G.R. No.

162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling
government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan,
Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of
a state university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on
December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of
the funds, according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of
student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her
brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The
Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a
high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student
Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying
and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for
their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government
in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction
over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only
has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers),
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book
II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she
was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their
positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a
student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested
with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her
functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions,
the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution
countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown
trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the
BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on
Mechem’s definition of a public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public
officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has
been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.15 It
ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed
by public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this
Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents,
to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate
powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may
be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact
for the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the
University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation,
hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board
of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing
body of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being
a member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom
this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE
INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the
rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for
petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and
often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a
case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final
judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer
a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to
quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and
expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper
venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a
whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila
and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over
the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further
proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the
case except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based
on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the
criminal case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside on
certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section
4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of
authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that
petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the
Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No.
1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with,
and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the
civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be
transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses
certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may
lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be
filed with the Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In
fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal
friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which
assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

I I
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid
an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive
at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the
whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s
interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the
principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum
statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB)
of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an
indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government
instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,
1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It
was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to
PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No.
709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple
reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of
the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately
charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by
the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP
student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In
Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer.39
The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are
found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public
Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even
an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying
student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In
Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary
Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of
law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a
public officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a
legitimate governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and
arts, and giving professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it
declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there
was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her
acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction
is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss,
or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
defendant or respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent
of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and
taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x
x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from the government
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the
latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused
Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of
defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition
for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not
misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the
name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to
deception by using a name different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty.
Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the
court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if
lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18, 2009 Resolution1
and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-
CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.

The facts are plain and undisputed.

Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation
of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public
officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City,
and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and
net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and
business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family
are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son
VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of
Arrest7 before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted that he is a
Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v. Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9
he asserted that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch
occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade
27.

In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly
show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch
other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director"
and "higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are different,
apart and distinct, words but are conjoined together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of
the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its
salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade,
fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already
resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering
that the Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v.
Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.

On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution, disposing: WHEREFORE,
in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit.
Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued against the accused.

SO ORDERED.14

The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions where the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of
R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch
of the government occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade
27 and higher, of R.A. No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to
(g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.

Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court required respondents
to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP,
a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by petitioner.

At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under
R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among
the public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on
Cuyco, petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional Director with
Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.

The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.18 By virtue
of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No.
1606,20 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this
year, R.A. No. 10660.30

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4
of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

o
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those
holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations.

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

x x x"

Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1)
(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32

That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and higher" is
apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos. 1353and 844, which
eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:

As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to
it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the positions of regional
director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of
the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)

To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the
"larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it
provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or
lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public
officials holding important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis supplied)

The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time cases involving
the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who are of limited means who stand trial
for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the executive branch
occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a position
lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those
cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically
included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically
included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where
none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher." By this construction,
the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular
words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all
possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the
statute – its every word.39

Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,40 a department manager of
the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student regent of the University of the
Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of
Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any position
particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all fours with
Cuyco.1avvphi1 Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX,
Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the 0 crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director II
with Salary Grade 26.44 It was opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in
1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with
the Regional Trial Court.

We sustain petitioner's contention.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and
higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with
Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the
Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45

In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the BIR shows that,
although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II with Salary Grade
26.46

There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground that respondent
court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose that when a warrant of
arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on September
17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009
Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner's Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 229781

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
204, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, P/DIR. GEN. RONALD M. DELA ROSA, in his capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police, PSUPT. PHILIP GIL M. PHILIPPS, in his capacity as Director, Headquarters Support
Service, SUPT. ARNEL JAMANDRON APUD, in his capacity as Chief, PNP Custodial Service Unit, and ALL
PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, INSTRUCTION OR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO
THE ORDERS THAT MAY BE ISSUED BY THE COURT, Respondents

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, and Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Status Quo Ante Order1 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Senator Leila De Lima. In it, petitioner assails the following orders and
warrant issued by respondent judge Hon. Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 204, in Criminal Case No. 17-165, entitled "People vs. Leila De Lima, et al.:" (1) the Order dated
February 23, 2017 finding probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest against petitioner De Lima; (2) the
Warrant of Arrest against De Lima also dated February 23, 2017; (3) the Order dated February 24, 2017
committing the petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center; and finally, (4) the supposed omission of
the respondent judge to act on petitioner's Motion to Quash, through which she questioned the jurisdiction of
the RTC.2

Antecedents

The facts are undisputed. The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the
proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed
affidavits in support of their testimonies.3 These legislative inquiries led to the filing of the following complaints
with the Department of Justice:

a) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00313, entitled "Volunteers against Crime and Corruption (VACC), represented by
Dante Jimenez vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et al.;"

b) NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315, entitled "Reynaldo Esmeralda and Ruel Lasala vs. Senator Leila De Lima, et al.;"

c) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00331, entitled "Jaybee Nifio Sebastian, represented by his wife Roxanne Sebastian, vs.
Senator Leila M De Lima, et al.;" and

d) NPS No. XVI-INV-16K-00336, entitled "National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) vs. Senator Leila M. De Lima, et
al. "4

Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and the DOJ Panel of
Prosecutors (DOJ Panel),5 headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong, was directed to conduct the
requisite preliminary investigation.6

The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016,7 wherein the petitioner, through her
counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of the Ombudsman and for
the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice ("Omnibus Motion").8 In the main, the
petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four
complaints against her. Further, alleging evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner
contended that the DOJ prosecutors should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the
Ombudsman.
A hearing on the Omnibus Motion was conducted on December 9, 2016,9 wherein the complainants, YACC,
Reynaldo Esmeralda (Esmeralda) and Ruel Lasala (Lasala), filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to the Omnibus
Motion. 10

On December 12, 2016, petitioner, in turn, interposed a Reply to the Joint Comment/Opposition filed by
complainants VACC, Esmeralda and Lasala. In addition, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Motion to First
Resolve Pending Incident and to Defer Further Proceedings. 11

During the hearing conducted on December 21, 2016, petitioner manifested that she has decided not to submit
her counter-affidavit citing the pendency of her two motions.12 The DOJ Panel, however, ruled that it will not
entertain belatedly filed counter-affidavits, and declared all pending incidents and the cases as submitted for
resolution. Petitioner moved for but was denied reconsideration by the DOJ Panel.13

On January 13, 2017, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition and
Certiorari14assailing the jurisdiction of the DOJ Panel over the complaints against her. The petitions, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 149097 and CA-G.R. No. SP No. 149385, are currently pending with the Special 6th Division of
the appellate court.15 Meanwhile, in the absence of a restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals, the DOJ
Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation16 and, in its Joint Resolution dated February
14, 2017,17 recommended the filing of Informations against petitioner De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17,
2017, three Informations were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before the RTC
ofMuntinlupa City. One of the Infonnations was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17-16518 and raffled off to
Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This Information charging petitioner for violation of Section 5 in
relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, contained the following
averments:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department
of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Rages, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections,
by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being
then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or
influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following
manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority, demand, solicit and extort
money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the senatorial bid of De Lima in the
May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of
mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic
dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal
drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara"
each from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.19

On February 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash,20mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks
jurisdiction over the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; the
Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege the corpus
delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are not qualified to be
discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are hearsay.21

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued the presently assailed Order 22finding probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. The Order stated, viz.:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z.
RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAYAN.

WHEREFORE, let Warrants of Arrest be issued against the abovementioned accused.

SO ORDERED.23

Accordingly, the questioned Warrant of Arrest dated February 23, 2017 ,24 which contained no
recommendation for bail, was issued against petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant of Arrest on petitioner
and the respondent judge issued the assailed February 24, 2017 Order,25 committing petitioner to the custody
of the PNP Custodial Center.

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to this court via the present petition, praying for the following reliefs:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23 February 2017, the Warrant of
Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial Court - Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M De Lima, et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further DOJ
proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;
at Hrc
Scand a writ of
c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO)
preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the Order and
Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to
her liberty and freedom.26

On March 9, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the respondents, interposed its
Comment to the petition.27 The OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed as De Lima failed to show
that she has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Further, the OSG posited that the petitioner did not
observe the hierarchy of courts and violated the rule against forum shopping. On substantive grounds, the OSG
asserted inter alia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense charged against the petitioner, that the
respondent judge observed the constitutional and procedural rules, and so did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, in the issuance of the assailed orders and warrant.28

On petitioner's motion, the Court directed the holding of oral arguments on the significant issues raised. The
Court then heard the parties in oral arguments on March 14, 21, and 28, 2017.29

In the meantime, the OSG filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 2017,30 claiming that petitioner falsified the
jurats appearing in the: (1) Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping page of her petition; and (2)
Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief. The OSG alleged that while the advertedjurats
appeared to be notarized by a certain Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-Cabalo on February 24, 2017, the guest
logbook31 in the PNP Custodial Center Unit in Camp Crame for February 24, 2017 does not bear the name of
Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo. Thus, so the OSG maintained, petitioner De Lima did not actually appear and swear
before the notary public on such date in Quezon City, contrary to the allegations in the jurats. For the OSG, the
petition should therefore be dismissed outright for the falsity committed by petitioner De Lima.
In compliance with an Order of this Court, petitioner filed the Affidavit of Atty. Maria Cecille C. Tresvalles-
Cabalo dated March 20, 201732 to shed light on the allegations of falsity in petitioner'sjurats.

The parties simultaneously filed their respective Memoranda on April 17, 2017.33

The Issues

From the pleadings and as delineated in this Court's Advisory dated March 10, 201734 and discussed by the
parties during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution by this Court are:

Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts considering that
the petition should first be filed with the Court of Appeals.

B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial court renders the
instant petition premature.

C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present petition, violated the rule against forum shopping given the
pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Criminal
Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 149097,
assailing the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act
No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.

B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to issue the Warrant
of Arrest against petitioner.

C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the
interim until the instant petition is resolved or until the trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.

OUR RULING

Before proceeding to a discussion on the outlined issues, We shall first confront the issue of the alleged
falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping
and Affidavit of Merit in support of her prayer for injunctive relief.

In her Affidavit, Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo disproves the OSG's allegation that she did not notarize the petitioner's
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in this wise:

4. On February 24, 2017 at or around nine in the morning (9:00 AM), I went to PNP, CIDG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City to notarize the Petition as discussed the previous night.

5. I met Senator De Lima when she was brought to the CIDG at Camp Crame and I was informed that the
Petition was already signed and ready for notarization.

6. I was then provided the Petition by her staff. I examined the signature of Senator De Lima and confirmed that
it was signed by her. I have known the signature of the senator given our personal relationship. Nonetheless, I
still requested from her staff a photocopy of any of her government-issued valid Identification Cards (ID) bearing
her signature. A photocopy of her passport was presented to me. I compared the signatures on the Petition and
the Passport and I was able to verify that the Petition was in fact signed by her. Afterwards, I attached the
photocopy of her Passport to the Petition which I appended to my Notarial Report/Record.

7. Since I already know that Sen. De Lima caused the preparation of the Petition and that it was her who signed
the same, I stamped and signed the same.

8. To confirm with Senator De Lima that I have already notarized the Petition, I sought entry to the detention
facility at or around three in the afternoon (3:00 PM). x x x

xxxx

11. Since I was never cleared after hours of waiting, I was not able to talk again to Senator De Lima to confirm
the notarization of the Petition. I then decided to leave Camp Crame.35

At first glance, it is curious that Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo who claims to have "stamped and signed the [Verification
and Certification and Affidavit of Merit]" inside Camp Crame, presumably in De Lima's presence, still found it
necessary to, hours later, "confirm with Senator De Lima that [she had] already notarized the Petition."
Nonetheless, assuming the veracity of the allegations narrated in the Affidavit, it is immediately clear that
petitioner De Lima did not sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit
in front of the notary public. This is contrary to the jurats (i.e., the certifications of the notary public at the end of
the instruments) signed by Atty. Tresvalles-Cabalo that the documents were "SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to
before me."

Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima in this case, to sign the instrument or document in the presence
of the notary, viz.:

SECTION 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules;

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

While there is jurisprudence to the effect that "an irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private document, which requires /roof of its due execution and authenticity to be
admissible as evidence,"37 the same cannot be considered controlling in determining compliance with the
requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Both Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 6538 require that
the petitions for certiorari and prohibition must be verified and accompanied by a "sworn certificate of non-
forum shopping."

In this regard, Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit
that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading." Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed." "Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided x x x."

In this case, when petitioner De Lima failed to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping in
the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under oath the contents thereof, thereby
rendering false and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping. The
significance of a proper jurat and the effect of its invalidity was elucidated in William Go Que Construction v.
Court of Appeals,39where this Court held that:

In .this case, it is undisputed that the Verification/Certification against Forum Shopping attached to the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 was not accompanied with a valid affidavit/properly certified under oath.
This was because the jurat thereof was defective in that it did not indicate the pertinent details regarding the
affiants' (i.e., private respondents) competent evidence of identities.

Under Section 6, Rule II of AM. No. 02-8-13-SC 63 dated July 6, 2004, entitled the "2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice" (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice), ajurat refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

xxxx

In Fernandez v. Villegas (Fernandez), the Court pronounced that noncompliance with the verification
requirement or a defect therein "does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order
its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby." "Verification is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct." Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification requirement
as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in
the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence of any of their
identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.

For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the certification against forum shopping
requirement. In Fernandez, the Court explained that "non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to
relax the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of 'special circumstances or compelling
reasons."' Here, the CA did not mention - nor does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or
compelling reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private
respondents certified under oath that no similar action has been filed or is pending in another forum.

xxxx
Case law states that "[v]erification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative." On the other hand, "[t]he
certification against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora." The important purposes behind these requirements
cannot be simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper
justification is especially called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of the
remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient submissions
before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the submission of a proper
verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly ignored settled procedural rules
and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the proper course of action was for it to dismiss
the petition.40 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Without the presence of the notary upon the signing of the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping, there is no assurance that the petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. It must be noted that verification is
not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere
expedience or sheer caprice,41 as what apparently happened in the present case. Similarly, the absence of the
notary public when petitioner allegedly affixed her signature also negates a proper attestation that forum
shopping has not been committed by the filing of the petition. Thus, the petition is, for all intents and purposes,
an unsigned pleading that does not deserve the cognizance of this Court.42 In Salum bides, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman,43the Court held thus:

The Court has distinguished the effects of non-compliance with the requirement of verification and that of
certification against forum shopping. A defective verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading and thus
produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied, while the
failure to certifv against forum shopping shall be cause for dismissal without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, and is not curable by amendment of the initiatory pleading. (Emphasis and italicization from the
original.)

Notably, petitioner has not proffered any reason to justify her failure to sign the Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping in the presence of the notary. There is, therefore, no justification to relax the rules and
excuse the petitioner's non-compliance therewith. This Court had reminded parties seeking the ultimate relief of
certiorari to observe the rules, since nonobservance thereof cannot be brushed aside as a "mere technicality."44
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.45 Thus, as in William Go Que Construction, the proper course of action is
to dismiss outright the present petition.

Even if We set aside this procedural infirmity, the petition just the same merits denial on several other grounds.

PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court.46 It will not entertain
direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts.47 The Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the orderly administration of justice and not
imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons.48 In The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections,49the Court explained the reason for the doctrine thusly:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is
not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time
for the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to

O
it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

xxxx
only when absolutely necessary
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level
of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only
determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in
relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions
and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly
perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the "actual
case" that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course,
would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be
practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law
made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the
actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions.
Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally,
should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to
determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of
new circumstances or in the light of some confusion of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of
first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal
devices in order that it truly performs that role.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule and direct resort to this Court were allowed in some

I
instances. These exceptions were summarized in a case of recent vintage, Aala v. Uy, as follows:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.
Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better
Idecided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a I
constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8)
when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy.51

Unfortunately, none of these exceptions were sufficiently established in the present petition so as to convince
this court to brush aside the rules on the hierarchy of courts.

Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not covered by
the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a
reason for this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the
petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent
judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the issues before it through
the warped prisms of political partisanships.

That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her case. The right to
equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on
account of her position and status in the government.

Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first impression. Petitioner is
not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she the first defendant to question the finding of
probable cause for her arrest. In fact, stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the
mill matters that could have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do so in
the first place.

In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded as her case
involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One of the grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is
that the respondent judge erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her
arrest. By itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of law. It is
established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/ or evidence appended to the
Information.52 This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate court, which is in the
better position to review and determine factual matters.

Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the rule on the hierarchy of
courts in the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the practical aspects of the administration of justice
in deciding to apply the exceptions rather than the rule. However, it is all the more for these practical
considerations that the Court must insist on the application of the rule and not the exceptions in this case. As
petitioner herself alleges, with the President having declared the fight against illegal drugs and corruption as
central to his platform of government, there will be a spike of cases brought before the courts involving drugs
and public officers.53 As it now stands, there are 232,557 criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796
criminal cases involving other offenses pending before the R TCs.54 This Court cannot thus allow a precedent
allowing public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants to be brought
directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling reason.

THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE

The prematurity of the present petition is at once betrayed in the reliefs sought by petitioner's Prayer, which to
restate for added emphasis, provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in the interest of substantial justice and fair play, Petitioner respectfully
prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:

a. Granting a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the Order dated 23 February 2017, the Warrant of
Arrest dated the same date, and the Order dated 24 February 2017 of the Regional Trial CourtBranch 204,
Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165 entitled People of the Philippines versus Leila M De Lima et al.;

b. Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting respondent judge from conducting further
proceedings until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality;
c. Issuing an order granting the application for the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary injunction to the proceedings; and

d. Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the parties to the status prior to the issuance of the Order and
Warrant of Arrest, both dated February 23, 201 7, thereby recalling both processes and restoring petitioner to
her liberty and freedom.55 (Emphasis supplied)

Under paragraph (a), petitioner asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding
probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the
custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release
from detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case.

More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b) of the prayer "until
and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to
rule on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission
against interest binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the
greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.56 It is based on the presumption that "no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration is true. "57 It can be presumed then that the declaration corresponds
with the truth, and it is her fault if it does not.58

Moreover, petitioner under paragraphs (c) and (d) prayed for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and a
status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her
liberty and freedom."

Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 17-165. What is clear is
she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest.

In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the petition on the ground of
prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the desire of petitioner.

This Court, in Solid Builders Inc. v. China Banking Corp., explained why a party should not pre-empt the action
of a trial court:

Even Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which SBI and MFII invoke, works against them. Under that provision, the
equitable reduction of the penalty stipulated by the parties in their contract will be based on a finding by the
court that such penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable. Here, the trial court has not yet made a ruling as to
whether the penalty agreed upon by CBC with SBI and MFII is unconscionable. Such finding will be made by the
trial court only after it has heard both parties and weighed their respective evidence in light of all relevant
circumstances. Hence, for SBI and MFII to claim any right or benefit under that provision at this point is
premature.59 (Emphasis supplied)

In State of Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,60the Court likewise held that a petition for certiorari can
be resorted to only after the court a quo has already and actually rendered its decision. It held, viz.:

We note, however, that the appellate court never actually ruled on whether or not petitioner's right had
prescribed. It merely declared that it was in a position to so rule and thereafter required the parties to submit
memoranda. In making such a declaration, did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction? It did not.
xxxx

All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided nothing and whatever petitioner's
vehement objections may be (to any eventual ruling on the issue of prescription) should be raised only after such
ruling shall have actually been promulgated.

The situation evidently does not yet call for a recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. 61(Italicization
from the original. Emphasis supplied.)

An analogous ruling was made by this Court in Diaz v. Nora, where it ruled in this wise:

x x x In the case of the respondent labor arbiter, he has not denied the motion for execution filed by the
petitioner. He merely did not act on the same. Neither had petitioner urged the immediate resolution of his
motion for execution by said arbiter. In the case of the respondent NLRC, it was not even given the opportunity
to pass upon the question raised by petitioner as to whether or not it has jurisdiction over the appeal, so the
records of the case can be remanded to the respondent labor arbiter for execution of the decision.

Obviously, petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to seek relief from public respondents but he
failed to avail himself of the same before coming to this Court. To say the least, the petition is premature and
must be struck down.62 (Emphasis supplied.)

The dissents would deny the applicability of the foregoing on the ground that these were not criminal cases that
involved a pending motion to quash. However, it should be obvious from the afore-quoted excerpts that the
nature of the cases had nothing to do with this Court's finding of prematurity in those cases. Instead, what was
stressed therein was that the lower courts had not yet made, nor was not given the opportunity to make, a ruling
before the parties came before this forum.

Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that petitioner is actually
asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively
in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge
from doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit
of orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the
proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality
on the instant petition.

Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this Court can exercise its
review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of "final
judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue," viz.:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction of the lower court in
issue -- there is no controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of the lower
court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court
cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions.

Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a non-existent
court action. It can only act to protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it is not for
this Court to negate "uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not
occur at all," as the lower court's feared denial of the subject Motion to Quash.63

The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of controversies "wherein actual and not
merely hypothetical issues are involved."64 The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts through
avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements, and for us to be
satisfied that the case does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not
and indeed may never transpire."65

Even granting arguendo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this Court under Section 5 (1) of Article
VIII, the petition nonetheless falls short of the Constitutional requirements and of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In the absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the
lower court, there is no occasion for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a judgment or
ruling, there is nothing for this Court to declare as having been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion.

Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy found in law."66 Thus, the failure to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later discussed, before a
premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action.

Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23 and 24, 2017 Orders she is currently
assailing in this Petition. As this Court held in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a] motion for
reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors x x x [it] is
mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari."67The reasons proffered by petitioner fail to justify her
present premature recourse.

Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule
enunciated in Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and attention to
matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket. There is no reason to consider the
proceedings at bar as an exception.

PETITIONER VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

It is settled that forum shopping exists when a party repetitively avails himself of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already
resolved adversely by, some other court. It is considered an act of malpractice as it trifles with the courts and
abuses their processes.68 Thus, as elucidated in Luzon Iron Development Group Corporation v. Bridgestone
Mining and Development Corporation,69forum shopping warrants the immediate dismissal of the suits filed:

Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different
fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely
by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in
one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which
tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.

xxxx

What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused the courts and litigants
by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or related causes and/or
grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered upon the same issues.

xxxx

We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. To avoid any confusion, this Court adheres
strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. The
acts committed and described herein can possibly constitute direct contempt.70

This policy echoes the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which states that "[i]f the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions."

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia, or whether a
final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other. Forum shopping therefore exists when the
following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing the same interests in
both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.71

Anent the first requisite, there is an identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is
privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.72

Meanwhile, the second and third requisites obtain where the same evidence necessary to sustain the second
cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even if the forms or the nature of the two (2)
actions are different from each other. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are
considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise,
it is not.73

All these requisites are present in this case.

The presence of the first requisite is at once apparent. The petitioner is an accused in the criminal case below,
while the respondents in this case, all represented by the Solicitor General, have substantial identity with the
complainant in the criminal case still pending before the trial court.

As for the second requisite, even a cursory reading of the petition and the Motion to Quash will reveal that the
arguments and the reliefs prayed for are essentially the same. In both, petitioner advances the RTC's supposed
lack of jurisdiction over the offense, the alleged multiplicity of offenses included in the Information; the
purported lack of the corpus delicti of the charge, and, basically, the non-existence of probable cause to indict
her. And, removed of all non-essentials, she essentially prays for the same thing in both the present petition and
the Motion to Quash: the nullification of the Information and her restoration to liberty and freedom. Thus, our
ruling in Jent v. Tullet Prebon (Philippines), Inc. 74 does not apply in the present case as the petition at bar and
the motion to quash pending before the court a quo involve similar if not the same reliefs. What is more, while
Justice Caguioa highlights our pronouncement in Jent excepting an "appeal or special civil action for certiorari"
from the rule against the violation of forum shopping, the good justice overlooks that the phrase had been used
with respect to forum shopping committed through successive actions by a "party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has [already] been rendered in one forum."75 The exception with respect to an "appeal or
special civil action for certiorari" does not apply where the forum shopping is committed by simultaneous
actions where no judgment or order has yet been rendered by either forum. To restate for emphasis, the RTC
has yet to rule on the Motion to Quash. Thus, the present petition and the motion to quash before the R TC are
simultaneous actions that do not exempt petitions for certiorari from the rule against forum shopping.

With the presence of the first two requisites, the third one necessarily obtains in the present case. Should we
grant the petition and declare the RTC without jurisdiction over the offense, the RTC is bound to grant De Lima's
Motion to Quash in deference to this Court's authority. In the alternative, if the trial court rules on the Motion to
Quash in the interim, the instant petition will be rendered moot and academic.

In situations like the factual milieu of this instant petition, while nobody can restrain a party to a case before the
trial court to institute a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, still such petition must be
rejected outright because petitions that cover simultaneous actions are anathema to the orderly and expeditious
processing and adjudication of cases.

On the ground of forum shopping alone, the petition merits immediate dismissal.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION

Even discounting the petitioner's procedural lapses, this Court is still wont to deny the instant petition on
substantive grounds.

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in Criminal Case No. 17-165, the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges
her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even
assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the
exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately
related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's
view, declaring that the Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the R TC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA
9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the
respondents contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try
drug-related cases even those committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the
laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address
specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

Before discussing the issue on jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is necessary to clarify the crime with which
the petitioner is being charged. For ease of reference, the Information filed with the R TC is restated below:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

Versus
Criminal Case No. 17-165

(NPS No. XVI-INV-16J-00315 and NPS No. XVl-INV-16K-00336) For: Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26 (b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165
(lllegal Drug Trading)

LEILA M. DE LIMA

(66 Laguna de Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paraiiaque City and/or Room 502, GSIS Building,
Financial Center, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City), RAFAEL MARCOS Z. RAGOS (c/o National Bureau of
Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila) and RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, (Barangay Galarin, Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan), Accused

x-------------------------------------x

INFORMATION

The undersigned Prosecutors, constituted as a Panel pursuant to Department Orders 706 and 790 dated
October 14, 2016 and November 11, 2016, respectively, accuse LEILA M. DE LIMA, RAFAEL MARCOS Z.
RAGOS and RONNIE P ALISOC DAY AN, for violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 3 (jj), Section 26 (b) and
Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Act of 2002, committed
as follows:

That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Leila M. De Lima, being then the Secretary of the Department
of Justice, and accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, being then the Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Corrections,
by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being
then the employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or
influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading, in the following
manner: De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority demand, solicit and extort
money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the
May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of
mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic
dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal
drug trading amounting to Five Million (₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million
(₱5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012, and One Hundred Thousand (₱l00,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara"
each from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.

CONTRARY TO LAW.76

Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the Information repeatedly
provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very
designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is
charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, 77 the designation of the offense
in the Information is a critical element required under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the
accused of the offense being charged, viz.:

The offense charged can also be elucidated by consulting the designation of the offense as appearing in the
Information. The designation of the offense is a critical element required under Sec. 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court for it assists in apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Its inclusion in the Information is
imperative to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him of the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. Its import is underscored in this case where the preamble states that the crime charged is of "Acts
of Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No.7610." 78(Emphasis supplied.)

Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted would convey that De
Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug Trading. The pertinent provisions of RA 9165
read:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxxx

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.

xxxx

SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of
opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

xxxx

SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. - Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be
penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

xxxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

xxxx

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The maximum penalties of the unlawful
acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public
office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees.

While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct Bribery under

o_0
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other allegations in the Information portray a
much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) as "a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of
substances,"79 necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and
corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent vintage regarding billions of pesos'
worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports without the scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and
bribery that may have changed hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial
contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the offense for which the persons
involved should be penalized.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the Information against
De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the RPC.80 As Justice Martires
articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as
constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The
averments on how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of
conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs
through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj),
Section 26(b), and Section 28, of RA 9165.

On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the actual trafficking of
dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non sequitur given that the allegation of
conspiracy makes her liable for the acts of her co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable
for a co-conspirator to take a direct part in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not even know of all the
parts which the others have to perform,81 as conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not
participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. 82 As long as the accused, in one way or another,
helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony, she is liable as a co-principal.83 As the Information
provides, De Lima's participation and cooperation was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the
NBP inmates. The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of evidence that need not be
specified in the Information but presented and threshed out during trial.

Yet, some justices remain adamant in their position that the Information fails to allege the necessary elements of

I
Illegal Drug Trading. Justice Carpio, in particular, would cite cases supposedly enumerating the elements
necessary for a valid Information for Illegal Drug Trading. However, it should be noted that the subject of these
cases
I was "Illegal Sale" of dangerous drugs -- a crime separate and distinct from "Illegal Trading" averred in the
Information against De Lima. The elements of "Illegal Sale" will necessary differ from the elements of Illegal
Trading under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), of RA 9165. The definitions of these two separate acts are
reproduced below for easy reference:

SECTION 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxxx

(ii) Sell. - Any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether
for money or any other consideration.

(jj) Trading. - Transactions involving the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or
landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other consideration in violation of this Act.

It is obvious from the foregoing that the crime of illegal trading has been written in strokes much broader than
that for illegal sale. In fact, an illegal sale of drugs may be considered as only one of the possible component
acts of illegal trading which may be committed through two modes: (1) illegal trafficking using electronic
devices; or (2) acting as a broker in any transactions involved in the illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs.

On this score, the crime of "illegal trafficking" embraces various other offenses punishable by RA 9165. Section
3(r) of RA 9165 provides:

(r) Illegal Trafficking. - The illegal cultivation, culture, delivery, administration, dispensation, manufacture, sale,
trading, transportation, distribution, importation, exportation and possession of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical.

In turn, the crimes included in the definition of Illegal Trafficking of drugs are defined as follows:

(a) Administer. - Any act of introducing any dangerous drug into the body of any person, with or without his/her
knowledge, by injection, inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of committing any act of indispensable
assistance to a person in administering a dangerous drug to himself/herself unless administered by a duly
licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.

xxxx

(d) Chemical Diversion. - The sale, distribution, supply or transport of legitimately imported, in-transit,
manufactured or procured controlled precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted, mixtures or in concentrated
form, to any person or entity engaged in the manufacture of any dangerous drug, and shall include packaging,
repackaging, labeling, relabeling or concealment of such transaction through fraud, destruction of documents,
fraudulent use of permits, misdeclaration, use of front companies or mail fraud.

xxxx

(i) Cultivate or Culture. - Any act of knowingly planting, growing, raising, or permitting the planting, growing or
raising of any plant which is the source of a dangerous drug.

xxxx

(k) Deliver. - Any act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any
means, with or without consideration.

xxxx
(m) Dispense. - Any act of giving away, selling or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug with or without
the use of prescription.

xxxx

(u) Manufacture. - The production, preparation, compounding or processing of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical, either directly or indirectly or by extraction from substances of
natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical
synthesis, and shall include any packaging or repackaging of such substances, design or configuration of its
form, or labeling or relabeling of its container; except that such terms do not include the preparation,
compounding, packaging or labeling of a drug or other substances by a duly authorized practitioner as an
incident to his/her administration or dispensation of such drug or substance in the course of his/her professional
practice including research, teaching and chemical analysis of dangerous drugs or such substances that are not
intended for sale or for any other purpose.

xxxx

(kk) Use. - Any act of injecting, intravenously or intramuscularly, of consuming, either by chewing, smoking,
sniffing, eating, swallowing, drinking or otherwise introducing into the physiological system of the body, any of
the dangerous drugs.

With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized and defined in RA
9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the
prosecution for Illegal Trading.

More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it impossible to provide
the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text
messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal
Trading can be remotely perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the subject
of the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital technology coupled with ride sharing and delivery services,
Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed without getting one's hand on the substances or knowing and
meeting the seller or buyer. To require the elements of Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object
and consideration, in Illegal Trade) would be impractical.

The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by "acting as a broker" in
transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the accused may neither have physical possession of
the drugs nor meet the buyer and seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as
early as 1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a middleman, negotiating contracts
relative to property with which he has no custody, viz.:

A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on a commission, negotiating contracts relative
to property with the custody of which he has no concern; the negotiator between other parties, never acting in
his own name, but in the name of those who employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purposes
the agent of both parties.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they actually took no part in the
negotiations, never saw the customer."85 For the Court, the primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing
"the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made. "86 Hence, in indictments for Illegal
Trading, it is illogical to require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object and consideration.87 For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to prosper, proof that the
accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices
such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant
messengers and chat rooms" is sufficient.

The DOJ' s designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway. After all, the prosecution
is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion of whether, what, and whom to charge.88 The
exercise of this discretion depends on a smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the
prosecutors.89

As such, with the designation of the offense, the recital of facts in the Information, there can be no other
conclusion than that petitioner is being charged not with Direct Bribery but with violation of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the elements of Direct
Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case, possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still
the prosecution has the authority to amend the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has
not yet been arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant
to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in

substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the
trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law.90 It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.91
Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It
follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard
and determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law
on jurisdiction of courts.92

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will
reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other.
The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the
following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to
hear drug-related cases:

Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the
Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - x x x x

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately
schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and
properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be
found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:

xxxx
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which
may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia
legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.

xxxx

Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the Voluntary
Submission Program. - x x x

A petition for the confinement of a person alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to a Center may be
filed by any person authorized by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where such
person is found.

xxxx

Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to Treatment and
Rehabilitation. - If a person charged with an offense where the imposable penalty is imprisonment of less than
six (6) years and one (1) day, and is found by the prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to
be a drug dependent, the prosecutor or the court as the case may be, shall suspend all further proceedings and
transmit copies of the record of the case to the Board.

In the event the Board determines, after medical examination, that public interest requires that such drug
dependent be committed to a center for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a petition for his/her
commitment with the regional trial court of the province or city where he/she is being investigated or tried: x x x

xxxx

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional
Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number
of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending
in their respective jurisdiction.

The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.

Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-
related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals,93this Court categorically named the RTC as the court with
jurisdiction over drug related-cases, as follows:

Applying by analogy the ruling in People v. Simon, People v. De Lara, People v. Santos, and Ordonez v. Vinarao,
the imposable penalty in this case which involves 0.4587 grams of shabu should not exceed prision correccional.
We say by analogy because these cases involved marijuana, not methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). In
Section 20 of RA. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of RA No. 7659, the maximum quantities of marijuana
and methamphetamine hydrochloride for purposes of imposing the maximum penalties are not the same. For
the latter, if the quantity involved is 200 grams or more, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from ₱500,000 to PIO million shall be imposed. Accordingly, if the quantity involved is below 200
grams, the imposable penalties should be as follows:

xxxx
Clearly, the penalty which may be imposed for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 96-8443 would at most
be only prision correccional duration is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Does it follow then
that, as the petitioner insists, the RTC has no jurisdiction thereon in view of the amendment of Section 32 of B.P.
Big. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, which vested upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties?
This Section 32 as thus amended now reads:

xxxx

The exception in the opening sentence is of special significance which we cannot disregard. x xx The
aforementioned exception refers not only to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts in criminal cases, but also to other laws which specifically lodge in Regional Trial Courts exclusive
jurisdiction over specific criminal cases, e. g., (a) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
Nos. 1289 and 4363 on written defamation or libel; (b) Decree on Intellectual Property (P. D. No. 49, as
amended), which vests upon Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over the cases therein mentioned
regardless of the imposable penalty; and (c) more appropriately for the case at bar, Section 39 of RA No. 6425,
as amended by P.D. No. 44, which vests on Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Courts concurrent exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving violations of said
Act.

xxxx

That Congress indeed did not intend to repeal these special laws vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Regional
Trial Courts over certain cases is clearly evident from the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by RA No. 7691. These special laws are not, therefore, covered by the
repealing clause (Section 6) of RA No. 7691.

Neither can it be successfully argued that Section 39 of RA. No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44, is no longer
operative because Section 44 of B.P. Big. 129 abolished the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, and
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts. While, indeed, Section 44 provides that these courts were to be
"deemed automatically abolished" upon the declaration by the President that the reorganization provided in
B.P. Blg. 129 had been completed, this Court should not lose sight of the fact that the Regional Trial Courts
merely replaced the Courts of First Instance as clearly borne out by the last two sentences of Section 44, to wit:

xxxx

Consequently, it is not accurate to state that the "abolition" of the Courts of First Instance carried with it the
abolition of their exclusive original jurisdiction in drug cases vested by Section 39 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended
by P. D. No. 44. If that were so, then so must it be with respect to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 57 of the Decree on Intellectual Property. On the contrary, in the resolution of 19 June 1996 in Caro v.
Court of Appeals and in the resolution of 26 February 1997 in Villalon v. Ba/dado, this Court expressly ruled that
Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over libel cases pursuant to Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code. In Administrative Order No. 104-96 this Court mandates that:

xxxx

The same Administrative Order recognizes that violations of RA. No. 6425, as amended, regardless of the
quantity involved, are to be tried and decided by the Regional Trial Courts therein designated as special
courts.94 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Yet, much has been made of the terminology used in Section 90 of RA 9165. The dissents would highlight the
provision's departure from Section 39 of RA 6425 - the erstwhile drugs law, which provides:

SECTION 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court. - The Circuit Criminal Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act.

For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a clear indication
that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the
Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165.

As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is unwarranted given the
clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of
the drugs law but to segregate from among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will
"exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new
phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the
further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each judicial region. This intent can be
clearly gleaned from the interpellation on House Bill No. 4433, entitled "An Act Instituting the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, repealing Republic Act No. 6425, as amended:"

Initially, Rep. Dilangalen referred to the fact sheet attached to the Bill which states that the measure will
undertake a comprehensive amendment to the existing law on dangerous drugs -- RA No. 6425, as amended.
Adverting to Section 64 of the Bill on the repealing clause, he then asked whether the Committee is in effect
amending or repealing the aforecited law. Rep. Cuenco replied that any provision of law which is in conflict with
the provisions of the Bill is repealed and/or modified accordingly.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen suggested that if the Committee's intention was only to amend RA No. 6425,
then the wording used should be "to amend" and not "to repeal" with regard to the provisions that are contrary
to the provisions of the Bill.

Adverting to Article VIII, Section 60, on Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Case, which provides that "the
Supreme Court shall designate regional trial courts to have original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable by
this Act," Rep. Dilangalen inquired whether it is the Committee's intention that certain RTC salas will be
designated by the Supreme Court to try drug-related offenses, although all RTCs have original jurisdiction over
those offenses.

Rep. Cuenco replied in the affirmative. He pointed that at present, the Supreme Court's assignment of drug
cases to certain judges is not exclusive because the latter can still handle cases other than drug-related cases.
He added that the Committee's intention is to assign drug-related cases to judges who will handle exclusively
these cases assigned to them.

In this regard, Rep. Dilangalen stated that, at the appropriate time, he would like to propose the following
amendment; "The Supreme Court shall designate specific salas of the RTC to try exclusively offenses related to
drugs."

Rep. Cuenca agreed therewith, adding that the Body is proposing the creation of exclusive drug courts because
at present, almost all of the judges are besieged by a lot of drug cases some of which have been pending for
almost 20 years.95 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Per the "Records of the Bilateral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1858
and House Bill No. 4433," the term "designation" of R TCs that will exclusively handle drug-related offenses was
used to skirt the budgetary requirements that might accrue by the "creation" of exclusive drugs courts. It was
never intended to divest the R TCs of their exclusive original jurisdiction over drug-related cases. The Records
are clear:

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). x x x [W]e would like to propose the creation of drug courts to handle
exclusively drug cases; the imposition of a 60-day deadline on courts within which to decide drug cases; and No.
3, provide penalties on officers of the law and government prosecutors for mishandling and delaying drugs
cases.

We will address these concerns one by one.

1. The possible creation of drugs courts to handle exclusively drug cases. Any comments?

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). We have no objection to this proposal, Mr. Chairman. As a matter of fact, this
is one of the areas where we come into an agreement when we were in Japan. However, I just would like to add
a paragraph after the word "Act" in Section 86 of the Senate versions, Mr. Chairman. And this is in connection
with the designation of special courts by "The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this
Act. The number of court designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of
pending cases in their respective jurisdiction." That is my proposal, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). We adopt the same proposal.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. BARBERS). I have no problem with that, Mr. Chairman, but I'd like to call your attention
to the fact that my proposal is only for designation because if it is for a creation that would entail another
budget, Mr. Chairman. And almost always, the Department of Budget would tell us at the budget hearing that
we lack funds, we do not have money. So that might delay the very purpose why we want the RTC or the
municipal courts to handle exclusively the drug cases. That's why my proposal is designation not creation.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. CUENCO). Areglado. No problem, designation. Approved.96

I
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever

I
the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged
as committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking
government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits
are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.98 As it
now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

xxxx

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986. Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
information: (a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the
government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding
One Million pesos (₱l,000,000.00).

The foregoing immediately betrays that the Sandiganbayan primarily sits as a special anti-graft court pursuant to
a specific injunction in the 1973 Constitution.99 Its characterization and continuation as such was expressly given
a constitutional fiat under Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

SECTION 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drug-related
cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a
catchall provision, does not operate to strip the R TCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA
9165. As pointed out by Justices Tijam and Martires, a perusal of the drugs law will reveal that public officials
were never considered excluded from its scope. Hence, Section 27 of RA 9165 punishes government officials
found to have benefited from the trafficking of dangerous drugs, while Section 28 of the law imposes the
maximum penalty on such government officials and employees. The adverted sections read:

SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to
Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laborat01y Equipment
Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(Pl0,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the
unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous
drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural
or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall be removed from
office and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its
divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. - The maximum penalties of the unlawful
acts provided for in this Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public
office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, provides but the general rule, couched in a "broad and
general phraseology. "100 Exceptions abound. Besides the jurisdiction on written defamations and libel, as
illustrated in Morales 101and People v. Benipayo, 102 the RTC is likewise given "exclusive original jurisdiction to
try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus Election Code,"103 regardless of
whether such violation was committed by public officers occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher in
relation to their offices. In fact, offenses committed by members of the Armed Forces in relation to their office,
i.e., in the words of RA 7055,104 "service-connected crimes or offenses," are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan but by court-martial.

Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not determined solely by the pay
scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to their office." In determining the forum vested with
the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal
prosecution must likewise be considered.

In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the
general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that
a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the general.105

Parenthetically, it has been advanced that RA 10660 has repealed Section 90 of RA 9165. However, a closer look
at the repealing clause of RA 10660 will show that there is no express repeal of Section 90 of RA 9165 and well-
entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. It is only accepted upon the clearest proof of
inconsistency so repugnant that the two laws cannot be enforced.106 The presumption against implied repeal is
stronger when of two laws involved one is special and the other general.107 The mentioned rule in statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law applies regardless of the laws' respective dates of
passage. Thus, this Court ruled:

x x x [I]t is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law - regardless of their
dates of passage - and the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general.

So also, every effort must be exerted to avoid a conflict between statutes. If reasonable construction is possible,
the laws must be reconciled in that manner.

Repeals of laws by implication moreover are not favored, and the mere repugnancy between two statutes should
be very clear to warrant the court in holding that the later in time repeals the other.108

To reiterate for emphasis, Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their
office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction violations of RA
9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by
the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to
the public officials' office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs
specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases.
With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and
untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily
identifiable.109 In fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by forensic chemists to determine their
composition and nature.110 Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are specially trained by the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions to equip them with the proper tools to
appreciate pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary
consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant
sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan
justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.

Hard figures likewise support the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs over violations of RA 9165. As
previously stated, as of June 30, 2017, there are 232,557 drugs cases pending before the RTCs. On the other
hand, not even a single case filed before the Sandiganbayan from February 1979 to June 30, 2017 dealt with
violations of the drugs law. Instead, true to its designation as an anti-graft court, the bulk of the cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan involve violations of RA 3019, entitled the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and
malversation.111 With these, it would not only be unwise but reckless to allow the tribunal uninstructed and
inexperienced with the intricacies of drugs cases to hear and decide violations of RA 9165 solely on account of
the pay scale of the accused.

Likewise of special significance is the proviso introduced by RA 10660 which, to reiterate for emphasis, states:

Provided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information: (a) does
not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to the government or bribery
arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos
(₱l,000,000.00).

The clear import of the new paragraph introduced by RA 10660 is to streamline the cases handled by the
Sandiganbayan by delegating to the RTCs some cases involving high-ranking public officials. With the dissents'
proposition, opening the Sandiganbayan to the influx of drug-related cases, RA 10660 which was intended to
unclog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan would all be for naught. Hence, sustaining the RTC's jurisdiction over
drug-related cases despite the accused's high-ranking position, as in this case, is all the more proper.

Even granting arguendo that the Court declares the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the information subject
of Criminal Case No. 17-165, still it will not automatically result in the release from detention and restore the
liberty and freedom of petitioner. The R TC has several options if it dismisses the criminal case based on the
grounds raised by petitioner in her Motion to Quash.

Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has three (3) possible alternative actions when confronted
with a Motion to Quash:

1. Order the amendment of the Infonnation;

2. Sustain the Motion to Quash; or

3. Deny the Motion to Quash.

The first two options are available to the trial court where the motion to quash is meritorious. Specifically, as to
the first option, this court had held that should the Information be deficient or lacking in any material allegation,
the trial court can order the amendment of the Information under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
which states:

SECTION 4. Amendment of Complaint or Information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by
the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution
fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.

The failure of the trial court to order the correction of a defect in the Information curable by an amendment
amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power. So, this Court held in Dio v. People:

This Court has held that failure to provide the prosecution with the opportunity to amend is an arbitrary exercise
of power. In People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division): When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity
and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to
quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of
an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment. In such
instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the
prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed
without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on
technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule. As explained by
this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's
refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted
under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails
the State's right to due process.112

Notably, the defect involved in Dio was the Information's failure to establish the venue - a matter of jurisdiction
in criminal cases. Thus, in the case at bar where petitioner has not yet been arraigned, the court a quo has the
power to order the amendment of the February 17, 2017 Information filed against the petitioner. This power to
order the amendment is not reposed with this Court in the exercise of its certiorari powers.

Nevertheless, should the trial court sustain the motion by actually ordering the quashal of the Infonnation, the
prosecution is not precluded from filing another information. An order sustaining the motion to quash the
information would neither bar another prosecution113 or require the release of the accused from custody.
Instead, under Section 5, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the trial court can simply order that another complaint
or information be filed without discharging the accused from custody. Section 5, Rule 117 states, thus:

Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. - If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order
that another complaint or information be filed except as provided in Section 6 of this rule. If the order is made,
the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been
made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or within such further time as the court
may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody for another
charge.

Section 6, Rule 117, adverted to in the foregoing provision, prevents the re-filing of an information on only two
grounds: that the criminal action or liability has already been extinguished, and that of double jeopardy. Neither
was invoked in petitioner's Motion to Quash filed before the court a quo.

The third option available to the trial court is the denial of the motion to quash. Even granting, for the nonce,
the petitioner's position that the trial court's issuance of the warrant for her arrest is an implied denial of her
Motion to Quash, the proper remedy against this court action is to proceed to trial, not to file the present
petition for certiorari. This Court in Galzote v. Briones reiterated this established doctrine:

A preliminary consideration in this case relates to the propriety of the chosen legal remedies availed of by the
petitioner in the lower courts to question the denial of his motion to quash. In the usual course of procedure, a
denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower court's decision of
conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an error
committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to
quash via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an
interlocutory order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper
subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate,
plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to
trial as discussed above.114 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At this juncture, it must be stressed yet again that the trial court has been denied the opportunity to act and rule
on petitioner's motion when the latter jumped the gun and prematurely repaired posthaste to this Court,
thereby immobilizing the trial court in its tracks. Verily, De Lima should have waited for the decision on her
motion to quash instead of prematurely filing the instant recourse.

In the light of the foregoing, the best course of action for the Court to take is to dismiss the petition and direct
the trial court to rule on the Motion to Quash and undertake all the necessary proceedings to expedite the
adjudication of the subject criminal case.

RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE TO ORDER THE
PETITIONER'S ARREST

The basis for petitioner's contention that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
February 23, 2017 Order115 finding probable cause to arrest the petitioner is two-pronged: respondent judge
should have first resolved the pending Motion to Quash before ordering the petitioner's arrest; and there is no
probable cause to justify the petitioner's arrest.

Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.116

In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion to Quash before
issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or jurisprudence to support the petitioner's
claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court117 required the respondent judge to evaluate the
prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days, viz.:

SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. -

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge
shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he
shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to
Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer and first attended to
the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to a possible administrative liability for failure
to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with
the provisions of the Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by a trial
court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea.118 What is more, it is in accord with this
Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller119that "[a]s the presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the
Information, to first and foremost determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused."

This Court's ruling in Miranda v. Tuliao 120does not support the petitioner's position. Miranda does not prevent
a trial court from ordering the arrest of an accused even pending a motion to quash the infonnation. At most, it
simply explains that an accused can seek judicial relief even if he has not yet been taken in the custody of law.

Undoubtedly, contrary to petitioner's postulation, there is no rule or basic principle requiring a trial judge to first
resolve a motion to quash, whether grounded on lack of jurisdiction or not, before issuing a warrant of arrest. As
such, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed February 23, 2017 Order
even before resolving petitioner's Motion to Quash. There is certainly no indication that respondent judge
deviated from the usual procedure in finding probable cause to issue the petitioner's arrest.

And yet, petitioner further contends that the language of the February 23, 2017 Order violated her constitutional
rights and is contrary to the doctrine in Soliven v. Makasiar. 121Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed
to personally determine the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the
assailed Order, respondent judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.122 This hardly
deserves serious consideration.

Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before a warrant of arrest
may issue. The Constitution123 and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure124 command the judge "to refrain
from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutor's findings and to conduct his own examination of the
facts and circumstances presented by both parties. "125 This much is clear from this Court's n1ling in Soliven
cited by the petitioner, viz.:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.126

It must be emphasized, however, that in determining the probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against
the petitioner, respondent judge evaluated the Information and "all the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation conducted in this case." The assailed February 23, 2017 Order is here restated for easy
reference and provides, thusly:

After a careful evaluation of the herein Information and all the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation conducted in this case by the Department of Justice, Manila, the Court finds sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of Warrants of Arrest against all the accused LEILA M. DE LIMA x x x.127 (Emphasis
supplied.)

As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation, this Court cannot consider the respondent judge to have evaded her duty or refused to perform
her obligation to satisfy herself that substantial basis exists for the petitioner's arrest. "All the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation" encompasses a broader category than the "supporting
evidence" required to be evaluated in Soliven. It may perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed
her duty in a manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the evidence,
not just the supporting documents. At the very least, she certainly discharged a judge's duty in finding probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant, as described in Ho v. People:

The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again
what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, 'must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed
and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof' At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge
is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient
that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon we stressed that
the judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need
not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial determination finding
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."

xxxx

x x x [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial.
However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or non-existence) of
probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.
Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by
forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so
much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate
judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any)
upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the
prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable
cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty
if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.128 (Emphasis supplied.)

Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is tasked to
merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused.129 She is given wide latitude of
discretion in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.130 A finding of probable
cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction.131 It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.132

Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the
petitioner. This is not surprising given that the only evidence available on record are those provided by the
complainants and the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this.
Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors relative to the
allegations in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-165:

Thus, from November 2012 to March 2013, De Lima[,] Ragos and Dayan should be indicted for violation of
Section 5, in relation to Section 3Gj), Section 26(b) and Section 28, of R.A. 9165, owing to the delivery of PS
million in two (2) occasions, on 24 November 2012 and 15 December 2012, to Dayan and De Lima. The monies
came inmate Peter Co [were] proceeds from illicit drug trade, which were given to support the senatorial bid of
De Lima.

Also in the same period, Dayan demanded from Ragos money to support the senatorial bid of De Lima. Ragos
demanded and received ₱100,000 tara from each of the high-profile inmates in exchange for privileges,
including their illicit drug trade. Ablen collected the money for Ragos who, in turn, delivered them to Dayan at
De Lima's residence.133

The foregoing findings of the DOJ find support in the affidavits and testimonies of several persons. For instance,
in his Affidavit dated September 3, 2016, NBI agent Jovencio P. Ablen, Jr. narrated, viz.:

21. On the morning of 24 November 2012, I received a call from Dep. Dir. Ragos asking where I was. I told him I
was at home. He replied that he will fetch me to accompany him on a very important task.

22. Approximately an hour later, he arrived at my house. I boarded his vehicle, a Hyundai Tucson, with plate no.
RGU910. He then told me that he will deliver something to the then Secretary of Justice, Sen. Leila De Lima. He
continued and said "Nior confidential 'to. Tayong dalawa lang ang nakakaalam nito. Dadalhin natin yung quota
kay Lola. SM 'yang nasa bag. Tingnan mo."

23. The black bag he was referring to was in front of my feet. It [was a] black handbag. When I opened the bag, I
saw bundles of One Thousand Peso bills.1âwphi1

24. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, we arrived at the house located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive,
South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

25. Dep. Dir. Ragos parked his vehicle in front of the house. We both alighted the vehicle but he told me to stay.
He then proceeded to the house.

26. From our parked vehicle, I saw Mr. Ronnie Dayan open the gate. Dep. Dir. Ragos then handed the black
handbag containing bundles of one thousand peso bills to Mr. Dayan.

27. At that time, I also saw the then DOJ Sec. De Lima at the main door of the house. She was wearing plain
clothes which is commonly known referred to as "duster."

28. The house was elevated from the road and the fence was not high that is why I was able to clearly see the
person at the main door, that is, Sen. De Lima.

29. When Dep. Dir. Ragos and Mr. Dayan reached the main door, I saw Mr. Dayan hand the black handbag to
Sen. De Lima, which she received. The three of them then entered the house.

30. After about thirty (30) minutes, Dep. Dir. Ragos went out of the house. He no longer has the black handbag
with him.

31. We then drove to the BuCor Director's Quarters in Muntinlupa City. While cruising, Dep. Dir. Ragos told me
"Nior 'wag kang maingay kahit kanino at wala kang nakita ha," to which I replied "Sabi mo e. e di wala akong
nakita."

32. On the morning of 15 December 2012, Dep. Dir. Ragos again fetched me from my house and we proceeded
to the same house located at Laguna Bay comer Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City.

33. That time, I saw a plastic bag in front of my feet. I asked Dep. Dir. Ragos "Quota na naman Sir?" Dep. Dir.
Ragos replied "Ano pa nga ba, 'tang ina sila lang meron. "134

Petitioner's co-accused, Rafael Ragos, recounted in his own Affidavit dated September 26, 2016 a similar
scenario:

8. One morning on the latter part of November 2012, I saw a black handbag containing a huge sum of money
on my bed inside the Director's Quarters of the BuCor. I looked inside the black handbag and saw that it
contains bundles of one thousand peso bills.

9. I then received a call asking me to deliver the black handbag to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. The caller said the black
handbag came from Peter Co and it contains "Limang Manoi<' which means Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) as a "manoR' refers to One Million Pesos (Php 1,000,000.00) in the vernacular inside the New
Bilibid Prison.

10. As I personally know Mr. Dayan and knows that he stays in the house of the then DOJ Sec. Leila M. De Lima
located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, I knew I had to deliver the
black handbag to Sen. De Lima at the said address.

11. Before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address, I called Mr. Ablen to
accompany me in delivering the money. I told him we were going to do an important task.

12. Mr. Ablen agreed to accompany me so I fetched him from his house and we proceeded to the house of Sen.
De Lima at the above-mentioned address.

13. While we were in the car, I told Mr. Ablen that the important task we will do is deliver Five Million Pesos
(Php5,000,000.00) "Quota" to Sen. De Lima. I also told him that the money was in the black handbag that was
on the floor of the passenger seat (in front of him) and he could check it, to which Mr. Ablen complied.

14. Before noon, we arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima located at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South
Bay Village, Paranaque City.

15. I parked my vehicle in front of the house. Both Mr. Ablen and I alighted from the vehicle but I went to the
gate alone carrying the black handbag containing the Five Million Pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

16. At the gate, Mr. Ronnie Dayan greeted me and opened the gate for me. I then handed the handbag
containing the money to Mr. Dayan.

17. We then proceeded to the main door of the house where Sen. De Lima was waiting for us. At the main door,
Mr. Dayan handed the black handbag to Sen. De Lima, who received the same. We then entered the house.

18. About thirty minutes after, I went out of the house and proceeded to my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa
City.

19. One morning in the middle part of December 2012, I received a call to again deliver the plastic bag
containing money from Peter Co to Mr. Ronnie Dayan. This time the money was packed in a plastic bag left on
my bed inside my quarters at the BuCor, Muntinlupa City. From the outside of the bag, I could easily perceive
that it contains money because the bag is translucent.

20. Just like before, I fetched Mr. Ablen from his house before proceeding to the house of Sen. De Lima located
at Laguna Bay corner Subic Bay Drive, South Bay Village, Paranaque City, where I know I could find Mr. Dayan.

21. In the car, Mr. Ablen asked me if we are going to deliver "quota." I answered yes.

22. We arrived at the house of Sen. De Lima at the above[-]mentioned address at noontime. I again parked in
front of the house.

23. I carried the plastic bag containing money to the house. At the gate, I was greeted by Mr. Ronnie Dayan. At
that point, I handed the bag to Mr. Dayan. He received the bag and we proceeded inside the house.135

The source of the monies delivered to petitioner De Lima was expressly bared by several felons incarcerated
inside the NBP. Among them is Peter Co, who testified in the following manner:

6. Noong huling bahagi ng 2012, sinabi sa akin ni Hans Tanna nanghihingi ng kontribusyon sa mga Chinese sa
Maximum Security Compound ng NBP si dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa
senado sa 2013 Elections. Dalawang beses akong nagbigay ng tig-P5 Million para tugunan ang hiling ni Sen. De
Lima, na dating DOJ Secretary;

7. Binigay ko ang mga halagang ito kay Hans Tan para maibigay kay Sen. Leila De Lima na dating DOJ
Secretary. Sa parehong pagkakataon, sinabihan na lang ako ni Hans Tan na naibigay na ang pera kay Ronnie
Dayan na siyang tumatanggap ng pera para kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima Sinabi rin ni Hans Tanna ang
nagdeliver ng pera ay si dating OIC ng BuCor na si Rafael Ragos.

8. Sa kabuuan, nakapagbigay ang mga Chinese sa loob ng Maximum ng PIO Million sa mga huling bahagi ng
taong 2012 kay dating DOJ Sec. De Lima para sa kanyang planong pagtakbo sa senado sa 2013 Elections. Ang
mga perang ito ay mula sa pinagbentahan ng illegal na droga.136

All these, at least preliminarily, outline a case for illegal drug trading committed in conspiracy by the petitioner
and her co-accused. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the allegation that respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order for petitioner's arrest.

Petitioner would later confine herself to the contention that the prosecution's evidence is inadmissible, provided
as they were by petitioner's co-accused who are convicted felons and whose testimonies are but hearsay
evidence.

Nowhere in Ramos v. Sandiganbayan 137 - the case relied upon by petitioner - did this Court rule that
testimonies given by a co-accused are of no value. The Court simply held that said testimonies should be
received with great caution, but not that they would not be considered. The testimony of Ramos' co-accused
was, in fact, admitted in the cited case. Furthermore, this Court explicitly ruled in Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman138that hearsay evidence is admissible during preliminary investigation. The Court held thusly:

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.139 (Emphasis supplied.)

Verily, the admissibility of evidence,140 their evidentiary weight, probative value, and the credibility of the
witness are matters that are best left to be resolved in a full-blown trial,141 not during a preliminary investigation
where the technical rules of evidence are not applied142 nor at the stage of the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Thus, the better alternative is to proceed to the conduct of trial on
the merits for the petitioner and the prosecution to present their respective evidence in support of their
allegations.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the provisional reliefs prayed for, as a consequence, have to be rejected.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed with dispatch with Criminal Case N6.17-165.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her
capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE,
INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART
PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87948.

The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes
for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime
Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care
Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the
taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code
of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under
Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of
their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under
protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint
denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax,
Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"

which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the
amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21
thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines
under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further
averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already
been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.2

In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15,
2004 Orders of the RTC.6

In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents'
complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to

o
its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

RTC
tr
CA
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
lb CA itshould beto CTA
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners, their agents and/or authorized
representatives from implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against
private respondents.

III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private respondents to make a written claim for
tax credit or refund with the City Treasurer of Manila.

IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are
mere collecting agents of the City Government.

V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result
to greater damage and prejudice thereof. (sic)8

Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for being
moot and academic.

Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a Decision9 in the main case
had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code
of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following amounts:

To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02

To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34
TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein
plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.10
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had already become final
and executory per the Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ
of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that
the issues raised in the present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued
by the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its decision on the
merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision is now final and
executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.13

In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its
significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled principle that courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.14

However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise
address a procedural error which petitioners committed.

Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed with the said
court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of
the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases
where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in
the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.15

Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.17

Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial
justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1)
if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on
certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation
of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the
significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat
the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The basic question
posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said
court jurisdiction over the following:

(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in
relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Customs; and

(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the assessment and taxation
of real property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative
thereto.

On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by
expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides thus:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;

4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto,
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs;

5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals;

6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;

7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article,
and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and
countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard
measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose
said duties.

b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue
Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau
of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the principal
amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by the regular Courts and the
jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability for taxes
and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding
by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action will be recognized.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.

2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:

a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases
originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.19

A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by

0
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as
well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence
of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v.
COMELEC,23 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25
this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that
there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be observed, however, that with the
exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that the
special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the
Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of
their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA
includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the
CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if
not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should
only be considered as partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al.29 that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said
court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a
court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De
Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer.

If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA,
this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over
basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.35 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering
that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such
power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private
I
I
 I
I
respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking
nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To
rule otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while
another court rules on an incident in the very same case.

Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial abhorrence to split
jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local tax case filed with the
RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the
RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It
is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate
jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete
supervision over the acts of the latter.36

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively,
to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder
effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when
necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its
rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37

Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have
powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as
powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of
practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all
the inherent powers of a court of justice.

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and
functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and
render it effective in behalf of the litigants.38

Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."39 Hence,
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within
the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of
its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.40

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take
cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is
included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial
tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This
doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015

CE CASECNAN WATER and ENERGY COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
THE PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, THEOFFICEOFTHEPROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF NUEVA ECIJA, and
THEOFFICEOFTHEPROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NUEVA ECIJA, as represented by HON. AURELIO UMALI,
HON. FLORANTE FAJARDO and HON. EDILBERTO PANCHO, respectively, or their lawful successors,
Respondents,
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, As Necessary Parties.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a local tax case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the November 2, 2010 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-GR SP No. 108441 which dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the Petition for Certiorari of petitioner CE
Casecnan Water and Energy Company, Inc.(petitioner) against the Province of Nueva Ecija, the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Assessor) and the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Nueva Ecija (Office of the Provincial Treasurer) (respondents). Also assailed is the March 24, 2011 Resolution3 of
the CA denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

Factual Antecedents

On June 26, 1995, petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered into a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) contract known as the "Amended and Restated Casecnan Project Agreement"5 (Casecnan
Contract) relative to the construction and development of the Casecnan Multi-Purpose Irrigation and Power
Project (Casecnan Project) in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija and Alfonso Castaneda, Nueva Vizcaya. The Casecnan
Project is a combined irrigation and hydroelectric power generation facility using the Pantabangan Dam in
Nueva Ecija. On September 29, 2003, petitioner and NIA executed a Supplemental Agreement6 amending
Article II of the Casecnan Contract which pertains to payment of taxes. Article 2.2 thereof states that NIA must
reimburse petitioner for real property taxes (RPT) provided the same was paid upon NIA’s directive and with the
concurrence of the Department of Finance.

On September 6, 2005, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor a Notice of Assessment of
Real Property dated August 2, 2005, which indicates that for the years 2002 to 2005, its RPT due was
248,676,349.60. Petitioner assailed the assessment with the Nueva Ecija Local Board of Assessment Appeals
(Nueva Ecija LBAA) which dismissed it on January 26, 2006. Undeterred, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with
the Nueva Ecija Central Board of Assessment Appeals (Nueva Ecija CBAA). During the pendency thereof,
respondents collected from petitioner the RPT due under the said assessment as well as those pertaining to the
years 2006 up to the second quarter of 2008, totalling ₱363,703,606.88. Petitioner paid the assessed RPT under
protest; it also initiated proceedings questioning the validity of the collection with respect to the years 2006 up
to the second quarter of 2008. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter7 dated July 9, 2008 from the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer stating that it has RPT in arrears for the years 2002 up to the second quarter of 2008
amounting to ₱1,277,474,342.10. Petitioner received another letter8 dated August 29, 2008 from the same
office clarifying that its arrearages in RPT actually amounted to ₱1,279,997,722.70 (2008 RPT Reassessment).
Again, petitioner questioned this assessment through an appeal before the Nueva Ecija LBAA. While the same
was pending, petitioner received from respondents a letter dated September 10, 2008 demanding payment for
its alleged RPT arrearages.

Hence, on September 23, 2008, petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija a Complaint9 for
injunction and damages with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction10
praying to restrain the collection of the 2008 RPT Reassessment. Petitioner emphasized, among others, that it
was not the one which should pay the taxes but NIA.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 24, 2008, the RTC denied petitioner’s application for a 72-hour TRO.11 Meanwhile, petitioner
received from the Office of the Provincial Treasurer a letter dated September 22, 2008 further demanding
payment for RPT covering the third quarter of 2008 (2008-3Q Assessment). Thus, petitioner filed on September
29, 2008 an Amended Complaint12 asking the RTC to likewise enjoin respondents from collecting RPT based on
the 2008-3Q Assessment in the amount of ₱53,346,755.18.

On October 2, 2008, the RTC issued a 20-day TRO13 enjoining respondents from collecting from petitioner the
RPT covered by the 2008 RPT Reassessment amounting to ₱1,279,997,722.70, including surcharges and
penalties.

Subsequently, however, the RTC denied petitioner’s application for writ of preliminary injunction in its Order14
of October 24, 2008.It also denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof in an Order15 dated January
30, 2009.

On April 24, 2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari16 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to annul and set aside the aforementioned October 24, 2008 and January 30, 2009 RTC Orders.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its November 2, 2010 Decision,17 the CA observed that the Petition for Certiorari before it was actually an
offshoot of the 2008 RPT Reassessment. And since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the issue of the validity
of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against petitioner must also be resolved, thus jurisdiction over
the case lies within the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).Hence, the CA ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly,
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner sought reconsideration; however, it was denied in a Resolution19 dated March 24, 2011.

Undaunted, petitioner filed this Petition imputing upon the CA grave error in:

x x x ruling that it is the Court of Tax Appeals (and not the Court of Appeals) which has jurisdiction over the CA
Injunction Case.20

Petitioner’s Arguments

In its Petition21 and Reply,22 petitioner argues that it is the CA, not the CTA, which has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of its Petition for Certiorari. Petitioner maintains that its petition relates to an ordinary civil action
for injunction and not to a local tax case. It insists that in both the RTC injunction case and the Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, petitioner was not protesting respondents’ assessment of RPT against it; what it was
seeking was respondents’ enjoinment from committing or continuing to commit acts that would probably violate
its right. In particular, petitioner points out that the RTC injunction case was intended to enjoin respondents from
collecting payment during the pendency of the case with the LBAA challenging the validity of the 2008 RPT
Reassessment. Petitioner explains that the said injunction case was filed with the RTC because the LBAA has no
injunctive power.

Respondents’ Arguments

In their Comment,23 respondents argue that in resolving the issue on the propriety of issuing a writ of
injunction, the CA will have to inevitably pass upon the propriety of the assessment of RPT on the Casecnan
Project, a local tax matter which is within the jurisdiction of the CTA. Respondents also echo the CA
pronouncement that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to the assessment and
collection of RPT.

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the Petition.

O
It is the CTA which has the power to rule
on a Petition for Certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order of the RTC relating
to a local tax case.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy. It is conferred by law and
not by the consent or waiver upon a court. As such, if a court lacks jurisdiction over an action, it cannot decide
the case on the merits and must dismiss it.24

With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a collegiate court with
special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282.25 This expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.26
In the recent case of City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,27 the Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari or to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s
exclusive appellate jurisdiction, thus:

The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA
includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

Further, the Court in City of Manila, citing J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo,29 De Jesus v. Court of
Appeals,30 as well as the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Hon. Judge Geronimo31 and Bulilis v. Nuez,32
held that:

Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Jaramillo, et al. that ‘if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court
or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.’ This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that ‘a court
may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or
writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.’ The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo and Bulilis v. Nuez.

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law, jurisdiction is
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer.33 (Citations omitted)

Anent petitioner’s contention that it is the CA which has jurisdiction over a certiorari petition assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case, the Court had this to say: If this Court were to sustain
petitioners’ contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this Court would be
confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of
justice. The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role
of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the
Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for
tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an
absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on an incident in
the very same case.

xxxx
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively,
to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder
effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.34 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied) Given these, it is settled that
it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

The RTC injunction case is a local tax >case.

In maintaining that it is the CA that has jurisdiction over petitioner’s certiorari petition, the latter argues that the
injunction case it filed with the RTC is not a local tax case but an ordinary civil action. It insists that it is not
protesting the assessment of RPT against it but only prays that respondents be enjoined from collecting the
same.

The Court finds, however, that in praying to restrain the collection of RPT, petitioner also implicitly questions the
propriety of the assessment of such RPT.1awp++i1 This is because in ruling as to whether to restrain the
collection, the RTC must first necessarily rule on the propriety of the assessment. In other words, in filing an
action for injunction to restrain collection, petitioner was in effect also challenging the validity of the RPT
assessment. As aptly discussed by the CA:

x x x [T]he original action filed with the RTC is one for Injunction, with an application for Temporary Restraining
Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the province of Nueva Ecija from further collecting the
alleged real property tax liability assessed against it. Simply because the action is an application for injunctive
relief does not necessarily mean that it may no longer be considered as a local tax case. The subject matter and
the issues, not the name or designation of the remedy, should control. While an ancillary action for injunction
may not be a main case, the court [still has] to determine, even in a preliminary matter, the applicable tax laws,
rules and jurisprudence. x x x35

Moreover, in National Power Corporation v. Municipal Government of Navotas,36 as well as in City of Lapu-Lapu
v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,37 this Court already held that local tax cases include RPT.

No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case. And as earlier discussed, a certiorari petition
questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls under the jurisdiction of the CT A. Thus, the CA
correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 2, 2010 Decision and March 24, 2011 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.108441 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
G.R. No. 192463 July 13, 2015

OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. RASAD G BALINDONG, Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, 4th Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City,
Lanao del Sur and AMBOG PANGANDAMUAN and SIMBANATAO DIACA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of demolition seeking to annul the
Order1 dated November 9, 2009 of the Shari'a District Court (SDC), Fourth Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City,
issued in Civil Case No. 055-91, denying petitioners' motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, and the
Orders2 dated January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010 denying petitioners' first and second motions for
reconsideration, respectively.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On August 16, 1991, petitioners Omaira and Saripa Lomondot filed with the SDC, Marawi City, a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order
against respondents Ambog Pangandamun (Pangandamun) and Simbanatao Diaca (Diaca). Petitioners claimed
that they are the owners by succession of a parcel of land located at Bangon, Marawi City, consisting an area of
about 800 sq. meters; that respondent Pangandamun illegally entered and encroached 100 sq. meter of their
land, while respondent Diaca occupied 200 sq. meters, as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" submitted as
evidence. Respondents filed their Answer arguing that they are the owners of the land alleged to be illegally
occupied. Trial thereafter ensued.

On January 31, 2005, the SDC rendered a Decision,3 the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered as follows:

1. DECLARING plaintiffs owners of the 800 square meter land borrowed and turned over by BPI and described
in the complaint and Exhibits "A" and "K";

2. ORDERING defendants to VACATE the portions or areas they illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits "A"
and "K" and to REMOVE whatever improvements thereat introduced;

3. ORDERING defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs (a) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; (b) ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages; (C) ₱50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED4

Respondents filed an appeal5 with us and petitioners were required to file their Comment thereto. In a
Resolution6 dated March 28, 2007, we dismissed the petition for failure of respondents to sufficiently show that
a grave abuse of discretion was committed by the SDC as the decision was in accord with the facts and the
applicable law and jurisprudence. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on
September 17, 2007.7 The SDC Decision dated January 31, 2005 became final and executory on October 31,
2007 and an entry of judgment8 was subsequently made.
Petitioners filed a motion9 for issuance of a writ of execution with prayer for a writ of demolition.

On February 7, 2008, the SDC granted the motion10 for a writ of execution and the writ was issued with the
following fallo:

NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid judgment. If defendants
do not vacate the premises and remove the improvements, you must secure a special order of the court to
destroy, demolish or remove the improvements on the property. The total amount awarded to and demanded
by the prevailing party is ₱150,000.00 (damages, attorney's fees and the cost) which defendants must satisfy,
pursuant to Section 8 (d) and (e), Rule 39, Rules of Court.11

The Sheriff then sent a demand letter12 to respondents for their compliance.

On February 3, 2009, petitioners filed a Motion13 for the Issuance of a Writ of Demolition to implement the SDC
Decision dated January 31, 2005. The motion was set for hearing.

On March 4, 2009, the SDC issued an Order14 reading as follows:

The plaintiffs, the prevailing party, filed a Motion for Writ of Demolition and the motion was set for hearing on
February 16, 2009. On this date, the plaintiffs, without counsel, appeared. The defendants failed to appear.
Thus, the court issued an order submitting the motion for resolution. Resolution of the motion for issuance of a
Writ of Demolition should be held in abeyance. First, defendant Ambog Pangandamun has filed on February 6,
2009 an Urgent Manifestation praying deferment of the hearing on the motion for writ of execution. Second,
Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro filed on February 13, 2009 a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Postpone the
hearing set on February 16, 2009 to study the records of the case as the records are not yet in his possession.
Third, the recent periodic report dated January 26, 2009 of the Sheriff shows Sultan Alioden of Kabasaran is
negotiating the parties whereby the defendant Ambog Pangandamun will be made to pay the five (5)-meter
land of the plaintiffs encroached by him and that what remains to be ironed out is the fixing of the amount.

WHEREFORE, the resolution on the Motion for Writ of Demolition is HELD IN ABEYANCE. The Sheriff is
DIRECTED to exert efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table seeing to it that Sultan Alioden of
Kabasaran is involved in the negotiation. Atty. Saro is REQUIRED to file his comment on the motion for writ of
execution within fifteen (15) days from notice to guide the court in resolving the incident in the event the
negotiation fails.

SO ORDERED.15

On May 5, 2009, the SDC issued another Order16 which held in abeyance the resolution of the motion for
issuance of a writ of demolition and granted an ocular inspection or actual measurement of petitioners' 800-sq.-
meter land.

The SDC issued another Order17 dated May 14, 2009, which stated, among others, that: While the decision has
become final and executory and a Writ of Execution has been issued, there are instances when a Writ of
Execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening event that prevents the Sheriff to execute a Writ of
Execution.

The defendants claimed they have not encroached as they have already complied with the Writ of Execution and
their buildings are not within the area claimed by the plaintiffs. This to the Court is the supervening event, thus
the order granting the request of Atty. Jimmy Saro, counsel for the defendants, to conduct a survey to
determine whether there is encroachment or not. Thus, the Order dated May 5, 2009.

WHEREFORE, Engr. Hakim Laut Balt is hereby commissioned to conduct a survey of the 800 square meters
claimed by the plaintiffs. Said Eng. Balt is given a period of one (1) month from notice within which to conduct
the survey in the presence of the parties.18

On November 9, 2009, the SDC issued the assailed Order19 denying petitioners' motion for demolition. The
Order reads in full:

It was on February 3, 2009 that the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Demolition. The defendants
filed their comment thereto on March 24, 2009. They prayed that an ocular inspection and/or actual
measurement of the 800 square meter land of the plaintiffs be made which the court granted, in the greater
interest of justice, considering that defendants claimed to have complied with the writ of execution, hence there
is no more encroachment of plaintiffs’ land.

The intercession of concerned leaders to effect amicable settlement and the order to conduct a survey justified
the holding in abeyance of the resolution of the pending incident, motion for writ of demolition.

After attempts for settlement failed and after the commissioned Geodetic Engineer to conduct the needed
survey asked for relief, plaintiffs asked anew for a writ of demolition. Defendants opposed the grant of the
motion, alleging compliance with the writ of execution, and prayed for appointment of another Geodetic
Engineer to conduct a survey and actual measurement of plaintiffs' 800 square meter land.

At this point in time, the court cannot issue a special order to destroy, demolish or remove defendants' houses,
considering their claim that they no longer encroach any portion of plaintiffs’ land.

Gleaned from Engineer Hakim Laut Balt's Narrative Report, he could have conducted the required survey had
not the plaintiffs dictated him where to start the survey.

WHERFORE, the motion for issuance of a writ of demolition is DENIED. A survey is still the best way to find out if
indeed defendants' houses are within plaintiffs' 800 square meter land. Parties are, therefore, directed to choose
and submit to the court their preferred Geodetic Engineer to conduct the survey within ten (10) days from
notice.20

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which the SDC denied in an Order21 dated January 5, 2010
saying that the motion failed to state the timeliness of the filing of said motion and failed to comply with the
requirements of notice of hearing. Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was also denied in an Order22
dated February10, 2010. The SDC directed the parties to choose and submit their preferred Geodetic Engineer
to conduct the survey within 15 days from notice.

Undaunted, petitioners filed with the CA-Cagayan de Oro City a petition for certiorari assailing the Orders
issued by the SDC on November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010. In a Resolution23 dated April
27, 2010, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, saying, among others, that:

xxxx

In pursuing the creation of Shari'a Appellate Court, the Supreme Court En Banc even approved A.M. No.
99-4-06, otherwise known as Resolution Authorizing the Organization of the Shari'a Appellate Court.

However, the Shari'a Appellate Court has not yet been organized until the present. We, on our part, therefore,
cannot take cognizance of the instant case because it emanates from the Shari'a Courts, which is not among
those courts, bodies or tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of [Batas] Pambansa Bilang 129, as
amended over which We can exercise appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the instant Petition should be filed directly
with the Supreme Court.24 Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari assailing the SDC Orders, invoking
the following grounds:

RESPONDENT JUDGE, HONORABLE RASAD G. BALINDONG, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF DEMOLITION AFTERTHE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE COURT COULD
NOT BE IMPLEMENTED AND INSTEAD DIRECT THE CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY.

RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN MAKING IT APPEAR THAT HE
WAS IN COURT AT HIS SALA IN MARAWI CITY LAST JANUARY 28, 2010 WHEN THE PARTIES WERE PRESENT
AND HE WAS NOT THERE.25

uh CA hasappellatejurisdiction over Mc's decision

Preliminarily, we would deal with a procedural matter. Petitioners, after receipt of the SDC Order denying their
second motion for reconsideration of the Order denying their motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition,
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction in a Resolution
dated April 27, 2010 saying that, under RA 9054, it is the Shari’a Appellate Court (SAC) which shall exercise
jurisdiction over petition for certiorari; that, however, since SAC has not yet been organized, it cannot take
cognizance of the case as it emanates from the Shari’a Courts, which is not among those courts, bodies or
tribunals enumerated under Chapter 1, Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, over which it can
exercise appellate jurisdiction.

Under Republic Act No. 9054, An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, amending for the purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled, "An Act Providing for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as amended", the Shari'a Appellate Court shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts. In Villagracia v. Fifth (5th)
Shari’a District Court,26 we said:

x x x We call for the organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to effectively enforce
the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system – a legal system complete with its own
civil, criminal, commercial, political, international, and religious laws is part of the law of the land, and Shari’a
courts are part of the Philippine judicial system.

The Shari’a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all
cases tried in the Shari’a District Courts.1avvphi1 It shall also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. The decisions of the Shari’a Appellate Court shall be final and executory, without prejudice to the
original and appellate jurisdiction of this court.27

and

In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong,28 we stated that:

x x x [t]he Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two
Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals
or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to
be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.29

SPECIAL DIVISION ot
 Q
Notably, Tomawis case was decided on March 5, 2010, while the CA decision was rendered on April 27, 2010.
The CA's reason for dismissing the petition, i.e., the decision came from SDC which the CA has no appellate
jurisdiction is erroneous for failure to follow the Tomawis ruling. However, we need not remand the case, as we
have, on several occasions,30 passed upon and resolved petitions and cases emanating from Shari’a courts.

Petitioners contend that their land was specific and shown by the areas drawn in Exhibits "A" and "K" and by
oral and documentary evidence on record showing that respondents have occupied portions of their land, i.e.,
respondent Pangandamun's house encroached a 100 sq. meter portion, while respondent Diaca occupied 200
sq. meters; and that the SDC had rendered a decision ordering respondents to vacate the portions or areas they
had illegally encroached as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever improvements thereat
introduced. Such decision had already attained finality and a corresponding entry of judgment had been made
and a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners' claim that the SDC's order for a conduct of a survey to determine
whether respondents' land are within petitioners' 800-sq.-meter land would, in effect, be amending a final and
executory decision.

Only respondent Pangandamun filed his Comment, arguing that petitioners' motion for the issuance of a writ of
demolition has no factual and legal basis because his houses are clearly outside the 800-sq.-meter land of
petitioners; that his house had been constructed in 1964 within full view of the petitioners but none of them ever
questioned the same.

We find for the petitioners.

The SDC Decision dated January31, 2005 ordered respondents to vacate the portions or areas they had illegally
encroached as indicated in Exhibits "A" and "K" and to remove whatever improvements thereat introduced.
Thus, petitioners had established that they are recovering possession of 100 sq. meters of their land which was
occupied by respondent Pangandamun's house as indicated in Exhibit "K-1", and 200 sq. meter portion being
occupied by Diaca as indicated in Exhibit "K-2". Such decision had become final and executory after we
affirmed the same and an entry of judgment was made. Such decision can no longer be modified or amended.
In Dacanay v. Yrastorza, Sr.,31 we explained the concept of a final and executory judgment, thus:

Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. A final and executory judgment may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of factor law and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the
court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. It is grounded
on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, the
judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there will be no
end to litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law
and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.32

However, the SDC later found that while the decision has become final and executory and a writ of execution
has been issued, there are instances when a writ of execution cannot be enforced as when there is a supervening
event that prevents the sheriff to execute the writ of execution. It found that respondents' claim that their
buildings are not within the area claimed by petitioners is a supervening event and ordered a survey of the land,
hence, denied the motion for a writ of demolition.

We do not agree.

It is settled that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment, and one of which is a supervening event.
In Abrigo v. Flores,33 we said:

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and settled, or
substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible
or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and
executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the
parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.
In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of
execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and
the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily
establish the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive
effects of a final and immutable judgment.34 In this case, the matter of whether respondents' houses intruded
petitioners' land is the issue in the recovery of possession complaint filed by petitioners in the SDC which was
already ruled upon, thus cannot be considered a supervening event that would stay the execution of a final and
immutable judgment. To allow a survey as ordered by the SDC to determine whether respondents' houses are
within petitioners' land is tantamount to modifying a decision which had already attained finality.

We find that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for the issuance a
writ of demolition. The issuance of a special order of demolition would certainly be the necessary and logical
consequence of the execution of the final and immutable decision.35 Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court
provides:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. —

xxxx

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - when the property subject of the execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not
destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of
the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable
time fixed by the court.

Notably, this case was decided in 2005 and its execution has already been delayed for years now. It is almost
trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of law.36 A judgment, if left unexecuted,
would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 9, 2009, January 5, 2010 and February
10, 2010, of the Shari'a District Court, Fourth Shari'a Judicial District, Marawi City are hereby CANCELLED and
SET ASIDE. The Shari'a District Court is hereby ORDERED to ISSUE a writ of demolition to enforce its Decision
dated January 31, 2005 in Civil Case No. 055-91.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for whatever action he may
undertake in light of our pronouncement in the Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong case quoted earlier on the creation
of a Special Division to handle appeals or petitions from trial orders or decisions of the Shari' a District Court.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 193340

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial District,
Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B. ALOMPO,
Respondents.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines1 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests concurrent
jurisdiction upon Shari'a district courts over personal and real actions wherein the parties involved are Muslims,
except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The question presented is whether the Shari'a District
Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a
municipality whose mayor is a Muslim. The respondent judge held that it has. We reverse.

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint2 with the Shari'a District Court of
Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and
ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal,
Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an
agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the
construction of the municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition
upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership
of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid
the value of the land within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land
be returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss3 on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot
be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery
of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.

In its Order4 dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a Distric.t Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to

o
dismiss. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an action
involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." It
added that venue was properly laid because the Shari' a District Court has territorial jurisdiction over the
provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi and Iligan. Moreover, the
filing of a motion to dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts.5

The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari' a District Court. The
Shari' a District Court also ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within 10 days.6 The Municipality
of Tangkal timely filed its answer7 and raised as an affirmative defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.

Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to us via petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order8 (TRO). It reiterated its
arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the Shari' a District Court has no jurisdiction since one
party is a municipality which has no religious affiliation.

In their Comment,9 private respondents argue that under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the district court is a
prohibited pleading. Likewise, the Municpality of Tangkal' s motion to dismiss is disallowed by the rules. They
also echo the reasoning of the Shari' a District Court that since both the plaintiffs below and the mayor of
defendant municipality are Muslims, the Shari' a District Court has jurisdiction over the case.

In the meantime, we issued a TRO10 against the Shari'a District Court and its presiding judge, Rasad Balindong,
from holding any further proceedings in the case below.

II

In its petition, the Municipality of Tangkal acknowledges that generally, neither certiorari nor prohibition is an
available remedy to assail a court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss. But it cites one of the
exceptions to the rule, i.e., when the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify its remedial action. 11
In rebuttal, private respondents rely on the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari' a Courts which expressly
identifies a motion to dismiss and a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order issued by the court as prohibited pleadings.12

Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari' a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this
procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of
the complaint. As we held in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih:13

Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction
over the parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they
were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a
bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of
the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be
challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action. 14

Indeed, when it is apparent from the pleadings that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is
duty-bound to dismiss the case regardless of whether the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. 15 Thus, in
Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court, 16 we held that once it became apparent that the Shari'a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter because the defendant is not a Muslim, the court should have motu proprio
dismissed the case.17

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a
case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. Thus, as a
general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is
a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. 18 As exceptions, however, the
defendant may avail of a petition for certiorari if the ground raised in the motion to dismiss is lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant or over the subject matter, 19 or when the denial of the motion to dismiss is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 20
The reason why lack of jurisdiction as a ground for dismissal is treated differently from others is because of the
basic principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action21-to the extent that all proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction are void.22 We grant certiorari on this basis. As will be shown below, the Shari'a District Court's lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter is patent on the face of the complaint, and therefore, should have been
dismissed outright.

III

The matters over which Shari'a district courts have Jurisdiction are enumerated in the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, specifically in Article 143.23 Consistent with the purpose of the law to provide for an effective
administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws among Muslims,24 it has a catchall provision granting
Shari' a district courts original jurisdiction over personal and real actions except those for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer.25The Shari'a district courts' jurisdiction over these matters is concurrent with regular civil
courts, i.e., municipal trial courts and regional trial courts.26 There is, however, a limit to the general jurisdic;tion
of Shari'a district courts over matters ordinarily cognizable by regular courts: such jurisdiction may only be
invoked if both parties are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular
courts. 27
concurrent reg courtsExcept bothparties mustlee Muslim
y
The complaint below, which is a real action28 involving title to and possession of the land situated at Barangay
Banisilon, Tangkal, was filed by private respondents before the Shari' a District Court pursuant to the general
jurisdiction conferred by Article 143(2)(b). In determining whether the Shari' a District Court has jurisdiction over
the case, the threshold question is whether both parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private
respondents, as plaintiffs below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because
the mayor of the defendant municipality is also a Muslim.1âwphi1

When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein the parties involved are
Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court defines real parties in interest as those who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or are entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the parties who will be directly benefited or injured are the
private respondents, as real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as the real party defendant. In their
complaint, private respondents claim that their predecessor-in-interest, Macalabo, entered into an agreement
with the Municipality of Tangkal for the use of the land. Their cause of action is based on the Municipality of
Tangkal's alleged failure and refusal to return the land or pay for its reasonable value in accordance with the
agreement. Accordingly, they pray for the return of the land or the payment of reasonable rentals thereon. Thus,
a judgment in favor of private respondents, either allowing them to recover possession or entitling them to
rentals, would undoubtedly be beneficial to them; correlatively, it would be prejudicial to the Municipality of
Tangkal which would either be deprived possession of the land on which its municipal hall currently stands or be
required to allocate funds for payment of rent. Conversely, a judgment in favor of the Municipality of Tangkal
would effectively quiet its title over the land and defeat the claims of private respondents.

MAYOR representative airing

cap Batingolo was impleaded only in a
It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor
representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an action is defended by a
representative, that representative is not-and neither does he become-a real party in interest. The person
represented is deemed the real party in interest;29 the representative remains to be a third party to the
action.30 That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the
jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is
the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a
legal impossibility.
The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the oneness of God and the
Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam."31 Although the definition does not explicitly distinguish
between natural and juridical persons, it nonetheless connotes the exercise of religion, which is a fundamental
personal right. 32 The ability to testify to the "oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad" and to
profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are artificial beings with
"no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires."33 They are considered persons only by virtue
of legal fiction. The Municipality of Tangkal falls under this category. Under the Local Government Code, a
municipality is a body politic and corporate that exercises powers as a political subdivision of the national
government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. 34

Furthermore, as a government instrumentality, the Municipality of Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and
in ways that have primarily secular effects35-consistent with the non-establishment clause. 36 Hence, even if it is
assumed that juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is constitutionally
proscribed from adopting, much less exercising, any religion, including Islam.

The Shari' a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the
Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian."37 Yet it still proceeded to attribute the religious
affiliation of the mayor to the municipality. This is manifest error on the part of the Shari' a District Court. It is an
elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor,
sanggunian, and other officers composing it.38 And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced
on purely religious considerations-as the Shari' a District Court has done-without running afoul the inviolability of
the separation of Church and State enshrined in the Constitution. 39

In view of the foregoing, the Shari' a District Court had no jurisdiction under the law to decide private
respondents' complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Since it was clear from
the complaint that the real party defendant was the Municipality of Tangkal, the Shari'a District Court should
have simply applied the basic doctrine of separate juridical personality and motu proprio dismissed the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City in Civil
Case No. 201-09 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 201-09 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 198172

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Regulus Development, Inc. (petitioner) to
challenge the November 23, 2010 Decision1 and August 10, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 105290. CA Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. penned the rulings, concurred in by
Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Fiorito S. Macalino.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan Apartments) located at San Juan Street, Pasay City.
Antonio dela Cruz (respondent) leased two units (Unit 2002-A and Unit 2002-B) of the San Juan Apartments in
1993 and 1994. The contract of lease for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of one (1) month,
subject to automatic renewals, unless terminated by the petitioner upon written notice.

The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the lease of the two subject units. Due to the
respondent’s refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint3 for ejectment before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City, Manila, on May 1, 2001.

The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, and pay
the rentals due until the respondent actually complies.4

The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the
monthly rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive the rentals.

The RTC affirmed5 the decision of the MTC in toto and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent.

CA-G.R. SP No. 69504: Dismissal of Ejectment Case Meiji

In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA reversed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the
ejectment case.6 On March 19, 2003, the dismissal of the case became final and executory.7

Orders dated July 25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 for payment of rentals due under lease contracts

The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by the defendant-appellant as lessee)8 praying for
the withdrawal of the rentals consigned by the respondent with the RTC.

In an order dated July 25, 2003,9 the RTC granted the petitioner’s motion. The RTC explained that the effect of
the complaint’s dismissal would mean that there was no complaint filed at all. The petitioner, however, is
entitled to the amount of rentals for the use and occupation of the subject units, as provided in the executed
contracts of lease and on the basis of justice and equity.

The court denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration10 in an order dated November 28, 2003.11

On the petitioner’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution on December 18, 2003, to cause the enforcement
of its order dated July 25, 2003.12

CA-G.R. SP No. 81277: Affirmed RTC Orders

The respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA to assail the RTC Orders dated July
25, 2003 and November 28, 2003 (RTC orders), which granted the petitioner’s motion to withdraw funds.

The CA dismissed13 the petition and held that the assailed RTC Orders were issued pursuant to its equity
jurisdiction, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 39,14 and Rules 515 and 616 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court.
The respondent’s motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.

G.R. SP No. 171429: Affirmed CA Ruling on RTC Orders

The respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court to assail the decision of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81277. In a resolution dated June 7, 2006,17 we denied the petition for insufficiency in form and for
failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA.

Our resolution became final and executory and an entry of judgment18 was issued.

Execution of RTC Orders

The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to proceed
against the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing rentals for the leased properties from May
2001 to October 2001, and to withdraw the lease payments deposited by respondent from November 2001 until
August 2003.19 The RTC granted the motion.20

The RTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution21 dated April 26, 2007, allowing the withdrawal of the rental deposits
and the value of the supersedeas bond.

The petitioner claimed that the withdrawn deposits, supersedeas bond, and payments directly made by the
respondent to the petitioner, were insufficient to cover rentals due for the period of May 2001 to May 2004.
Hence, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion22 dated October 23, 2007, praying that the RTC levy
upon the respondent’s property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 136829 to satisfy the
judgment credit.

The RTC granted the petitioner’s motion in an order dated June 30, 2008.23 The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an order dated August 26, 2008.24

CA-G.R. SP No. 105290: Assailed the levy of the respondent’s property

On October 3, 2008, the respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 with application for issuance of
a temporary restraining order. The petition sought to nullify and set aside the orders of the RTC directing the
levy of the respondent’s real property. The CA dismissed the petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration26 dated November 3, 2008.

Pursuant to the order dated June 30, 2008, a public auction for the respondent’s property covered by TCT No.
136829 was held on November 4, 2008,27 where the petitioner was declared highest bidder. Subsequently, the
Certificate of Sale28 in favor of the petitioner was registered.

Meanwhile, on January 7, 2010, the respondent redeemed the property with the RTC Clerk of Court, paying the
equivalent of the petitioner’s bid price with legal interest. The petitioner filed a motion to release funds29 for
the release of the redemption price paid. The RTC granted30 the motion.

On February 12, 2010, the respondent filed a manifestation and motion31 before the CA to withdraw the
petition for the reason that the redemption of the property and release of the price paid rendered the petition
moot and academic.

Thereafter, the petitioner received the CA decision dated November 23, 2010, which reversed and set aside the
orders of the RTC directing the levy of the respondent’s property. The CA held that while the approval of the
petitioner’s motion to withdraw the consigned rentals and the posted supersedeas bond was within the RTC’s
jurisdiction, the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.

The CA explained that the approval of the levy on the respondent’s real property could not be considered as a
case pending appeal, because the decision of the MTC had already become final and executory. As such, the
matter of execution of the judgment lies with the MTC where the complaint for ejectment was originally filed
and presented.

The CA ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC for execution. The petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration which was denied32 by the CA.
ointment Cerry
NTCYogadffefontv
THE PETITION
NO JURISDICTION onb Hugo Mt
The petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
105290 which held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real property.

The petitioner argues: first, that the RTC’s release of the consigned rentals and levy were ordered in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction; second, that the respondent’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 was already moot and
O
academic with the conduct of the auction sale and redemption of the respondent’s real property; third, that the
petition in CAG. R. SP No. 105290 should have been dismissed outright for lack of signature under oath on the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.

The respondent duly filed its comment33 and refuted the petitioner’s arguments. On the first argument,
respondent merely reiterated the CA’s conclusion that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the levy on
respondent’s real property as it no longer falls under the allowed execution pending appeal. On the second
argument, the respondent contended that the levy on execution and sale at public auction were null and void,
hence the CA decision is not moot and academic. On the third argument, the respondent simply argued that it
was too late to raise the alleged formal defect as an issue.

THE ISSUE

The petitioner poses the core issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction to levy on the respondent’s real
property.

OUR RULING

We grant the petition.

Procedural issue: Lack of notarial seal on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping is not fatal to
the petition.

The petitioner alleged that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed since the notary public failed to
affix his seal on the attached Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.

We cannot uphold the petitioner’s argument.

The lack of notarial seal in the notarial certificate34 is a defect in a document that is required to be executed
under oath.

Nevertheless, a defect in the verification does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction, or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.35

Noncompliance or a defect in a certification against forum shopping, unlike in the case of a verification, is
generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless the covering Rule is relaxed on the
ground of "substantial compliance" or based on the presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons."36 Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not
however jurisdictional.37

In the present case, the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping were in fact submitted. An
examination of these documents shows that the notary public’s signature and stamp were duly affixed. Except
for the notarial seal, all the requirements for the verification and certification documents were complied with.

The rule is that courts should not be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The higher objective of procedural rules is to ensure that the substantive rights of the
parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.38

The CA correctly refused to dismiss and instead gave due course to the petition as it substantially complied with
the requirements on the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping.

An issue on jurisdiction prevents the petition from becoming "moot and academic."

The petitioner claims that the assailed CA petition should have been dismissed because the subsequent
redemption of the property by the respondent and the release of the price paid to the petitioner rendered the
case moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of
supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the resolution of the issue without any practical
use or value.39 Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness
except when, among others, the case is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.40

The CA found that there is an issue on whether the RTC had jurisdiction to issue the orders directing the levy of
the respondent’s property. The issue on jurisdiction is a justiciable controversy that prevented the assailed CA
petition from becoming moot and academic.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the
parties. "Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing
court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case."41

Even assuming that the case has been rendered moot due to the respondent’s redemption of the property, the
CA may still entertain the jurisdictional issue since it poses a situation capable of repetition yet evading judicial
review.

Under this perspective, the CA correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the petition.

Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC

The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.42

On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law
is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent
unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.43

The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the subject
units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 81277.
equity junic
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The
RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing more to
execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case
effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued
in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
levycinotbased inappellatebutequinjjurisd
equity vs appellatejurisdiction
This Court takes judicial notice44 that the validity of the RTC Orders has been upheld in a separate petition
before this Court, under G.R. SP No. 171429 entitled Antonio Dela Cruz v. Regulus Development, Inc.

The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with the MTC.

An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the respondent’s real property
shows that it was based on the RTC order dated July 25, 2003. The levy of the respondent’s property was issued
to satisfy the amounts due under the lease contracts, and not as a result of the decision in the ejectment case.

The CA erred when it concluded that the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction in the ejectment case when it
directed the levy of the respondent’s property.

Furthermore, the order to levy on the respondent’s real property was consistent with the first writ of execution
issued by the RTC on December 18, 2003, to implement the RTC orders. The writ of execution states that:

xxx In case of [sic] sufficient personal property of the defendant cannot be found whereof to satisfy the amount
of the said judgment, you are directed to levy [on] the real property of said defendant and to sell the same or so
much thereof in the manner provided by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment and to make return of your
proceedings together with this Writ within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. (emphasis supplied)

The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was merely a reiteration and an
enforcement of the original writ of execution issued.1âwphi1

Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question that needs to be resolved is which
court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the RTC orders.

The RTC, as the court of origin, has jurisdiction to order the levy of the respondent's real property.

Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1,45 Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court.
The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the court which issued these orders. The RTC is the
court with jurisdiction to order the execution of the issued RTC orders.

Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent's real
property before the RTC as the court of origin.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated November 23, 2010,
and the resolution dated August 10, 2011, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 105290 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated June 30, 2008, and August 26, 2008, of Branch 108 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent Antonio dela Cruz.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice