatures are good, there is
commonality, with participation. God possesses his excellences simply, and so his
goodness, his mercy, his justice, &c. are all the same thing in his essence.
Creatures, on the other hand, which are not simple, possess their excellences in a
complex way. And yet because of the participation of creatures in divine excellence,
But the metaphysics of analogy are not really our concern here: it is
paradoxical to advance the claim that creatures can take part in the life of a God in
whom there are no parts, but what Christian would dare to deny it? Our main
theologically. And it is no small thing. We have seen that St. Thomas agrees with
the pseudo-Denys that all language about God is first creaturely language, which
we then apply to God with a greater or lesser degree of justification. But the crux of
St. Thomas’s teaching about analogical language is that some of the language we
26
ibid., q13.a5
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first learn about creatures is actually already language about God.27 If the pseudo-
less and less concrete talk about God until we abandon the ladder, our language
exhausted—if that is a fair simile for the pseudo-Denys’s theology, then St. Thomas
has given us a ladder more like Jacob’s ladder, on which the angels both ascend and
discover that the divine perfections are already somehow present in and among
creatures. When St. Thomas, then, writes that through faith we are united to God as
if to something unknown (quasi ignoto), he adds that “we know him more fully
according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated in us.”28 In
principle, the pseudo-Denys could agree with this; he believes, after all, that we can
only know God through his effects in creation. He could not, however, agree with it
—in fact, he would probably worry that what St. Thomas means by it is outright
blasphemous. For the pseudo-Denys, the quasi ignoto is the summary of our
knowledge of God; for St. Thomas it’s a kind of condition superadded to his
description of the way in which we know God. St. Thomas insists that God is
declare the glory of God, and that the invisible things of God are clearly known from
the things that are made, and that our human language is not inadequate to
speaking of these.
And though the roots of this divergence in St. Thomas’s and the pseudo-
opinion regarding the relation of creation to Creator, the end results are extremely
different. Parvus error in principio magnus est in fine, as St. Thomas might point
27
ibid. q13.a6
28
ibid. q12.a13, ad 1um.
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out. And so St. Thomas produces a theological textbook, filled with precise
understand how the divine essence “is neither one nor oneness, divinity nor
goodness,” and “falls neither within the predicate of nonbeing nor of being.”29 For
theology, and concludes that it is based on nothing more than a failure to properly
may be univocally false and analogically true;30 he treats the critique as another
his thought. A negative theologian might see this style of theology as a very
disappointing thing, a far cry from the passionate yearning of the soul for God in
unknowing. But to be fair, one cannot say that St. Thomas is opposed to negative
something about divine mysteries greater than language’s power to express. But for
St. Thomas, it was no denigration of mysticism to claim that that “true affirmative
Although St. Thomas’s theology leaves room for mysticism, its style and its
and to yearning after the inexhaustible bliss of God, a theology which, cut off from
constraints of language is the most suitable theology that could be imagined. Even
St. Thomas admits that the contemplative life is best, and he admits, most
importantly of all, that his teaching work is but “milk” when compared to the true
29
Myst. Theol. 5, 1048a
30
Summ. Theol. Ia.q12.a12, ad 1um.
31
ibid, loc. cit.
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“meat” of the Christian life.32 There is much more to know about God than can be
distinctions and analogies. But St. Thomas was not a monk. He was a Dominican: if
a monk’s duty is to weep, a Dominican’s is to use language for the glory of God, to
pray, to bless, and to preach, and to teach others to do likewise. Language that can
And for those of us who are not monks, who are not prepared to yearn for God in
silence, who want to know what to say about God and how to pray to him, language
metaphor,33 if our theological diet might be blander without the paradoxical pastries
For which I am indebted proximally to Mr. Jonathan Teubner, and distally to Josef Pieper’s
33
advisor.