sa aking tao.
"[3] At twelve o'clock midnight, the group transferred in front of the house
DIVISION
[ GR No. 102140, Apr 22, 1994 ]
PEOPLE v. ROLANDO MANLULU +
DECISION
G.R. No. 102140
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GERARDO ALFARO, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot with his service pistol
in a drinking spree. He died in the hospital the following day. His drinking partners,
Rolando Manlulu and Dante Samson, were haled to court for his violent death.
The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent
Alfaro. The accused on the other hand invoke self-defense. They also insist that the
non-issuance of a search warrant and warrant of arrest should nullify their arrest and
consequently exclude from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained.
But the trial court was not convinced. It found accused Dante Samson and Rolando
Manlulu "guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender on the part of Dante Samson and no mitigating
circumstance modifying the commission of the offense on the part of Rolando
Manlulu."[1] As a result, accused Dante Samson was sentenced to a prison term of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, while accused
Rolando Manlulu, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion perpetua as maximum. They were also sentenced jointly to
indemnify the offended party P30,000.00 as compensatory damages and P10,410.00
for hospitalization and funeral expenses, and to pay the costs.
Upon review, the appellate court raised their penalties to reclusion perpetua and
certified the case to this Court pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule 124, of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.[2]
Testifying for the prosecution, Wally Manlapaz, a.k.a. Crisanto Meneses, narrated that
at around ten o'clock in the evening of 29 May 1986, he and accused Dante Samson
and Rolando Manlulu were having a drinking spree in an alley along Quirino Avenue,
Paco, Manila. They were later joined by Agent Gerardo Alfaro who had a .45 cal.
pistol tucked to his waist. When Alfaro arrived he blurted out, "Dito may kumakatalo
of Manlapaz and continued to drink. There Samson suddenly stabbed Alfaro in the
chest with a 6-inch double-bladed knife while boasting, "Dapat sa iyo manahimik
na."[4] Alfaro at this time was "somewhat bent because he was already
drunk."[5] Manlulu then followed suit and stabbed Alfaro in the abdomen several times
with an ice pick they used to chip ice. Samson grabbed the .45 cal. service pistol of
Alfaro and shot him in the neck. When Alfaro slumped on the pavement, both accused
fled, with Samson holding Alfaro's handgun. After a few seconds, both accused
returned and got Alfaro's wristwatch and wallet.[6]
Noel Pagco, another witness for the prosecution, recounted that at the time of the
shooting he was outside the alley where the accused and the deceased were drinking.
After hearing a gunshot coming from the direction of the alley, he saw Dante Samson
and Rolando Manlulu coming out the alley, the former tucking a gun in his waist and
sporting a watch on his right wrist, and the latter holding an ice pick.[7]
As already adverted to, both accused invoke self-defense. According to Samson,
while they were drinking, and after taking ekis pinoy,[8] Alfaro said he had a "prospect"
and invited them to go with him. Thinking that "prospect" meant they were going to rob
somebody, Samson excused himself by saying that he had just been released from
prison, and had yet to fetch his wife. Alfaro, apparently resenting Samson's
unwillingness to join them, drew his gun and pointed it to Samson who parried it
saying: "Pare, wala tayong biruan ng ganyan. Baka pumutok iyan." But Alfaro
repeatedly pointed the gun to him. Every time he did, Samson would push the gun
aside. Fearful that it might go off, he held the gun and tried to ward it off, resulting in a
struggle for its possession. He got hold of the ice pick on top of the drum and stabbed
Alfaro instinctively. Manlapaz tried to separate them; as a consequence, Samson
dropped the ice pick. As Samson and Alfaro continued to wrestle for the possession of
the gun, they fell on the ground and the gun accidentally went off hitting Alfaro in the
neck. Rattled, Samson immediately fled. He then fetched his wife from Malate,
proceeded to Pasay City, and sent word to his father who later accompanied him to
surrender to Capt. Pring of the Homicide Division of the Western Police District. When
he fled, he left behind Alfaro's gun.[9]
Rolando Manlulu corroborated the testimony of his co-accused. He added that he
picked up the ice pick when it fell, and fearing that he might be the next victim should
Alfaro succeed in shooting Samson, he (Manlulu) stabbed Alfaro several times with
the ice pick, then dropped it, and ran away. He looked back and saw Samson and
Alfaro fall on the pavement. Almost simultaneously, the gun went off.[10]
Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at around seven o'clock in the evening of
30 May 1986 he, together with some other officers, arrested Manlulu on the
information given by Manlapaz. He said that he seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. pistol
and Casio wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro,[11] and that Manlulu verbally confessed
to the commission of the crime. Patrolman Perez however admitted on cross-
examination that when he arrested Manlulu and seized from him the handgun as well
as the wristwatch, he (Perez) was not with any warrant nor did he inform the accused
of the latter's right to counsel. Perez added that at that time Manlulu was under the
influence of liquor.[12]
Dr. Marcial Ceñido, Medico-Legal Officer of the Western Police District, confirmed that
Alfaro sustained nine (9) wounds, four (4) of them fatal, i.e., a gunshot wound in the
neck, a penetrating stab wound probably caused by a bladed weapon, and two (2)
stab wounds probably caused by an ice pick.[13]
In this appeal, accused Manlulu and Samson would want us to believe, first, in their
version of the incident, and next, that they acted in self-defense.
The account of the appellants does not inspire belief. A review of the testimony of
Manlapaz, who admittedly had drunk a little too much, reveals that his story tallies not
only with some accounts of accused Samson and Manlulu but also with the findings of
Dr. Ceñido. Hence, except for the actual attack on the victim, the testimonies of
Samson and Manlulu square with that of Manlapaz, including the conversation that
took place. Thus we give credence to the testimony of Manlapaz that Samson used a
bladed weapon and not an ice pick in stabbing Alfaro, contrary to what Samson would
want us to believe. This version of Manlapaz is consistent with the necropsy report of
Dr. Ceñido which states that the deceased had a penetrating stab wound which could
have been caused by a bladed weapon. That Manlulu according to Manlapaz used an
ice pick in repeatedly stabbing Alfaro was not only admitted by Manlulu on the witness
stand but is confirmed likewise by the medical findings of Dr. Ceñido.
If Manlapaz was indeed too drunk to recall the events that transpired before the actual
killing, then in all probability he could not have remembered the weapons used by the
accused. Certainly, eyewitness Manlapaz could not have been so drunk as to muddle
those incidents which impute guilt to the accused and recall only those which are
consistent with their innocence.
Similarly, we cannot disregard those portions of the testimonies of the two accused
which tend to confirm the narration of Manlapaz. Expectedly, the accused will refute
the statements tending to establish their culpability. Hence, they have to differ in
some respects from the narration of Manlapaz. Since it appears from the testimony of
Manlapaz that he had not yet reached that degree of intoxication where he would
have otherwise lost control of his mental faculties, we find his version to be credible as
it conforms with the autopsy report and admissions of both accused.[14] Thus, we
sustain the factual findings of the trial court and reject the version of the defense. But,
even if we consider the theory of the accused thus far if only to satisfy them, still they
cannot elude the consequences of their felonious acts. By invoking self-defense, the
accused admit killing Alfaro. The burden of proof is thus shifted to them. Their duty
now is to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the
killing.[15] In this regard, they have miserably failed.
The three (3) requisites for self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[16] For self-
defense to prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and
unprovoked attack that placed the life of the accused in danger which forced him to
inflict more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefore reasonable
means to resist said attack.[17]
Here, at the outset, the two accused have already failed to show that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of Alfaro. A gun aimed at the accused, without more,
is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated
in self-defense, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. [18]
Even the means employed to repel or prevent the supposed attack was not
reasonable. For, even if we disregard the gunshot wound which Samson claims to
have resulted from an accidental firing, the victim also suffered seven other stab
wounds, three of which were fatal, one of which was admittedly inflicted by Samson,
while the other two, by accused Manlulu. Definitely, it was not necessary to stab, more
so repeatedly, the victim. Considering their relative positions as they drank - each
within the other's reach - all that was necessary was for the two accused to band
together and overpower the lone victim with their bare hands, assuming the deceased
was indeed pointing his gun at one of them. A stab wound may not necessarily be
fatal and thus enable the victim to fire his gun. But a firm grasp by the two accused of
the victim's arm holding the gun, or of the gun itself, could prevent the victim from
shooting them. At any rate, the number of wounds suffered by Alfaro indicates a
determined effort of both accused to kill the victim, which negates self-defense.[19]
Furthermore, their flight from the scene of the crime is a strong indication of their guilt.
[20]
 Indeed, a righteous individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the
killing at the earliest opportunity if he were morally justified in so doing. A belated plea
suggests that it is false and only an afterthought made as a last ditch effort to avoid
the consequences of the crime.[21] If the accused honestly believed that their acts
constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of the victim, they should
have reported the incident to the police, instead of escaping and avoiding the
authorities until they were either arrested or prevailed upon to surrender.[22]
The reliance of the accused on the Constitution however is warranted. Certainly, the
police authorities should have first obtained a warrant for the arrest of accused
Rolando Manlulu, and for the search and seizure of his personal effects. The killing
took place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and
seizure came at around seven o'clock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This
instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b),
Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the arresting
officer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact just been
committed." In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor
was the offense "in fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally
gathered the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The
law requires "personal knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is
different from "personal knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately
follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours later. This is not any
different from People v. Cendana[23] where the accused was arrested one day after the
killing of the victim, and only on the basis of information obtained by the police
officers. There we said that the "circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless
arrest."
However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness
account of Manlapaz which we find to be credible. Hence, in spite of the nullification of
the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, i.e., the .45 cal.
service pistol of Agent Alfaro and his Casio wristwatch, as well as his extra-judicial
confession which was taken in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, still the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. After
all, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to
prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. [24]
While we confirm the factual findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the
appellate court, we nevertheless differ from the conclusions drawn that treachery and
conspiracy attended the killing of Alfaro. Indeed, there is serious doubt as to whether
treachery could be appreciated against the two accused. There is nothing on record to
show that both accused deliberately employed means tending to insure the killing of
Alfaro without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the latter might make.
It must be noted that Alfaro set the mood of the evening with a threatening tone that
someone in the group was provoking him. Clearly, the attack on Alfaro who was then
armed with a .45 cal. revolver by Samson who on the other hand was merely armed
with a knife could not have been so sudden as to catch the former off-guard. In fact,
Manlapaz testified that after Samson's initial attack on Alfaro the latter was even able
to push Samson back.[25] Even Manlulu, who impulsively stabbed the victim, only
picked up the ice pick they were using to chip ice. Taking into account the attendant
circumstances, our minds cannot rest easy in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. Hence, the two accused may only be convicted of simple
homicide.
liable to indemnify the heirs of their victim in the amount of P10,410.00 for
hospitalization and funeral expenses.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows:
(a) ROLANDO MANLULU is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum;
(b) DANTE SAMSON is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to a straight
prison term of fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal medium and, for being a habitual delinquent, is ordered to serve an
additional penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum; and
(c) ROLANDO MANLULU and DANTE SAMSON are directed jointly and severally to
pay the heirs of Gerardo Alfaro the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P10,410.00 as death and funeral expenses, with costs.
SO ORDERED.

There was no conspiracy likewise in the killing of Alfaro. Settled is the rule that neither Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
joint nor simultaneous action per se is a sufficient indicium of conspiracy. [26] The
evidence shows that it was the victim who chanced upon Manlapaz and the
two accused drinking, and decided to join then. Accused Manlulu was not even armed 317 Phil. 826
when he went to the drinking spree. We have often said that conspiracy must be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the prosecution failed to show that
Manlulu and Samson conspired to kill Alfaro. There being no conspiracy, each is liable
KAPUNAN, J.:
for his own acts.
Before us is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal [27] the range of which is twelve (12)
XLIX in Criminal Case No. 91-95478, convicting the appellant Elyboy So of the crime
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
to accused Rolando Manlulu, there being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the maximum of his penalty shall be taken from the medium period
On 10 June 1991, Elyboy So was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court
of reclusion temporal, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of Manila for the death of Mario Tuquero.  The information reads:
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6)
That on or about June 3, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery
As regards accused Dante Samson, although he is entitled to the mitigating and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same is offset by reiteracion or habituality he of one Mario Tuquero y Alas by then and there stabbing him several times with a fan
having previously been convicted once of robbery and thrice of theft[28] within ten (10) knife on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said Mario Tuquero y Alas
years prior to this incident, each time serving sentence therefor, which further bars mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
him from availing of the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[29]
 Consequently, he should be sentenced to reclusion temporal medium the range of Contrary to law[1].
which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months. Furthermore, being a habitual delinquent as defined in the last On 19 July 1991, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded "NOT GUILTY." [2]
paragraph of Art. 62 of The Revised Penal Code,[30] he should serve an additional
penalty within the range of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court handed down its decision on 17
[31]
 And, as correctly determined by the appellate court, the civil liability of both January 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:
accused is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. In addition, both accused are
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Murder" qualified by
treachery, as defined in and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby condemns the said Accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law.  The Accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Mario Tuquero in the amount of P50.000.00.  The
period during which the Accused was detained in the City Jail shall be credited to him
in full provided that he agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules
and regulations of the City Jail of Manila. With costs against the Accused.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The facts established by prosecution's evidence are summarized in the People's brief
as follows:
On June 2, 1991, at around 9:00 p.m., Elyboy So met his lady friend, Teresita
Domingo, in a jeep in Quiapo bound for Pasig.  Since Elyboy's house which is located
in 2969-D Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila, is walking distance to
Teresita's house located in 2050 Abad Santos Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Teresita
requested Elyboy to bring her home (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 6-7; Nov. 12, 1991, p.
7).
While walking along Araullo Street on their way to Teresita's house, they passed by
the house of Elyboy's first cousin, Esteban, Edgar, and Emy, all surnamed So (t.s.n.,
Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 8-9).
When they passed by his cousins' house, he saw his cousin Edgar with Ronnie Tan
and three (3) others and noticed that a drinking spree was taking place in front of the
house (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 9-10).
Upon seeing Elyboy, Edgar greeted him by saying: "Bingbong Crisologo is coming"
(t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 10).  He then invited Elyboy to have a drink and requested
that his lady companion be introduced to them (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 11).  Elyboy
answered: "I cannot introduce her to you because she is mine" (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991,
p. 12).
Elyboy then proceeded to bring Teresita directly to her house (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p.
12).
Immediately after bringing Teresita to her house, Elyboy passed by his cousins' house
to honor their invitation (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 12).
After an exchange of pleasantries, Edgar offered Elyboy a bottle of beer which the
latter declined because it was already past 10:00 p.m. and he was on his way home
already.  Edgar convinced him to drink just a little and to stay awhile so he could also
meet his future brother-in-law, Mario Tuquero, who will arrive later with his sister Emy. 
Elyboy was prevailed upon to stay on as he was also interested in meeting Mario
(t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, p. 14).
Before Emy and Mario arrived, Edgar invited Elyboy and Ronnie to watch the dance in
the playground which was part of the fiesta celebration.  At the playground, Esteban
met Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie and informed them that Emy and Mario had arrived
and instructed them to buy beer (t.s.n., October 23, 1991, pp. 15-18).
Edgar, Elyboy and Ronnie proceeded to buy beer while Esteban went home ahead of
them (t.s.n., October 23, 1991, p. 19).
After buying beer, they proceeded to the house.  Upon arriving in the house, Emy
introduced Elyboy to her boyfriend Mario (t.s.n., Oct. 23, 1991, pp. 14-20).
Mario Tuquero worked as a manager of a restaurant in Paris, France, and arrived in
the Philippines on March 7, 1991.  Emy So, who is a registered nurse, met Mario
sometime in March, 1991 and they started living in as husband and wife in her
parents' house at 1920, Araullo Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, also in the same month
until June, 1991.  However, Mario was legally married to a certain Evelyn Tuquero and
this fact was not known to Emy (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 37-39, 42-43, 54-55).
The group, consisting of Esteban, Edgar, Elyboy, Ronnie, Mario and Emy resumed
their drinking spree. However, after the group consumed four (4) cases of beer and
before 3:00 a.m.,  Emy felt sleepy and went inside (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 52; Oct.
23, 1991, p. 21).
While Emy was sleeping inside the house, she was awakened by the noise coming
from the group outside their house (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 59).
It turned out that Elyboy had a misunderstanding and altercation with somebody and
he was shouting loudly, disturbing the neighbors in the process (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 59, 63).
After pacifying the protagonists, Mario advised Elyboy to go home because his loud
voice was disturbing the neighbors (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 62-63).
After he was pacified and advised to go home, Elyboy ran towards home (t.s.n., Sept.
4, 1991, pp. 62-63).
At around 4:00 a.m. of June 3, 1991, Mario and Emy decided to leave for Fairview
Subdivision, Quezon City, in order to get papers of a vehicle owned by Mario that they
will bring out of the Bureau of Customs (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 30-31, 60).
While Mario and Emy were waiting for a taxi at the corner of Magsaysay Avenue and
Pureza Street, Elyboy suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed Mario at the back
several times with an eleven inch fan knife with a white handle (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991,
pp. 30, 32, 67; Sept. 9, 1991, p. 25).
Emy shouted for help (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
When Mario was about to run, he slid and fell to the ground lying on his back.  Elyboy
took advantage of this circumstance and repeatedly stabbed Mario on the front part of
his body (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 33).
Emy pleaded to Elyboy to stop stabbing Mario but Elyboy ignored her and continued
delivering stabbing blows at Mario (t.s.n., Sept. 4, 1991, p. 34).
Elyboy fled from the scene of the crime and ran to a dark alley (tsn., Sept. 4, 1991, p.
34; Oct. 23, 1991, p. 40).
Emy called for a taxi that passed by and brought Mario Tuquero to the University of
the East - Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital (tsn., Sept. 1991, p. 34).
Elyboy stayed in the alley for about thirty (30) minutes until the policemen arrived at
the scene of the crime and shouted at him to surrender.  After a while, Elyboy went
out of hiding and shouted at the policemen not to fire because he is surrendering.  THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS TREACHERY
When Elyboy surrendered, he was blushing and uneasy and naked from the waist up
because he removed his shirt to wipe the blood on his face (tsn., Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 6,
13; Nov. 12, 1991, p. 3).
Elyboy was then brought by the policemen to Precinct No. 8 of the Western Police
District and the fan knife used was surrendered by Barangay Chairman Aida de los
Santos to the police authorities (tsn., Sept. 9, 1991, pp. 7, 25).
As a result of the stabbing incident, Mario suffered several stab wounds numbering
eighteen (18) on the different parts of his body with at least four (4) fatal wounds
causing his death (tsn., Sept. 4, 1991, pp. 8-23).[4]
Appellant vehemently opposed the version of the prosecution.  According to him, while
they were drinking and talking about France, Esteban So suddenly stood up and said
that the reason he was not able to work in France is because his surname was "So."  We deny the appeal.
Appellant felt aggrieved as he recalled the time when he lived with Esteban So and his
family and was driven out by them.  He was told that his only link to them is the
surname "So."  Then when Esteban So pulled a knife and Edgar So broke bottles of
beer and Mario Tuquero pulled out "something" from his socks, appellant, fearing for
his life, fled.  Appellant claims that Esteban So and Mario Tuquero chased him but
were not able to catch him.[5]
Appellant further narrated that when he tried to go back to his cousin's house and talk
to them, he met Mario Tuquero and Emy So at the corner of Pureza and Magsaysay
Streets. Suddenly Mario Tuquero attacked him with a knife but because Tuquero's
thrust was slow, he was able to evade it. He grabbed the knife and proceeded to stab
Tuquero repeatedly.  He ignored the pleas of Emy So but finally stopped when four (4)
persons in a jeep passed by and shouted at him.  He ran into a dark alley until the
police came and brought him to the police precinct.[6]
Appellant claimed self-defense and in the instant appeal assigned the following errors:
I "not inherently improbable in itself."[10]  Emy So testified thus:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED SELF-DEFENSE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE TESTIMONY OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ELYBOY SO IS UNDESERVING OF CREDIT,
IMPROBABLE AND IMPLAUSIBLE.
III
IN THE INSTANT CASE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY ON THE PART OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ELYBOY SO.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME OF MURDER.[7]
Appellant's second assigned error, in essence, raises the issue of credibility of
witnesses.  Whose testimony is more believable and reliable, prosecution witness
Emy So's narration or appellant's version? Appellant would like us to believe that Emy
So's testimony was biased in favor of her brothers and the victim who was her
common-law-husband[8] and aggravated by an alleged grudge harbored by her family
against appellant's family.
We give no credence to appellant's argument.  Long settled in criminal jurisprudence
is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect
the result of the case.[9]  In the instant case, although Emy So readily admitted that her
relationship with appellant was "not close," she explained that it was appellant who
had ill-feelings against her family and bore a grudge.  The defense has not shown
such degree of partiality on the part of prosecution witness Emy So as would cast
doubt on her credibility and impeach her testimony, especially when said testimony is
xxx              xxx              xxx
COURT:
WITNESS:
You mentioned of a grudge between your family and that of the Accused and this
referred to the surname, So.  What was the trouble all about? No, maam, we are not so close that's why.

WITNESS: xxx              xxx              xxx

COURT:
Actually, there was no grudge with respect to the family name So. They really have
grudge in our family, Your Honor.
Another question.  Is it your habit not to be concerned with the welfare of your
COURT: relatives?

WITNESS:
What was that grudge all about?

WITNESS: I have concerned to my other relatives, Your Honor.

COURT:
Their family is a broken family and ours is intact, Your Honor. And they live only from
hand-outs from relatives and also from us, Your Honor.
How about the Accused, you are not concerned with him?
COURT:
WITNESS:
So, what was the grudge about? You even help them.  You even helped the Accused. 
What was the grudge all about? No, Your Honor.

WITNESS: COURT:

I just do not know really why they have such ill feelings towards us.  I think it's jealousy Why, because of the fact between your family and their family?
"inggit," Your Honor.
WITNESS:
xxx              xxx              xxx
It could be said that way, Your Honor, because since then, he is a problem child that's
why my feelings towards him is not so intimate anymore. [11]
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
The fact alone that the victim was Emy So's live-in partner does not impair her
You are not concerned with Elyboy he being not a resident in your community? testimony.  The Court has time and again ruled that mere relationship of the witness to
the victim does not automatically impair his credibility and render the testimony less
WITNESS: worthy of faith and credit.[12]  In People v. Estrellanes, Jr. and Manolo,[13] we put it thus:

No, ma'am. ... It is settled that the relationship of the key witness to the victim does not necessarily
disqualify him for being biased and interested.  A son or a wife is not incompetent to
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS: testify simply because of his or her relationship to the victim.  In other words, the
relationship of the witnesses to the victim does not per se affect their credibility.  Their
testimony must be evaluated and assessed according to its own merit and if not
That is because you have grudge over this person.  Referring to the Accused, is that otherwise offset by more credible evidence on record or any other revealed intrinsic
correct? defect should be given credit.

Appellant's strategy to discredit Emy So on ground of bias and interest to exculpate

himself from criminal liability cannot succeed.
Appellant maintains that he stabbed the victim in legitimate self-defense and invokes
in his favor the constitutional presumption of innocence claiming that, despite his plea
of self?defense, the prosecution retains the burden of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[14]  This argument deserves no credit in light of the established and
time-honored rule that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to
the appellant to show that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal
liability therefor.  He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not
be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.  He must prove
the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression,
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. [15]
In People v. Jotoy,[16] we stated:
It is oft-repeated that in criminal cases, the burden rests on the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt.  However, when
the accused invokes self-defense, the onus probandi is shifted and he is duty bound
to prove the elements of the plea by clear and convincing evidence otherwise,
conviction is inescapable.
We shall now proceed to determine whether or not appellant has completely and
satisfactorily proven the elements of self-defense.  The initial and crucial point of
inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim for absent
this essential element, no claim of self-defense can be successfully interposed.  If
there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the second
requisite of self-defense would have no basis.[17]
Appellant's claim that the victim, Mario Tuquero, attacked him with a knife fails to
convince us.  The record reveals glaring and serious inconsistencies in appellant's
testimony that makes it totally unworthy of credence.
Appellant testified that he was able to wrest the knife from Tuquero because the
latter's thrust was slow. However, this contradicts his statement during the same
cross-examination, that the incident happened so fast and that Tuquero's attack was
sudden.
xxx              xxx              xxx
   
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw Mario near the corner of Magsaysay and Pureza, how
far were you in relation to him the first time that you saw him?
WITNESS:
I think about 1 and 1/2 armslength, sir, because I was on the other side and Mario was
also on the other side and we exactly met at the corner, sir.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And the first time that you saw bringing out something from his waistline, what did you
do?
WITNESS:
The incident happened so fast, sir.  After pulling out something from his waistline,
immediately thereafter, he made a thrust on me but I was able to grab the knife from
him, sir. (Underscoring ours.)[18]
xxx              xxx              xxx
Further, we share the incredulity of the trial court that the victim stabbed appellant in
slow motion:
Even the testimony of the Accused denigrated his claim that he acted in self-defense. 
For, when he testified before the Court, the Accused claimed that Mario Tuquero
stabbed him but that Mario Tuquero failed to hit the accused because Mario Tuquero
stabbed the accused slowly and the Accused was able to evade the thrust and that
the latter, thereupon, wrested the knife from Mario Tuquero.  It is sheer lunacy for the
Accused to asseverate that Mario Tuquero stabbed the Accused in slow motion... [19]
Even if we allow appellant's contention that Tuquero was the initial unlawful
aggressor, we still cannot sustain his plea of self-defense.  After appellant
successfully wrested the knife from Tuquero, the unlawful aggression had ceased. 
After the unlawful aggression has ceased, the one making the defense has no more
right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.[20]
As correctly pointed out by the trial court:
...More, there is no evidence in the record that, after the Accused wrested the knife
from Mario Tuquero, the latter still did any overt act to indicate that he still tried to grab
or wrest back the knife from the Accused or, in any manner, persist in inflicting any
harm on the Accused.  On the contrary, after the Accused wrested the knife from
Mario Tuquero, the Accused repeatedly stabbed Mario Tuquero in the front portions of
his body even after Mario Tuquero embraced the Accused to hang on for dear life.  At
the time the Accused stabbed Mario Tuquero, the latter's initial unlawful aggression
had already ceased and that there was, therefore, no more need for the Accused to
still stab Mario Tuquero and stab him with impunity... [21]
We reiterated the same rule in People v. Jotoy:[22]
But even if We assume that it was the deceased who attacked the accused with a
knife, as the latter would make Us believe, We still hold that there was no self-defense
because at that point when accused was able to catch and twist the hand of the
deceased, in effect immobilizing him, the unlawful aggression had already ended. 
Thus, the danger having ceased, there was no more need for the accused to start
stabbing the deceased, not just once but five (5) times.
victim.
The claim is unmeritorious.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads
the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it.[28]

and in People v. Gomez:[23]
There was no self-defense where the accused was able to obtain possession of the
weapon from the deceased and there was no necessity to stab the latter for
aggression had already ceased.
Appellant's claim of self-defense is, likewise, contradicted and negated by the physical
evidence on record. The victim sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds on different parts
of his body.  Of the eighteen (18), four (4) were fatal stab wounds. [24]  The presence of
a large number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove
self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim.[25]
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be
complete depreciation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused
acted without the least discernment.  Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability.[29]
The testimony of Dr. Omer Galvez, Chief of the Child & Adolescent Service of the
National Center For Mental Health (NCMH) and attending physician of appellant when
he was confined at the National Center for Mental Health from June 8, 1985 to
December 2, 1985, only established the previous confinement of appellant at the
NCMH and that appellant showed signs of psychosis or insanity at the time. The rest
of his testimony consisted merely of assumptions, possibilities and generalities:

We quote with favor the observations of the trial court in this regard:
xxx              xxx              xxx
In this case, the evidence in the record buttresses the testimony of Emie So, on the
one hand, and belied and deprecated the testimony of the Accused on the other.  As
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
can be gleaned from the Necropsy Report of Dr. Florante Baltazar, (Exhibits "B" and
"C"), the deceased sustained no less than eighteen (18) stab wounds.  Four (4) of the
stab wounds sustained by the deceased were on the posterior aspects of his body, Why did you attend to this Elyboy So?
namely, stab wounds No. 4 (Exhibit "C-4"), stab wound No. 13 (Exhibit "B-13"), stab
wound No. 15 (Exhibit "C-15") and stab wound No. 18 (Exhibit "C-18") and the rest of WITNESS:
the stab wounds sustained by the victim were on the anterior portions of his body. 
These jibe with the testimony of Emie So that the Accused suddenly darted from He was admitted June 8, 1985 to the service of the Child and Adolescents Service,
behind Mario Tuquero and stabbed him on the posterior aspects of his body and, maam.
when Mario Tuquero slipped because his shoe slid, and fell on the ground, face up,
the Accused then stabbed Mario Tuquero anew successively on the anterior aspects ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
of his body.

On the other hand, if the Accused acted merely on self-defense, it is incomprehensible Why?
that he would stab Mario Tuquero no less than eighteen (18) times (Exhibits "B" and
"C"), not only on the anterior but also on the posterior aspects of his body. [26] WITNESS:

Considering the number and nature of the wounds inflicted by appellant on the victim, He showed signs of psychosis or insanity, maam.
the testimony of the prosecution witness Emy So that appellant unexpectedly and
suddenly attacked the victim from behind and the fact that appellant suffered not a xxx              xxx              xxx
single injury, we agree with the trial court that the killing was attended by treachery.
This clearly illustrates that appellant, in the commission of the crime, employed ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
means, methods and form in its execution which tended directly, and especially to
ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim
might make.[27] What are the characteristics of this kind of illness Mr. Witness?

Not content with a self-defense plea the defense likewise seeks to exempt appellant WITNESS:
from criminal liability by claiming that appellant was insane at the time he stabbed the
Even this illness it is assumed that this patient will have episodes of insanity for the
rest of his life especially if he will not take the medicines that will prevent the episodes WITNESS:
of insanity.  (Underscoring ours.)
If they were told about a behaviour that they are showing that is inacceptable, they will
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
react to that in a disproportionate way, maam.

And you said that this patient per your record was discharged on December 3, 1985.  ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
Do we understand that from the time of his discharge, he was already healed or
recovered from that kind of insanity?
What do you mean by disproportionate way?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:

I can only say that at the time of the last check up he was doing well three (3) months
It will not proportionate that the amount of stimulus meaning, to say that they will over
after that, he was discharged because he failed to come back for his check-up,
react.
maam.  (Underscoring ours.).
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

Is violence a kind of over reaction to a given stimulus?

You mentioned that this will be for the rest of his life.
WITNESS:
WITNESS:

Patients who are suffering from this condition has more proclivity to violence than the
For many patients, it is like that.  It is very exceptional that they will be able to recover
general population.
or completely cured from it, maam.  (Italics ours.)
xxx              xxx              xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
COURT:
When you say for the rest of his life, do we understand that this will be recurrent?
Doctor, you told that he was discharged.  Was he told to come back for further
WITNESS:
treatment?

Yes, maam. WITNESS:

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

Yes, Your Honor, that is standard that we tell to everybody. (Underscoring ours.)

What are the causes that will trigger the recurrency of this kind of illness? COURT:

WITNESS:
And how often is he supposed to come back for treatment in the case of the Accused
Elyboy So?
Generally, the main characteristic of this patients who are suffering from this illness is,
they are very sensitive to any kind of social censures and criticisms. WITNESS:

ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:

After six (6) months he failed to come.  He was supposed to come every month after
his passe which was given on August 1, 1985, Your Honor.[30]
Could you enlighten what do you mean by social censures?
xxx              xxx              xxx
Further and more importantly, the testimony of Dr. Galvez is bereft of any evidence
that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or discernment at the time or at
the very instant when he stabbed the victim.
Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of appellant should relate
to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act was committed. [31]  In
the present case, the testimony of Dr. Galvez refers to appellant's treatment six (6)
years before the incident happened.
Moreover, Dr. Galvez admitted that after appellant's last check-up sometime in 1985,
or six (6) years before the crime was committed, he was doing well and relieved from
psychosis:
xxx              xxx              xxx
COURT:
When he came back, after his discharge, was he given medication?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
How did you find his behaviour when he came back for medication?
WITNESS:
As per record, he was doing well, Your Honor. (Underscoring ours.)
COURT:
When you say doing well, what exactly do you mean by that?
WITNESS:
He was relieved from psychosis at that time, Your Honor.  (Underscoring ours.)
xxx              xxx              xxx
FISCAL PERALTA:
If the patient was discharged in 1985 and finished his college degree in four (4) years,
do you think that by that time he was already cured of his sickness?
WITNESS:
It will look like that, sir. (Italics ours.)
FISCAL PERALTA:
What do you mean it will look like that?
WITNESS:
It will look that while there are various types of clinical courses, meaning, the
development of an illness in a patient and if the patient was able to finish college, then
the outcome of the treatment that was given to him in 1985 was quite good.
FISCAL PERALTA:
And do you think doctor that could have been the reason why he already failed to
report on a monthly basis considering that he was already in college and actually
finished his college degree?
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
That might be misleading, Your Honor, considering that the testimony of the doctor, he
said that he should report six (6) months after the discharge but he took his college
degree for several years thereafter.
COURT:
The only point of the fiscal is that, is that an indication of having been cured.  If he was
able to take and finished even college.  Go ahead.
WITNESS:
It would look that during that period, he would have been cured and there are some
also who although that they may not be entirely cured would be able to get a degree,
make the standards of education and there are some who could also get the standard
of employment despite their craziness.  "Medyo naitatago or nakakaya."  Psychosis is
something in many patients it is very obvious.  You could see that they are really
grossly disorganized "talagang sira."  But there are some who has some ability to
keep it just there and maintain a proper social behaviour and be able to achieve
socially acceptable functioning in society.
COURT:
In other words, that illness is dormant.
WITNESS: FISCAL PERALTA:

Yes, Your Honor. How many times did you stab him on the front portion?

COURT: WITNESS:

And it emerges in some point of time? I don't know, sir, because I was out of myself.

WITNESS: FISCAL PERALTA:

Yes, Your Honor. After repeatedly stabbing the front portion of his body, you said that you also stabbed
him at the back?
COURT:
WITNESS:
So, it is possible doctor that the decease is there but at the same time, the patient is
able to study? When he was already embracing me, sir, my right hand was freed and that was the
time when I stabbed him at the back.
WITNESS:
FISCAL PERALTA:
Yes, Your Honor.  The possibilities are these, he was cured, entirely cured during the
period or the decease is just there and it is not affecting his behaviour. So there are And how did you stab him at the back?
two (2) possibilities. [32] (Italics ours)
WITNESS:
A perusal of appellant's testimony further negates his plea of insanity.  His recall of the
events that transpired before, during and after the stabbing incident, as well as the
Like this, sir.  He was embracing me, my right hand was freed.
nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an aberrant mind.  His memory
conveniently blanks out only as to the number of wounds he inflicted on the victim. 
INTERPRETER:
This, appellant attributes to insanity but we are far from convinced.  A man may act
crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.[33]
Witness demonstrated by stretching his right hand, swinging it from the right side to
the front towards his body.
xxx              xxx              xxx
FISCAL PERALTA:
FISCAL PERALTA:
And how many times also did you stab the back portion of the body of the victim?
Afterwards, when you got hold of the knife, you repeatedly stabbed him?
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
I could not recall also, sir.
Yes, sir, because after I got hold of the knife, I was able to wrest it from him.  And with
FISCAL PERALTA:
the use of my right hand, I repeatedly stabbed him.  At the time his left arm was
embracing me and I repeatedly stabbed him with my right hand from the left swinging
it to the right infront, hitting him on the front of his body, sir. And when you stopped stabbing the victim when you said four (4) men boarded a jeep
and shouted "itigil na, itigil na"?

WITNESS:
It was during the time when both of us fell down. I was on top of him and I stabbed
him on his chest, sir.  That was when four (4) persons arrived and shouted "itigil na,
itigil na," and I stopped, sir.[34]
xxx              xxx              xxx
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
And what did you do when you were not hit?
WITNESS:
By the time I evaded his thrust I was able to get hold of his palm, ma'am.
ATTY. DELOS SANTOS:
And when you were able to get hold of his palm, what happened?
WITNESS:
Because I was so made of what he did, when I was able to grab and get hold of the
knife, I hit him, ma'am.
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating by raising his right hand upward on the level of his breast,
swinging his right hand towards the right.[35]
xxx              xxx              xxx
In People v. Renegado,[36] we held thus:
By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment he was unaware
or unconscious of what he was doing, that he 'regained his senses' when he heard the
voice of Mrs. Tan telling him: 'Loreto, don't do that,' and only then did he realize that
he had wounded Lira.  That, to Us, is incredible.  For it is most unusual for appellant's
mind which was in a perfect normal state on Monday morning, August 29, to suddenly
turn blank at that particular moment when he stabbed Lira.  Appellant himself testified
that he was acting very sanely that Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he
went to the canteen in a jovial mood 'singing, whistling, and tossing a coin in his hand';
he saw the persons inside the canteen namely, Venecia Icayan, Lolita Francisco,
Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of the latter (all of whom, except the last one,
testified for the prosecution); he noticed the arrival of Lira who banged his folders on
the table, elbowed him, and said in a loud voice: 'ano ka', he saw Lira put his right
hand inside his pocket and with the other hand push a chair towards him; he became
'confused' because he remembered that Lira threatened to kill him if he would see him
again; at this point he 'lost his senses' and regained it when he heard the voice of Mrs.
Tan saying: 'Loreto, don't do that', and he then found out that he had wounded Lira.  If
appellant was able to recall all those incidents, We cannot understand why his
memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to return at the
snap of a finger as it were, after he accomplished the act of stabbing his victim... 
(Italics our.)
and in the later case of People v. Aquino,[37]  we ruled:
The clinical case report also shows that appellant, when interviewed upon his
admission to the mental institution, recalled having taken 120 cubic centimeters of
cough syrup and consumed about 3 sticks of marijuana before the commission of the
crime. This admission substantially affirms his prior extrajudicial confession that he
was under the influence of marijuana when he sexually abused the victim and, on the
occasion thereof, killed her. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that assuming appellant had
some form of mental illness, it did not totally deprive him of intelligence.  The presence
of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate the aforesaid matters, sufficiently discounts any intimation of
insanity of appellant when he committed the dastardly felonies.  The annals of crime
are replete with documented records, and we are not without our share in this
jurisdiction, where mental illness has been feigned and invoked to provide a defense
for the accused in a criminal prosecution. (Italics ours.)
In the present case, the defense has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overthrow
the presumption of sanity.  The State, thus, continues, its guard against sane
murderers who seek to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.[38]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 115233. February 22, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs. 
WILSON GUTUAL y REMOLLENA and JOAQUIN NADERA y APOSTOL, accused. 
WILSON GUTUAL y REMOLLENA, accused-appellant.
Facts: The accused are members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographic Unit
(CAFGU) in the Municipality of San Vicente, Davao. On 29 December 1990, at
around 1:30 p.m.,The defense claims that the killing was committed in self-defense or
defense of a relative or stranger. It tried to prove that on the aforementioned date and
time, the victim was running amuck or berserk, chasing Barangay Captain Wayne
Gutual in front of the latters house. Drawn by shouts for help from onlookers, accused
Gutual and Nadera rushed to the scene, with Gutual firing warning shots into the air.
Maglinte stopped pursuing the barangay captain, turned towards the accused, then
started approaching them. Although Gutual continued to fire warning shots, Maglinte
kept walking towards him, while Gutual kept retreating to put some distance between
Plainly, the accused-appellant could no longer retreat from the continuing assault by
him and the victim. The two moved some ten meters, crossed the road in front of the
the victim who, as inexorably shown by his relentless advance towards the accused-
barangay captains house, and ended up near the barangay hall. Finally, Gutual was
appellant, was poised to kill the latter. The danger to the accused-appellants life was
pinned against the staircase of the barangay hall. Maglinte was now about one to
clearly imminent. It would not then be proper nor reasonable to claim that he should
three meters from Gutual and pressing on, unceasingly hacking away at Gutual, who,
have fled or selected a less deadly weapon, because in the emergency in which,
however, managed to evade the blows. Nadera fired warning shots into the air, but
without any reason whatever, he was placed, there was nothing more natural than to
Maglinte continued his attack. Gutual then fired at the victims hand to disarm him, but
use the weapon he had to defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the
unfortunately the bullet pierced Maglintes bolo-wielding arm, went through his chest,
instinct of self-preservation, he was compelled to resort to a proper defense.
and came out his back.

Issues: 
 It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material
1. WON Wilson Gutual has sufficiently proved defense of a relative or of a
commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires
stranger
is rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter the principal factors the
2. WON Wilson Gutual has sufficiently proved self-defense  emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the
instinct, more than the reason, that moves or impels the defense, and the
proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the
imminent danger of such injury
Held: 
NORBERTO MASIPEQUIÑA v. CA, GR No. 51206, 1989-08-25

1. NO, As correctly posited by the Appellee, the defense of a relative or a stranger is
unavailing in this case. The accused-appellant shot the victim while the latter, after
having stopped chasing the barangay captain, was approaching the former. At that
instance then, the barangay captains life was no longer in danger as the accused-
appellant admitted. Clearly then, what might have been unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim against the barangay captain had ceased, and there was nothing
more to prevent or repel. Hence, the second requisite of the defense of a relative or a
stranger under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz., reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression, cannot be present.
2. YES, The requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. It was sufficiently established
that the unlawful aggression came from the victim. Indeed, since he was running
amuck, he did not care anymore whom to attack or whether the person to be attacked
was unarmed or armed with a high-powered rifle.  of imprisonment to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
Significantly, the entry in the Death Certificate corroborates the theory of the defense
that the victim was in the act of hacking the accused-appellant when the latter shot
deceased's right hand for the purpose only of throwing the bolo out of his hand, but
the bullet pierced through and hit the deceased's breast. There can be, as well, no
doubt in the mind of the Court that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the accused-appellant. Whether the means employed by the accused-appellant
were reasonable depends on the circumstances of this case.
Facts:
Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequiña and Jovencio Alampayan, who were
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of San Isidro, Bohol, were charged
with the crime of homicide for the death of Leopoldo
Potane.  They were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of from seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leopoldo Potane in the amount of
twelve thousand pesos
(P12,000.00).
the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but modified the penalty
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day... of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Before this Court both the petitioners and the Solicitor General reassert that
petitioners should be acquitted because
Before this Court both the petitioners and the Solicitor General reassert that
petitioners should be acquitted because they acted in lawful self-defense.
In the afternoon of December 21, 1976, Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane of Barrio
Abehilan, San Isidro, Bohol and his father, Pedro Potane requested assistance from
the Police Sub-station Commander of San
Isidro in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, son of Pedro Potane and elder brother of
Nicolas, who has begun to show signs of recurring insanity.  Since his arrival from
Mindanao in 1974, Leopoldo had been acting... queerly and at times violent.  On
December 18, 1975, Leopoldo chased the wife of Nicolas with a bolo and almost
hacked her.  He always carried a bolo, and had threatened his own wife, daughter,
brothers, and... even his parents with death.
Patrolmen Norberto Masipequiña and Jovencio Alampayan, the former armed with a .
38 cal. revolver and the latter with the Thompson submachine gun, were ordered by
the sub-station commander to arrest
Leopoldo.
Pat. Masipequiña went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a petromax
lamp.  Patrolman Jovencio Alampayan and the rest stayed in the yard.  circumstances, both reasonable and necessary.  He initially tried to defend himself by
Although in the yard, Patrolman Alampayan could see what was going on inside the
house because it was a single storey house and had an elevation of only 4 feet (p. 56,
t.s.n., Dec. 6, 1976).  Nicolas stayed on the... door landing while Masipequiña entered
the sala and was about to sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly
emerged from an adjacent room and rushed at him swinging a bolo.  himself against the attack.  Under the circumstances, there was no opportunity for
Masipequiña pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo.  Leopoldo hit Masipequiña
on the bridge of the nose  (p. 23. t.s.n.,... ibid).  As the latter retracted, he lost his
balance and was hit on the right side of his face.  At this juncture, Masipequiña drew
his revolver and fired three shots.  One... shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo
on the chest.  Leopoldo continued to advance towards him.  He pushed the rocking
chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house shouting for... help.  Leopoldo ran after
him.  Pat. Masipequiña jumped from the house and landed on the ground.  In the
process he hit his shin on a piece of stone.  Leopoldo also... jumped to the ground and
continued to pursue Masipequiña.  As Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequiña, Pat.
Alampayan fired his gun hitting Leopoldo once at the thigh
Leopoldo Potane died some thirty (30) minutes later while being brought to the health
center for treatment.
Issues:
whether or not, given the undisputed facts, petitioner Masipequiña had acted in lawful
self-defense.
Ruling:
"The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds
justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person and rights
from impending danger and peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born
to man and... part of his nature as a human being." [People v.  Boholst-Caballero,
G.R. No. L-23249, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA 180, 185.] In our jurisdiction it is
found in
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 11.  Justifying circumstances.  ? The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1.  Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided the following
circumstances concur:
First.  Unlawful aggression;
Second.  Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or r... epel it;
Third.  Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
the means employed by Masipequiña in repelling the attack were, under the
pushing the rocking chair toward
Leopoldo Potane but when that proved futile and he (Masipequiña) was caught in a
very precarious position, i.e., his back was on the floor and Leopoldo Potane kept
flailing at him with the bolo, he had no other... choice but to use his revolver to defend
Masipequiña to carefully take aim.  He just discharged his weapon at the deceased in
the hope that such... would save him from any further injury or death.
After the elements of self-defense had been established to exculpate petitioners from
the charge of homicide, the next question that arises, albeit only incidentally, is
whether or not Alampayan could be separately convicted of the lesser offense of less
serious... or slight physical injuries for the gunshot wound he inflicted on Leopoldo
Potane's thigh.
the elements of defense of stranger are:  (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending
be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
after a careful consideration of the undisputed facts and the rule on self-defense by
police officers enunciated in
Mojica, this Court is convinced that said element had been established and that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it rejected petitioners' defense
and affirmed the trial court's judgment of... conviction.
the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED.  Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequiña and Jovencio Alampayan
are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Date: April 6, 2019Author: staredecisis0 Comments
CASE BRIEF 2011-0439
CASE: Santiago Paera Vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 181626 May 30,
2011)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.:
SUBJECT:
1. Criminal Law: Grave Threats
FACTS:
As punong barangay, Santiago allocated his constituent’s use of communal water
coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of his
contituents. Despite Santiago’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the
tank. Santiago reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and
cut Indalecios access.
The following day, Santiago inspected the tank after constituents complained of water
supply interruption. Santiago discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, Santiago, using a
borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point
when Indalecio arrived. Santiago then, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and
charged towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for
safety, passing along the way, Diosetea. Upon seeing Santiago, Diosetea inquired
what the matter was. Instead of replying, Santiago shouted
“Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!” (I dont spare anyone, even if you
are a woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the
nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, Santiago turned his attention
back to Indalecio. As Santiago chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing
the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting “Bisag gulang ka, buk-
on nako imo ulo!” (Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!).
Santiago was charged for three (3) counts of Grave Threats.
Santiago claimed that he can only be charged for a single count of the continued
complex crime of Grave Threats. He argued that there is a single crime committed
through series of acts arising from one criminal intent.  THINGS DECIDED:
ISSUE: Whether Santiago is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
RULING:
Santiago is liable for three counts of Grave Threats.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come to
the knowledge of the person threatened.
Applying these parameters, it is clear that Santiago’s threat to kill  Indalecio and
Diosetea and crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at
the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC.
These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard
Santiago utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different
points in time to these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, Santiago
incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
Santiago’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only
had a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent to threaten
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge
of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicentes presence near the water tank. The facts,
however, belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, Santiago was as much
surprised to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing Santiago when they chanced
upon each other near the water tank. Similarly, Santiago came across Diosetea as he
was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, Santiago crossed paths
with Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, Santiago went to the water tank not
to execute his single intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to
investigate a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence near the water tank at the time in
question, Santiago could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them
until shortly before he inadvertently came across each of them.
Santiago’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose
only when he chanced upon each of his victims.
Indeed, Santiagos theory holds water only if the facts are altered that is, he
threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same
time. Had this been true, then Santiagos liability for one count of Grave Threats.
————————————————-
a) Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come to
the knowledge of the person threatened.
b) Not having known in advance of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence
near the water tank at the time in question, Santiago could not have formed any
intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came across
each of them.
c) Indeed, Santiagos theory of continued crime holds water only if the facts are altered
that is, he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the
same time.
PEOPLE v. ARTURO PUNZALAN, GR No. 199892, 2012-12-10
Facts:
crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder,... Seaman 1
Class
(SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of
the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training
Command (NETC) at
Zambales.
at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the "All-in-One" Canteen to have
some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby
videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they... continued their drinking session.
a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering
light bulb inside "Aquarius."
When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw"),...
appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa's statement
belligerently reacted asking, "Sinong papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa's
statement was directed at him.
SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while
SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant
was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table.
To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave... and return to the
NETC camp
Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate... to give the sentries some
barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions.
Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate,... flagged down a rushing
and zigzagging maroon Nissan van
The sentries approached the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor,
as the driver.
Appellant angrily uttered, "kasi chief, gago ang mga 'yan!," while pointing toward the
direction of the navy personnel's group. Even before he was given the go signal to
proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering, "papatayin ko ang mga
'yan!"... an sped away towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the
group of the... walking navy personnel prompting him to exclaim
"chief, binangga ang tropa!"
When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were
thrown away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost
consciousness.
SN1 Duclayna lying motionless on the ground.
Members of the local police soon arrived at the scene of the crime.
found the bloodied lifeless body of SN1 Andal lying on the side of the road.
When they asked appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply answered
that he was drunk.
directly caused the death of
Andal and
Duclayna
In his defense, appellant testified that in the evening... he was drinking... at the
"Aquarius" videoke bar. When he sang, the navy personnel who were also inside the
bar laughed at him as he was out of tune.
informed... that the navy personnel would like to make peace with him. He went back
inside the bar... and approached the navy personnel.
appellant offered his hand but
Bacosa suddenly punched appellant's right ear.
To avoid further altercation, appellant left the bar... went home driving his van... they...
passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at the van
When he alighted and inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the headlights was
broken. Thereafter, he saw SN1 Bacosa and another man approaching him so he
went back inside the van but the duo boxed him repeatedly on his... shoulder through
the van's open window.
When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards him, he accelerated the
van.
RTC... found appellant guilty... appellant claimed... he may not be held criminally liable
as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury,... His act of increasing his
vehicle's speed was reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men
whose four companions were also approaching.
Court of Appeals
AFFIRME
Issues:
Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?
Ruling:
The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, double murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime
contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and
committed a single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the
road ramming through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1
Duclayna and, at the same time,... constituting an attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1
Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.
The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave felonies... as the law
attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment
(reclusion perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by
prision mayor,... an afflictive penalty.
Principles:
CASE DIGEST: FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special Prosecutor
(G.R. No/ 148431, July 28, 2005)
Facts:
Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN were all
charged for the MURDER of Jimmy Valino before the Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino
was a detained prisoner who was escorted to retrieve the effects of the crime to the
place where he hid the same. Aboard the police vehicle, Jimmy Valino suddenly
grabbed the M16 rifle and about to jump out of the jeep. CABANLIG shouted
“hoy!”and without issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino, hitting
his head, left side of the chest and left lower back.
CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig justified the
shooting as an act of self-defense and performance of duty. Nevertheless,
Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG but acquitted his 4 companions.
Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG
RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in the
fulfillment of duty
A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as is
reasonably (and absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and detain the offender, (2)
overcome his resistance, (3) prevent his escape, (4) recapture him if he escapes, and
(4) protect himself from bodily harm. (People v. Oanis, 74 Phil 257 [1943]; People v.
Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of
duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is NOT a requisite.
In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who lunged at a
policeman with a bamboo-makeshift lance, the SC ruled that the same was done in
the fulfillment of duty. The fugitive’s unlawful aggression, in that case, had already
ceased when the policeman killed him, however, the policeman's act of shooting at
him is justified because he was running away from him when he was shot. Ordinarily,
it may appear that the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty, is the aggressor, but
his aggression is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill his duty. But IF the
policeman was a PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of duty, and the same
situation was given, there would be NO self-defense because there would be NO
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when he
IMMEDIATELY SHOT Valino without issuing a warning.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost to
the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a warning
contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers.
In exceptional circumstances where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already
imminent AND there is NO OTHER option but to use force to subdue the offender, the
law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is EXCUSABLE.
RULING 3: Was there an OVERKILL?
There was none.
FROM SHOZ: This is one of my favorite SC cases and most of the time, I’m always
using this to justify my actions. I’ve been through with lots of CHR cases and I am
always asking them -- do you ever witness a shootout? Do you ever experience how
your brain runs when guns were being fired at you and you’re scared that you'll die
and you can no longer see your family? Most of them deny to respond but just a piece
of advice, those CHR people, they are not our enemies.. like us, they are just doing
their job.. all they need is to know our side of the story- with evidentiary proof of
course.
SALVADOR YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 120744-46,
2012-06-25
Facts:
These are petitions for review on certiorari... assailing the
Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614
cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of... attempted murder
The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay
Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup
(Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were... members of the
Integrated National Police (INP)... stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San
Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were...
barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno,
Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu,
Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David
(David), who were either members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del
Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted
murder and frustrated murder in three Informations... after having voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities... the accused except Pabalan who died earlier... and
Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed... entered individual pleas of not guilty.
A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his
arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.
The prosecution established
Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of
Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m..
The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m.,... shortly after the religious
procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva,
who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals
on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the...
back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with
headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they
met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and
bleeding profusely.
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself
as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga
and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno
He narrated tha... he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu
suddenly received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was
instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a... reported presence of armed NPA members
in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for
reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring... their
M-16 rifles with them.
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan
who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms.
Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the... curve where the
Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the
jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so
he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it
to stop. He claimed... that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated and swerved
to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police officers... to fire warning
shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at...
the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the
direction of Naron's house directly at the subject jeepney.
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the
time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the
area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements,... and that he
frequently... patrolled the barangay on account of reported sightings of unidentified
armed men therein.
He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney did not
come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members
assembled in the residence... of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when
the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled.
, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and
Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the
eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612)
and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated
murder as charged in
Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all of
them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores,
Panlican, De Vera and Calma.
Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and
which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein
willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order;... that the theory of mistaken
belief could not likewise benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing
that they had sufficient... basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan's report
that the victims were armed NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence
to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they
did
;... that there was... insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the
occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and
that the shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-
coordinated police operation but was the... result of either a hidden agenda concocted
by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish
attempt to gain commendation.
Issues:
whether the accused had acted in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in
the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials and as members of
the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the... justifying
circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they
had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them.
Ruling:
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first,
think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never... has
homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never
predicated on the cost of human life.
the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure
In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which,
if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the...
prosecution.
Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it
negates the intent component of the crime.
It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general...
intent.
The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,... and it does not look at all to
the belief or state of mind of any other person.
A proper invocation of this defense requires (a)... that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental state
which the statute... prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United
States v. Ah Chong
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30
caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the...
bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the possibility of the
passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject
jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as
much too... difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to
which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at
the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law
enforcers or unskilled neophytes... in encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the
firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even
the driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least,
certain to be precise.
This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to
fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to
evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical impulse was
to debilitate... the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and
hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that
petitioners' actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel,
together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the
shooting breed no other... inference than that the firing was deliberate and not
attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
Principles:
CASE DIGEST: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981
Title: People v. Genosa, GR No. 135981
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised
Penal Code
Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband
which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband
when she got home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The
appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure
she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist,
has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of
self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the crime of
parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while
asleep.
Issues:
(1)    Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2)    Whether or not treachery attended the killing.
Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-
defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing
of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent
harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily
immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence perpetuated
by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the
quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the
assailant’s aggression.
RUSTAN ANG v. CA
G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010
FACTS:
Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish decided to break
up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a live‐in partner whom he had gotten
pregnant. Before Rustan got married, he tried to convince Irish to elope with him. Irish,
however, rejected his proposal. She changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. He used two cellphone numbers for
sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her
alone.
On June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure. The sender's cellphone
number was one of the numbers that Rustan used. After she got the obscene picture, Irish
got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through the
internet. Irish sought the help of the police in apprehending Rustan. Under police
supervision, she contacted Rustan and asked him to meet her at the Lorentess Resort.
When Rustan came, police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being
questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Rustan claims that he went to meet Irish because she asked him to help her identify a
prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender's number
and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene
messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. According
to him, this explained why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from
his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene
picture to him.
The RTC found Irish's testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous
manner. The trial court found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision and denied Rustan’s MR. Rustan filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term
is defined in R.A. 9262; and
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
HELD:
1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that the elements
of the crime of violence against women through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
Section 3(a) of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where
the parties are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the
course of the relationship. The law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb
"romance" that implies a sexual act. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple's relationship, i.e., "a love affair. The law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship
from a dating relationship. Section 3(e) defines "dating relationship" while Section
3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may
not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place
between those involved. An "away‐bati" or a fight‐and‐kiss thing between two lovers
does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up
during periods of misunderstanding.
2. YES. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into
violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. What is
obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be determined based on
the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread
open and bearing Irish's head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a
revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography
trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes
it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post
it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

April 05, 2018
Dabalos vs. RTC Branch 59 of Angeles City, Pampanga
G.R. No. 193960
Facts:
Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the
complainant whom he had a dating relationship with. The said violence constituted the
pulling of hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye which have
demeaning and degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a
human being, in violation of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos'
defense, he averred that the relationship had already ceased at the time of the alleged
incident.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the
proximate cause of the violence?
Held:
Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against
women through physical harm when it is committed against a woman or her child and
the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child, and when it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish,
neither should the courts, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against
women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not
distinguish that the act of violence should be a consequence of such relationship.
NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW
DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM                                                 G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond
ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son
in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a
Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also
resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the
complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to
do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It
is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not
be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of
the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.

CASE DIGEST: PEOPLE VS. JACINTO
8:56 AM
G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO,
Facts:Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of the
then 5-year-old victim. The crime was committed when appellant was only 17; Judgment was
rendered when appellant was already 25.
Issue:Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding
criminal liability of an accused who was a minor during the commission of the crime and the
suspension of sentence of one who is no longer a minor during the pronouncement of verdict.
Held:The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward
testimony of the victim and the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17 during the
commission of the crime since, in view of the circumstances to which accused committed the
felony, it was proved that he acted with discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing
that the accused understood the consequences of his action.
Applying,  the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion perpetua instead
of the death penalty.
As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the
Court, ordering accused to pay the victim for damages.
However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his sentence
provided in Section38 of RA 9344, which made no distinction to an accused found guilty of a
capital offense. The Court stated that what was important was the intent of the Act to uphold
the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was to be considered was the fact that
accused committed the crime at a tender age.The Court held that accused may be confined in
an agricultural camp or any training facility in accordance with Sec 51 of RA 9344. The case
was remanded to the court of origin to take appropriate action in accordance to the said
provision.
DIVISION
[ GR No. 127818, Nov 11, 1998 ]
PEOPLE. v. GUILLERMO NEPOMUCENO +
DECISION
358 Phil. 942
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. has interposed the instant appeal in
regard to the decision dated November 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region (Manila, Branch 46) which decreed:
Wherefore, the court hereby renders judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 for the death of Grace
Nepomuceno and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Forty (40) years of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 with
costs against him.
Pursuant to Article 921, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, the court declares the accused
ineligible to inherit from his wife. The entire estate should go to his son, Giordan
Benitez Nepomuceno.
                                                                                               (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The Information against accused-appellant charged:
That on or about May 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of one GRACE NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ, his wife, with whom he was
married in lawful wedlock, by then and there shooting her with a gun of unknown
caliber hitting her on the left hip, thereby inflicting upon the said GRACE
NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ gunshot wound which was necessarily fatal and which
was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.
                                                                                                        (p. 5, Rollo)
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued in saw accused-appellant carrying a gun in the Mary Chiles Hospital where her sister was
due course. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction now on confined (tsn, August 12, 1996, pp. 3-28).
appeal.
Upon the other hand, the defense presented accused~appellant himself as its lone
The prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Eden Ontog, SPO2 Rodolfo Rival, witness. His story was quoted by the trial court thus:
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranas, Medico-Legal Examiner Floresto Arizala,
Monserrat De Leon, Ballistic Expert Isabelo Silvestre, Jr. and Romeo Pabalan.
Two days before the incident on May 2, 1994, Grace, the deceased was very much
worried about the check (sic) she issued which was post dated May 2, 1994. She would
Eden Ontog declared that on May 2, 1994, she was the housemaid of the spouses
have no funds for the checks. She had been nagging him, displaying her tantrums
Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. and Grace Nepomuceno, having started as such since May
(nagdadabog) pestering him to do something to be able to fund the checks.
31, 1993. At around 11 o'clock on the evening of May 2, 1994, accused-appellant, who
was drunk, arrived and went to their bedroom where Eden and her ward Giordan the
In the noon time of May 2, 1994, he left her spouse in their store and went to his
one-year old son of the couple, were sleeping. She was awakened by the loud voices of
mother's house in San Andres Bukid, Manila. This day was the day after the accused-
the spouses who were arguing. She saw accused-appellant get a gun from a drawer, so
appellant and his wife, and in-laws arrived from Batangas to attend a town fiesta.
she went out of the room because of fear. After a few moments and while she was
outside the room, she heard Grace Nepomuceno say: "Sige patayin mo ako, patayin mo
He left the store to avoid further nagging, tantrums and pestering of his wife about his
na kami ng anak ko." Then Eden heard a gunshot. She was so scared that she went out
inability to produce money to be able to fund the postdated checks (sic).
of the house, reaching the door of the house of Barangay Chairman Congen Leonardo
which is 5 meters away. After ten minutes, she saw accused-appellant coming out of
At about 11:00 P.M. after dropping at a friend's house, he decided to go home,
the room. He told her to get a taxi so he could bring the wounded Grace to the
thinking his wife has already cooled off.
hospital. She was left behind in their room to take care of baby Giordan. She tried to
call up Monserrat de Leon, the sister of Grace in Pasig to inform her of the incident,
When his wife opened the door, she greeted the husband: 'You left in the store and you
but she could not get any connection (tsn, July 27, 1994, pp. 4-17; 24-42).
room (roam) around, where you able to find money.' He replied, 'where would I get
money, do you expect me to hold up people?' (tsn, October 5, 1994, p. 18)
Mary Ann T. Aranas, a chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation Chemistry
Division, declared that she conducted paraffin examination on both hands of the
They had some arguments and Eden Ontog went out of their bedroom, and the
victim and those of accused-appellant. She found the victim's hands negative of
arguments continued. There was a point in the argument when the wife told the
nitrates, but found accused-appellant's right hand positive thereof. She gave the
accused thus: 'Wala akong silbi, bakit pa ako nag-asawa sa kanya.'
opinion that in view of the absence of nitrates on the hands of the victim, it is probable
that she did not fire a gun and that accused-appellant, being positive of nitrates, did
Because of these continued pestering and nagging of his wife he thought of separation.
really fire a gun (tsn, August 31, 1994, pp. 17, 22; tsn, July 8, 1996, p. 6).
Perhaps it would be better if he should end his life. He then took a gun from their
child's drawer. He sat on the bed holding that gun, engrossed in his thinking what to
Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., the Medico~Legal Officer of the NBI who conducted a
do. The gun was pointed towards the floor of their room.
second-post mortem examination of the victim on May 7, 1994 at the Capitol
Memorial Chapels, found that the victim died due to a gunshot wound, with the slug
In that situation, his wife continued with his nagging and pestering. He just remained
hitting the left internal iliac artery and the small intestines and thereafter resting
silent.
between the uterus and the sacrum of the victim. He testified that taking into
consideration the location of the wound, if the victim were in a sitting or lying
And then Guillermo asked her wife: 'How come you do not treat me as a husband, why
position, the trajectory of the slug was upward coming from right to left; and if the
do you treat me like this.'
victim were in a standing position, the muzzle of the gun should have pointed up. The
witness declared that the muzzle of the gun could not have been less that one foot from
It was at this point that Guillermo decided to end his life. Perhaps seriously, perhaps
the victim. He opined that grappling for possession of the gun was impossible because
just to scare his wife to stop all the pestering and tantrums. Surely not only a few
the trajectory of the bullet was going upwards and there were no smudges or signs of
husbands would thought (sic) as what that Guillermo was thinking then, he felt
close firing. He believed that the victim could have survived if the surgeons had
desperate. He wanted to finish his life. (p. 24, TSN, October 5, 1994)
operated immediately (tsn, July 23, 1996, pp. 15-30).
It was during that time that their son, Jordan woke up, walked to the space between
Monserrat de Leon, sister of the victim, declared that Grace would confide to her that
them (husband and wife) and Nepomuceno block his son's way with his right knee. In
accused-appellant was jobless and that Grace had problems with the low income of the
the process, he wanted to totally force Grace from taking possession and control of the
store she owned at Zurbaran Mart as compared to her expenses. Accused-appellant
gun. He raised his arm holding the gun passing over the left leg of Grace.
would force sex on Grace especially when he was drunk. Her sister had two
miscarriages after their first child and it was during one of these miscarriages that she
The gun went off.
                                                                                                (pp. 16-17, Rollo)
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, accused-appellant assigns the following
errors:
I Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE KILLING WAS ACCIDENTAL,
AND THAT THE DECEASED WAS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
II
ASSUMING THE ACCUSED IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN NOT FINDING THE KILLING WAS RESULT OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
                                                                                      (p. 5, Appellant's Brief.)
In support of the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that he did not have
the least intention of killing his wife. He urges the Court to consider the circumstances
attendant to the killing, which, according to him negate all inferences and deductions,
that he would kill his wife. First, the deceased was hit in the upper leg, not in any vital
organ. If he had the intention of killing the deceased, he would have shot her at the
most vital part of her body.
Secondly, the reaction of the deceased after she was hit was contrary to ordinary and
usual human behavior, if her husband really intended to kill her. The deceased just
uttered, "Masakit Papa", she did not curse nor mouth evil and harsh language against
accused-appellant to show hatred and anger.
Thirdly, if accused-appellant really intended to kill his wife, why did he call a taxi and
bring her to the hospital for immediate medical attention?
Fourthly, why should accused-appellant voluntarily surrender to the police, if the
incident was not accidental?
Accused-appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Paragraph 4, Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code because, according to him, the incident occurred when he
tried to prevent his wife from killing herself, and he and his wife grappled for
possession of the gun.
After a painstaking review of the evidence and record of this case, the Court finds itself
unable to reach conclusions identical to those put forward by accused-appellant.
First, accused-appellant cannot invoke the benevolent provisions of Paragraph 4,
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code in order to be exempted from criminal liability
arising from the death of his wife, Grace Nepomuceno. Said provision pertinently
states:
from criminal liability:
xxx
xxx
xxx
4.     Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
At all events, accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here,
however, the act of accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel,
the same not being in self-defense, is unlawful -- it at least constitutes light threats
(Article 285, par. 1, Revised Penal Code). There is thus no room for the invocation of
accident as a ground for exemption (People vs. Reyta, Jr., 13 CAR (25) 1190; 1195
[1968]).
The gun which accused-appellant took from his child's drawer was not even licensed
or registered in his name as shown by the Certification of the Firearms and Explosives
Office of the Philippine National Police, hence, he could have been charged with illegal
possession of a firearm.
Secondly, accused~appellant's claim that the shooting happened when he tried to
prevent his wife from killing herself and he and his wife grappled for the possession of
the gun is belied by the expert testimony of Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr. of the NBI who
conducted a second post mortem examination on the cadaver of Grace Nepomuceno.
He declared:
Q.   Now, is it possible Doctor, considering the location of the wound, the entrance
wound and the trajectory of the bullet upwards, would you say Doctor, that both
parties, I mean the victim and the assailant were grappling for the possession of said
gun and it went off accidentally, is that possible, Mr. Witness?
A.   Well, I have to be convinced as to the grappling between the victim and the
assailant, because if we were to be re-construct of the scenario that the gun have been
fired, the muzzle of the gun could not have been closer than twelve (12) inches and
considering that the gun was held by a hand, it farther places the assailant farther
from the victim and farther the victim is, from the assailant, then the more impossible
for the grappling for the gun. (tsn, July 23, 1996, pp. 19~20).
Thirdly, accused-appellant, testifying on the relative positions of the victim and
himself when the gun discharged, stated:
Q.   Please tell the court your relative position and the victim when the gun actually
went off?
A.   When I was in the act of trying to dispossess Grace with that gun and I was trying
to let my right hand pass through my right side but because Grace was struggling, the
butt of the gun hit a part of her upper leg and it exploded.
Q.   So when the gun actually fired, you were holding that gun, what part of your arm
being held by Grace?
A.   Witness pointing the upper forearm and the lower portion of her upper arm."
                                                                                     (tsn, Oct. 5, 1994, p. 28.)
If Grace were holding the upper forearm and lower portion of the upper arm of
accused-appellant when the gun fired, then at least the hand of Grace that held the
upper forearm of appellant would have traces of nitrate considering its nearness to the
exploding gun. However, in the paraffin test conducted by the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation on Grace Nepomuceno's both hands,
no traces of nitrates were found- while accused-appellant's right hand was positive of
nitrates. The absence of nitrates on the victim's hands is convincing proof that she did
not grapple with accused-appellant for the possession of the gun. It also proves that
she was shot at a distance.
The fact that the victim was not shot in the head, or in any vital part of her body does
not negate intent to kill. The Post Mortem findings on the cadaver of Grace
Nepomuceno by Dr. Arizala shows that the bullet entered "the left thigh, lateral aspect,
upper third . . . directed slight forwards, slightly upwards and from left to right initially
involving the skin and subcutaneous tissue, then taking an intramascular route into
the pelvic cavity thru the left obturator foramen, partially transecting the left internal
iliac artery and the small intestines with the slug lodging just underneath the uterus in
front of the sacrum where it was recovered." The extent of the physical injury inflicted
on Grace, as above proved, manifests intention to extinguish life (People vs.
Dawandawan, 184 SCRA 264 [1994]). Moreover, Dr. Arizala likewise declared that
the bullet injured a vital organ of the victim (tsn, July 23, 1996, p. 9).
The fact that Grace, upon being shot, uttered, "Masakit, Papa" and did not use harsh
language against accused-appellant does not, in any way, negate intent to kill. The
utterance of a victim made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be
considered as pure emanations of the incident or the incident speaking through the
victim (People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709; 710 [1995]). Thus, by the word "Papa", Grace
was in effect, saying that it was accused-appellant who shot her.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the act of accused-appellant ordering Eden
Ontog to call a taxi in which he brought the wounded Grace to the hospital is "merely
an indication or act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant" (Appellee's
Brief, p. 71, Rollo).
Accused-appellant's voluntary surrender is not sufficient ground to exculpate him
from criminal liability. The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of
criminal offenders; it merely considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. Non-
flight is not proof of innocence (People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 [1996]).
Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant claims that even assuming that
the killing was not totally accidental, his acts would constitute only simple negligence.
He asserts that he had established that the gun went off while he was grappling with
his wife for its possession. He was preventing his wife from taking her own life. He
might not have exercised the necessary due care in wrestling for the gun that resulted
in the injury of his wife, but he could be charged only with parricide through simple
negligence. So he says.
It has been held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Oanis, et al., 74 Phil 257
(1943); People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil 232 [1922]). What qualifies an act of reckless or
simple negligence or imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the
execution thereof (United States vs. Maleza, 14 Phil 468, 471 [1909]). Otherwise
stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it
being simply the incident of another act done without malice but with lack of foresight,
or with carelessness or negligence, and which has harmed society or an individual
(People vs. Castillo, Jr., (275 SCRA 752 [1997]).
The argument of accused-appellant finds no support in the physical evidence. As
already discussed, if the version of grappling for the gun were to be believed, there
should have been nitrates on both hands of Grace. And if it was when accused-
appellant placed the barrel of the gun at the base of his head that Grace grabbed his
hand holding the gun and in the struggle for its possession his hand holding the gun
was pushed down so that its butt hit the upper leg of Grace causing it to fire, then the
trajectory of the slug should be downwards, through the upper thigh of Grace where it
entered. Yet, the autopsy report of Dr. Arizala, Jr. showed the bullet entered the left
thigh of Grace directed slightly upwards and from left to right, taking an intramascular
route into the pelvic cavity, instead of a downward direction if accused-appellant's
version were to be believed.
Thus, over and above the testimony of accused-appellant, these physical evidence, the
lack of powder burns or nitrates on the hands of Grace and the trajectory of the bullet
that entered her left thigh being slightly upwards and from left to right instead of
downwards, repudiate accused-appellant's claim of simple negligence. Physical
evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth and rates high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People vs. Uycoqua, 246 SCRA 769 [1995]).
Lastly, accused-appellant, perhaps in desperation, resorts to the shotgun type of
argument that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The argument
is bereft of merit.
The prosecution has sufficiently established the elements of parricide by its evidence.
These elements are: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that she was killed by the
accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused (Article 246, Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Embalido, 58 Phil 154 (1933)].
The first and third elements were stipulated during the pre~trial stage of the case,
thus:
1.     that the victim and the accused are legally married. Said civil marriage took place
on July 5, 1990;
 xxx G.R. No. 186128. June 23, 2010

5.     that immediately after the shooting, the accused voluntarily and bodily carried the
victim into a taxicab and proceeded to UERM Hospital where she died on the
operating table." (Pre-Trial Order of July 11, 1994, Record, p. 6)
The only issue then is whether accused-appellant intentionally killed Grace Facts
Nepomuceno, his legally wedded wife.
Appellant, Susan Latosa, has been found guilty of parricide by the RTC and Court of
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of the Appeals. She was convicted as such when she allegedly shot her husband, Major Felixberto
prosecution witnesses. This Court finds no reason to do otherwise. It is a fundamental
Sr., in the head, thereby creating intercranial hemorrhage which caused the latter’s death. In
and settled rule that the trial court's assessment in regard to the credibility of
witnesses is entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on the previous trials, appellant claimed that the killing was an accident, as when the victim
appeal, as the trial court was in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to asked the appellant to give him the service pistol of the former, it accidentally fired, hence
observe the demeanor of the witnesses (People vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 the death of the victim. However, circumstantial evidences such as (1) the ordering of the
[1993]; People vs. Camaddo, 217 SCRA 162 [1993]; People vs. Vallena (244 SCRA 685 accused of her children unusual errands; (2) at the time of the shooting, only the accused and
[1995]).
the victim were at home; and more. Latosa now contends that such evidences are not
The Court agrees with the conclusions of the trial court as they are founded on the convincing and not strong enough for her not to be given the exempting circumstance of
dictum that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a accident.
credible witness, but must be credible in itself - such as the common experience of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the Issue
truth of human testimony, except in conformity with our knowledge, observation, and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of
judicial cognizance (People vs. Escalante, 238 SCRA 554 [1994]). Whether or not appellant has strongly established the exempting circumstance of
accident to relieve her from criminal liability.
Further, accused-appellant having admitted that he shot his wife, he has the burden of
proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of Held.
responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it
can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing (People vs. No. The Supreme Court holds that it is incumbent upon the appellant to prove
Bautista, 254 SCRA 621 [1996). Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he has miserably with clear and convincing evidence, the following essential requisites of the exempting
failed to discharge this task. circumstance of accident. To prove as such, the appellant must rely on the strength of her
own evidence, and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. In the case at bar, the
The trial court correctly appreciated the voluntary surrender of accused-appellant as a
mitigating circumstance, this fact having been stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial appellant failed to provide strong evidences of her own to merit her of such exempting
stage of this case (Pre~Trial Order, Stipulation No. 10 Record, p. 17) circumstance. The following circumstantial evidences considered by the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill her husband. Wherefore the appeal
The penalty for the crime of parricide is reclusion perpetua to death; however, there of Susan Latosa is dismissed, and previous decisions of the RTC and CA are hereby affirmed.
being one mitigating circumstance but no aggravating circumstance, the lower of the
two indivisible penalties should be imposed. The penalty cannot be further reduced by
one degree as the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not find application, the penalties
involved being indivisible.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision convicting accused-appellant GUILLERMO G.R. No. L-6082

NEPOMUCENO, JR. of the crime of Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the slight
modification that his sentence shall be simply reclusion perpetua not "imprisonment March 18, 1911
of Forty (40) Years of reclusion perpetua" as stated by the trial court.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
SO ORDERED.
vs.
People of the Philippines v. Susan Latosa
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
Ponente: Justice Carson
Topic: Insuperable Cause
Facts:
Vicentillo, a policeman was found guilty by the lower court of "illegal and arbitrary detention"
of the complaining witness for a period of three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Three days were expended in the detention , but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at
the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary were in the
municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the two adjoining
municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat.
Issue:
FAILING TO PERFORM AN ACT WHEN PREVENTED BY SOME LAWFUL OR INSUPERABLE CAUSE
Held:
The judgment of conviction of the lower court must therefore be reversed, unless the
evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant arbitrarily and without legal
authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining witness to be detained for a period of three
days without having him brought before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and
trial of the charge on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the record in
this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a justice of the peace as soon as
"practicable" after his arrest.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant is reversed and he
is hereby acquitted.
Attached is the the digest from Esguerra.
US v. Vicentillo (1911)
A policeman charged cannot be held liable for
illegal detention when after arresting his victims, it took
him three days to reach the nearest judge. The distance
which required a journey for three days was considered
to be an insuperable cause.
PEOPLE VS MAGLIAN (2011)
[G.R. No. 189834; March 30, 2011] Criminal Law| Mitigating Circumstance
Article 13: Mitigating Circumstance
Pp vs. JAY MANDY MAGLIAN y REYES
FACTS:
 
The accused and his wife Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmariñas, Cavite
when they got into an argument. The accused refused to let Mary Jay to attend a party,
causing them to fight. Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that Mary Joy had given
him for Christmas and told her he would burn them all and started pouring kerosene on the
clothes. Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the same time,
warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife’s plea, the accused still poured gas on her,
thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire.
The accused brought Mary Jay to one hospital to another to treat her but at the PGH where
she was last transferred, she was no longer able to recover. Before she expired, she told her
mother what had happened to her, declaring, “Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay
Mandy burned me.)”
 
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental. He said it
was Mary Jay who was being difficult while they were arguing.
Accused, trying to avoid further provoking his wife, left his wife and went upstairs to his son.
While climbing the stairs, he heard Mary Jay shouting. He ran down the steps and saw the
blaze had reached the ceiling of the kitchen.
Accused-appellant contends that,
(1) he never or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed or so grave an
offense as the felony charged against him; and
(2) that he voluntarily, and of his own free will, surrendered or yielded to the police or
government authorities.
RULING:
 
• No intent to commit so grave a wrong
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.  “This mitigating
circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when
the offender executes or commits the criminal act.” The intention of the accused at the time
of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack
employed and the injury sustained by the victim.”
As aptly explained by the trial court:
The accused had full control and possession of the kerosene. He is a bulky and very muscular
person while the deceased was of light built, shorter, smaller and weaker. the kerosene
content of the gallon container must have been poured over the head of the deceased. This
explains why when she got ignited, the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from
head to toe. There was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the
resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.
 
• Voluntary surrender
An accused may enjoy the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender if the following
requisites are present: ”
1) the offender has not been actually arrested;
2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and
3) the surrender was voluntary.
The Court explained, “The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may
be incurred for his search and capture.”
The claim of the accused is backed by the records of the case and a certification made by the
Dasmariñas Police Station that he has voluntarily surrendered. He contends that both the RTC
and the CA inexplicably did not appreciate this mitigating circumstance in his favor. That the
Accused-appellant at the time of his surrender had not actually been arrested. He
surrendered to the police authorities. His surrender was voluntary, as borne by the
certification issued by the police. There is, thus, merit to the claim of accused-appellant that
he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.